

In spite of similar political and socio – economic conditions at times of transition to democracy some post-Communist cabinets lasted for the duration of their constitutionally designated mandates, while others collapsed after less than a year. The paper address the question of what governments do once invested in office, and what are the different strategies governments employ in doing so in order to prolong their stay in the office and hence influence policy making. Further, it addresses the importance of structural factors that constrain or encourage cabinets to maintain themselves in power. Namely, the paper suggests a combination of three explanatory factors to account for the difference in the duration of cabinets; the institutional context, of which constitutional rules play the major role, the style of leadership and party systems. More specifically, the paper analyses the constitutional powers of presidents and prime ministers, the organization of parties in cabinets; in particular the impact of factions and conflicts within cabinet parties on the decision-making process, and typology of prime ministerial leadership on the different aspects of cabinet decision making. A method of most similar and/or most different design is employed in this medium N study of 15 post-Communist cabinets. The paper contributes to the comparative analysis of cabinets in post-Communist Europe, which so far, is severely lacking. Moreover, the study of stability of cabinets is related to the successful policymaking, representation and accountability. Broadly speaking, stable cabinet affects the quality of democracy since its longer duration is related to more effectiveness with better internal cohesion and better control over polices put on parliamentary agenda. To the contrary, short lasting cabinets are ineffective policymakers, as they lack time to organize and develop consistent policies, as a result of which quality of decision making and representation in parliamentary democracy may come into question.