

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

PhD Course, four credits, Fall 2010

Instructor

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Classes

Tuesday 13:30-15:10 and Thursday 11:00-12:40

Office hours

Tuesdays and Thursdays 9:30-10:30 and by appointment

Credits

4 CEU credits, 8 ECTS credits

Course Description

This is a course on the fundamental political institutions of modern, primarily democratic, societies. The principal aim of the course is to familiarize students with cutting-edge research on the development and on the consequences of political institutions, and to discuss the fundamental normative and empirical regime-alternatives.

The course will

1. discuss the major theoretical frameworks of comparative government
2. investigate current institutional reforms
3. analyze the ways how institutions constrain behavior, both mechanically and psychologically, and how they endow actors with resources.

The course centers on the institutions related to preference-aggregation and government-building, and will treat the areas of policy-making and policy-implementation only marginally.

Course Requirements

No prior knowledge is assumed, although students with solid background in political

science are expected to benefit most from the course.

Students are expected to be present at all lectures and seminars. During the seminars they are expected to reflect critically on the mandatory readings listed below. If one is unable to attend the class, (s)he should signal this via e-mail to the lecturer. Activity in the classroom can be complemented with questions, suggestions and comments sent to the lecturer 24 hours prior to the meetings.

The course is organized into lectures and seminars. Typically the first meeting of the week is a lecture, while the second is a seminar. The mandatory literature must be read before the seminars. This format is, however, flexible, depending on the progress in the class and the character of specific topics.

Evaluation

- (1) One in-class presentations
- (2) One book review
- (3) Three position papers
- (4) Class activity
- (5) Final essay

The position papers should summarize the content of the readings for a particular week and comment them relying on previous readings and lectures. The student decides for which weeks she prepares a position paper (about. 800 words), but the paper must be sent by e-mail to the lecturer not later than 12 o'clock Wednesday. The presentations are also expected to be related to the topic of the week, but in this case complementing it by describing phenomena not analyzed by the texts in the reader. The topic of the presentations must be chosen during the first two weeks of the course, through a consultation with the lecturers. The book review (about 2500 words) should be written in a way that it could be published. The final essay (about 5000 words) may elaborate on the topic of one of the presentations.

The final grade is determined by the following proportion of partial grades:

- (1) Presentation 15%
- (2) Book review 15%
- (3) Position paper 20%
- (4) Class activity 20%
- (5) Final essay 30%

Learning Outcomes and their assessment

The overall grade will primarily indicate the ability of the students to comprehend the ways political institutions can shape the life of democracies and to analyze various institutional solutions as representatives of analytically distinct alternatives that maximize different social values. The learning outcomes of the doctoral program are supported and measured by the present course in the following ways: The ability to reflect on the intellectual tradition of the discipline is measured primarily by the book review. The ability to deploy effective oral presentation and discussion skills is assessed with the help of the presentation. The skills to analyze contemporary events in broader institutional, political and social context, to evaluate political institutions in a comparative perspective, to make policy-relevant conclusions and to

employ cutting-edge methods are reflected by the final essay. Finally, the seminar discussions (measured by the 'class activity' component of the final grade) will show how students can conduct a dialogue employing cross-national comparative perspectives.

Reading Material

All the course material is available in electronic form through a pass word protected e-learning site. Students who do not wish to purchase a paper reader are welcome to download the texts from <http://e-learning.ceu.hu/> . The password will be communicated to the enrolled students.

Course Outline

Week 1. Institutionalisms

In the first class we discuss the major theoretical frameworks that focus on the analysis of institutions. The intellectual status, fundamental functions, and basic mechanisms of institutions are discussed from the point of view of logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness. New institutionalism and historical institutionalism receive special attention.

Mandatory:

Pierson, Paul (2000): Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, no. 2, 251-267.

Aspinwall, Mark D. and Gerald Schneider (2000): Same Menu, Separate Tables: The Institutional Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 38, Number 1, 1-36

Recommended:

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (2006): Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”, In: R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman (eds) *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford: OUP, 3-22.

Hall, Peter A./Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996): Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, vol. 44, 4, pp. 936-957

Immergut, Ellen M. (1998): The theoretical core of the new institutionalism. *Politics & Society*, vol. 26, issue 1, pp. 5-34

March, James G./Olsen, Johan P. (1984): The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 78, pp. 734-749,

Peters, B. Guy (1998): *Institutional theory in political science: the new institutionalism*. London: Pinter Publishers

- Pierson, Paul and Skocpol, Theda (2002): Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science, in Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner (eds). *Political Science: State of the Discipline*. New York: W.W. Norton, 693-721.
- Patrikios, Stratos (2008): American Republican Religion? Disentangling the Causal Link Between Religion and Politics in the US. *Political Behavior* 30 (3), pp. 367-389.
- Sanders, Elisabeth (2006): Historical Institutionalism in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford University Press, pp. 476-494.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1994): *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: an Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*. London: Macmillan
- Thelen, Kathleen/Steinmo, Sven (1992): Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. In Steinmo, Sven/Thelen, Kathrin/Longstreth, Frank: *Structuring Politics Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-32

Week 2. The presidential-parliamentary dilemma

The presidential-parliamentary dichotomy is one of the most traditional and best known alternatives in institutional design. The class investigate the differences between the two regimes, the internal divisions and the relevance of this dilemma for democratic consolidation.

Mandatory:

- Cheibub, José Antonio (2001). Presidentialism and Democratic Performance. In Andrew Reynolds (ed.) *The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*. Oxford: OUP, 104-141.
- Elgie, Robert (2009). Duverger, Semi-presidentialism and the Supposed French Archetype, *West European Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 248–267.
- Albert, Richard (2009) The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, *American Journal of Comparative Law*, Volume 57, Issue 3 , 531-577.

Recommended:

- Elman, Miriam Fendius (2000) Unpacking democracy: Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and theories of democratic peace, *Security Studies*, 9: 4, 91-126
- Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach (1993). Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism. *World Politics*. vol. 46, no. 1, 1-22
- Lijphart, Arend, Ronald Rogowski, and R. Kent Weaver (1993). Separation of Powers and Cleavage Management in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (eds) *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*. Washington D. C; Brookings Institution, 302-344.

- Linz, Juan J. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter): 51-69. Reprinted in *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*, ed. by Arend Lijphart, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 118-27.
- Lijphart, Arend 1992. "Introduction." in *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*, ed. by Arend Lijphart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-27.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart 1997. "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy." *Comparative Politics* 30: 449-71.
- Holmes, Stephen 1993. "Superpresidentialism and its Problems." *East European Constitutional Review* 2-3: (Fall 1993 - Winter 1994): 123-6.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart eds. 1997. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1994): *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: an Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*. London: Macmillan
- Shugart, Matthew S. and John M. Carey 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Strom, Kaare 2000. "Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37: 261-89.
- Taras, Ray ed. 1997. *The Presidency in Post-Communist States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- von Mettenheim, Kurt ed. 1997. *Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Weaver, R. Kent, and Bert A. Rockman 1993. "When and How Do Institutions Matter?" in *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, ed. by Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 445-61.

Week 3. The majoritarian-consensual dilemma

Perhaps the most comprehensive typology of democracies has been produced by Arend Lijphart. The class analyzes his ideas, investigates the consociationalist roots of his model and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of consensual and majoritarian systems.

Mandatory:

- McGann, A. J. (2004). The Tyranny of the Supermajority How Majority Rule Protects Minorities, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 53-77
- Macedo, Stephen (2010). Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design, *Boston University Law Review* Volume 90 Number 2, 1029-1043.
- Lane, Jan-Erik and Svante Ersson (2000). *The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes*. London: Routledge, 207-224.

Recommended:

- Cohen, Frank S. (1997). Proportional versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 30, no. 5, 607–630.
- Lijphart, Arend (1999) *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty–Six Countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
- Powell, G. Bingham Jr (2000). *Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional visions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 20-46, 122-157.
- George Tsebelis (2002): *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Week 4. The direct-indirect dilemma. Normative debates and institutional alternatives.

Although an ancient dilemma, the opposition between direct popular control and representative politics is also a hotly debated current issue. The first week discussing this issue will focus on normative considerations. The class will weight the pros and cons from the point of view of the quality of democracy, individual and minority rights, and equality. Classic, liberal democratic institutional setups are contrasted with alternatives that aim for a higher degree of inclusion.

Mandatory:

- Matsusaka, John G. (2004). *For the Many or the Few. The Initiative, Public Policy, and American Democracy*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 113-145
- Setälä, Maija (1999). *Referendums and Democratic Government. Normative Theory and the Analysis of Institutions*. Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 69-107.
- Hobolt, Sara and Berthold Rittberger (2006). Direct Democracy and European Integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*. Vol. 13 Issue 1, p.153-166,

Recommended

- Elizabeth Garrett and Mathew D. McCubbins (2008). When Voters Make Laws. How Direct Democracy Is Shaping American Cities *Public Works Management & Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 39-61
- Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2003). Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance in Fung and Wright (eds) *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*. London and New York: Verso, 3-43.
- Haskell, John. (2001) *Direct Democracy or Representative Government? Dispelling the Populist Myth*. Westview Press., 85-146

Week 5. The direct-indirect dilemma. Transforming democracy

The second week dedicated to direct vs. indirect democracy focuses on actual, tangible institutional alternatives, innovations and reforms in this area. It also analyzes the question: do these reforms change the functioning of liberal democracies to the extent that new typologies need to be constructed.

Mandatory

Warren, Mark E. (2003). 'A Second Transformation of Democracy?', in Bruce Cain, Russell Dalton and Susan Scarrow (eds.) (2003). *Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.223-249.

Vatter, Adrian (2000). Consensus and direct democracy: Conceptual and empirical linkages. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 38, Number 2, 171-192.

Recommended:

Svensson, Palle (2007). Direct and Representative Democracy - Supplementing, not Excluding Each Other Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Helsinki, 7-12 May 2007

Papadopoulos, Yannis (2001): How Does Direct Democracy Matter? The Impact of Referendum Votes on Politics and Policy-Making, *West European Politics*, vol. 24, no. 2, 35-58.

George Tsebelis (2002): *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 116-135.

Adrian Vatter (2007). *Three Dimensions of Democracy? Lijphart's Typology and Direct Democracy A Cross-National Analysis of Forms of Government in 23 Advanced Democracies between 1997 and 2006*, paper presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Helsinki, Mai 7-12, 2007.

Week 6. Parties and Party Systems as Institutions

In the chain of representation parties occupy the most crucial position because they have an impact both on preference formation and on policy implementation. The class focuses on the question: to what extent individual parties and assemblies of parties can be treated as institutions.

Mandatory:

Janda, Kenneth, Jinyoung Kwak, and Julieta Suarez-Cao (2010): Party System Effects on Country Governance 1. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1-30.

Mair, Peter (2007): Party Systems and Alternation in Government, 1950-2000: Innovation and Institutionalization, in Siri Gloppen and Lise Rakner (eds.) *Globalisation and*

Democratisation: Challenges for Political Parties, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 135-154.
Panebianco, Angelo (1988): *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 49-68.

Recommended:

Siaroff, Alan (2000): *Comparative European Party Systems and Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections Since 1945*, New York: Garland Publishing, 69-80.

Herbert Kitschelt (2007). Party Systems. In Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (eds). *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 522-54.

Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambricht (2001). Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries. *Party Politics*. Vol. 7, No. 4: 437-68.

Week 7. Representation and Accountability

This week focuses on the conceptualization of political representation, delegation and accountability. The stability, transparency, and adaptability of representative linkages are assessed in the light of the current political developments. The class discusses whether accountability is the best yardstick for assessing the quality of democracy.

Mandatory:

Andeweg, Rudy B. and Jacques J. A. Thomassen (2005). Modes of Political Representation: Toward a New Typology. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30 (4): 507-528

Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins (2000). Representation or Abdication? How Citizens Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed, *European Journal of Political Research*, 37:3, 291-307.

Müller, Wolfgang C. (2000). Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 37, Number 3, 309-333.

Recommended:

Stokes, Susan C. (2001): *Mandates and democracy: neoliberalism by surprise in Latin America* New York: Cambridge University Press, 154-196.

Stokes, Susan C. (1999): What do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy in Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes eds. *Democracy, accountability, and representation*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 98-130.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr, (2000): *Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional visions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 159-231.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. (2007): Aggregating and Representing Political Preferences, in *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 653-678

- Strom, Kaare, Wolfgang. C. Müller, Torbjörn Bergman and Benjamin Nyblade (2003): Dimension of Citizen Control. In: Kaare Strom, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.) *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, 651-706.
- Mansbridge, Jane (2003): Rethinking Representation. *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515-528.
- Ferejohn, John (1999). Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131-153.
- Torbjörn Bergman (2000). The European Union as the Next Step of Delegation and Accountability, *European Journal of Political Research*, 37:3, 415-429.
- Manin, Bernard/Przeworski, Adam C./Stokes, Susan C. (1999): Introduction. In Przeworski, Adam C./Stokes, Susan C./Manin, Bernard: *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-26
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (2004): The ambiguous virtues of accountability. *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, issue 4, pp. 47-60
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (2007): Political accountability in 'real existing' democracies: meaning and mechanisms. unpublished manuscript, European University Institute
- Lupia, Arthur and Matthew McCubbins (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Voters Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 79-93.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Manin, Bernard 1997. *The Principles of Representative Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Week 8. Legislatures: oversight and structure

This class focuses on the internal structure and external links of legislatures and on the various roles representatives may fulfill. It investigates the legislatures' ability to control the executive. The logic of government formation is investigated from the point of view of the members of parliaments.

Mandatory:

- Saalfeld, Thomas (2000). Members of parliament and governments in western Europe: Agency relations and problems of oversight. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 37, Number 3, 353-376.
- Huber, John D. 1992. Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States , *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 3, 675-687
- Thomassen, Jacques JT, Peter PE Esaiasson (2006). Role Orientations of Members of Parliament. *Acta Politica*, Volume 41, Number 3, 217-231.

Recommended:

- Khmelko, Irina S., Vladimir A. Pigenko and Charles R. Wise 2007. Assessing Committee Roles in a Developing Legislature: The Case of the Ukrainian Parliament, *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, Volume 13, Issue 2, 210 - 234
- Martin, Lanny W., and Randolph T. Stevenson (2001): Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 33-50.
- Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996): *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 61-78, 147-174
- Siaroff, Alan (2003): Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 445-464
- Morgenstern, Scott (2003): Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 26-46, 85-114.
- Uslaner, Eric M and Thomas Zittel (2006): Comparative Legislative Behavior in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 455-473.
- Uhr, John (2006): Bicameralism in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* (Oxford University Press), 476-494.
- Carey, John M (2006): Legislative Organization. in R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 431-454.
- Urbinati, Nadia and Mark E. Warren, (2008). The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*; 2008, Vol. 11 Issue 1, p. 387-412,
- Rasch, Bjorn Erik (2002). Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe. In G. Loewenberg, P. Squire & R. D. Kiewit (Eds.), *Legislatures. Comparative Perspective on Representative Assemblies*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 269-287
- Laver, Michael (2007). Divided Parties, Divided Government, in G. Loewenberg, P. Squire & R. D. Kiewit (eds.), *Legislatures. Comparative Perspective on Representative Assemblies* (pp. 269-287). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 201-221.

Week 9. The Executive: institutions vs. networks vs. persons

This week is about the structure of government, the changing role of political leaders and the transformation of classical structures of government into complex networks of governance. .

Mandatory:

- Rhodes, R.A.W. (2003). What is New about Governance and Why Does it Matter? in Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (eds.) *Governing Europe*, Oxford: OUP, 61-73.
- Andeweg, Rudy B. (2000). Ministers as double agents. The delegation process between cabinet and ministers. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 37, Number 3, 377-395.
- Karvonen, Lauri (2009). *The Personalization of Politics. A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*. Colchester: The ECPR Press, 1-40, 65-84.

Recommended:

- Andeweg, Rudy (2003). On Studying Governments. In Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (eds.) *Governing Europe*, Oxford: OUP, 39-60.
- Goetz, Klaus H. (2003). Executives in Comparative Context in Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (eds.) *Governing Europe*, Oxford: OUP, 74-91.
- Poguntke, Thomas and Paul Webb 2007a. The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis. In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1-25
- Poguntke, Thomas and Paul Webb 2007b. The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence, Causes, and Consequences. In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 336-356.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo A. (1999): Horizontal accountability in new polyarchies. In Schedler, Andreas/Diamond, Larry/Plattner, Marc F.: *Institutionalizing Accountability*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 29-51
- Schedler, Andreas/Diamond, Larry/Plattner, Marc F. (eds.) (1999): *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Week 10. State and Interest Groups

This week focuses on the origins of state power, on the links between states and civil society, and on the organization of civil society. The normative and descriptive theories of corporatism and pluralism receive special attention.

Mandatory:

- Spruyt, Hendrik (2002). The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the modern State, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5, 127-49
- De Vries, Michiel S. (2000). The rise and fall of decentralization: A comparative analysis of arguments and practices in European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 38, Number 2 , 193-224
- Potters, Jan and Randolph Sloof (1996). Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence, *European Journal of Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 3, 403-442.

Recommended:

Evans, Peter (1997). The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization, *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 62-87

Stepan, Alfred (2001). Liberal-pluralist, Classic Marxist, and Organic-Statist Approaches to the State In: Alfred Stepan: *Arguing Comparative Politics*, Oxford: OUP, 39-72.

Alan Siaroff (1999). Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement, *European Journal of Political Research*, 36, 175–205

Week 11. Electoral systems and institutional engineering

The week has two, related topics: the possibilities and dangers of tinkering with institutional structures in general, and the politics of electoral systems. We will review the major alternatives of electoral rules and ask the question: what are the trade-offs involved in choosing a particular electoral system.

Mandatory:

Renwick, Alan (2010): *The Politics of Electoral Reform. Changing the Rules of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1-85.

Schmitter, Philippe C. & Trechsel, Alexander H. (eds.), (2004). *The Future of Democracy in Europe. Trends, Analyses and Reforms*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 93-130.

Recommended:

Katz Richard S. (2006). Electoral Reform in Italy: Expectations and Results. *Acta Politica*, 41, 285–299

Horowitz, Donald, R. (2002). Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes. In Andrew Reynolds (ed.), *The Architecture of Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 15-36

Lijphart, Arend (1993) Constitutional Choice for new Democracies In: Larry Diamond and Mac F. Plattner (eds.) *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 146-158

Quade, Quantin L. (1993). “PR and Democratic Statecraft. In: Larry Diamond and Mac F. Plattner (eds.) *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 165-170

Schmitter, Philippe C. (2001): Contrasting approaches to political engineering: constitutionalism and democratization. In Becker, Michael/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Pickel, Gert: *Rechtsstaat Und Demokratie*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 130-138

Sartori, Giovanni (1994): *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: an Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*. London: Macmillan

Blais, André and Louis Massicotte (1996): Electoral Systems. In Lawrence LeDuc,

- Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds.) *Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in a Global Perspective*. London: Sage Publications, 49–81.
- Mitchell, Paul (2000). Voters and their representatives: Electoral institutions and delegation in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 37, Number 3, 335-351.

Week 12. Institutional Performance and Veto Points

The last week examines institutional alternatives from the point of view of effectiveness, and the structure of decision-making mechanism. It considers the question whether it is possible to design indicators that represent the quality of democracy in a value-neutral way.

Mandatory:

- Roller Edeltraud 2005. *Performance of Democracies. Political Institutions and Public Policies*, Oxford: OUP, 76-138, 223-267

Recommended:

- George Tsebelis (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 289-325
- Levitsky, Steven and Murillo, María Victoria 2009. Variation in Institutional Strength. *Annual Review of Political Science*; 2009, Vol. 12 Issue 1, 115-133,
- Munck, Gerardo L./Verkuilen, Jay (2002): Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: evaluating alternative indices. *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 35, issue 1, pp. 5-33
- Coppedge, Michael/Reinicke, Wolfgang H. (1990): Measuring polyarchy. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 25, issue 1, pp. 51-72
- Elkins, Zachary (2000): Gradations of Democracy? Empirical tests of alternative conceptualizations. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44, issue 2, pp. 287-294
- Gastil, Raymond Duncan (1991): The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions. In Inkeles, Alex: *On Measuring Democracies: Its Consequences and Concomitants*. New Brunswick (New Jersey): pp. 21-46
- Marshall, Monty G./Gurr, Ted Robert/Davenport, Christian/Jagers, Keith (2002): Polity IV, 1800-1999. comments on Munck and Verkuilen. *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 35, issue 1, pp. 40-45
- McHenry, Dean E. Jr. (2000): Quantitative measures of democracy in Africa: an assessment. *Democratization*, vol. 7, issue 2, pp. 168-185
- Przeworski, Adam/Alvarez, Michael E./Cheibub, José Antonio/Limongi, Ferdinando (2000): *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13-55.