

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Dr. Andrés Moles
Molesa@ceu.hu
Office Hours: TBA
Core Course, 4 Credits
Fall 2010

The study of politics includes not only how the political world operates, but also how it *ought* to operate. The course focuses on John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* and some of the most important objections it has been presented with in the last thirty years. The course addresses some of these questions: what is a fair redistribution? How can taxation be justified? Is justice about giving people what they deserve? Is equality an important political value? Should people who are reluctant to take up employment be subsidised? How can political institutions be justified? Should politics promote community values? The goal of the course is to provide students with theoretical musculature to think further about politics.

Aims:

- To trigger an understanding of central arguments of contemporary political philosophy.
- To foster the ability to analyse and discuss arguments in political philosophy.
- To develop the ability to link and apply arguments of political philosophy to social and political issues.
- To foster the ability to communicate both orally and in writing arguments in political philosophy.
- To develop the capacity to learn new ideas and approaches, and to apply them in research.

Learning outcomes:

At the end of the course the student shall be able to:

- Understand the main arguments for and against the basic principles of liberal egalitarian thought.
- Understand the key positions within contemporary political philosophy.
- Produce critical and well-structured arguments in political philosophy.
- Balance and contrast the weakness and strengths of different positions in contemporary debates in liberal egalitarian thought.
- Summarise arguments clearly and succinctly.

Requirements:

- All students must read the core reading before the lectures and seminars.
- Attendance is compulsory. You need at least 90% of attendance to get a grade.

- There will be a mid-term exam, and a final 4,000 words paper. The paper's title must be pre-approved, so consult me once you have an idea what you want to write about. You can use some of the seminar questions to formulate the title or any other related topic you are interested in

Grades will be awarded as follows:

- Exam: 25%, participation 15%, presentation 15%, final paper 45%.
- Essays are due on the date they are due! Extensions will be granted only in special circumstances. Late submissions will get a -20% initial penalty, and a -10% daily penalty afterwards. *Organise your time!*
- Academic dishonesty will be severely penalised. **Don't plagiarise!!**

The essays must represent a significant piece of independent research; it can be a positive argument of your own, or a critical argument. They should provide succinct, clear statements of your positions and of arguments pro and con. Don't make claims without arguing strongly for them! Also, when you criticise and argument, use the best counter-argument you find, don't waste your time with straw men!

Finally, literary or emotive or heavily jargon-laden style is often unhelpful. *Do not write a one-sided essay: be sure to evaluate the strongest arguments on both sides!*

Weekly Program:

Week 1: 'What is Political Philosophy?'

Week 2: 'John Rawls: Justice as Fairness'

Week 3: 'Libertarian Justice'

Week 4: 'Justice and Desert'

Week 5: 'Equality of What? Dworkin on Resources and Responsibility'

Week 6: 'Equality or What?'

Week 7: 'Cohen on Incentives and the Site of Justice'

Week 8: 'Unconditional Grants'

Week 9: 'Neutrality and Perfectionism'

Week 10: 'Religious and Cultural Justice'

Week 11: 'Gender and Justice'

Week 12 'Revision and Conclusions'

General books and introductions:

- Brighouse, H. *Justice* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005)
- Hampton, J. *Political Philosophy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001)
- Kymlicka, W. *Introduction to Political Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). The best survey. If you only read one, read this one.
- Swift, A. *Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide for Students and Politicians* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006)
- White, S. *Equality* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007)
- Wolff, J. *An Introduction to Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996/2006).

Edited collections:

- Clayton, M., and A. Williams, (eds.) *The Ideal of Equality* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000)
- Clayton, M., and A. Williams, (eds.) *Social Justice* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004)
- Dryzek, J., B. Honig and A. Phillips (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Goodin, R. and P. Pettit (eds.) *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
- ————— (eds.) *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993).
- LaFollette H. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- McKinnon, C. (ed.) *Issues in Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Mason, A. *Ideals of Equality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

Week 1.

‘Introduction: What is Political Philosophy’

This week introduces some broad notion of what political philosophy is. It is distinguished, on the one hand, from moral philosophy and on the other from political science. The difference between conceptual analysis and substantive theory is also drawn. Some practical applications of political philosophy are discussed. Key concepts such as legitimacy, coercion, power, justice and liberty will be introduced. The idea of utilitarianism is also introduced.

Seminar questions:

- What is political philosophy? What is the difference between political philosophy and moral philosophy and political science?
- Is there any point in knowing what ought to be done even if one lacks political power?
- Is hopeless realism worthless? Is utopianism best avoided?

Core reading:

(Read Brighouse and Estlund for the first session, and Hampton and Anderson for the second)

- Brighouse, H. *Justice* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004) 1-30.
- Estlund, D. *Democratic Authority* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 263-71.
- Hampton, J. *Political Philosophy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) pp 123-133.
- Anderson, E. ‘What Game Would You Rather Play’
http://left2right.typepad.com/main/elizabeth_anderson/index.html

Supplementary reading:

- Gaus, G. *Political Concepts and Political Theories* (Boulder: Westview, 2000) Ch. 1-2.

- McKinnon, C. 'Introduction', in her edited book *Issues on Political Theory*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Nagel, T. 'Ruthlessness in Public Life' in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.75-90.
- ——— 'Concealment and Exposure' in his *Concealment and Exposure*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- Rawls, J. 'Remarks on Political Philosophy' in his *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007).
- Waldron, J. *Liberal Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) Ch. 2.

Week 2.

'John Rawls: Justice as Fairness'

In this session we will introduce 'justice as fairness'. We will discuss the intuitive appeal of Rawls's theory, and some of its practical applications. We will assess whether the selection model of the principles of justice as a rational decision model is successful. Most of the discussion, though, will address the question of how egalitarian is Rawls's theory, the structure of the two principles of justice and plausibility of the 'difference principle'.

Seminar questions:

- What are Rawls' two principles of justice? Are they appealing?
- What is the Original Position? What role does it play in Rawls' argument? Is it plausible?
- Would the parties choose the two principles?

Core reading:

- Rawls, J. *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) Secs. 2-4, 9, 11-14, 20, 24-26.

Supplementary reading:

There are thousands of papers on Rawls. Look at the vast bibliographies of Freeman's, Audard's and Pogge's books. Here is a short selection:

- Audard, C. *John Rawls* (London: Acumen, 2007).
- Barry, B. *Justice as Impartiality* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), Ch. 1, 3.
- Daniels, N. (ed.) *Reading Rawls* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989)
- Freeman, S. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Read whichever chapters call your attention. Also, look at the vast bibliography cited there.
- ——— *Rawls* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- Martin, R. 'Economic Justice: Contractarianism and Rawls's Difference Principle, in D. Boucher, and P. Kelly (eds.) *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls* (London: Routledge, 1994).
- Nagel, T. 'Equality' in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

- Pogge, T. *John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- Rawls, J. *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001) Part 2.
- Scanlon, T. 'The Diversity of Objections to Inequality, in his *The Difficulty of Tolerance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- Scheffler, S. *Boundaries and Allegiances* (Oxford: OUP, 2001)
- Sen, A. 'Justice: Freedom versus Means', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 19 (1990), 111-21.
- Waldron, J. 'John Rawls and the Social Minimum', in his *Liberal Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Week 3.

'Libertarian Justice'

Nozick is one the best critics of Rawls, so in this week his criticisms are discussed. The main claims of libertarianism will be introduced and analysed. Particular attention will be paid to Nozick's claim that patterns upset liberty, that taxation is a form of slavery, and what values motivate libertarian justice.

Seminar questions:

- Do patterns upset liberty? Should Will Chamberlain's earnings be taxed?
- Does Nozick succeed in devising a pure entitlement theory?
- Is liberty or self-ownership at the centre of Nozick's theory?
- Is Nozick unfair to the poor?

Core reading:

- Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) Ch. 7 (esp. pp149-64, 167-204, 213-31).

Supplementary reading:

- Arneson, R. 'Lockean Self-ownership: Toward a Demolition' *Political Studies*, 39 (1991), 36-54.
- Cohen, G. A. *Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) Ch, 1-4, 9, 10.
- Freeman, S. 'Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View' *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30 (2001), 105-51.
- Nagel, T. 'Libertarianism without Foundations' in Paul, J. (ed.) *Reading Nozick* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). See also essays by Williams, Scheffler, Scanlon, O'Neill.
- Olsaretti, S. *Liberty, Desert and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chs. 4, 5.
- Otsuka, M. 'Self-ownership and Equality' in his *Libertarianism without Inequality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- Perry, S. 'Libertarianism, Entitlement, and Responsibility', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 26 (1997) 351-96.

- Rawls J. *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) Sec. 12-14, 17, 20-26
- Wolff, J. *Robert Nozick* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).

Week 4

‘Desert and Justice’

Rawls famously stated that desert has no place in a theory of justice. However, it seems that many people hold desert-based intuitions. In this session, we will discuss the plausibility of desert as a basis of distribution, and the some important criticisms to it. We will also discuss the extent to which equal opportunity conflicts with desert.

Seminar questions:

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Core reading:

- Miller, D. ‘The Concept of Desert’ reprinted in Clayton, M., and A. Williams, (eds.) *Social Justice* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004)
- Wolff ‘The Dilemma of Desert’ in Olsaretti, S. *Desert and Justice*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007), 219-32).

Supplementary reading:

- Baiasu, S. ‘Institutions and the Normativity of Desert’, *Contemporary Political Theory*, 6 (2007), 175-195.
- Kristjansson, K. ‘A Utilitarian Justification of Desert in Distributive Justice’, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, 2 (2005), 147-170.
- Moriarty, J. ‘Desert and Distributive Justice in *A Theory of Justice*’, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 33 (2002), 131-143.
- Norman, R. ‘Criteria of Justice: Desert, Needs and Equality’, *Res Publica*,. 7 (2002), 115-136
- Olsaretti, S. ‘Unmasking Equality? Kagan on Equality and Desert’, *Utilitas*, 14 (2002), 387-400.
- Olsaretti, S. *Desert and Justice*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007) A good collection of essays, especially Miller, Scheffler, Kagan, Vallentyne, Olsaretti, Wolff and Arneson.
- Pojman, L and O. McLeod (eds.) *What Do We Deserve?* (Oxford, OUP, 1999). Another good collection of essays.
- Rawls, J. *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) sections 3, 17, 48.

Week 5.

‘Equality of What? Resources and Responsibility’

Discussions so far have made comparisons between the relative positions of different people. However, hardly anything has been said about the ‘currency’ of justice. The debate is introduced through a critical analysis of Dworkin’s equality of resources.

Seminar questions:

- Assess the debate between ‘primary goods’, ‘resources’ and ‘welfare’.
- What is the relation between equality and luck?
- How convincing is Dworkin’s ‘envy test’ and the ‘hypothetical insurance market’ as a theory of distributive justice?
- Can we do without welfare?

Core reading:

- Dworkin, R. *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 48-59, 65-83.
- Cohen, G. A. ‘Against Equality of Resources: Relocating Dworkin’s Cut’ in Clayton, M. and A. Williams (eds.) *Social Justice* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 134-53.

Supplementary reading:

- Anderson, E. ‘What is the Point of Equality’, *Ethics*, 109, 2 (1999), 287-337.
- Arneson, R. ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’, *Philosophical Studies*, 56 (1989), 77-93.
- Arneson, R., ‘Egalitarian Justice versus the Right to Privacy’, *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 17 (2000), 91–119.
- Arneson, R. ‘Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism’, *Ethics*, 110 (2000), 339–49.
- Arneson, R. ‘Why Justice Requires Transfers to Offset Income and Wealth Inequalities’, *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 19 (2002), 172–200.
- Burley, J. (ed.) *Dworkin and his Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), read chapters by Cohen, Otsuka, and Arneson.
- Clayton, M and A. Williams, ‘Egalitarian Justice and Interpersonal Comparisons’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 35 (1999), 445-64.
- Cohen, G. A. ‘On the Currency of Distributive Justice’, *Ethics*, 99 (1989), 906-44.
- Daniels, ‘Equality of What: Welfare, Resources or Capabilities’ in his *Justice and Justification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Dworkin, R. et. al. ‘Symposium on Ronald Dworkin’s *Sovereign Virtue*’, *Ethics*, 113 (2002) 5-143.
- Dworkin, R. ‘Equality, Luck and Hierarchy’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 31 (2003), 190–8.
- Fleurbaey, M. ‘Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?’, *Economics and Philosophy*, 11 (1995), 25–55.
- Hinton, T. ‘Must Egalitarians Choose Between Fairness and Respect?’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30 (2001), 72–87.
- Hurley, S., *Justice, Luck and Knowledge* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003), chs. 5-7.
- Lippert-Rasmussen, K., ‘Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility’, *Ethics*, 111 (2001), 548–79.
- Matravers, M. ‘Responsibility, Luck and the ‘Equality of What’ Debate’ *Political Studies*, 50 (2002), 558-72.
- Nussbaum, M., *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), chs. 1-3.

- Rawls, J. 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', in his *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 359-87.
- Roemer, J. *Theories of Distributive Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) Ch. 7.
- Scanlon, T. 'Equality of Resources and Equality of Welfare: A forced Marriage?' *Ethics*, 97 (1986) 111-118.
- Scheffler, S. 'What is Egalitarianism?', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 31 (2003), 5–39.
- Scheffler, S. 'Equality as a Virtue of Sovereigns: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 31 (2003), 199–206.
- Sen, A. 'Justice: Freedom versus Means', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 19 (1990), 111-21.
- Sen, A. *Inequality Reexamined* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- White, S., *Equality*, ch. 4.
- Williams, A. 'Equality for the Ambitious', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 52 (2002), 377-89.
- Williams, A. 'Equality, Ambition and Insurance' *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 78 (2004), 131-50.
- Williams, A. 'Liberty, Equality, and Property', in J. Dryzek et al (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*.
- Wolff, J., 'Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 27 (1998), 97–127

Week 6

'Equality or what?'

Although at first sight 'equality' seems to be an attractive ideal, on a second thought is more problematic. In this week we will discuss the appeal of equality and some objections to it. The difference between prioritarianism and egalitarianism will be discussed at length and the 'levelling-down objection' will be subject to close scrutiny. Finally, the main claim posed by sufficientarians will be dealt with.

Seminar questions:

- Should we be egalitarians, sufficientarians or prioritarians? Or none of them?
- Is the levelling-down objection fatal to egalitarians?

Core reading:

- Parfit, D. 'Equality or Priority?' in Clayton, M. and A. Williams (eds.) *The Ideal of Equality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).

Supplementary reading:

- Brighouse, H. and A. Swift 'Equality, Priority and Positional Goods', *Ethics*, 116 (2006), 471-97.
- Casal, P. 'Why Sufficiency is not Enough', *Ethics*, 117 (2007), 296-326.
- Clayton, M and A. Williams, 'Some Questions for Egalitarians' in Clayton, M. and A. Williams (eds.) *The Ideal of Equality* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

- Crisp, R. 'Egalitarianism and Compassion', *Ethics*, 113, (2003), 119-26.
- ——— 'Equality, Priority, and Compassion', *Ethics*, 113 (2003), 745-63.
- Frankfurt, H. 'Equality as a Moral Idea', *Ethics*, 98 (1987), 21-43
- Holtug, N. and K. Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), *Egalitarianism* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Kekes, J. 'A Puzzle for Egalitarians', *Ethics*, 107, (1997) 658-70.
- Mason, A. 'Egalitarianism and the Levelling-Down Objection', *Analysis*, 61 (2001), 246-54.
- Mason, A. *Levelling the Playing Field* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) ch. 5.
- Moss, J. 'Egalitarianism and the Value of Equality', *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, September 2009, www.jesp.org.
- O'Neill, M. 'What Should Egalitarians Believe?', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 36, 2 (2008), 119-156.
- Otsuka, M. and A. Voorhoeve 'Why it Matters that Some are Worse Off than Others: An Argument against the Priority View', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 37, 2 (2009), 171-99.
- Temkin, L. *Inequality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- ——— 'Equality, Priority and the Levelling-Down Objection' in Clayton, M. and A. Williams (eds.) *The Ideal of Equality* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
- ——— 'Egalitarianism Defended', *Ethics*, 114 (2003), 764-82.
- ——— 'Equality, Priority or What?' *Economics and Philosophy*, 19 (2003) 61-87.

Week 7.

'Cohen on Incentives and the Site of Justice'

This week discusses an important criticism to Rawls's 'difference principle'. The main question today is captured in Cohen's title: 'If You're an Egalitarian How Come You're So Rich?' We will discuss the incentive argument for inequality, and Cohen's 'egalitarian ethos' argument.

Seminar questions:

- Is Cohen's appeal for an 'egalitarian ethos' convincing? How can the Rawlsians reply?
- Is the difference principle egalitarian enough?
- Can incentive inequality be justified?
- Is there a meaningful difference between the first and third person perspectives regarding distributive justice?

Core reading:

- Cohen, G. A. *If You're an Egalitarian How Come You're So Rich?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Chapters 8-9.

Supplementary reading:

- Brighouse, H. *Justice* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), ch. 8.

- Casal, P. 'Mill, Rawls, Cohen and the Egalitarian Trilemma', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (forthcoming).
- Cohen, G. A. *Rescuing Justice and Equality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
- Cohen, G.A. 'Incentives, Inequality, and Community' <http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/cohen92.pdf> also reprinted in Darwall, *Equal Freedom*.
- Cohen, J. 'Taking People as They Are?', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30 (2001), 363-86.
- Estlund, D. 'Liberalism, Equality and Fraternity in Cohen's Critique of Rawls' *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 6 (1998), 99-112.
- Julius, A. 'Basic Structure and the Value of Equality', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 31 (2003), 321-55.
- Hurley, S. *Justice, Luck, and Knowledge* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) Chs. 8, 9.
- Lipper-Rasmussen, K. 'Inequalities, Incentives and the Interpersonal Test', *Ratio*, 21 (2008), 421-39.
- Murphy, L. 'Institutions and the Demands of Justice' *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 27 (1998), 251-91
- Nagel, T. 'Cohen on Inequality' in his *Concealment and Exposure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- Pogge, T. 'On the Site of Distributive justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 29 (2000) 137-69.
- Shiffrin, S. 'Incentives, Motives and Talents', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 28, (2010), 111-42.
- Tan, Kok-Chor 'Justice and Personal Pursuits' *Journal of Philosophy*, 101 (2004), 331-62.
- Titelbaum, 'What Would a Rawlsian Ethos Look Like?', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 36, 3 (2008), 289-322.
- Williams, A. 'Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 27 (1998), 225-47.
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Week 8.

'Unconditional Grants'

Most entitlements are conditional upon people willing to cooperate. There is a proposal which suggests that the state should distribute some basic unconditional grants that are independent of people willing to work. An argument for this scheme holds that it maximises people's real freedom. We look at some advantages and problems of this suggestion.

Seminar questions:

- Is Unconditional Basic Income appealing?
- What is the difference between principled and pragmatic arguments for UBI? Which supports it better?
- Is UBI exploitative?

Core reading:

- Ackerman, B and A. Alstott ‘Why Stakeholding?’ in E. O. Wright (ed) *Redesigning Distribution* (London: Verso, 2006)
- Van Parijs, P. ‘Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-First Century’, in Ackerman, B. and Wright, E.O. (eds.) *Redesigning Distribution* (London: Verso, 2006).
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Supplementary reading:

- Ackerman, B., and A. Alstott, *The Stakeholder Society* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1999).
- Ackerman, B. and Wright, E.O. (eds.) *Redesigning Distribution: Basic Income and Stakeholder Grants as Alternative Cornerstones for a more Egalitarian Capitalism* (London: Verso, 2006).
- Arneson, R. ‘Is Socialism Dead?’ *Ethics* 102, (1992), 485-511
- Barry, B., ‘Real Freedom and Basic Income’, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 4 (1996), 242-76.
- Cohen, G.A., ‘Notes on the Universal Grant Proposal’ *Basic Income Studies*, 1 (2006), article 7
- Cunliffe, J, & G. Erreygers, “‘Basic Income? Basic Capital!’ Origins and Issues of a Debate’, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11 (2003), 89-110.
- Dahms, H., ‘Capitalism Unbound? Peril and Promise of Basic Income’ *Basic Income Studies*, 1 (2006), article 11.
- Dowding, K. et al (eds.), *The Ethics of Stakeholding* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).
- McKinnon, C., ‘A Scandalous Proposal: Ethical Attractions of Basic Income’ *Basic Income Studies*, 1 (2006), article 10.
- Otsuka, M. ‘Self-Ownership and Equality: A Lockean Reconciliation’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 27 (1998), 65-92. Also reprinted in his *Libertarianism without Inequality* (OUP, 2003)
- Reeve, A., ‘Introduction’ to A. Reeve & A. Williams (eds.), *Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
- Van der Veen, R., ‘Real Freedom versus Reciprocity: Competing Views on the Justice of Unconditional Basic Income’, *Political Studies*, 46 (1998), 140-163.
- Van der Veen, R., and P. Van Parijs ‘A Capitalist Road to Global Justice: Reply to Another Six Critics’ *Basic Income Studies*, 1 (2006), article 13.
- Van Parijs, P. ‘Why Surfers should be Fed?’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 20 (1991), 101-31.
- Van Parijs, P. (ed) *Arguing for Basic Income*, (London: Verso, 1992) chs by Steiner, Carling, Baker, Barry, van Parijs
- Van Parijs, P. ‘Basic Income Capitalism’, *Ethics* 102 (1992), 465-84.
- Van Parijs, P., *Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Chs 1,2,5.
- Van Parijs, P., et al, Symposium on ‘Delivering a Basic Income’, *Boston Review*, October/November 2000. Includes a defence by van Parijs and comments by others. Available at: <http://bostonreview.net/ndf.html#Income>

- White, S., 'Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income', *Political Studies*, 45 (1997), 312-26.
- White, S., *The Civic Minimum; On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- White, S., 'Assessing the Unconditional Stake', in K. Dowding et al (eds.), *The Ethics of Stakeholding*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003)
- White, S., 'Fair Reciprocity and Basic Income', in A. Reeve & A. Williams (eds.) *Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).
- White, S., 'Reconsidering the Exploitation Objection to Basic Income', *Basic Income Studies*, 1 (2006), article 4, 1-17.
- Williams, A., 'Basic Income and the Value of Occupational Choice' *Basic Income Studies*, 1 (2006), article 8.
- Wright, E. O., 'Reducing Income and Wealth Inequalities: Real Utopian Proposals', *Contemporary Sociology*, 29 (2000), 143-56.
- Wright, E. O., 'Basic Income as a Socialist Project' *Basic Income Studies*, 1 (2006), article 12.
- Also see the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) website: <http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/Index.html>

Week 9.

'Neutrality and Perfectionism'

This week's discussion follows from last week. Some liberals argue that a liberal state must be neutral towards different conceptions of the good. The seminar will address that concept of neutrality and different ways to understand it. The plausibility of 'public reason' will also be discussed.

Seminar questions:

- What sort of neutrality do liberals seek?
- Should the State be neutral?
- Is the idea of public reason feasible? Is it attractive?
- Is political liberalism just another comprehensive doctrine?

Core reading:

- Rawls, J. *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) Introduction to the paperback edition.
- Rawls, J. *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) sections 9, 11, 26, 43, 47.

Supplementary reading:

- Arneson, R. 'Perfectionism and Politics', *Ethics*, 111 (2000), 37-63.
- Arneson, R. 'Liberal Neutrality on the Good: An Autopsy' in Wall, S. and G. Klosko, *Perfectionism and Neutrality* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 191-218.
- Caney, S. 'Anti-Perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism', *Political Studies*, 43 (1995), 284-64.

- Chan, J., 'Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 29 (2000), 5-42.
- Christman, J. 'Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy', in Taylor, J. (ed.) *Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Roles in Contemporary Moral Philosophy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 277-98.
- Clayton, M., 'White on Autonomy, Neutrality and Well-Being', *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 27 (1993), 101-12
- ———. 'Liberal Equality and Ethics', *Ethics* (2002), 113, 8-22.
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Week 10

'Religious and Cultural Justice'

In this seminar we will discuss whether religious practices should be treated differently from other practices. Through the case of religion, we will raise questions of diversity and multiculturalism in contemporary societies.

Seminar questions:

- Under which circumstances, if any, should religious accommodation be granted? It is legitimate doing so?
- Is religion in any sense special?
- What is the most attractive conception of multiculturalism?

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Week 11.

'Gender and Justice'

An important deal of criticism has come from the feminist front. It seems that some liberal theories neglect the importance that gender has in our society. The seminar will discuss the extent to which the feminist critique succeeds as well whether liberalism has the resources in order to address it.

Seminar questions:

- How convincing is Okin's conception of justice and gender?
- Is liberalism male-biased?
- Is Okin too radical, or not radical enough?
- Is Rawls' response attractive?

Core reading:

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- ———, "'Forty Acres and a Mule": Rawls and Feminism' Politics, *Philosophy, and Economics*, 4, 2 (2005), 233-48.
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Week 12.

'Revision and Conclusions'