Among the many works that have been written about blind panics and about the violence of those obscure mass reactions which wish to redeem a collective shame and to punish an act of treason the first which comes to mind is a classical study by Georges Lefebvre, *La Grande Peur de 1789*, though other important books have appeared since, notably Jean Delumeau’s *La Peur au Moyen-Age* and René Girard’s *The Scapegoat*.

They do not refer directly to my subject, but the question naturally arises when we try to analyse outbursts of hostility against Jews. The need to assess their general or specific causes, their spontaneous or premeditated character, or the identity of their authors, if they were planned beforehand, may still be felt long after they have been perpetrated.

I should record here the outcome of some research I did on the ‘Image of the Jew in Medieval Romanian Society’, a paper which was intended as an introduction to the first volume of a collection of documents (this was in 1986 and censorship played its part by preventing me from publishing it). On that occasion I came upon what was probably the first instance of a pogrom in the Romanian lands. We know that in 1715 the Prince of Wallachia, Stephen Kantakouzenos, ordered the Bucharest synagogue to be demolished.

The incident was mentioned in only one book written by the Italian secretary of that prince, Antonio-Maria del Chiaro, who was a baptised Jew himself, which may account for the interest he took in the fact, while the contemporary Romanian chronicles kept silent. But an inscription on a tombstone referring to the murder of Rabbi Mordechai ben Joshua gives the precise date, 6 December 1715, and I should therefore be inclined to consider him the victim of an anti-Judaic riot. The accusation of ritual murder may have given grounds for this gruesome episode but the real cause must have been involvement in internal factional struggles, if the Jews, like other foreigners, were recognised (and persecuted) as supporters of the late prince Constantin Brancovan. [1] In this case, as well as in the 1726 charge of ritual murder, which occasioned in Moldavia an infamous lawsuit involving the bribery of high officials, it seems that the religious motivation was not taken seriously. Actually, it would be rather on the Jewish side that one finds instances of religious intolerance, as has been proved for 1836, when, in a Moldavian borough, Târgu-Ocna, a group of Jews made Easter the object of scorn and mockery by staging a derisive parody of the Resurrection. [2]

Some years ago, the late Chief Rabbi of Romania, Moses Rosen, asked me to make an investigation in the archives on the conduct of Bessarabian Jewry at the end of June 1940, a study which, he believed, would have resulted in proving false the accusations of disloyalty brought forward to justify the pogroms of Dorohoi (1940) and Iaşi (1941). I declined the invitation, saying that the time had not yet come for a balanced, coherent overview, which would have needed first a number of *prolegomena* based on documents. Yet the task was, sooner than expected, accomplished by journalist M. Pelin who had formerly been involved in advocating Marshal Antonescu’s innocence. Though he had contested the truth of Malaparte’s horrifying description of the Iaşi pogrom, this author declared this time that the evidence of a great quantity of material was showing how the myth of ‘Jewish treason’ had been built up. [3] Recent discussion of the same topic, especially by military historians, led to different conclusions. [4] It seems that in Bessarabia, where antisemitic oppression was at its worst, because a popular prejudice associated the Jews with communism, the withdrawal of the Romanian army was an opportunity for those who sympathised with the Soviet regime to express their political preference. Most of them belonged to the Russian, Ukrainian, and Jewish minorities. Both credulity and malevolence have contributed to the tendency to explain in such terms the antisemitic violence of the war, which included the sinister camps in Transnistria. What I shall try to show here is that, under conditions of ethnic prejudice, ‘Jewish treason’ is an inevitable presupposition and that an occasional bloodbath is regarded as purificatory after a collective humiliation. The same form was taken by popular emotions in a little-known case, which I recognised to be a prelude of what was to come. The events of 1918 parallel almost exactly those that would take place in 1940–1941.

There is a source which has not yet been utilised in writing the history of the Jewish community in Romania before and during the First World War, on the eve of emancipation. Charles Vopicka’s memoirs, *Secrets of the...*
Balkans. Seven Years of a Diplomatist’s Life in the Storm Center of Europe, published in 1921, are a most valuable account of the mission accomplished as extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary of the United States in Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria. In those days, American policy in the Balkans had not reached a level that would have justified the expense of three diplomatic missions, and Vopicka was travelling between Bucharest, Sofia, and Belgrade. (On his biography see Glenn Torrey’s contribution to a collection of historical essays published in New York in 1982.) [5]

Even before coming to Romania, Vopicka had been informed about the situation of the local Jewish community through his contacts with the American Jewish Committee. ‘Before I left for my post, in 1913’, said Vopicka, ‘I was visited by many prominent Jews of America, and before my departure I had a conference with the Jewish leaders in New York, regarding the condition of the Jews in Romania. They all complained that the Romanian Jews were regarded and treated as slaves’. This was slightly exaggerated, to say the least. Romania’s reputation for being, along with Russia, the most antisemitic country in Europe had been produced by the public debate about the franchise which had begun in 1866 when the constitution then adopted had refused non-Christians Romanian citizenship. Under pressure of the Western powers that had used the opportunity of the Berlin Treaty to link the recognition of Romania’s independence with the emancipation of the Jews, the previous limitation was formally suppressed. Nevertheless, only a minority within the minority had acquired citizenship by the turn of the century, and this only through a long and by no means secure procedure in every case. To understand this situation one should take a closer look at the political and social structure of Romanian society: 800,000 ‘foreigners’ out of a total population of eight million – that is, 10 percent of the total population – was still tolerable, and the kingdom was a homogeneous nation-state. But the majority was formed by a massive peasantry which itself was deprived of political rights. Illiteracy in 1900 was estimated at 87 percent, comparable only with Southern Italy or with large parts of Russia. If the word ‘oligarchy’ ever had a meaning, it was in a country where the right to vote was directly exercised by no more than 15 percent of the population. The Jews amounted to 4.5 percent of the total population, but in Moldavia recent immigration from Galicia had brought their presence to 10.6 percent, and in the city of Iaşi they constituted already more than half of the inhabitants. Statistics concerning the place taken by Jews in trade and industry are even more striking: all the enterprises created in Romania from 1881 to 1902 were owned by Jews. During the same period, thirty banks were established, and seven of them were in Jewish ownership. Reliable figures describe the structure of entrepreneurship as 52 percent Jewish and only 17 percent Romanian, while the remaining 31 percent was shared among German, Italian, and British capital. Probably no less significant was the role played by Jews in journalism, but we need further research into that profession. [6]

It was obvious that to grant citizenship en bloc to an ethnic group which would have balanced the percentage of the native population who had civic rights was out of the question. Even more so because the economic influence of the Jews challenged the Romanian middle-class. The question of civic rights for the Romanian Jews was, as we have seen, a cause actively defended by a widely ramified lobby abroad. In answer to such propaganda, anti-Semitism became more persuasive by stirring the nationalist resistance to Western influence at the very moment when modernisation was inevitably producing traumatic effects.

It is interesting to read one of Vopicka’s conversations with King Charles I, in which the monarch explained his reasons for refusing to accept equality of rights: ‘The Jews are better educated than the Romanians, so we must first build schools where our own people may be taught. Then, in twenty years, the Romanians will be educated enough to vote on the question of whether or not the Jews shall be admitted to citizenship.” Incidentally, this gives us a hint about when the king thought it would be appropriate to introduce universal suffrage in Romania. [7] Vopicka adds: ‘To this I answered: “That is too long a time. Neither you nor I will have a chance to see that reform.”’ He was wrong. Only the old king, who was to die in 1914, would not witness the reforms. Another conversation – with his successor, King Ferdinand – indicates that the Liberal government in Iaşi, some two years before the decree of January 1919, was prepared to grant civic rights to the Jews who had participated in military campaigns: ‘The king told me that he would favour a decree conferring citizenship on all Jews serving in the army, but at the same time he stated that many Jewish soldiers were deserters.’ The same allegation was made by prime minister I. I. C. Brătianu. On the other hand, Moritz Wachtel, chairman of the Moldova Bank, complained to Vopicka that the Jewish soldiers, despite their honourable conduct, were refused any decoration or advancement; moreover, they were selected for disciplinary battalions in the front line. Vopicka did not disregard these pieces of information. He says: ‘Later, I investigated these charges and counter-charges and became satisfied that the Jewish soldiers were badly treated by some officers, and also that the accusation that many of them were deserters was true.’ [8]

In an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, while people were ready to discover spies everywhere, as we note from the diary of the writer and politician Barbu Delavrancea who left Bucharest with the parliament in December 1916, the
Jews were victims of the general distrust: it is impossible to ignore this psychological element. Vopicka came to their defence: ‘I took the part of the Jews, defended them before the Romanian government and succeeded in having many of them freed and their property returned to them.’ With the same solicitude, he made efforts to deliver food supplies to the Jews in Moldavia, an activity which was co-ordinated by the American Jewish Distribution Committee of New York. Like ambassador Morgenthau for the Armenians, Vopicka protected the people who had been entrusted to him and interlocked his action as a philanthropist with diplomatic negotiations.

The experience of the previous five years had prepared Vopicka for the critical situation in which he would find himself. He does not seem to have been surprised when, at the beginning of November 1918, he learned that a pogrom was about to break out. Its date was already known: 12 November. In his memoirs, Vopicka remembers:

A young lawyer from Bucharest sent me a letter in which he appealed to me to use what influence I had to stop the threatened pogrom. . . . I prepared a letter to the Prime Minister, General Coandă, in which I called attention to the expected pogrom, and asked that he take steps to stop it at once. . . . I told the Minister that my country had entered the war solely for the sake of humanity, that if Romania should start killing the Jews, she should not expect anything from the Peace Conference and that most likely I would be obliged to quit my post, as my government would not overlook such an outrage.

What was the general’s reaction to the news thus broken to him? He answered he would do everything in his power to prevent the massacre by sending orders by telegraph or messengers to the territory which had been until then occupied by the German army and was being already gradually abandoned by those troops. ‘A few weeks later he told me that the Germans had made the preparations for the pogrom in order to discredit Romania before the world and the Peace Conference.’ As Vopicka concludes: ‘pogroms were started on 12 November in Braila and Bucharest, but were suppressed by the military authorities’. [9]

Before evaluating this account, we must compare it with a report that Vopicka addressed to state secretary Lansing on 22 August 1919, in which he recorded the essential facts of his mission that was now near its end. It is better to reproduce the entire passage, which gives some more details.

During my stay in Jassy, at the beginning of the month of November, many Jews came to our Legation and asked me for protection against the coming pogrom in Romania. They stated that they had positive evidence that a massacre of the Jews was being planned. Many letters also reached me from Jews in different parts of Moldavia and Wallachia, so that I commenced to believe that the statements made by the Jews might be true. I then wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, General Quanda, asking him to prevent the pogrom, stating that if the pogrom should take place, Romania would pay dearly for it, because our country, which went into the war for the sake of humanity only, could not support her aims and she would be condemned before the world. I carried this letter to the Prime Minister myself, and he kept reading it over, and finally said that he did not believe that any pogrom was planned, but, to protect the Jews, he would comply with my wish and immediately telegraphed to the military and police authorities to do everything in their power to stop any pogrom, if it was true that one was intended. A few days after, when I met him, he told me that he was informed that the Germans had planned a pogrom in Romania for the purpose of discrediting the Romanians before the world. The Jews claimed that the pogrom was to be started on 12 November in Braila and Bucharest. The trouble was started, but was suppressed by the military and police authorities. I have received many letters from Jews and from Jewish societies thanking me for my action in this matter. [10]

When writing his memoirs, the author read his own report again and left a few details out. A first question arises from the difference between the version attributing the dramatic news to a letter (the ‘young lawyer’ might have been Wilhelm Fildermann, then thirty-six, who was a well-known leader of Uniunea Evreilor Români) and the other text, which invoked ‘many’ denunciations. The alarm was given a day after the dismissal of Alexandru Marghiloman by King Ferdinand and the instalment of a new government led by General Coandă, which means that the American diplomat saw the new prime minister either on 9 or 10 November. Between Vopicka’s intervention and the result of the enquiry some ‘days’ or ‘weeks’ passed. In the end, the answer was embarrassed and unconvincing. Why would the Germans organise a pogrom or encourage it? They were too busy with their own retreat to think about involving Romania in a discreditable affair. Those who were most unfriendly to the Jews were not in the German camp. At least on a local level, some Romanians must have been eager to take revenge on the collaborationists for the two years’ humiliation of German military occupation. Furthermore, the idea of a Jewish conspiracy that haunted the antisemites seemed confirmed by the fact that the granting of citizenship to the Romanian Jews was included among the conditions imposed by the Central Powers in the notoriously drastic treaty of Buftea (May 1918). Thus, the Germans had been the champions of civic rights for the Jews and the latter were made to pay for this association.

We know what actually happened when the German troops who had kept the situation under control began to leave. A useful work of reference is Carol Iancu’s book L’Emancipation des Juifs de Roumanie (1913–1919), published in Montpellier in 1992, though it makes no use of Vopicka’s memoirs. Fear of an imminent pogrom had
started to spread from the end of October. On 11 November, in Bucharest, antisemitic riots broke out in the Jewish outskirts of Văcărești and Sfânta Vineri, where the hooligans were faced with vigorous resistance from the self-defence organisation of the community. These incidents are described not only in the complaint filed by the Union of Native Born Jews on 2 December, but also in the memoirs (published only last year) of Al. Tzigara-Samarucăș, who was then chief of police in Bucharest. The second source tells of fourteen deaths, while many civilians on both sides, as well as some policemen, were injured. Shop-plundering and devastation seem to have caused more harm in Braia, where order was re-established only after one week. The authors of a recent book about Bucharest under the German occupation completely ignore the episode. [11]

Thus some unsavoury facts are expelled from historical memory. On the other hand, Professor Iancu’s standard account does not admit that there was a spontaneous reaction of the mob: ‘Les soulèvements, les déprédations et les dévastations ont bel et bien été le résultat d’une campagne orchestrée dont les organes de police n’ont pas été étrangers.’ (‘The riots, the plundering and the havoc were the result of a plotted instigation which may be well suspected of being the feat of the police’). This conclusion, however, has no evidence to rely upon. It tries to demonstrate that the charge of having collaborated with the enemy was false, because, as far as we know, no popular emotion threatened those Romanians who were known to have been in the Germans’ service, not even the slightest sanctions being imposed by the government against members of the social and political elite who had sided with the enemy. This argument, however, means falling into a trap because antisemitism is irrational and it does not provide logical arguments for mass aggression. The common enemy disguised a diversity of aims; while the part of the population exasperated by poverty accused the Jew of being a businessman, the upper-middle class suspected him of being a subversive Socialist.

Let us try to understand the unintelligible. Here is the representative of the great American democracy who was not only shocked by the semi-feudalism of the country, but had also been taught what he had to believe. The rumour that Vopicka benefited from the Austrian rate of exchange, which he applied to the money deposited in his safe keeping by Jewish capitalists can be disregarded. Before him stood a Romanian prime minister, who, hopefully in good faith, was probably influenced by the prejudices of Romanian society and of the class to which he belonged. Even his perplexity proves that General Coandă was an honest man and a loyal soldier. His attempt to exculpate his fellow countrymen by accusing the Germans implies that he considered the violent form of antisemitism as both undesirable and immoral. It would be absurd to assume that the head of the Bucharest police might be the instigator of a pogrom: Tzigara-Samarucăș was an art historian, educated in Germany, who had accepted this most unlikely office, but whose antisemitism was of the mild variant then common among his peers. He even used his authority to stop the riots at a moment when the capital was in the grip of the feverish expectation of the entrance of the Allied troops.

The doubts that lie behind the question of instigation suggest a different approach, which might give us a more precise evaluation of the intensity with which the Jewish minority marked its presence, and also of the sensitivity of Romanian society to the problem. After all, France, with only 70,000 Jews, reacted very strongly, as we know, to the Dreyfus affair. What is important, in its practical effect, is mass mobilisation through propaganda, or, in other words, the change from pre-liberal backward-looking to post-liberal mass-based antisemitism. In order to ponder the effectivenes of both antisemitic and Jewish methods of using communication, let us examine the bibliography regularly published by the Academy Library of Bucharest (Creşterea Coleţ iumilor, 1916–1919). [12]

In 1916, among the newly acquired books included in that inventory were 24 works concerning ‘the Jewish Question’ – some of them published abroad, like the Protocol of the First Zionist Congress, Basle, 1897 – but also 14 Jewish newspapers (in Romanian, Hebrew, German, and Yiddish), while the total number of periodicals was 325. We should also note the great number of Jewish associations which published their statutes and annual proceedings – no fewer than 28 – which is very interesting when one tries to trace the development of civil society in Romania. During the following years, 1917 and 1918, the number of periodicals diminished to about 200, and only three were Jewish: Curierul israelit, Neamul evreesc and Tikkvath-Israel. Four new associations appeared indicating philanthropic and cultural aims. The theme of Judaism was discussed in 13 new books. Of the 406 periodicals printed in 1919, when the transformation of the kingdom into ‘Greater Romania’ brought an explosion of press activity, five were Jewish, three of them being new (including the Cernăuţi newspaper Ostjüdische Zeitung). Fifteen new associations were founded, in Bucharest, Iaşi, Piatra-Neamţ, Piteşti, Roman, and Vaslui, and even in Negreşti. The year of the emancipation of the Jews brings only a modest gathering of eight pamphlets on this subject. The titles are typical of a raging battle. An anonymous brochure entitled Doveţi de intentiunile Idoiilor de a distrage poporul român [Proofs of the kikes’ plotting to destroy the Romanian nation] was published in Craiova, to which an equally anonymous reply came from Iaşi under a no less sensational title, La guerre d’extermination contre les Juifs.
Ghelmegeanu justified his threats against Jews by the hostile attitude that the Jewish population of the lost province. A significant fact is presented. On 26 June 1940 – that is, before the retreat from Bessarabia – the Home minister M. connected (for instance, by the nationalist politician Aurel C. Popovici, one of the advisers of Archduke Francis-Ferdinand and editor-in-chief of the Bucharest newspaper *România Jună*). The Social-Christian inspiration of this group, which specifically condemned Marxism, Republicanism, and Socialism, was manifested by the sympathy shown to Karl Lueger, the antisemitic mayor of Vienna, whose popularity in Romania was due to his firm stand against Hungary. Besides, Popovici was fascinated by the racial theories of H. S. Chamberlain.

The same themes are present in obscure, marginal newspapers like *Vocea Dreptății* (1905–1908) and *Liga antisemită* (1908–1916), both of them published by the same rabidly antisemitic lawyer Jean N. Sachelarie. The two newspapers had little weight in the political life of that time and were even reduced to a merely symbolic existence, managing to survive only through blackmail. The other way of making money, which was advertising, indicates that the readership was mostly lawyers. A more detailed investigation would probably find that the political zone covered by antisemitism before the First World War was a fringe of the Conservative Party. Violent slogans like ‘Go to Uganda!’ or ‘Death to the Asiatic vipers!’, however, are more in keeping with the vulgar anti-parliamentary hysteria which appears elsewhere in these newspapers. The same xenophobic extremism, pretending to defend Romanian trade and industry, openly demanded that the Jewish shops of Lipsani street (a traditional commercial part of Bucharest) be burnt to the ground upon and stated that the solution to the Jewish Question would be the gallows or the guillotine. Such rhetoric must have incensed enough readers to make them talk about a pogrom in 1918, when they needed to give way to their patriotic feelings.

But the story does not stop here. On 27 May 1919, Charles Vopicka asked for an explanation from prime minister General Văitoianu concerning the proclamation of the commander of Romanian troops in Bessarabia, who was said to have declared that the local Jews should be exterminated as Bolsheviks and enemies of Christian civilisation. This information had reached Washington, and the State Department, alarmed by the Jewish lobby, wanted to know more. This time, Vopicka’s answer was all in favour of the Romanians:

I beg to report Jews are not persecuted in Romania and just received a faultless law by which they received equal rights with all other people in Romania. . . . It is my opinion that the agitation by Jews in Bessarabia is part of their campaign by which they wish to discredit Romanians so that the Peace Conference will not grant Bessarabia to Romania, although seventy percent of all the population is Romanian.

Of course, Vopicka’s change of position had been determined by the decree signed on 22 May 1919, which granted citizenship to the Jews. It is nevertheless strange that once more we hear about intrigues aimed at blackening Romania’s image abroad: before, this intention had been attributed to the organisers of pogroms; now it was attributed to those who were in danger of becoming their victims.

After only twenty years, equality was replaced by discrimination, and the pogrom which was prevented in 1918 was successfully engineered in 1941. The suspicion that the two situations may be related comes to mind. The connection is suggested by the memoirs of the former Chief Rabbi of Romania, Dr Alexandre Safran, in which a significant fact is presented. On 26 June 1940 – that is, before the retreat from Bessarabia – the Home minister M. Ghelmegeanu justified his threats against Jews by the hostile attitude that the Jewish population of the lost province
was said to have manifested. The rumours spread during the following days and weeks about the shameful humiliation that Romanian soldiers had undergone from Jews served to justify a global condemnation of the Jewish minority. Curiously, the minister seemed to have foreseen it. [18] In these circumstances, as in 1918, the vindictive reflex was to seek revenge after a national trauma (the behaviour of both Romanians and Jews under the German military occupation in the first case, and the loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina without any resistance in the second). In the interwar period, antisemitic positions which had earlier been characteristic only of a lunatic or opportunistic fringe (if we select only the most extremist messages) had become a significant political philosophy, on the way to acquiring dominance in the war years. Especially because, when the charge of cowardice cannot be accepted on a national scale, compensation is sought and this means putting the responsibility on the traditional scapegoat. The unity of the nation can be restored by rejecting the aliens as the most plausible traitors. In both the cases we have invoked here, the Romanians turned their backs on an experience which had shamed them because of its contrast with the ideal conduct preached by nationalists, and they allowed themselves to be propelled towards a war from which they expected purification. The two situations should perhaps be placed within a historical framework: in 1918, whatever happened or did not happen in Romania was contemporary with the pogroms in Poland, Ukraine and Russia, occasioned by the revolution, the civil war and the Polish–Soviet military conflict. In 1941, parallel events were possible because they were located near the vortex of the Holocaust. This does not mean that the significance of anti-Jewish crimes should be minimised. The essence of the problem is that in the period between the two events antisemitism had grown into a powerful movement and that an intoxicating press had actively contributed to the taking of this course in the most violent decade in modern Romanian history.
Notes

4. Ioan Scurtu and Constantin Hlihor, Anul 1940. Drama românilor dintre Prut și Nistru (Bucharest, 1992).
6. These figures are quoted in a study I have been preparing for some time, most of them according to Catalin Turliuc, Modernizarea și evreii din Moldova în a doua jumătate a secolului XIX, SAHJR, II, p. 154 sq. A useful comparison with the Armenians in Turkey would show that this single minority responded to the capitalistic forces of the industrialised West at a faster rate than did the majority population, and that they achieved a major economic presence in the Ottoman Empire, disproportionate to their numbers (Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, Survivors. An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide (University of California Press, 1993).
8. Carol Iancu, L’Emancipation des Juifs de Roumanie (1913–1919) (Montpellier, 1992), pp. 116–17, refers to the 300 Jewish deserters who, on their arrival in Odessa, asked to be enlisted in the Russian army in 1917.
13. See also S. Bernstein, Les persécutions des Juifs de Roumanie (Copenhagen, 1917); Enric Braunstein, L’Oligarchie roumaine et les Juifs (Paris, 1921).
14. See for instance the collection of the weekly Neamul evreesc [The Jewish Nation, popular independent newspaper for unity and fraternisation between Jews and Christians].
17. National Archives, Bucharest, microfilms from the USA, r. 648, f. 203, 205, 207, exchange of messages with State Secretary Polk.