

Dorota Szeligowska
Draft prospectus
March 2009

Dynamics of Polish Patriotism after 1989: Concepts, Debates and Identities

I. Introduction

While I was writing my master thesis about ‘politics of history’ and the way this concept colonized political processes in Poland under the government of the conservative right (2005-2007), I was confronted with a broad use of the concept of patriotism in public discourse. I had the impression that the more often the term ‘patriotism’ was employed in various contexts, the more confuse its definition was becoming.

A very basic and conventional definition reads patriotism as ‘love of country’. Surely, this preliminary definition is not able to capture all possible understandings of patriotism. Nonetheless, it opens the way for everyone to a more or less free interpretation of what this feeling should consist of.

The overwhelming presence of the word patriotism in public discourse in Poland is what I tend to call an empirical puzzle. Why and how is patriotism made into a politically relevant concept? It can mean that, from being one of the four integrating forces encouraging the construction of political consensus in Poland¹, patriotism became an object of contestation.

¹ Diane M. Duffy, John L. Sullivan and Leonard A. Polakiewicz enumerate four integrating forces: ethnic and religious homogeneity of Polish people after 1945; existence of ‘persisting values’ within the Polish society that were not replaced or destroyed by the communist regime trying to impose its proper values; the Roman Catholic Church being an institution that was firmly preserving Polish national identity; an abstract appeal to patriotism that allowed people to identify with it. (“Patriotic perspectives in contemporary Poland: conflict or consensus?”, *The Polish Review* 3 (1993))

One can depart from the insight that patriotism is a multifaceted phenomenon²; specifically, in Poland it has always been an important feature of public debates, perceived by some as “school of practical thinking about politics”³. For this reason, I argue that undertaking an analysis of a series of public debates⁴ about patriotism and its meaning is a legitimate research object, and it would allow me to develop a broader understanding of Polish politics, its language (discourse) and its transformation after the change of regime in 1989. It will allow me to answer my research questions: *What is the significance of the concept of patriotism in political realm in Poland? To what purposes the language of patriotism is used, and what possible consequences it breeds?*

Conceptual history can be seen as a theoretical approach providing tools to analyze this kind of questions. There are different approaches within this theory I will analyze in depth in the next section of the prospectus. Here, I only wanted to point to the importance they all attach to the study of political concepts, processes of transformation, their actors, and the necessity to contextualize these dynamics. Such an analysis can be developed in more synchronic terms, focusing on particular speech-acts and their rhetorical value (as demonstrated by works of Quentin Skinner), or point to a more diachronic approach putting specific concepts within broader

² Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub enumerate four dimensions of patriotism: psychological (having cognitive, affective and behavioural components); social (constructing foundations of union of individuals into groups); political (as a tool for organizing, mobilizing, and gaining the support of group members); and cultural and educational. (*Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations* Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997), 6-7.

³ Jacek Kłoczkowski *Patriotyzm Polaków. Studia z historii idei* (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, Wyższa Szkoła Europejska im. ks. J. Tischnera, 2006), 7.

⁴ First of all I considered approaching this question as one broad public debate (that would fulfil the criteria of a public debate as defined by David Art 2006). However, I tend to think that a focus on a series of specific debates might be more clear and helpful in order to better assess their changing dynamics. Patriotism is a question that is often debated, especially on the occasions of national holidays, such as 3rd of May or 11 of November. However, apart from these ‘traditional’ occasions of its appearances in public discourse, there was a number of particular debates concerning its definition that engaged a number of actors, mostly intellectuals (in 1998, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005); within these debates they tried to provide a definition of patriotism that would not be dependent on fear or occupation as it was often the case by the past, but that would be more adapted to times of peace.

political languages (as promoted by John Pocock). Following Iain Hampsher-Monk⁵, I tend to think that both of these dimensions are necessary to appreciate the question of conceptual change in all its aspects. Even if conceptual history in both of its crucial variants - German and Anglo-Saxon - is more oriented at analyzing historical concept-formation, I believe that development of a contemporarily oriented conceptual history of patriotism in Poland would be valuable for general conceptual history of patriotism (such as developed by Mary G. Dietz 1989, 2002), conceptual history of Polish patriotism (following works of Andrzej Walicki on three traditions of Polish patriotism: republican, romantic and realist 1991) and normative theory of patriotism. The latter will not be absent from the theoretical focus of my work, because while actors try to define the concept of patriotism, often times they use theoretical references, and normative arguments, rarely their interventions can be perceived as neutral. Hence, conceptual tools that I will try to develop within literature review and theoretical framework of the prospectus will be helpful in order to analyze competing understandings and languages of patriotism and their importance in politics. They will also help me to shed light onto how different actors perceive and define common political culture, questions relating to social bond, loyalty and allegiance.

Studying patriotism might also be important, because “compared to the related phenomenon of nationalism, patriotism received surprisingly little attention in the social sciences”⁶. In the Polish case, nationalism constitutes a derogatory term; its concept is not widely used. Andrzej Walicki stipulates that “in the vocabulary of Polish politics the word nationalism is a pejorative term, reserved for the

⁵ Iain Hampsher-Monk, “Speech acts, languages or conceptual history?”. In *History of concepts: comparative perspectives* Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree (Amsterdam University Press, 1998), 46.

⁶ Daniel Bar-Tal, Ervin Staub, ed., *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997)

manifestations of intolerant, xenophobic ethnocentricity”⁷. For that reason, I will be particularly attentive to possible elements of nationalist language that would be part of discourse on patriotism. Disentangling of these two languages of patriotism and nationalism can contribute to clarification of their use at both general and Polish level.

In the following sections of the prospectus, I will introduce theoretical framework and literature that is relevant to my project. Then, I will present the methodology I plan to use. Finally, I will introduce my preliminary hypotheses and I will address the question of the relevance of my project to the field of political theory.

II. Theoretical framework and Literature Review

This section will allow me to review the literature I would be further addressing in my research. It will also help me to construct a preliminary theoretical framework necessary to understand the phenomenon of patriotism in all of its aspects.

A. Conceptual history

According to Terrence Ball, “political vocabulary consists not simply of words but of concepts”⁸. He sustains that words do not have histories, but concepts do. Quentin Skinner, who opposes a possibility of developing a history of concepts, challenges this statement, while he proposes to study the history of the use of concepts in political argument.

⁷ Andrzej Walicki. “Intellectual elites and the vicissitudes of “Imagined nation” in Poland”, in *Intellectuals and the articulation of the nation*, edited by Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (University of Michigan Press, 1999), 282.

⁸ Terrence Ball, “Political theory and conceptual change” in *Political theory: tradition and diversity*, Andrew Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 40.

Terrence Ball in his account of the link between political theory and conceptual change discusses the question of how key political concepts should be defined and analyzed. He sustains that W. B. Gallie challenged in 1956 the consensus over the fact that one can define key concepts in a neutral way by stating that some concepts are “‘*essentially* contested’; that is, continuing disagreement over their meaning and application is an essential and ineliminable feature of their functioning in the discourses in which they figure”⁹. However, as Ball points out, a claim that a particular concept is essentially contested would mean that one is taking a timeless and ahistorical view of the character and function of political concepts. For him, the essential contestability thesis can rather hold for political language perceived as a kind of discourse. Within political discourse, concepts would be better perceived as contingently contestable. Therefore, conceptual contestation can be seen as a persistent possibility, but it is not permanent. Such an approach paves the way for the study of history of political concepts that would “take the form of conceptual contests in which older meanings are challenged and arguments are advanced in favour of new understandings”¹⁰. Thus, if one perceives conceptual disputes as an engagement into politics¹¹, then, as Ball suggests, political innovation and conceptual change can be seen as two sides of the same coin. He defines conceptual change as “the alteration in the meaning of key concepts that constitute the discourse of politics”¹².

The rise of conceptual history within political theory is due to seminal works of Reinhart Koselleck. He is perceived as the founder of the German school of conceptual history, *Begriffsgeschichte*. In his works, he sustained that “without

⁹ Terrence Ball, op. cit., 34.

¹⁰ Terrence Ball, op. cit., 36.

¹¹ Stephen Lukes, *Power : a radical view*, (London, MacMillan Press, 1974), 26.

¹² Terrence Ball, “Must political theory be historical?”, *Contributions to the history of concepts*. 1 (2006)

common concepts there is no ‘society, and above all, no political field of action’¹³. His studies were oriented at long time perspective trying to detect the radical change in perception of concepts. To his mind, “a concept can possess clarity, but must be ambiguous (...) A concept binds a variety of historical experience and a collection of theoretical and practical references into a relation that is, as such, only given and actually ascertainable through the concept”¹⁴. However, his approach can be seen as different from the history of ideas or intellectual history¹⁵ because it is placed more onto the side of historical studies than philosophy. The aim of Koselleck was to combine the history of concepts with social history. His vision of the recovery of meaning of particular concepts can be described as studying a process that is independent from particular actors and their speech that would not be perceived as equivalent to an action. Within this German tradition of conceptual history, concepts should be perceived as independent from linguistic contexts in which they are deployed.

Scholars coming from the so-called Cambridge school (otherwise called representatives of critical conceptual history or contextualists) challenge a number of assumptions of the initial German conception of conceptual history. Two of its most prominent representatives are John G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner. They not only stress the linguistic constitution of political reality, but also see concepts as necessarily taking their meaning from specific patterns of discourse within which they are deployed. They also sustain that it is possible to detect particular agents who bring about the linguistic change. Hence, the explanation of the conceptual change involves catching a language user red-handed in the (speech) act as it were. As far as

¹³ Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures past. On the semantics of historical time*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 1985), 74.

¹⁴ Reinhart Koselleck, *op. cit.*, 84.

¹⁵ Melvin Richter, “A German version of the ‘linguistic turn’: Reinhart Koselleck and the history of political and social concepts” in *The history of political thought in national context* Dario Castiglione, Iain Hampsher-Monk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 64.

the conceptual change is perceived to be the feature of political discourse, it makes it necessary to identify processes and mechanisms by means of which specific agents brought about particular changes. It involves the critical scrutiny of dominant discourses, and shedding the light on the arguments and rhetorical stratagems employed by different actors with a purpose of constructing an alternative discourse¹⁶.

There are a number of differences between the two approaches of Pocock and Skinner. Pocock assumes that one should deconstruct and understand languages in which politics is discussed. He puts an emphasis on identifying the *language* of political discourse the he describes as “a complex structure comprising a vocabulary, a grammar, a rhetoric; and a set of usages, assumptions and implications, existing together in time and employable by a semi-specific community of language-users for purposes political interested in and extending sometimes as far as the articulation of a world-view or ideology”¹⁷. Thus, this type of study wants to combine synchronic focus on particular texts and diachronic focus on a broader context, language or discourse within which it is performed. Pocock does not want to make the study of *langages* (languages) and *paroles* (words) separate, because they can contribute both to their mutual understanding. Skinner, to the contrary, objects the explanatory power of the language, as far as it cannot give the full account of what type of action is being performed within it, and he promotes, especially in his early works, an approach oriented at speech acts: “In politics, speech is used to *affect* the world. Political

¹⁶ James Farr, “Understanding conceptual change politically” in *Political innovation and conceptual change*, edited by Terence Ball, James Farr, Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989)

¹⁷ J. G. A. Pocock, “Concepts and discourses: a difference in culture? Comment on a paper by Melvin Richter” in *The meaning of historical terms and concepts. New studies on Begriffsgeschichte*, German Historical Institute (Washington D.C.: Occasional Paper N.15, 1996), 47.

speech is paradigmatically speech *action*”¹⁸. However, he also wants to put the text into the context, as far as yielding an understanding of speech acts can only rest on the identification of conventional meaning, genre and practice and also on identification of departures from that convention. Hence, even if both scholars differ, to a certain extent, in their focus, Iain Hampsher-Monk sustains that both Pocock and Skinner underline the concern about the diachronic question of identity of the language¹⁹ and its conventions over time, and the synchronic question of the individual locutions performed within it at any moment that have to be kept in mind while developing a comprehensive theory of conceptual change.

B. Conceptual history of patriotism

Mary G. Dietz provides one of the most useful introductions to the concept of patriotism²⁰. She develops a conceptual history of the term tracing its historical transformations back to Antiquity. It starts with the word ‘patriot’, because it largely preceded in time the appearance of the term ‘patriotism’. The word patriot is derived from *Patria* that in Ancient Greece stood for the city – *Polis*. Being a patriot (even though the use of this word was not widely spread) meant to show deep attachment and pride of one’s city. Further development of the term occurred under the Roman Empire, as pointed up by Hannah Arendt²¹. *Patria* became the symbol of all values

¹⁸ Iain Hampsher-Monk, *op. cit.*, 42.

¹⁹ Terrence Ball quotes (1997: 38-39) a useful definition of language provided by White: “shared conceptions of the world, shared manners and values, shared resources and expectation and procedures for speech and thought - through which - communities are in fact defined and constituted”. He points up to the fact that the community language can be constituted by a series of sub-languages – discourses, within which the political discourse would be shared by people in their common capacity as citizens.

²⁰ Mary G. Dietz, “Patriotism” in *Political innovation and conceptual change*, ed. Terrence Ball, James Farr, Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)

²¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Human condition* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1958), 120-124.

for which a soldier or a citizen could live and die. The notion of self-sacrifice became really important in defining who was a good patriot. As Cicero put it, “*fatherland is dearer to me than my life*”. Later, with the extension of the Roman Empire, a kind of double allegiance developed, one towards the city itself, the second one towards Rome.

With the growing importance of Christian religion the meaning of being a patriot changed dramatically and moved onto spiritual level. Self-sacrifice of a warrior was replaced by figures of the martyrs, saints and holy virgins. The come back of a more emotional and not spiritual acceptance of being a patriot occurred in 12th and 13th centuries in corollary to two important phenomena: the construction of national kingdoms and institution of a tax for the defence of a king. *Patria* became not only a territorial reference, but was also embodied in the person of the king. It also implied the come back of the willingness to self-sacrifice for the sake of the fatherland.

Subsequently, in the end of the 16th, beginning of the 17th century, the words ‘*patriote*’ in French²² and ‘patriot’ in English entered into common use. At the very beginning they referred to the fellow countrymen and lovers of the country. The term ‘patriot’ really developed in Great Britain at the end of the 17th century in the discourse of radical Whigs, especially during the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It became associated with the defence of liberty and rights of Englishmen against tyranny. Being a patriot implied a link to political martyrdom. At that moment, the previously established link between the person of king and *Patria* loosened, as far as the king could reveal being a tyrant. Other crucial principles took over the allegiance to the king: liberty, constitutional rights and property. The same proceeding occurred

²² In French the word ‘*patrie*’ comes indirectly from Latin, *via* its Italian counterpart. Later, it is followed by ‘*patriote*’ and ‘*patriotique*’. Philippe Contamine, “Mourir pour la Patrie. X^e-XX^e siècle” in *Les lieux de mémoire*, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1986)

in France, where, at first, most of references to *Patria* (especially in different mottos) were used in the context of self-sacrifice of life. Afterwards, other values became associated to '*patrie*': God, king, piety, faith, honour and liberty²³.

The following important moment was the appearance of the very word patriotism. It entered the political discourse along with other '-isms' in the 18th century. Hence, it can be perceived as a relatively new word whose linguistic life involves dramatic change over time.

Soon, in the United States, the understanding of being a patriot became more radical than it was originally in Great Britain. In late 17th century Britain patriotism implied the opposition to a tyrant king, in 18th century United States it became an opposition to any king, especially the British one (as he embodied foreign domination). This turn of action had a decisive role of clarifying political life and allegiances. On the American soil, the partisans of American independence were declared patriots and its opponents – loyalists. No wonder that those in England who were opposing American independence could even go towards calling patriotism “the last refuge of scoundrel”, as Samuel Johnson did²⁴. French philosophical reflection went in a similar direction as the American one, many authors since the beginning of the 18th century sustained that patriotic ideal was incompatible with despotic monarchy and could only be fulfilled in a republican form of government²⁵. In consequence, patriotism became associated with a set of ideological, constitutional and political principles, such as free republic, love of liberty, sanctity of property,

²³ *idem. op. cit.*

²⁴ This sentence is quoted by the biographer of Samuel Johnson, Boswell, and dated on April 7th, 1775. It is often used in nowadays-academic works endorsing a critical approach to patriotic ideas; it is taken out of its original context though. Johnson clearly directed it against the American revolutionary patriotism that he considered as fake, and not against patriotism as such of which he considered himself partisan.

²⁵ To illustrate this position Philippe Contamine (*op. cit.*) refers to La Bruyère “Il n’y a point de patries dans le despotisme...”; chancellor d’Aguesseau “Un grand royaume et point de patrie”; Montesquieu “Dans le gouvernement monarchique, l’Etat subsiste indépendamment de la patrie”.

limited government, etc. It can thus be concluded that semantics of patriotism kept changing “across time and place”²⁶, being strongly linked to internal situation of a country, and its geopolitical position. The possible meaning of terms ‘patriotism’ and ‘patriot’ changes according to the political reality, it does not signify the same thing during the warfare and the times of peace.

The following important moment in the perception of patriotism occurred during the 19th century that was marked by the construction of modern nation-states. The change of nature of the state altered as well the acceptance of patriotism: nationalism became a significant part of political discourse in the middle of 19th century and since then “weights heavily upon the meaning of patriotism in our age”²⁷. The new nationalist discourse promoted, according to Dietz, the “idea of nation as the ultimate object of political loyalty, and of the state as the embodiment of the nation”²⁸. Since then, it is possible to observe a growing amalgam or even replacement of the republican tradition of patriotism by nationalism. It provoked the fact that the old perception of a patriot as “one who defends constitutional rights, reveres liberty, agitates for an end to corruption, and struggles against the outrages of centralized power has been thoroughly eroded”²⁹. Dietz sustains that in these circumstances of a growing blurring of the distinction between the two terms “maintaining a distinction between patriotism and nationalism is more than just an exercise in semantics or arid conceptual analysis”³⁰. According to her words: “remembering patriotism’s past can itself be understood as a patriotic act”³¹. An attempt at reconstruction or reconceptualization of patriotism would reflect present times concerns with “questions of civic virtue, loyalty, dissent, citizenship, obedience,

²⁶ Hwa-Ji Shin, Michel Schwartz, “The duality of patriotism”, *Peace Review* 4 (2003)

²⁷ Mary G. Dietz, op. cit., 189.

²⁸ Mary G. Dietz, op. cit., 190

²⁹ Mary G. Dietz, op. cit., 190

³⁰ Mary G. Dietz, op. cit., 191

³¹ Mary G. Dietz, op. cit., 191

liberty, and the manifold complexities associated with “love of country”³². Before passing to this present occupation with patriotism, and its possible conceptualizations that would go beyond being “uncritically supportive of one’s government”³³, there is a need to discuss possible visions of relationship between patriotism and nationalism that result from an interlink between these two notions.

C. Conceptual history of patriotism in Poland

According to seminal work of Andrzej Walicki³⁴, there are three main traditions of Polish patriotism: republican, romantic and realist.

- i. Republican tradition (dating to the end period of the existence of the First Republic³⁵ in 1795, and especially to the proclamation of the Constitution of May 3rd, 1791 and to the 1794 Kościuszko’s uprising) exhorted the faithfulness to national will (*wola narodowa*). Republican patriotism of the end of the 18th century stressed the need of all estates acting ‘for the sake of the homeland, for the sake of the people’³⁶.
- ii. Romantic tradition of patriotism underlined the faithfulness to national idea (*idea narodowa*). After the loss of independence by Poland in 1795,

³² Mary G. Dietz, op. cit., 192

³³ Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, ed., *Political innovation and conceptual change*, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4.

³⁴ Andrzej Walicki, *Trzy patriotyzmy: Trzy tradycje polskiego patriotyzmu i ich znaczenie współczesne* (Warszawa : Res publica, 1991)

³⁵ The name of *Rzeczpospolita*, Republic was in use since the middle of the 14th century. The First Republic was composed of the Crown of Poland and of Big Duchy of Lithuania. After the signature of the Union of Lublin, in 1569, another name in use was *Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów*, the Republic of both nations. The country remained monarchy though, till the end of its existence in 1795; in 1573 it was transformed from a hereditary into an elective monarchy where all members of the noble estate (about 10% of Polish society) were entitled to participate in the election of the king.

³⁶ Bogdan Suchodolski, *Dzieje kultury polskiej* (Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Interpress, 1986)

patriotism was given more intensified, secretive and mystical meaning³⁷. This modern form of patriotism was highly idealistic, emphasising the necessity to fight to regain independence and restore the native soil to Poles. At first, it was associated with a more political vision of nation, and then it drifted towards a more cultural one. However, it was still devoid of chauvinism and wanted to link the Polish cause with a more general fight for a better future of all Europeans. Its slogan was: “*Za wolność Waszą i Naszą* (For your freedom and ours)”.

- iii. Finally, the realist tradition of patriotism emerged in the late 19th century and drifted from positivist programme of “*praca u podstaw* (work at basis)” towards more nationalist stances. It defined patriotism as faithfulness to national interest (*interes narodowy*). It is commonly associated with Roman Dmowski and his party, the National-Democracy. They promoted an organic vision of nation, and preferred to call themselves nationalists, because they perceived the term ‘patriotism’ as too polysemantic and more related to the love of country than of nation.

Thus, it is possible to observe subsequent changes in definition of patriotism and its ethos: from republican anti-authoritarian and collectivist ethos of serving the Republic³⁸ through Romantic ethos of fight for independence even in battles ‘lost in advance’, towards realist ethos of serving Poland and its national interest. Under the communist regime, the Party³⁹ tried to use elements of these historical patriotic

³⁷ Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe. A Short History of Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1984)

³⁸ This ethos was compared by Andrzej Walicki to the liberty of Ancients (Constant 1816).

³⁹ PZPR, *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*, Polish United Workers’ Party

discourses in its nationalistic rhetoric in order to legitimize its power⁴⁰ and create a ‘socialist’ patriotism.

After 1989, the disappearance of an external threat (historically constituted by tsarist Russia, the German empire, and the Hapsburg Empire or later by Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia etc.) is important to be underlined, because it removed the integrative aspect of patriotism and it opened the way for it becoming a weapon in the political struggle and object of conceptual redefinition⁴¹.

D. Patriotism and/or/against nationalism

Before discussing the relation between patriotism and nationalism, it might be useful to introduce, at least preliminary, definitions that might help to make difference between the two phenomena. The shortest and most spread definition of patriotism would state that it is the ‘love of country’⁴² that includes self-sacrifice, of life, in its most extreme form. Patriotism can also be defined as love and attachment of group members to their group and the land where they reside⁴³. This attachment can be further specified in terms of systemic altruism and loyalty⁴⁴, identification with republican liberty⁴⁵, or political loyalty and commitment to one’s country⁴⁶. It can thus promote a broad feeling of belonging that is transmitted through a process of

⁴⁰ Marcin Zaremba, *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm* Wydawnictwo Trio Warszawa 2001

⁴¹ Diane M. Duffy, John L. Sullivan, Leonard A. Polakiewicz, “Patriotic perspectives in contemporary Poland: conflict or consensus?”, *The Polish Review*, 3 (1993).

⁴² Maurizio Viroli, *For love of country. An essay on patriotism and nationalism*, (Oxford University Press, 1995)

⁴³ Daniel Bar-Tal, Ervin Staub, ed., *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997)

⁴⁴ Gary R. Johnson, “The evolutionary roots of patriotism” in *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations*, Daniel Bar-Tal, Ervin Staub, ed., op. cit.

⁴⁵ Maurizio Viroli, op. cit.

⁴⁶ Janusz Reykowski, “The uses of the past: patriotism between history and memory” in *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations*, Daniel Bar-Tal, Ervin Staub, ed., op. cit.

patriotic socialization. This process of socialization, necessary for constructing a collective system of meaning, often takes place through education that is regulated by political decisions. For that reason, it seems important to mind about the political perspective of patriotism, as far as this phenomenon can be seen as indispensable to the survival and well-being of a group.

While patriotism is often defined as a feeling, nationalism is rather perceived as an ideology⁴⁷. It is thought to attach a crucial importance to the existence of a nation, its superiority over others and necessity of creation of a (nation-)state that would be congruent with this particular population. According to Herbert C. Kelman “nationalism appropriates people’s attachment and loyalty to the country as a basis for their attachment and loyalty to the state”⁴⁸. It might then be understandable why, together with the rise of nation-state in the 19th century, nationalism gradually ‘ate’ patriotism that was a much older concept. However, according to Maurizio Viroli, the two languages, of patriotism and nationalism, “can and must be distinguished. The language of patriotism has been used over the centuries to strengthen and invoke love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of a people, that is love of the republic; the language of nationalism was forged in late eighteenth-century Europe to defend and reinforce the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic oneness and homogeneity of a people”⁴⁹. The following table tries to distinguish between the two discourses in the Polish case⁵⁰ (it can help to operate the distinction between the two languages in empirical sources):

⁴⁷ e. g. Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests that “(...) patriotism, unlike nationalism, [is a] sentiment more than ideolog[y]”, in “Cosmopolitan Patriots” in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, Josh Cohen, ed., (Boston: Beacon, 1996), 21-29.

⁴⁸ Herbert C. Kelman, “Nationalism, patriotism and national identity: social psychological dimensions” in *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations*, Daniel Bar-Tal, Ervin Staub, ed., op. cit.

⁴⁹ Maurizio Viroli, op.cit., 1.

⁵⁰ Table compiled on the basis of Michał Głowiński, “Kryzys dyskursu patriotycznego” in *Patriotyzm Wczoraj i dziś* Polska Akademia Umiejętności Kraków 2006

N°	Characteristic	Patriotic discourse	Nationalist discourse
1	General	Positive approach, choice of events that reunite, identification resulting from one's choice, based on culture, tradition, language Open	Negative approach, choice of events that polarise, those that endanger the existence of nation, lead to its destruction, participation into a community due to ethnic and blood criteria Closed
2	Religion	Being a catholic is not a condition of membership in the nation, tradition of multi- religious community	Model of " <i>Polak-katolik</i> " (Polish catholic) created under occupation, extended in normal times; under captivity it served the purpose of differentiation and protection from orthodox Russians in the East and protestant Germans in the West.
3	Enemy	There can be a concrete and real opponent: occupant, conqueror etc.	The figure of 'enemy' is necessary to have a coherent discourse.
4	Fear	Accent put on positive elements, no explicit references to fear. Cohesion produced by language, tradition, culture.	Strong rhetoric of fear, multiples theories of conspiracy and danger. There has to be an 'imagined' enemy, nation's failures are explained by mysterious congregations. Discourse of 'alertness', a word that is supposed to create cohesion, often used by communists.
5	Danger	No particular prediction of danger	Situation of danger seen as a basic national situation. The motive of destitution as an archetype without empirical proofs. E.g. EU can destitute Poles of their faith.

There is a number of different approaches dealing with the relationship between patriotism and nationalism. There are different typologies of patriotism and different typologies of nationalism that are not always easy to combine and compare. The following list can, by no means, be seen as exhaustive.

In a number of articles the two terms are used indiscriminately, synonymously to describe questions concerning national identity⁵¹. It is also pointed out by Maurizio Viroli that “in scholarly literature and common language, ‘love of country’ and ‘loyalty to the nation’, patriotism and nationalism, are used as synonyms”⁵².

More often one will be confronted with a dichotomous approach. Often times it is an opposition between ‘good’ patriotism and ‘bad’ nationalism or chauvinism. Here, patriotism can be also perceived as a solution to nationalism, its “bloody brother”⁵³. Even Viroli falls in this trap, when he states that “properly understood, the language of republican patriotism could serve as a powerful antidote to nationalism”⁵⁴.

Another way of conceptualizing this relation comes from the concept of civic nationalism. It tries to encompass patriotism as a kind of mechanism able to inspire a stronger people’s allegiance to the nation. Michel Ignatieff sees it in a following way: “(...) this nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal rights bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values”⁵⁵.

Most of previously mentioned approaches (except for the last one, putting an accent on political component of nationalism rather than ethnicity) would define nationalism as an aggressive ideology willing to create a homogenous nation, based on ethnic and cultural criteria, seeking to create a nation-state. In opposition to such a perception, patriotism would be seen as less insidious as source of political allegiance. It can be further illustrated by a reference to Maurizio Viroli’s vision of their

⁵¹ Avnar Ben-Amos, “The uses of the past: patriotism between history and memory” *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations*, Daniel Bar-Tal, Ervin Staub, ed., op. cit.

⁵² Maurizio Viroli, op.cit. 1.

⁵³ John H. Schaar *Legitimacy in the modern state* (Transaction Publishers, 1989), 285.

⁵⁴ Maurizio Viroli, op.cit. , 8.

⁵⁵ Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and belonging: Journeys into new nationalism* (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1994), 3-4.

interrelation: “The language of patriotism has been used over the centuries to strengthen or invoke love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain the common liberty of a people, that is love of the republic; the language of nationalism was forged in late eighteenth-century Europe to defend or reinforce the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic oneness and homogeneity of a people”⁵⁶; or to Jürgen Habermas’ description quoted by Margaret Canovan: “the central claim is that patriotism means the political loyalty of citizens to the free polity they share, whereas nationalism is a matter of ethnicity and culture”⁵⁷.

Nonetheless, these primary approaches seems unsatisfactory, and for a better understanding of both nationalism and patriotism it seems necessary to develop a broader conceptual framework that will be useful in assessing different elements of Polish debate about patriotism that will follow.

E. Patriotism

I introduced before a short version of conceptual history of patriotism developed by Mary G. Dietz. Her final conclusion showed a concern about developing such a reconceptualization of patriotism that would convene to address contemporary issues such as questions of citizenship etc. Indeed, the theoretical reflection on patriotism is more and more abundant. As far as studies of nationalism are more sociological in their nature, and willing to describe real-life phenomena (even if there are also a number of normative approaches that try to suggest a desirable version of nationalism, such as liberal nationalism for instance⁵⁸), recent studies concerning patriotism take a

⁵⁶ Maurizio Viroli, op.cit., 1.

⁵⁷ Margaret Canovan, “Patriotism is not enough”, *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (2000)

⁵⁸ Graham Day and Andrew Thompson *Theorizing nationalism* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 150-153.

more normative stance. They try to discuss what is the form patriotism should take, and what kind of loyalty or social bond it can embody.

i. Patriotism as vice (mistake, racism): dying for an abstraction

One can call patriotism a mistake, as George Kateb does, when he defines patriotism as “a readiness to die and to kill for an abstraction (...) a readiness to die and to kill for what is largely a figment of imagination”⁵⁹. This is one of the most common visions of patriotism that would emphasize warship and life-sacrifice in a battle, moreover, for an abstraction. But, as Justine Lacroix points out, people can also fight for ideals, not only for an abstraction (leaving aside the question whether national allegiance can be described as an abstraction): “many people have risked their lives in war on the basis of shared principles rather than shared nationality, race, language...”⁶⁰. Then, if ‘abstraction’ from the first definition was substituted by ‘principle’, as mentioned in the second one, maybe it would be more understandable why patriotism could represent something more broadly mobilising. Concerning the critique of patriotism developed by George Kateb, Jan-Werner Müller explains it by the fact that Kateb is a defender of democratic individualism, thus, he opposes any possibility of patriotism that could endanger inclusiveness, individuality and diversity⁶¹.

Generally, it should be noted, that patriotism might constitute a problem for those who privilege individualism over collectivism, as far as patriotic bond seems collective *per se* and implying attachment either to one’s group or country. This collective dimension is present in an important number of definitions, such as the one provided by Hwa-Ji Shin and Michael Schwartz: “patriotism can be understood as a

⁵⁹ George Kateb, *Patriotism and other mistakes* (Yale University Press, 2006), 8.

⁶⁰ Justine Lacroix, “For a European constitutional patriotism”, *Political Studies* 50 (2002)

⁶¹ Jan-Werner Müller, “Three objections to constitutional patriotism”, *Constellations* 14 (2007)

form of collective identity in which someone advances the needs or desires of the nation, even at the expense of individual interest”⁶². However, this particular definition of patriotism reflects a number of characteristics that Isaiah Berlin attributes to nationalism⁶³: conviction that man belongs to a particular human group (i.e. nation) and that this belonging shapes his identity. The nature of this belonging is seen as organic, thus not voluntary, and for this reason, national interests might override individual ones. In this understanding one would not follow a set of values, because they would be the good ones, but because they are perceived as the ones of a particular group.

There is no need to remind the fact that the theme of self-sacrifice was historically linked to patriotic feelings for the community. However, this approach seems to induce an implicit problem. If patriotism is to be defined as the willingness of people to sacrifice for their country (in the most radical version) or for a shared ideal, it supposes that there is an enemy to be fought. This vision of patriotism closely associated with war and enmity⁶⁴ presupposes that it would not be desirable that citizens of other countries were also patriots, because they would always represent a possible danger. That is why another possible reading of patriotism compares or even assimilates it with racism. Paul Gomberg implies that there is no morally defensible form of patriotism⁶⁵, and that there is no possibility of a “moderate patriotism” that would place itself in the middle way between the chauvinistic patriotism (nationalism) and unpatriotic universalism. He considers that the willingness of good things for one’s national community (love of one’s country) automatically implies willingness of bad things to happen to others. This

⁶² Hwa-Ji Shin, Michael Schwartz, op. cit.

⁶³ Isaiah Berlin *Against the current: essays in the history of ideas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 341-342.

⁶⁴ Margaret Canovan, op. cit.

⁶⁵ Paul Gomberg, “Patriotism is like racism” in *Patriotism*, Igor Primoratz, ed., (Humanity books, 2002)

understanding of patriotism subscribes to the tradition of seeing it as a ‘vice’. A maxim of Paul Léataud illustrates pretty accurately this vision: “*L’amour fait des fous, le mariage des cocus, et le patriotisme des imbeciles malfaisants*”⁶⁶. There is the opposite tradition that describes patriotism as a ‘virtue’.

ii. Patriotism as a virtue: in its moderate form.

Stephen Nathanson challenges Gomberg’s point of view and subscribes to the perception of patriotism as a virtue. He tries to point out the difference between the so-called ‘extreme’ patriots and ‘moderate’ ones⁶⁷. In his analysis, ‘extreme’ patriots are described as those who believe in the superiority of their own country and nation over the others; and ‘moderate’ patriots as those who do not seek neither superiority nor dominance over the others and thus their version of patriotism could be morally permissible, especially in times of peace.

This approach can hardly be perceived as resolving all dilemmas. First of all, both Gomberg and Nathanson follow, in a way, the dichotomous vision of relations between patriotism and nationalism. They are not talking about nationalism, but their vision of extreme patriotism reflects the perception of ‘bloody’ nationalism that would imply an extreme version of one’s allegiance to his community, perceiving it as superior to all other communities. This version of patriotism would be unacceptable. However, Nathanson wants to allow for moderate patriotism that would not entail feelings of national superiority. The trouble with such a formulation of this question lays in the fact how to define what would or not be ‘moderate’, as far as “patriotism must be seen as a combination of four complex attitudes: (1) a special affection for one’s country; (2) a sense of personal identification with one’s country;

⁶⁶ “Love makes us crazy, marriage cuckolds and patriotism cruel imbeciles”, quote by Paul Léataud from *Passe-temps* 1929

⁶⁷ Stephen Nathanson, “Is patriotism like racism?” in *Patriotism*, Igor Primoratz, ed., op. cit., 114

(3) a special concern for the well-being of one's country; (4) a willingness to sacrifice to promote the good of one's country"⁶⁸. This definition points up to two important aspects: the fact that the object of loyalty would be one's country (and not nation, nation-state or state, thus it makes reference to initial understanding of patriotism) and also it does not support any perception of superiority of one state over another.

Apart from 'moderate' patriotism, there are a number of other approaches. Margaret Canovan discusses the case of new patriotism that covers a spectrum from what she calls "cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism" to "rooted republicanism"⁶⁹. She sustains that the latter presents republican and liberal influences, and the former has more cosmopolitan but also local aims.

iii. Patriotism of liberty

Maurizio Viroli argues for patriotism of liberty⁷⁰ that is derived from republican patriotism. Its obligation would be to "instil in (people) a culture of liberty, an interest in the republic, a love of the common good"⁷¹. This understanding of patriotism angles the reflection rather in the direction of more universal principles that can generally be praised. Patriotism would be, therefore, seen as love of country, but not obligatorily of *one's* country and also it would not have to be unconditional. Viroli grounds his claim in the necessary pursuit of common good, in the name of civic virtues. To his mind, political liberty can survive if it is based on civic virtue, because only citizens are capable of committing themselves to the defence of common good and liberty. The stress put on civic virtues is supposed to resolve the question where to find roots for such a demanding commitment. Viroli wants to discard any vision of social link as promoted by nationalists and communitarians in

⁶⁸ Stephen Nathanson, *op. cit.*, 114

⁶⁹ Margaret Canovan, *op. cit.*, 276

⁷⁰ Maurizio Viroli, *op. cit.*, 17

⁷¹ Maurizio Viroli, *op. cit.*, 16

terms of irreplaceable bonds of language, culture or history of a nation. He insists, to the contrary, on a need to go beyond particularism, towards a “political unity, sustained by the attachment to the ideal of the republic”⁷². It would be grounded in common practice of citizenship.

This ‘patriotism of liberty’ would thus be opposed to nationalism understood as unconditional loyalty or exclusive attachment to one’s nation or state. Nonetheless, the call for love of universal principles of justice and liberty, embodied in a particular republic based on common political culture does not give an answer about the extent to which those principles could work. Alasdair MacIntyre says that patriotism “is only possible in certain types of national communities under certain conditions”⁷³. It reflects the point of view of Cecile Laborde who implies that different patriotic paradigms that were elaborated in different national settings are only suitable for these particular circumstances⁷⁴.

iv. Constitutional patriotism, another variant of new patriotism

In contrast to two new patriotisms examined by Margaret Canovan, Justine Lacroix mentions (after Jean-Marc Ferry) four different forms of patriotism: historic, legal (or juridical), civic and constitutional. Without going into much detail about their respective forms, she tries to point out differences of the constitutional patriotism in relation to historical and legal patriotisms. To her mind, constitutional patriotism cannot be associated with legal patriotism, because it shows a strong attachment to history; but it is not easily assimilated with historic patriotism either, because it does not praise history, but subscribes to a more critical approach towards it. As Jean-

⁷² Maurizio Viroli, op. cit., 13

⁷³ Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is patriotism a virtue?”, *Theorizing citizenship*, Ronald Beiner, ed., (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 225.

⁷⁴ Cécile Laborde, “From constitutional to civic patriotism”, *British Journal of Political Science*, 32 (2002)

Marc Ferry concludes “la notion d’un “patriotisme constitutionnel”, rompt avec l’autocentrement du patriotisme historique sans pour autant renouer avec la figure artificialiste et abstraite d’un patriotisme juridique”⁷⁵. The ideal of constitutional patriotism is also most commonly quoted as, firstly, the most likely possibility to dissociate patriotism and nationalism, and secondly, as a possible way leading towards European patriotism. The fourth form of patriotism such as mentioned above, the civic patriotism constitutes a sort of answer to the paradigm of constitutional patriotism. It results from the confusion about alleged shortcomings of constitutional patriotism, and produces even more confusion in return, because it is based on flawed interpretations of what constitutional patriotism is supposed to be. In the remainder of this section I want to focus on the initial conceptualization of constitutional patriotism and some criticisms it provoked. It will thus allow me subsequently to introduce and discuss the paradigm of civic patriotism.

The paradigm (or a ‘school of thought’ as it is called by Cécile Laborde⁷⁶) of *Verfassungspatriotismus*, ‘constitutional patriotism’⁷⁷ was developed during the *Historikerstreit* ‘Historians’ Debate’, in the late 1980 in Germany, in the context of its prospective reunification. Jürgen Habermas argued that “a German liberal democratic national identity could only be elaborated through critical confrontation with the

⁷⁵ Jean-Marc Ferry, “Avatars du sentiment national en Europe à la lumière du rapport à la culture et à l’histoire”, *Comprendre* 1 (2000): (trad.) “constitutional patriotism breaks with auto-centred and apologetic history of ‘historical patriotism’ without tying again with artificialist and abstract figure of ‘juridical patriotism’”.

⁷⁶ Cécile Laborde, op.cit.

⁷⁷ The term of ‘constitutional patriotism’ is commonly associated with the name of Jürgen Habermas who is deservedly seen as its main promoter. It should mention, though, that its appearance in German political thought is antecedent to Habermas. It was first used by Dolf Sternberger who was searching for an alternative to ethnic nationalism. According to Jan-Werner Müller (“On the origins of constitutional patriotism”, *Contemporary Political Theory* 3 (2006)), Sternberger gave the term of constitutional patriotism the significance of “‘protective’ and state-centred patriotism” whereas its further developments offered by Habermas went in the direction of the “‘purifying’ patriotism”.

nation's past"⁷⁸. This implies a selective appropriation of one's past, through a critical approach. It privileges the respect of constitution and of fundamental democratic rights over ethnic nationhood. The prospective unity of German people and recreation of their national identity was to Habermas' mind supposed to be based on the shared values and attachment to a shared political culture. It had to be expressed as a "loyalty to 'abstract procedures and principles'"⁷⁹. In the very German case, constitutional patriotism was supposed to be non-nationalist or even anti-nationalist and put a strong accent on the need of deliberate political socialization. The adoption of this ideal can signal a change of definition of the concept of patriotism as such. It can be described as a further broadening of the classical understanding of patriotism as love of the country (republic, justice, liberty) onto a conscious choice of a particular form of patriotism. As Jan-Werner Müller describes it: "unconditional or even unreflective identification becomes replaced by dynamic and complex processes of identity formation – or, put differently, by open-ended political and legal learning processes"⁸⁰.

Constitutional patriotism underlines the fact that "political attachment ought to centre on the norms, the values, and, more indirectly, the procedures of a liberal-democratic constitution"⁸¹. This vision would reflect the republican ideal of the existence of voluntary nation of citizens providing basis for democratic legitimacy of political decisions. In consequence, the allegiance is due neither to a national culture (as it is the case with nationalism), nor to the "worldwide community of human beings" (cosmopolitanism as described by Martha Nussbaum⁸²). In addition,

⁷⁸ Cécile Laborde, *op. cit.*

⁷⁹ Jürgen Habermas *The New conservatism: cultural criticism and the Historians' Debate* (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), 261.

⁸⁰ Müller, Jan-Werner, *op. cit.*

⁸¹ Müller, Jan-Werner, *op. cit.*

⁸² Martha C. Nussbaum, *For love of country?* (Boston, Massachusetts : Beacon Press, 1996), 4.

constitutional patriotism does not want to cut itself from national or regional framework of reference. Surely, it underscores the fact that the loyalty is due to universal principles and practices of procedural democracy, but it has to be interpreted taking into account different national traditions and histories⁸³. By combining both national and more universal levels of allegiance, it is distancing itself from cosmopolitanism, as far as the national democratic tradition should be rooted in the Western political culture. It stresses the need of sharing the same principles, and having the same political culture, but it does not imply directly the fact that this tradition has to be national. In consequence, constitutional patriotism would not mean to dissociate political allegiance from cultural identity, but would represent the willingness to dissociate it from nationalism.

v. Criticism of constitutional patriotism and question of civic patriotism

Justine Lacroix distinguishes between three main lines of criticism against constitutional patriotism. They go along the following lines: first of all, this paradigm is perceived as too abstract, relying only on universal principles and being an oxymoron *per se*, mixing cold juridical reference to constitution with warm feeling of patriotism. Secondly, it is seen as being detached from thick historical realities, and finally as self-defeating because of willingness of dissociating politics from culture. She discards them one by one, referring to main assumptions of constitutional patriotism. First of all, she point to the fact that constitutional patriotism states that the ultimate motive of attachment to political community are universal values of human rights and democracy. These principles have to guide communities (e.g. national ones) that are responsible for their enforcement. Constitutional patriotism can be seen as a set of normative beliefs and commitments, but it does not imply the

⁸³ Margaret Canovan, *op. cit.*

homogeneity of individual beliefs. Furthermore, even if it promotes the attachment to the constitution and values that it embraces, it is not calling for a veneration of it as a symbol. That is why Jan-Werner Müller discards the criticism associating constitutional patriotism with a kind of civic religion. Secondly, according to Lacroix, one cannot declare the dissociation of constitutional patriotism from historical reality, because of its origins. Its very elaboration in the German case was marked by the need of remembrance of past wrongdoings and avoiding them in the future. Constitutional patriotism neither does want to dissociate political sphere from culture, however, it rather calls for a shared political culture, instead of one political culture (in case of nation states and national cultures, it would most likely be the dominant culture). In order to do so, it promotes the ideal of deliberation and confrontation of different interests.

For aforementioned reasons one can think that Cecile Laborde's criticism towards constitutional patriotism and her willingness to replace it with civic patriotism is somehow misleading⁸⁴. She bases herself on two main readings of constitutional patriotism that do not do justice to this paradigm: neutralist and critical. Her main concern is to find a suitable place for patriotism somewhere between blind loyalty to national states and more vague forms of cosmopolitan citizenship. She discusses extensively questions of equality and inclusiveness of political cultures, and insists on their possible and necessary link to national framework. However, she tries to strike a right balance between questions of how collectivities should create their political cultures and universalize it in order to provide for a broader inclusion of all citizens. My impression is that, here, the problem relies to a certain extent in the name of constitutional patriotism that by its resemblance to legal patriotism hints at

⁸⁴ Cécile Laborde, op.cit.

exclusively procedural form. Laborde does not really provide a new concept, and her position does not deviate much from what has been discussed till now.

G. Public debates

Following David Art, public debates⁸⁵ can be seen as critical junctures in the process of ideational change. He provides three criteria helping to measure and analyze a public debate: breadth, duration and intensity. He sustains that elite-led or elite mediated public debates are central to democratic processes; however they are rarely taken into account as analytical tools, despite their strong influence on mass attitudes. According to Art, there is a number of reasons why a broader analysis of public debates should be launched. First of all, they allow elite actors to articulate their ideas better than in times of normal politics. Secondly, they do not only reflect ideas, but also they can lead to their change in the process of broad deliberation. Finally, they can account for a fast and dramatic change in public opinion and elite ideas that would not be captured by other theoretical approaches, namely generational change paradigm of shifts in elite interests.

According to Art, it is crucial to look at those who mediate debates, in a more top-down approach. It would imply to focus on professional communicators such as politicians, members of organized interest groups, media personalities and journalists, intellectuals and specialists. These elites can be described, according to Putnam (1971), as *“those who in any society rank toward the top of the (presumably closely intercorrelated) dimensions of interest, involvement and influence in politics”*. A

⁸⁵ David Art, *The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 27. He defines public debates as “an episode of concentrated public ideational contestation among political elites reported in media on a particular subject of some controversy”.

further refinement of tools and assumptions coming from elite theory might be needed in order to better assess the potential of intellectuals and politicians (and other actors such as editorialists etc.) to shape the debate and its agenda.

III. Methodology

My analysis adopts more an inductive approach. As David art puts it, it would be an *a posteriori* approach, aiming at explaining some puzzling real world phenomena, concerning public debate, its content, and political significance.

In order to better assess the dynamics of public debate about patriotism after 1989 it is necessary to use longitudinal analysis. It gives the opportunity to observe changes throughout the whole period, and to compare different sub-periods of time. The comparison would have as aim to determine which actors participated in the debate, which themes and frames were most used and for which reasons. While I talk about the debate about patriotism after 1989, I understand by that the attempt at redefining its meaning by different actors. It occurs within a series of debates about patriotism provoked by different events that I treat as sub-periods of analysis, trying to track the change of definition of the concept of patriotism that results from those subsequent debates.

As already mentioned, David Art conceptualizes debates as possible ‘critical junctures’ of ideational change, nonetheless it is necessary to put them in a broader context, taking into account their critical antecedents⁸⁶. Within each of particular debates, process tracing might be useful to study in depth causal mechanism accountable for change of the definition of the concept of patriotism.

⁸⁶ Dan Slater, Erica Simmons, "Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents and Historical Causation" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, New York City, August 10, 2007)

Other possible methodological tools will include discourse analysis, because of its usefulness to analyze elite's discourse, questions of collective identity, patriotism, nationalism, and ideational and institutional change⁸⁷. Discourse can be understood as a communicational activity, use of signs in particular contexts⁸⁸. For this reason, discourse analysis should encompass text (what is said) and the context (who said it, to whom, when and with what effect). This interactionist and systemic approach towards discourse would allow going beyond simply language-oriented approaches as might result from another possible approach used by Quentin Skinner, consisting in analyzing particular speech-acts. Nonetheless, analysis of individual speech acts and their rhetorical arguments can be a basis for development of a broader analysis⁸⁹.

Within discourse analysis a suitable approach might be provided by map discourse analysis⁹⁰. This method allows constructing maps of different definitions of a given concept. Based on a selection of crucial texts (including articles, letters, books etc. selected due to their saliency and notoriety of their authors, e.g. number of quotes or provoked responses) map discourse analysis allows analyzing what other concepts are linked to the concept of patriotism. It might help to find out which conceptualizations of patriotism are used in the public discourse and by whom, and, in this way, it will help to revisit critically the existing typologies of conceptualizations of patriotism. The first step would be to elaborate this kind of a map for intellectual elites' understanding of patriotism, then, the same can be done for political elites, in

⁸⁷ I namely think of discursive institutionalism, building on historical institutionalism, as theorized by Vivien A. Schmidt. "From historical institutionalism to discursive institutionalism: explaining change in political economy" (Paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Meetings, Boston, August 2008)

⁸⁸ Johannes Angermüller, "L'analyse du discours en Allemagne et en France. Croisement nationaux et limites disciplinaires", *Langage et société* 6 (2007), 120.

⁸⁹ John Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, (Cambridge University Press, 1969)

⁹⁰ Kathleen Carley, "Extracting culture through textual analysis", *Poetics* 22 (1994)

order to better contrast their respective use of the term. Map discourse analysis also allows tracking changes over time, thus it would be compatible with longitudinal analysis mentioned above.

Having detected different concepts associated with patriotism, both by intellectual and political elites, and having them grouped into different frames, these preliminary “*culturally available frames*” in elite discourse might be used as a coding scheme in a supplementary content analysis. This step would make possible to analyze how media (probably two most-read opinion-setting daily newspapers *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita*, and/or 2 weeklies: *Polityka* and *Wprost*) reinforce this preliminary framing effect operated by intellectuals and politicians. According to the framing theory of Chong and Druckman⁹¹, this type of analysis is useful to detect cultural shifts, media biases, opinion formation and transformation, etc.

In order to value this possible framing effect an analysis of public opinion on which mechanisms of priming and framing are supposed to exercise an influence might be of use. A way to approach this question would be, for instance, to use public opinion surveys led on questions concerning patriotism. However, it may reveal that this data will not be sufficient to test priming and/or framing effects.

It might also be helpful to conduct a series of semi-structured interviews with most powerful actors in the debate, both intellectuals and politicians, in order to triangulate their uses of different definitions and frames concerning patriotism, and in case of political elites, their electoral strategies that might be related to these questions.

IV. Argument

⁹¹ Dennis Chong, James N. Druckman, “Framing theory”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (2007)

Drawing on aforementioned theoretical tools, I perceive public debates as moments of ideational change. This change might be perceived at different levels; proponents of conceptual history imply that political theory might try to develop theories of political change that are closely linked to conceptual change. Building on a very useful metaphor of J. G. A. Pocock of a diagram of web, such an approach should pay attention to both “horizontal threads (of) synchronically existing languages or discourses” and “vertical threads (constituted by) history of individual concepts”⁹².

Most studies within the framework of conceptual history have historical focus, and try to theorize the decisive change of perception of political concepts, that would have occurred during *Sattelzeit* (late 18th century) in the case of Koselleckian *Begriffsgeschichte*, or between 1780-1830 in the British discourse (Pocock). Other studies focus on one particular author and his works (Skinner’s works on the philosophy of Hobbes). Nevertheless, other scholars perceive disagreement over concepts and their possible contestation and change as an inherent feature of political discourse. Terrence Ball introduces an intuition that we might be living in a time of ‘deeply disturbing conceptual shifts’ and for this reason, he does not want to cut conceptual history from contemporary political contestation of concepts. Furthermore, he also stresses the link between political change and the conceptual one, by advancing that “which concepts are believed to be worth disputing and revising is more often a political than a philosophical matter”⁹³.

Seen in this light, political theory would give an opportunity to study the interplay between conceptual change and political change. Along this line of reasoning, Peter Farr argues that political theory of conceptual change “must take its point of departure from political constitution of language and the linguistic

⁹² J. G. A. Pocock, op.cit., 49-50.

⁹³ Terrence Ball, *Transforming political discourse. Political theory and critical conceptual history* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 10, 14.

constitution of politics”⁹⁴. It needs to acknowledge that in acting politically actors do things for strategic and partisan purposes in and through language, but also that their use of concepts might bring unintended consequences. Furthermore, concepts should not be analyzed in isolation, because they constitute elements of broader schemes or belief systems.

Yet another theoretical insight implies that conceptual change has to be understood in historical perspective, and go beyond the words that embody the concept. James Farr gives a simple example of a girl who says ‘I love my country’; he admits that she possesses the concept of patriotism even without having this word as a part of her vocabulary. However, I argue that in order to better understand the concept one should start by the word that is supposed to signify it. It is also the case of patriotism. Farr refers to its basic understanding of love of country, but its conceptual history shows important change over time. Mary G. Dietz concludes that nowadays it can signify, among others, an ‘uncritical support of government’s programs and policies’⁹⁵. However, the empirical insight drawn from Polish debates about patriotism seems to contradict such a straightforward understanding. The debate about patriotism⁹⁶ brings a number of theoretical arguments that are discussing acute political questions of the type of patriotism suitable for times of peace⁹⁷, for future⁹⁸, and also what kind of identity, loyalty, social bond and society it is meant to promote. It also reflects the conclusion of Geneviève Zubrzycki that “questions of identity have been central in Polish public life since 1989 and the ‘nation’ has become

⁹⁴ James Farr, op.cit., 34.

⁹⁵ Mary G. Dietz, op.cit., 191.

⁹⁶ That can be taken as an example of debates in which academics, editorialists and politicians discuss questions concerning the legacy of the communist times and also try to redefine important concepts. Piotr Tadeusz Kwiatkowski, *Pamięć zbiorowa społeczeństwa polskiego w okresie transformacji* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar 2008)

⁹⁷ It can also be called ‘patriotism in good times’, e.g. Wojciech Sadurski, “O patriotyzmie w czasach dobrych” in *Rzeczpospolita* 29.09.2004

⁹⁸ Marcin Król, *Patriotyzm przyszłości* (Warszawa: Szklane domy, 2004)

the most significant idiom and symbol, invoked and contested by different social groups and political actors in search for power and legitimacy”⁹⁹.

Drawing on these insights, my work is guided by a number of preliminary premises that justify the academic relevance of the proposed research:

1. Patriotism is an important concept, continuously present in political/public discourse in Poland.
2. The meaning of patriotism is being contested within a number of public debates, but this contemporary contestation does not lead to a rapid process of conceptual change.
3. More ‘traditional’ vision of patriotism is still the dominant one, but the ‘liberal’ one is getting more ground.
4. The power of intellectuals to define questions connected to nation and national identity is not decisive anymore. (They are initiators of the debate, and it reflects broader theoretical debates, but themes they introduced in the debate are only partially adopted and redefined by politicians.)

For the time being I adopt two preliminary hypotheses:

1. The salience of the use of the concept of patriotism in political discourses throughout different stages of the Polish political history reflects the interplay between the political dynamics and the transformation of the language of political class.

Given my focus on the contemporary perspective,

2. I will argue that the regime transformation in 1989 can be seen as a critical juncture for public discourse that regains its plurality. For patriotism it could mean to follow one of previous traditions, but it does not happen.

⁹⁹ Geneviève Zubrzycki “‘We, the Polish nation’: ethnic and civic visions of nationhood in Post-Communist constitutional debates”, *Theory and society* 30 (2001), 632.

V. Rationale and contribution of the research project

The rationale of the project is to develop a contemporarily oriented conceptual history of patriotism, such as defined in public and political debates in Poland. It would be a novel project, because patriotism did not constitute an object of contemporary scholarly research in Poland. I believe that this project will contribute to political theory in a number of ways. First, I will offer the concept clarification and systematization. Second, I will elaborate on links between the concept of patriotism and different political languages. Third, I hope to contribute to a possible development for both conceptual history of patriotism and conceptual history of patriotic traditions in Poland. On more theoretical grounds, I will try to address a number of normative approaches to patriotism, and observe how their arguments might be used in public debates and political argument. Finally, I will provide an empirical analysis of different uses of patriotism in public and political debates that will try to track different rhetorical strategies of actors. Hopefully, it would give ground to a subsequent development of a theory of how and when different actors deploy reference to patriotism in public debates. It might namely be useful for elite theory to analyze which actors are more important in promotion of their definition of patriotism and in which circumstances does it happen. For this reason, particular debates will be replaced in a broader context of political reality and political discourse.

Indicative Bibliography:

- Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, "Identity as a variable", *Perspectives on Politics* 4 (2006).
- Angermüller, Johannes. "L'analyse du discours en Allemagne et en France. Croisement nationaux et limites disciplinaires". *Langage et société* 120 (2007).
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Human condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958
- Art, David. *The politics of the Nazi past in Germany and Austria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Ball, Terrence. *Transforming political discourse. Political theory and critical conceptual history*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- Ball, Terrence. "Political theory and conceptual change". In *Political theory: tradition and diversity*, edited by Andrew Vincent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Ball, Terrence. "Must political theory be historical?", *Contributions to the history of concepts*. 1 (2006)
- Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Ervin Staub. *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997.
- Ben-Amos, Avnar. "The uses of the past: patriotism between history and memory". In *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations*, edited by Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub, Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997.
- Berlin, Isaiah. *Against the current: essays in the history of ideas* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995
- Billig, Michael. *Banal nationalism*. London: Sage publications, 1995.
- Brieskorn, Norbert. "Le patriotisme est-il nécessaire ?". *Objectif Europe* 41-42 (1996)
- Calhoun, Craig. *Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
- Canovan, Margaret. "Patriotism is not enough". *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (2000)
- Carley, Kathleen. "Extracting culture through textual analysis". *Poetics* 22 (1994)
- Chong, Dennis, Druckman, James N. "Framing theory". *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (2007)
- Contamine, Philippe. "Mourir pour la Patrie. X^e-XX^e siècle". In *Les lieux de mémoire*, edited by Pierre Nora. Paris: Gallimard, 1986
- Davies, Norman. *Heart of Europe. A Short History of Poland*. Oxford University Press, 1984.

- Dietz, Mary G. "Patriotism" in *Political innovation and conceptual change*, ed. Terence Ball, James Farr, Russell L. Hanson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, also available as "Patriotism. A brief history of the term" in *Patriotism*, edited by Igor Primoratz. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2002
- Duffy, Diane M., John L. Sullivan, and Leonard A. Polakiewicz, "Patriotic perspectives in contemporary Poland: conflict or consensus?". *The Polish Review* 3 (1993)
- Farr, James. "Understanding conceptual change politically". In *Political innovation and conceptual change*, edited by Terence Ball, James Farr, Russell L. Hanson. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Ferry, Jean-Marc. "Avatars du sentiment national en Europe à la lumière du rapport à la culture et à l'histoire", *Comprendre* 1 (2000)
- Foucault, Michel. *Archaeology of knowledge*. New York : Pantheon, 1972.
- Freedon, Michael. *Ideologies and political theory : a conceptual approach*. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1996.
- Głowiński, Michał. "Kryzys dyskursu patriotycznego". In *Patriotyzm Wczoraj i dziś* Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności 2006
- Gomberg, Paul. "Patriotism is like racism". In *Patriotism* edited by Igor Primoratz. Humanity Books, 2002.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *The New conservatism: cultural criticism and the Historians' Debate*. Cambridge: Polity, 1989
- Hampsher-Monk, Iain. "Speech acts, languages or conceptual history?". In *History of concepts: comparative perspectives*, edited by Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998
- Hubby, Leonie, Khatib, Nadia "American patriotism, national identity, and political involvement". *American Journal of Political Science* 1 (2007).
- Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood and belonging; Journeys into the new nationalism* London: Viking Press, 1994.
- Johnson, Gary R. "The evolutionary roots of patriotism". In *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations*, edited by Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub, op. cit.
- Kateb, George. *Patriotism and other mistakes*. Yale University Press, 2006.

- Kelman, Herbert C. "Nationalism, patriotism and national identity: social psychological dimensions". In *Patriotism. In the lives of individuals and nations*, edited by Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub, op. cit.
- Kloczkowski, Jacek *Patriotyzm Polaków. Studia z historii idei*. Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, Wyższa Szkoła Europejska im. ks. J. Tischnera, 2006.
- Koczanowicz, Leszek. *Politics of time. Dynamics of identity in post-communist Poland*. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. *Futures past. On the semantics of historical time*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 1985
- Koselleck, Reinhart. "Social history and *Begriffsgechichte*". In *History of concepts: comparative perspectives*, edited by Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree, op. cit.
- Koseła, Krzysztof. *Polak i katolik. Splątana tożsamość*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IfiS PAN, 2003.
- Król, Marcin. *Patriotyzm przyszłości*. Warszawa: Szklane domy, 2004.
- Kwiatkowski, Piotr Tadeusz. *Pamięć zbiorowa społeczeństwa polskiego w okresie transformacji*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar, 2008.
- Laborde, Cécile. "From constitutional to civic patriotism". *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2002).
- Lacroix, Justine. "For a European constitutional patriotism". *Political Studies* 50 (2002)
- Lacroix, Justine. *L'Europe en process. Quel patriotism au-delà des nationalismes?*. Paris: Cerf humanités, 2004.
- Levi, Margaret. *Consent, dissent and patriotism*. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Lukes, Stephen. *Power : a radical view*, London, MacMillan Press, 1974
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. "Is patriotism a virtue?". In *Theorizing citizenship*, edited by Ronald Beiner. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995
- Michener, Roger. *Nationality, patriotism and nationalism*. Paragon House, 1993.
- Muller, Jan-Werner. "On the origins of constitutional patriotism". *Contemporary Political Theory* 3 (2006)
- Muller, Jan-Werner. "Three objections to constitutional patriotism". *Constellations* 14 (2007)
- Nathanson, Stephen. "Is patriotism like racism?". In *Patriotism* edited by Igor Primoratz. op.cit.

- Nowak, Andrzej. *Powrót do Polski. Szkice o patriotyzmie po "końcu historii" 1989 – 2005*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Arcana, 2005.
- Nussbaum, Martha C. *For love of country?*. Beacon Boston Press, 2002.
- Palonen, Kari. "An application of conceptual history to itself", *Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought*, 1999
- Pocock, J. G. A. "Concepts and discourse: a difference in culture? Comment on a paper by Melvin Richter". In *The meaning of historical terms and concepts: new studies on Begriffsgeschichte*, edited by Hartmut Lehmann, Melvin Richter. Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1996.
- Porteret, Vincent, and Emmanuelle Prévot. *Le patriotisme en France aujourd'hui*. Centre d'Etudes en sciences sociales de la Défense 59 (2003)
- Prizel, Ilya. *National identity and foreign policy. Nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Primoratz, Igor. *Patriotism*. Humanity Books, 2002.
- Putnam, Robert D. "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of 'Ideology'". *American Political Science Review*. 65 (1971)
- Richter, Melvin. "A German version of the 'linguistic turn': Reinhart Koselleck and the history of political and social concepts". In *The history of political thought in national context* Dario Castiglione, Iain Hampsher-Monk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Schaar, John H. *Legitimacy in the modern state*. Transaction Publishers, 1989.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. "From historical institutionalism to discursive institutionalism: explaining change in political economy". Paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Meetings, Boston, August 2008.
- Searle, John. *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969
- Sękowska, Elżbieta "Charakterystyka dyskursu politycznego na przełomie XX I XXI wieku". *The Linguistic Guide (Poradnik językowy)* 3 (2006)
- Skinner, Quentin. "Rhetoric and conceptual change", *Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought*, 1999
- Shin, Hwa-Ji, and Michel Schwartz. "The duality of patriotism". *Peace Review* 4 (2003)

- Slater, Dan, and Erica Simmons. "Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents and Historical Causation". Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York City, August 10, 2007.
- Spencer, Philip, and Howard Wollman. *Nations and nationalism: a reader*. Rutgers University Press, 2005.
- Suchodolski, Bogdan. *Dzieje kultury polskiej*. Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Interpress, 1986.
- Sullivan, John L., Amy Fried, and Mary G. Dietz. "Patriotism, Politics, and the American Presidential Election of 1988". *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (1992)
- Viroli, Maurizio. *For love of country. An essay on patriotism and nationalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
- Walicki, Andrzej. *Trzy patriotyzmy: Trzy tradycje polskiego patriotyzmu i ich znaczenie współczesne*. Warszawa : Res publica, 1991
- Walicki, Andrzej. "Intellectual elites and the vicissitudes of "Imagined nation" in Poland". In *Intellectuals and the articulation of the nation*, edited by Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- Wańkiewicz, Andrzej. "The language of the Polish Political Class". *Polish sociological review* 163 (2008)
- Wierzejski, Wojciech. "Polityka Narodowa – zasady, obszary zainteresowań, metody pracy". *Polityka Narodowa* 2-3 (2008)
- Wnuk-Lipiński, Edmund. *Socjologia życia publicznego*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar, 2008.
- Zaller, John R. *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Zaremba, Marcin. *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2001.