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RATIONALITY
IN THE POST-FOUNDATIONALIST AGE
7 - 25 July, 1997
Course Director: Mark A. Notturno (CEU)
Resource persons:
Joseph Agassi
(Tel Aviv)
András Benedek (Institute of Philosophy, Budapest)
Adam Chmielewski (University of Wroclaw)
Ian Jarvie (York University, Toronto)
Pavel Materna (Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague)
Western philosophers have traditionally
held that the rationality of a belief, theory, policy, or action depends
upon its justification. Those that can be justified were regarded as rational;
those that cannot were not. And `justification', in any event, meant showing
that the beliefs, theories, policies, or actions in question were `grounded'
upon indubitably true principles. But as a result of the logical and epistemological
investigations of the 20th century, this `foundationalist' view of rationality
has now led to a widespread ‘crisis of rationalit’. Many western philosophers
no longer believe that our beliefs, theories, policies, and actions can
be justified upon indubitable foundations. And some no longer believe that
they can be justified at all. Most western philosophers, in response to
this crisis, have adopted some form of what might be called `floating foundationalism'.
Simply put: they attempt to `ground' our beliefs, theories, policies, and
actions upon a `form of life', or `linguistic framework', or `scientific
paradigm', or `communal consensus' that is not regarded as indubitable
or unique; but which, nonetheless, is held to provide, and to limit, our
`authoritative horizons'. Others, following Karl Popper, have tried to
redefine rationality in terms of our ability to criticize our beliefs,
theories, policies, and actions instead of our ability to justify them.
Some philosophers regard these attempts as rational; others do not. But
everyone recognizes that our beliefs, theories, policies, and actions can
no longer be regarded as rational in the sense in which they once were.
The purpose of Rationality in the
Post-foundationalist Age is to study the options for restructuring
our understanding of rationality and the use of reason given the collapse
of tradtional foundationalism.
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