

Central European University
Department of Political Science

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

Dr. Andrés Moles
Molesa@ceu.hu
Office Hours: TBA, FT 901.
Elective Course, 4 Credits
Winter 2009/2010

The course examines philosophical and methodological questions relevant to research in the social and political sciences, focusing on the nature of explanation in the social sciences. The course is interdisciplinary by nature, drawing arguments from various fields such as philosophy, politics, economics, psychology, anthropology and sociology. Special attention will be given to fostering the ability to draw together arguments on a particular topic from relevant discussions in different disciplines. Topics covered include casual explanation vs. interpretation, functional explanation, rational choice and game theory, collective and co-operative action, evolutionary psychology, objectivity and relativism, imitation, social learning, and relations between cognitive and social sciences. The course also aims to foster skill at making effective philosophical and methodological arguments in relation to substantive issues in the social sciences, and to enable students to analyze and interpret various kinds of explanation

Objectives:

The course aims to:

- Develop an understanding of the nature of explanation in the Social Sciences.
- Grasp the practical implication of different philosophical positions in the Social Sciences.
- Understand the impact and plausibility of different interdisciplinary approaches to the Social Sciences.

Learning outcomes:

At the end of the course the student shall be able to:

- Understand the key approaches within contemporary debates regarding explanation in the social sciences.
- Produce critical and well-structured arguments in the philosophy of the social sciences.
- Balance and contrast the weakness and strengths of different positions in social sciences.
- Summarise arguments clearly and succinctly.

Requirements:

- All students must read the core reading before the lectures and seminars. Students are expected to contribute to class discussion via weekly assignments, reaction papers, or presentations.
- Attendance is compulsory. You need at least 90% of attendance to submit your essays.
- There will be either a midterm exam, or a midterm paper. They must also submit a 5,000 words essay at the end of the term.
- All titles must be pre-approved.

Grades will be awarded as follows:

- Midterm paper/exam 30%, long essay 60%, participation 10% (however, if you don't submit at least 90% of the assignments, your essay will not be marked).
- *Essays are due on the date they are due!* Extensions will be granted only in special circumstances. Late submissions will be penalised.
- Academic dishonesty/**plagiarism is a grave offence**, and it will not be taken lightly.
- You can use some of the seminar questions to formulate the title or any other related topic you are interested in. Consult me early so you have time to do your research.
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The essays must represent a significant piece of independent research; it can be a positive argument of your own, or a critical argument. They should provide succinct, clear statements of your positions and of arguments pro and con. Don't make claims without arguing strongly for them! Also, when you criticise and argument, use the best counter-argument you find, don't waste your time with straw men!

Finally, literary or emotive or heavily jargon-laden style is often unhelpful. *Do not write a one-sided essay: be sure to evaluate the strongest arguments on both sides!*

Weekly Program:

Week 1: What is an Explanation? Rationalism, Empiricism, Structures and Functions.

Week 2: Some Environmental Applications of Game Theory

Week 3: Understanding and Hermeneutics

Week 4: Explaining Suicide Missions

Week 5: Sociobiology

Week 6: The Evolution of Cooperation

Week 7: Cultural Evolution and Social Learning

Week 8: Memetics

Week 9: Automatic Behaviour and Social Ecology

Week 10: Explaining Morality

Week 11: Sex and Gender

Week 12: Conclusions. How do Explanations in Social Sciences look like?

Core Texts

Benton, T. and Craib, I. (2001) *Philosophy of Social Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).

Elster, J. *Explaining Social Behaviour* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007)

Hollis, M. (1994) *The Philosophy of Social Sciences* (Colorado: Westview).

Other Useful Texts:

- Carnap, R. (1955) *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (New York: Dover), edited by Martin Gardner.
- Delanty, G. and Strydom, P. (2003) (eds) *Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings* (Maidenhead: Open University Press).
- Elster, J. (2007) *Explaining Social Behaviour: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Elster, J. (1989) *The Cement of Society* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Fay, B. (1996) *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Hargreaves, S.P. and Varoufakis, Y (1995) *Game Theory: A Critical Introduction* (London: Routledge)
- Hay, C. (2002) *Political Analysis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Hempel, C. (1965) *Aspects of Scientific Explanation: and other essays in the philosophy of science* (New York: Free Press).
- Hollis, M. and Smith, S. (1990) *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon)
- Hollis, M. (1996) *Reason in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Kuhn, T. (1996) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (3rd edition) (London: University of Chicago Press).
- Little, D. (1991) *Varieties of Social Explanation: an introduction to the philosophy of social science* (Boulder: Westview).
- Martin, Michael and Lee MacIntyre (1994) *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (Princeton: MIT Press)
- Popper, K. (1991) *The Poverty of Historicism* (London: Routledge).
- Root, M. (1993) *Philosophy of Social Science: the methods, ideals, and politics of social inquiry* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Rosenberg, A. (1995) *Philosophy of Social Science* (Boulder: Westview).
- Ryan, A. (1970) *The Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (London: Macmillan).
- Sperber, D. (1996) *Explaining Culture: a naturalistic approach* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Taylor, C. (1985) *Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: CUP).
- Trigg, R. (1985) *Understanding Social Science: A Philosophical Introduction to the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: CUP).

Week 1.

What is an Explanation? Rationalism, Empiricism, Structures and Functions

The seminar introduces some well-known theories of explanation, and gives a background into the debate about what is an explanation, and whether there is something distinct about explanations in social sciences.

Questions:

1. What is involved in providing an explanation? How is explanation distinct from and related to interpretation or understanding?
2. What is naturalism? Is it coherent approach to social science?
3. How does rationalism differ from empiricism as an approach to social and natural science?
4. Why is determinism troubling for social scientists?
5. Is the principle of falsification a useful revision of empiricism?
6. Are functional explanations of social phenomena coherent?
7. What is the relationship between functionalism and structuralism?
8. Is social science holistic or individualistic?

Core reading:

Elster, J. *Explaining Social Behaviour*, 9-66.

Supplementary reading:

Benton and Craib, 'Introduction', Ch. 1-2, 4

Delanty and Styrdom, 'What is the philosophy of social science?', pp.1-12.

Hollis, Ch. 3, 4, 5.

Little, Ch.5, 'Functional and Structural Explanation', pp.90-113

Pratt, Ch.8, 'Explanation and Prediction', pp.69-76.

Rosenberg, Ch.1, 'What is the Philosophy of Social Science', pp.1-27.

Root, Ch.4, 'Functional theories in sociology and biology', 78-99

Dore, R.P. (1973) 'Function and Cause', in A. Ryan (ed) *The Philosophy of Social Explanation* (Oxford:OUP), pp.65-81.

Kuhn, Ch.9, 'The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions', pp.92-110.

Marx, K. (1977) Preface to *The Critique of Political Economy*, in D. McLellan (ed) *Karl Marx's Selected Writings* (Oxford: OUP), pp.388-90.

Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in Delanty and Styrdom (eds), pp.57-61.

Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1952) *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (New York: Free Press), pp.133-211.

Rosenberg, Ch. 5, 'Functionalism and Macrosocial science', pp.124-152

Week 2

Some Environmental Applications of Game Theory

In this session, we'll analyse some applications of game theory. We'll discuss this approach regarding population problems and climate change.

Questions:

1. What is a collective action problem?
2. What is the difference between coordination and cooperation? Is the latter ever rational?
3. To what extent is Game Theory useful to understand international relations? What about environmental problems?

4. Can Game Theory be applied to dealings between agents belonging to different generations?

Core reading:

- Hargreaves, S.P. and Varoufakis, Y. *Game Theory: A Critical Text* (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 4-36.
- Hardin, G. (1968) 'The Tragedy of the Commons', *Science*, 162, 3859, pp.1243-48.
- Gardiner, S. 'The Real Tragedy of the Commons', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30 (4), 2001, pp.387-416
- Hardin, G. 'Extensions of "The Tragedy of the Commons"', *Science*, 280, 5364 (1998), pp. 682-683.

Supplementary reading:

- Axelrod, R. (1997) *The Complexity of Cooperation: agent-based models of competition and collaboration*(Princeton: Princeton University Press), Introduction and Ch.1, pp. 3-29.
- Binmore, K. *Fun and Games* (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Co, 1992)
- Brams, S. (2000) 'Game theory: pitfalls and opportunities in applying it to international relations', *International Studies Perspectives*, 1(3), pp.221-232.
- Colman, A. (1999) *Game Theory and its Applications*, Ch. 5, 6, 7, 11, 12.
- Elster, J. (1989) *The Cement of Society*, (Cambridge: CUP), Introduction and conclusion.
- Gardiner, S. (2004) 'The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto Protocol', *Ethics and International Affairs* 18(1), pp.23-29.
- Gauthier, D. (1986) 'Persons, Peoples, Generations', in *Morals by Agreement* (Clarendon: Oxford), pp.268-305.
- Gauthier, D. (1986) *Morals by Agreement*, ch. 6, esp. pp. 158-70
- Hargreaves, S.P. and Varoufakis, Y. *Game Theory: A Critical Text* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*.
- Jaeger, C. et al. (1998) 'Decision Analysis and rational action', in S.Rayner and E.L.Malone (eds) *Human Choice and Climate Change Vol. 3* (Columbus: Battelle), pp.141-21
- Olson, C. (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Oström, E., Burger, J., Field, C.B., Norgaard, R.B., and Policansky, 'Revisiting the commons:local lessons, global challenges', *Science*, 284, 9 April 1999, pp.278-82
- Parson, E.A. and Ward, H (1998) 'Games and Simulations', in S.Rayner and E.L.Malone (eds) *Human Choice and Climate Change Vol. 3* (Columbus: Battelle), pp.105-140.
- Schelling, T. (1960) *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), Ch.1 'The retarded science of international strategy' (pp.3-20) and Ch. 10, 'Surprise attack and disarmament' (pp.230-54).
- Stone, R.W. (2001) 'The use and abuse of game theory in international relations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2), pp. 216-44.

Week 3

Understanding and Hermeneutics

In this session we'll approach a different paradigm within the social sciences; the idea that the goal is to understand agency, rather than to explain events. We'll discuss problems raised by Wittgenstein's idea of rule following, problems of ascribing rationality, and questions about social norms.

Questions:

1. What is the problem of other minds?
2. Can social action be explained as rule following?
3. What is a hermeneutic explanation?
4. What is the connection between social identity and personal identity?

Core Reading:

Fay, Ch.7, 'Is the meaning of others' behaviour what *they* mean by it?', pp.136-54.

Rosenberg, A. *Philosophy of Social Science* (3rd ed), ch. 4.

Supplementary Reading:

Benton and Craib, Ch.6, 'Rationality as rule-following: cultures, traditions and hermeneutics', pp.93-106.

Bohman, J. *New Philosophy of Science* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991) pp. 102-45.

Gadamer, H-G. (1960) 'Hermeneutical Understanding', in Delanty and Styrdom (eds), pp.158-63.

Hollis, Ch. 7-8.

MacIntyre, A. 'The idea of a social science', in A. Ryan (ed) *The Philosophy of Social Explanation*, pp.15-32.

Taylor, Ch.1, 'Interpretation and the sciences of man' (pp.15-57); Ch.5, 'Rationality' (pp.134-51).

Winch, P. (1990 [1958]) *The Idea of a Social Science and its relation to philosophy*, (2nd edition) (London: Routledge), Ch.1, pp.1-39.

Week 4

Explaining Suicide Missions

At first sight, suicide missions seem irrational. In this seminar we'll discuss some recent attempts to identify and explain this phenomenon.

Questions:

1. Why is it so hard to explain the phenomenon of suicide terrorism?
2. What is the role of terrorist organizations in the execution of suicide missions?
3. Is 'dying to kill' rational?
4. To what extent can religious or psychological factors explain the occurrence of suicide missions?

Core reading:

Atran, S. (2003) 'The Genesis of Suicide Terrorism', *Science* 299, pp.1534-39.

Elster, J. (2005) 'Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions', in D. Gambetta (ed) *Making Sense of Suicide Missions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.233-58.

Pape, R.A. (2003) 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism', *American Political Science Review* 97 (3), pp.343-61

Supplementary reading:

Bjorgo, T. (ed) (2005) *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward* (London: Routledge) (especially chapters by Ahmed and Merari).

Bloom, Mia (2005) *Dying To Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press), Ch.4 (pp.76-105)

Gambetta, D. (ed) (2005) *Making Sense of Suicide Missions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.259-99.

Hafez, M.M. (2006) *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press).

Margalit, A. (2003) 'The Suicide Bombers', *The New York Review of Books* 50(1), pp.1-8.
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15979>

Moghadam, A. (2006) 'Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and Globalization of Martyrdom', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, pp.707-29.

Moghadam, A. (2006) 'The Roots of Suicide Terrorism', in A. Pedahzur (ed) (2006) *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom* (London: Routledge), pp.81-107.

Pape, R.A. (2006) *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House).

Pedahzur, A (ed) (2006) *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, especially chapters by Moghadam (pp.13-24); Bloom (pp.25-53); and Hafez (pp.54-80)

Week 5

Sociobiology.

The idea that we can explain human behaviour by looking back the evolutionary advantage that certain forms of behaviour bring is an appealing but highly controversial idea. We'll discuss the main assumptions of this approach, its limits and advantages.

Questions:

1. Is evolutionary psychology plausible? Does it assert far too strong claims?
2. What is the relation between selfish gene theory and game theory?
3. Do genes keep culture on a leash?

Core reading:

Dawkins, R. (1989) *The Selfish Gene (2nd edition)* (Oxford: OUP), Chapters 1-3 (but try and read as much as you can).

Wilson, W. O. *Consilience*, (London: Abacus, 1998), Chapters 6-7.

Supplementary reading:

- Barkow, J., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (eds) (1992) *The Adapted Mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture* (Oxford: OUP). Ch. 1.
- Carruthers, Peter (2005) 'Simple Heuristics Meet Massive Modularity', in Carruthers et al, *The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Dennet, D. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (London: Penguin, 1995)
- Dennett, D. *Freedom Evolves* (London: Penguin, 2003)
- Hirschfeld, L. (1996) *Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child's Construction of Human Kinds* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press), Ch. 3.
- Ridley, M. (1997) *The Origins of Virtue* (London: Penguin).

Week 6

The Evolution of Cooperation

In this session we'll discuss how are altruism and cooperation possible. Some people think that humans are inherently selfish beings, and that we should be perplexed by cooperation. We'll look at different explanations about how cooperation and altruism can evolve and obtain.

Questions:

1. Is cooperation possible? Under which circumstances?
2. Can evolutionary explanations tell us why cooperation evolved?
3. Is evolution of cooperation at the bottom of human morality?

Core Reading:

Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby, 'Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange' in *The Adapted Mind*.

Supplementary Reading:

- Binmore, Ken. 1994. *Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract I*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Binmore, Ken. 1998. *Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract II*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press
- Binmore, Ken. 2005. *Natural Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Binmore, Ken. 2006. "Why do people cooperate?" *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 5 (1): 81–96.
- Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 2003. 'Origins of Human Cooperation'. In *Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation*, ed. Peter Hammerstein. Cambridge (MA) and London: M.I.T. Press pp. 429–443.
- Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. *Culture and the Evolutionary Process*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Brosig, Jeanette. 2002. "Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 47(3):275–290
- Fehr, Ernst and Urs Fischbacher. 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation." *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 8(4):185–190
- Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2001. The Adaptive Toolbox. In *Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox*, ed. Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten. Cambridge (MA) and London: MIT Press pp. 37–50

- Gintis, Herbert. 2000b. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality." *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 206: 169–179.
- Nowak, Martin A. 2006. "Five rules for the Evolution of Cooperation." *Science* 314:1560–1563.
- Nowak, Martin A. and Karl Sigmund. 2005. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity." *Nature* 437 (7063): 1291–1298
- Pettit, Philip. 2000. "Rational choice, functional selection and empty black boxes." *Journal of Economic Methodology* 7 (1): 33–57
- Sen, Amartya. 2002. *Rationality and Freedom*. Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press.
- Sen, Amartya K. 1977. "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6 (4):317–344.
- Sober, Elliott and David Sloan Wilson. 1998. *Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, Ch 5
- Voorhoeve, Alex. 2002. "The Good, the Right, and the Seemly: Ken Binmore interviewed." *The Philosopher's Magazine* 21:48–51.
- Wright, R. *The Moral Animal* (London: Abacus, 1994).

Week 7.

Cultural Evolution and Social Learning

In this seminar we'll discuss how the capacity to imitate other's behaviour can provide a clue to explain cultural evolution. We'll discuss the plausibility of the answers that evolutionary processes give as to explain cultural differences and the existence of culture.

Questions:

1. How are functional explanations in the social sciences related to evolutionary explanations in biology?
2. How is cultural evolution related to genetic evolution?
3. Does imitation make culture possible?

Core reading:

Tomasello, M. (1999) *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 1-55.

Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2006). Sylvia's recipe: The role of imitation and pedagogy in the transmission of human culture. In: N.J. Enfield & S.C. Levinson (Eds.), *Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition, and Human Interaction* (pp. 229-255). Oxford: Berg Publisher

Supplementary reading:

Dennett, D. (1995) *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (London: Penguin) Part III.

Gigerenzer, G. (2000) *Adaptive Thinking: rationality in the real world* (Oxford: OUP), pp. 211-39.

Sperber, D. *Explaining Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

- Sperber, D. (2005): 'Modularity and Relevance: How Can a Massively Modular Mind be Flexible and Context-Sensitive?', in P. Carruthers et al (eds) *The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Sperber, D. and Hirschfeld, L. (2006): 'Culture and Modularity', in P. Carruthers et al (eds) *The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition*.
- Richerson, P. and R. Boyd. *Not by Genes Alone* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005)

Week 8

Memetics

Richard Dawkins suggests that an entity capable of self-replication is subject to Darwinian evolution. He also suggests that cultural items satisfy this criterion. In this seminar we'll discuss the controversial idea that culture evolves by replicating itself without the intervention of human agency.

Questions:

1. What are memes?
2. Are they a helpful to understand some social phenomena?
3. Are they useful, even if we cannot say exactly they are?
4. Is this biology gone mad?

Core Reading:

- Blackmore, S. (1999) *The Meme Machine* (Oxford, Oxford University Press) Chapters 1-2.
Try and read as much as you can; it's easy and fun.
- Dennett, D. *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (London: Penguin, 1995), Ch 12.

Supplementary Reading:

- Dawkins, R. (1989) *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford: OUP) Chapter on memes.
- Aunger, R. (ed) *Darwinizing Culture* (Oxford: OUP, 2000). A collection of essays for and against memetics.
- Distin, K. *The Selfish Meme* (Cambridge: CUP, 2004).
- Sterelny, Kim. 2006. "Memes Revisited." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 57(1):145–165.

Week 9

Automatic Behaviour and Social Ecology.

In the last two decades, psychologists have found that humans display a variety of automatic behaviours. People have a tendency to imitate behaviour without their awareness. We'll also discuss how implicit social stereotypes are causally effective in human behaviour. We'll consider that impact that these phenomena have for the social sciences. Debate will focus on the evidence of this phenomenon, the problems they present for society, and the manner in which they can be neutralised.

Questions:

1. What is imitation? What different types of imitation should be distinguished? What is the significance of imitation for the social sciences?
2. What is the Chameleon Effect?
3. What is the relevance of imitation for Social Sciences? Are there any normative consequences? Are stereotypes intrinsically problematic?
4. Can the problem of aversive racism explain certain patterns of social discrimination?
5. Is the idea of 'social ecology' sound? Is it useful, or too vague?
6. Considering some of the problems regarding stereotyping and imitation, is there any role for responsibility in the explanation of human behaviour? if so, how can it be fleshed out?

Core Reading:

- Chartrand, T., and J. Bargh 'The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior Link and Social Interaction', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76 (1999), 893-910.
- Bargh, J., and T. Chartrand 'The Unbearable Automaticity of Being', *American Psychologist*, 54, (1999), 462-79
- Anderson, C., Bushman, B. 'The Effects on Media Violence in Society', *Science*, 295 (2002), 237-238.
- Johnson, J. et. al. 'Television Viewing and Aggressive Behavior during Adolescence and Adulthood', *Science*, 295 (2002), 2468-71.

Supplementary Reading:

- Bargh, J., M. Chen, and L. Burrows 'Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects on Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71 (1996), 230-44.
- Berkowitz, L. (1993) *Aggression*, (London: McGraw Hill). part 3
- Cohen-Eliya, M., and Y. Hammer, 'Advertisement, Stereotypes and Freedom of Expression', *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 35 (2004), 165-87.
- Devine, P., 'Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56 (1989), 5-18.
- Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J.A. (2001). The perception-behavior Expressway: Automatic effects of social perception on social behavior. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 33, 1-40
- Dovidio, J., N. Evans, and R. Tyler 'Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their Cognitive Representations', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 22 (1986), 22-37.
- Dovidio, J., and S. Gaertner 'Aversive Racism'. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 36 (2004), 1-52.
- Dovidio, J., K. Kawakami, et. al., 'On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 33 (1997), 510-40.
- Eldridge, J. 'What Effects Does the Treatment of Violence in the Mass Media Have on People's Conduct?' and Rowell Huesmann, L. 'Imitation and the Effects of Observing Media Violence on Behaviour' both in Hurley, S. and N. Chater (eds.) *Perspectives on Imitation*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press), 243-66.

- Gilbert, D. 'How Mental Systems Believe', *American Psychologist*, 46 (1991), 107-19.
- . 'The Assessment of Man: Representation and the Control of Belief', in Wegner, D., and J. Pennebaker (eds.) *Handbook of Mental Control* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993), 57-87.
- Gilbert, D., R. Tatarodi and P. Malone, 'You Can't Not Believe Everything You Read', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65 (1993), 221-33.
- Hirschfeld, L., *Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child's Construction of Human Kinds* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
- Hurley, S. (2006) 'Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech', in Pockett, S., W. Banks, and S. Gallagher, (eds.) *Does Consciousness Cause Behavior* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 301-37.
- Hurley, S and N. Chater (eds.) *Perspectives on Imitation*, 2 volumes (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005).
- Moles, A., 'Autonomy, Free Speech and Automatic Behaviour', *Res Publica*, 13 (2007), 53-75.
- Pratto, F., and J. Bargh, 'Stereotyping Based on Apparently Individuating Information: Trait and Global Components of Sex Stereotypes Under Attention Overload', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 27 (1991), 26-47.
- Sugden, R. & R. Cubitt, 'The selection of preferences through imitation', *Review of Economic Studies* 65 (1998): 761-771
- Wilson, T. *Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious* (New York: Belknap, 2002).
- Wheeler, S. C., W. Jarvis, and R. Petty, 'Think Unto Others: The Self-Destructive Impact of Negative Racial Stereotypes', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37 (2001), 173-80.
- Check out the abstracts of papers and posters at: www.imitationconference.org for an overview of work on imitation in the cognitive and social sciences.

Week 10

The Evolution of Morality

If Evolutionary Psychology is right, then moral norms should have evolved by natural selection. In this session will discuss evolution can give us a clue about the origin of moral norms. We will also examine the relation between normative ethics and natural ethics.

Seminar Questions:

Can evolution explain morality?

How/why do we follow social norms?

Can naturalism give an answer regarding what we ought to do?

Can we derive 'ought' from 'is'?

Core reading:

Kelly, D and S. Stich 'Two Theories about the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality' in Carruther, P, Laurence, S. and Stich, S. *The Innate Mind: Volume III*, (Oxford: OUP, 2007).

Hauser, M, Young, L and Cushman, F. 'Reviving Rawls's linguistic Analogy' in Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) *Moral Psychology, Volume 2*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
Greene, J. 'The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul' in Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.) *Moral Psychology, Volume 3*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).

Supplementary reading:

Week 11.

Sex and Gender

Can evolution explain human's sexual division of labour? In general, feminists believe that evolutionary explanations of gender are sexist. In this seminar we examine some ideas regarding the evolution of gender roles and we'll discuss whether they are compatible with non-sexist explanations.

Questions:

1. What relationship is there, if any, between human nature and justice between the sexes?
2. What does the evolution of the sexes tell us about our contemporary 'sexual dynamics' (if anything)?

Core Reading:

Ridley, M. (1994) *The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature* (London: Penguin), Ch. 6, 7, (long, but easy and fun).

Supplementary Reading

Buss, D. *The evolution of desire: strategies of human mating* (New York : Basic Books, 1994).

Diamond, J. (1997) *Why is Sex Fun? : The evolution of human sexuality* (London: Pheonix), especially pp.3-52 (very accessible).

Hrdy, S. (1981) *The Woman that never evolved* (London: Harvard University Press).

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Hurley, S. 'Sex and the Social Construction of Gender' in Browne, J *The Future of Gender* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007).

Kymlicka, W. (1990) *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: OUP), Ch.7, pp.238-92.

Pateman, C. *The Sexual Contract* (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), pp.1-18; and 154-188.

Week 12 Conclusions.

How do Explanations in Social Sciences look like?