

Central European University  
Department of Political Science

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY  
EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

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Office Hours: TBA.  
Elective Course, 4 Credits  
Winter 2010/2011

### **Course objectives**

To what extent can policies foster human cooperation? What tools do recent developments in the cognitive and behavioural sciences provide to improve human sociality? Why is social cooperation difficult to secure? We will investigate the ways in which a deeper understanding of the cognitive foundations of social cooperation could inform policy-making.

In order to approach these questions, we will review recent work that investigates whether and how policy-making could be informed by the results of cognitive science, and whether policies could be ameliorated by taking cognitive theories into account.

There are, indeed, cognitive theories that may be relevant to policy-making. In particular, research in cognitive psychology and behavioural economics develop accounts of decision-making that are alternatives the classical homo economics model. The alternative, more empirically adequate, models open new avenues for thinking about which policies would foster individual decisions that are better for both the individual taking them and society.

Currently, the most popular defence for grounding policies on cognitive science is made by “liberal paternalists.” They claim that, in view of humans' cognitive limitations, which are revealed by psychologists and behavioural economists, the state can help people taking the right decisions without impinging on their freedom to choose. For instance, people tend to choose the default option even if it is not in their best interest; politicians should therefore pay attention to implementing policies where default options are the one that are in the best interest of the community.

The course is interdisciplinary: it draws on various fields of cognitive science and tries to understand the relevance of their findings to political science; it raises philosophical questions regarding the legitimacy of using scientific theories about human behaviour for policy-making.

### **Course Structure**

The course is organized into lectures and seminars. A lecture summarizes the main theoretical and empirical advances in each topic, and the seminar is devoted to the discussion

of the reading material. Students are also required to write an essay on a topic agreed with the lecturers.

### **Learning outcomes**

In this course, students will acquire knowledge about, and will reflect on:

- theories in cognitive science deemed to be relevant to political science; these mainly include experimental work on biases in decision-making.
- specific applications of policy-making informed by cognitive psychology/science, with an eventual focus on cooperative behaviour
- whether exploiting the theories of cognitive psychology for policy-making can be understood as beneficial or even acceptable, depending on one's ethical principles

At the more general level, the interdisciplinary nature of the course will lead student to familiarize with different methods and paradigms in the social sciences. Students will be asked to evaluate arguments and evidence, and to express their own ideas.

### **Requirements:**

- All students must read the core reading before the lectures and seminars. Students are expected to contribute to class discussion via weekly assignments, reaction papers, or presentations.
- Attendance is compulsory. You need at least 90% of attendance to submit your essays.
- There will be either a midterm exam, or a midterm paper. Registered students must also submit a 4,000 words essay at the end of the term.

Grades will be awarded as follows:

- Midterm paper/exam 30%, long essay 50%, presentation 10%, participation 10% (however, if you don't submit at least 90% of the assignments, your essay will not be marked).
- Essays are due on the date they are due! Extensions will be granted only in special circumstances. Late submissions will be penalised.
- Academic dishonesty/**plagiarism is a grave offence**, and it will not be taken lightly.
- You can use some of the seminar questions for your essays. Consult one of the lecturers early so you have time to do your research.

The essays must represent a significant piece of independent research; it can be a positive argument of your own, or a critical argument. They should provide succinct, clear statements of your positions and of arguments pro and con. Don't make claims without arguing strongly for them! Don't waste your time with straw men! Do not write a one-sided essay: be sure to evaluate the strongest arguments on both sides!

### **Weekly Program:**

Week 1: Policy making as designing choice architecture: the role of cognitive science

Week 2: Irrational choices: can we help it?

Week 3: Irrational choices and self-interest: Explaining Suicide Missions

Week 4: The evolution of cooperative behaviour – insights from game theory  
Week 5: Sociobiology: interacting organisms and fitness  
Week 6: Social cognition and cooperation  
Week 7: Moral cognition, moral intuitions  
Week 8: Media violence: A case study in Memetics, and Social Ecology  
Week 9: Social Learning and the cultural evolution of pro-social norms  
Week 10: Cooperation and reputation management  
Week 11: Ways to foster cooperative behaviour  
Week 12: Wrap-up discussion

### **Some relevant books**

Thaler, R. and C. Sunstein (2008) *Nudge* (Yale University Press)  
Ariely, Dan. (2008) *Predictably Irrational* (Harper Collins)  
Schmid, Allan. *Conflict and Cooperation: Institutional and Behavioural Economics*  
Elster, J. (1989) *The Cement of Society* (New York: Cambridge University Press).  
Hargreaves, S.P. and Varoufakis, Y (1995) *Game Theory: A Critical Introduction* (London: Routledge)  
Hay, C. (2002) *Political Analysis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).  
Sperber, D. (1996) *Explaining Culture: a naturalistic approach* (Oxford: Blackwell).

### **Week 1**

#### **Policy making as designing choice architecture: the role of cognitive science**

In this session, we will analyse the notion of choice architecture, as it is used by Thaler and Sunstein in their book *Nudge*. We will consider two issues:

- To which extent are politicians meant to design choice architectures?
- How could cognitive psychology and decision theory inform politics?

#### **Core reading:**

Chapters 1, 4 and 5 of Thaler, R. and C. Sunstein (2008) *Nudge* (Yale University Press)

#### **Supplementary reading:**

Economics Behaving Badly By GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN and PETER UBEL  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/15loewenstein.html?\\_r=2](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/15loewenstein.html?_r=2)

### **Week 2**

#### **Irrational choices: can we help it?**

This session will review cases of irrationality and questions why these cases are characterised as irrational and whether the so-called irrational choices should be avoided. We will then question whether this is possible and how.

#### **Core reading:**

Chapter 10 Thaler, R. and C. Sunstein (2008) *Nudge* (Yale University Press)  
Chapter 3 Ariely, Dan. (2008) *Predictably Irrational* (Harper Collins)

**Supplementary reading:**

Listen to Ariely's talk on Predictably Irrational

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhjUJTW2i1M>

Laurie Santos on Monkeynomics: <http://www.ted.com/talks/view/id/927>

Sen, Amartya K. 1977. "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6 (4):317–344.

**Week 3**

**Irrational choices and self-interest: Explaining Suicide Missions**

At first sight, suicide missions seem irrational. In this seminar we'll discuss some recent attempts to identify and explain this phenomenon.

**Questions:**

1. Why is it so hard to explain the phenomenon of suicide terrorism?
2. What is the role of terrorist organizations in the execution of suicide missions?
3. Is 'dying to kill' rational?
4. To what extent can religious or psychological factors explain the occurrence of suicide missions?

**Core reading:**

Atran, S. (2003) 'The Genesis of Suicide Terrorism', *Science* 299, pp.1534-39.

Elster, J. (2005) 'Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions', in D. Gambetta (ed) *Making Sense of Suicide Missions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.233-58.

Pape, R.A. (2003) 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism', *American Political Science Review* 97 (3), pp.343-61

**Supplementary reading:**

Atran's recent talk: <http://vimeo.com/11847595>

Bjorgo, T. (ed) (2005) *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward* (London: Routledge) (especially chapters by Ahmed and Merari).

Bloom, Mia (2005) *Dying To Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press), Ch.4 (pp.76-105)

Gambetta, D. (ed) (2005) *Making Sense of Suicide Missions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.259-99.

Hafez, M.M. (2006) *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press).

Margalit, A. (2003) 'The Suicide Bombers', *The New York Review of Books* 50(1), pp.1-8.  
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15979>

Moghadam, A. (2006) 'Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and Globalization of Martyrdom', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, pp.707-29.

- Moghadam, A. (2006) 'The Roots of Suicide Terrorism', in A. Pedahzur (ed) (2006) *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom* (London: Routledge), pp.81-107.
- Pape, R.A. (2006) *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House).
- Pedahzur, A (ed) (2006) *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, especially chapters by Moghadam (pp.13-24); Bloom (pp.25-53); and Hafez (pp.54-80)

## **Week 4**

### **The evolution of cooperative behaviour – insights from game theory**

It is, arguably, desirable that people cooperate among themselves. Game theory provides powerful ways to describe what is at stake, and why cooperation is not so easily obtained.

#### **Questions:**

1. What is a collective action problem?
2. What is the difference between coordination and cooperation? Is the latter ever rational?
3. To what extent is Game Theory useful to understand international relations? What about environmental problems?
4. Can evolutionary explanations tell us why cooperation evolved?

#### **Core reading:**

- Hardin, G. (1968) 'The Tragedy of the Commons', *Science*, 162, 3859, pp.1243-48.
- Hardin, G. 'Extensions of "The Tragedy of the Commons"', *Science*, 280, 5364 (1998), pp. 682-683.
- Skyrms, Brian. *The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure*, Cambridge University Press 2004. Chapter 2.

#### **Supplementary reading:**

- Axelrod, Robert (1984), *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books – selected chapters
- Axelrod, R. (1997) *The Complexity of Cooperation: agent-based models of competition and collaboration*(Princeton: Princeton University Press), Introduction and Ch.1, pp. 3-29.
- Binmore, K. *Fun and Games* (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Co, 1992)
- Binmore, Ken. 1994. *Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract I*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Binmore, Ken. 1998. *Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract II*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press
- Binmore, Ken. 2005. *Natural Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Binmore, Ken. 2006. "Why do people cooperate?" *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 5 (1): 81–96.
- Brams, S. (2000) 'Game theory: pitfalls and opportunities in applying it to international relations', *International Studies Perspectives*, 1(3), pp.221-232.
- Colman, A. (1999) *Game Theory and its Applications*, Ch. 5, 6, 7, 11, 12.

- Elster, J. (1989) *The Cement of Society*, (Cambridge: CUP), Introduction and conclusion.
- Gardiner, S. (2004) 'The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto Protocol', *Ethics and International Affairs* 18(1), pp.23-29.
- Gardiner, S. 'The Real Tragedy of the Commons', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30 (4), 2001, pp.387-416
- Gauthier, D. (1986) 'Persons, Peoples, Generations', in *Morals by Agreement* (Clarendon: Oxford), pp.268-305.
- Gauthier, D. (1986) *Morals by Agreement*, ch. 6, esp. pp. 158-70
- Hargreaves, S.P. and Varoufakis, Y. *Game Theory: A Critical Text* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*.
- Jaeger, C. et al. (1998) 'Decision Analysis and rational action', in S.Rayner and E.L.Malone (eds) *Human Choice and Climate Change Vol. 3* (Columbus: Battelle), pp.141-21
- Olson, C. (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Oström, E., Burger, J., Field, C.B., Norgaard, R.B., and Policansky, 'Revisiting the commons:local lessons, global challenges', *Science*, 284, 9 April 1999, pp.278-82
- Parson, E.A. and Ward, H (1998) 'Games and Simulations', in S.Rayner and E.L.Malone (eds) *Human Choice and Climate Change Vol. 3* (Columbus: Battelle), pp.105-140.
- Schelling, T. (1960) *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), Ch.1 'The retarded science of international strategy' (pp.3-20) and Ch. 10, 'Surprise attack and disarmament' (pp.230-54).
- Stone, R.W. (2001) 'The use and abuse of game theory in international relations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2), pp. 216-44.

## **Week 5**

### **Sociobiology: interacting organisms and fitness**

Sociobiology develops on the idea that we can explain why organisms behave the way they do by looking at the consequences of their behaviour on their fitness: how does a type of behaviour improve fitness in the environment where it evolved? Sociobiology applies this analysis to those behaviour that lead to coordination or cooperation. Furthermore, it hopes to be applicable to the analysis of human social interaction. This latter assumption has been highly controversial.

#### **Questions:**

1. Are humans maximizing their own fitness?
2. What is inclusive fitness and to which extent this notion could lead to an explanation of cooperative behaviour?
3. How could reciprocal altruism evolve?

#### **Core reading:**

- Dawkins, R. (1989) *The Selfish Gene (2nd edition)* (Oxford: OUP), Chapters 1-3 (but try and read as much as you can).
- Chapter 3 of Kevin N. Laland and Gillian Brown *Sense and Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behaviour*, Chapters on Hamilton and Trivers.

**Supplementary reading:**

Wilson, W. O. *Consilience*, (London: Abacus, 1998), Chapters 6-7.

**Week 6****Social cognition and cooperation**

An explanation of cooperative behaviour should be explained, according to psychology, on the basis of the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that produce the behaviour. What are these cognitive mechanisms and motivations and how have they evolved? In this session, we will learn about the answers given by cognitive and evolutionary psychologists

**Core Reading:**

Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby, 'Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange' in *The Adapted Mind*.

**Supplementary Reading:**

Some papers about social cognition to be determined.

Sober, Elliott and David Sloan Wilson. 1998. *Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, Ch 5

Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2001. The Adaptive Toolbox. In *Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox*, ed. Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten. Cambridge (MA) and London: MIT Press pp. 37–50

Tomasello, M. (2009). *Why We Cooperate*. MIT Press.

**Week 7****Moral cognition and moral intuitions**

Not only are humans endowed with cognitive means to behave socially, they are also able and willing to behave morally. Why is that so? Psychologists have made hypothesis about the cognitive foundations of moral behaviour.

**Seminar Questions:**

How/why do we follow social norms?

Can naturalism give an answer regarding what we ought to do?

**Core reading:**

Greene, J. 'The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul' in Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) *Moral Psychology, Volume 3*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).

Haidt, J. [The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail](#) (in *Psychological Review*, 2001)

Haidt, J. [The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology](#) (in *Science*, 2007)

Haidt's online talks:

[The moral foundations of political ideology](#) (at TED.com, 2008)

[The New Science of Morality](#) (Edge.org, 2010)

**Supplementary reading:**

- Alexander, J. *The Structural Evolution of Morality* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Berker, S. 'The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 37 (2009), 293-329
- Doris, J. M. 'Out of Character: On the Psychology of Excuses in the Criminal Law', in Hugh La Follette (ed.), *Ethics in Practice*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
- Doris, J. M. and Stich, S. P. 'As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics.' In F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
- Greene, J. and Haidt, J.. "How (and where) Does Moral Judgment Work?" *Trends in Cognitive Science* 6 (2002). 517-23.
- Kamm, F. 'Neuroscience and Moral Reasoning', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 37 (2009), 330-45.
- Haidt, J., Koller, S. and Dias, M.. 'Affect, Culture, and Morality, Or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65 (1993), 613-28.
- Haidt, J. *The Happiness Hypothesis*
- Hauser, M. *Moral Minds*, (London: Abacus, 2008), selected chapters.
- Hauser, M, Young, L and Cushman, F. 'Reviving Rawls's linguistic Analogy' in Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) *Moral Psychology, Volume 2*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
- Joyce, R. *The Evolution of Morality* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006). Rachels, J.. *Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
- Kelly, D and S. Stich 'Two Theories about the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality' in Carruther, P, Laurence, S. and Stich, S. *The Innate Mind: Volume III*, (Oxford: OUP, 2007).
- Sunstein, C. "Moral Heuristics." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 28 (2005), 531-42.
- Waal, Frans de. *Primates and philosophers: how morality evolved* , edited by S. Macedo and J. Ober, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

## **Week 8**

### **Automatic Behaviour and Social Ecology.**

Some scientists have claimed that people have a tendency to imitate behaviour without being aware of doing so.

We'll discuss how implicit social stereotypes are causally effective in human behaviour.

We'll consider that impact that these phenomena have for the social sciences. Debate will focus on the evidence for the theory that human behaviour is to a significant extent the result of imitation. We will question the problems and opportunities that imitative behaviour might give for politicians and society.

#### **Questions:**

1. What is imitation? What different types of imitation should be distinguished? What is the significance of imitation for the social sciences?
2. What is the Chameleon Effect?
3. What is the relevance of imitation for Social Sciences? Are there any normative consequences? Are stereotypes intrinsically problematic?

4. Can the problem of aversive racism explain certain patterns of social discrimination?
5. Is the idea of 'social ecology' sound? Is it useful, or too vague?
6. Considering some of the problems regarding stereotyping and imitation, is there any role for responsibility in the explanation of human behaviour? if so, how can it be fleshed out?

**Core Reading:**

- Bargh, J., and T. Chartrand 'The Unbearable Automaticity of Being', *American Psychologist*, 54, (1999), 462-79
- Anderson, C., Bushman, B. 'The Effects on Media Violence in Society', *Science*, 295 (2002), 237-238.
- Johnson, J. et. al. 'Television Viewing and Aggressive Behavior during Adolescence and Adulthood', *Science*, 295 (2002), 2468-71.

**Supplementary Reading:**

- Bargh, J., M. Chen, and L. Burrows 'Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects on Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71 (1996), 230-44.
- Berkowitz, L. (1993) *Aggression*, (London: McGraw Hill). part 3
- Chartrand, T., and J. Bargh 'The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior Link and Social Interaction', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76 (1999), 893-910.
- Cohen-Eliya, M., and Y. Hammer, 'Advertisement, Stereotypes and Freedom of Expression', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 35 (2004), 165-87.
- Devine, P., 'Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56 (1989), 5-18.
- Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J.A. (2001). The perception-behavior Expressway: Automatic effects of social perception on social behavior. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 33, 1-40
- Dovidio, J., N. Evans, and R. Tyler 'Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their Cognitive Representations', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 22 (1986), 22-37.
- Dovidio, J., and S. Gaertner 'Aversive Racism'. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 36 (2004), 1-52.
- Dovidio, J., K. Kawakami, et. al., 'On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 33 (1997), 510-40.
- Eldridge, J. 'What Effects Does the Treatment of Violence in the Mass Media Have on People's Conduct?' and Rowell Huesmann, L. 'Imitation and the Effects of Observing Media Violence on Behaviour' both in Hurley, S. and N. Chater (eds.) *Perspectives on Imitation*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press), 243-66.
- Gilbert, D. 'How Mental Systems Believe', *American Psychologist*, 46 (1991), 107-19.
- . 'The Assessment of Man: Representation and the Control of Belief', in Wegner, D., and J. Pennebaker (eds.) *Handbook of Mental Control* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993), 57-87.
- Gilbert, D., R. Tatarodi and P. Malone, 'You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65 (1993), 221-33.
- Hirschfeld, L., *Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child's Construction of Human Kinds* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

- Hurley, S. (2006) 'Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech', in Pockett, S., W. Banks, and S. Gallagher, (eds.) *Does Consciousness Cause Behavior* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 301-37.
- Hurley, S and N. Chater (eds.) *Perspectives on Imitation*, 2 volumes (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005).
- Moles, A., 'Autonomy, Free Speech and Automatic Behaviour', *Res Publica*, 13 (2007), 53-75.
- Pratto, F., and J. Bargh, 'Stereotyping Based on Apparently Individuating Information: Trait and Global Components of Sex Stereotypes Under Attention Overload', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 27 (1991), 26-47.
- Sugden, R. & R. Cubitt, 'The selection of preferences through imitation', *Review of Economic Studies* 65 (1998): 761-771
- Wilson, T. *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (New York: Belknap, 2002).
- Wheeler, S. C., W. Jarvis, and R. Petty, 'Think Unto Others: The Self-Destructive Impact of Negative Racial Stereotypes', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37 (2001), 173-80.
- Check out the abstracts of papers and posters at: [www.imitationconference.org](http://www.imitationconference.org) for an overview of work on imitation in the cognitive and social sciences.

### **Supplementary Reading on memetics:**

- Blackmore, S. (1999) *The Meme Machine* (Oxford, Oxford University Press) Chapters , 3, 4, 17, 18. Try and read as much as you can; it's easy and fun.
- Dennett, D. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (London: Penguin, 1995), Ch 12.
- Dawkins, R. (1989) *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford: OUP) Chapter on memes.
- Aunger, R. (ed) *Darwinizing Culture* (Oxford: OUP, 2000). A collection of essays for and against memetics.
- Distin, K. *The Selfish Meme* (Cambridge: CUP, 2004).
- Sterelny, Kim. 2006. "Memes Revisited." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 57(1):145–165.

## **Week 9**

### **Social learning and the cultural evolution of pro-social norms**

Moral norms vary across history and cultures; but some norms can be better at fostering cooperation than others. Moral behaviour can be said to result from both the biological evolution of pro-social cognition and preferences and the cultural evolution of pro-social norms. We will consider the theory according to which humans evolved conformity biases that enabled the cultural evolution of moral norms ... via group selection.

### **Core readings**

- Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2003. 'Origins of Human Cooperation'. *In Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation*, ed. Peter Hammerstein. Cambridge (MA) and London: M.I.T. Press pp. 429–443.
- Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., Ziker, J. (2010)

Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment. *Science*, 327, 1480-1484. [[Article PDF](#)]

Henrich, J. (2006) Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions. *Science*, 312: 60-61. [[PDF](#)]

Fehr, Ernst and Urs Fischbacher. 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation." *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 8(4):185–190

### **Supplementary readings**

Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. *Culture and the Evolutionary Process*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Henrich, J. and Henrich, N. *Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation*

## **Week 10**

### **Cooperative behaviour and reputation management**

In this session and the following one, we will review alternative models of the biological and cultural evolution of moral and cooperative behaviour.

In this session, we will continue to investigate the consequences of the market selection model of the evolution of cooperative behaviour and examine:

- The selective pressures for the evolution of reputation management mechanisms
- The social skills, learning mechanisms and preferences that form the psychological foundations of reputation management

### **Core reading**

Baumard, N. & Sperber, D. (2010) Morality and reputation in an evolutionary perspective, *The Monist*

Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham, 'When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize'.

Revise: Haidt, J.,. [The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology](#) (in *Science*, 2007) from week 7.

## **Week 11**

### **What we know about moral cognition, and ways it could be used to foster cooperative behaviour**

In this session, we will come back to the notion of choice architecture and try to apply it to the problem of cooperative behaviour. We will take as a main example choice architectures implemented on the Web and the many software applications that manage the attribution of reputation.

### **Core readings**

TBA

## **Week 12 Conclusions.**

### **Wrap-up, discussion**

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Brosig, Jeanette. 2002. "Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 47(3):275–290

Gintis, Herbert. 2000b. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality." *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 206: 169–179.

Nowak, Martin A. 2006. "Five rules for the Evolution of Cooperation." *Science* 314:1560–1563.

Nowak, Martin A. and Karl Sigmund. 2005. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity." *Nature* 437 (7063): 1291–1298

Pettit, Philip. 2000. "Rational choice, functional selection and empty black boxes." *Journal of Economic Methodology* 7 (1): 33–57

Sen, Amartya. 2002. *Rationality and Freedom*. Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press.

Voorhoeve, Alex. 2002. "The Good, the Right, and the Seemly: Ken Binmore interviewed." *The Philosopher's Magazine* 21:48–51.

Wright, R. *The Moral Animal* (London: Abacus, 1994).

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