

**Political Cleavages and Socioeconomic Context:  
History, Welfare State, Deindustrialization and Variation in  
Patterns of Political Divisions in Advanced Industrial Countries**

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# 1. Cleavages Transformed: An Introduction

Over the last several decades the structure of political cleavages in advanced industrialized societies of Western Europe changed substantially compared to historical pattern identified in Lipset and Rokkan work (1967). This change was brought about by the process of social and economic change with deindustrialization, expansion of higher education and secularization as its most notable trends. Economic and social change produced large service and public sector which made social structure more complex by splitting middle and working classes into what Esping Anderson (1993) calls industrial and post-industrial hierarchy thus changing the nature of class cleavage. Secularization and the rise of new issues replaced religious cleavage with conflict over values and center-periphery cleavage either withered away or was institutionalized and therefore made more or less permanent feature of political system in countries like Spain or Belgium.

Social and economic change also produced new political issues which intersected or surpassed previously existing lines of political conflicts (Inglehart 1990, Kitschelt 1994). This made it increasingly difficult for the established parties to accommodate all social demands and allowed new parties to enter political competition through the politicization of new issues. Also, it forced established parties to adjust their positions and realign their electoral coalitions to include new social groups into their support base.

The result of these changes was a more complex political space characterized by multiple lines of political divisions. Divisions within middle and working class constituencies caused by the rise of new occupational groups and the politicization of new issues in 1980s and 1990s resulted in the split on the left between mainstream left and new left and on the right between mainstream and radical right (Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Kriesi 1998).

Social structure of advanced industrial societies is characterized by greater complexity than that of post-war industrial societies (Kriesi 1998, Esping Anderson 1993). Increasing relevance of employment conditions, task structure, exposure to labor market risk, education and various forms of their interaction makes it increasingly difficult to analytically reduce cleavages in contemporary industrial societies to a set of few structural variables.

Destructuralization of cleavages was further helped by the decline of mass organizations linked to parties and partisan encapsulation of the society through pillarization and similar arrangements segmenting society into separate groups. Social complexity translated into political complexity as greater social fragmentation inevitably translated into greater fragmentation of the political space (Mair 1997).

The final outcome is that today we can hardly speak of cleavages in the sense Lipset and Rokkan did and in terms of three-component definition proposed by Bartolini and Mair (1990). While we still have some level of structural foundation of modern political divisions, the usefulness of variables such as class or religion to explain their shape is at best only marginal. Whereas cleavages in modern societies do have some degree of stability and structural foundation (see Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004, Iversen and Soskice 2001), structural foundations of modern cleavages is hard to capture with available structural variables. Therefore new political cleavages achieve greatest visibility at the level of general political issues.

The rise of new issues is by and large a trend that is common to all advanced industrial countries (Inglehart 1990, Duch and Taylor 2003), as is the rise of new parties on the left and the right (Ignazi 1996). However, the exact shape of issue divisions and alignment of particular parties varies across nations (Knutsen and Scarborough 1995, Kriesi et al 2006). The source of this variation is likely to be a combination of path dependent development of

previously existing cleavages with social and economic developments linked to welfare state and deindustrialization.

Huber and Stephens (2001), Lynch (2006) and Esping Anderson (1990) show that the construction of welfare state was also an exercise in political coalition building where parties of different ideological orientation choose different paths by implementing policies and shaping coalitions that would enhance their electoral fortunes in the future. In part, policies used to respond to deindustrialization were also to a large extent shaped by the need of the established parties to construct viable political coalitions (see Iversen and Wren 1998). Variation in policies used to respond to social and economic shifts influenced how new political parties used new political issues to enter competition. That is why we could see significant differences between radical right in Scandinavia and continental Europe or why green parties do not exist in countries such as Norway and Denmark, or why greens in the Netherlands are very different from the European mainstream.

This chapter addresses the issue of transformation of political cleavages from the industrial model best described through Lipset and Rokkan (1967) work toward a more complex and multidimensional form taking place in modern postindustrial societies of Western Europe. Since I expect that structural cleavages lost their previous simplicity while new structural divisions are a complex interaction of a number of variables, I focus here principally on general issue divisions.

In order to give answers to these questions, this chapter analyzes the structure of ideological divisions among mass publics and their manifestation in voting behavior. The discussion in this paper provides a basis for comparative empirical analysis in the following chapters. With the use of mass survey data from WVS and EVS, following chapters will estimate structural and issue divisions that are structuring voting behavior of mass publics in western societies and how strong those general issue divisions are in particular countries.

## 2. Causes of Cleavage Transformation

Different trajectories in political and social developments across western societies invariably caused variation in the nature and the importance of political cleavages. According to classic literature on political cleavages, economic left-right cleavage is present in all societies while the nature and the importance of cleavages based on religion differs from country to country depending, on the religious composition of their population (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967 and their contributors). The pattern produced by the interaction of those two cleavages varies. In some countries, cleavages based on religion and economic conflict cross-cut each other, forming an essentially two-dimensional pattern of ideological divisions. In other countries they reinforce each other, and in third group of countries center-periphery division intersects predominant economic and religious divisions (Kitschelt 2002).

With the arrival of advanced industrialism the advocates of newly prominent value change theory argued that it can be expected that opposition between materialist and postmaterialist values will become dominant ideological divide in western societies (Inglehart 1990, 1997, Sankiah 1984). Value change theory with Inglehart as its main proponent, argues that as western societies grow richer and as security and the absence of major security threats begin to be taken for granted, political significance of economic and security issues will decline. As this happens, left-right ideological division based primarily on economic issues will eventually be replaced by divisions that are predominantly based on materialist and postmaterialist value orientations. The more developed and wealthier the society is, the bigger will be the importance of value orientation as the primary source of political divisions (Inglehart 1977, 1990).

There is almost no disagreement in the literature that societal development after 1970s produced new issues and brought about new dimension of political competition. The

mechanism that produces this new dimension in Inglehart hypothesis is related to trends he considers to be present in all societies equally, though not in equal amount, and more often than not independently of preexisting variations in social conditions and past developments (Inglehart 1977). The only societal conditions that really matter according to Inglehart are the level of economic development and the peacefulness of societies in question.

The value change theory therefore predicts relatively uniform, but differently timed, development of new value divisions. However, the variation in the interaction between old ideological cleavages, based on economic conflict and religion, and new ideological cleavage based on socio-cultural values produces cross national variation that can not be explained only by different timing in what is seen as a uniform developmental pattern.

More likely causes for cross national variation of ideological cleavages could be found in interactions between relevant historical factors, such as the historical strength of religious and other communitarian divides, and more recent political divisions related to welfare state formation and, even more recently, responses to deindustrialization and globalization, as well as dominant patterns of party competition. These historical factors influenced developmental path of cleavages and shaped the form they developed into at present time.

Given historical salience of particular forms of divisions we could reasonably expect to see following developments. The strength of religious and communitarian divisions could affect the salience of modern ideological cleavages based on cultural issues or values, and their alignment with political divisions based on economic issue. Intense historical competition along cultural and identity politics dimension is likely to increase the mobilization potential of 'new politics' issues and created conditions for the replacement of religion and related cultural issues with new politics and politics of identity issues as existing parties and voters were already accustomed to competition over cultural issues. On the other hand, the strength of economic divisions is likely to be affected by the divisions within middle

and working class and their cross-class coalitions, by the shape of political coalitions and by the policies pursued by main political actors during the formation of the welfare state.

Historically intense competition over economic issues is likely to be maintained as parties start competing over a new set of policies related to deindustrialization and transformation of the welfare state. Policy responses to deindustrialization and service sector growth affected how established parties managed to incorporate new social groups into their electoral coalitions and what issue niche(s) provided opportunity for successful new parties' entrance.

Comparative empirical analysis of political cleavages in advanced industrial countries conducted by Oddbjorn Knutsen and Elinor Scarborough (see Knutsen 1988 and Knutsen and Scarborough) supports such expectations. In countries with historically strong political divisions based on class and economic status economic issues had larger role in structuring political divisions in 1980s and 1990s than was the case in countries where historical political divisions were either dominantly based on religion or where religion and class were of equal importance.

Deindustrialization and globalization also produced qualitatively new division which combines economic and cultural elements. Hanspeter Kriesi and his coauthors, as well as some other scholars expect this particular division to become a prominent determinant of political divisions in advanced industrial societies (see Kriesi et al 2006, Esping Anderson 1999, Derks 2004, Rueda 2005). On the structural level this is a division between winners and losers of deindustrialization and globalization, or in other words, between insiders and outsiders of a modern capitalist system. This division is expected by Kriesi and others to reshape to some extent the nature of economic and social issues. On the outsider side it would bring calls for more economically protectionist and socially exclusivist measures, while on the insider side it would bring support for liberalizing and culturally libertarian policies. How would this division exactly develop in different national settings and whether it could for a

base for the development of new parties depends on the strength of various social groups that can be described as outsiders.

Transformation of cleavages, as described here, represents a path dependent development of the historical cleavages in interaction with social and economic changes providing opportunity structure for established political parties to realign their position and new parties to enter competition. In short, it is an interaction between structure and an agency with feedback links running in both directions, as political actors actively strive to form electoral coalitions of social groups through policy.

It should be stressed that this mechanism presupposes an important role for political actors (parties) in the development of cleavages. The strength of particular political actors, the way they formed coalitions and policies they pursued, shaped the formation of ideological cleavages in the future. Therefore, variation across countries is not only caused by societal differences, but rather, it is the consequence of interaction between societal differences and the actions of political actors<sup>1</sup>. How exactly this development played out in individual countries is the subject of the following sections.

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<sup>1</sup> One of the best examples for such development are policies of expanding welfare state services that created large left constituencies in the public sector and could be expected to be among the causes of the rise in importance of the new politics issues. Such development could also be responsible for potential division within constituencies of the left on old left workerist concerned with economic issues and new left social professional concerned about new politics issues. Such development could also be responsible to the change in the base of economic cleavage from class to sectoral (between public and private sector) (Knutsen 2001, 2005).

### **3. Political Cleavages: Cross-Country Differences**

Since I am focused on cross country variation in political division to be connected with models of capitalism, welfare regimes and deindustrialization patterns I present below three expected configurations of political divisions. These configurations are derived from differences between countries based on interaction between welfare regimes and deindustrialization patterns with previously existing issue divisions. I consider these interactions to be the principal contextual sources of cross national variation in political divisions in post-industrial societies. The political divisions I consider here are general issue divisions that give structure to general position of the electorate and shape their position on more political concrete issues. Therefore I do not focus here on the shape of exact political issues as they developed in particular countries. That would require much detailed focus than is possible here and would also reduce comparability between countries turning the theoretical discussion into a descriptive presentation.

#### **3.1 Configuration 1**

In the first configuration economic issues, such as management of the economy, taxation and redistribution are the primary and dominant source of issue divisions. This division historically as its base had class and socioeconomic status and for most of history of competitive elections was over issues such as taxation, redistribution and market regulation. At present time this political division is more shaped by the possession of mobile skills and resources, which determine one's ability to survive on competitive market, and consumption patterns, or dependence on welfare state for income and servicing of needs such as education, health and so on (see Rhem 2005, 2004, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004). Other issues, such as

libertarian or authoritarian cultural issues, or identity politics historically did not play such an important role since salience of religion and nationalism was generally low in politics of these countries. In modern time cultural issues are either subsumed into the primary division, or differences between parties on those issues are only marginal and do not have particularly high political relevance (Kitschelt 2001). This configuration of ideological cleavages can be found in countries that have liberal type of welfare regime and where religion did not play an important role in politics historically. In reality, countries where this type of ideological divisions is predominant are Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

Political competition in these countries is principally about economic issues such as taxation, welfare spending and economic openness, while cultural and identity issues have lower though generally increasing salience (with the notable exception of the US). The strength of economic divisions did not change significantly over the period as it kept its dominance because of highly polarized conflict between protectionist and market based responses to deindustrialization among mainstream left and right parties. The fact that left parties in some cases, most notably New Labor, adjusted their position toward more market based solutions does not seem to be affecting salience of economic issues significantly. Recent rising prominence of sociocultural dimension, namely issues such as immigration and cultural diversity, mainly reinforces principal division between those able to compete on the market and those that do not, but it does not add to the complexity of the political space.

Principal political actors in these countries were and still are mainly secular conservative and labor parties with constituencies that were (and in a way still are) divided mainly along class lines and with long history of political conflict over economic issues. Division between winners and losers of globalization in these countries is likely to follow the line of economic divisions. Deregulated labor markets prevented the rise of outsiders in the classic sense; however, the same mechanism produces large groups of low skilled workers

living under the high risk of poverty and feeling threatened by immigration and free trade. Therefore, it can be expected that losers and excluded will combine left economic positions with positions that is opposed to immigration and free trade (cultural and economic openness).

Although in these countries religious differences sometimes did transform themselves in communitarian divisions, they generally never generated strong self-standing political cleavage (the notable exceptions from this pattern are Northern Ireland and potentially Quebec in Canada). The role of religion in party formation was only minor or non-existent, and there are no significant parties that would predominantly compete on religion or socio-cultural issues. The absence of strong historical communitarian divisions and large immigration resulted in low salience of identity politics. Low salience of religion and identity politics allowed these societies (US being notable exception) to deal with cultural issues relatively easily and resulted in political divisions that continue to be primary economic in nature. However, in terms of structural characteristics predominantly class based divisions are most likely to be diluted and replaced with postindustrial divisions based on employment conditions, possession of mobile skills and resources and consumption styles (in essence we are talking about divisions within as middle and working class as well as between them).

The principal issue dimension in these countries is expected to be a division between redistributive and protectionist on the one hand and pro-market and pro-competition positions. Division over cultural issues is likely to become less aligned with economic dimension with time as on both sides of the economic divide we could find groups adversely affected by increasing economic and cultural openness which would call for more protectionist measures and greater cultural homogeneity (see Kriesi et al 2006 and van der Brug and van Spanje 2007).

## 3.2 Configuration 2

The second configuration of political cleavages is characterized by the combination of dominant economic division concerning issues such as taxation, redistribution and welfare programs, and somewhat less prominent division over socio-cultural and communitarian issues (see Knutsen 1988 and 1995 and Knutsen and Scarborough 1995). This type of ideological division can be found in countries that have socialdemocratic type of welfare state such as Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

Economy and the welfare state as the primary source of political divisions has its origin in the formation of social democrat universalist welfare states (Esping Anderson 1990). Social democrat welfare states were created by the social democratic parties, acting as representatives and supported by strongly unionized working class constituencies, with the support of agrarian constituencies of self-employed farmers represented by center parties (Esping Andersen 1985). In the post-war period of further expansion of welfare state programs toward the middle classes and the self-employed, social democrats also enjoyed the support of sizable segments of professional middle classes, while the opposition to welfare state growth was concentrated mainly within the conservative and liberal constituencies of business professionals and high income groups (Huber and Stephens 2001, Esping Anderson 1985).

The main political cleavage in such setting became a division between those who support policies aimed at the creation of universalist welfare state and those who oppose it, with significant groups (parts of the middle class and agricultural population) holding centrist, but generally supportive views of the universalist risk-sharing policies (Huber and Stephens 2001). In some countries in addition there existed a division within left between those who

support policies pursued by mainstream social democrats and those that thought such policies did not go far enough (such as communist and left parties in Norway, Sweden and Finland).

In the period of deindustrialization and increase in the service employment, economic conflict rotates over the size of public sector and its economic impact (Garret and Way 1999). This division causes splits between middle class and working class constituencies into protectionist and market supportive group, and is mainly based on employment differences between those in private and public sector and differences in risk exposure and dependency on welfare state programs. High income groups and middle class in the market exposed and private sectors are least supportive. These groups are followed by various segments of workers in industry and services and middle class groups with relatively high dependence on public sector services, which are in generally supportive of welfare policies but opposed to excessive taxation that could price them out of the international market. The most supportive groups are private sector employees, low skilled workers exposed to highest market risk and those highly dependent on welfare state for income and services.

Socio-cultural ideological divisions in Scandinavian countries are somewhat less prominent. Historically, cultural divisions in these countries have the source in the divide between the center and periphery (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Center-periphery division took shape of a conflict between urban and rural economy and between state protestant churches and nonconformist denominations concerning the nation building policies, where nonconformist Protestants wanted to maintain the autonomy of their social groups against the state interference (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

But in modern times socio-cultural divisions take a very different form. The rise of new issues brought left-libertarian and right-authoritarian positions on cultural and moral values, issues of cultural homogeneity, environmental protection, growth and nuclear energy at the hart of this dimension (Granberg and Holmberg 1988). The change partially also

happened because policies used to establish social-democratic welfare states and competitive export oriented economies also created large and strong public sector middle class and professional middle class in export oriented economy producing high value added goods and services. Public sector employees and part of the professional middle class share economically left positions and left-libertarian positions on socio-cultural and moral issues combined with pro-environmental positions (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, Kitschelt and Rehm 2004). Their positions are mirrored on the other side of the principal issue divide by business professionals and industrial constituencies who hold the opposite positions. Repositioning of the large segment of the middle class has potential to redefine essentially a dominantly economic cleavage into a dominantly socio-cultural cleavage over the issues such as identity, cultural homogeneity and acceptance of globalization (Kitschelt and Rehm 2004).

The rise of new issues and the number of public sector employees and sociocultural professionals, created potential for issue divisions within left, between old working class constituencies and sociocultural professionals over the question whether mainstream left parties should adopt new politics agenda and take more open and libertarian position on these issues, or adopt protectionist and exclusivist position that caters to their traditional working class constituencies. How these developments played out in various parties depends on within party coalitions and recruitment patterns of new activist in any particular party (see Kitschelt 1994). But answering this issue would go beyond the scope of this study and I will not address it here as I deal with divisions within the electorate and inter-party differences

Issue divisions on the right resemble old center-periphery cleavage and have the shape of differences between secular conservative or liberal on the one hand and centrist (agrarian) or religious parties on the other. While historically divided between agricultural and industrial producers and nonconformist and state churches, in modern time their electorates are divided

over the issues of environment, immigration and individual morality<sup>2</sup>. Divisions within the right are also partially caused by the rise of new issues such as environmentalism and nuclear energy, where actors are divided in a way that resembles old economic component of center-periphery division between industry and agriculture. The second part of center-periphery cleavage is religion and individual morality. But in modern period division between dissenter Protestants and national churches is replaced by the division between secular right and religious right divided over the issues of the place of religion in the society and its relationship with the state.

Although such divisions within left and right could account for differences within voters of right and left, it is likely that the content of predominant issue divisions in Scandinavian countries is still economic in character. Sociocultural divisions overall can be expected to be broadly aligned with economic divisions, while at the same time separating clearly between constituencies within left and right. Divisions between globalization winners and losers in themselves are not likely to be as prominent in these countries because of following two reasons. The first is historically high economic openness and exposure to world markets which made the electorate in these countries more accustomed to the realities of increasing economic integration and market competition (see Katzenstein 1985). The second reason is the presence of an array of welfare and employment policies aimed simultaneously at achievement of high employment and low inequality which prevented the emergence of substantial groups of outsiders. However, such policies did produce a revolt against the welfare state and related taxation policies, especially among small entrepreneurs (see Kitschelt and McGann 1995), which led to a rise of radical right parties. As process of deindustrialization and technological change affected labor market position of workers with

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<sup>2</sup> It can be argued that one of these divisions has a religion as a source, given that, Scandinavian countries relatively recently saw the emergence and strengthening of religious christian-democratic parties. It also must be borne in mind that the issue is not the stronger role of religion vis a vis the state and greater role for it in state sponsored institutions. Since protestant dissenter denominations place a huge emphasis on the autonomy of communities from the state (Manow 2005), the division over religion is more about the preferences for autonomy of religious communities vis a vis the state and the promotion of christian morality in the society.

insufficient skills, these parties used welfare chauvinistic appeals to mobilize working class electorate and reshape their electoral coalitions (Ignazi 1996, Iversflaten 2005).

### **3.3 Configuration 3**

The third configuration of political cleavages combines two strong but not equally significant cleavages, which in most countries cross cut each other. This configuration characterizes countries that were historically religiously predominantly catholic or mixed and have Christian-democratic type of welfare regime. Principal political cleavage in such countries is mainly cultural and rotating about new politics issues and cultural homogeneity while the economic cleavage is slightly less prominent (see Knutsen 1988 and Knutsen and Scharborough 1995).

Countries belonging to this configuration, such as Austria, Germany, Netherlands or Belgium historically had strong communal divisions based on religion and links between church and the state (Klalyvas 1995, Lipset and Rokkan 1967). High political salience of religion increased the potential for the emergence of cultural and identity issues, first related to church control over education and later to issues related to secularization of public space and links between individual rights and religious morality.

The structure of political divisions in continental countries in post war period is in large part related to the establishment of the corporatist welfare states. The dominant force behind the establishment of the corporatist welfare state were Christian-democrat parties, which frequently used particularistic social policies to forge electoral coalitions among assorted groups of working class, middle class and petty bourgeoisie (Huber and Stephens 2001, Manow 2005).

Ideological of Christian-democratic parties viewed society as an organic structure with social solidarity and subsidiarity as main its components (Manow 2005, Keesbergen 1999). This meant that while members of society should be protected from risk through social insurance, the autonomy of family and social associations as well as the place of each social unit in the overall social structure should be preserved (Khalyvas 1995, Keesbergen 1999). That is the reason why Christian democrats as dominant parties in most of these countries supported redistributive measures, universalization of insurance against risks and income support to families for basic caring services. However, because of the strong emphasis on the family autonomy, personalism and the subsidiarity principle, christian-democratic parties were opposed to the government economic intervention and particularly government service provision as such measures were considered to be an infringement on the autonomy of independent social units, such as the family, local community or associations based on interests (Manow 2005, Wilensky 1986). They were also opposed to policies that could at some point have transformational effect on the structure of society and relations between social groups. This is the reason why most of the caring services, and some elements of social insurance, are funded by the government but administered by churches, local communities, unions, foundations or social associations.

The core constituencies of Christian democratic parties were composed from a number of various social groups ranging from working class and self-employed farmers to petty bourgeoisie and segments of the middle class. Their economic preferences were not always in line, but they generally supported the state support for the family and family oriented social policy. Christian democrat parties managed to weld this diverse electorate in a single coalition through the development of social programs aimed at particular social groups and through creation of clientelistic links between parties and organized interest representing these groups (Lynch 2006, Kitschelt 2000, Khalyvas 1995). Electorate of social democratic parties, on the

other hand, was predominantly unionized working class with strong preferences for left economic policies and segments of secularized lower middle class linked to the party through mass organizations. Secular members of middle class usually supported liberal parties whose size widely differed across countries.

Economic positions of christian-democrat and social-democrat electorate were not identical but were fairly close to each other and much closer than were positions of the electorate of mainstream left and right parties in Scandinavian countries or Great Britain. Both groups agreed on the necessity of the establishment of comprehensive social insurance system and the need for governmental support of the economy. But they disagreed on the shape of policies that were supposed to bring that about (Huber and Stephens 2001). Social democrats, and their core constituencies of unionized workers, wanted universal system of social insurance, some amount of nationalization and direct government role in economic management, while Christian-democrats and their core constituencies supported fragmented occupational system of social insurance, corporatism and government support of private sector investment. The remaining significant social group, the secular business and upper middle classes were opposed to redistributive policies and government intervention, but they comprised a smaller part of the electorate and their political representation, secular liberal parties, were weaker than other two mainstream parties.

Relatively closer positions of major parties and their core electorate on a number of economic issues made economic dimension less salient and less competitive than in other two configurations. This relative weakness of economic dimension was helped by the division of working class into Christian and socialist blocks, and by the strong role that corporatist interest mediation had in continental countries (Wilensky 1986, Keesbergen 1999). It was also helped by a relative weakness of secular liberal or conservative parties and dominant position of christian-democrats in the party system.

As opposed to other two configurations, the content of dominant issue divisions in continental European countries belonging to Christian democratic welfare regime is predominantly sociocultural in nature (Kitschelt 2002, Knutsen 1988, Knutsen and Scarborough 1995)<sup>3</sup>. Historically, the nature of sociocultural and communitarian division was predominantly religious, dividing catholics, protestants, nonconformist protestants and secular liberals and social democrats in different combinations. Usually the main conflict line was between secular liberal elites concerned with modernization and nation building. Christian social groups were trying to preserve the role of the church and religion in society regarding education, provision of social services and control over rules regulating social life. They also tried to preserve autonomy and solidarity of religious communities from state interference (Khalyvas 1995, Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

In recent several decades, with the rise of new politics agenda, increasing cultural heterogeneity of western societies and globalization, the meaning of sociocultural cleavages has shifted to issues such as environment, multiculturalism, gender equality, immigration and response to globalization and EU integration (Kriesi et al 2006). Christian-democratic welfare state was supporting gender division of the workforce and the traditional form of family, with women mainly employed as housewives and in domestic care (Esping Andersen 1999a). However the achievement of gender equality implies an increase in the women participation on the labor market and the restructuring of the welfare state to make it more efficient in the provision of services supporting women participation. This issue brought about the division between traditionalist who wanted to preserve existing welfare regime and gender division of labor and modernizers and new social movements, who wanted to make it more open and

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<sup>3</sup> Kitschelt's expectations are partially supported by Knutsen's empirical analysis (Knutsen 1995) of the importance of different ideological cleavages for voting behavior. Knutsen found that in countries with social-democratic or liberal welfare regimes, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, and, not in accordance with expectations, France, the strongest ideological division is economic while religious and materialist-postmaterialist value divisions are less prominent. On the other hand in countries with christian-democratic welfare regime and religiously predominantly catholic or mixed, such as Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, the strongest ideological divisions are religious and materialist-postmaterialist value divisions while economic divisions are slightly less prominent.

supportive of women participation in the labor market (Kriesi 1999, Kitschelt 1994). Calls for greater gender equality and the rise of alternative lifestyles brought about the question of the role of Christian morality and individual freedom and the definition of basic rights in new social context. Such issues are in a way representing the continuation of a division about the role of religion in a society, though they are not in themselves about religion. Abortion and divorce are prime examples of moral issues where Christian morality comes in conflict with calls for greater individual freedom and gender equality. The rise of alternative lifestyles brought about the issue of acceptability and legal status of homosexuals. And most recent issue belonging to this group is the legal status of euthanasia, and potentially, the decriminalization of light drugs.

Another important source of sociocultural divisions concerns the definition of community. Multiculturalism and immigration placed a strain on the traditional definition of community which is very significant in continental countries characterized by segmented societies where religious identity is very important. The formation of new bonds of social solidarity would inevitably mean the redefinition of the role of religion and the redefinition of the meaning of the community. This in the end has an impact on the positions taken regarding the inclusiveness of the society, status and integration of immigrants and the definition of citizenship. Finally, worsening economic position of unskilled workers and other losers of globalization increased the salience of issues related to immigration, EU integration and citizenship (because of the access to welfare programs) (Kriesi et. al. 2006).

The rise of new politics agenda and the expansion of mainly private service sector in continental countries helped to bring about the division between new and old left. This division was also predominantly sociocultural in character and it is dividing old working class and trade union constituencies and new professional middle class-new left constituencies. In terms of content the conflict was primarily about the importance of issues such as

environmentalism, nuclear energy, economic growth and conservation, social inclusiveness and gender equality. Usually, the old working class was supporting authoritarian positions, exclusive view of society, welfare chauvinistic positions and placed more emphasis on growth and redistribution, while new left professionals were holding libertarian positions, supported social inclusiveness and openness and placed more emphasis on environment and conservation. Due to the small size of the public sector large segment of new service professionals are employed in the private and semi-private service sector. Given this, it is likely that they would be less economically left than old left constituencies and their counterparts in the Scandinavian countries, making the division on the left slightly deeper.

Deindustrialization and globalization placed left parties in these countries in a strategic dilemma, on the one hand they could aim to integrate new middle class electorate into their coalition by adopting more libertarian and centrist economic approach, or they could continue to cater to their core electorate of industrial workers with protectionist appeals (Kitschelt 1994). As we could see in Netherlands, Germany, Austria or France in recent decades, the strategic decision of social democrat parties in these countries affected the salience of economic issues. Christian democrat faced up to a point a similar dilemma. The choice on the right was more or less whether to continue with particularistic social policies aimed at their client groups or to implement market liberalizing reforms and create new electoral coalition based mainly on middle class while simultaneously appealing to segments of petty bourgeoisie and working class with strong emphasis on law and order issues and opposition to immigration. This dilemma visibly affected parties in Italy, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. In the end, interaction of positions taken by left and right parties affected the salience of economic divisions and decided whether new protectionist party would emerge on

the left, as it did in Germany and the Netherlands, and whether new party representing losers would establish itself on the right like it happened in Austria and Belgium<sup>4</sup>.

Deindustrialization and increasing women participation in the labor market in continental countries produced large surpluses of labor force that could not be compensated by the similar rise in the service sector because of the inadequate support of the social security system, fiscal constraints and heavily regulated labor market<sup>5</sup> (Iversen and Wren 1998). Large structural unemployment affected unskilled young males particularly hard and in contributed to the growing significance of division between insider and outsider on the labor market. In general, welfare regimes of continental countries were ill equipped to deal with deindustrialization which resulted in the creation of large groups of outsiders. This resulted in increased political salience of issues related to immigration, globalization and access to welfare system. More substantively, socioeconomic insecurity of groups that had hard time coping with socioeconomic change brought into prominence 'new right' agenda characterized by social exclusivism, welfare chauvinism and an anti-establishment appeal. This helped create radical right parties that are somewhat more exclusivist and protectionist than their Scandinavian counterparts.

All in all, in continental countries we can expect a greater range and higher salience of sociocultural issues. Economic issues are expected to be less correlated with sociocultural issue dimension than in other two configurations, and are also expected to be less salient and less diversified when it comes to positions held by mainstream left and right parties.

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<sup>4</sup> In the case of Austria initially different logic was at work. Freedom party at first emerged as a response to clientelistic corporatism established in Austria after second world war, only after Christian democrats embraced more market reforming approach did Freedom party, turned to losers.

<sup>5</sup> Simply stated high wage and job protection prevented the creation of low skilled private sector and budget pressures and the welfare system made it unfeasible to create large public service sector.

## Final note

This chapter provides a general overview of political divisions I expect to find in advanced industrial countries of Western Europe. It links patterns of political divisions with changes in social structure that are consequences of interaction between deindustrialization and globalization, characteristics of welfare regimes and previously existing patterns of political divisions. As such it provides a ground for the development of propositions that will be tested in the following chapters.

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