Katalin Farkas - papers

"Phenomenal Intentionality without Compromise" 

forthcoming April 2008, in a special issue of The Monist, on “Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness”, edited by Uriah Kriegel and Terence Horgan 
penultimate draft pdf

Abstract:
In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow.

"Time, tense, truth"

forthcoming in Synthese
published in Online First
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9116-y
penultimate draft pdf

Abstract
A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for way the  truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-value are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike  other views, the present proposal,  can meet the challenges posed to both the A and the B theory.

"Indiscriminability and the sameness of appearance" 

This is an electronic version of a paper published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume CVI (2006) Part II, pp. 205-25  pdf  © Aristotelian Society

Abstract
How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations about the phenomenal sorites.

"Semantic Externalism and Internalism"

in the Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, ed. by Barry C. Smith and Ernest Lepore: 323-40 (penultimate draft pdf)

Abstract
This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.

"The unity of Descartes's thought"

in History of Philosophy Quarterly 22/1 (January 2005) 17-30 (penultimate draft pdf)

Abstract
One of the central tenets of Descartes's philosophy is dualism: that everything in the world can be divided into thinking substances (or minds) and their properties on the one hand, and corporeal substances (bodies) and their properties on the other hand. It is therefore puzzling that on a number of occasions, Descartes seems to suggest that certain phenomena - including perceptions, sensations, emotions, called the 'special modes' - belong to neither mind nor body alone, but specifically to the union of the two. It has been suggested that in the light of these claims, we should regard Descartes as a 'trialist' rather than a dualist. In the paper, I criticise the 'trialist' interpretation, and I offer an explanation of the theory of the special modes which reveals it to be perfectly compatible with Descartes's dualism.

"What is Externalism?"

Philosophical Studies 112/3 (February 2003): 187-208 (penultimate draft pdf)

Abstract
The content of the externalist thesis about mental content depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the ``internal'' and the ``external''. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is around the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate. On the one hand, we could have a perfectly good externalist argument about a natural kind which is found only inside the body; hence it is not necessary for the externalist argument that the individuating facts should be outside the body. On the other hand, 'external' understood as 'external to the body' fails to address dualist versions of internalism, and hence it isn't sufficent to run a general argument against internalism. I suggest a new way of drawing the boundary, and argue that only this new understanding of the external/internal distinction helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access.

"Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake?"

Croatian Journal of Philosophy III/8 (2003): 155-69 (penultimate draft pdf) 

Abstract
The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of objective entities do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we can trace conceptual differences to internal differences.If it doesn’t, we do not have a case of conceptual difference. Neither case supports Twin Earth externalism.