

What Goes Around Comes Around: Structural Analysis of Color Revolutions

Introduction

Political development pathways in the post-Soviet space emerged at the crossroad of institutionalized and street politics. Starting from very similar initial conditions in the early 1990s, some countries opted for evolutionary building of political institutions, whereas others resorted to street politics and experienced revolutionary turnovers of the power-holding elites. In general, the evolutionary path was taken either by stable democracies (Baltic states) or stable autocracies (most of Central Asian states). Countries with hybrid regimes, however, swung between the evolutionary and revolutionary political changes. Yet all post-communist regimes that chose a non-democratic path were keen to mimic democracies by regularly holding elections. In most cases elections served as a legitimating mechanism for the autocrats, but in several instances it revealed vulnerability of hybrid regimes. Indeed, mass protests peacefully ousted long-serving leaders in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) after national elections that opposition forces claimed to be rigged by incumbent governments. Although mass protests and street politics were present in all cases, final outcomes were achieved through the negotiations between the incumbent and the opposition elites. Negotiated outcome, in different contexts named as elite settlements (Burton and Higley 1987) or negotiated revolutions (Lawson 2005) set a new equilibrium for political actors. It is worth noting that rigged elections followed by mass protests were not exclusive to these four countries in the region. Similar processes started, but never transformed into elite settlements in Armenia,

Azerbaijan and Belarus. Why did political contentions in the streets resulted in elite settlements in some cases, but not in others with similar preconditions? This is the main research question of present project.

This paper develops theoretical and methodological frameworks for the analysis elite settlements during color revolutions. Most of the authors discuss these cases in the context of democratization. In contrast, this paper intends no normative claims associated with revolutionary outcomes. Instead, it interprets color revolutions as a punctuation points between the pre-revolutionary equilibrium and post-revolutionary elite settlements. Following Burton and Higley, here elites are defined as people who “are able, through their positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes individually, regularly, and seriously” (Burton and Higley 2005: 296). Elite settlement is defined as elite negotiation and agreement on their basic disagreements (Burton and Higley 2005: 296). It should be noted that, unlike these authors, this paper makes no causal link between elite settlement and democratization. In contrast, elite settlement is understood as a precondition of a stable, equilibrium but not necessarily democratic stage or elite coexistence.

The concept of elite settlements received surprisingly little attention by the scholars studying color revolutions. As important as mass protest were in all cases, ultimate outcome came about through the negotiations between the incumbent regime and the opposition leadership. Foundations of new equilibrium stages were set by the presidential resignation (Georgia), the second round of elections (Ukraine) or transfer of power to the opposition leader (Kyrgyzstan). Surely, street politics was important to give bargaining power to the opposition, but it was not a

sufficient condition for dramatic change as indicated by cases of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. In these countries mass protests helped little to bring about elite settlement. As a result, incumbent regimes did not experience break-points into their respective equilibrium phases. Thus, the puzzle is why political contentious leads to negotiated outcomes in some cases and not in others? To answer this question I will apply a design of the most similar cases and select two countries, where similar preconditions and political processes produced dramatically different outcomes: in Georgia political contention powered by mass protests produced elite settlements and new equilibrium, whereas in Armenia similar processes strengthened already existing equilibrium. Although this research will be conducted in two countries, units of analysis will be the government and the opposition elite networks prior and after political contentions of the 1990s that intended to produce major political shifts.

Analytical framework of this paper is a synthesis of the punctuated equilibrium model and the relational approach to political action. The concept of punctuated equilibrium, originally applied by evolutionary biologists to explain the emergence of new species, views political process as relatively long equilibrium periods interrupted by relatively short disturbances that produces major shift to new equilibrium stages. From this perspective, color revolutions can be considered as punctuations between the pre- and post-revolutionary equilibria among the elite groups. Yet one needs to understand what is going on inside the elite groups before and during the short punctuation periods. And here comes a potential contribution of a relational approach to political action that places emphasis on relational properties of actors and disregards conventional attributes. From this view, often cited attributes like the incumbent regime strength or personal characteristics of opposition leaders loses analytical game to relational ties among the key elite

actors. Hence, if political contention is a competition between the opposed elite networks, success and failure becomes contingent to the network structure built by multiplicity of relations that binds key actors together. Moreover, attributes like regime strength, opposition unity and elite division can also be explained by these relational variables. However, structure not only disables some actions, but also creates opportunities for certain activities that contribute to dynamic development of competing networks. To identify network structure and scan actors' structural positions, this research will rely heavily on methods and techniques of social network analysis. To construct relevant elite networks in the periods of punctuated equilibria, I will use databases of grant-making organizations for initial analysis and a snowballing technique to collect relatively complete network data on the later stage.

I expect to find the network structure having a significant effect on elite configurations. Thus, I hope to identify common structural factors of collective actions leading to elite settlements. It is worth noting that this research will be conducted in the two small neighboring countries. Therefore, its observations and findings should be used with caution to forecast stability and change in the realm of muddling hybrid regimes.

Analytical framework

To understand the logic of elite settlement after contentious politics, it is necessary to identify relational features of elites that enable or disable settlement strategies. For this purpose relational paradigm and network analysis can be linked to the concept of punctuated equilibrium. The punctuated equilibrium model differs from models of gradual change by arguing that periods of gradual evolution are "punctuated" by sudden revolutionary periods of rapid change. This

concept was originated from evolutionary biology and later applied to international relations, organizational analysis and policy studies (Krasner 1984; Gersick 1991; John 2003). Another difference between the punctuated equilibrium and linear models is that the former accepts both directions of change and rejects a possibility of a desired “end goal” (Sabherwal, Hirschheim and Goles 2001). According to Gersik (1991: 14), one key component of the punctuated equilibrium model is “the set of fundamental choices a system has made of (1) the basic parts into which the units will be organized and (2) the basic activity patterns that will maintain its existence”.

Yet political system is dynamic and activity patterns change through time. In the punctuated equilibrium model this change comes abruptly and gives birth to a new equilibrium stage. Thus, to understand why actors refuse to follow accepted patterns of action, one has to analyze their interactions before and during the points of punctuation. From this perspective, relational (network) analysis is promising, since it has necessary tools for analyzing patterns of relations. Relational analysis suggests that actors involved in the transaction derive their meaning, significance and identity from the changing functional roles they play within the transaction (Emirbayer 1997: 292). Operationalization of this paradigm is best approximated by social network analysis that represents actors as sets of nodes linked by one or more type of relationship. Nodes may consist of individuals, organizations, and other entities such as neighborhoods or even states. Relations may range from friendship and organizational co-membership to exchange of material and/or symbolic resources. Ties among the actors are normally asymmetric, leading to unequal distribution of scarce resources. As a result, structure of ties creates non-random context for competition and cooperation for available resources (Wellman 1988: 40-41).

The punctuated equilibrium model coupled with relational (network) paradigm offers interesting opportunity for understanding political changes like color revolutions. Contextual or structural factors unevenly distribute opportunities and constraints for political actors (Hay 2002: 164-165). So who can get what opportunity at what point of time becomes conditioned by actors' structural position in networks they are embedded in. For structural positions are dynamic due to disappearance and appearance of social relations, opportunities for any individual actor also changes through time. Those who can identify a window of opportunity and act strategically can transform the structure, thus, creating new opportunities for other sets of actors (Hay 2002: 166).

I argue that political development frequently follows the punctuated equilibrium logic: periods of stable development are interrupted by relatively short periods of instability that gives birth to a new stage of stability. Whereas in stable democracies punctuations are caused by new ideas (for instance Thatcher's "revolution"), in hybrid regimes equilibrium stages are interrupted by revolutions. In the case of post-communist world one major point of punctuation came in the late 1980s, when the communist rule ended. Since then equilibrium stage was characterized by democratic development in some countries and by autocratic stability in others. The second punctuation point, I argue came as color revolutions in hybrid regimes that became a starting point of a new equilibrium, albeit not necessarily a democratic one. It is argued that uncertainties associated with the power transfer in hybrid regimes established a condition when old equilibrium is no more satisfactory for competing political actors (Hale 2006). While existing literature on color revolutions gives comprehensive account of preconditions that challenged the

equilibrium, it says little, if anything, about the factors facilitating elite settlements during the political crisis.

Color revolutions as punctuations in equilibria

A new pattern of regime change in the post-communist space motivated many analysts to search for relevant explanations. Since color revolutions ousted enduring autocrats, the debate has been naturally centered on the possibilities of democratization. For instance, McFaul labeled events of Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine as cases of successful democratic breakthrough (McFaul 2005: 6). Rosy view of color revolutions was somewhat withered by a different revolutionary outcome in Kyrgyzstan. However, proponents of the democratization thesis quickly found a solution, arguing that some countries without necessary preconditions could adopt revolutionary actions by sheer power of diffusion (Beissinger 2007: 273). Whereas some authors sought for new equilibria, others argued for continuities: for example, color revolutions hardly qualify as revolutions for Hale, as they constitute continuity of patronal presidential rather than democratization (Hale 2006: 306).

Scholars that are looking for favorable factors for color revolutions emphasize either structural preconditions or the diffusion power. Structuralists assign the main explanatory power to the contextual factors such as economic development, regime structure and strength of ties with the West. Still, authors mainly focus on different attributed of elites, rather than on elite interactions. In his recent work Way focuses exclusively on structural weaknesses of hybrid regimes arguing that color revolutions were unavoidable due to low organizational capacity of incumbent regimes. He lists three internal preconditions as sources of incumbent strength: (1) highly

institutionalized ruling party, (2) well-funded coercive apparatus, and (3) discretionary control of the state over the economy (Way 2008: 66; Way 2009: 92). Thus, opposition strategies, tactics and even scale of mass protests are considered as contingent to the regime strength: weaker regimes can be toppled by relatively low-scale protests (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan), whereas challenging stronger regime require greater effort to mobilize protestors (Ukraine) (Way 2009: 94). McFaul also acknowledges the importance of structural factors, such as unpopular semi-autocratic regimes and division among the coercive forces. However, he also highlights the importance of agency, namely unpopularity of incumbents, opposition's ability to unite and apply right protest strategies using the independent media (McFaul 2005).

Structural features of incumbent regimes are Hale's focus too, but from a deferent perspective. He also thinks that electoral revolutions can be predicted, since regime type hints to predictable behaviors of political actors. Thus, patronal presidentialism involves regular and predictable cycles of significant movement and popular support. The elite contestation could therefore mobilize genuine support among the population during the unfair election process. The effect of collective action is expected to be the most powerful in the countries where the time of power transfer is approaching and where exogenous factors, such as international pressure, exists (Hale 2005: 321). In contrast, D'Anieri argues that a single variable, division among the regime's security and law enforcement forces, explains many other important variables such as the organization of the opposition, the ability to demonstrate that election results were falsified, the independence of media, the neutrality of security forces and the ability to mobilize protestors (D'Anieri 2006: 336).

Beissinger's approach also focuses on elites, but on the opposition side. His main argument is that diffusion of ideas and action repertoires became a vehicle for color revolutions. According to Beissinger, elections provide good opportunity to challenge the incumbent regime without engaging in unlawful rebellions, but this is possible through modular actions that are learned from already successful cases (Beissinger 2007). Whereas Beissinger argue for diffusion by default, some authors believe that electoral revolutions exemplified the Western attempt to export democratic institutions to the Eastern frontiers. They assert that regime changes are realized in accordance with a strategic blueprint primarily through the Western-funded organizations. Thus, support by the Western actors in party training, civil society building and peaceful protests could eventually bring down autocratic governments (Herd 2005; Anable 2006; Kuzio 2006).

As it was described above, explanations of color revolutions are by and large structural, focusing either the incumbent or the opposition side. All authors give due attention to large-scale protests that facilitated regime change, but little effort has been made to analyze inter- and intra-elite interactions that lead to specific outcomes in color revolutions. McFaul does mention negotiations in Serbia and Ukraine, but assigns no significance to this factor. Strangely, he dismisses the presence of negotiations in Georgia altogether (McFaul 2005: 17-18). Perhaps one exception is Welt's work, where he convincingly describes three alternative scenarios for political developments in Georgia just before and immediately after the rigged elections. He suggests that three alternatives were feasible: 1) holding of passably free and fair elections, 2) post-electoral adjustment of the vote count and 3) repeated parliamentary elections (Welt 2004: 51). Yet elite interactions lead to the fourth, the least possible scenario – resignation of he

president and partial abolition of fraudulent parliamentary election results. This example suggests that relational variables should be applied to tackle the interactions. Moreover, the outcome of the elite competition can be explained by the differential structural properties of those networks. From this perspective, government actors were constrained by intra-elite relations. Similarly, intra-elite relations on the elite created a structure that enabled some actions and disabled others. Tucker (2007) suggests that mass mobilization of protestors was very important factor for the opposition success. However, mass protests alone did not achieve major breakthrough in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. In the cases of color revolutions protesters did enable the opposition to gain extra bargaining power, but disabled them to negotiate suboptimal outcomes with the incumbents.

Collective actions through network lenses

Interest in the relationship between collective actions and social networks has grown in recent years. Some contributions have dealt primarily with the process of individual recruitment and various forms of collective engagement (Kriesi 1991; Opp 1989; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Other scholars have focused on overall structure of networks in specific communities and their impact on development of collective action (Gould 1991; Macy 1993). Meanwhile, studies of the structure of social movements have primarily focused on overlapping affiliations (Schmitt-Beck 1989; Diani 1995) and interorganizational exchanges (Rucht 1989; Diani 1995; Phillips 1991). Another relevant research direction focuses the resource exchange between organizations that happen through direct and indirect ties: direct ties exchange information and mobilize resources, whereas indirect ties cover a broad range of possibilities from shared personnel to joint

participation in events and common linkages to the third party organizations (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Jones et al. 2001; Hanes 1984).

The main dependent variable in the research is elite settlement operationalized as its presence or absence. Since this research looks at collective action of elites through network lenses, it becomes important to understand what network variables are relevant for elite settlement on micro, meso and macro levels. Since network analysis is a loose coalition of methods and approaches rather than a social theory with a predictive power, Multitheoretical, Multilevel analytical framework (MTML) suggests the application of different social theories at different levels of network analysis. Although none of the theories, on their own, provide full explanation of network phenomena, application of multiple theories provides complementary information for the explanation of emergent networks (Monge and Contractor 2003: 21). While this research applies quantitative methods of social network analysis, I should emphasize qualitative and comparative focus of this work, since all variables, including network measures, require qualitative assessment and interpretation.

In theory, macro level looks at the general structure of network. Since the world is ultimately one network, where all individuals are connected by average path length of six (Watts 2003), it is hardly feasible to analyze global network. In practice, researchers set informed boundaries to a network under study and treat it as a global one. In this research network boundary can be set where no more new actor is generated by the snowballing technique. Networks constructed by this way can be analyzed and classified according to the following ideal types: *Small World* (approximates networks in modern cities with multiple overlapping networks and no exceptional

individuals holding disproportional number of ties), *Village* (mimics villages where everyone is connected to everyone else in the social units, but only rare individuals connect these social units), *Opinion Leader* (most people have few connections, but few individuals have many), and *Hierarchy* (number of ties are hierarchically arranged from the top to the bottom) (Siegel, 2009: 131). It is argued that the ideal model of *Opinion Leader* network entails the highest level of participation when leaders' motivation to participate is uniformly high. In contrast, uniformly high motivation in the *Hierarchical* model reduces the level of participation. In the case of *Village* network, the level of participation depends on the ties between otherwise isolated participation cliques (Siegel, 2009: 136). Thus, *I expect higher probability of elite settlements in the context, where network structure resembles the Opinion Leader ideal type.*

On the meso (dyadic) level I will apply exchange theory, which interprets social interaction as based on the need to obtain resources from others and to provide their own resources in return (Cook and Whitmeyer 1992: 110). On the dyadic level exchange is operationalized as the *reciprocity* variable. Reciprocity is defined as the extent of symmetry of ties between two nodes (Monge and Contractor 2003: 40). Thus, the following is expected for in the competition of the governmental and "revolutionary" networks: *The higher proportion of reciprocal dyads within a network the greater its cohesion and thus, its competitive advantage during the political crisis.*

On the micro (nodal) level I will use the theory of structural holes, which assigns competitive advantage to those actors that are capable of reaching discontinuities in social networks (Burt 2001: 36). Accessibility to the structural holes can be measured by a nodal level network property called structural autonomy (Monge and Contractor 2003: 57). Therefore, the first

expectation states that: *Greater proportion of structurally autonomous actors in a network increases its bargaining power during the political crisis.*

Network data and measurements

The main objective of this paper is to find out what structural properties of elite networks facilitate or block elite settlements. This requires comprehensive analysis of elite networks in selected countries (Armenia and Georgia). It is worth noting that network data is the hardest to collect, since informants are frequently unwilling to disclose sensitive information. Thus, my strategy is to rely on available sources as much as possible and collect additional information directly from the elite representatives whenever feasible.

It is well acknowledged that civil society organizations played important role in color revolutions. In fact, individuals coming from civil society took active part in the process of elite settlement and later accepted high positions in the government. Therefore, I intend to start data collection on civil society networks and extend it further to other actors through the snowballing technique. Civil society networks will be constructed in Armenia and Georgia using grant management files of two major foundations – local branches of Soros Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation. These files include: 1) the list of funded NGOs; 2) the list of funded organizations' leaders; 3) the list of project directors and project participants. Applying standard social network analysis, this data will be transformed into a two-mode matrix that connects individuals to organizations. The two-mode matrix will be partitioned into the two one-mode matrices (organization-by-organization and individual-by-individual) that indicate which individuals are connected to each-other through organizations and which organizations are linked

through individuals. The first stage will close with quantitative analysis of the organizational and individual matrices using UCINET, a network analysis software. The software will help to identify key organizational and individual actors for further data collection and analysis on the second stage.

The second stage will start by snowballing to identify additional actors, as well as resource exchange and network overlaps among them. Snowballing normally starts from focal informants and extend the list of additional actors until no new actor is identified (Scott 2000: 61). For the opposition network the focal points will be the central civil society actors identified on the first stage. For the government network the focal points will be the most active politicians and government supporters one year prior to the street actions in each case. Relevant information will be gathered through a network questionnaire that will contain questions about the overlapping affiliations, resource exchange and respondents' social ties. Examples of relations that can be useful for the analysis are as follows: co-membership of public or private organizations, reputational networks (who considers whom to be an influential person), advice networks (who asks whom for advice), friendship ties among the key actors of social movements, etc. Gathering the data on multiple relations is important to measure network overlaps, operationalized as multiplexity (Monge and Contractor 2003).

The second stage will end with quantitative analysis of more completed network sets for the government and the opposition. To estimate the values of independent variables, I will construct (quasi) full networks and ego-centered networks, and measure network properties such as structural autonomy, reciprocation, density, centrality and prestige. I will also conduct

blockmodel analysis to identify structurally equivalent actors and cohesive subgroups (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Using these measures I will test expectations specified above on structural preconditions for elite settlements.

Concluding remarks

This paper argues that political contentions using mass mobilization of opposition supporters can only lead to a new equilibrium stage if an elite settlement takes place. While countries of color revolutions achieved major political transformations through elite settlements, in other countries with similar preconditions incumbent regimes managed to maintain existing equilibria. Differential outcomes have been mainly by contextual variables (favorable conditions). Among these variables the regime strength, the opposition strength and the division of law enforcement forces stand out as the most frequently cited. Yet, these variables have been treated as given and little effort has been made to explain them. Considering the elite settlement process as a competition between the regime and the opposition networks, I argue that variables derived from the relational (network) paradigm can provide a key for assessing the degree of competitiveness of the opposed networks. Moreover, network variables can explain behavior of the key individuals embedded in the competing networks. Thus, network measures (structural autonomy, reciprocation, centrality, multiplexity) can explain submissiveness of incumbent leaders in all cases of color revolutions and harshness of measures taken by regimes in the cases of failed unsuccessful collective actions.

References:

- Beissinger, M. (2007). Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5 (2): 259-276.
- Burton, M.G. and Higley, J. (1987). Elite settlements. *American Sociological Review*, 52: 295-307.
- Burt, R.S. (2001). Structural holes versus network closure as social capital. In N. Lin, K. Cook and R.S. Burt (Eds.), *Social Capital: Theory and Research*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Cook, K.S., & Whitmeyer, J.M. (1992). Two approaches to social structure: Exchange theory and network theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*. 18(1), 109-127.
- Cook, K.S., Gillmore, M., and Yamagishi, T. (1988). Network Connections and the distribution of power in exchange networks. *American review of Sociology*, 93 (4): 833-851.
- Curtis, R.L. and Zurcher, L.A. Jr. (1973). Stable resources of protest movements: The multi-organizational field. *Social Forces*, 52 (1): 53-61.
- D'Anieri, P. (2006). Explaining the success and failure of post-communist revolutions. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39: 331-350.
- Diani, M. (1995). *Green Networks. A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for relational sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 103(2), 281-317.
- Fairbanks, C.H. JR. (2004). Georgia's Rose Revolution. *Journal of Democracy*, 15 (2): 110-124.
- Gersick, C. J. G. (1991). Revolutionary change theories: A multilevel exploration of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm. *Academy of Management Review*, 16 (1): 10-36.
- Gould, R.V. (1991). Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871. In D. McAdam and D. A. Snow (Eds.), *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics*. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- Hale, H. E. (2005). Democracy and revolution in the postcommunist world: From chasing events to building theory, PONARS working paper # 24.
<<http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/workingpapers/>>

- Hanes, H.H. (1984). Black radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970. In D. McAdam and D. A. Snow (Eds.), *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics* Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- Hay, C. (2002). *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave.
- Herd, G. P. (2005). Colorful revolutions and the CIS: “manufactured” versus “managed” democracy? *Problems of Post-Communism*, 52(2): 3-18.
- John, P. (2003). Is there life after policy streams, advocacy coalitions, and punctuations: Using evolutionary theory to explain policy change? *The Policy Studies Journal*, 31 (4): 481-498.
- Jones, A., Huntchinson, R., van Dyke, N., and Gates, L. (2001). Coalition form and mobilization effectiveness in local social movements. *Sociological Spectrum*, 21: 207-31.
- Krasner, S. D. (1984). Approaches to the State Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics. *Comparative Politics*, 16 (2): 223-246.
- Kriesi, H. Koopmans, R. Duyvendak, J. W., and Giugni M. G. (1992). New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe. In D. McAdam and D. A. Snow (Eds.), *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics*. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- Knoke, D. (1990). *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuzio, T. (2005). Ukraine’s Orange Revolution: The opposition’s road to success. *Journal of Democracy*, 16(2): 117-130.
- Lawson, G. (2005). Negotiated revolutions: the prospects for radical change in contemporary world politics. *Review of International Studies*, 31: 473–493.
- Macy, M. W. (1990). Learning-theory and the logic of critical mass. *American Sociological Review*, 55 (6): 809-826.
- McAdam, D. and Paulsen, R. (1993). Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism. In D. McAdam and D. A. Snow (Eds.), *Social Movements: readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics*. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- Monge, P.R., and Contractor, N.S. (2003). *Theories of Communication Networks*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Opp, K. and Roehl W. (1990). Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest. In D. McAdam and D. A. Snow (Eds.), *Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics*. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- Rosenthal, N., Fingutd, M., Ethier, M., Karant R., and McDonald, D. (1985). Social Movements and network analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 90 (5): 1022-1054.
- Sabherwal, R., Hirschheim, R., and Goles, T. (2001). The dynamics of alignment: Insights from a punctuated equilibrium model. *Organization Science*, 12 (2): 179-197.
- Scott, J. (2000). *Social Network Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.
- Siegel, D.A. (2009). Social networks and collective action. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53 (1): 122-138.
- Schmitt-Beck, R. (1989). Organizational interlocks between new social movements and traditional elites. *European Journal of Political Research*, 17: 583-98.
- Wasserman, S., and Faust, K. (1994). *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Way, L. (2008). The real causes of color revolutions. *Journal of Democracy*, 19 (3): 55-68.
- Way, L. (2009). A reply to my critics. *Journal of Democracy*, 20 (1): 90-97.
- Watts, D.J. (2003). *Six Degrees: Science of a Connected Age*. London: Vintage.
- Wellman, B. (1988). Structural analysis: From method and metaphor to theory and substance. In B. Wellman and S.D. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Social Structures: A Network Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.