

Central European University
Department of Political Science

FOUNDATIONAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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This is an introductory course to political philosophy. The study of politics includes not only how the political world operates, but also how it *ought* to operate. The course is focused on John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* and some of the most important objections it has been presented with in the last thirty years. Some normative background is given, such as the (by then) most influential political doctrine of utilitarianism, and the distinction between negative and positive liberty. The core of the course deals with the presentation of Rawls' own theory, 'justice as fairness', and some libertarian and egalitarian challenges, such as those of R. Nozick, G. A. Cohen, and R. Dworkin. The last part covers some normative issues arising from different doctrines about distributive justice, such as the question whether equality is a normative goal, the plausibility of state-neutrality, or some questions presented by feminists.

Aims:

- To trigger an understanding of central arguments of contemporary political philosophy.
- To foster the ability to analyse and discuss arguments in political philosophy.
- To develop the ability to link and apply arguments of political philosophy to social and political issues.

Weekly Program:

Week 1: 'What is Political Philosophy?'
Week 2: 'Negative and Positive Liberty'
Week 3: 'Utilitarianism'
Week 4: 'John Rawls: Justice as Fairness'
Week 5: 'Libertarian Justice'
Week 6: 'Equality of What? Resources and Capabilities'
Week 7: 'Equality or What?'
Week 8: 'Cohen on Incentives and the Site of Justice'
Week 9: 'The Communitarian Critique to Liberalism'
Week 10: 'Perfectionism and the Problem of Neutrality'
Week 11: 'Gender and Justice'
Week 12 'Revision and Conclusions'

General books and introductions:

- Brighouse, H. *Justice* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005)

- Hampton, J. *Political Philosophy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001)
- Kymlicka, W. *Introduction to Political Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). The best survey. If you only read one, read this one.
- Swift, A. *Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide for Students and Politicians* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006)
- White, S. *Equality* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007)
- Wolff, J. *An Introduction to Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996/2006).

Edited collections:

- Clayton, M., and A. Williams, (eds.) *The Ideal of Equality* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000)
- Dryzek, J., B. Honig and A. Phillips (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Goodin, R. and P. Pettit (eds.) *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
- ————— (eds.) *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993).
- LaFollette H. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- McKinnon, C. (ed.) *Issues in Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Mason, A. *Ideals of Equality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

Week 1.

'Introduction: What is Political Philosophy'

Seminar questions:

- What is political philosophy? What is the difference between political philosophy and moral philosophy and political science?
- Is there any point in knowing what ought to be done even if one lacks political power?

Core reading:

- Hampton, J. *Political Philosophy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) Ch. 1.
- Rawls, J. *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001), § 1.

Supplementary reading:

- McKinnon, C. 'Introduction', in her edited book *Issues on Political Theory*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Nagel, T. 'Ruthlessness in Public Life' in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.75-90.
- ————— 'Concealment and Exposure' in his *Concealment and Exposure*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- Waldron, J. *Liberal Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) Ch. 2.

Week 2.

'Negative and Positive Liberty'

Seminar questions:

- What is the difference between positive and negative liberty? Is it relevant?
- Is there something wrong with negative liberty?
- Is it enough for the state to protect negative liberty? Should it also foster positive liberty?

Core reading:

- Berlin, I. 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in his *Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- Taylor, Ch. 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty?' in his *Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.211-29.

Supplementary reading:

- Dworkin, R. *Sovereign Virtue*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Ch. 3.
- Carter, I. *A Measure of Freedom*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Introduction and Part 2.
- Hobbes, T. *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Ch. XXI.
- Macpherson, C. B. 'Berlin's Division of Liberty' in his *Democratic Theory*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973).
- Mill, J. S. 'On Liberty' in *On Liberty and other Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) Ch. 1-3.
- Pettit, P. *A Theory of Freedom*, (Oxford: Polity, 2001).
- Rousseau, J-J. *Social Contract*, Various editions, I, VI, VII.

Week 3.

'Utilitarianism'

Seminar questions:

- What is the difference between utilitarianism as a moral doctrine and as political doctrine? Is the difference relevant?
- Can utility be measured? Can interpersonal comparisons be made?
- Is utilitarianism self-defeating?
- What is the point of Williams' story 'Jim and the Indians'?
- How does the difference between external and internal preferences threaten utilitarianism?
- Does utilitarianism fail to respect the separateness of persons? Does it matter?

Core reading:

- Smart, J.J.C. and Williams B. *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

Supplementary reading:

- Dworkin, R. 'Justice and Rights' in his *Taking Rights Seriously* (London: Ducksworth,

1977).

- ———— *Sovereign Virtue*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), Ch. 1.
- Griffin, J. *Well-being*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), Ch. 1-4.
- Harsanyi, J. *Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation*, (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976).
- Kymlicka, W. *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), Ch. 3.
- Mill, J. S. 'Utilitarianism' in *On Liberty and other Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
- Rawls, J. *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) secs.5, 15,27-30.
- Scheffler, S. *Consequentialism and its Critics*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986), Introduction.
- Sen, A. 'Utilitarianism and Welfarism', *Journal of Philosophy*, 76, (1979), 463-89.
- ———— Choice, Welfare and Measurement, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982) Ch. 9, 12.
- Sen, A. and B. Williams, *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) essays by Taylor, Schick, Elster, Scanlon, Harsanyi, Rawls.
- Check the database for the journal *Utilitas*, there are many interesting papers published there.

Week 4.

'John Rawls: Justice as Fairness'

Seminar questions:

- What are Rawls' two principles of justice? Are they appealing?
- What is the Original Position? What role does it play in Rawls' argument? Is it plausible?
- Would the parties choose the two principles?

Core reading:

- Rawls, J. *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) Secs. 3, 4, 9, 11-13, 20, 24-26.

Supplementary reading:

- Audard, C. *John Rawls* (London: Acumen, 2007).
- Barry, B. *Justice as Impartiality* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), Ch. 1, 3.
- Daniels, N. (ed.) *Reading Rawls* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press)
- Freeman, S. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Read whichever chapters call your attention. Also, look at the vast bibliography cited there.
- ———— *Rawls* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- Martin, R. 'Economic Justice: Contractarianism and Rawls's Difference Principle, in D. Boucher, and P. Kelly (eds.) *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls* (London: Routledge, 1994).
- Nagel, T. 'Equality' in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
- Pogge, T. *John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- Rawls, J. *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001) Part 2.

- Scanlon, T. 'The Diversity of Objections to Inequality, in his *The Difficulty of Tolerance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- Sen, A. 'Justice: Freedom versus Means', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 19 (1990), 111-21.
- Waldron, J. 'John Rawls and the Social Minimum', in his *Liberal Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Week 5.

'Libertarian Justice'

Seminar questions:

- Do patterns upset liberty? Should Will Chamberlain's earnings be taxed?
- Does Nozick succeed in devising a pure entitlement theory?
- Is liberty or self-ownership at the centre of Nozick's theory?
- Is Nozick unfair to the poor?

Core reading:

- Nozick, R., *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) Ch. 7.
- Rawls, J. *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) Sec. 24.

Supplementary reading:

- Arneson, R. 'Lockean Self-ownership: Toward a Demolition' *Political Studies*, 39 (1991), 36-54.
- Cohen, G. A. *Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) Ch, 1-4, 9, 10.
- Freeman, S. 'Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View' *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30 (2001), 105-51.
- Nagel, T. 'Libertarianism without Foundations' in Paul, J. (ed.) *Reading Nozick* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). See also essays by Williams, Scheffler, Scanlon, O'Neill.
- Olsaretti, S. *Liberty, Desert and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chs. 4,5.
- Otsuka, M. 'Self-ownership and Equality in his *Libertarianism without Inequality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- Perry, S. 'Libertarianism, Entitlement, and Responsibility', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 26 (1997) 351-96.
- Rawls J. *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) Sec. 12-14, 17, 20-26
- Wolff, J. *Robert Nozick* (Cambridge, Polity,1991).

Week 6.

'Equality of What? Resources and Capabilities'

Seminar questions:

- Assess the debate between 'primary goods', 'resources' and 'capabilities'.
- What is the relation between equality and luck?

- How convincing is Dworkin's 'envy test' and the 'hypothetical insurance market' as a theory of distributive justice?

Core reading:

- Dworkin, R. *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 2.
- Sen, A. 'Equality of What?' in Darwall, S. (ed.) *Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 307-30.

Supplementary reading:

- Arneson, R. 'Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare', *Philosophical Studies*, 56 (1989), 77-93.
- Burley, J. (ed.) *Dworkin and his Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), read chapters by Cohen, Otsuka, and Arneson.
- Clayton, M and A. Williams, 'Egalitarian Justice and Interpersonal Comparisons', *European Journal of Political Research*, 35 (1999), 445-64.
- Cohen, G. A. 'On the Currency of Distributive Justice', *Ethics*, 99 (1989), 906-44.
- Daniels, 'Equality of What: Welfare, Resources or Capabilities' in his *Justice and Justification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Dworkin, R. et. al. 'Symposium on Ronald Dworkin's *Sovereign Virtue*', *Ethics*, 113 (2002) 5-143.
- Matravers, M. 'Responsibility, Luck and the 'Equality of What' Debate' *Political Studies*, 50 (2002), 558-72.
- Rawls, J. 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', in his *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 359-87.
- Roemer, J. *Theories of Distributive Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) Ch. 7.
- Scanlon, T. 'Equality of Resources and Equality of Welfare: A forced Marriage?' *Ethics*, 97 (1986) 111-118.
- Sen, A. *Inequality Reexamined* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- Williams, A. 'Equality for the Ambitious', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 52 (2002), 377-89.
- ————— 'Equality, Ambition and Insurance' *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 78 (2004), 131-50.

Week 7.

'Equality or what?'

Seminar questions:

- Should we be egalitarians, sufficientarians or prioritarians? Or none of them?
- Is the levelling-down objection fatal to egalitarians?

Core reading:

- Frankfurt, H. 'Equality as a Moral Idea', *Ethics*, 98 (1987), 21-43.
- Parfit, D. 'Equality or Priority?' in Clayton, M. and A. Williams (eds.) *The Ideal of Equality* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).

Supplementary reading:

- Brighouse, H. and A. Swift 'Equality, Priority and Positional Goods', *Ethics*, 116 (2006), 471-97.
- Casal, P. 'Why Sufficiency is not Enough', *Ethics*, 117 (2007), 296-326.
- Clayton, M and A. Williams, 'Some Questions for Egalitarians' in Clayton, M. and A. Williams (eds.) *The Ideal of Equality* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
- Crisp, R. 'Egalitarianism and Compassion', *Ethics*, 113, (2003), 119-26.
- ——— 'Equality, Priority, and Compassion', *Ethics*, 113 (2003), 745-63.
- Holtug, N. and K. Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), *Egalitarianism* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Kekes, J. 'A Puzzle for Egalitarians', *Ethics*, 107, (1997) 658-70.
- Mason, A. *Levelling the Playing Field* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) ch. 5.
- Temkin, L. *Inequality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- ——— 'Equality, Priority and the Levelling-Down Objection' in Clayton, M. and A. Williams (eds.) *The Ideal of Equality* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
- ——— 'Egalitarianism Defended', *Ethics*, 114 (2003), 764-82.
- ——— 'Equality, Priority or What?' *Economics and Philosophy*, 19 (2003) 61-87.

Week 8.

'Cohen on Incentives and the Site of Justice'

Seminar questions:

- Is Cohen's appeal for an 'egalitarian ethos' convincing? How can the Rawlsians reply?
- Is the difference principle egalitarian enough?
- Can incentive inequality be justified?
- Is there a meaningful difference between the first and third person perspectives regarding distributive justice?

Core reading:

- Cohen, G. A. 'Incentives, Inequality, and Community', in Darwall, S. (ed.) *Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

Supplementary reading:

- Brighouse, H. *Justice* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), ch. 8.
- Cohen, G. A. 'Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 26 (1997), 3-30
- Cohen, G. A. 'The Pareto Argument for Inequality', in E. Paul et. al. (eds.) *Contemporary Social and Political Philosophy*.
- Cohen, G. A. *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
- Cohen, J. 'Taking People as They Are?', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30 (2001), 363-86.

- Estlund, D. 'Liberalism, Equality and Fraternity in Cohen's Critique of Rawls' *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 6 (1998), 99-112.
- Julius, A. 'Basic Structure and the Value of Equality', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 31 (2003), 321-55.
- Hurley, S. *Justice, Luck, and Knowledge* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) Chs. 8, 9.
- Nagel, T. 'Cohen on Inequality' in his *Concealment and Exposure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- Williams, A. 'Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 27 (1998), 225-47.
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Week 9.

'The Communitarian Critique to Liberalism'

Seminar questions:

- Can a theory of justice be 'political, not metaphysical'?
- In what sense is liberalism inherently individualistic? Should liberals regret that?
- Has Sandel misunderstood Rawls?

Core reading:

- Rawls, J. 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical' in his *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 388-414.
- Sandel, M. *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Ch. 4 and Postscript 'A Response to Rawls' Political Liberalism

Supplementary reading:

- Barry, B. *Culture and Equality* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001).
- Buchanan, A. 'Assessing the Communitarian Critique', *Ethics*, 99 (1989), 852-82.
- Gutmann, A. 'The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 22 (1993), 171-206.
- Kymlicka, W. *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- MacIntyre, A. *After Virtue*, 2nd ed. (London, Duckworth, 1985).
- Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. 'Rawls and Communitarianism', in Freeman, S. *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.460-87.
- Okin, S. *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
- Swift, A. and S. Mulhall, *Liberals and Communitarians*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Blackwell, 1996).
- Taylor, Ch. 'Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate' in Rosenblum, N. (ed.) *Liberalism and the Moral Life* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 159-182.
- Taylor, Ch. *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- Walzer, M. *Spheres of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

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Week 10.

‘Perfectionism and the Problem of Neutrality’

Seminar questions:

- What sort of neutrality do liberals seek?
- Should the State be neutral?
- Is the idea of public reason feasible? Is it attractive?
- Is liberal perfectionism just another comprehensive doctrine?

Core reading:

- Raz, J. *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), ch. 14-15.
- Rawls, J. ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ in his *The Law of People with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 129-80.

Supplementary reading:

- Arneson, R. 'Perfectionism and Politics', *Ethics*, 111 (2000), 37-63.
- Bou-Habib, P., 'A Theory of Religious Accommodation', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 23 (2006), 109-26.
- Caney, S. ‘Anti-Perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism’, *Political Studies*, 43 (1995), 284-64.
- Chan, J., 'Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 29 (2000), 5-42.
- Christman, J. 'Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy', in Taylor, J. (ed.) *Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Roles in Contemporary Moral Philosophy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 277-98.
- Clayton, M., 'White on Autonomy, Neutrality and Well-Being', *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 27 (1993), 101-12
- ———. 'Liberal Equality and Ethics', *Ethics* (2002), 113, 8-22.
- ———. 'A Puzzle about Justice, Ethics and the Sacred'. In Burley, J. (ed.) *Dworkin and his Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 99-110
- Cohen, J. ‘Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus’ in D. Copp et. al. (eds.) *The Idea of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
- Dreben, B., 'On Rawls and Political Liberalism', in Freeman, S. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 316-46.
- Galston, W., *Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- Gaus, G., 'The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism', in Christman, J. and J. Anderson, (eds.) *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 272-306.
- Hurka, T., 'Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Neutrality', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 3 (1995), 36-57.
- Jones, P., 'Equality, Recognition, Difference', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 9, (2006) 23-46.

- ———. 'Toleration, Recognition and Identity', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14, (2006) 123-43.
- Kymlicka, W. 'Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality' *Ethics*, 99, (1989) 883-905.
- Larmore, C. 'Political Liberalism', *Political Theory*, 18, (1990) 339-60.
- Nagel, T. 'Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 16 (1987), 215-40.
- ———. 'Rawls and Liberalism', in Freeman, S., (ed) *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 62-85.
- Quong, J., 'Disputed Practices and Reasonable Pluralism', *Res Publica*, 10 (2004), 43-67.
- Raz, J. 'The Scope of Public Reason', *Political Studies*, 52 (2004), 233-50.
- ———. 'Facing Up: A Reply', *Southern California Law Review*, 62 (1989), 1153-235.
- ———. *Practical Reasons and Norms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
- ———. 'Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 19 (1990), 3-46.
- Reidy, D., 'Rawls's Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough', *Res Publica*, 6, (2000) 49-72.
- Sher, G., *Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism in Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- Wall, S., 'Perfectionism, Public Reasons, and Religious Accommodation', *Social Theory and Practice*, 31 (2005), 281-304.
- Williams, A. 'The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason', *Res Publica*, 6 (2000), 199-211.

Week 11.

'Gender and Justice'

Seminar questions:

- How convincing is Okin's conception of justice and gender?
- Is liberalism male-biased?
- Is the ethics of care bad for feminism?

Core reading:

- Okin, S. M. *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Ch. 1, 6, 7.

Supplementary reading:

- Anderson, E. 'Is Women's Labor a Commodity?', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 19 (1990), 71-92.
- Baier, A. 'The Need for More than Justice', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 13 (1987), 41-56.
- Blum, L. 'Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory', *Ethics*, 98 (1988), 472-91.
- Cohen, J., 'Okin on Justice, Gender, and Family', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 22 (1992), 263-86.

- Dancy, J. 'Caring about Justice', *Philosophy*, 67 (1992) 447-66.
- Diamond, J. *Why is Sex Fun?* (London: Phoenix, 1998).
- Evans, J. 'An Overview of the Problem for Feminist Political Theorists', in J. Evans (ed.) *Feminism and Political Theory* (London: Sage, 1986).
- Frazer, N. and N. Lacey 'Liberal Individualism: The Feminist Critique', in their *The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal/Communitarian Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
- Gilligan, C. *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
- Held, V. (ed.) *Justice and Care: Essentials Readings in Feminist Ethics* (Oxford: Westview, 1995).
- Hrdy, S. *The Woman who Never Evolved* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
- ————*Mother Nature* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1999)
- Hurley, S. 'Sex and the Social Construction of Gender: Can Feminism and Evolutionary Psychology be reconciled?' in Browne, J. (ed.) *The Future of Gender* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- Kymlicka, W. 'Rethinking the Family', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 20 (1991), 77-97.
- Nussbaum, M. *Sex and Social Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Ch. 1-2.
- Nussbaum, M. and A. Sen (eds.) *The Quality of Life*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Esp. Part III.
- Okin, S., 'Justice and Gender', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 16 (1987), 42-72.
- ———, 'Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice' *Ethics*, 99, (1989), 229-49.
- ———, 'Politics and the Complex Inequality of Gender' in D. Miller and M. Walzer (eds.) *Pluralism, Justice and Equality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 120-43.
- Pateman, C. *The Sexual Contract* (Cambridge: Polity, 1988).
- Phillips, A. (ed.) *Feminism and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
- Rawls, J., *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001), §50.
- Ridley, M. *The Red Queen* (London: Penguin, 1994).
- Wright, R. *The Moral Animal* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994).
- Young, I. *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
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Week 12.

'Revision and Conclusions'