Dedicated to the victims of Eastern European antisemitism and the courageous people who continue the fight against it.
Journal for the Study of Antisemitism (JSA)

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Shalva Weil, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Robert Wistrich, Sassoon Center/SICSA Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Bat Ye’or, Independent Scholar, Switzerland

Andreas Zick, Faculty of Education, University of Bielefeld, Germany
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*The JSA thanks Jeff and Evy Diamond for their continuing patronage.*

*Jeff Diamond Law*

*New Mexico and Texas*
München-Gladbach, Germany, March 18, 1945: Pfc. Abraham Mirmelstein, Newport News, holds the Holy Scroll as Cpt. Manuel M. Poliakoff, Baltimore, and Cpl. Martin Willen, cantor, of Baltimore, conduct services in Rheydt Castle, former residence of Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. The Jewish services, the first conducted east of the Roer River, were offered in memory of boys of the Jewish faith who lost their lives in the drive. The castle is now occupied by troops of the 29th division, US Ninth Army.

—Bettmann/Corbis
Introduction: Special Issue on Eastern European Antisemitism

András Kovács*
Guest Editor

More than four million Jewish victims of the Holocaust came from four countries: Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia (an independent state from 1939), most of whose inhabitants had either passively observed or actively supported the ghettoization of the Jews and their deportation to the death camps. The scars left by the Shoah seemed to be deep and enduring. For a long time after World War II, it was thought that the mass murder of the Jews led to catharsis; it had rendered all forms of antisemitism illegitimate forever in the countries of the genocide. “The antisemite was a latent killer before Auschwitz, but a manifest killer after Auschwitz,” wrote the Buchenwald survivor and Nobel Prize-winner author Imre Kertész.1 After Auschwitz, there seemed to be a moral consensus that there was no “innocent” antisemitism, and not only legal and social discrimination of Jews but the public expression of everyday stereotypes and prejudices became intolerable—not least because people had seen how quickly “moderate” antisemites could become active participants in, or passive observers of, the persecution of Jews. This explains why so many were shocked by the sudden reappearance of antisemitism in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia (an independent state once again from 1993) in the aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes.

As a series of memoirs, oral history documents, and recollections indicate, the antisemitic schemata that had been part of the prewar public discourse remained alive in many niches of the private sphere and in personal communications. Indeed, antisemitism survived even in the sphere of politics. Despite their total control over Jewish institutions and Jewish community life, the Communist parties of East Central Europe considered the conflicting historical memories about Jews as well as the Jewish presence in their societies to be disturbing factors. They kept the problem permanently on the political agenda, either by using the barely coded antisemitic language of “anti-Zionism” in political campaigns, as in Poland or Czechoslovakia, or in debates of the leading party organs behind the scenes, where the Jewish origin of politicians and public figures had been a permanent subject, as in Hungary. This way they (re)constructed their own “Jewish ques-

1. See Imre Kertész, “Nem tűröm, hogy kirekesszenek” (I will not let them marginalize me), Magyar Hirlap, September 25, 1990.
tions”—which they were then eager to “solve.” The sudden reappearance of the “Jewish question” and traditional antisemitism in the post-communist countries was largely the consequence of the policies of the Communist parties, which systematically and permanently (re)constructed the boundaries between Jews and non-Jews by discursive and political means, and then eagerly manipulated the self-constructed “Jewish question” according to their temporary political aims. Thus, antisemitism did not simply emerge out of nothing after the fall of communism.

In the former communist countries, the consequences of the fall of the regime resembled the conflicts arising out of modernization in Europe in the 19th century. Not only did the political regimes collapse, but acquired statuses and the associated identities were also undermined. The prospects of upward or downward social mobility for substantial social groups were changed, and previous social rules and norms lost their validity. The consequences of life strategies and everyday decisions, which had once been easily calculable, became increasingly unpredictable.

In the 19th century, it was mainly such factors that led to the development of modern antisemitism. The questions now are: Do the conflicts of the Eastern European transition pose similar risks? Should we fear the emergence of a situation in which major social groups in the post-communist countries frame their problems in the ever-present language of antisemitism and seek to resolve such problems through the means proposed by antisemitic politics?

These questions form the background to many important researches on antisemitism conducted by sociologists in the affected countries in recent years. The authors in this issue of the JSA report on these studies. The empirical surveys of antisemitic prejudice focused primarily on locating and estimating the size of antisemitic groups within Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, and Slovak society and on identifying the typical social features and attitudes within them. The studies provide us with a relatively accurate and comparable picture of changes in anti-Jewish prejudice over time. The analyses go further than this, however. They begin from the premise that although the existence, extent, and intensity of anti-Jewish prejudices are important signals in a given society, prejudice tends to be a prerequisite for, and indicator of, the dynamics of antisemitism rather than its trigger or cause.

Researchers of the history of antisemitism have shown that anti-Jewish prejudice does not inevitably exert a strong influence on political or social events, even when a relatively large number of people harbor anti-Jewish prejudices. Anti-Jewish prejudice, the development of antisemitic culture, and the emergence of an antisemitic political ideology do not necessarily follow one from the other. If, however, for various historical and social
reasons they appear at the same time in a society, then sooner or later antisemitism may become a serious and dangerous political and social factor. In other words, if at a time of great social change and in societies plagued by anti-Jewish prejudice, there emerges a “culture” and a language that uses popular beliefs and fantasies about “the Jews” to interpret and explain various social problems and conflicts, and if solutions to the problems are also sought in this language, then the different manifestations of antisemitism may indeed form an explosive mixture. For this reason, the following analyses examine not only the intensity and forms of anti-Jewish prejudice and the groups most likely to exhibit antisemitism, but also the antisemitic discourses heard by the public at large—which are mostly products of the social elite.

Political antisemitism has always been a creation of social elite groups, which use it to accomplish various political goals. The urgent question today is whether the danger of antisemitism becoming a definitive element of politics and social life in the countries of East Central Europe is present again in this region. The articles in this special issue of the JSA are designed to assist in assessing this risk.

*András Kovács is the professor at the Nationalism Studies Program and academic director of the Jewish Studies Program at Central European University, Budapest, and has held many academic appointments throughout the globe. Professor Kovács has research interests in Jewish identity and antisemitism in postwar Europe, memory and identity, socioeconomic attitudes and political choice, and the European extreme right. Widely published, his latest book is The Stranger at Hand: Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary (Brill, 2010).
A Note from the Editors: The Year in Hate

Malmo and Montreal, Auckland and Lvov have little in common unless you are a Jew. In each location, there has been significant antisemitic attacks in the recent past. But in the last few months, activity in Hungary, France, and the UK stands out even more.

By the end of the year, Hungary’s Márton Gyöngyösi (Jobbik Party) called to draw up lists of Jews who “represent a security risk.” It was time, he said, “to assess . . . how many people of Jewish origin there are here, and especially in the Hungarian parliament and the Hungarian government, who represent a certain national security risk for Hungary.” The lists were deemed “necessary” because of heightened tensions after a Gaza conflict and should include lawmakers and other officials.

If you were a resident of France in 2012, you may have experienced direct attack. With a 45% increase in antisemitic incidents in the first 120 days of 2012, an unprecedented 90 antisemitic incidents occurred in the next ten days—e.g., Jewish students in Lyon were attacked with hammers on their way to school. Related incidents include two synagogue vandalizations (Paris, July 11, October 7), the closing down of the Twitter account #unbonjuif/”#AGoodJew is a dead Jew” (October 15), and an attempted explosion aimed at a teacher thought to be Jewish (December 15). French minister of the interior Manuel Valls earlier pointed to “a new form of antisemitism originating among the Muslim youth of our suburbs.”

Several of these themes were addressed at the JSA Sunday Symposium at Weiner Library, London, on December 2. (The proceedings papers are to be published in Vol. 5, No. 1 [June 2013] of the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism.) A postscript to the symposium occurred the day after, when one of us (Baum), together with conference cameraman Simon Greenberg, watched with astonishment the House of Lords debate on Palestinian UN recognition. Reporter Richard Mather highlights what we witnessed:

- Conservative peer Lord King (left photo) blamed America’s Jewish community for the US “no” vote. His explanation for this condemnation is: “The truth is that the Jewish lobby has done no service to Israel and it has done no service to the standing of the United States in the region.”

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• The Labour Party’s Lord Judd (middle photo) accused Israel of “screwing” Gaza. He also claimed that “no people paid a higher price for the creation of the State of Israel than the Palestinian people.”
• Lord Phillips of Sudbury (right photo) blamed American Jews for the US decision to vote against the Palestinian bid. He said that “if necessary” the UK should be independent of the United States, “which is in a particular relationship with the huge and powerful Jewish community there.” Lord Phillips also found time to characterize Israeli plans to build new homes in E1 as a colonial initiative (“3,000 new colonists in east Jerusalem”) and made a favorable reference to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh: “I was immensely impressed by the man.”

While the British House of Lords was busy condemning all things Israel, researchers at Eastern Europe’s top academies were seeking explanations for the outbreaks in antisemitic phenomena in their countries. I had asked András Kovács, professor at the Nationalism Studies Program and academic director of the Jewish Studies Program at Central European University, Budapest, to guest edit a special issue of the JSA on Eastern Europe. Dr. Kovács then assembled researchers in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia to produce Volume 4, No. 2—Special Issue on Eastern Europe—which yielded the finest and most comprehensive original research to date for the JSA. We welcome all these authors, and thank them for their enlightening and significant contributions to the field of antisemitism study.

It was another busy year in antisemitism, but your readership and support of the JSA’s efforts to advance the scholarly understanding of it makes such ugliness a bit easier to live with—we feel a little less alone. Here is hoping that 2013 will not be as ugly.

Steven K. Baum
Neal E. Rosenberg
Editors, Journal for the Study of Antisemitism

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/12260#.UM24qaV5n0c
JSA Best Nominees—2012

Best Article
Ben Arem—Never Again and Not At Work
Michał Bilewitz, Mikołaj Winiewski, and Zuzanna Radzik—Poland*
Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti—Slovakia
Karen Eltis—Hate Speech
András Kovács—Hungary
Peter Krekó—Back to the Roots
David Matas—Palestinian Rights and Israeli Wrongs
Stephen Norwood—The Expulsion of Robert Burke
Frederick Schweitzer—International Law
Michael Shafir—Romania

Best Original Research/Dissertation
Florette Cohen—Do Political Cartoons Reflect Antisemitism?*
Nora Gold—Jewish Girls and Their Experience of Antisemitism
Wilhelm Kempf—Antisemitism and Criticism of Israel*

Best Essay
Sirpa Bagman—Finnish Reactions to the Holocaust
Israel Charny—Irrational Iran
Ben Cohen—Bistro Antisemitism;* Rachel Corrie and the Rest of the Story
Leonard Dinnerstein—Antisemitism in the United States: An Update
Jessica Felber—Israel Apartheid Week at Berkeley
Abraham Foxman—Global Antisemitism: Old Hatred, New Threats
Eszter Garai-Édler—Letter from Budapest*
Francisco Garrett—Reversing Social Memory in Portugal, Parts I and II
Manfred Gerstenfeld—Toulouse Murders; Postcards from Switzerland and Holland
David Hirsh—Portia, Shylock, and the Exclusion of Israeli Actors
Steven L. Jacobs—The Elephant in the Room
Ryan Jones—What Palestinian Polls Reveal
Efraim Karsh—The Middle East’s Real Apartheid
Daniel L. Leeson—Tarnobrzg’s Intergenerational Blood Libel
Leonard Livak—In the Classroom
Itamar Marcus and Nan J. Zilberdik—Why There Is No Peace in the Middle East
Melanie Phillips—Galloway’s Lethal Game Changing
Faydra Shapiro—Jews Without Judaism
Richard Spence—The Tsar’s Other Lieutenant, Parts I and II
Joseph S. Spoerl—Islamic Antisemitism
Daniel Vahab—Antisemitism in Hollywood, Parts I and II
Dina Siegal Vann—Venezuela’s Chavez

**Best Book**
Steven Baum, *Antisemitism Explained* University Press of America
Neil Kressel, *Sons of Apes and Pigs* Potomac Books*
Gregg Rickman, *Hating the Jews* Academic Studies Press*
Robert Wistrich, *From Ambivalence to Betrayal* University of Nebraska Press

**Best Book Review**
Catherine Chatterley—Klein’s *Nazi Germany, Canadian Responses*
Florette Cohen—Alexander’s *The State of the Jews*
Steven L. Jacobs—Landes and Katz’s *Paranoid Apocalypse*, Grobman’s *License to Murder*, and Webman’s *The Global Impact of The Protocols*
Matthias Küntzel—Kressel’s *The Sons of Apes and Pigs*
John Pawlikowski—Boyarin’s *The Jewish Gospels*
Asaf Romirowsky—Stromberg’s *Jewish Images in the Comics*
Richard Rubenstein—Bat Ye’or’s *Europe, Globalization, and the Coming of the Universal Caliphate*
Frederick Schweitzer—Wistrich’s *From Ambivalence to Betrayal*
Alexander Traum—Rickman’s *Hating the Jews*

* Winner for that category.
Honorees 2012

Lifetime Achievement Award

Manfred Gerstenfeld

Previous recipients include Robert S. Wistrich and Richard L Rubenstein

Righteous Persons Who Fight Antisemitism

The Right Honorable Denis MacShane

Previous recipients include Canadian Prime Minister Stephen J. Harper

Jabotinsky Award

Shimon T. Samuels
Antisemitic Incidents from Around the World, July–December 2012
A Selected List

JULY

Vienna, July 2: A police statement said that tombstones and slabs were found toppled or damaged at the cemetery, but noted that the vandals did not deface the graves with graffiti. A statement from Austria’s Jewish community on Friday said it was “deeply affected” by the vandalism of the graves, which included those of a number of people killed during World War II. Vienna Jewish community head Oskar Deutsch says he is confident that police will find the culprits. Police said they were trying to track down who was responsible.

Madrid, July 5: Online antisemitism in Spain doubled in volume last year, according to a Spanish Jewish community monitor. In a report on antisemitism in Spain in 2011, the Observatory on Anti-Semitism in that country counted more than 1,000 antisemitic sites and Web pages that it said were created in Spain. In 2010, the observatory counted 400 such sites.

Budapest, July 5: Hungary’s Jews had an ironic appreciation of the news that a leader of the country’s notoriously antisemitic, anti-Roma Jobbik party is technically Jewish—and the grandson of an Auschwitz survivor. Csanád Szegedi, a Jobbik regional leader and member of the European Parliament, revealed his roots in an interview last week with Jobbik’s extreme-right daily Barikad. Jobbik won nearly 17 percent of the vote in the 2010 general elections to become Hungary’s third largest party.

Paris, July 5: A French judge has ruled that the antisemitic motive of two Arabs who attacked a Jewish student of the Otzar Hatorah school in Tou-
louse will be included in the lawsuit against them. The 17-year-old student was attacked on the train as he was traveling between Toulouse and Lyon. According to a French Interior Ministry report, the youth was wearing religious symbols. Conductor and another passenger overpowered the assailants. The two attackers, who were charged with carrying out an antisemitic attack, tried to argue that the incident was a mere brawl in which they tried to defend themselves against Jewish students. The judge rejected these arguments and pointed out the antisemitic motive in the statement of claim.

Krakow, July 9: A group of Jews dining in a Krakow restaurant said they were verbally and physically attacked by waiters. The antisemitic and racist comments allegedly were made over the weekend at the Moment Restaurant during Krackow’s Jewish Culture Festival. Uwe von Seltmann said his group, who were from Poland, Israel, and Germany, came to meet friends who were sitting at a table in front of the restaurant. “Immediately after our arrival I heard the words ‘f***ing Jews’ and something like ‘we’ll not serve you’ spoken by a waiter,” von Seltmann said. “The four members of the staff were in general very unfriendly, and their body language showed that they would not serve us.” A member of the group went inside the restaurant to complain about the slurs, which led to a verbal confrontation, von Seltmann told the JTA. Following the complaint, a waiter threw an object at a female member of the group. The group then left the restaurant; at that time, according to von Seltmann, someone told them to “Go back to Israel.” Moment manager Sebastian Wojnar said he would punish the staff involved in the incident.

Chappaqua, NY, July 10: Provocative poster advertisements showing shrinking Palestinian land in Israel that are on display at Metro-North Railroad platforms have alarmed leaders in the Jewish community, who are concerned they could lead to acts of hate. “This is antisemitic because when people think of Jews they think of the Jewish state,” said Dovid Efune, editor of the Manhattan-based Jewish newspaper The Algemeiner. “Jews have seen this happen so many times. It always starts with messaging that says Jews are committing a crime.” The ads, which show a succession of shrinking Palestinian territory in four maps and contain a headline saying that 4.7 million Palestinians are classified as refugees by the United Nations, were paid for by an 84-year-old ex-Wall Street financier who lives in Connecticut.
Paris, July 11: The Noisy-le-Grand synagogue in the Seine-Saint-Denis district of Paris was vandalized, the third antisemitic incident within a ten-day period.

London, July 12: The Community Security Trust has confirmed that it was briefed on potential attacks on Jewish neighborhoods in London after the discovery of papers on the body of Al Qaeda’s African leader, who was killed last year. According to documents revealed by a Canadian newspaper this week, terrorists were planning an operation in Golders Green or Stamford Hill during Hanukah. A CST spokesman said that the organization had been “briefed on a confidential basis by the police about this information, suggesting the potential terrorist targeting of London’s Jewish communities when it was discovered last year.”

Cyprus, July 14: Police arrested a Swedish citizen of Lebanese origin in connection with information he was gathering on Israeli flights to Cyprus and bus tours catering to Israeli tourists. Initial press reports noted that he admitted a connection to Hizbollah, but a later police statement suggested he was acting alone. The unnamed man was further remanded in custody on July 24.

London, July 15: It was announced that Great Britain’s secretary of state for culture, media, and sport, Jeremy Hunt, will not join the international campaign for a moment of silence for the 11 Israeli athletes murdered at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. There have been calls, including from governments, for a moment of silence from around the world. Fifty members of the British Parliament, the German Bundestag, 140 members of the Italian Parliament, about 100 Australian members of parliament, including the prime minister and the opposition leader, the Canadian parliament, and the US Senate all passed resolutions calling for a moment of silence.
Anklam, Germany, July 17: Fifteen out of 30 gravestones in the Jewish cemetery were desecrated. Mayor Michael Galander condemned the act. Police were investigating.

Burgas, Bulgaria, July 19: A senior American official confirmed Israel’s assertions that the suicide bomber who killed five Israelis in an attack here on Wednesday was a member of a Hezbollah cell operating in Bulgaria.

Manchester, UK, July 20: Following a three-week trial at Manchester Crown Court, Mohammed Sadiq Khan and his wife, Shasta Khan, were convicted of planning to bomb Jewish targets in north Manchester on July 12.

Wayne County, PA, July 26: Five people face charges for allegedly terrorizing a Jewish summer camp in Pennsylvania. In three separate episodes earlier this month, three adults and two juveniles caused property damage as they sped through Camp Bonim in Wayne County in a pickup truck, shouting antisemitic epithets and firing paintball guns at campers and staff, district attorney Janine Edwards said in a press release. The three adults face felony and misdemeanor charges, including ethnic intimidation, terrorist threats, and assault.

Berlin, July 31: European antisemitism scholars are strongly protesting the appointment of Achim Rohde, an Islamic studies scholar in the mold of the late Columbia professor Edward Said, to the Berlin-based Center for Research on Antisemitism (ZfA), which is now branching out into an apparently unrelated research project, “Islamophobia in European Societies.” Opponents of Dr. Rohde’s appointment claim that his work is aimed at belittling antisemitism by confounding it with Professor Said’s Orientalism philosophy, which Dr. Rohde is now advocating as a replacement theology that equates antisemitism with Orientalism and portrays Muslims as victims of Nazism and the Holocaust.

AUGUST

Washington, DC, August 1: The US State Department’s report on religious freedom for 2011 described a “global increase” in antisemitism, saying that the “rising tide of anti-Semitism” was among the key trends of last year. In addition to the spread of Jew-hatred, the report outlined the mushrooming persecution of Christian and Baha’i religious groups in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The executive summary of the report also detailed the “impact of political and demographic transitions on religious minorities” and “the effects of conflict on religious freedom.” According to the report, the increased antisemitism was “manifested in Holocaust denial, glorification
and relativism; conflating opposition to certain policies of Israel with blatant anti-Semitism; growing nationalism movements that target ‘the other’; and traditional forms of anti-Semitism, such as conspiracy theories, acts of desecration and assault, ‘blood libel,’ and cartoons demonizing Jews,” the summary said.

Berlin, August 9: The Swiss World Peace Academy suspended Norway’s peace researcher Johan Galtung because of his allegedly antisemitic comments. According to articles in the Swiss papers *Mittelland Zeitung* and *Basler Zeitung*, Galtung was booted from the Swiss Academy because of “reckless and offensive statements to questions that are specifically sensitive for Jews.” The University of Basel is a partner organization of the Swiss.

London, August 14: European rabbis said Tuesday that they were lobbying Apple Inc. to pull a mobile app version of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a notorious antisemitic forgery. The Conference of European Rabbis, which represents Orthodox Jewish congregations across the continent, says it wants the iPhone manufacturer to stop selling an Arabic-language version of *The Protocols* being offered through its iTunes service. “They wouldn’t allow pedophilia and pornography on their networks,” the Conference of Rabbis told The Associated Press. “They shouldn’t allow xenophobia, antisemitism, or racism.”

Lima, August 20: A leader of a far-right political group in Peru said he would like to expel the country’s small Jewish community because “they control the global economy.” In an interview with the British newspaper *The Guardian*, Martín Quispe Mayta, the leader of the Andean Peru National Socialism movement, which is currently trying to collect enough signatures to register as a party, claimed that research he conducted found that Winston Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Abimael Guzmán, the leader of Peru’s Shining Path terror group, all had Jewish roots. Mayta further claimed that Francisco Pizarro, the leader of Spain’s brutal conquest of Peru, was also Jewish. “The Jew Pizarro and his band of genocidal Jews killed millions of native Peruvians in their mission to possess our gold,” he told *The Guardian*.

Óświęcim (Auschwitz), Poland, August 20: Grandchildren of Nazis, along with Holocaust survivors and their descendants, were among hundreds who began a week-long march across Poland Monday, traveling through former Nazi death camps. The symbolic march began at Auschwitz near Krakow in southern Poland and wound up on Friday at Treblinka, 100 kilometers (65 miles) northeast of the capital, Warsaw. Participants also planned to visit
the sites of other former Nazi German death and concentration camps set up in then-occupied eastern Poland, including Belzec, Majdanek, Sobibor, and Chelmno, organizers said. The march was the initiative of the Protestant TOS church in Tübingen, southern Germany, in cooperation with Polish groups.

Austria's Freedom Party's Heinz-Christian Strache
Facebook posting of banker

Vienna, August 21: Austrian authorities are investigating a cartoon on a rightist political leader’s Facebook page that critics say strongly implied antisemitism by showing a repulsive fat banker with a large hooked nose and what appeared to be Star of David patterns on his cufflinks, an official said Tuesday. The right-wing Freedom Party has called criticism of the caricature politically motivated and said its leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, denies that the cartoon posted on his Facebook page was directed against Jews. Strache accused his detractors of “trying to link me to something insidious” and said they were seeing Stars of David where there were none. He also said that anyone who automatically assigns ethnicity or religion to a hooked nose is a racist.

Melbourne, Australia, August 24: A Melbourne man who taunted his neighbors with antisemitic abuse was evicted from his apartment in Caulfield. Adam Schipkie, 28, was ordered out by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal yesterday after residents, including some Jews, complained. One man, the son of Auschwitz survivors, said he worried about retaliation. “He knows where we live,” Melbourne’s newspaper, the Herald Sun, quoted the man, who does not want to be identified, as saying. Some residents said cars had been scratched with a swastika. But Schipkie blamed his acquaintances and said it was they who had scared his neighbors. “I’m not a neo-Nazi,” he told the newspaper.
Sydney, Australia, August 26: Australian counter-terror agents have reopened an investigation into the bombings of the Israeli Consulate and a Jewish social club in Sydney 30 years ago. Police confirmed Saturday that members of a special force called “Operation Forbearance,” established to investigate these two bombings on December 23, 1982, had interviewed a prime suspect in an American jail. In the first Australian counter-terror cold case ever to be reopened, detectives traveled in May to interrogate Jordanian-born Palestinian Mohammed Rashid, local media reported. The 65-year-old is serving a seven-year sentence at a federal prison in Indiana for the bombing of a Pan Am flight from Japan to Hawaii in August 1982, which killed one passenger and injured 15 others. Australian detectives believe Rashid, who is scheduled to be released next March, was also behind the bombings of the Israeli consulate and the Hakoah Club.

Lansing, MI: August 28: A violent antisemitic hate crime took place in East Lansing, when 19-year-old Zachary Tennen was beaten unconscious and then had his mouth stapled by two men, according to his family. Tennen, a sophomore at Michigan State University, was approached by the men at a party and asked if he was Jewish, his mother said. The men proceeded to raise their right arms in a Nazi salute and said “Heil Hitler” before beating Tennen unconscious. According to Tennen’s mother, 20 people watched while her son had his mouth stapled by the two suspects. “It’s an awful hate crime, and what he’s gone through emotionally and physically, it’s scary to put into words,” Tina Tennen told the Indianapolis Star.

SEPTEMBER
Berlin, September 1: After a Berlin rabbi and his young daughter were assaulted, the president of Germany’s Jewish community called on the country’s Muslim associations to tackle antisemitism within their communities and urged Jews to continue wearing kippot in public. According to the Berlin police, four young Arabs punched Rabbi Daniel Alter several times in the face because he was Jewish and wearing a yarmulka, and threatened to kill his six-year-old daughter. Doctors performed surgery on Alter’s fractured cheekbone.

Vienna, September 2: A rabbi was attacked in Vienna by local soccer fans. According to local media reports, the fans, who were on their way to a game, met Rabbi Schlomo Hoffmeister and screamed at him, “Move, Jew—Jews Out, Heil Hitler.” According to the rabbi, they also saluted with the Nazi salute. Rabbi Hoffmeister claimed that police officers standing nearby refused to intervene. When he asked for their help, they reportedly replied, “It’s just soccer.”
Winnipeg, September 16: Mayor Sam Katz says he is extremely saddened and disgusted to hear that antisemitic posters attacking him have appeared in the city’s downtown over the weekend. Several posters, which were first spotted near Broadway and Carlton Street, attack the integrity of Katz, who is Jewish, and make references to Hitler. David Matas, a B’nai Brith representative from Winnipeg, said the posters constitute a hate crime. “It’s a testimonial to the permanence of antisemitism. It seems never to stop,” Matas told CBC News.

Oakland, CA, September 18: The University of California Students Association passed a resolution condemning any attempts to censure Palestinian human rights activists on University of California campuses and demanded that the UC stop profiting from Israel’s human rights violations. The resolution passed without opposition. The resolution points out the UCSA’s “opposition to all racism, whether it be the racism of campus and global anti-Semitism or the racism of Israel’s human rights violations, neither of which our campuses should tolerate, support, or profit from.” The vote follows the passing of California State Assembly House Resolution 35 (HR 35) on August 28, which passed with no debate. The resolution calls upon California public universities to “increase their efforts to swiftly and unequivocally condemn acts of anti-Semitism.” HR 35 does not call for any new laws or policies, but opponents of the resolution, including the UCSA, say there are implicit calls for censorship.

Paris, September 19: Firebombs were hurled at a kosher grocery store outside of Paris, damaging the shop and wounding one shopper, French police said. The store was reportedly full of shoppers after the Rosh Hashanah holiday marking the Jewish New Year, beginning their preparations for the pre-Yom Kippur meal, Moshe Cohen-Sabban, president of the Jewish communities of Val d’Oise, told the French online edition of the newspaper Metro.
New York, September 21: Across the Arab and Muslim world, newspapers have printed hateful antisemitic cartoons and caricatures blaming Jews for the [Innocence of Muslims film] controversy. In Algeria, the Muslim Brotherhood officially blamed the “American Jewish lobby” for producing the film in a statement that read, “the movement strongly condemns this criminal act against the Master of Beings . . . and holds as accountable the U.S. authorities and the Jewish lobby which always tries to defame the peaceful message of Islam.” In France, the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo ran a series of offensive cartoons that included a cover illustration playing on the French film The Intouchables, with a stereotypical Orthodox Jew pushing the Prophet Mohammad in a wheelchair. In Lebanon, Israeli and American flags were burned during a demonstration against the anti-Muslim film. In Yemen, protestors outside the US embassy joined together in anti-Jewish chants. In Gaza, Palestinian protestors chanted “Death to America, Death to Israel,” and one protestors held up a sign featuring a Star of David made to appear as if it had been stained with blood. In Egypt, a high-profile bishop in the Coptic Church blamed the “Zionists” for the decision by the American Copts to insult Islam through the film. He claimed, “They are trying to incite sectarian sedition in Egypt, to execute an evil Zionist plot.” For days, the official Iranian television news repeated the myth as if it was fact.

Malmo synagogue firebombed September 28, 2012

Malmo, Sweden, September 28: An early-morning bomb exploded at a Jewish community center in Malmo, causing damage but no injuries. The door leading into the community center was shattered, as were some windows. Several eyewitnesses told police officers that they saw two vehicles speeding away from the scene immediately after the explosion. One of the cars was located, and its two occupants taken into custody. Swedish police are continuing to investigate the incident. The suspects, both 18 years old, have denied any wrongdoing. According to local statistics, Malmo sees some 50 to 100 antisemitic incidents a year. Many of the perpetrators are
first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants, who make up 30 to 40 percent of Malmo’s population of 300,000. Many of Malmo’s Muslims are Palestinian.

OCTOBER

Budapest, October 6: Police said they had arrested two men after the president of a local branch of the Budapest Jewish Faith Community, Andrés Kerényi, was verbally and physically assaulted after leaving a synagogue in the late evening, according to a statement on the Budapest police website. According to the news agency AFP, the men were later detained and charged with violent assault against a member of a community group. Gusztav Zoltai, the director of the Alliance of Hungarian Jewish Faith Communities, told Hungarian state news agency MTI that Kerényi was kicked in the stomach by the assailants, who shouted “Rotten filthy Jews, you will all die.”

Toronto, October 7: A founder of the Free Gaza Movement last week mistakenly—and publicly—revealed herself to be a Holocaust revisionist. Greta Berlin, who co-founded the US-based group in 2006, posted a September 30 Twitter comment to @freegazaorg, the group’s official feed, that read: “Zionists operated the concentration camps and helped murder millions of innocent Jews.” The post also contained a link to a video of a speech by Eustace Mullins, a noted antisemitic conspiracy theorist who died in 2010, claiming that the word “Nazi” is an amalgam of the words “National socialism” and “Zionist,” and that Adolf Hitler and Europe’s Zionists conspired together to eradicate non-Zionist Jews. Although she later deleted the post, Berlin apologized for having made it public, stating that the message had been intended only for people on her personal Facebook list. “Facebook attached the [Facebook twitter] account to my personal account. It should have gone to the [Facebook] account. My apologies,” she told the National Post. “I shared it without watching it. I am sorry that I just sent it forward without looking at it. It won’t happen again,” read a tweet from the Free Gaza Movement account, posted October 3.

Paris, October 7: French president François Hollande met with leaders of the country’s Jewish community after blank bullets were fired on a synagogue west of Paris, and amid renewed concerns about antisemitism in France. A representative of the synagogue, which is in the Paris suburb of Argenteuil, says the building was targeted Saturday night and services were canceled. The representative, who spoke on condition of anonymity because a police investigation is under way, said no one was hurt in the incident. According to the security unit of France’s Jewish communities, SPCJ, the shots were fired hours after the city’s chief prosecutor gave a news confer-
ence detailing the arrests of suspects in the recent bombing of a Jewish store. Hollande was scheduled to meet with Jewish community leaders Richard Prasquier and Joel Mergui. Police carried out raids across France after DNA found on a grenade that exploded last month at a kosher grocery store led them to a suspected jihadist cell of young Frenchmen recently converted to Islam.

Atlanta, October 9: Emory University is finally acknowledging blatant discrimination against Jewish students who attended its dental school between 1948 to 1961. The Jewish students were ordered to leave the school by the dean, who maintained that they had failed the classes. Soon, hardly any Jewish students attended the dental school, which had an application that required applicants to check off “Caucasian, Jew or Other.” The saga of bias at the Emory dental school is now a documentary, “From Silence to Recognition.” Before the premiere, held at Emory, the university will do something long overdue: President James Wagner will apologize to former students at the dental school.

Prague, October 10: The Czech Bar Association (CAK) imposed a one-year professional ban on lawyer Petr Koci as he raised a bias objection to a court expert because he is of Jewish origin, CAK spokeswoman Iva Chaloupková has told journalists. “The decision has not taken effect and Koci can appeal it,” she said.

Lvov, Ukraine, October 12: A Jewish doctor was murdered on Saturday in his house in Lviv. Dr. Leon Freifeld, 60, was a senior orthopedic surgeon, a university professor, and a prominent member of the Lviv community. Police arrested three suspects but have yet to establish a motive, Ukraine news websites reported. A Russian-language Israeli website reported that one of the suspects is an Arab man age 26, who was likely under the influence of either drugs or alcohol.

Paris, October 14: A Jewish man was attacked and rendered unconscious in a Paris metro in late September on the first night of Rosh Hashanah, a local watchdog reported on this date. The 52-year-old victim entered the subway directly from his synagogue but wore no markings that would identify him as Jewish, according to a report on the incident by the National Bureau of Vigilance Against Anti-Semitism. He may have been targeted because of a book on Jewish philosophy by the chief rabbi of Paris that he was reading in the metro when he was attacked, the report said. The attackers, who are unknown, knocked the man unconscious with a sharp blow to his temple, but did not steal anything from him as he lay unconscious on the subway
floor. He sustained minor injuries. A female passenger moved the man from the floor out of the metro at Miromesnil station, near the Champs-Élysées.

“Occupy Wall Street” Facebook page, October 15, 2012

Paris, October 15-19: Jewish organizations in France and other anti-racist groups have expressed outrage over a wave of antisemitic messages that have been sweeping through Twitter. The hashtag #unbonjuif, which in English literally means “a good Jew,” has been one of the top trending words on French-language tweets in recent days and has led thousands of Twitter users to enter what the French daily Le Monde termed “a competition of anti-Semitic jokes.” One user posted a picture of an emaciated Jewish woman in a Nazi concentration camp as the interpretation of “a good Jew,” while others tweeted that “a good Jew is a dead Jew.” Anti-racist groups Racism and for Friendship between Peoples (MRAP) and SOS Racisme joined the Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions (CRIF), the umbrella group representing French Jewish communities in denouncing the hateful messages and vowing to sue those sending antisemitic tweets. MRAP said in a statement that Twitter should “take the appropriate measures” to end what it called a “flood of antisemitism” and said it was proposing to meet with executives from the firm, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported. A day after saying it blocked a neo-Nazi account in Germany in a global first, Twitter agreed to remove antisemitic posts in France, a lawyer said, according to AFP. The company did not immediately confirm the move, but the lawyer for a French Jewish student union said that after it threatened legal action, Twitter agreed to take down many of the offending tweets that have recently flooded the site. Union of Jewish Students of France lawyer Stephane Lilti said after a meeting with
Twitter’s lawyer in France that his client had scored an “important victory” over the micro-blogging site. The student union on Thursday threatened to seek an injunction against Twitter to make it remove the offending tweets. The tag, #unbonjuif, has been one of the top trending words on French-language tweets, and is often followed by comments such as: “#AGoodJew is a dead Jew.”

Auckland, Australia, October 19: Vandals defaced Jewish gravestones in central Auckland with graffiti including Nazi swastikas, the AFP news agency reports, in a crime the Israeli embassy condemned as “vile desecration.” About 20 graves, some dating back to the 1880s, were spray-painted in the Jewish section of the Karangahape Road Cemetery, the New Zealand Herald reported. Photographs showed rows of graves sprayed with swastikas, and the number 88—a code used by neo-Nazis to mean “Heil Hitler,” with H being the eighth letter of the alphabet, a reference to HH and antisemitic messages. The Israeli embassy in Wellington urged New Zealand authorities to bring the vandals to justice.

The Hague, October 19: Belgium’s recent local elections triggered “an unprecedented wave of manifestations of antisemitism,” according to the country’s organization of French-speaking Jews. The October 14 election and the campaign that preceded it “were characterized by a flood of antisemitic events the likes of which we have never before seen,” Maurice Sosnowski, president of the CCOJB, said. In Schaarbeek, a municipality near Brussels, “candidates who belonged to the Jewish community were attacked for their affiliation,” and the municipality saw a “hate campaign under the pretext of anti-Zionism,” according to Sosnowski. On October 8, Belgian health minister Laurette Onkelinx had complained to police about a pamphlet naming Yves Goldstein, a Jewish member of her party who ran for a seat on the city council of Schaarbeek, an “enemy of Islam.” The Turkish-language pamphlet called him “an active Zionist and an enemy of Islam,” Onkelinx said at a news conference. The pamphlet was preceded by email warnings to voters to cast ballots against Onkelinx’s and Goldstein’s Socialist Party. Doing so, the email said, would be like “stabbing Palestinians in the back.” Local politicians have been less resolute than Onkelinx in condemning this “hate speech,” according to the CCOJB statement.

Montreal, October 21: A kosher restaurant in Montreal was firebombed, according to a report on the website of the weekly newspaper Toronto Shalom. The report said that the restaurant Resto Bar Chops, which is located in the city’s Snowdon district, was attacked by two masked men who arrived at the restaurant at four in the morning, smashed its front window, and threw a firebomb into it. In addition, Toronto Shalom reported, an attempt
was made to firebomb a gym in the city, and there were two similar cases of attacks on Montreal restaurants. Burglars, some amateur, broke into 11 synagogues and two churches in the city’s Mile End and Outremont neighborhoods. Congregation Belz in Outremont was attacked four times in the last month, and a total of $2,000 has been stolen from its tzedakah (charity) boxes.

Washington, DC, October 23: Ninety-seven percent of US and Canadian college campuses report no anti-Israel or antisemitic events, and the campus-based anti-Israel divestment effort has failed, according to a new study. Bard and Dawson tracked 674 anti-Israel events at 108 US and Canadian universities during the 2011-12 academic year. One-third of the incidents took place on 10 campuses; four were in the University of California system. Several of the campuses, the report said, have strong pro-Israel groups and cannot be characterized as “hostile toward Israel.” Two anti-Israel groups—the Muslim Students Association and Students for Justice in Palestine—were responsible for most of the episodes. The report also said that while a 2011 AICE survey with The Israel Project found that “a shocking 78 percent of Jewish students reported witnessing or personally being subjected to anti-Semitism,” the new report found the figure “inconsistent” with their findings. They noted that a recent survey by the Institute for Jewish & Community Research found that 43 percent of Jewish students saw antisemitism as a problem—“a significantly lower, but still a disturbing figure.”

Aix-les-Bains, France, October 28: Numerous virulently antisemitic flyers have been placed in letterboxes across the town of Aix-les-Bains. The tracts, which claim to be the work of “The Church of Wotan,” refer to Jews as “the main people responsible for the decadence of the White People and the invasion of sub-races.” A number of complaints have been made to the police and an investigation is ongoing. Aix-les-Bains, which is in southeastern France, is home to a largely Orthodox Jewish community centered on one of the leading yeshivot (Talmudic colleges) in Europe. Around 1,000 Jews live in the town.

NOVEMBER
Paris, November 1: France expelled a Tunisian imam accused of antisemitism and of calling his followers to “violent jihad” and violence against women, the interior ministry said, according to a report by AFP. Mohamed Hammami was subject to “expulsion from French territory. He has been deported to Tunisia, where he is a citizen,” the ministry said. “In his sermons,” Hammami “encouraged violent jihad, made antisemitic remarks and
justified the use of violence and corporal punishment against women,” the ministry noted in its statement.

London, November 1: A Jewish academic repeatedly broke down in tears as he told an employment tribunal that he had suffered a decade of harassment while opposing a boycott of Israel. Mathematics lecturer Ronnie Fraser, whose parents escaped Nazi Germany, said he felt a special responsibility to challenge the university and College Union after it rejected a widely accepted definition of antisemitism. “This case is not about Israel-Palestine. It’s not about me. It’s about fellow Jews. We have been forced out. We have been humiliated. It has been horrendous and relentless against us,” he said. Later, the tribunal was briefly halted when Fraser again wept while explaining how he believed his grandparents had been killed at Auschwitz. “They died as a result of antisemitism, and this is my way of saying ‘never again’,” he stated.

London, November 2: The Jewish umbrella body in Britain lodged a complaint with church officials about an Anglican vicar whom they accuse of antisemitic speech. The Board of Deputies of British Jews filed the complaint against Reverend Stephen Sizer in connection with content that appeared on his website, the London-based Jewish Chronicle reported. Sizer, a senior pastor of the Anglican Christ Church in Virginia Water, Surrey, has twice altered his website after linking to sites that promote Holocaust denial and Zionist conspiracy theories, the Chronicle reported.

Paris, November 12: Abdelghani Merah, the brother of Franco-Algerian Islamist Mohamed Merah, who killed seven people in southwest France last March, has co-written a book on his terrorist brother that will be published this month. French news websites published extracts from the book, Mon frère, ce terroriste (My Brother, This Terrorist), and he was interviewed by M6 television. He emphasized that the main motivation behind the attacks in Toulouse and Montauban was the antisemitism of the Merah family. “Hatred and racism” explain the radicalization of his brother Mohamed, Merah said. “The Salafists had only to harvest the flower of this hatred.”

London, November 13: Metropolitan police reportedly said the recent delivery of an explosive device to a house near London was an antisemitic hate crime. The explosive device was sent to a house in Clayhall, near London, causing police to close the area to traffic, according to the Ilford Recorder, a local newspaper. The report did not say how the package was delivered or who was the intended recipient. Explosives experts examined the package and made it safe. The house to which the package was delivered remained cordoned off while police conducted their investigation. Nobody was
injured during the incident and police say the package posed no danger to the public, the Recorder reported. London24, a news site, quoted Clayhall resident Michelle Levy as saying that the device was discovered inside the house of her next-door neighbor.

London, November 14: A Guardian cartoon implying that Jews are “omnipotent conspirators” has sparked furious debate online. Barrister Jeremy Brier, who has already lodged a complaint about Steve Bell’s drawing with the Press Complaints Commission, labeled the image “plainly antisemitic.” The cartoon in question shows Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a puppet master, controlling tiny versions of foreign secretary William Hague and Tony Blair.

Milan, November 18: Italian police arrested four people, connected with the Italian version of the US-based, white supremacist website Stormfront, on charges of inciting racial and ethnic hatred and antisemitism. The four, considered key organizers of the website, were picked up in Milan; Frosinone, near Rome; and Pescara, on the Adriatic coast. Police also blocked the Stormfront site. Police also raided the homes of 17 other Italians following an investigation of more than a year that was launched after Stormfront posted “blacklists” targeting prominent Jews. Police confiscated fascist and neo-Nazi propaganda material, including banners, pins, and other objects bearing swastikas, as well as knives, baseball bats, and other objects that could be used as weapons.

Warsaw, November 20: A Polish university researcher said to be driven by nationalistic and antisemitic hatred was arrested for planning to detonate a four-ton bomb in front of the parliament building in Warsaw with the president, prime minister, government ministers, and lawmakers inside, authorities said. Prosecutors arrested the suspect in Krakow on November 9. They said he is a 45-year-old Polish researcher, employed at the University of Agriculture in Krakow, who had access to chemistry laboratories. He was in illegal possession of explosive materials, munitions, and guns.
London, November 23: A brutal attack in Rome on fans of the Tottenham Hotspurs soccer team, a London club with strong Jewish connections, has been blamed on antisemites. Ten fans were injured on Thursday, one seriously, when a gang of around 50 stormed a bar in the Italian capital, wielding baseball bats, knives, and broken bottles before a Europa League match against Lazio, a Rome team. The assault was immediately linked to Lazio’s notoriously troublesome fans, the Ultras, although team officials denied its supporters were involved. As the police in Rome were reported to have arrested two local men on suspicion of attempted homicide, officials were pursuing the theory that antisemitism was behind what appeared to be an organized attack.

Cairo, November 29: An Egyptian preacher has accused Jews of financing Internet pornography as a way to corrupt Muslims. In a sermon broadcast by Egypt’s Tahrir TV on November 23, Egyptian cleric Abd Al-Fattah Abu Zayd told his followers that “they replaced the armed forces with soft power.” He said that the soft power of “urges, sex and women” has been turned into “4.2 million pornography websites to corrupt the nation of Mohammed.”

DECEMBER
Budapest, December 2: Thousands of Hungarians braved winter temperatures to attend an anti-Nazi rally in Budapest against a far-right leader’s proposal to draw up lists of Hungarian Jews who may “represent a security risk” for the nation. Márton Gyöngyösi of the Hungarian Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), the country’s largest far-right party, told parliament last week that it was time “to assess . . . how many people of Jewish
origin there are here, and especially in the Hungarian parliament and the Hungarian government, who represent a certain national security risk for Hungary.” He said the lists, resembling similar measures during the Nazi era, “were necessary” because of heightened tensions after a brief conflict in Gaza and should include lawmakers and other officials. Gyöngyösi also claimed Hungary’s Foreign Ministry had “rushed to make an oath of allegiance to Israel.”

London, December 9: Following the UN General Assembly’s overwhelming vote to accord Palestine non-member observer status, negative references to “Jewish lobbies” and “Jewish power” (as well as unbalanced criticism of Israel’s building program) have been bandied about in the House of Lords, the UK parliament’s upper chamber.

Berkeley, CA, December 11: Manzar Foroohar, a well-known anti-Israel activist who teaches modern Middle Eastern and Latin American history at California Polytechnic State University, was placed as the head of an Academic Senate 2012/2013 CSU committee charged with implementing the Governor’s Task Force on Tolerance and Anti-Semitism Training.

Marseille, December 15: Two French teenagers were arrested on suspicion of setting off an explosion near a teacher after she reported receiving antisemitic threats at school. The teenagers, 16 and 19 years old, were arrested in Aix-en-Provence near Marseille in southern France for allegedly setting off a chemical explosion in the classroom of their plastic arts teacher, according to France Info, a public radio station. No one was hurt in the explosion. The teacher, Chantal Viroulou, told the radio station that before the incident, “students from that class, two or three of them at least, called me and told me: ‘Jew, we will break your face.’ ” Viroulou, who teaches at the Latecoere professional high school in the town of Istres, did not say whether she was Jewish. An unnamed police source told Ouest France, a local daily, that Viroulou is not Jewish and that “the antisemitic connotation” is not being investigated. The source added that the explosion, which the two suspects allegedly caused by mixing hydrochloric acid with aluminum, “had nothing to do” with the threat.

United Nations, December 18: Refusing to condemn Hamas’ serial missile attacks targeting Israeli civilians, the UN General Assembly passed nine resolutions condemning Israel in one day, bringing the total number of UNGA anti-Israel resolutions for 2012 to 22.

Los Angeles, December 21: Ukrainian politician Igor Miroshnichenko has reportedly taken aim at one of his country’s most famous, glamorous
emigrants: Mila Kunis. In a recent Facebook post, the lawmaker argued that the Jewish, Ukrainian-born *Ted* actress, 29, is not a true Ukrainian, calling her a “zhydovka,” which translates to “dirty Jewess.”
Polls and Antisemitism in Post-Communist Romania

Michael Shafir*

As in many other former communist countries of East Central Europe,¹ antisemitism in Romania resurged almost concurrently with the demise of the previous regime.² Empirical research on antisemitism, however, emerged only considerably later and did not become a main focus until the establishment of the National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania “Elie Wiesel” (INSHREW) in 2005. This does not imply that the subject of Jews, attitudes to Jews measured by instruments such as stereotypic perceptions and/or “social distance,” or attitudes toward controversial Romanian historical figures linked to the country’s antisemitic past were not tangentially or even directly tackled occasionally. What was lacking until 2005, however, was an effort to use a systematic method, such as a standard questionnaire capable of producing comparative results, that would permit focusing on the phenomenon of the strong reappearance of antisemitism in both its synchronic and diachronic unfolding. In other words, the task of gathering longitudinal data on antisemitism in the country to allow forging a “perceptual map” that would select in consistent aspects and select out inconsistencies³ is still just beginning.

Key Words: Antisemitism, Ethnic Minorities, Hungarians, Jews, Political Antisemitism, Polls, Roma, Social Distance, Stereotyping

“Us vs. Them”

As articles with direct or allusive antisemitic tones began to appear in the daily press or in weeklies, the daily Adevărul (The Truth) on July 27-28, 1991, for the first time mentioned a poll in which Jews were being scrutinized as a separate category of national minorities subjected to what the Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Polling (IRSOP)\(^4\) termed to be either a “press syndrome” (i.e., reports designed to attract readership by exploiting existing prejudice) or a “social syndrome” (i.e., a reflection of attitudes toward Jews shared by segments of Romanian society). Respondents were asked to mention whether they agreed or disagreed that the Romanian media should carry articles against any of the following ethnic groups, as shown in table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Don’t Know/NA (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies(^6)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tbody>
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As this table shows, some two respondents in five condoned the publication of articles critical of the country’s Gypsy (Roma) minority, whereas

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4. IRSOP was set up in 1990 as a government institute. Not long after it was privatized, it proved to be one of the most successful polling institutes in the country, though it took some time to shed suspicions that it served former president Ion Iliescu and his different governments.

5. The IRSOP poll was based on a representative sample of 2,179 persons, with a margin of error of \(\pm 2.1\)\%.

6. The word “Gypsy” (\(\text{fi}gan\)) has a pejorative sense and was officially replaced in the late 1990s by the word “\(\text{rroma}\),” which nonetheless is also discriminatory, since the doubling of the first letter is intended to avoid confusion between “Roma” and “Romanian.” While I reproduce the word as used by the different samplers, I employ “Roma” (adjective “Romani”) whenever referring to this ethnic group.
only one in ten respondents endorsed similar articles directed at the criticism of Jews. Germans (alongside Serbs) occupied a privileged position, with Hungarians (soon after the infamous Târgu-Mureș [Marosvásárhely] clashes of March 1990) occupying a somewhat less privileged position as targets of criticism, but still considerably safer than the Roma. While subsequent surveys would show some fluctuations in attitudes toward the Hungarian minority (the general trend being that of improvement) and toward the German minority (a rather less though still positive attitude), rejection of the Roma (measured by studies focusing on social representation, social distance, or stereotypes) has been and remains the single most consistent aspect in Romania, as indeed in the rest of the former communist countries. For example, in a survey conducted by the Bucharest-based Center of Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS) in December 1997, 52 percent of the respondents said they had “favorable” sentiments toward Hungarians (vs. 41% admitting their sentiments were “unfavorable”), but no less than two in three respondents (67%) were negatively inclined toward the Roma minority (vs. 27%). Jews, on the other hand, were unfavorably viewed by only 15 percent, and no less than 69 percent claimed their sentiments regarding this minority were favorable.

To what extent, however, do surveys where respondents are straightforwardly asked to depict their sentiments toward a national minority reflect reality? In a public opinion poll conducted by the Bucharest-based Institute for Marketing and Polls (IMAS) in June 2009 (table 2), respondents were asked to indicate, on a 1-5 scale, their perception of three pejorative words employed in reference to Hungarians (bozgor), Jews (jidan⁹), and Roma (tigan). By the time the survey was carried out, the first term, bozgor, had been eliminated by the Romanian Academy from its Explicative Dictionary of the Romanian Language (DEX),¹⁰ but the two other terms still figured in, despite protests stemming from Jewish and Romani NGOs. After initial attempts to justify their presence, the Academy’s Linguistic Institute consented in 2012 to specify that the latter two terms were pejoratives, but left them in the dictionary.¹¹

7. See Cercetări cu privire la minoritatea roma, coordinated by Ioan Mărginean (Bucharest: Ministerul Informației Publice, Oficiul Național pentru Romi, 2001), 15, 18.
9. Best rendered in English as “kike” or “yid.”
**Table 2**

*On a Scale from 1 to 5, Where 1 Means “Absolutely Inoffensive” and 5 “Very Offensive,” Please Tell Me How Offensive the Term Seems to You*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Absolutely Inoffensive (%)</th>
<th>2 (%)</th>
<th>3 (%)</th>
<th>4 (%)</th>
<th>Very Offensive (%)</th>
<th>DK/NA (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bozgor</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jidan</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tigan</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By and large, then, table 2 seems to reconfirm the findings in table 1. A significantly larger plurality of Romanians is aware of the offensiveness of the pejorative when it comes to Hungarians than the plurality of those aware of it when Jews are concerned. More significant, when it comes to the Roma minority, the plurality switches from “very offensive” to “absolutely inoffensive.” In all cases, differences of gender in appraising the pejorative as “very offensive” are statistically insignificant.

Age is definitely playing a role. In the case of Jews, nearly one in four respondents aged 45-59 (24%) were of the opinion that jidan is an “absolutely inoffensive” term, somewhat higher than those respondents aged 60 and over (22.3%). At the other end of the spectrum, the age range 30-44 scored the largest plurality (32.1%) among those who perceived the term as “very offensive,” closely followed by those aged 45-68 (30.4%) and those aged 60 and over. It can thus be concluded that the age range 45 and over is the most opinionated at both ends of the scale.

When residence is taken into consideration, a highly interesting factor emerges: in all three cases, the highest score for those believing the terms were “absolutely inoffensive” is given by those residing in small towns with...
a population of between 10,000-49,000 inhabitants. Significant differences emerged in the case of the “very offensive” answers as well: in the case of the Jews, the most aware that \textit{jidan} has a pejorative meaning were residents of middle-sized towns (50,000-199,000 inhabitants), 37 percent of whom returned that response; they were followed by residents of rural areas (28.6%) and those residing in small towns (23.2%), with those residing in large towns with a population of over 200,000 occupying the last place (21.8%). Surveys carried out in Romania have repeatedly shown that the strongest rejection of the Hungarian minority is found in regions where members of that minority are either historically absent or present in insignificant numbers. This may well explain why residents of middle-sized towns and rural areas, as most Transylvanian settlements are, tend to view their Hungarian-minority neighbors with a more benevolent eye and be more aware of the significance of pejorative meanings. The same applies to some extent to the Roma, since a large proportion of that population resides in middle-sized towns and rural areas. But since Romania’s Jewish population has been reduced to a meager few thousands, with practically no Jews residing in the countryside and very few in small towns, this explanation can hardly apply in their case.

Is historical memory, then, playing a role? The results of the 2009 IMAS survey seem to point in that direction, as the largest share of those whose opinion is that \textit{jidan} is a “very offensive” term stems from respondents from Moldova (40.0%), where a large proportion of Romania’s Jew-

---

13. The four types of localities into which the sample was divided were rural, small town (10,000-49,000), middle-sized towns (50,000-199,000), and large towns (200,000+ inhabitants).

14. As reported by the daily \textit{Evenimentul zilei} on December 8, 1993, in reference to a poll conducted by CURS and by the weekly \textit{Revista} 22, No. 31 (August 3-9, 1994), in reference to a survey conducted by IMAS. The latter findings were also reported by the daily \textit{Adevărul}, August 13, 1994.

15. According to the census conducted in March 2002, only 6,057 Jews (0.02% of the total population) were still living in Romania (5,870 had defined themselves as Jews according to nationality and 6,057 according to religion; 951 said Yiddish was their mother tongue. See “Structura etnodemografică a României,” http://recensamant.referinte.transindex.ro/?pg=8. The results of a census conducted in July 2011 have not been published in full and the number of Jews is small enough to have been included under “Other minorities” in preliminary reports; see Cristian Andrei, “Recensământul populației, primele rezultate. Căți români sunt, căți etnici maghiari și căt de mare este minoritatea româ,” \textit{Gândul}, February 2, 2012, http://www.gandul.info/news/recensamantul-populatiei-primele-rezultate-cati-romani-sunt-cati-etnici-maghiari-si-cat-de-mare-este-minoritatea-roma-9200308.
ish population lived before emigrating to Israel and elsewhere. This is not necessarily an indication of philosemitism, however, but simply of a more acute awareness of the pejorative than in the other Romanian regions.

Education seems to play a somewhat significant, but by no means crucial, role, according to the findings of this survey. Differences in the case of Jews for “absolutely inoffensive” are of at most four percentage points between the higher educated (17.2%) and those with a high school and post-high school education (21.2%). The education factor is more relevant in the case of respondents who chose to give the “very offensive” answer: the difference between graduates of high school and post high schools (31.6%) and the higher educated (23.6%) is a full eight percentage points. Surprisingly, to some extent (but not for those familiar with Romanian history), “intellectuals” (defined as holders of university diplomas for this purpose) seem to be less willing to be aware of the pejorative meaning of jidan (23.6%)—not only less than graduates of high schools, but also graduates of gymnasi ums (10 schooling years) or vocational schools (27.4%), and even of the lower (up to 8 years) educated (24.5%).

The findings of the 2009 IMAS survey relevant for Jews is summarized in table 3:

---

16. Out of nearly 800,000 Jews, nearly 410,000 had survived the Second World War. By 1961, with Romania’s Jewish population at 225,000, more than half of the survivors had emigrated; in 1968, less than half of the latter figure (about 100,000) were still living in the country. For yearly emigration figures to Israel, see Radu Ioanid, *The Ransom of the Jews: The Story of the Extraordinary Secret Bargain between Romania and Israel* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2005), 185-6.
### Table 3*17

**How Offensive Is the Term Jidan?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Absolutely inoffensive (%)</th>
<th>2 (%)</th>
<th>3 (%)</th>
<th>4 (%)</th>
<th>Very offensive (%)</th>
<th>DK/NA (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-49,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-199,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transylvania</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muntenia</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8 years</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational, gymnasiu</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school, post high school</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means “Absolutely inoffensive” and 5 “Very offensive.”

### Stereotypes

Several empirical studies were produced in Romania in 2001 and 2002 on stereotyping, tackling “in the mirror” mutual perceptions of the ethnic majority, on one hand, and its different ethnic minorities (mainly Hungarians, Roma, Germans, and Jews) on the other hand.18 By and large, these studies confirm the findings mentioned above, namely, that the general

17. *Sondaj Romnibus realizat de IMAS pentru LDK Consultants*, 27.
18. For example, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, *Transilvania subiectivă* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1999).
depiction of the Romani minority was in negative terms (e.g., “dirty,” “thieves,” and “lazy”), of the Germans in positive terms (e.g., “civilized” and “diligent”), and of Hungarians in both positive (“diligent,” “hospi-
table”) and negative (“vain,” “egoist”) images. I shall therefore concentrate on the stereotypical depiction of Jews in these two surveys and on an additional poll Gallup conducted in July 2008. The three surveys are not quite comparable, as the first two were based on three separate subsamples (Romanians, Hungarians, and Roma) with an additional sub-subsample for Romanian Transylvanians, whereas the 2008 survey did not make that distinction. In addition, the 2008 survey included groups (Arabs, Chinese, Africans, Jehovah’s Witnesses) not examined in the 2001 and 2002 surveys but excluded one group (Germans) examined in those two surveys.

In all three surveys, respondents were asked to choose up to three opposite characteristics out of 12 pairs of presumably opposing traits for Romanians, Hungarians, Roma, and Jews, which should have produced a scale of prejudiced stereotyping. In the 2001 sample, respondents of Romanian ethnic origin chose “entrepreneurial” (33%) and “religious” (31%) most frequently as characterizing Jews on what the questionnaire designers viewed as the “positive pole”; “egoists” (9%) was the most fre-
quently mentioned characteristic at the “negative pole.” It is interesting to note that there was only a difference of frequency, but not of picked stereo-
types, among the three subsamples at the “positive end”: ethnic Hungarians and Roma respondents also chose “entrepreneurial” and “religious” most often. Ethnic Hungarians viewed the two traits in nearly equal proportion (30% for entrepreneurship and 29% for religiousness), whereas the Roma chose “religious” (23%) slightly more often than “entrepreneurial” (20%). The three subsamples differed in their choice of negative characteristics, however: the most frequent choice of Romanian ethnics was “egoists” (9%), Hungarian ethnics opted most frequently for “divided” (8%), while Roma respondents picked “hypocrites” more frequently than any other neg-
itive trend (9%).


The 2002 survey mirrored the same image of the Jews, with significantly higher options but many of the same choices. Nearly two in five ethnic Romanians (39.2%), over half (51.2%) ethnic Hungarians, and more than a third of the Roma respondents to the survey chose “religious” at the positive pole, alongside “intelligent” (31% of the Romanians, 31.4% of the Hungarians, and 26.7% of the Roma). The third “positive” characteristic picked by respondents to this survey was “nice” (cumsecade).²²

Unlike the 2001 and the 2002 surveys, the 2008 survey, a poll conducted by Gallup Romania on behalf of the National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD), was based on a mixed sample, i.e., Romanian and members of other ethnicities pulled together.²³ Jews were again mostly depicted as “entrepreneurial” (32%), “religious” (26%), and “intelligent” (23%) on the positive side, and as “egoists” (10%), “proud” (6%), and “superstitious” (5%) on the negative side. The prejudice stereotyping scale also included Romanians, Roma, Hungarians, Arabs, Chinese, Africans, and (oddly enough, since they are neither a separate ethnic group nor a separate race), Jehovah’s Witnesses. Findings, including a positive-negative traits balance, are shown in table 4:

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²² Aurora Liiceanu, “Alteritate etnică și imaginar colectiv,” in Barometrul relațiilor etnice 1994-2002, 59-60. No findings for “negative traits” were reported.

²³ The Gallup Organization Romania, Perceptii și atitudini ale populației României față de fenomenul de discriminare. Cercetare realizată la cererea Consiliului Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării (Bucharest: Gallup International, July 2008). The survey was based on a probabilistic tristadial stratified sample of 1,200 respondents aged 18 and over and had a margin of error of ±2.8%. The sample was weighted for the variables of geographical region, place of residence, sex, age, and ethnicity. It was conducted between June 27 and July 7, 2008.
TABLE 4
WHICH TRAITS DO YOU BELIEVE BEST CHARACTERIZE THE . . .?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic/Religious minority</th>
<th>First three choices</th>
<th>Positive/Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Diligent</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hospitable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>Thieving</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dirty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>Diligent</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entrepreneurial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Diligent</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entrepreneurial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>Uncivilized</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dirty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Superstitious,” “Neglectful,” “Nice.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witnesses</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superstitious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 2008 Gallup poll, Jews score considerably higher than Hungarians in the positive/negative balance, thus reconfirming the findings of the 2001 poll conducted by Metro Media Transylvania. But do such findings fully depict reality? As András Kovács has demonstrated for the case of Hungary, a not insignificant part of "the Devil" might hide in the “Don’t know/No answer” returns; in other words, the more sensitive and the more at stake the respondents perceive the issues to be, the more often they might

24. On par with “Superstitious,” “Neglectful,” and “Nice.”
25. The most frequently picked negative traits: “Egoists (10%),” “Conceited (6%),” and “Superstitious (5%).”
26. Kivu, “Comentarii pe marginea Barometrului Relațiilor Interetnice,” 49. The score for other ethnicities in the 2001 survey was Romanians 2.18, Germans 2.03, and Roma minus 1.83. The score for “Attitudes toward others,” which referred to perceptions of ethnicities other than the respondent’s own, was 1.97.
seek refuge in noncommitment, thus avoiding returning to perceived “politically incorrect” answers. This is one of the many strange legacies of the communist system and (this is my own assumption) one likely to be at its peak among the oldest age groups. While in the case of Romanians and Roma the “Don’t know/NA” answers were of a negligible 1%, and one in five (19%) opted out of answering when asked to describe Hungarians, no less than one-third of the sample (33%) avoided replying to the question in regard to the Jews, as well as for Jehovah’s Witnesses (34%), the Arabs (35%), and the Chinese (36%). In the case of Africans, over two in five respondents (43%) did respond to the question about these groups.

One last aspect concerning stereotypes. It is questionable whether the “opposing pairs” are really what they were taken to be by questionnaire designers, who apparently chose recognized measurements but ones that were designed for other social contexts. In the Romanian context, “entrepreneurial” might be something else from the opposite of “neglectful”; it simply might be a “politically correct” synonym for “geșeftar” (from the Yiddish gesheft), a rather pejorative expression often used in reference to Jews and describing their alleged propensity to engage in profiteering and other avaricious money-making activities. Similarly, “religious” might be a politically correct substitute for “bigoted,” and even “intelligent” might not stand in for the opposite of “stupid,” but rather as a way of describing cunning.

Using a different 12-pair list suggested by INSHREW, a poll conducted between December 27 and January 11, 2012, by the Bucharest-based TNS CSOP Romania on behalf of the CNCD produced findings on Jews considerably different from earlier polls, as shown in table 5.

28. On a sample of 1,400 persons aged 18 and over, with the margin of error ±2.6%. Probabilist stratified sample according to region of development and residence, carried out in 60 rural settlements, 57 towns, and the Bucarest municipality; face-to-face interviewing at the respondents’ home. Weighted according to National Statistic Institute data. Cf. TNS CSOP, CNCD, Raport de cercetare, Perceptii și atitudini privind discriminarea în România (Bucharest: TNS CSOP, CNCD, 2012).
29. Other ethnicities included in the poll were Romanians, Roma, Hungarians, and Germans.
TABLE 5
PLEASE CHOOSE THOSE TRAITS MOST REPRESENTATIVE FOR JEWS;
PLEASE CHOOSE THOSE DEFICIENCIES THAT YOU BELIEVE ARE
REPRESENTATIVE OF JEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good points</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Bad points</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Disunited</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Aggressive</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diligent</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confident</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lacking self-confidence</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Unserious</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dishonest</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polite</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Impolite</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courageous, daring</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cowardly</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant (hospitable)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Intolerant</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law-abiding</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Disrespectful of the law</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generous</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Avaricious</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Untrustworthy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 1,400

The findings of this survey mirror even more emphatically the points raised in connection with the earlier surveys. First, no less than half of the respondents on “bad points” opted out of answering, and one-third of those responding on “good points” did the same; there are strong reasons to suspect that some of these respondents must be “latent antisemites.” Second, the choice of pairing is still subject to interpretation. “United” very often expresses prejudice rather than praise, since ethnic majorities tend to attribute that trait to “the other” to explain to themselves both group failure and particularly to give vent to concealed conspiracy-theory frustrations. It is revealing in this sense that the respondents to this survey opted for “United” as their most frequent choice to describe the alleged “good points” of the
Roma (64%) and of the Hungarians (36%). Just as revealing, by far the most “Bad points” choice for ethnic Romanians was “Disunited” (44%).

**SOCIAL DISTANCE**

In December 1993, IMAS was commissioned by the Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg)-based Korunk Friendship Association to conduct an investigation on interethnic relations in Romania that would focus on relations between Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, Jews, and Roma measured, among other instruments, by utilizing a “social distance” scale (Bogardus scale). The survey established that for Romanian ethnics, social distance was growing from Germans (closest) to Hungarians, followed by Jews and Roma. Hungarian respondents returned identical social distances; just as in the Romanian case, social distance was at its peak when members of the Roma minority were mentioned. Once again, social distance in relation to Hungarians was narrower in the case of Romanians living in Transylvania and wider in the Romanian national sample.

Subsequent surveys would also include sexual minorities (homosexuals and lesbians), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims (Islam) believers, Arabs, Chinese, and (in one case, a Gallup survey conducted in 2003) citizens of the Moldovan Republic (Bessarabia), while excluding members of the German minority. In order to make the data comparable, table 6 sums up results returned by ethnic Romanian respondents for social distance in relation to Hungarians, Jews, and Roma. As the wording of the question was not always identical, these results must be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. Thus, respondents to the 2003 Gallup survey were asked: “In the following questions, we intend to see how comfortable you feel when interacting with different categories of people. Which is the closest relationship

---

30. “Courageous/Daring” (29%) was in second place and “Self-confident” (18%) in third. There are grounds to suspect that all three referred to the alleged criminal activities of the Romani minority.

31. “Diligent” was the second most opted for (23%) and “Self-confident” third (17%).

32. “Lacking self-confidence” (24%) and “cowardly” (15%) were in second and third place.

33. “Români despre maghiari, maghiari despre români,” Revista 22, No. 31, August 3-9, 1994. The representative sample was based on 1,022 interviews, conducted at the respondent’s residence and had a margin of error of ±3%.

34. Institutul pentru Politici Publice, *Intoleranță, discriminare și autoritarism în opinia publică* (Bucharest: Institutul pentru Politici Publice, September 2003). The survey was conducted by Gallup Romania and based on a representative sample of 1,500 respondents aged 18 and over. Stratified probabilistic three-stadial unweighted sample, margin of error ±2.7%. 
you would [be ready to] have with someone that is a . . .?"; respondents to the other three surveys (2007, 2010, 2011-12) were asked: “Which is the closest relationship you would accept to have with people belonging to the following [ethnic] minorities?” Answers, reproduced in table 6, indicate the degree of acceptance: the smallest distance is reflected by those ready to have a person of the specified minority as a family member and the largest distance is reflected by respondents (not included in the table) unwilling to have a member of that minority live in or even visit their own country.

**Table 6**  
Social Distance, 2003 to 2011-12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003 (n=1,500)</th>
<th>2007 (n=1,026)</th>
<th>2010 (n=1,400)</th>
<th>2011-12 (n=1,400)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family member</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(H)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal friend</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(H)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor (live in my town)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(H)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work colleague</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(H)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit (live in) Romania</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(H)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should not visit (live in) Romania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(H)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(H)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The results of the 2007 survey are so different from the other three surveys that one is inclined to conclude that something must have gone astray with responses to this question. There simply was no precipitating event that would explain why Romanian respondents suddenly become so welcoming of both Hungarians and Jews (two in five respondents or higher) and even to a greater extent of the Roma minority (nearly half of the sam-

35. For the purpose of longitudinal comparison, “Live in my town” (asked in the 2003 survey) has been combined with “Visit Romania” (not asked in that survey), resulting in a six-point scale instead of the classic seven-point Bogardus scale.
ple). Returns from other years have between 15% (2011-12), and nearly one-third of the sample (2003) saying they would agree to having Hungarian ethnics visiting Romania or living there. The same applies to Jews, with one respondent in five or somewhat higher returning that response in the other three surveys (2003, 2010, 2011-2012). Nothing justifies this rise. And while acceptance of the Roma to either visit or live in Romania most likely reflects an acquiescence to reality, there have been no grounds that would have turned nearly one-half of Romanian respondents that happy about a Romani presence. In what follows, then, we shall not take that survey into consideration.

The remaining three surveys under consideration show that between one in five ethnic Romanians (2003) and one in ten (2010, 2011-12) display minimal social distance (member of one’s own family) in regard to Jews and that roughly the inverse proportion in all three surveys claims readiness to have a Jew as a personal friend (second best indicator of acceptance, according to theory). There is a statistically significant drop in those displaying minimal social distance toward Jews from 2003 to 2010, and the trend seems to have continued in the following surveyed year. Those willing to have Jews as neighbors (considered to be the third-best indicator of acceptance) are roughly within the margin of error—around one and a half Romanians out of ten—but show a tendency to rise from survey to survey when it comes to the fourth level of acceptance, namely, having a Jew as a work colleague. At the other end, all three polls show under 5 percent as positioning themselves in the category of highest social distance (should not live in or visit the country). Yet only between one in four and one in five ethnic Romanians are ready to have Jews either living in the country or visiting it. This means that a good part of the three samples might have (once again) been displaying latent antisemitism and (unfortunately) this aspect remained hidden from the eyes of analysts.

### Antisemitism

Other surveys lit up that dark corner of antisemitism slightly more. Thus, a poll commissioned by the governmental Department for Interethnic Relations in October-November 2006, conducted by the Max Weber College of Professional Sociology in collaboration with the Center for Research on Interethnic Relations, and titled “National Minorities in Romania: Representations, Intolerance, Discrimination” found that 7.2 percent of respondents “fully” and 8 percent “partly” agreed that “All Jews in
Romania should move to Israel.”36 This is significantly higher than the 4 percent or less who, according to the three surveys discussed in the last section, were ready to state that Jews should not live in Romania or visit it, though lower than those who held the same view of the Hungarians (11% in full agreement and 11.9% partly agreeing).37

Even more significant, the poll conducted by Max Weber College repeated several questions first used in a survey conducted some three years earlier by Gallup Romania,38 thus again making possible a longitudinal comparison that turned out to be highly relevant for spotting latent antisemitic inclinations. Table 7 sums up these findings.

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36. Guvernul României. Departamentul pentru Relaţii Interetnice. Secretar de Stat, “Material pentru presă. Lansarea studiului de cercetare ‘Climat interetnic în România în pragul integrării europene’ ” (Bucharest, December 4, 2006), 2. The survey was conducted on a representative sample of 1,170 persons aged 18+ and had a margin of error of ±2.9%. The probabilistic sample was stratified according to type of residence (rural vs. urban), residence size, residential administrative status, region, and proportion of national minorities in local political representation according to the 2002 census.

37. No findings were reported for the Romani minority, but 6.2% fully and 8.5% partly agreed with the statement that “People of nationalities other than Romanian should leave Romania,” and 24.6% (12.3% each) backed the statement that “Romanians should not mix with other nations.”

Table 7

**Antisemitic Attitudes—2003, 2006**

**To What Extent Do You Agree with the Following Statements re Jews?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>2003 n = 1,500</th>
<th>2006 n = 1,170</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement (%)</td>
<td>DK/NA (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The emigration of Jews should be encouraged</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews destabilize societies they live in</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews exaggerate the persecutions they were subjected to in order to obtain advantages</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish interests in our country are most often different from other citizens’ interests</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine Christians should have nothing to do with Jews</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much influence in our country</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International politics and finances are controlled by Jews</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews backed the communist takeover</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews cannot be forgiven for the sin of Christ’s crucifixion</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The suffering of the Jewish people is God’s punishment</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps the most important finding of Table 7 rests in the sharp drop in respondents who in 2006 no longer opt out of replying the question “To what extent do you agree with the following statements on Jews?” While in 2003 a majority of 53 percent did so, in 2006 three in five respondents (62%) were ready to express an opinion.39 It is interesting that religious-based “deicidal justifications”40 are the only exception to this pattern (37% no answers to the “unforgivable sin”), but this is compensated by the drop in the partly related absence of answers supporting the “God’s punishment” version, that (for reasons mentioned below) might be related to the debates on the Holocaust. The same connection might explain the moderate increase

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(from 27% to 31.5%) in the proportion of those backing the statement that “Jews exaggerate the persecutions they were subjected to in order to obtain advantages” and the significant drop in those no longer opting out of answering this question.

What I am trying to suggest is that, paradoxically, the publication of the findings of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania in 200541 and the setting up of INSHREW in line with the commission’s recommendations triggered reactions opposite from what was expected: contributing to awareness of the role played by Romania in the Holocaust and accepting the current generation’s responsibility (to distinguish from culpability or guilt) for those events.

Part of the 2003-2006 findings were in fact partly reconfirmed by INSHREW itself in its 2007 survey, shown in table 8:

**Table 8**

**Antisemitic attitudes—2007**

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements re Jews?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N = 1,026</th>
<th>Fully agree (%)</th>
<th>Partly agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree (%)</th>
<th>Fully disagree (%)</th>
<th>Cannot appreciate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It would be better if they went to live in their country</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They pursue only their interests, even if harming others</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They supported the communist takeover</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They act to destabilize societies they live in</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On those questions belonging to the same “family,” tables 7 and 8 seem to confirm each other in the span of one year. The proportion of those who would rather see a Romania cleansed of its Jews reaches by 2007 one in five respondents, but no less significantly, the “opting out” choice is fourfold that of 2006, becoming by far the first choice. More than half of the sample opts out on the “They supported the communist takeover”


42. Institutul Național pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România “Elie Wiesel,” *Sondaj de opinie*, 24. The poll was conducted by TNS CSOP between April 25 and May 3, 2007, on a sample of 1,026, and had a margin of error of ±3.06%.
choice, and nearly half of the respondents do the same on the other two questions. One is forced to conclude that attitudes toward Jews are still hard to measure.

That this indeed is so is illustrated by table 9, showing references to Jews in what questionnaire designers and analysts considered to be positive terms in the same 2007 survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS OF JEW S, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS RE JEWS?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fully agree (%)</th>
<th>Partly agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree (%)</th>
<th>Fully disagree (%)</th>
<th>Cannot appreciate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They are a minority maintaining good relations with the rest of the population</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have many important personalities in different fields</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have a lot of international influence</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are an important minority for Romania</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They represent a community furthering the country’s progress</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case as well, large pluralities ranging from one-third to two-fifths of the sample would not express themselves. More important, perhaps, we need to ask if having “a lot of international influence” is really a “positive” reference? Is it really essentially different from the 2003-2006 surveys’ item, “International politics and finances are controlled by Jews”? The Max Weber College survey showed that every third Romanian believes in conspiracy theories—an increase of a significant 10 percent from 2003, when “only” 23 percent were inclined to espouse such fallacies. The promulgation of the idea that Jews dominate international finance can be considered to be the modern age’s version of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which, as sociologist István Horváth of Max Weber College pointed out, responds to the need of the layman to receive “simple, coherent explanations” rather than “rational, complex and abstract” explanations to a situ-

Romanian sociologist George Voicu, who produced a tome on “conspirationism” in postcommunist Romania, saw a direct link between the “tongue in cheek” declarations of Romanian officials concerning the Holocaust after being pressed by the West to do so as a condition to becoming a member of NATO and later the European Union, and their conviction that “Jews dominate the world.”

**HOLOCAUST AWARENESS**

Optional classes on the Holocaust were introduced in the national high school curriculum as a mandatory subject (2-4 hours) in the larger framework of World War II history (which was being taught in the seventh, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades) as early as 1998. The first textbooks to include the topic were published in 1999, but many of them included wrong or even biased information, most of the time in a clear attempt to exonerate the Romanian authorities from any responsibility for their wartime wrongdoings. Things, however, seemed to change for the better after the issuance of the *Final Report of the International Commission for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania*, whose findings became the country’s “official position” on the Romanian chapter of the Holocaust. So with few exceptions, the textbooks published after 2004 are generally more coherent and accurate than they had been.

Apparently having in mind precisely the purpose of finding out how these developments affected high school students, the 2007 survey initiated by INSHREW stepped out of line, including in its sample people aged 15 and over, rather than the habitual age groups of 18 and over. The experiment has not been repeated since, which makes longitudinal comparison impossible. Four surveys conducted between 2007 and 2011-12 included a question that requested respondents to state whether they had heard of the

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47. Borza, “Fiecare al treilea român crede în teoriile conspiraţioniste.”
Holocaust. As table 10 shows, awareness seems to have increased in 2010 (but then tended to slide back again) due to the debates launched after the publication of the International Commission for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania report and the establishment of INSHREW.

**Table 10**

**Have You Heard about the Holocaust?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007 n = 1,026 (%)</th>
<th>2009 n = 1,201 (%)</th>
<th>2010 n = 1,400 (%)</th>
<th>2011-12 n = 1,400 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


That increase in awareness is also illustrated in the findings of table 11, where, regardless of the simplicity or complexity of answers or their accuracy, an increasing longitudinal awareness of the phenomenon combines with a decreasing drop in the proportion of no answers. The question was asked of all respondents who said they had heard of the Holocaust.
**Table 11**

**What Does the Term “Holocaust” Mean? (Multiple Choice)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
<th>2009 (%)</th>
<th>2010 (%)</th>
<th>2011-12 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The extermination of Jews by the Germans</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The persecution of European Jews</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass crimes/killings/pogroms</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The deportation of Jews</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The punishment of Jews in Nazi concentration camps</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration camps</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organized persecutions of one nation</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A disaster</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something bad for mankind</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass gassing</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The persecution of Gypsies (Roma)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The attitude of Germany toward Jews</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other answers &lt; 1%</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two additional findings emerge from this table: the first is that there is still relatively little awareness among Romanian respondents of the Porriamos (the Roma genocide). This must be considered in connection with the large anti-Roma prejudice; indeed, in 2003, Gallup Romania found that 25 percent of the respondents to a survey based on a representative sample of 1,500 persons aged 18+ believed that Romania did not participate in the Porriamos, 22 percent said that Romania did participate, and the majority (53%) simply did not know or did not care to answer the question. Second, there is a strong tendency to blame the Holocaust on the Germans alone.

Indeed, respondents who answered that they had heard about the Holocaust were then requested to state where it had been perpetrated. This question was important in view of numerous attempts to deflect the perpetration of the crimes on Germany alone, and particularly in view of what I have termed “selective negationism,” by which is meant the attempt to present one’s own country as an exception among Germany’s allies in the Second World War.

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World War. In spite of having passed in 2002 a government ordinance forbidding the negation of the Holocaust that (after long procrastination) became law in 2006, Romanian officials and historians have repeatedly claimed that no Holocaust has taken place on Romanian territory and prosecutors often refuse to heed complaints about the law’s infringement on the grounds that the law does not refer to Romania but to Germany alone.

### Table 12
WHERE DID THE HOLOCAUST OCCUR? (MULTIPLE CHOICE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
<th>2009 (%)</th>
<th>2010 (%)</th>
<th>2011-12 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European countries</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As table 12 demonstrates, only between one-quarter and one-half are conscious of their own country’s involvement in perpetuating the crimes. Remarkably, ethnic Hungarian respondents (for obvious reasons) are by far more aware of the fact that the Shoah had been perpetrated in countries other than Germany. More than half of them (52%) said in 2007 that the atrocities took place in other European countries as well, significantly higher than the average.

Respondents who in the 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011-12 surveys said that a Holocaust had taken place in Romania were further requested to specify what the Shoah in their country had consisted of (table 13). In 2007 and 2009, they had the possibility of choosing from a handed list, whereas in the latter two surveys they could either approve or reject the mentioned options.

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52. Institutul Național pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România “Elie Wiesel,” *Sondaj de opinie*, 35. No data available for other years.
Options for the bottom two entries seem to indicate that large segments among the respondents still have difficulty in acknowledging that their country has participated in the perpetration of the worst atrocities against its Jewish minority. Except for respondents to the 2010 sample, these segments never become majorities on both counts. There is clearly a significant increase, however, in the proportion of those who, due to the International Commission’s report, the debates in the media in its wake, and the activity of INSHREW, are now ready to acknowledge the existence of mass executions and of pogroms. Three in four respondents, moreover, mention the deportations (although it remains unclear whether they mean those carried out by German and Hungarian authorities in northern Transylvania or those implemented by the Romanian authorities to Transnistria), and roughly two in three refer to other forms of persecutions. Yet one should never lose sight of the fact that these answers are not representative of the population as a whole, but rather of the one quarter to one half of those aware of their country’s participation in the Holocaust, i.e., about 15-25 percent of the total population.

Does that mean that these respondents are ready to admit Romania’s responsibility for those events? Respondents to the four surveys (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011-12) who acknowledged the fact that a Holocaust had been perpetrated in Romania, among other places, were asked who in their opinion should be held responsible for it. The findings are summarized in table 14.

| Options for the bottom two entries seem to indicate that large segments among the respondents still have difficulty in acknowledging that their country has participated in the perpetration of the worst atrocities against its Jewish minority. Except for respondents to the 2010 sample, these segments never become majorities on both counts. There is clearly a significant increase, however, in the proportion of those who, due to the International Commission’s report, the debates in the media in its wake, and the activity of INSHREW, are now ready to acknowledge the existence of mass executions and of pogroms. Three in four respondents, moreover, mention the deportations (although it remains unclear whether they mean those carried out by German and Hungarian authorities in northern Transylvania or those implemented by the Romanian authorities to Transnistria), and roughly two in three refer to other forms of persecutions. Yet one should never lose sight of the fact that these answers are not representative of the population as a whole, but rather of the one quarter to one half of those aware of their country’s participation in the Holocaust, i.e., about 15-25 percent of the total population.

| Does that mean that these respondents are ready to admit Romania’s responsibility for those events? Respondents to the four surveys (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011-12) who acknowledged the fact that a Holocaust had been perpetrated in Romania, among other places, were asked who in their opinion should be held responsible for it. The findings are summarized in table 14. |
Table 14
Who Was Responsible for the Outbreak of the Holocaust in Romania?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007 (%)</th>
<th>2009 (%)</th>
<th>2010 (%)</th>
<th>2011-12 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very large</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Little</td>
<td>Very little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>extent (%)</td>
<td>extent (%)</td>
<td>extent (%)</td>
<td>extent (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazi Germany</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Antonescu government</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The USSR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jews</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Romanian people</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/NA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While attributing responsibility for the Holocaust to Nazi Germany is close to unanimous in Romania, at most half of the respondents to this question answer (“Very large” and “Large” extent) that the country’s wartime government should also share it. Only one in ten Romanians or less is willing to accept responsibility as a member of the Romanian nation for the country’s wartime persecution of its Jewish minority.

There is a strong likelihood of a correlation between the post-communist Antonescu personality cult53 and the above findings. The impact of that cult has been measured several times before. A poll conducted by IRSOP in April 1995 established that 62 percent of respondents had “a good opinion” of the wartime dictator Marshal Ion Antonescu, 24 percent had a “bad opinion,” and 14 percent replied that they did not know. The poll attempted to establish how Romanians were viewing the Second World War, and Antonescu was the only leader of that time who scored positively among those

mentioned. As asked to pick out the Romanian leader who best served Romania’s interests (a făcut cel mai mare bine) in the last one hundred years in a survey conducted by CURS in November 1999 and by Gallup Romania in October 2007, however, only 4 percent selected Marshal Antonescu in 1999 and 2 percent in 2007; conversely, only 2 percent picked him as the leader who served Romania the worst in 1999 and 3 percent in 2007. In both instances, communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu distantly headed the lists on both accounts.

Bearing in mind these aspects, how is the marshal viewed by the minority of respondents (an aspect that should never be overlooked) aware of Romania’s participation in the Holocaust? The four surveys commissioned or carried out by INSHREW provide a mixed picture. In the first survey, all 1,026 respondents were asked to choose from a list ascribing to Antonescu six positive and five negative descriptions, shown in table 15.

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54. The poll was conducted April 21-30, 1995, on a representative sample of 1,198 respondents aged 18+ randomly selected from 78 rural and urban settlements, and had a margin of error of ±2.8%. Results for other Second World War leaders were as follows: Good opinion—Hitler 2%, Mussolini 5%, Stalin 5%, Churchill 26%, Roosevelt 31%. Bad opinion—Hitler 90%, Stalin 87%, Mussolini 68%, Churchill 38%, Roosevelt 31%. See “Ce cred românii despre al Doilea Război Mondial,” Adevărul, 9, May 1995.


57. Twenty-two percent in 1999, 23% in 2007 as the country’s best leader; 22 percent in 1999, 24 percent in 2007 as its worst leader in the last one hundred years. Bădescu, Comșa, Sandu, and Stânculescu, Barometrul, 46.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fully suitable (%)</th>
<th>Suitable to a great extent (%)</th>
<th>Not too suitable (%)</th>
<th>Not suitable at all (%)</th>
<th>Cannot appreciate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He was a great patriot</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was a great strategist</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He must be rehabilitated for what he did for Romania</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was a democratic leader</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He created Greater Romania</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was a savior of Jews</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is responsible for crimes against the Roma/Gypsies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was a dictator</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is responsible for crimes against the Jews</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He led Romania to disaster</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He was a war criminal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From very large pluralities of between 41 and 49 percent to small majorities ranging from 50 to 54 percent, Romanian respondents seem non-committal on the symbolic figure of the marshal. Whether this is due to a wish to avoid making a public choice on sensitive subjects or a genuine lack of information, there is no way of telling. The roughly half of the sample who opt for expressing an opinion seem to be divided, but the wartime leader’s partisans display more certainty. And, of course, there has been a pronounced negationist effort to deny involvement in crimes against Jews, to attempt deflecting the responsibility for the atrocities on subordinates and on Jewish “provocations,” and even to transform Antonescu into a savior of Jews.58 The 2007 poll seemed to indicate that success in establishing Antonescu as such a savior was rather limited—not more than 15 percent of those questioned opted for that description. Notably, however, a third of the sample supports the attempts to bring about Antonescu’s judicial rehabilitation.

In the remaining three polls, the same question was posed only to those who had replied that Romania had participated in the Holocaust. In other words, the query was directed to those who were more informed than the rest. Would they have a different image of Marshal Antonescu? The findings are summarized in table 16, in which the two opposing pairs have been joined into one.

### Table 16
**Tell Me How These Statements Suit Antonescu**
*(2009, 2010, and 2011-12)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suitable (%)</td>
<td>Unsuitable (%)</td>
<td>Cannot appreciate (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great patriot</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great strategist</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must be rehabilitated</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic leader</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created Greater Romania</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savior of Jews</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible for crimes against Roma</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictator</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible for crimes against Jews</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Led Romania to disaster</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War criminal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In view of the fact that these answers were provided by the *informed* segment of respondents, there is little ground for comfort. To put it another way: out of the roughly half of the total sample who in 2010 and 2011-12 acknowledged that the Holocaust had been perpetrated in their country, between 36 and 56 percent (over a third to half of the respondents) chose not to declare themselves on Antonescu’s good or bad attributes as a statesman.

Compared to 2007, when all respondents answered this question, and the remaining three surveys, where only those informed were faced with it, one notes some surge in the awareness of the effect that the Holocaust had on the Roma population, yet at most two out of five respondents fit into this category. There is also a slight surge in the awareness of Antonescu’s crimes against Jews, but this rise is even smaller, affecting at most one in
four respondents. On whether Antonescu had been a dictator, there is practically stagnation, accompanied by a significant decline in those who view him as having led Romania to disaster. One also notes fluctuations in those opting for seeing the former Conducător (Führer) as a war criminal, yet the proportion of those who do so is never higher than one in five respondents.

The view of Antonescu as a “great patriot” or a “great strategist” is also stable over time, but these are clearly the most favored responses, chosen by some two in five respondents, or even higher. The drive for his rehabilitation loses ground from one in three to one in four respondents, and there are significant drops in the “ignorant” answers (democratic leader and forger of Greater Romania). Notably, Antonescu’s apologists do less well in their depiction of him as an alleged savior of Jews; the choice here declines to as little as 3 percent in 2010, though some ground is regained in 2011-12 (10%).

Altogether and despite some progress in the post-2005 years, the Holocaust remains a subject that interests the Romanians only superficially (if at all). Out of the 1,026 respondents to the 2007 survey, only 1 percent said they were “very much interested in the problem of the Holocaust”; an additional 5 percent claimed they were “much interested.” Twenty-three were “neither much nor little interested,” and 15 percent acknowledged their interest was “little”; two respondents in five (39%) admitted their interest in the problem was “very little.” Twenty-two percent of the respondents to the same survey were aware that Romania has a national Holocaust Commemoration Day, but 71 percent were unaware of it and 7 percent could not answer the question. Even among those aware of the commemoration’s existence, only 10 respondents were able to supply the correct date (October 9, when the first deportations of Jews began in Bukovina in 1941).59 Only a minority among Romanians are aware that the Holocaust had been perpetrated in Romania and Marshal Antonescu is predominantly viewed as a positive figure in the country’s history—or at least as one in whose political record the “good side” overshadows the “bad side.”

POLITICAL ANTISEMITISM

As András Kovács has pointed out, “While anti-Jewish prejudice is an important factor to be considered in any society, it is more likely to be a prerequisite and indicator of the dynamic of antisemitism rather than its cause.” To become politically consequential, the process entails “the com-

59. Institutul Național pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România “Elie Wiesel,” Sondaj de opinie, 39. The questions were not included in subsequent surveys, which makes longitudinal comparison impossible.
The combined effects of several internal and external factors, only one of which is anti-Jewish prejudice." The transformation of overt or covert "societal moods" into politically relevant actions "gathers momentum if, in societies where anti-Jewish prejudices have been present more or less continuously, a 'culture' and a language arises that makes use of opinions, myths, and phantasmagorias 'about Jews' to interpret situations that are unrelated to Jews or the role of Jews in society."\(^{60}\) The surveys presented in this article leave little doubt that such elements are indeed present in Romanian political culture. To what extent might they at one point lead to the politicization of antisemitism in post-communist Romania—as was the case in the emergence of Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) as a xenophobic, antisemitic, and anti-Roma force in Hungary—is a deeply pertinent question.

Available data on Romania is, alas, too scarce to match what is available on Hungary. In what follows, the analysis is qualitative.

Back in 2008, I wrote\(^{61}\) that if antisemitism in post-communist East Central Europe may be said to be a dependent variable (i.e., what needs to be explained), an examination of the reasons for its relatively successful post-communist dissemination is bound to reveal a variety of independent variables (what explains a phenomenon) in the postures of the different movements, associations, and political parties displaying evident or less obvious antisemitic nuances. These might be driven by different, indeed sometimes contradictory, attitudes toward the past (the legacy of the interwar radical right), present (the legacy of communism), and future (orientations toward the "well ordered" society). They may be political and/or cultural foes, and the fact that they find themselves in the same boat, disturbing as it might be for the local remnants of the Jewish communities, should not make one jump to the conclusion that the rationality of this state of affairs is to be sought in the simplistic, blind, ancestral hatred of what Andrei Oișteanu in Romania called the "imaginary Jew."\(^{62}\) My article distinguished between the following taxonomic categories of "producers" of antisemitism: (a) Self-exculpatory nostalgic antisemitism, or what I have called in past parties and movements a "radical return" to models of the interwar radical right; (b) Self-propelling antisemitism, or what I have

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60. Kovács, The Stranger at Hand, x.
called in past parties and movements a “radical continuity” based on models provided by exacerbated national communism; (c) Neo-populist mercantile antisemitism, in which antisemitism is either used or discarded as a function of perceptions of what “sells” and what does not at both national and international levels; (d) Utilitarian antisemitism, which shares some characteristics with category (c) but is nonetheless distinguished from it by the fact that it is employed by parties, movements, and personalities who are on record as being “anti-antisemitic”; (e) Reactive antisemitism, basically explained in terms of the “competitive martyrology” between the Holocaust and the Gulag; and (f) Vengeance antisemitism, represented by that category driven by the inherent hatred of Jews for whatever they do or refrain from doing. Of these, categories (a) to (e) are particularly relevant for examining political antisemitism. Category (f) is less relevant, as it appears that everywhere in East Central Europe (and perhaps not only) there would be a number of individuals who simply and incurably hate Jews.

The “nostalgic” attribute is warranted by the fact that the category looks upon the interwar authoritarian past as a model for solving the transitional problems of the present and constructing the country’s future.

These political (and “cultural”!) formations would be the Romanian penchant for a reactionary political group such as Jobbik. But none of these movements ever made it to parliament—or was even close to making it. Among them one can mention the (now deceased) Movement for Romania led by Marian Munteanu, founded in 1992; Radu Sorescu’s Party of National Right, founded in 1993; and the neo-Iron Guardist Everything for the Fatherland Party (Totul pentru Patrie), founded in 1993, a party that decided in 2011 to take off its mask and restore its interwar name, Everything for the Country (Totul pentru Țară).

In most cases, however, an apologist explanation accompanies some distancing from the interwar period—enough to provide justification for meritorious intellectuals of a center-right political persuasion to lend their prestige by regularly contributing to publications explicitly or implicitly linked to such political formations and thereby legitimize antisemitism and extremism. Even if yet “in the bud,” one is reminded of Kovács’s explicit warning that “If, in addition to the antisemites, other people who feel no personal antipathy toward Jews are inclined to use the vocabulary of this language for debating changes, conflicts, decisions, and existential issues, and if antisemitic arguments become, for such people, a considerable, though not necessarily acceptable, explanation of different events, then the

various forms of anti-Jewish hostility can indeed constitute an explosive mix.”

As for self-propelling antisemitism, parties that make up this category are the parties of “radical continuity.” There are either personal or ideological links (or both) between these parties and the communist past. Such formations exacerbate the implicit antisemitism inherited from the former regime and transform it into an explicit one. The transformation is not accidental but intentional. Antisemitism, for the members of this category, is instrumental, serving purposes of mobilization. The purpose no longer is (as in the case of the nostalgics) to merely cleanse the past, but to prepare for the future. The authoritarian legacy comes into play here in a pivotal role. The instrumentality of antisemitism consequently consists in providing electorates with “models” that rule out their political adversaries’ alternative democratic constructs.

Like the nostalgic antisemites, self-propelling antisemites indulge in the “Judaization” of political adversaries, but unlike them the exercise is aimed at the effective rather than at the affective aspect of politics. The past is important for the self-propelling antisemites, but its importance derives from its instrumentality.

Self-propelling antisemites “propose” alternative models to democracy, though they are usually careful to do so implicitly rather than explicitly. With democracy viewed as a foreign implant aimed at establishing world Jewish power, “patriotic” figures of the recent past are resurrected and their rehabilitation is tenaciously pursued; Marshal Antonescu serves this purpose in Romania. The post-communist political party that best fits this category is the Greater Romania Party (PRM). That the generic Jew is instrumental for no other purpose than power-seeking was demonstrated in the PRM’s case by the ease in which antisemitism was briefly abandoned shortly before the 2004 elections, when party chairman Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s electoral campaign was managed by an Israeli spin doctor, and by its reemergence as a central feature of party mass appeal once that EU-eying recipe proved inefficient at the polls.

Both nostalgic and self-propelling antisemites engage in self-victimization and in the externalization of guilt. They both seek to present either their own group or the Romanian nation as a whole as being the victim rather than the perpetrator, and to attribute whatever black spots may have existed to other internal and/or external forces. They share with nostalgic antisemites the generic Jew in the role of the internal enemy, along other national minorities such as the Hungarians, just as they share with them

64. Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand*, x.
65. Shafir, “Reds, Pinks, Blacks and Blues.”
Russia and revisionist Horthyate Hungary as outlets for the externalization of guilt. Yet while some self-propelling nationalists such as Tudor occasionally distance themselves from the Iron Guard (though freely print its propaganda in the publications they disseminate), other self-propelling nationalists, such as historian Gheorghe Buzatu, collaborate with the nostalgics in the Iron Guard cleansing operation.

The leader of the New Generation Party (PNG), George (Gigi) Becali, belongs to the category labeled “neo-populist mercantile antisemites.” Becali is an “instinctive” neo-populist politician seeking to gain power from below by whatever possible means. His model appears to be former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. Like Berlusconi, he is a highly successful businessman and Romania’s second-richest man. Also like the Italian leader, he owns the country’s most popular soccer team—in Becali’s case, Steaua Bucharest. Unlike Berlusconi, however, Becali lacks any formal education, and, again, unlike him, he is on record as occasionally uttering antisemitic remarks.

When journalist Keno Verseck reminded him of the Iron Guardist anti-Jewish pogroms, Becali countered:

We are not a people of criminals. When I watch those movies with the Jews, I cannot believe that Romanians, my people, did such things. Never! The Romanians are simply not capable of that. This is why I do not believe that a Holocaust has ever taken place in Romania.66

When the list of PNG candidates for the 2007 European Parliament elections was released, it included “historian” Alex Mihai Stoenescu and former PRM parliamentary deputy Vlad Hogea. Both are notorious antisemites and Holocaust deniers and/or trivializers; Hogea is also on record for racist positions targeting the Roma.

In a multi-volume book entitled Istoria loviturilor de stat în România (History of State-Strikes in Romania), Stoenescu tells his readers that in its beginning days, the Legionary Movement was by no means antisemitic—“Captain” Corneliu Zelea Codreanu “was not born as an anti-Semite, but as an anti-communist leader.” The movement became so, however, when it realized that the many Jews who at that time attended Romanian universities were leftists and thus carriers of the Bolshevik threat.67 Even so, Stoenescu claims, it is wrong to describe the movement as right wing just


because of its antisemitism, and it is particularly wrong for Jews to do that, because “once you explain the position of the Legionary Movement as Right wing, by implication you find yourself in the position of having stated that the Jews were Left wing, thus provoking a Right-wing antisemitic reaction.” For Stoenescu, whatever Jews do is unavoidably wrong. Those who worked in the media are “the first who should be held responsible for the instauration of hatred between Romanians and Jews.” In the December 2012 parliamentary elections, Becali ran as a candidate of the National Liberal Party, a formation allied for that scrutiny with the Socialist Party; he won a seat in Bucharest by a huge majority. He thus managed to turn that center-left alliance into one that can be now viewed as belonging to the “utilitarian antisemitic” category.

“Utilitarian antisemitism” refers to the occasional exploitation of antisemitic prejudice for the pressing and current needs of politicians who, by and large, are probably not antisemitic. Utilitarian antisemitism is by no means a distinguishing feature of the post-communist world; it is no less evident in Western countries. It is not as much what utilitarian antisemites say that counts as it is what they refrain from saying. In other words, the political discourse of utilitarian antisemites is implicit rather than explicit. It is also quite often a coded discourse, never going all the way of the self-exculpatory nostalgics or the self-propelling antisemites, but “signaling” to those able to encode the discourse its unmistakable intent. Failure to distance oneself from antisemitic views in the hope of enlisting the support of those who are obviously prejudiced, or even forging political alliances with them, can be just as telling as embracing their view openly. That such political alliances are shortsighted and, more often than not, turn against the utilitarian antisemites themselves is altogether another matter. But it is one that brings to the fore the singularly present orientation of utilitarian antisemites, who seem to believe that what counts is only what serves the need of the hour, and that the future can always be dealt with starting from scratch. It is therefore not surprising to find the immediate, short-term political discourse of utilitarian antisemites to be self-contradictory in the long term.

Utilitarian antisemitism is to be found at both the left and the right ends of the “mainstream” post-communist political spectrum. This is not a surprise either, since neither the left nor right ends of that spectrum are oblivious to the dangers of being painted by more extremist political adversaries as lacking roots in the country’s past or culture. Utilitarian memory fine-tunes itself to that of the exculpatory nostalgics, and particularly to that

of the self-propelling antisemites as being potential political allies. Former Romanian president Ion Iliescu is such a utilitarian politician.

There are many aspects to “reactive antisemitism,” but the most recent ones refer to what has been called “the competition of the victims” or “competitive martyrology” between the Holocaust and the Gulag.69 To avoid any misunderstanding, let me clearly state that “reactive antisemites” would be surprised to observe that anyone can consider them as having anti-Jewish prejudice. Considering the issue of competitive martyrology in a more general analytical framework, Dan Stone rightly titles it a “memory war.”70 Rather than dealing with history, one deals in this case with what Pierre Nora in 1989 termed a dispute among “counter memories.”71 While not necessarily explicitly antisemitic, partisans of this symmetric or double genocide approach often imply that Jews indulge in “monopolizing suffering,” mostly in order to conceal their participation in and responsibility for their country’s suffering under communist rule. Romania is by no means a singular case in this category, but as tables 7 and 8 show, the impact of such contentions cannot be overlooked either. In Budapest’s Terror House,72 in Tallinn and Riga’s Occupation Museums, and in Vilnius’s Museum of the Victims of Genocide, the memories of Nazism and communism are placed in competition with each other, and anti-fascism is employed only if it does not impinge on the anti-communist narrative.

In his seminal Rethinking the Holocaust, Yehuda Bauer stresses the role of “Lumpenintellectuals” in the emergence of Nazi ideology. These intellectuals, he writes, were people who were “largely unemployed, exceedingly bitter regarding the bourgeois society that rejected them for a variety of reasons, searching for explanations for their disappointment in a society that appeared to be disintegrating.” It would be these people who would form the future “Nazi elite.” The danger of drawing parallels in different historical contexts aside, such “transition losers” are not absent in


Romania (or elsewhere in the region), where they form the backbone of PRM supporters. However, it is only

[when an intellectual or pseudo-intellectual elite with a genocidal program, whether explicit or implicit, achieves power in a crisis-ridden society for economic, social, and political reasons that have nothing to do with the genocidal program, then, if that elite can draw the intellectual strata to its side, genocide will become possible. By intellectual strata I mean what John Weiss describes as elites: upper-class social groups, army officers, church leaders, bureaucrats, doctors and lawyers, industrial and commercial elites, and especially the university professors who provide all the rest with the necessary ideological tools. A social consensus will be created with the help of these elites: the consensus will provide justification for ordinary folks to participate in the genocidal program.]

Political antisemitism is not born at that point. By then, it might be too late to do anything about it.

*Michael Shafir is emeritus at the Institute for Doctoral Studies, School of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, and associate professor at the Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University in Bucharest. He is the author of over 350 articles and books, including Romania (Frances Pinter, 1985), Between Negation and Comparative Trivialization (Polirom, 2002), and X-Rays and other Phobia (Instiutul European), and was the editor for East European Perspectives. Dr. Shafir heads the Romanian delegation to the International Holocaust Remembrance Organization.

Antisemitism in Poland:
Psychological, Religious, and
Historical Aspects

Michał Bilewicz,* Mikołaj Winiewski, and Zuzanna Radzik

The article discusses the phenomenon of antisemitic prejudice in Poland after 1989. The comparative cross-national data suggests that prejudice against Jewish people remains visible in Poland independent of the difficult history of Polish-Jewish relations. The studies reviewed in this article present potential causes and mechanisms of anti-Jewish attitudes in Poland, such as relative deprivation, victimhood-based national identity, and authoritarian political attitudes. The role of Catholic clergy and the relative decline of traditional religious antisemitic beliefs are also considered, as well as the contrast presented by political antisemitism, which has remained unchanged for the past two decades.

Key Words: Antisemitism, Authoritarianism, Jewish, National Identity, Polish, Victimhood

PROBLEMS IN POLISH-JEWISH RELATIONS

Ethnic Poles and Polish Jews shared the same space for about one thousand years. This cohabitation was devastated not only by the Holocaust, but also by serious waves of antisemitic pogroms that occurred during World War II and right after its end (Gross, 2001, 2006). The difficult past of postwar pogroms, antisemitic discrimination in prewar Poland, and unacknowledged history of the Holocaust (Steinlauf, 1997), as well as the involvement of some Jewish people in the Communist regime (Schatz, 1991), created very fragile ground for Polish-Jewish relations in a democratic country established after the systemic transition from communism to capitalism beginning in 1989. One of the largest East European countries with a tiny Jewish minority entered its democratic period with a burden of unresolved historical issues and several new problems of religious, economic, and psychological character.
Before World War II, Jews were the second largest ethnic minority in Poland (population of above 3 million), while after the war, the Holocaust survivors and Jewish repatriates from Soviet Union formed only a small percentage of the postwar population of the country. Finally, after three major emigration waves—in the first postwar years, after the political events of 1956, and as part of the antisemitic purge in 1968—the Jewish population of Poland decreased to 5,000-15,000 people. In the beginning of the systemic transition in 1989, the Jewish minority population was virtually non-existent (only 1,100 people declared Jewish identity in the Polish nationwide census of 2002, although these results raised some doubts among sociologists; see Datner, 2003). With the end of the communist era and newly regained freedoms, antisemitic ideologies resurfaced; with an almost vanished Jewish population, these ideologies lost a lot of their validity, but their influence in society, especially during first post-transition decade, remained significant. In post-transition Poland, several mainstream politicians tended to use antisemitic slogans or at least relate to such concepts—e.g., President Lech Wałęsa and his declaration about “true Polish origins” in the second term of 1990 elections. Extreme right-wing parties openly using antisemitic rhetoric were present in the Polish parliament (e.g., the extremist party Prawica Narodowa co-formed Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność in the elections of 1997). Although open anti-Jewish ideas and statements are no longer accepted in mainstream politics, there are still some noticeable traces of it. Some politicians who have a history of antisemitic excesses or of referring to prewar antisemitic ideologies changed their affiliations and are still present in Polish politics (e.g., Marcin Libicki, formerly allied with Prawica Narodowa, later a member of the ruling party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość and a member of the European Parliament, 2004-20091). Although contemporary conventional politics seems to be substantially less imbued with open antisemitism than a decade ago, on the more informal level of public discourse the situation is different. Antisemitic rhetoric is frequently used during protests, demonstrations, football games, or even on national holiday celebrations (e.g., 2011 Independence Day celebrations in Warsaw). Extremist groups use antisemitic slogans or banners proclaiming racist and Nazi ideologies.

1. His case, as are several other examples of antisemitic figures in Polish political life, is well depicted in the annual country reports of the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel-Aviv University, 1997-2007.
Another venue of expression, and probably most influential source of these ideologies, is a private (owned by a church-related foundation) media group consisting of a nationwide radio station, a newspaper, and satellite television. Weak penalization of those excesses by state institutions, accompanied by silent acquiescence of those incidents by a large part of the political scene, seems to be a dominant problem (Otwarta Rzeczpospolita, 2011). This issue is frequently raised by organizations monitoring racism and antisemitism in Poland (Kornak, 2011). It seems that while antisemitism is not politically profitable, mainstream right-wing parties do not want to spoil the potential political power of the extremist groups.

Two main themes can be seen in post-transition antisemitic rhetoric. The first theme is related to the Jew as an alien—the most noticeable example is accusing opponents of having Jewish origins, usually indicating some mysterious alien control or loyalty to other countries or organizations. The second theme is related to the economy: accusing foreign (Jewish) capital of taking over key businesses in Poland and fear of the claims of prewar property owners. Typically, these themes are accompanied by the attribution of bad intentions to Jews: blaming Jews for exploiting or conspiring to take control over the country. Both of these themes are rooted in prewar ideologies that are strongly related to conspiracy thinking (Kofta & Sedek, 2005) and useful for identifying scapegoats who are responsible for the poor economical situation, lack of control, and general feeling of deprivation.

The Holocaust Debate in Poland

One of the most important aspects of Polish-Jewish relations after 1989 is the newly discovered history of crimes committed by Poles during the Nazi German occupation of Poland and in the first years after the Second World War. Researchers dealing with antisemitism in contemporary Poland trace the roots of antisemitic resentments to the victimhood competition between Poles and Jews after the Holocaust (Bilewicz & Stefaniak, in press; Krzemiński, 1996) or to the silenced memory of bystanders after the genocide (Steinlauf, 1997). This silence had already ended before the fall of communism, following the famous essay by Jan Blonski (1990) in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny. In the essay, Blonsky draws the reader’s attention to the problem of Polish passivity during the Holocaust. The essay led to continuous debate in the weekly and in the public opinion in general, revealing strong opposition to commemorating the “dark sides” of the history of Polish Catholic–Polish Jewish relations. In the early 1990s, Poland faced several other such debates: about killings of Polish Jews by Polish Catholic insurgents during the Warsaw uprising (Cichy, 1994) and about
the presence of Catholic religious symbols on the grounds of the Auschwitz concentration camp (Kuleta, 2001). The conflict over crosses in Auschwitz led to severe tension between right-wing political forces, which treated crosses as symbols of the unique suffering of ethnic Poles in Auschwitz, versus that of religious Jews—e.g., Rabbi Avi Weiss, who openly stressed the blasphemic character of Christian religious symbols on places related to Jewish martyrdom. In a qualitative study of Polish high school students that we conducted in the early 2000s, we found that the competition over the status of Auschwitz was still vivid (Bilewicz, 2008). When students were asked to list the most important issues they would like to discuss with Jewish peers, they often came up with questions and statements such as: “Why do you think that only Jews suffered during the war? Don’t you know that Poles also were killed in camps . . .”; “Some of you say that Poles killed you in death camps, but we were also killed there”; or “Why did Jews not protest when crosses were erected in Auschwitz? It is our country and our Auschwitz!” (p. 32). These questions and the ensuing discussions show how the problem was represented among broader public after being exposed for years to the “conflict-over-crosses.”

The most animated of the public disputes about the history occurred after the publication of Jan Tomasz Gross’s books *Neighbors* (2001), *Fear* (2006), and to lesser extent *Golden Harvest* (2012). *Neighbors* presented the history of a small town in Eastern Poland where Polish Catholic inhabitants killed their Polish Jewish neighbors in a massive pogrom in 1941, after Soviet occupants left the town and before Nazi authority in the region was established. The history of this self-organized ethnic cleansing, Jedwabne, contradicted the dominant perception of Poles as virtuous victims of the wartime period (Krzemiński, 1993). The most pronounced reaction to the publication of this book was denial and biased explanations of the history; most of the Polish public perceived the Jedwabne crime as caused by Germans or at least by some marginal groups not representative of the nation as a whole (Bilewicz, 2004).

The second book in this series, *Fear*, touched on the question of post-Holocaust pogroms and expressions of violent antisemitism in Poland in late 1940s. The book provoked intensive—and mostly negatively intended—media coverage, with several journalists and public figures expressing their opinions before even reading the book.

In the most recent of these books, *Golden Harvest*, Gross presented the history of robberies, looting, and other crimes of property theft perpetrated against Jews during the Holocaust. Although reaction to this book was mostly calm, there were still several attempts to deny historical facts by questioning the evidence and materials Gross described.
These debates are also very much reflected in public opinion. The dominant category of the qualitative study of high-school students’ opinions dealt with the unwelcome anticipation of being blamed for collaboration with the Nazis in the destruction of Polish Jewry (e.g., “Why do Jews think that we allowed and helped Germans to build Auschwitz?”; “Why do you still blame Poles for the Holocaust?”; “They say that Auschwitz is a Polish deed, but these were Germans who burned Jews!” (Bilewicz, 2008, p. 31). This topic has been also frequently studied in survey studies.

Antisemitism and the Catholic Church

Catholic teaching about Jews and Judaism after 1965 went through the dramatic changes introduced by the Second Vatican Council’s declaration Nostra Aetate. In Poland, this new teaching was reported by some of the Catholic press as early as the ’70s and ’80s. It was acknowledged by the publications’ readers and the elite, intelligentsia circles of the wire editors. On the official level, though, the Catholic Church in Poland started to discuss issues of Jews, Judaism, and antisemitism only in the last 15 years or so of the 20th century, when the Polish bishop’s Sub-Commission for Dialogue with Judaism was established.

The most noticeable and outspoken form of antisemitism present in Catholic circles in Poland is focused less on the religious notions (deicide, broken covenant, blood libel) than on what arose from the nationalistic discourse; this aspect of antisemitism refers to conspiracy theories and victimhood competition. Preaching from pulpits and the Catholic media have been often used to nourish fears of Jews’ reclaiming their property ($60 billion of claims, announced by Radio Maryja); speculations about the alleged Jewish descent of disfavored politicians or public figures

2. It was presented in periodicals such as Znak, Więz, and Tygodnik Powszechny, e.g., Znak (2-3), 1983.

3. The commission was followed by the collapse of communism, with several initiatives on informing theologians about the new Catholic teaching and by organizing conferences and publishing books. What was already important in 1990 was the publication of a collection of translated Catholic Church documents and John Paul II’s teachings about Jews and Judaism from 1965 to 1990. It was a crucial event, as it enabled broader access to the further texts (Chrostowski & Rubinkiewicz, 1990).

4. As an example, Rev. Henryk Jankowski, in his sermon on October 26, 1997, noted: “[A] Jewish minority in the government should not be tolerated. The nation is afraid of it.”

have been present even in the sermons of the leading bishops. Such manifestations reflect the sympathies of the Catholic clergy toward right-wing beliefs of conservative and nationalistic parties formed after 1989. This political outlook has been more vocal than the expression of religious views against Jews (Michlic, 2004). At the same time, however, political antisemitism is often assisted by religious anti-Jewish expression. For example, when referring to the contemporary debate about Jan Gross’s book The Neighbors, Rev. Henryk Jankowski used in the Easter decoration (the so-called Lord’s thumb) the slogan directly referring to the traditional, anti-Jewish deicide accusation.

Certainly, there are many positive initiatives for learning about Judaism that have appeared during the last twenty years in the Catholic Church in Poland. Most of the people who started these initiatives were deeply inspired by the actions and words of the late pope John Paul II; referring to these words and actions is still the strongest argument they can use to justify their involvement. Unfortunately, those are rather rare events, still rarely attended by the local clergy and seminarians, and the new Catholic teaching is not incorporated into regular curricula of seminaries and theological faculties. Therefore, interest in Christian-Jewish relations and awareness of anti-Judaism in Catholic tradition is a sideline rather than an intrinsic part of the regular theological education. What is more, the priests who are the most active in Christian-Jewish dialogue and the most vocal about antisemitism are often criticized by their supervisors and colleagues.

When it comes to the Catholic doctrine and religious practice, there remain a number of things that need simple correction but nevertheless have been overlooked. For example, there are still titles in the Polish edition of the Bible and texts in the Holy Friday Liturgy of the Hours that are influenced by the older theology (see Weksler-Waszkinel, 2011). Another case

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6. Cardinal Józef Glemp in 1990 claimed that antisemitism in Poland is a myth created by the enemies of Poland or a statement of Bishop Józef Michalik, who said before the elections: “A Catholic should vote for a Catholic, a Muslim for a Muslim, a Jew for a Jew, a Freemason for a Freemason and a Communist for a Communist.” The most recent of such statements was an interview of Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek in pontifex.roma (2010), in which he described the Holocaust as a “Jewish invention” and spread the conspiracy theory of a Jewish lobby in the media.


8. In 1998, the Polish Episcopat introduced the annual celebration of the Day of Judaism in the Catholic Church in Poland to commemorate the Jewish roots of Christianity. This initiative is continuously implemented by a few diocese, and its central ceremonies are held every year in a different city.
reveals that for many years in the prayer for the Jews, included into the Good Friday liturgy, there was a mistake in translation. This mistake, in fact, had been introduced before the Second Vatican Council theological meaning; it had not been intended by the Latin original. The fact that for many years those revealing mistakes were not corrected shows ignorance and negligence of the issues concerning Jews and Judaism.

On November 30, 1990, the Polish Episcopat issued the pastoral letter on Catholic-Jewish relations for the 25th anniversary of the Second Vatican Council’s Nostra Aetate declaration. The letter, which included a condemnation of antisemitism and highlighted the importance of developing better Christian-Jewish relations, was read in all the churches across Poland only on January 20, 1991. Despite the availability of the letter, the leaders of the Church postponed its publication. All this occurred while antisemitic arguments were being used in the campaign before the first free presidential elections in Poland (Gebert, 2010). This was to become symptomatic for the years to come: the Catholic church in Poland officially expresses positive attitudes toward Judaism and condemns antisemitism, but its leaders do not care about educating the clergy about those issues and rarely condemn antisemitism when it happens in the Catholic Church.

The level of anti-Jewish resentments in several European countries was often compared. Many of these comparisons indicated the highest levels of antisemitism in post-communist East European countries, Poland among them. The most recent social-psychological comparison of eight European countries (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011) found the highest extent of antisemitism in Poland and Hungary—and the level of antisemitism in these two countries was significantly higher than in other European countries. This comparison found that 49.9% of Poles agree with the statement “Jews have too much influence in our country” (compared to 5.6% in the Netherlands, 13.9% in Great Britain, and 19.9% in Portugal) and that 56.9% agree with the statement “Jews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind” (compared to 20.4% in the Netherlands, 22.5% in Great Britain, and 54.2% in Portugal).

In addition, the opinion polls systematically conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) show that the expression of antisemitism in Poland is among the highest in contemporary Europe. In 2007, 2009, and

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9. The words “populus prioris aquisitionis” (people of the first choice) was translated as “people formerly chosen,” which echoed the pre-Vatican Council theology of supercession.
2012, the ADL surveyed several European countries, including Poland. One of the indices used to assess anti-Jewish attitudes was agreement (indicating “probably true”) to at least three of the following four stereotypical antisemitic statements: “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country”; “Jews have too much power in the business world”; “Jews have too much power in international financial markets”; and “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.” In 2007, Poland was the second highest, with a 45% rate of agreement, right after Spain (47%), and way above Germany (20%) and France (22%). Similar results were obtained in 2009, when the agreement rate in Poland was similar to that in France (48%) and right after Hungary\(^{10}\) (47%), and substantially above the agreement level in the UK (10%), Germany (20%), and France (20%). Most recent polls in 10 countries show similar results for Poland (48%), but there is a large change for Hungary (an increase to 63%) and Spain (53%), while the UK (17%) and the Netherlands (10%) remain the least antisemitic in their responses of the studied European countries.

In 2005, another multinational survey on attitudes toward the Holocaust and Jews was conducted for the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Several questions concerned excessive Jewish control; the exact statement used in the questionnaire was: “Now, as in the past, Jews exert too much influence on world events.” Out of the seven countries included in the survey, the highest agreement rate was in Poland (56% agree and somewhat agree with this statement, while 38% disagree). The second country with the highest agreement and lowest disagreement was Austria (45% and 50%, respectively).

Another aspect compared in cross-European studies was attitudes toward the State of Israel. In 2005 and 2007 studies for the ADL, only Spain’s unfavorable attitudes toward Israel exceeded positive ones (31% to 19% in 2005, and 30% to 18% in 2007). In general, attitudes in Poland toward Israel were positive: 23% favorable to 16% unfavorable (25% to 16% in 2005 and 2007, respectively). A similar pattern could be seen in the results of the survey for the AJC: the percentage of people declaring positive (positive and somewhat positive) feelings toward Israel in Poland exceeded those who declared negative feelings for 20%. The difference between positive over negative feelings toward Israel was 7% in Austria and 2% in Sweden.

While acknowledging these differences, it is important to note that comparisons and inferences based on the presented results could be misleading or incorrect for two main reasons. First, any direct comparison

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10. Hungary and the UK were included in 2009, and the Netherlands was included in the 2012 study conducted by ADL.
between different countries, cultures, and languages has to be done with great care because of cultural differences—i.e., answers to such questions can be influenced not only by a measured construct but also by characteristic functioning of theoretical constructs and interactions with other constructs within every culture (Maehr, 1974). Second, in every one of the cited multinational surveys different countries were selected. For example, the inclusion of Spain and Hungary in the ADL survey project and the omission of those countries in the AJC survey project changes the perceived situation of Poland in such comparisons—from the highest level of antisemitism to the third highest.11

There is considerable diversity in the questions used by different polling agencies to tap the same sector of antisemitic beliefs. A good example of this diversity is the wording of a question measuring traditional antisemitism: ADL surveys ask people “Do you think that Jews are responsible for the death of Christ?” while other polling agencies in Poland tend to ask “Do modern Jews bear responsibility for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ?” or “Do you believe that God punishes Jews for killing Jesus?” Based on the wording of the question, different polling agencies estimate the number of traditional antisemites in Poland from 15% (OBOP research institute data) to 46% (ADL) (Winiewski & Bilewicz, in press). Even such a seemingly insignificant issue as the grammatical form of ethnicity used in the study (the adjective “Jewish” vs. the noun “Jews”) significantly affects results obtained in public opinion polls (Graf, Bilewicz, Geschke, & Finell, in press).

Aside from these limitations, the results of the presented studies indicate a stable pattern of relatively high (in comparison to other European countries) social acceptance of antisemitic statements in Poland and relatively positive attitudes toward the State of Israel.

ANTISEMITIC BELIEFS IN POLAND: RESULTS OF SURVEYS

After 1989, several opinion polls, surveys, and longitudinal study projects about antisemitism were introduced. The recent comparison of these empirical studies, performed by Antoni Sulek (2012), showed that there is a positive shift in attitudes toward Jews: after 1989, the number of Poles declaring positive attitudes toward Jews systematically increased. Below, we focus on the specific components of antisemitic beliefs in order to describe the current state of antisemitism in Poland and assess economic and psychological sources of antisemitic biases in Poland.

11. For a detailed review of the limitations of survey methodology, see Smith (1993) and Winiewski and Bilewicz (in press).
Polish sociologists in their quantitative research usually distinguish between two basic forms of antisemitic attitudes: traditional and modern antisemitism (Datner-Śpiewak, 1996; Krzemiński, 1996). Traditional antisemitism, or anti-Judaism, is strongly rooted in religious background, related to such concepts as deicide and blood libel. Modern antisemitism has a secular character and is embedded in prewar political ideologies, putting antisemitism within a context of economical struggle and general worldviews. An important element of modern antisemitism is the belief in a Jewish conspiracy (Kofta & Sędek, 2005), which suggests that Jews hold secret agendas, have too much influence over some aspects of life, and work collectively to achieve their goals. This type of thinking can be traced to the 19th century, as in the antisemitic hoax The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

In 2009, the Center for Research on Prejudice at the University of Warsaw conducted a survey on a national representative sample consisting of measures of both of these types of antisemitism (Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, & Wójcik, in press). Factor analyses proved the distinctiveness of these two forms of prejudicial beliefs about Jews. It turned out that traditional antisemitism is currently shared by only a small part of Polish society. Most respondents disagreed with traditionally antisemitic statements: 78.5% participants placed themselves below the midpoint of the averaged 7-point scale (where 1 meant “definitely disagree” and 7 “definitely agree” with a given statement)—meaning that the vast majority of Polish society disagrees with traditionally antisemitic statements. Figure 1 presents percentages of responses to the two statements indicating traditional antisemitism. It is worth noting that although the majority of respondents definitely disagree with these statements, there is still a large part of the population that does not provide any answer.

Contrary to traditional forms of antisemitic attitudes, a belief in Jewish conspiracy appears to be much more widespread in Polish society. In the same study, almost two thirds (64.6%) of participants placed themselves above the midpoint of the belief in Jewish conspiracy scale (consisting of several statements), therefore agreeing at least to some extent with most of the concepts. Figure 2 presents three questions as an illustration of conspiracy theory, which ascribes to Jews collective goals, secret actions, and a high degree of group egoism and solidarity (Kofta & Sędek, 2005).

Most of the results show that traditional forms of antisemitism are clearly relics of the past. Superstitions concerning blood libel and deicide are shared by only a small percent of the Polish population—mostly the ones living outside of big cities and who are less educated and older.
Figure 1
Traditional Antisemitism.
Results of Nationwide Study of 997 Adult Poles
Center for Research on Prejudice, 2009

Do you agree with the statement that modern Jews bear responsibility for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ?

In the past Jews were accused of kidnapping Christian children for ritual purposes. Do you think that this accusation was true?

Figure 2
Modern Antisemitism.
Belief in Jewish Conspiracy—Selected Items
Results of a Nationwide Study of 997 Adult Poles
Center for Research on Prejudice, 2009

Jews would like to control the international financial institutions
Jews act in a secret way
Jews would like to rule the world

Not at all  Rather not  Hard to say  Rather yes  Yes, definitely
Anthropologists studying these people report that the remnants of such antisemitic imageries still exist—especially in the rural southern and eastern regions of the country (Tokarska-Bakir, 2008), while historical research suggests that in the early postwar years such imageries were even more common (Zaremba, 2007, 2012). On the contrary, opinion poll results show that modern, political antisemitism is still gaining popularity in contemporary Poland. Figure 3 shows this growing trend in its comparison of the results of several studies conducted by sociologists and by public opinion monitoring institutions.

**Figure 3**

**Comparative Results of Several Nationwide Surveys Concerning Perceived Jewish Influence**

*Do you agree or disagree that Jews in our country have too much influence over economy / Jews have too much power in the business world (AGREE)*

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Note: a—studies conducted by PBS for Ireneusz Krzemiński; b—study conducted by Demoskop for AJC; c—study conducted by CBOS; d—studies conducted by OBOP for ADL.

The results show that since the time of the system transition at the beginning of the 1990s, there is a stable and growing trend in support of the theory of the excessive influence of Jews in Poland.

**Post-Holocaust Antisemitism**

Holocaust-related forms of antisemitism have been extensively studied in Poland. On the one hand, debates about the Holocaust, Polish complicity, and crimes against Jews have obviously changed social consciousness. Sur-
vey results show a slightly delayed increase of knowledge about crimes committed by Poles on Jews—after dominant denial (observed immediately after the publication of books by Jan T. Gross) comes the acknowledgement. This effect resembles the widely known “sleeper effect”: with the passage of time, people remember the content of a given message while forgetting about the source that they perceived initially as not credible (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004).

On the other hand, knowledge about Holocaust history is not increasing. Our recent comparison of survey results after 1989 (Winiewski & Bilewicz, in press) showed that the number of Poles who acknowledge Jews as the highest number of victims of the wartime period systematically decreases (46% in 1992, 38% in 2002, and 28% in 2010), while the number of Poles who think that ethnic Poles were the highest number of victims of the wartime period increases (6% in 1992, 9% in 2002, 15% in 2010). This mounting ignorance could possibly be attributed to the demographic process: the generation of people who remember the Nazi occupation of Poland is disappearing from Polish society.

At the same time, this new “victimhood competition” seems to fuel antisemitic resentments. It is widely known in psychology that competitive victimhood is often used as the justification for ethnic conflict and animosities. Competitive victimhood reduces trust and empathy toward outgroup members (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008); our recent analysis, based on a nationwide study of Polish adult citizens from 2002, confirmed that prediction (Bilewicz & Stefaniak, in press). Poles who consider their nation an eternal victim of aggression from other nations more often share antisemitic attitudes. What is more important—even controlling for such absolute sense of victimhood—is that relative victimhood (the perception that Poles were more victimized in the past than the Jews) also significantly predicts anti-Jewish attitudes (see Figure 4).

Another aspect of history-related anti-Jewish prejudice is the idea of secondary antisemitism (Bergmann, 2006; Imhoff & Banse, 2009). This notion, adapted from German sociological and social psychological literature, explains the most subtle and “politically correct” version of antisemitism, one that focuses on denial of antisemitism and negating the historical significance of the Holocaust. Secondary antisemites are willing to forget about the Holocaust and actively oppose any compensations or restitution to the victims. In a recent study of a large sample of young Poles (Figure 5), we found that more participants agreed with the statements belonging to the secondary antisemitism scale than disagreed with them. More than 30% of young Poles think that Jews abuse Polish feelings of guilt and more than 40% believe that Jews would like to receive a compensation from Poland.
From a nationwide representative sample study in 2002. Linear regression. $R^2 = .06$, $p < .01$ (Bilewicz & Stefaniak, in press).

for the Nazi atrocities. This historical fear is closely linked to negative, discriminatory intentions toward Jews.

An additional aspect of postwar antisemitism is an appreciation of the fact that the Holocaust ended the thousand-year existence of a large Jewish community in Poland. In a recent survey (Kucia, 2010), conducted on a nationwide representative sample of adult Poles, 19.6% of the respondents agreed with the following statement: “Although the Holocaust was a great tragedy, one good thing about it is that there are no more Jews living cur-
rently in Poland.” This shows that not only the Holocaust denial, but also the specific evaluation of the Holocaust, might be used as a tool to communicate antisemitic beliefs or attitudes.

How Economic Deprivation Affects Antisemitic Beliefs in Poland

The idea that prejudice is caused by shared economic frustration or deprivation can be traced back to the classic formulations of a scapegoat theory of prejudice, built predominantly on psychoanalytic and frustration-aggression theories (Glick, 2002; Zawadzki, 1948). The interest in this concept was recently revived by social psychologists seeking an explanation for such diverse crimes as gay bashing in the United States and prewar antisemitic acts in the Weimar Republic (Glick, 2002; Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998). According to the ideological model of prejudice Glick proposed, widespread frustration motivates people to seek an explanation. Antisemitic ideology provides such an explanation and becomes particularly attractive in times of economic crisis. Finally, in order to restore control and economic power, the deprived majority groups engage in acts of cruelty and discrimination against a minority that is depicted as highly competent and lacking any warmth or morality. Taking historical situations into account, researchers observed that the economic crises creating a shared feeling of deprivation finally led to acts of genocide, mainly because peoples’ basic needs were being frustrated (Glick, 2002).

The ideological model of antisemitism creates a plausible explanation for numerous historical situations in which Jews were blamed for the majority group’s failures. On the other hand, several studies found that the situational factors, such as economic crises, are much weaker predictors of antisemitism than the personality factors, such as authoritarianism or nationalism (Bergmann, 2008). Archival material studies on the hate crimes in New York City found no evidence for the link between poor economic conditions and prejudicial behavior (Green et al., 1998), and none in which the socially shared economic frustration in post-Soviet Russia did not result with the rise of antisemitic attitudes or incidents, as one could suppose on the basis of the scapegoat theory of prejudice (Gibson & Howard, 2007). The economic deprivation after the systemic transition in Eastern Europe did not increase the belief in Jewish control in Ukraine, although it increased beliefs in Jewish control in Poland (Bilewicz & Krzemiński, 2010).

In a survey from 2009 (Figure 6) conducted by the Center for Research on Prejudice (Bilewicz et al., in press) all those predictors were measured, as well as several measures of antisemitic attitudes. The results of regression analyses showed that a prejudiced personality (authoritarianism), an
identity related to victimization, and a sense of economic deprivation are three independent and significant predictors of developing a conspiracy stereotype of Jews.

**Figure 6**

**Authoritarianism, Deprivation, Victimhood, and Conspiratorial Antisemitism**

![Diagram showing the relationships between Authoritarianism, Deprivation, Victimhood-based identity, and Conspiracy-Based Anti-Semitism. The coefficients for each relationship are indicated: β = .16**, β = .14*, β = .13**.]

Result of multiple linear regression, $R^2 = .09$, $p<.01$.

This analysis suggests that in order to explain contemporary forms of antisemitism in Poland, one has to consider both psychological factors (such as authoritarian forms of personality or victimhood-based identity), and economic causes (such as difficult life conditions that lead to a sense of relative deprivation). Most such analyses suggest that the stereotype of Jews as conspiring against Poland serves as a scapegoat-defining ideology in post-1989 Poland.

**Summary: The Future of Antisemitism in Poland?**

Overall, the case of Poland is an example of the endurance of antisemitism without Jews—or at least with a scant Jewish population (Lendvai, 1971). This leads to an interesting question about the psychological reasons of such long-enduring prejudice without an object. Based on the research and observation of political and social life in Poland, one could say that antisemitism plays several important functions in contemporary Polish society: it is one of the informal tenets of religiosity in current Poland; it defines a scapegoat for the problems and troubles of the post-transition
period; it allows the denial of responsibility for historical crimes toward Jews; and it supports perceiving the ingroup as the main victim of the Nazi occupation. These functions clearly allow antisemitism to exist—even without any significant Jewish presence in the country. At the same time, however, there is no link between such antisemitism and attitudes toward contemporary Israel. In this case, Polish society is far less anti-Jewish than many other European societies; in addition, the political representation of antisemitic prejudice is very limited—most politicians who were actively using antisemitic rhetoric are currently out of political life or at the margins of mainstream political debate.

The future of antisemitism in Poland could be severely affected by the development of any difficult economic or political situation in the country. Acknowledging the deprivation as one of the key predictors of antisemitism in Poland, one could suppose that any potential future economic crisis could reinforce antisemitic prejudice and put it in the focus of country’s political life. Otherwise, without such a precipitating condition as an economic or political crisis, the antisemitic resentments might disappear, as most forms of anti-Jewish attitudes are negatively correlated with age—younger and more educated people cease to believe in their parents’ and grandparents’ stereotypical narratives about Jews being responsible for economic problems, politics, or even deicide. Thus, the development of antisemitism in Poland is critically dependent on the future of the Polish economy and of Polish politics.

*Michał Bilewicz is on the Faculty of Psychology and the Robert B. Zajonc Institute of Social Studies, University of Warsaw. Address correspondence to: Michał Bilewicz, Center for Research on Prejudice, Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Stawki 5/7, 00-183 Warsaw, Poland, bilewicz@psych.uw.edu.pl; Mikołaj Winiewski is affiliated with the Robert B. Zajonc Institute of Social Studies, University of Warsaw, http://robert-zajonc.iss.uw.edu.pl/pres/ISS.pdf. Zuzanna Radzik is affiliated with the Institute of Slavic Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Bartoszewicz 1b m.17, 00-337, Warsaw, Poland. This research project was funded from the Polish national budget.

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Antisemitic Prejudice and Political Antisemitism in Present-Day Hungary

András Kovács*

The article analyzes the newest survey results on antisemitic prejudices, antisemitic political discourses, and political antisemitism in present-day Hungary. According to the research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held a strong antisemitic prejudice. Surveys conducted after 2006 show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party. When examining the causes of antisemitism, the most interesting finding was that the strength of antisemitic feelings is regionally different and that these differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but conversely should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. While analyzing antisemitic discourse, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism.

Key Words: Antisemitic Discourse, Antisemitism, Far Right, Hungary, Jobbik, Political Antisemitism, Post-Communist Antisemitism, Survey

Antisemitism appeared in Hungary in 1990, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism and the introduction of free speech and a free press. The phenomenon caused great concern and heated debate. It was feared that the inevitable economic and social difficulties of the transition would render people receptive to antisemitic ideologies. At the center of the debate was whether the economic and social changes were the cause of the sudden increase in antisemitism and the rapid spread of antisemitic views or whether covert hostility toward Jews was coming to the surface as a consequence of the new civil liberties. As the extent of antisemitic prejudice in Hungarian society was unknown, from the mid-1990s a series of research studies were conducted to determine which social groups were affected. The various research projects—including my own empirical stud-
ies—sought primarily to measure the proportion of antisemites in Hungary and to identify the most common antisemitic views. On the basis of the results, researchers tried to estimate whether antisemitism was increasing over time. In my own research, I sought to identify explanatory factors for antisemitic prejudice as well as the typical characteristics of people who were inclined to be antisemitic; a further important aim was to determine the form in which antisemitism appears in the political arena and whether antisemitic prejudice was likely to turn into a political ideology. After the publication of a monograph on the findings of research undertaken between 1994 and 2006 (Kovács, 2010), I conducted three further surveys to monitor changes in antisemitic prejudice. In what follows, based on the results of these surveys, I seek to analyze the direction and dynamics of changes observed in recent years. The question that I discuss in this article is: What explains the increase in antisemitic prejudice in Hungary since 2006 and especially since 2009?

The findings of surveys carried out regularly since 1995 show that—often contrary to the perceptions of observers—the share of antisemites among the adult Hungarian population barely changed until 2006. Although the results of the research conducted in different years are not always directly comparable because the surveys did not always include the same questions, nevertheless the findings show that the percentage of antisemites among the Hungarian population was roughly the same throughout 1995-2002. By 2006, the percentage had increased slightly, but it still did not exceed the highest value recorded in the preceding period (1994) (Kovács, 2010, pp. 123-126).

Research undertaken since 2006 has sought to examine the various aspects of antisemitic prejudice. The 2009 survey examined first and foremost opinions on, and attitudes toward, the Holocaust, while research in 2010 investigated affective antisemitism. In late 2011, using a longer and more detailed questionnaire, we were able to repeat as far as possible the main questions of the major research surveys of 1995, 2002, and 2006. Questions measuring the strength of anti-Jewish sentiment (i.e., the emotional intensity of antisemitism), however, have been included in every survey questionnaire since 1993. This means that we can use the data to form an exact picture of changes in affective antisemitism over the whole period.

As Figure 1 shows, between 1993 and 2006 the share of those who emotionally reject Jews varied between 10 and 15 percent. After 2006, this percentage increased significantly to 28 percent of the adult population in 2010 and to 24 percent in 2011. The graph also shows that the percentage of those who emotionally reject Jews jumped around the time of national elections (held in Hungary in 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010). This finding indicates that anti-Jewish sentiment strengthened at times of political mobil-
HUNGARY: ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE

Figure 1

EMOTIONAL REJECTION OF JEWS
(“Feel antipathy for Jews”—Agreement in %)

The Jews are antipathic.

Figure 2

LIKING THERMOMETER, 1995-2011

“Do you like the . . . living in Hungary?”
1: Don’t like them at all—9: Like them very much
(means on the scale 1-9)

The increase in anti-Jewish sentiment was also shown by another indicator, the “liking thermometer”: whereas Jews were among the “more liked groups” until 2009, after 2010, they were included among the “more disliked groups”—although one should note that since 2010 only the German minority has qualified as a “more liked group” (Figure 2).
Based on two variables indicating the strength of affective antisemitism, the extent of the antisemitic groups altered as follows over time.\(^1\)

**FIGURE 3**

**PROPORTION (%) OF AFFECTIVE ANTISEMITES IN HUNGARIAN SOCIETY, 2003-2011**

In our research over the past decade and a half, the aim has been not only to measure the strength of anti-Jewish sentiment (i.e., the affective dimension of prejudice), but also to examine the extent of support for antisemitic views—that is, the cognitive dimension of prejudice and people’s propensity to discriminate. The questions used in the various surveys sometimes changed, but some antisemitic statements were included in several survey questionnaires. Thus, it is possible, in such cases, to follow changes in opinions over time. As Table 1 shows, with the exception of statements expressing religious anti-Judaism, more people now agree with almost all the antisemitic statements than did so before—especially if we are looking at the post-1995 data. (Concerning the possible causes of the rather exceptional data of the 1994 survey, see Kovács, 2010, p. 36, note 4.) The increase is particularly striking in the case of the three statements indicating concern about “Jewish power” and a willingness to discriminate

\(^1\)This antisemitism indicator was constructed on the basis of answers to two questions. The first question concerned whether the respondent placed himself or herself in the group whose members “feel antipathy toward Jews.” The second concerned whether the respondent liked or disliked Jews on the basis of a 9-point scale. Those respondents who stated that they felt antipathy to Jews and scored between 1 to 6 on the Liking scale were classified as extreme antisemites. The remnant of the “antipathy” group and those who stated that they don’t feel antipathy but fell into the lower tercile (1-3) on the Like/Dislike scale were classified as moderate antisemites; all other respondents were classified as non-antisemites.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fully agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish intellectuals control the press and cultural sphere</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There exists a secret Jewish network determining political and economic</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affairs</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be best if Jews left the country</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In certain areas of employment, the number of Jews should be limited</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgivable sin of the Jews</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The suffering of the Jewish people was God’s punishment</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>want</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jews of this country are more loyal to Israel than to Hungary</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the index that was formed based on agreement with the antisemitic statements, since 2006 the proportion of antisemites—particularly “moderate antisemites”—has increased and the proportion of non-antisemites has decreased among the adult population. Examining the proportion of extreme antisemites, we observe no significant difference between the group of respondents who answered all questions and the group of respondents who answered at least one question: in these two groups, the proportion of extreme antisemites was 8 and 9 percent (in 2006, it was 11%-14%). Examining the proportion of moderate antisemites, we observe a greater difference between the two groups: 29 and 35 percent (the corresponding percentages in 2006 were 14% and 21%).

Theories on prejudice all state that prejudicial attitudes comprise at least two components, cognitive and affective (some theories treat a willingness to act on prejudice as a separate component). Accordingly, prejudice is usually measured in these two dimensions (Bergmann & Erb, 1991, pp. 41-57; Fiske, 2004, pp. 398-400). The data of the 2011 survey allow us to do so: based on a combination of the two indicators—measuring affective antisemitism and support for antisemitic views—we can make a well-founded estimate of the proportion of the current Hungarian adult population that is certainly antisemitic.

We made the estimate by placing those respondents classed as extreme antisemites in both dimensions, as well as those classed as extreme antisemites in one dimension and as moderate antisemites in the other dimension in the group of “certain” extreme antisemites. Meanwhile, those respondents classed as moderate antisemites in both dimensions or as extreme antisemites in one dimension and as non-antisemites in the other dimension were placed in the group of “certain” moderate antisemites. Finally, all other respondents were placed in the group of non-antisemites.

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2. Of those respondents who answered all the questions (N = 789), having aggregated their scores relating to eight statements (5: Fully agrees—1: Fully disagrees), I placed those scoring 31-40 on the scale among the extreme antisemites, those scoring 21-30 among the moderate antisemites, and those scoring 8-20 among the non-antisemites.
or—where there was a lack of responses—in the unclassified group. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extreme antissemites</th>
<th>Moderate antissemites</th>
<th>Non-antissemites/ Unclassified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full sample</td>
<td>Those responding to all questions</td>
<td>Full sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, by 2011 the proportion of extreme antissemites had risen, while the percentage of moderate antissemites had fallen slightly. The figures also indicate a decrease in latent antiseptic views: the number of extreme antissemites increased significantly among those responding to all the statements measuring anti-Jewish sentiment.

**The Content of Antisemitic Views**

As in previous studies, changes in the content of antisemitic views were examined in three dimensions. When investigating political, discriminative, and religious antisemitism, I used the same six statements that were employed in the 2006 survey. The analysis produced the following results, shown in Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for antisemitic views</th>
<th>Affective antisemitism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of antisemitism</td>
<td>no/unclassifiable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no/unclassifiable</td>
<td>no/unclassifiable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>no/unclassifiable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extreme</td>
<td>certainly moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Political antisemitism: “Jewish intellectuals control the press and cultural sphere”; “There exists a secret Jewish network determining political and economic affairs”; Discriminative antisemitism: “It would be best if Jews left the country; “In certain areas of employment, the number of Jews should be limited”; Religious antisemitism: “The crucifixion of Jesus is the unforgivable sin of the Jews”; “The suffering of the Jewish people was God’s punishment.”
As we look at the findings of the two surveys, which were conducted five years apart, the first striking difference is that far fewer respondents avoided answering questions in 2011 than in 2006. This obviously means that the increase in the proportion of respondents in the antisemitic group may also be explained by a decrease in latency: as antisemitism in public discourse becomes more strident, those who previously concealed their anti-Jewish prejudices feel encouraged to openly express them. Among respondents, there were increases in the percentages of both political antisemites and discriminative antisemites, but this may be linked with the increase in the propensity to respond. Thus, the real increase in the percentage of antisemites in recent years is probably smaller than the figures suggest. On the other hand, significantly fewer people are silent about their antisemitic views than was previously the case.

In both 2002 and in 2006, we also examined the size of the antisemitic hard core in the surveyed population—that is to say, we sought to ascertain how many people agree with both the political and the discriminative antisemitic statements. While this core constituted around 7 percent in 2006, by 2011 it had grown to 9 percent. Indeed, in that year, 21 percent of respondents agreed with both the political and the discriminative statements.

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political antisemitism</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminative antisemitism</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious antisemitism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the results show, the percentage of non-antisemites remained essentially unchanged, but the structure of the group agreeing with antisemitic views altered. The proportion of respondents agreeing only with the discriminative statements did not change, but the propensity to discriminate increased among the political antisemites. Accordingly, the proportion of respondents agreeing only with the political statements decreased slightly. A greater propensity to discriminate among the political antisemites may indicate an increase in the mobilization potential of antisemitism over the past five years—i.e., that is to say, among those who already show support for anti-Jewish views, the propensity to accept antisemitic political demands is greater now than it was five years ago.

Already at the time of the 2002 survey we found that discriminative antisemitism was more common among groups of lower social status and that political antisemitism was more common among groups of higher social status (Kovács, 2010, pp. 114-121). The findings of the 2011 study were similar: respondents agreeing only with the discriminative antisemitic statements were more likely than average to be rural dwellers, male, unemployed, and to have no more than elementary schooling. Meanwhile, respondents agreeing only with the political antisemitic statements were significantly more likely than average to live in Budapest or another urban area and to have a university education and a higher-paying, white-collar job. The data of the current study also confirm the finding of previous research that political antisemitism by itself is not necessarily closely linked to a personal antipathy for Jews. As Table 5 shows, among respondents who are exclusively political antisemites, the emotional rejection of Jews is not much stronger than the average for the whole population. Moreover, these antisemites are less hostile to Jews than they are to all other ethnic groups in Hungary listed on the questionnaire, with the exception of the Germans. (It should be noted that even the hard core of antisemites—the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agrees with all the political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and discriminative statements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agrees with at least one of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both the political and the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discriminative statements (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrees only with the political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statements (one or two of them)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrees only with the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discriminative statements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(one or two of them) (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrees with none of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statements (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
political and discriminative antisemites—are also more hostile to Arab, Roma, and Chinese people than they are to Jews.)

TABLE 5
AFFECTIVE ANTISEMITISM IN THE ANTISEMITIC GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dislike Jews (1)</th>
<th>Like Jews (9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N (%) (averages)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and discriminative</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antisemites</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminative antisemites</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political antisemites</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICE

Previous research in Hungary has usually shown only a small correlation between antisemitic prejudice and the socio-demographic and economic indicators. Whereas studies in Western Europe and the United States have found that anti-Jewish sentiment is more common among poorly educated people of lower social classes than among high-status groups, in Hungary the situation is less clear. In the major 1995 study, these factors accounted for less than 2.5 percent of the variance in antisemitism, and their explanatory potential did not increase in subsequent years (Kovác, 2010, p. 53, and Chapter 3). Other attitudes, however, did explain in large part antisemitic prejudice: in 2002, xenophobia, nationalism, and conservatism accounted for 43 percent of the variance in antisemitism; moreover, age and social status showed an effect only through such attitudes: older people and those of lower social status proved to be more receptive to these attitudes than did others (Kovác, 2010, p. 106).

The current survey produced findings similar to those of previous studies. Antisemitic prejudice5 was barely influenced by the socio-demographic background variables: males and skilled blue-collar workers were more antisemitic than others, but the explanatory potential of these factors was

5. The antisemitism indicator was formed as a principal component based on respondents’ agreement with the statements in Table 1 (without the statement relating to Israel) and from the two items that serve to measure affective antisemitism (see note 1).
weak. When, however, we examine other attitudes to explain antisemitic prejudice, the situation changes. Xenophobia, religious conservatism, law-and-order xenophobic attitudes, and nationalism do greatly influence support for antisemitic views ($R^2 = 31\%$). In the course of previous studies, we saw that anomic—that is, distrust of ethical and social norms and of institutions and political leaders—contributes to the development of antisemitic prejudice (Kovács, 2010, pp. 56-60). The 2011 survey confirmed this observation: anomic attitudes directly and indirectly—by inducing nationalism, law-and-order xenophobia, and more general xenophobia—strongly influence the development of antisemitic prejudice.

While socio-demographic variables exerted little influence on such attitudes, certain trends do reveal the social background of antisemitism. Xenophobes—people who are generally hostile to all “outsiders”—are also hostile to Jews. In addition to xenophobia-driven antisemitism, two other types can be observed. The first of these has been identified in many studies; it has always been the traditional terrain of antisemitism. In this group, older and poorly educated village-dwellers are overrepresented, among them men who typically display anomic attitudes. This group is highly receptive to religious conservative attitudes (applies particularly to women in the group) and to law-and-order xenophobia (applies particularly to men). A rather different group appears to comprise those people whose antisemitism is induced by nationalism. In this group, we find young and strongly anomic people. It is impossible, however, to link anomic—which induces nationalist attitudes—with a clearly definable social group. A great variety of people may perceive a weakening of social cohesion and an unraveling of the social fabric. Since a fear of social atomization and losing ties to social integrations—and thus the presence of anomic attitudes—may be caused not by actual deprivation but instead by a loss of social status and

6. These variables were formed as principal components. The items used to create the principal components were as follows: Law-and-order xenophobia: immigration rules should be tightened; would support the death penalty; would limit the number of colored people in the country (agreement/rejection); Religious conservatism: would restrict abortions; has religious convictions; considers homosexuality to be immoral (agreement/rejection); Xenophobia: like/dislike of eight ethnic groups (score on scale); Anomie: in this country you have to be dishonest to get rich; if people had the will, they could determine the fate of the country (rejection); nowadays, the courts do not serve justice to the people; nowadays, the country’s leaders are not really concerned about people like you; today, everyone and anyone can be bought (agreement/rejection); Nationalism: a firmer stand should be taken to defend the interests of the Hungarian minorities abroad; the defense of Hungary’s national interests is more important than EU membership; in important matters, people with strong national feelings should have a decisive say (agreement/rejection).
a diminished ability to cope with the complexity of society (particularly at times of rapid change), these attitudes may not necessarily be linked with clearly definable social groups.

Table 6 gives a give a clear picture of the studied population.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
<th>Cluster 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law-and-order xenophobia</td>
<td>–1.11274</td>
<td>.39902</td>
<td>.50689</td>
<td>.48485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious conservatism</td>
<td>-.23066</td>
<td>-.27972</td>
<td>.69365</td>
<td>.07092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>–.67519</td>
<td>.54870</td>
<td>.87141</td>
<td>–.44614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomie</td>
<td>–.28525</td>
<td>.71233</td>
<td>.68054</td>
<td>–.81072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General xenophobia</td>
<td>–.64262</td>
<td>–.25403</td>
<td>1.02775</td>
<td>.35505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisemitism</td>
<td>–.49075</td>
<td>–.24161</td>
<td>1.98920</td>
<td>–.20310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 742</td>
<td>221 (30%)</td>
<td>221 (30%)</td>
<td>79 (10%)</td>
<td>221 (30%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see that 30 percent8 of the studied population (cluster 1) obtained significantly lower scores than the average for the whole population in all dimensions of attitude surveyed, and thus may be considered to be free of antisemitism. The socio-demographic profile of this group is the high-status 30-40 age group living in Budapest. Such people typically support the left-wing opposition parliamentary parties. The inverse of this group is cluster 3, representing 14 percent of the studied population, which typically has law-and-order, xenophobic, and conservative attitudes and is anomie, and thus may be considered to be certainly antisemitic. We see greater complexity in clusters 2 and 4. Village dwellers are overrepresented in both clusters, but whereas cluster 4 tends to be made up of older people with little education, in cluster 2 we typically find young people (18-29 age group) who are relatively better educated (skilled workers particularly). Though people in both clusters are less antisemitic than on average, they do exhibit some of the attitudes associated with antisemitism: law-and-order attitudes, nationalism, and anomie in cluster 2, and religious conservatism and xenophobia in cluster 4. This latter discrepancy between the two clusters is probably an effect of the different age composition.

7. For this calculation we used the SPSS Quick Cluster program.
8. We included in the analysis those respondents who answered all the questions constituting the factors. The structure we saw closely resembled what we receive if we exclude only those who refused to answer any of the questions.
Concerning the question of differences in social status between the clusters, we can see that the profile of clusters 3 and 4 is typically older and poorly educated individuals of low-middle status. The basic difference between the two clusters is that members of the strongly nationalistic, xenophobic, and antisemitic cluster 3 live mainly in provincial urban areas (i.e., not in Budapest), while members of the law-and-order, religious, and xenophobic cluster 4 are primarily village dwellers and women. A further striking difference is that members of cluster 3 are very interested in politics and support the far-right political party, Jobbik, while members of cluster 4—inasmuch as they have any interest in politics—typically support the governing center-right Fidesz party and are hostile to the far right. Members of cluster 2 have little interest in politics, do not intend to vote in elections, but—if they must express a preference—would tend to support Jobbik.

We can see, therefore, that the cluster structure reflects a settlement structure. Within this structure, differences of status influence in which cluster members of the sample are found. Budapest residents—especially those of high status—belong among the well-integrated non-antisemites with liberal attitudes, while people living in urban areas outside Budapest—especially those of lower status—are typically found among the extreme antisemites. Village dwellers—depending on their age and level of education—have attitudes that in the case of urban dwellers induce antisemitism, but in the rural milieu the effect of such attitudes is not as strong as in urban areas. When we examined what distinguishes antisemites from non-antisemites within the rural clusters (2 and 4), we found that it was primarily difference in status. Forty-nine percent of the members of cluster 2 and 48 percent of cluster 4 belong among the extreme or moderate antisemites. In cluster 2, we see significant differences between the groups of antisemites and non-antisemites in terms of regional distribution and the relationship with politics. The antisemites tend to live in the country’s eastern region or in central parts of the Great Plain, while non-antisemites are more likely to come from the northeast or from the southern part of Transdanubia. Turning to politics, we see that people with an interest in politics who are certain to vote in the next elections are overrepresented among the antisemites, while typically the opposite is true of the non-antisemites: they have no interest in politics and will not vote in the elections; thus, although they sympathize with Jobbik, they will not cast a vote for anyone. In cluster 4, we found even less difference between the antisemites and non-antisemites: it seems those with a propensity for antisemitism—particularly

9. The Jobbik party was founded in 2002. In 2009, the party received 427,773 votes (14.77%) and three seats in the European elections, and 855,436 votes (16.67%) and 17 seats (12.18%) in the 2010 parliamentary elections.
political antisemitism—are not the older village dwellers typical of the cluster, but people aged under 50 living in urban areas outside Budapest, who are less numerous in this cluster and who, in fact, typically feature in cluster 3.

Summarizing the results of the analysis, we can state that although strong antisemitic prejudice reflects a typical attitude structure and these attitudes correlate with certain status indicators, the correlations cannot be described as strong causal explanations of the phenomenon. Based on the surveyed attitudes, a distinction can be made between certain non-antisemitic and certain strongly antisemitic groups, which together comprise 40 percent of the population. For the remaining 60 percent, however, the explanatory potential of such attitudes is far weaker: it appears that the effect of attitudes inducing antisemitism differs among the various settlement types and regions. Moreover, the potency of the effect seems to be related to the relationship of respondents to politics: a similar attitude structure gives rise to stronger antisemitism among those respondents with a greater interest in politics and well-developed party preferences. Based on all this, it seems to be worth analyzing the hypothesis that attitudes accounting for antisemitic prejudice—xenophobia, law-and-order attitude, conservatism, anomie, and nationalism—induce antisemitism where political actors seek to mobilize groups with these attitudes and use antisemitic language and ideology to form a common denominator around such attitudes. This process resembles the one that gave rise to German political antisemitism in the 19th century—a process analyzed by Shulamit Volkov in several works. Volkov (Volkov, 1978, 1989) demonstrated that the rise of German political antisemitism in the final third of the 19th century could be accounted for by the fact that amid the economic crisis afflicting the country such grave problems as the “social question” and the vulnerability of social integration were increasingly explained in terms of the “unresolved nature” of the “Jewish question,” whereby the economic, political, social, and cultural “expansion” of emancipated Jewry was used to explain any modern phenomenon perceived as a threat by major social groups. In this way, antisemitism became a discursive code for the rejection of modernity, which political actors then shaped into an effective political ideology for mobilizing groups in society whose status was threatened for whatever reason by modernization. If our hypothesis is true, then a similar process occurred in Hungary after 2006, when antisemitic prejudice strengthened in tandem with the rise of a far-right and antisemitic political party. The question is: to what extent does the latter phenomenon explain the former?

When answering this question, we started from the observation that the same group of attitudes induces regionally different effects in terms of the strength of antisemitism—as we saw above in the example of attitude clus-
This means that, in addition to attitudes inducing prejudice, other factors also contribute to the development of antisemitism, and that these factors are present to a different degree in the various regions. We also arrive at the same conclusion based on another observation. The results of surveys conducted in different years show that the intensity of antisemitic prejudice changes over time even within the same region. It is unlikely, however, that this is the consequence of regional changes in the background attitudes, because changes in such attitudes as law and order, conservatism, xenophobia, and anomie are usually slow and gradual. Thus, other factors must be contributing to the changing intensity of antisemitic prejudice.

Observations showing that other factors significantly influence antisemitic prejudice in addition to the attitudes explaining prejudice are in accord with the findings of a survey conducted in 2008-2009 by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011). This study mapped out the propensity to intolerance, prejudice, and discrimination in eight European countries, including Hungary. When analyzing the results, the researchers found that among the eight countries, the surveyed cluster of attitudes—which they called “group-focused enmity”—was most typical in Poland and then in Hungary. The explanatory potential, however, of the attitude variables, ideological attitudes, and value variables they used for a causal explanation of the phenomenon (including anomie and religious conservatism, which we also have used) was weakest in Hungary—although in Hungary as well they found a significant correlation between them and group-focused enmity. This also indicates what our own data have demonstrated—namely, that the propensity to prejudice is clearly an effect of certain sociological or socio-psychological factors, but that the manifestation and mobilization of this inclination are due to other factors.

We began to explore this hypothesis by comparing the proportion of antisemites in different regions of the country and at various points in time. The comparison showed interesting changes. Whereas between 2003 and 2009 the proportion of antisemites was significantly higher than elsewhere in the southwestern and central regions of the country (i.e., in southern Transdanubia, Pest County, and Budapest), after 2009 the surveys revealed substantial changes: in 2011, the proportion of antisemites increased significantly in northern parts of the Great Plain and in the northeastern region, while non-antisemites were significantly more numerous in Budapest and in Pest County—and in the northwestern region—than they were elsewhere. This change shows strong parallels with changes over time in party preferences.

Between 1994 and 2006, the political party of the Hungarian far right was the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, led by the late István Csurka, the most influential antisemitic writer and politician of the first two post-com-
This openly antisemitic party, which at the 1998 elections succeeded in crossing the 5 percent threshold needed for representation in Parliament, was particularly successful in Budapest and the surrounding area, in Pest County, and in several other urban centers; in Budapest, for instance, it received almost 9 percent of the vote. In 2002, the party failed to enter Parliament, and so at the 2006 elections it formed an alliance with the new far-right party, Jobbik. A resounding defeat was the result: the alliance of the two parties won only 2.2 percent of the vote. Thereafter, Jobbik gradually won over voters and added them to the far right, thereby squeezing the Hungarian Justice and Life Party out of Hungarian politics. As Figures 4 and 5 show, in the initial period, support for Jobbik—which was still modest—was most visible in those regions where the Hungarian Justice and Life Party had recruited a substantial share of its supporters. Over a three-year period, however, the situation changed radically (see Figures 4 and 5): at the 2010 elections, when Jobbik achieved 17 percent of the vote, support for the party was greater than average in the northern Great Plain region and in northern Hungary (22%-24%), while it was below average in Budapest (13.8%) and in southern Transdanubia (13.5%). Evidently, this change occurred in parallel with contemporaneous regional changes in the spread of antisemitic prejudice.

It is unlikely that the intensity of antisemitic prejudices increased suddenly in these regions during this period, and that the new antisemitic voters then found their party in Jobbik; it is far more likely that Jobbik, whose rhetoric gives an important place to antisemitism, mobilized the latent prejudice among its potential voters and “taught” them to consider antisemitism to be an accessory of—or, indeed, an acceptable element in—their choice of party. This does not mean that Jobbik mobilized primarily antisemitic voters; this is what the Hungarian Justice and Life Party had sought to do—in vain. According to our survey findings, 65 percent of Jobbik voters harbor antisemitic prejudice. But instead, the research study—the aim of which was to determine why Jobbik’s Facebook fans support the party—found that no more than 4 percent of respondents mentioned antisemitism as a motive (Bartlett, Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield, & Gyori, et al., 2012, p. 50). It therefore seems that far-right voters are not motivated above all by antisemitism when choosing their party but by other factors. An increase in antisemitic prejudice, however, will be a consequence of that choice. Thus, antisemitism correlates with party choice, but it does not explain it. All of this means that the appearance of the antisemitic party (i.e., a purely political factor) is a major and independent explanatory cause of the increase in antisemitism after 2009 that affects it, irrespective of atti-
The regional proportion of Jobbik voters, 2007

The regional proportion of Jobbik voters, 2010
tudes capable of eliciting antisemitic prejudices. This leads us to the methodological conclusion that research on antisemitism should not be confined to the theoretical framework of prejudiced attitudes. An explanation of the dynamics of prejudice cannot be reached exclusively by means of socio-demographic indicators and attitudes pointing to a propensity to antisemitism. We need also to examine how anti-Jewish sentiment is transformed into political—in the sense of Schmidt and Arendt—that clearly marks out the boundaries between political opponents. It is therefore worth investigating how antisemitism fits into Jobbik’s general political rhetoric.

**Antisemitic Discourse**

Antisemitic discourse appeared in the Hungarian public space in the immediate aftermath of the political changes of 1989-90. For many people this came as a shock, because they believed that the old prejudices had passed into oblivion during the four decades of communism, when public antisemitic speech was prohibited. As many sources have since shown, this is not what happened at all (Kovács, 2010). Beneath the surface, many antisemitic clichés survived—in the private sphere and in personal communications and especially in non-public intellectual communications (Kovács, 2012). Another reason the survival of the “Jewish question” happened beneath the surface was Communist Party policy. Despite its total control over Jewish institutions and Jewish community life, the Hungarian Communist Party (similarly to other communist parties in East Central Europe) considered the conflicting historical memories about Jews and the Jewish presence in Hungarian society to be disturbing factors. Throughout the period, the party kept the problem permanently on the political agenda. In doing so, it (re)constructed the boundaries between Jews and non-Jews by discursive and political means and then eagerly manipulated the self-constructed “Jewish question” according to its own temporary political aims. This explains to a great extent the open reemergence of antisemitism after 1990. Nevertheless, during the decades of prohibition of antisemitic speech, many aspects of the antisemitic vocabulary, language, and ideology had indeed faded from public consciousness. Thus, when the antisemitic

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10. Linear regression analysis can also be used to show this. In the course of linear regression, we defined antisemitic prejudice as a dependent variable. Among the independent variables, we also placed—in addition to the attitudes presented above—the choice of Jobbik. The variables together accounted for 31 percent of the variance of the principal component of antisemitism. Choosing Jobbik directly affected the antisemitism variable (beta = .102, sig. = .000), while through its effect on the nationalism variable (beta = .142, sig. = .000), it was also indirectly linked with antisemitism.
discourse reappeared in the public space after 1990, a part of Hungarian society—primarily people born after 1956—had to “relearn” the antisemitic vocabulary and to find a way of systemizing their rather diffuse prejudices. The “relearning process” occurred in the years following the political changes of 1989-90. The emergent antisemitic discourse played a major role in this process (Kovács, 2010, Chapter 1).

The first step in the structural differentiation of antisemitic discourse was to challenge and question the language of the Jewish-Hungarian, liberal-universalist tradition in which Jewish and non-Jewish Hungarians appeared as constituting one single national community. The emerging new discourse branded the Jews as an alien—or newly alienated—outgroup. This was already described in terms of a historical process by the renowned Hungarian author Sándor Csoóri (Csoóri, 1990). According to him, the first two decades of the 20th century were the last period in which Hungarian Jews were still able to identify with the most vital issues of the Hungarian nation: “The Republic of the Councils (the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919), the Horthy era, and especially the period of bloody Nazi persecution, destroyed the possibility of a spiritual and emotional bond,” he wrote. Targeting the popularity of what was the liberal party at the time (the Alliance of Free Democrats), which was considered to be “Jewish” by some of its right-wing adversaries, he continued: “Today, attempts at a reverse assimilation are becoming increasingly apparent in our country: the liberal Hungarian Jews are now seeking to ‘assimilate,’ in style and thought, the Hungarians. With this aim in mind, they could establish a parliamentary spring-board—something they had never been able to do before.”

The next step in the development of the new antisemitic discourse was to define the relationship between the two groups as one of conflict—as a battle between nationals and anti-nationals. The two groups were constructed as permanent adversaries, independently from the characteristics of the political system. Indeed, representatives of the extreme right-wing discourse argued that there was a striking continuity between the communist and post-communist system. In their view, the leaders and vehicles of the communist system were the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, a vengeful minority held permanently in terror and thus looking for foreign masters. After the fall of communism, Jews were able to maintain their previous positions of power because the former communist Jews were linked by a secret thread to Jews who opposed the former political system and founded the strongly anti-communist liberal party of the transition. The explanation for this was that the experiences and memory of persecution had triggered the same reactions in both groups, despite their seemingly different political stances. For those who have been living in constant fear ever since the Holocaust, anything that happened in the interest of the nation was a threat.
Therefore, the former communists and the liberals of the 1990s became allies and continuously raised the charge of antisemitism in order to delegitimize the anti-communist national forces representing the real interests of the majority. Because a small minority like the Jews would never be able to exert decisive influence on the politics of the country, however, they looked for the support of powerful allies, making use of international Jewish financial and media power. Accordingly, after the fall of communism new foreign masters appeared who were no longer in Moscow, but in New York and in Tel Aviv (Csurka, 1992; Domonkos, 1990). Thus, through a renewal of the old stereotypes of Jewish world conspiracy, local antisemitism was placed in a global context, whereby the struggle of the Hungarian people for survival was presented as just one example of similar struggles against the “globalizing” conqueror of the world, which included the struggle of the Palestinians against Israel and the struggle of the entire Arab world—and even of Europe—against the United States. In addition, by suggesting continuity between the dominance of the pre-1990 communist anti-nationals and the post-communist liberal ones, the antisemitic rhetoric acquired a system-critical dimension. This dimension enabled those who had opposed the communist system but who had also been disappointed by post-communism to express their total rejection of the new system in such language.

On the extreme right this discourse became the general conceptual framework for explaining the difficulties of the post-communist period and for offering remedies. The late István Csurka, referenced above and the most influential antisemitic writer and politician of the first two post-communist decades, characterized the world as follows: “It’s a war now, a domestic Hungarian cold war, between the Hungarian people and the domineering foreigners” (Csurka, 1995a); “. . . They’ve forced upon us a financial system and a colonial financial management administration which [. . .] aims to establish a secure zone, a refugee camp and a hinterland for the perpetual war in the Middle East. For all this to happen, the primary need is that others rather than Hungarians should dispose of Hungarian assets, or Hungarians who are reliable as far as the Middle East is concerned and who profit from the transaction” (Csurka, 1995b); and “[The] . . . final aim is the extermination of Hungarians. Not by using weapons or poison gas, but by financial policy means, by removing livelihood opportunities, and by leading them toward self-destruction” (Csurka, 1998).

In the next fifteen years, the antisemitic discourse barely changed. The antisemitic texts of Krisztina Morvai, representative of the Hungarian far-right Jobbik Party in the European Parliament, which were written more than ten years after Csurka’s articles, could have been worded by Csurka himself. The discourses point in the same direction: their aim is to construct
a powerful “Other,” a political enemy able to embody the general Evil in the world.

Setting “our kind [of people]” against “your kind”—outsiders that malign the country and causing the decline of Hungary—Morvai wrote: “Decisions made by your kind [of people] are always dictated by whatever happens to ‘pay off’ at a particular point in time, whatever is profitable for you, that is, whatever results in money or power. Common values are replaced by antifascist slogans and anti-Hungarian sentiment, and other ways of bringing ‘our kind’ [of people] under control . . . Your kind [intend us to be] obedient subjects, servants and domestics, in an impoverished and maimed Hungary that has been turned into a third-world colony” (Morvai, 2008). The discourse leaves little doubt about the identity of the ‘Other’:

“If, after the fifty years of your communism, there had remained in us even a speck of the ancient Hungarian prowess, then after the so-called ‘change of regime’ your kind would not have unpacked your legendary suitcases, which were supposedly on standby. No. You would have left promptly with your suitcases! You would have voluntarily moved out of your stolen . . . villas, and . . . you would not have been able to put your grubby hands on the Hungarian people’s property, our factories, our industrial plants, our hospitals . . . We shall take back our homeland from those who have taken it hostage!” (Morvai, 2008).

Though Csurka’s and Morvai’s texts are almost identical in meaning, the political function of the antisemitic discourse seems to be very different in the two cases. Whereas Csurka and his party, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, tried to directly mobilize antisemitic groups by their rhetoric, Jobbik seems to exploit the political potential of the antisemitic rhetoric for other purposes. The strongest mobilizing factor of the party program and rhetoric is not antisemitism, but its bluntly racist anti-Roma demands: the facilitation of Roma segregation and the withdrawal of welfare from impoverished Roma groups (Karácsony & Róna, 2010). These and some additional programmatic demands of the party—the demand for a revision of the postwar boundaries, the rejection of Western integration—create the radical outlook of the organization, through which Jobbik can portray itself as being on one side of the political divide with all the other mainstream parties on the other. The “ownership” of these themes positions the party unambiguously in opposition to all mainstream “establishment” parties, be they on the left or right of politics, in government or as part of the parliamentary opposition. This self-positioning enabled the party to attract the votes many of those groups that had become disappointed in the post-communist decades and had turned against the new system in its totality. Many empirical investigations have proved that quite a wide array of different social groups tend to accept anti-establishment views in present-day Hun-
gary, and Jobbik draws support from these various social groups (Karácsony & Róna, 2010; Kovács, 2012).11 These people vote for the party for various reasons (Kovács, 2012), and consequently, Jobbik’s political success is due to its ability to find the element that binds the various groups together. The common denominator that unites the groups behind the party is a strong anti-establishment attitude, and Jobbik was able to locate easy-to-understand identity pegs for expressing this common denominator as the basic trait of the party’s identity. Jobbik’s antisemitism should be interpreted in this context.

It is striking that whereas each of the discourse elements underlying the anti-establishment identity have been included in the party’s program in the form of concrete political demands, antisemitism has remained at the level of discourse: antisemitic political demands were absent both from the party’s program and from the antisemitic discourses in its media.12 It seems that the present-day Hungarian far-right antisemitic discourse basically has a group-identity function, appealing to those who, for whatever reason, belong to the anti-establishment camp. The heterogeneity of this camp, however, requires a common language, one able to express the common group belonging. It is the antisemitic language that makes members of the group recognizable to each other and that allows them to express commonality and groupness. In the case of Jobbik, antisemitism seems to play the role of group language (Kovács & Szilágyi, 2012). In this regard, the function of antisemitism closely resembles what Volkov (1989) wrote about the antisemitism of the 19th century: at that time, antisemitism functioned as a code for anti-modernity, serving as a common denominator for hostile feelings related to modernization and its various consequences. Nowadays, Hungarian antisemitism on the extreme right seems to serve as code for the political identity of those who oppose the system of parliamentary democracy.

11. On the anti-establishment character of the post-communist extreme right, see Bustikova, 2009. Research on the rise of the “social demand” for right-wing extremism in Hungary showed that the proportion of those who do not have trust in the existing institutional system grew drastically between 2002 (12%) and 2009 (46%) (Krekó, P., Juhász, A., & Molnár, C., 2011).

12. A first step into the direction of antisemitic political demands was the parliamentary question of a Jobbik MP on November 26, 2012, in which he demanded the listing of government members and MPs of Jewish origin “representing security risk” for Hungary. See http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20121126-zsido-listat-kesziteneegy-jobbikos-kepviselo.html.
According to our research findings, during the first decade and a half after the fall of communism, 10%-15% of the Hungarian adult population held strong antisemitic prejudice. Anti-Jewish sentiment was reactive to political campaigns: antisemitism increased in election years and then fell back to its previous level. This trend altered after 2006, and the surveys indicate an increase in prejudice since 2009. The increase in the percentage of antisemites is related in large part to a substantial decrease in latency, but an increase in the number of people harboring such prejudice in society is probable. The results of our investigations show not only an increase in the absolute percentage of antisemites, but also an increase in the proportion of antisemites who embed their antisemitism in the political context and who would be inclined, under certain circumstances, to support antisemitic discrimination. This phenomenon is linked with the appearance on the political scene of Jobbik, a more or less openly antisemitic party.

When examining the causes of antisemitism, we reached the same conclusions as in earlier studies: certain attitudes—such as general xenophobia, anomie, law-and-order conservatism, and nationalism—correlate significantly with antisemitism and well explain its potency. Nevertheless, the most interesting finding of the 2011 study was that these attitudes do not elicit the same intensity of antisemitic feeling in each social milieu and in each region. The differences correlate with the strength of Jobbik’s support in the various regions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that support for a far-right party is not a consequence of antisemitism, but—conversely—should be regarded as a factor that mobilizes attitudes leading to antisemitism and that directs people toward antisemitism. Thus, antisemitism is—at least in large part—a consequence of an attraction to the far right rather than an explanation for it. In this article we attempted to substantiate this hypothesis—whose verification would require many more studies—by examining the far-right antisemitic discourse. In the course of this, we found that the primary function of the discourse is not to formulate anti-Jewish political demands but to develop and use a language that clearly distinguishes its users from all other actors in the political area, doing so in such a way that those who reject the antisemitic language are presented as supporters of the current political establishment, while those who use the antisemitic language as the radical opponents of it. Thus, the main function of the language is to establish a common identity for groups that, for various reasons and motives, have turned against the liberal parliamentary system that replaced communism and have given their support to the anti-establishment far right, which does not hesitate to capitalize on these pseudo-revolutionary resentments.
András Kovács is a professor at the Nationalism Studies Program and academic director of the Jewish Studies Program at Central European University, Budapest, and has held many academic appointments throughout the globe. He has research interests in Jewish identity and antisemitism in postwar Europe, memory and identity, socioeconomic attitudes and political choice, and the European extreme right. Widely published, his latest book is *The Stranger at Hand: Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary* (Brill, 2010).

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Hating Thy Imaginary Neighbor:  
An Analysis of Antisemitism in Slovakia

Lenka Bustikova* and Petra Guasti

This article offers an analysis of subnational variation in antisemitism. Utilizing survey data from 1990 to 2008 in Slovakia, we characterize three types of anti-Jewish attitudes. Our results point to: (1) the decline of antisemitism due to the consolidation of a Hungarian-Slovak divide; (2) the lowest antisemitism levels expressed by those in the capital city; and (3) the diffuse voting patterns of antisemitic respondents, e.g., the Slovak National Party, the Christian Democratic Movement, and Mečiar’s nationalist-populist Movement for Democratic Slovakia.1

Key Words: Antisemitism, Political Cleavages, Slovakia, Survey Data

There is a specter haunting the end of communism—the specter of two old European demons—nationalism and antisemitism. Despite the sparse presence of Jews today in Eastern Europe, antisemitic attitudes persist in some places and among some segments of society. A great deal has been written on antisemitism in several states, notably Germany, Poland, and Ukraine, yet there is surprisingly little systematic research on the subject in certain countries in the post-communist world. Slovakia is one of the more egregious oversights.2 This article remedies this lacuna in the literature on antisemitism by providing an original, empirical analysis of subnational variation (Snyder, 2001) in antisemitism within Slovakia. Our analysis is guided by a multilevel conceptual framework, developed in Kovács (2010), and exploits survey data covering the period from 1990 to 2008.3

Analytically, we focus on characterizing three types of variation in anti-Jewish attitudes: (a) macro-level temporal trends, (2) meso-level regional variation, and (3) micro-level variation among political subgroups. Our results point to three main findings. First, antisemitism has declined

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1. For more on party voter linkages in Czechoslovakia, see Rakušanová (2002).
2. For important work on antisemitism in Slovakia, see Bútorová and Bútora (1992), Focus (1999), Klamková (2009), Mesežníkov, Koliár, and Vaščka (2005), Mešťan (2011), and Vaščka (2006).
3. For a recent overview of antisemitism in Europe, see Bergmann (2008); for a survey of post-communist Europe, see Erős and Enyedi (1999), Kovács (1999, 2010), and Shafir (2004).
significantly in Slovakia since the early 1990s, which highlights the shifting salience of identity cleavages over time and the consolidation of the Hungarian-Slovak divide. Second, unlike Hungary, the lowest level of antisemitism is expressed among those living in the capital city. Third, the voting patterns of antisemitic respondents are diffuse, and include supporters of the Slovak National Party (SNS), the Christian Democratic Movement (HZDS), and Mečiar’s nationalistic-populist Movement for Democratic Slovakia. Despite the recent focus on the Jewish origins of one Slovak politician, our findings point to the relatively peripheral nature of the Jewish question in Slovakia’s politics—especially when compared to the more prominent Hungarian language issue and to the Roma question.

Our analysis proceeds in three stages. First, we provide a brief history of antisemitism and antisemitic discourse in Slovakia. Second, we characterize both temporal changes and regional variation in antisemitic attitudes within Slovakia since 1989, and provide a comparison with other “out-groups.” Third, we analyze the individual-level determinants of antisemitic attitudes and the role of antisemitism in political competition.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Antisemitism in Czechoslovakia has traditionally had two primary manifestations, the ethnic and the economic—the former typically targeted Jews as members of a distinct ethnic group, as opposed to a separate religious group, while the latter focused on Jews as economic exploiters of the new nations seeking self-determination (Pavlát, 1997). The Tiso regime—an interwar Slovak-Nazi puppet state under the leadership of Catholic

4. Salience is defined as the prominence and relative importance of a given political issue.
5. In this article, the term “out-groups” is used to refer to ethnic, religious, economic, and social minorities excluded from mainstream politics.
6. One example is the bill that Josef Herzog proposed in the Austrian Parliament in 1903. It called for removing the equal status of Jews on racial rather than religious grounds. The Christian Socialist Party was one of the main parties expressing antisemitic policies; see its party pamphlet Vaterland [Fatherland].
7. See Bútorová and Bútora (1992), Focus (1999), Klamková (2009), Měšťan (2011), and Vašečka (2006). These two forms of antisemitism—ethno-religious and economic—have historically been deeply intertwined, in part because the Jews were frequently segmented into certain occupational niches, and thus displaying the characteristics of the cultural division of labor, an integrated culture-class system of ethnically based economic stratification (Hechter, 1978).
8. The Tiso regime had embraced many anti-Jewish policies, which we discuss later. We are indebted to Hana Kubátová-Klamková for her comments on the nature of the Tiso regime.
priest-cum-politician Josef Tiso—adeptly blended the ethno-religious and economic dimensions of antisemitism.\textsuperscript{9}

Czechoslovakia was one of the few countries that openly supported the emerging Jewish state in 1947-8, yet it quickly shifted its pro-Israel stance in 1948. The most infamous indication of this shift was the “anti-Zionist” show trial of Rudolf Slánský in 1952.\textsuperscript{10} In 1975, Czechoslovakia adopted UN Resolution No. 3379, which determined that Zionism was a form of racism, yet Czechoslovakia, like many other communist countries, developed a specific form of antisemitism that persists today: antisemitism without Jews.\textsuperscript{11} After communism, antisemitism was resurrected in the specific form of “Judeo-bolshevism,” which implicated Jews in the establishment of communist regimes across Eastern Europe (Krejča, 1993; Shafir, 2004).\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{9} Although antisemitism in Czechoslovakia has both nationalistic and socio-economic roots, the major difference between the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and Slovakia is that antisemitism in Slovakia is driven by religious differences, contrary to the Czech lands, due to the high levels of secularization in Bohemia. An important exception to this rule was the so-called 1899 Hilsner affair.

\textsuperscript{10} In 1952, Rudolf Slánský and 13 other party officials (of which 11 were Jewish) were tried. Many victims of the Slánský trial were later rehabilitated during “de-Stalinization” (Margolius Kovály, 1986; Rotkirchen, 2012).

\textsuperscript{11} The exception was the dissident organization Charter 77, which prepared reports mapping the status and situation of Jewish communities and monuments in Czechoslovakia. Examples include: “The Open Letter to the Leadership of the Council of Jewish Communities in the Czech Lands,” written in February 1989 by Leo Pavlát and signed by twenty-four other dissidents; and “Critique on the Devastation of the Jewish Cultural Monuments” and “Tacit Disregard of the Role of Jews in Czechoslovak History” from April 1989 and signed by Tomáš Hradlík, Dana Němcová, and Saša Vondra (Frankl, 1998; Rotkirchen, 2012, p. 293).

\textsuperscript{12} The most striking example was the publication of Týdeník Politika [Politics Weekly], which launched open attacks against Jews, the “Judeo-Masonic conspiracy,” and the State of Israel. The publication, which was associated with Josef and Tomáš J. Dolejší between 1991-1993, focused on the detection of “Zionists, Jews, Freemasons, Rotarians, and Illuminati” among the political elite and other public figures and printed excerpts from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and articles on the “Auschwitz lie.” Since the beginning of its publication, however, Politics Weekly was criticized by individuals, organizations, and public authorities. In particular, the weekly Respekt [Respect] and daily Lidové noviny [People’s News] monitored and informed about law enforcement action (or a lack thereof) concerning Politics Weekly and its publishers. Due to public pressure, the publication of Politics Weekly was discontinued by the end of 1992. Another antisemitic journal is National Flag, the content of which is analogous to the content of Politics Weekly—but, unlike Politics Weekly, it cannot be purchased in the customary shops.
Our subsequent analysis suggests that antisemitism in Slovakia still exists today, but at significantly lower levels than in the early 1990s. Recent years have brought mixed signals: the first Jewish museum was established in Bratislava in the same year that a prominent Slovak politician was the subject of a smear campaign for his alleged Jewish origins. We investigate these signals of antisemitism at the national, the regional, and the individual level using several waves of public opinion data.

**Prejudice at the National Level**

Our first goal is to characterize how aggregate levels of antisemitic prejudice have evolved in Slovakia since the end of communism—i.e., is there more or less antisemitism over time? Is there significant variation across regions? Who in Slovakia expresses antisemitic prejudice? We consider these three questions in turn, using surveys conducted between 1990 and 2008.13

Our results suggest that the aggregate level of antisemitism, as expressed in the distaste for having Jews as neighbors (“social distance”), has declined sharply since the early 1990s. At the time, roughly one in three respondents (34%) did not want to have a Jew as a neighbor, compared to approximately roughly one in seven respondents (12.5%) almost two decades later.14 This downward trend is comparable to social distance attitudes toward other out-groups as well—for instance, social distance toward immigrants and Gypsies (Roma) has also declined sharply over time. In 1990, roughly 37% of respondents expressed high social distance from immigrants, whereas the number was about one half that level (17%) in 2008. More than three-quarters of respondents said that they would rather not have a Roma as a neighbor in 1990; less than one-half of respondents expressed social distance toward Roma in 2008. This finding is consistent with the decline of social distance toward all groups since 1989.

The most recent data indicate that the least social distance is expressed toward Jews (13%), compared to immigrants (17%) and Roma (47%). Noteworthy is that the relative rank order of these three groups in terms of social distance (Roma > immigrants > Jews) remains consistent over time. While these trends display less social distance over time toward Jews—as well as Roma and immigrants—the numbers also tend to hide considerable

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13. We use the World Values Survey (1990, N = 466), the European Values Survey (1999, N = 1331, and 2008, N = 1426), and the International Social Science Program Survey (2003, N = 1152).

14. The most recent surveys we were able to obtain did indicate a considerable increase from previous survey research (from 6% in 1999 to 12% in 2009).
variation across regions and social groups, to which we now turn our attention.

REGIONAL VARIATION

Figure 1 displays the intensity of antisemitism in each of Slovakia’s eight regions. The national-level story hides considerable variation between regions that were highly antisemitic in the early 1990s, such as Žilina (41%), and those that were significantly less antisemitic, such as Bratislava (12%). In the early 1990s, Banská Bystrica and Žilina were the most antisemitic regions (41%), followed by Nitra, Trenčín, and Trnava (34%), Prešov and Košice (32%), and Bratislava as the least (12%). This suggests that, unlike in Hungary (Kovács, 1999), antisemitism is largely a phenomenon of smaller cities and the countryside in Slovakia.

It is important not to infer too much from data collected in the early 1990s. By the end of the decade, all regions exhibited significantly lower levels of social distance toward Jews. The mean declined to 10 percent, and ranged between 4 and 17 percent in 1999. The level of antisemitism declined in all regions, but it declined most dramatically in Banská Bystrica (from 41% to 6%) and the least in Bratislava (from 12% to 11%). By 2008, there was a slight correction to the decline, and many regions experienced a marginal rise in the level of antisemitism, reflecting an overall inverted J-curve pattern over time. Today, the highest level of antisemitism is evident in the eastern Slovak regions.

Taking the average level across all three time periods, Bratislava still displays the lowest level of antisemitism, with a mean level of 12 percent, whereas Žilina exhibits the highest level, with roughly 22 percent. This is followed closely by Trnava (21%), Prešov (20.4%), Nitra (19%), Banská

15. To maximize both comparability and coverage over time, we rely on the European Values Survey, which was conducted every nine years: 1990, 1999, and 2008. Slovakia has eight administrative regions: Banskobystrický, Bratislavský, Košický, Nitrianský, Prešovský, Trenčianský, Trnavský, and Žilinský.

16. The average regional level was roughly 33 percent, with a range between 41 and 12 percent.

17. Overall, from 1999 to 2008, six regions increased or stayed the same, while only two decreased; for instance, Bratislava (14%) was slightly higher than it was in the early 1990s (12%). This may reflect, in part, the migration of individuals from the periphery, where antisemitism was generally greater than it was in the capital during the early 1990s. Unfortunately, our data are not strictly longitudinal and thus do not follow the same individuals over time, so we are unable to test this supposition empirically.

1 Bratislavský; 2 Trnavský; 3 Trenčianský; 4 Nitrianský; 5 Žilinský; 6 Banskobystrický; 7 Prešovský; 8 Košický.
Bystrica (18%), Košice (17.6%), and Trenčín (16%). These differences across regions and trends over time are depicted in Figure 1.

Aside from the capital region of Bratislava, the remaining regions exhibit more volatility in antisemitism over time. In general, the outskirts of the former Austro-Hungarian empire bordering Galicia tend to be more antisemitic. Although the roots of these differences are historical, and connected to the nation and state building in Slovakia and the WWII era, our analysis shows that they have persisted to the present day and to some degree influence political choices—in particular the support for the nationalistic parties.

**Micro-Level Variation**

After the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the initial level of social distance regarding Jews was very high in the Slovak part of the federation. According to a representative survey conducted in 1990, every third respondent mentioned that he or she would not want to have a Jew as a neighbor (Table 1). This high display of hostility toward Jews was not matched by widespread attacks on Jews, outbursts of antisemitism rhetoric among Slovak politicians, or a sudden surge of antisemitic discourse in the media (Měšťan, 2011). One interpretation of this disparity between attitudes and behavior is that the attitudes reflect the confusion and anxiety associated with the political and economic transition (Bútorová & Bútora, 1992). Ethnicity also came to the forefront, due in part to the collapse of the Czechoslovak federation and demands for greater Slovak autonomy. At the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentioned Jews</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>33.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not mention Jews</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>66.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not know</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data are from the World Value Survey 1990 and the European Values Surveys 1999 and 2008.

---

same time, Slovak nationalists called for the rehabilitation of the World War II fascist Tiso regime.

Consistent with this explanation, surveys from 1999 and 2008 show that the degree of hostility toward Jews stabilized at around 10 percent, dropping dramatically from the early 1990s, as shown in Table 1. Examining the trend over a twenty-year period suggests that social distance toward Jews expressed in the early 1990s was indeed peculiar to the immediate collapse of communism and the subsequent secession from the federation.\textsuperscript{19} Current levels of antisemitism in Slovakia are in the high single digits, which is one third the level of the early 1990s and stable over time.

Despite some potential to mobilize anti-Jewish sentiment, none of the major Slovak political parties over the past twenty years can be singled out as carrying a distinctly anti-Jewish message (Figures 2-4). In 1990, at least over 20 percent of respondents for all Slovak political parties declared that they do not want to have a Jew as a neighbor, including respondents from voters for “Public Against Violence” [\textit{Verejnost’ proti násiliu}], the major anti-communist, pro-democratic political movement that ousted the communists from power in Slovakia.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics{figure2}
\caption{Social Distance toward Jews in 1990 by Political Parties}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Political Party & Proportion of those who do not want to have Jews as their neighbors by party \\
\hline
Slovak National P. & 41.09\% \\
Christian-Democratic P. & 39.13 \\
Democratic P. & 33.33 \\
Public against Violence & 32.47 \\
Green P. & 25.71 \\
Communist P. & 24.49 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Proportion of those who do not want to have Jews as their neighbors by party}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{19} On the effect of secession increasing the role of ethnicity, see Siroky (2011).

\textsuperscript{20} Figures 2-4 include parties that have received over 5 percent of the popular vote in the elections.
Figure 2 shows that two major political parties stand out in 1990 as harboring the most voters with anti-Jewish sentiments: The Slovak National Party [Slovenská národná strana] and the Christian Democratic Party [Krest’ansko-demokratická strana]. Slovak nationalists, seeking Tiso’s rehabilitation, “describe the Tiso years as a ‘Slovak miracle’ and the fascist leader’s alliance with Hitler as the ‘lesser of evils’” (Hockenos, 1994, p. 12).

Almost 40 percent of voters for both of these parties mentioned not wanting to have a Jew as a neighbor, according to the 1990 World Value Survey. Both parties were instrumental in attempts to rehabilitate the Tiso legacy, highlighting its Catholic character and its distinction in being the first independent Slovak republic; it’s no surprise that supporters whitewashed its record as a Nazi satellite regime that enthusiastically enforced anti-Jewish policies, deported Jews to concentration camps, stripped them of their citizenship, and appropriated their property.

**Figure 3**

**SOCIAL DISTANCE TOWARD JEWS IN 1999 BY POLITICAL PARTIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Proportion of those who do not want to have Jews as their neighbors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>17.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement f. Democratic St.</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian-Democratic Party</td>
<td>10.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Understanding Party</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Democratic Coalition</td>
<td>4.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Coalition Party</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
<td>3.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Values Survey 1999.

Figure 3 shows that the degree of social distance toward Jews dropped dramatically across all parties by 1999. The number of voters who did not want to have a Jew as a neighbor did not exceed 20 percent for any of the major political parties. The Slovak National Party, together with the Christian Democratic Movement and Mečiar’s nationalistic-populist Movement
for Democratic Slovakia, harbored most of the respondents expressing anti-Jewish attitudes. The reformist successor of the Slovak Communist Party (Party of the Democratic Left) and the ethnic Hungarian Party (Party of the Hungarian Coalition) expressed the lowest levels of social distance toward Jews in 1999.

**Figure 4**

**Social Distance toward Jews in 2008 by Political Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Coalition P.</td>
<td>16.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMER - Social Democrats</td>
<td>9.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian-Dem Movement</td>
<td>9.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>7.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDKU - Democratic P.</td>
<td>5.88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Values Survey 2008.

Figure 4 shows that the degree of social distance toward Jews remained stabilized around 10 percent among most of the supporters of all political parties, according to the survey conducted by the European Values Survey in 2008. One clear conclusion that emerges from this party-level data is that the political base of anti-Jewish support is highly unstable (cf. Gyárfásová, 2004; Kitschelt, 2007; Tucker, 2005). While voters of the ethnic Hungarian Party were the least anti-Jewish in 1999, almost 20 percent of its supporters express anti-Jewish sentiment almost a decade later. A flip occurred among voters of the Slovak National Party: in 1999, its voters expressed the highest level of hostility toward the Jews, while in 2008 they expressed the relatively low level of social distance toward Jews.

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21. On Slovak populism and semi-authoritarianism, see Bunce and Wolchik (2010); Bustikova (2009); Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009); Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009); Kopecky and Mudde (2003); Krekó, Szabados, Molnár, Juhász, and Kuli, 2010; and Vachudova (2005).
Voters of the Slovak National Party are hostile toward accommodative policies that benefit Hungarians—the most politically organized minority in Slovakia—but not toward Hungarians per se (Bustikova, 2012). This lack of group hostility, as opposed to policy hostility, is consistent with the low antisemitism of Slovak National Party voters after 2000, when policy concessions toward Hungarians became a strong political factor. Conversely, the low antisemitism among the voters of the Hungarian Party in 1999 coincides with the time when Hungarian parties were seeking political concessions from the Slovak majority under the umbrella of ethnic accommodation, and succeeded. The primary ethnic political cleavage in Slovak politics is between Hungarians and Slovaks, and the secondary cleavage is between Roma and Slovaks. The Jewish-Slovak divide occupies a third and relatively unimportant ethnic dimension of political competition.

The classification of Jews also appears to be changing over time (Tables 2-4). Based on a factor analysis that includes three time points over two decades, the perception of Jews as either an ethnic or social minority has changed over time. In 1990, Jews were associated primarily with ethnic minorities, which included “people of a different race,” immigrants, and Muslims (Factor 2, Ethnic minorities, in Table 2). Social outcasts and social minorities—such as drug addicts, homosexuals, and people with AIDS—appear on a separate dimension. Jews were associated with other distinct minorities in the early 1990s, but not with social outcasts.

By the end of 1999, the distinctions between non-politicized ethnic minorities and social minorities blurred, as did the distinction between social minorities and outcasts, such as criminals and alcoholics, who fall into their own category (Table 3, Factors 1 & 3). The perception of outcasts—in particular, of ethnic and social minorities, such as homosexuals and people with AIDS—has changed over time. In the early 1990s, Jews were identified solely with ethnic minorities, and outcasts were perceived as identical with social minorities. In 1999 and 2008, various groups of outcasts form their own category, while social and ethnic minorities blend together. This de-escalates the formation of a unique ethnic identity—such a Jew, Gypsy, Muslim, or foreigner—since ethnic groups are, in respondents’ minds, pooled with social minorities (Tables 2-4). The identification of political extremists as a distinct category remains the same in 1990, 1999, and 2008 (Tables 2-4) (see also Krieglerová & Kadleciková, 2012).

In 1999, Jews are associated with both ethnic minorities, such as Muslims, and with social minorities, such as homosexuals (Table 3, Factor 1). The de-ethnicization of Jews, as the surveys suggest, coincides with the

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22. Slovak National Party voters are primarily concerned with political concessions afforded to Hungarians since Slovak independence (Bustikova, 2012).
Table 2

**Group Hostility: Factor Analysis and Factor Loadings, 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Factor 1 (Social minorities and outcasts)</th>
<th>Factor 2 (Ethnic minorities)</th>
<th>Factor 3 (Political minorities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>.786 (.786)</td>
<td>.029 (−.024)</td>
<td>.111 (.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>.703 (.716)</td>
<td>.261 (.210)</td>
<td>.138 (.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who have AIDS</td>
<td>.717 (.703)</td>
<td>.276 (.262)</td>
<td>.065 (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with a criminal record</td>
<td>.659 (.660)</td>
<td>.178 (.154)</td>
<td>.058 (.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy drinkers</td>
<td>.617 (.563)</td>
<td>−.044 (−.012)</td>
<td>.322 (.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>.093 (.148)</td>
<td>.773 (.751)</td>
<td>.053 (.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of a different race</td>
<td>.160 (.224)</td>
<td>.740 (.694)</td>
<td>.228 (.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/Foreign workers</td>
<td>.050 (.133)</td>
<td>.677 (.612)</td>
<td>.219 (.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>.362 (.422)</td>
<td>.625 (.561)</td>
<td>.274 (.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with large families</td>
<td>(−.322)</td>
<td>(−.583)</td>
<td>(−.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremists</td>
<td>.108 (.113)</td>
<td>.125 (.096)</td>
<td>.902 (.895)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing extremists</td>
<td>.097 (.103)</td>
<td>.164 (.138)</td>
<td>.907 (.891)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionally unstable people</td>
<td>(.137)</td>
<td>(.389)</td>
<td>(.480)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                             | 466                                      |
| Proportion of variance        | 0.240 (.215)                             | 0.201 (.184)                 | 0.178 (.166)                    |

Method: Factor analysis, varimax rotation. Question: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please identify any that you would not like to have as neighbors? The second column includes the full battery of questions, including factor scores for “People with large families” and “Emotionally unstable people.” Source: World Value Survey 1990.

The reduction of social hostility toward Jews once Slovakia achieved independence.

Table 4 shows data from 2008 that suggest respondents associate Jews firmly with both members of other ethnic groups, including Roma (Gypsies), and with social minorities, such as homosexuals and people with AIDS, as in 1999. The placement of Jews in the factor that combines both ethnic groups and social minority groups is unequivocal. Compared to 1990, Jews are strongly associated not only with ethnic minorities, but with social minorities as well. Yet, anti-Jewish sentiment in Slovakia is politically unsettled. Since the independence, none of the major political parties has sought to capitalize on anti-Jewish sentiment in Slovakia.

**Who Is a Real Slovak?**

The relationship between antisemitism and nationalism can be analyzed further by investigating how antisemites define a real Slovak (Figure...
### Table 3
**Group Hostility: Factor Analysis and Factor Loadings, 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Factor 1 Ethnic and social minorities</th>
<th>Factor 2 Political minorities</th>
<th>Factor 3 Outcasts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>.686</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>−.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of a different race</td>
<td>.670</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>−.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/Foreign workers</td>
<td>.602</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who have AIDS</td>
<td>.534</td>
<td>−.031</td>
<td>.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>.533</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>−.082</td>
<td>.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing extremists</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.917</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremists</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.920</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with a criminal record</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy drinkers</td>
<td>−.011</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                            | 1331                                  |                              |                   |

Method: Factor analysis, varimax rotation. Question: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please identify any that you would not like to have as neighbors? This analysis excludes two items: “People with large families” and “Emotionally unstable people,” due to low factor scores. Source: European Values Survey 1999.

### Table 4
**Group Hostility: Factor Analysis and Factor Loadings, 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Factor 1 Ethnic and social minorities</th>
<th>Factor 2 Political minorities</th>
<th>Factor 3 Outcasts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/Foreign workers</td>
<td>0.751</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of a different race</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>−0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who have AIDS</td>
<td>0.577</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>−0.065</td>
<td>0.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with a criminal record</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy drinkers</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>−0.541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing extremists</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing extremists</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                            | 1188                                  |                              |                   |

Method: Factor analysis, varimax rotation. Question: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please identify any that you would not like to have as neighbors? This analysis excludes two items: “People with large families” and “Emotionally unstable people,” due to low factor scores. Source: European Values Survey 2008.
5). For the majority of respondents (among those who would not mind having a Jew as a neighbor), being a true citizen means speaking the official (Slovak) language and complying with Slovak laws and institutions (Figure 5). The survey was administered in 2008, right before the reversal of minority language rights in 2009, and thus captures the politicization of language in party competition in Slovakia (Kelley, 2004; Liu & Ricks, 2012).

**Figure 5**
**IMPORTANCE: TO BE A TRUE SLOVAK (2008)**

The results of Figure 5 show that respondents who display social hostility toward Jews have a more primordial view of Slovak citizenship. While almost 80 percent of the respondents who do not express social distance toward Jews think that speaking the official language is very important to being a true citizen of Slovakia, only 54 percent of respondents who are hostile toward Jews share the same view of language as critical to being Slovak. Similarly, over 70 percent of those not expressing social distance toward Jews think that complying with laws and institutions is very important to being a true citizen of Slovakia, while only 47 percent of hostiles share the same view. Those expressing social distance toward Jews were also 10 percent more likely to think that having Slovak ancestors was important to being a true citizen. These differences, depicted in Figure 5, are both statistically significant and substantively noteworthy.

This rock-bottom construct of the nation among antisemites is also visible when we compare how much importance respondents attach to being
born in Slovakia. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents displaying antisemitic attitudes think that being born in Slovakia is important for being a true citizen of Slovakia, while being born in Slovakia is important only for the 62 percent of respondents without an antisemitic prejudice. Sixty-two percent of respondents who did not express hostility toward Jews thought that having Slovak ancestors was either very important or important for citizenship. In contrast, among respondents expressing hostility toward Jews, having Slovak ancestors was either important or very important to almost 80 percent of respondents.

Although this elemental view of Slovak citizenship is comparably important for respondents who express hostility toward Jews, it is trumped by cultural concerns. Even for respondents who are hostile to Jews, it is more important to be born and raised in Slovakia, and to comply with its laws and language requirements, than to possess Slovak blood (i.e., referring to definition of citizenship based on \textit{ius sanguinis}, defining citizenship not on place of birth—\textit{ius soli}—but on ancestry). Similar to the results from the factor analysis from 2008, anti-Jewish sentiment is only partially driven by primordial differences; more crucial are issues of compliance with Slovak laws, social norms, and habits.

Regardless of empathy or antipathy toward Jews, speaking the official language—Slovak—is a defining feature of true Slovak citizenship for all respondents (with the exception of many ethnic Hungarian respondents, of course). The importance of language rights in Slovakia’s ethnic politics cannot be underscored enough, and goes a long way toward explaining why antisemitic sentiment has not been tapped as an ethno-political issue. The battle over the status of the Hungarian language divides and preoccupies the Slovak political scene, and identifies the policy positions of all major parties. Although Hungarian was recognized as a minority language under communism, the Slovak language was the only language permitted in official documents. Road signs were written exclusively in Slovak (Votruba, 1998). In 1994, however, the parliament passed a new law, which listed 587 villages that could officially use both Slovak and non-Slovak names. The law stated that the name of the village could be displayed in the minority language if the population size of the minority group exceeds 20 percent.

The EU accession-oriented parties won the elections in 1998; the Hungarian Coalition Party was invited to join the first and second Dzurinda governments in 1998-2002 and in 2002-2006 (Vachudova, 2005). Language policies aimed at accommodating the Hungarian minority immediately fol-

The new law on minority languages, adopted in 1999, significantly expanded the rights of Hungarians. The Slovak National Party protested, arguing that the law instead opened the door to the Magyarization of southern Slovakia (Rafaj, 2011).

The 1999 language law mobilized the opposition around the issue of minority accommodation. Before the law was passed, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Slovak National Party, and a pro-Catholic cultural organization, Matica Slovenská [Slovak Heritage Fund], collected 447,000 signatures that called for a referendum on the language bill. The proposed question was: “Do you agree that the Slovak language should be used exclusively in official contacts, as it was before June 1, 1999?” Despite the fact that only 350,000 signatures were needed to initiate a referendum, President Schuster blocked the referendum due to the prohibition of plebiscites on human rights issues (Daftary & Gal, 2000, p. 32). It took ten years for the nationalist parties to overthrow the 1999 law. The Slovak National Party was invited to join populist, nationalistic Fico (SMER) government (2006-2010), and in 2009 helped to pass a new language law, which severely restricted the use of minority languages. The law declared that the Slovak language is an articulation of sovereignty, and that Slovak must be used in all official settings, including at the local government level.

Paradoxically, the success of the controversial 2009 minority language law opened the door for the politicization of anti-Jewish sentiments. The survival of the nationalistic Slovak National Party depends critically upon the politicization of the issue of (Hungarian) minority accommodation (Bustíkova, 2012). The Hungarian minority is momentarily politically

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24. According to the 2011 Slovak Census (Slovak Statistical Yearbook 2011), the Hungarian minority comprises approximately 8.5 percent of the Slovak population (the percentage of respondents identifying themselves as ethnic Hungarians) and 9.4 percent of respondents stated that Hungarian was their mother tongue. Furthermore, the Hungarian minority is not equally distributed on the Slovak territory, but rather concentrated in two southern regions on the border with Hungary (Nitra and Trnava). Regarding ethnic composition, these regions are the least ethnically Slovak, while the regions of Žilina and Trenčín are the most ethnically Slovak. In 2011, the Roma comprised 1.7 percent of the Slovak population; the regions with the most Roma population were Prešov, Košice, and Banská Bystrica. In comparison, in 1991 the proportion of the Hungarian population was 10.72 percent and 1.5 percent of the Roma population (Slovak Statistical Yearbook, 1996).


26. The most controversial clause of the law was the fine of up to 5,000 euros for those who violate the provisions of the law. The 2009 law was modified in 2011, when it lowered the ethnic size quota from 20 to 15 percent for localities in which minorities were allowed to use a minority language.
divided and fragmented. Until it recoups politically, nationalists may begin eyeing other ethnic groups (including Roma and Jews) to ensure their political relevance in the next elections.

The first major incident of antisemitism since early 1990s that directly targeted a prominent politician came in 2012 to the minister of internal affairs, Daniel Lipšic, a member of the Christian Democratic Movement Party. Prior to this event, the last prominent antisemitic attack on a public figure was against Fedor Gál, one of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution, who was associated with “Czechoslovakism,” considered to be a derogatory term very early in 1990. Since 1993, however, “none of the relevant political parties . . . practiced or included open antisemitism into its political program, with the exception of the Slovak National Party/True Slovak National Party in 2002” (Mesežníkov, 2012).

The attacks in early 1990s were aimed at Slovak Jews, for their allegedly pro-federalist stance toward Czechoslovakia. The attacks by SNS in 2002 were considerably more abstract, and focused on the policies of the state of Israel toward the Palestinians (Mesežníkov, 2012). In the early 1990s, anti-Jewish attacks were aimed at public intellectuals with a different vision of Slovak statehood—a less parochial vision of the nation-state, and a more cosmopolitan one, with greater diversity. The attack on Lipšic in 2012 is, however, unprecedented, and is the first major attack on an active high-ranking political representative since the establishment of an independent Slovak state in 1993.

Lipšic had been anonymously accused of having had inappropriate contact with an Israeli secret service agent. The compromising material, posted anonymously on the Internet, stirred the Slovak political scene, serving to discredit the efforts of Lipšic’s party to eradicate high-level corruption in Slovakia (Filip, 2012) since he has been in charge of handling serious corruption cases against prominent Slovak public officials (Economist, 2012). The Slovak National Party leader, Ján Slota, quickly seized the opportunity to conflate his relationship with Israel and his competence as minister of the interior (TASR, 2012). The discussion around Lipšic has unleashed a veritable avalanche of antisemitic and anti-Israeli comments, many of which are posted on an anonymous Web page that smears his career with unsubstantiated allegations of contacts with Mossad and in online comments under newspaper articles that refer to him in major Slovak press. The Lipšic case is interesting less for its use of antisemitic tropes

27. In 2009, the former leader of the Hungarian Coalition Party formed a new Hungarian Party (Most-HÍD).
28. The Web page containing the smear against Lipšic can be accessed at http://www.lipsic.net/.
in anonymous online commentaries, which tend to be standard and uncreative, than for its being the first politically motivated attack on a high-level politician in Slovakia since the early 1990s.

ANTISEMITIC DISCOURSE

Antisemitism has thus been present in Slovakia during its almost twenty years of independence. We have identified three antisemitic discourses in Slovakia: the historical, the political, and the international. The historical discourse is aimed at rehabilitating and glorifying the heritage and heroes of the Slovak Republic; the political discourse is aimed at portraying post-communist development as struggles between national forces and the “Jewish lobby”; and, finally, the international antisemitic discourse portrays critically the role and actions of Israel in Middle East politics (see Mesežníkov, 2012).29

The historical discourse blends religious and nationalistic forms of antisemitism.30 The key elements of this discourse are strong ethnic nationalism, a focus on positive perception of the anti-democratic, and the corporativist nature of the Slovak state under Tiso and its religious and ethnic antisemitism. The history of the Slovak Holocaust under Tiso’s leadership goes far beyond passive cooperation: Hitler praised Slovakia in 1942 for its exemplary cooperation in its “contribution to solving the Jewish question.”31

The memory of Slovak independence played a crucial role at the beginning of 1990s, when nationalistic and populist parties recalled nostalgically and sought to rehabilitate the legacy of the Tiso’s state.32 Public
intellectuals, such as selected historians from the Máťa Slovenská, were also active in the rehabilitation efforts. The main function of these efforts was political mobilization on ethnic and ideological grounds—based on nationalism and Catholicism—i.e., defining the “real” Slovaks. Moderate revisionists started a process of rehabilitation of historical public figures and the Slovak Catholic Church. The attempt to beatify the Roman Catholic bishop Ján Vojtaššák met with strong opposition from the domestic and international Jewish community, since Vojtaššák was actively involvement in transferring Jewish assets to the state during Tiso’s Slovak Republic (see Mesežníkove, et al., 2005).

The second Slovak antisemitic discourse is political and built on racist anti-Roma and anti-Hungarian attitudes. In general, such intolerant attitudes target Jews, Roma, Hungarians, immigrants, and foreigners as “the others,” but they also revive the discourse of “Jewish conspiracy.” Political discourse utilizes traditional negative stereotypes of Jews as “conspirators” in quest of a new world order (Vaščka, 2006). Key elements of this discourse are defamation and aggressive public shaming; proponents target public figures opposing their agenda as “Jews, Freemasons and Zionists.” While the first, historical, discourse seeks to rehabilitate and glorify the troublesome past, the second, political, discourse portrays the post-communist development in Slovakia as a struggle between “the pro-national Slovak forces and the representatives of the Jewish lobby” (Mesežníkove, et al., 2005).

The third antisemitic discourse in Slovakia—the international—is complex and often too nuanced to be primarily employed by the nationalistic extremists. Its roots can be discovered in the anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist rhetoric of the communist era. International discourse critically portrays the State of Israel in Middle Eastern politics and the world. It views Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians as barbaric and an act of aggression. The politically right-wing-leaning proponents of this discourse include representatives of the Slovak radical parties (SNS and PSNS), neo-Nazi groups, paramilitary groups based on the “Hlinka Guards,” and some representatives of the Catholic Church. The left-leaning participants in the discourse condemn the human rights record of Israel and challenge Israel’s right to the identity of the new state. The mainstream political views were framed by ethnic as well as religious discourse, and the main figures of the Slovakian state, including Tiso, expressed openly antisemitic views.

33. This form of antisemitism is often expressed in public demonstrations by such groups as Slovak Togetherness and in online discussions, including readers’ comments on the Web sites of mainstream media outlets. It has close ties to parts of the Slovak Peoples Party.
exist and defend its territorial integrity. The left is also slightly biased against the United States, since it views it as being controlled by the “Zionist lobby.”

Among the antisemitic discourses, the historical antisemitic discourse has been, so far, dominant in Slovak politics, although in no way did it play a crucial or overall role in that arena, nor did it structure the political competition. The central issue that divides antisemitic and extremist elements in Slovakia from their liberal and democratic counterparts is the attempt to whitewash the record of the fascist state and to rehabilitate its key figures. The divisions were observable in 1999, during the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Slovak state (established in 1939). The celebrations of the anniversary took place mainly in the Žilina region, where the leader of the SNS, Ján Slota, served as mayor. In 2000, Slota was planning to place a commemorative plaque honoring Tiso, but he had to abandon the plan due to the international pressure.

Media outlets were active in the late 1990s in their efforts to rehabilitate the WWII Slovak past as well. The periodicals Kultura [Culture] and Zmena [The Change] vigorously manipulated historical memories in order to justify the role played by Tiso, the Hlinka Guards, and other key figures of the Slovak state during the war. These periodicals resorted to the old antisemitic rhetoric of such canards as the blood libel in describing the contemporary reform efforts. The official Slovak authorities were largely lenient and ineffective in curbing antisemitic activities.

The Slovak public knows little about the history of the Jewish population in Slovakia and the active role of the Slovak state in the Holocaust. The lack of a large public debate about the character of the Tiso state creates fertile ground for speculations and interpretations of the past. Some public debate about the Tiso regime might be encouraged in the near future due to the recent detention of the 97-year-old Hungarian citizen László Csatáry, a war criminal. Csatáry, condemned to death in Czechoslovakia in 1948, was accused of organizing the deportation of Jews from Košice in 1944 and charged with “unlawful torture of human beings.” The Slovak Jewish community called on the government to request Csatáry’s extradition and a trial in Slovakia. In August 2012, Tomáš Borec, the Slovak minister of justice, declared that his ministry would request that Csatáry stand a trial in Slovakia. The municipal court of Budapest will eventually determine whether Csatáry will be extradited. Despite the fact that Tiso, as a historical figure, is highly unpopular in Slovakia, the extent of the anti-Jewish policies embraced by the Tiso regime are downplayed in the public discourse.

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34. Tiso was mentioned as one of the top three most unfavorable historical figures in a 2011 survey. Slovaks are most ashamed of the former PM Vladimír
due to its historical importance as a first free (semi)-independent Slovak state. A high-profile trial can serve to educate the public about the anti-Jewish character of the Tiso regime.

**CONCLUSION**

The aim of this article is to consider a multilevel theoretical framework (Kovács, 2010) that focuses our attention on three levels of analysis: a) individual, b) public discourse, and c) political parties. We characterize antisemitism over the last twenty years in Slovakia, provide an empirical analysis at each of these levels, and discuss the results in terms of their implications for understanding and explaining antisemitism. We show that antisemitic perceptions evolve over time and that antisemitism in Slovakia does not have a stable party base. We have five main results.

First, examining aggregate trends over time and across regions, we find that antisemitism has declined considerably since the early 1990s, yet its current level (around 10%) is not trivial, especially considering how few Jews actually live in Slovakia today.

Second, we find that there is a significant regional variation, with the capital city of Bratislava displaying the lowest levels of antisemitism, compared to other regions (in order of decreasing levels of antisemitism over the 20-year period)—Žilina, Trnava, Prešov, Nitra, Banská Bystrica, Košice, and Trenčín.

Third, although most voters expressing social distance toward Jews are found among voters of the Slovak National Party, the Christian Democratic Movement, and Mečiar’s nationalistic-populist Movement for Democratic Slovakia, the political base of anti-Jewish support is highly unstable. We suggest that this is partly because the primary political cleavage in Slovak politics is between Hungarians and Slovaks, and the secondary cleavage is between Roma and Slovaks. The Jewish-Slovak divide occupies a third and relatively unimportant dimension of political competition.

Fourth, this instability is also suggested by the somewhat stochastic characterization of Jews as similar to other ethnic minorities and, in other periods, to other social minorities as well.

Fifth, when we investigate the relationship between conceptions of nationalism and antisemitic prejudice, respondents who display social hostility toward Jews tend to have a view of Slovak citizenship that attributes greater weight to factors such as Slovak ancestry and being born in Slovakia. Yet, compliance with Slovak social norms and laws is also

Mečiar, who was mentioned by 19 percent of respondents, followed by Jozef Tiso (16%), and the leader of the Slovak National Party, Ján Slota (14%) (IVO, 2011).
deemed to be extremely important to being a true Slovak citizen. Regardless of antisemitic prejudice, however, we found that speaking the Slovak language is paramount to being a true citizen of Slovakia. This result, we suggest, further highlights that the key political cleavage in Slovakia over the past twenty years is not antisemitism or Jews, but rather the Hungarian (minority) language question.

Recent events in Slovakia, especially the high-level smear campaign against Daniel Lipšic for his alleged ties to Mossad, relate both to the change in public opinion polls and to changes in political rhetoric. Primary antisemitism has declined significantly since the breakdown of Czechoslovakia. Secondary antisemitism, however, such as the anti-Israeli bias and underplaying the severity of the anti-Jewish policies of the interwar Tiso regime, is more likely to become significant in political discourse in the future. Compared to ten years ago, we have observed a slight increase in antisemitic prejudice among the public, as reflected by the public opinion surveys. In the public-political domain, however, antisemitism has increased considerably due to the Lipšic affair. Combined with the current fragmentation of Hungarian parties, antisemitism may not be dead in Slovakia, but may now be experiencing a (it is hoped) fleeting revival.

*Dr. Lenka Bustikova teaches at the School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, lenka.bustikova@asu.edu. Dr. Petra Guasti teaches at the Institut für Politikwissenschaft at the Universität-Mainz, guasti@uni-mainz.de. The authors would like to thank Martin Barto, Olga Gyárfásová, András Kovács, Grigorij Mesežnikov, Hana Kubátová-Klamková, Pavol Mčešťan, Eva Salnerová, David Siroky, Andrew Srulevitch, and Miroslav Tížik. We are also indebted to the Universität-Mainz and to Arizona State University for institutional support.

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Back to the Roots: 
Are Antisemites Still Authoritarians?

Péter Krekó*

This study found a significant, yet not very strong, impact of authoritarianism on discriminatory antisemitism in a joint sample of four Central Eastern European countries (N = 6353). Submissive devotion to non-democratic political leadership is found to be the strongest predictor of antisemitism. According to our data, contemporary antisemitism, embedded in an attitude set that expresses rejection of the status quo with its social hierarchy and norms, therefore does not reflect uncritical acceptance of the power structures as the original theory of the authoritarian personality suggests.

Key Words: Authoritarianism, Conformity, Discriminatory Antisemitism

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the publication of one of the most famous social science volumes in the 20th century, The Authoritarian Personality (TAP) (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), it appears that research on antisemitism and authoritarianism has run on totally separate tracks. In the beginning, however, the successors of the Frankfurt School and their American colleagues who participated in the Authoritarianism research project were strongly interested in the research into antisemitism for historical, academic, and personal reasons.

The different members of the research group had started to investigate antisemitism decades before the publication of TAP.

Brown (2004, p. 46) offers a concise summary of the motives of one of the prominent members of the working group:

The work was subsidized by the Department of Scientific Research of the American Jewish Committee. One of the authors of the book, a social psychologist with very great talent, was Else Frenkel-Brunswik. Mrs. Brunswik and her husband, the eminent psychologist Egon Brunswik, had been students and teachers at the University of Vienna during the period in which Hitler rose to power. They were Jews and well acquainted with antisemitism.
But the research on authoritarianism, originally a research program supported by American Jewish organizations that was intended to unveil the psychological background of antisemitism in the 1940s in the United States, was finally concluded in a vast amount of researches on the general attitudes to power and social norms and on dominance and submission in general, eventually losing its original interest in antisemitism.

Of course, the original research project and idea behind TAP was highly characteristic of the age in which it was developed. The authors were researching the possibility that fascism as a political system may be implemented in other countries as well, and if there is any social potential for fascism behind the surface. The Zeitgeist and the preconceptions of the researchers may as well have influenced their data interpretation, just as the prototypical fascist or Nazi shares some antisemitic views; it may have pushed the authors to focus on antisemitism that fits into the so-called “authoritarian syndrome” and ignore other characteristics that did not.

Several researches on antisemitism—the ones in which antisemitism is the dependent variable to be explained—tend to use authoritarianism as an underlying factor to explain antisemitism (see, for example, Enyedi, 1999; Enyedi, Erös, Fábián, Fleck, & Albert, 1997; Enyedi & Todosijević, 2002; Frindte, Wettig, & Wammetsberger, 2005; Raden, 1999). On the other hand, most researches focusing on authoritarianism—i.e., when it is the dependent variable to be explained—overlook the phenomenon of antisemitism entirely. For example, in the special issue on authoritarianism (2005) in the Journal of Political Psychology, the official journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, the word “antisemitism” does not occur even once. Generally speaking, important new approaches and reconceptualizations of authoritarianism show absolutely no interest in antisemitism (see, for example, Altemeyer, 2004; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010; Kruglanski, 2004; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 2004; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004).

By tracking the development of authoritarianism researches, it is easy to understand why antisemitism has become peripheral within them. Adorno and his colleagues first tended to use the E (ethnocentrism) scale, a measurement that focuses on enmities toward any outgroups in general, instead of the A (antisemitism) scale, which focuses on the prejudices toward Jews in particular. With this move, the group moved toward Leo Loewenthal’s famous saying that antisemitism has nothing to do with Jews as such (Sanford, 1968). As the original subject of research, antisemitism was reduced to one simple dimension of prejudices toward a specific outgroup; it eventually gave way to research on different kinds of prejudices, gradually disappearing from the focus of researches.
Adorno and his colleagues finally excluded all antisemitism-related items from their final Fascism scales (Adorno et al., 1950; see, for example, Forms 40 and 45). Neither of the revised Authoritarianism scales that were produced in the following decades contained any items regarding Jews.

Three main factors can be identified behind this shift. First is a methodological one: the argument was that the authors tried to measure antisemitism without asking any questions about Jews. The researchers decided not to use Antisemitism scales in classrooms with considerable Jewish minorities in order to avoid offending the students; furthermore, one of the local branches of the Anti-Defamation League was protesting against using these scales because, the ADL argued, they could spread antisemitism. The second objection was the theoretical argument that they attempted to find the most important background variables behind the potential fascist personality without focusing merely on antisemitism. Third, the empirical argument was that their results seemed to prove the idea that antisemitism is part of a set of prejudices toward outgroup members in general: antisemites were typically found to be anti-Japanese, anti-Black, anti-Catholic, and anti-homosexual at the same time.

The original research route of authoritarianism began with antisemitism and moved toward a more abstract, more general theory on the personality's relation to power and its various manifestations (social hierarchy, norms, people in power, and people without power). Therefore, after the publication of TAP, antisemitism in social psychology researches became merely a symptom of a broader (attitudinal or personality) "disorder" i.e., the Authoritarian Syndrome. There is thus no need to measure antisemitism; it is obviously part of this syndrome.

But is it still self-evident that authoritarianism is strongly associated with antisemitism? Or, to turn the question around: is it still obvious that the most important cause behind antisemitism is still the Authoritarian Syndrome? There are several counterarguments to be raised:

- According to the revisions of the original researches on authoritarianism, authoritarianism is not a "Personality Syndrome," as Adorno and his colleagues asserted. It is, instead, an attitude cluster that is picked up by learning from the broader social environment rather than something that is "imprinted" in the personality in early childhood (see, for example, Altemeyer, 1981, 2006). In line with this statement, according to Jost and Sidanius (2004, p. 41), "It seems plausible that correlations among authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, education, and socioeconomic status could arise from cultural associations rather than personality dynamics per se [ . . . ]. And even if one were to accept the validity of the authoritarian syndrome, the original researchers were
never able to make a convincing case that it was caused by authorita-
rarian childrearing practices.”

• In line with this notion, even the items and the meaning of the items of authoritarianism seem to change to a considerable degree over time; it is not as consistent and stable as it was hypothesized to be. Altemeyer (1981) reported a significant decline in the consistency of authoritarian items and inter-item correlations. This loosening of internal consistency may have an impact on the relation between authoritarianism and antisemitism as well. Raden (1999, p. 323), for example, who conducted research in 1990 among non-Jewish whites, concluded: “The results suggest a diminished role for antisemitism in authoritarian attitude syndromes.”

• The political importance, content, and position of antisemitism on the left-right scale has changed dramatically in the last few decades. As a reaction to growing fears and cultural conflicts over Muslim immigration, some new populist, authoritarian, radical-right movements with a strongly, harshly philosemitic or Zionist political ideological standpoint—such as the Party of Freedom in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats, or the EDL in Great Britain—gained a foothold in Europe. Even a number of political forces that have once been strongly antisemitic, such as the Front National in France, have shifted toward a more pro-Israeli, philosemitic position. Political forces in the West that choose to remain on the antisemitic track (such as the BNP in Great Britain) seem to have become out of fashion and marginalized. At the same time, however, antisemitism and anti-Zionism have strengthened their political positions on the New Left and among anti-globalizational leftist movements. These political tendencies could have partly overwritten the relation of antisemitism to authoritarian right-wing tendencies—at least in Western European countries. In these samples, we can assume that authoritarianism may be associated with philosemitic and pro-Israeli attitudes.

• On the other hand, antisemitism is not necessarily a dimension of prejudice that is equivalent in importance attitudinally to any other types of prejudice. As Kovács (2011) noted in his book on post-communist Hungary, antisemitism nowadays serves as a code of identity in political conflicts, where it plays a crucial role in authoritarianism: this is a “revolution” against the democratic status quo, and also a strategy for group identification and a response to identity threats in times of crises and frustrations (on the latter point, also see Duckitt, 1989).

Because of the fact that researches on authoritarianism became so dis-
tant from studies on antisemitism, it would be relevant to examine the original assumptions of TAP regarding the close connection between authoritarian tendencies and antisemitism—namely, that authoritarian atti-
tudes are the important underlying factors and predictors behind antisemitism.
In our “back to the roots” approach, we hope to find the responses to the following questions:

1. Are authoritarian attitudes (as they are described in the original theory posited in TAP) really strong predictors of antisemitism?
2. Which subdimensions of authoritarianism are the best predictors of antisemitism?
3. Are there any particular subdimensions of authoritarianism that can be identified as exclusive predictors of antisemitism? We attempt to respond to this latter question by comparing predictors of antisemitism to predictors of anti-Romaism and generalized racism.

**Method**

**Sample and Database**

For our investigations, we have used the European Values Study 2008-2009 survey database, which contains representative samples from several European countries. Our focus was on the so-called Visegrad countries—four post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic [Romania], Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). There were three reasons for running the calculations on a sample of these four countries (in all four countries, similar sample sizes were applied):

1. We can form a broader picture of the background factors behind antisemitism than what we could derive from a simple national sample;
2. We have a bigger sample of antisemites this way than if we only analyzed the results of one country, making our predictions more accurate;
3. These countries share a lot in common regarding their history, political landscape, values, and cultural-religious background—i.e., Catholicism is the dominant religion in all four countries. All this makes it a relevant group to be examined.

**Measurements**

*Measurement of antisemitism.* In the EVS database, there is only one item on antisemitism: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please tell me any that you would not, generally speaking, like to have as neighbors?” The respondents could choose, using cards, from many groups, including Jews, and select the ones that they wouldn’t like to have as neighbors. This is a rough measurement of antisemitism that can capture only the most extreme, most openly antisemite respondents, whose ratio is pretty
low in the overall population (see Table 2). This item, derived from the traditional Bogardus social distance scale, is mostly able to measure the discriminative component of antisemitic prejudice in the three-dimensional typology of antisemitism: political, religious, and discriminative (see, for example, Kovács, 2011).

Measurement of authoritarianism. In choosing the items related to authoritarianism, we took into consideration the methodology of de Regt, Smits, and Mortelman (2011, p. 398), who have used the following items listed below to measure authoritarian attitudes:

- Whether homosexuality, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and having casual sex are acceptable;
- Whether people prefer a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliaments and elections;
- Whether obedience is an important quality children should learn at home;
- Whether one should always love and respect one’s parents regardless of their qualities and faults;
- Whether people believe that greater respect for authority in the future is “a good thing.”

Even so, we did not apply their methodology unaltered. The following important modifications were made:

- We did not include items on abortion and euthanasia, as rejecting these can be an element of the traditional conservative Christian approach, and doesn’t necessarily imply authoritarianism.
- We found a few more items relevant for our topics that we included in our calculations: “Democracies are indecisive and involve too much squabbling”; “Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order”; and “Democracies make the economy worse.” We put these attitude statements of the EVS in our scales because they reflect the antidemocratic, efficiency- and leader-oriented aspects of authoritarianism. In addition, we included the “Death penalty is justified” item because we think it reflects the punitive aspect of authoritarian aggression well. We also included items on religiousness, for the reason that it is an inherent part of the originally hypothesized “attitude syndrome” (see the items in Table 1).

For the selection of items, we have applied the following two principles:

- Face validity: based on our “back to the roots” approach, we chose and put together items that resemble the original items of the F scale and can be readily categorized under any of the original components of authoritarianism in TAP (see Table 1)—even if we decided to
### Table 1
**The Items of the Authoritarian Subscales**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Original Dimensions in the F Scale</th>
<th>Items Belonging to This Scale (EVS 2008-2009)</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conventionalism:</strong> Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.</td>
<td>a025—Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a042—Teach children at home: obedience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e018—Greater respect for authority is important in the future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian Submission:</strong></td>
<td>e114—Political system: strong leader</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.</td>
<td>e120—Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Power and Toughness”:</strong></td>
<td>e121—Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order and                 e122—In democracies, the economic system runs basically</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis on the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness. We reconceptualized this factor as “authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian Aggression:</strong></td>
<td>f144_02—Death penalty is justified</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish, people who violate conventional values.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Superstition and Stereotypy:</strong></td>
<td>f050—Do you believe in: God</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The belief in mystical determinants of an individual’s fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories. We changed the name to “Religious fundamentalism.”</td>
<td>f051—Do you believe in: life after death</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f053—Do you believe in: hell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f054—Do you believe in: heaven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f055—Do you believe in: sin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destructiveness and Cynicism:</strong></td>
<td>a165—People can be trusted you can’t be too careful in whom you trust</td>
<td>0.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized hostility; vilification of the human.</td>
<td>a168_01—Most of the time, people try to be helpful/people look out for themselves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projectivity:</strong> The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the outward projection of unconscious emotional impulses. We changed the name of this construct to “Anomie.”</td>
<td>a168a—Most people try to take advantage of you! Most people try to be fair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex:</strong> Exaggerated concern with sexual “goings-on.”</td>
<td>f118—Do you justify: homosexuality</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f121—Do you justify: divorce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f132—Do you justify: having casual sex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVERALL SCALE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
change the name of some components in order for them to fit the questions better.

- Availability: we chose the questions from the EVS database that apply to all four countries.

We have created six scales out of the selected 19 items, with acceptable internal consistency measures and taking into consideration the low numbers of items on the subscales. Then we transformed all of these scales in a 0-1 interval to make them comparable with each other (see the two sections of Table 3 for the mean values in the different countries).

### Table 2
**Sample Sizes and Ratio of Antisemitic Respondents in the Given Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ratio of antisemites (rejecting Jews as neighbors)</th>
<th>Ratio of anti-Roma respondents (rejecting Roma as neighbors)</th>
<th>Ratio of “racists” (rejecting people from other races as neighbors)</th>
<th>Overall sample size (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>1513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>1510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>1509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>6353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Results**

In Table 3, we can see that according to the 2008 data, the ratio of antisemites is the highest in Poland (17.9%) and lowest in Hungary (6.4%), while the anti-Roma discriminative attitude is highest in the Czech Republic (56.9%) and lowest in Poland (33.4%).

1. Cronbach’s alpha measurements are between 0.6 and 0.9 except the first subscale, but we decided to use it regardless of the low reliability due to the perfect fit of these questions to the construct conventionalism.

2. The fact that the level of antisemitism is the lowest in Hungary compared to other countries in the region deserves more attention, as studies from the past few years indicate that general xenophobia is higher in Hungary than in any other countries of the CEE region (see, for example, a calculation based on the European Social Survey database in Krekó, Juhász, & Molnár, 2011). This specific finding, however, is completely consonant with the findings of the comparative studies in
Table 3
The Values of Authoritarian Subscales in Different Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-establishment attitudes</td>
<td>.9000</td>
<td>.8000</td>
<td>.7000</td>
<td>.6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventionalism</td>
<td>.5000</td>
<td>.4000</td>
<td>.3000</td>
<td>.2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian aggression</td>
<td>.1000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fundamentalism</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomie</td>
<td>.8000</td>
<td>.7000</td>
<td>.6000</td>
<td>.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.4000</td>
<td>.3000</td>
<td>.2000</td>
<td>.1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall authoritarianism score</td>
<td>.6000</td>
<td>.5000</td>
<td>.4000</td>
<td>.3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't like as neighbours: Jews (%)</td>
<td>.3000</td>
<td>.2000</td>
<td>.1000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't like as neighbours: Roma (%)</td>
<td>.2000</td>
<td>.1000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Slovakia and lowest in the Czech Republic. Anti-establishment attitudes are almost equally high in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, with lower scores in Slovakia. Religious fundamentalism is, not surprisingly, highest in Poland, and lowest in the Czech Republic. Anomie scores are considerably high in Slovakia and Hungary and lowest in Poland. Sexual concerns are also pretty high in Poland, while they show low levels in the Czech Republic. Authoritarian aggression is highest in Hungary and lowest in Poland. In general, the relation between antisemitism and authoritarianism is not self-evident, even at first glance. In Poland, where the overall authoritarianism (the mean of the six subscales) score is highest among the four countries, the ratio of antisemites is by far the highest, yet we can find the lowest ratio of antisemites in the country where the authoritarianism score is the second highest, i.e., in Hungary.

**Predictors of Antisemitism**

Table 4 displays our results in evaluating factors that are significant in predicting antisemitism. Because the dependent variable we want to predict is dichotomous, we used logistic regression calculations to decide these predicting factors and the order of their predicting power.

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the nineties—namely, that the results of a research initiated by the American Jewish Committee in 1991 and a study conducted by researchers in the sociology department at the University of Vienna in the autumn of 1995 and spring of 1996 (both are quoted by Kovács, 2011) reflect a relatively high level of political antisemitism but a relatively low level of religious and discriminative antisemitism in Hungary compared to other countries in the region. The AJS study in 1991 found almost the same order in discriminative antisemitism in the region than the EVS 2008 research we used for this study: the ratio of respondents who said they would prefer not to have Jewish neighbors was the highest in Poland, then came the Slovaks, then the Czechs (the former two from a Czechoslovakian sample), and the study found the lowest results in Hungary. However, the fact that the appearance of Jobbik—a party that uses blatant antisemitic messages—on this party landscape raised significantly the level of visible antisemites in Hungary (the so-called “Jobbik effect”; see Kovács, 2011, and in this issue of the JSA on antisemitism in Europe) and decreasing figures of antisemitism in Poland could have changed the order among countries in the region.
We found the following variables to be significant predictors of antisemitism:

- Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes. This factor seems to be the strongest predictor of traditional antisemitism ($B = .557, p = 0.001, \text{Exp} \ B = 1.746$).

- Anomie. Outgroup members are the main target of endemic mistrust, including the Jews ($B = .494, p = 0.03, \text{Exp} \ B = 1.639$). From this premise, we can hypothesize that this variable will be a significant predictor of hostilities toward other kinds of minorities as well (see below).

- Conventionalism. Surprisingly, this attitude set seems to be negatively associated with discriminative prejudice toward Jews ($B = -0.517, p = 0.009, \text{Exp} \ B = 0.596$).

- Authoritarian aggression. The justification of the radical tools of punishment (in our case, the death penalty) appears to be a significant positive predictor of antisemitism ($B = .312, p = 0.15, \text{Exp} \ B = 1.366$). Aggression toward the weak, however, is not expected to be associated only with antisemitism, but with prejudices toward other ethnic outgroups as well.

We couldn’t find a significant impact from the following two dimensions of authoritarianism on antisemitism:

1. Religious fundamentalism. Contrary to the original (Adorno et al., 1950) and also the revised (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981) approaches of authoritarianism, religious beliefs do not seem to be strongly associated with discriminative antisemitism. If we analyze the items one by one, without putting other variables in the logistic model, we can find that a belief in heaven and hell is a view that is a significant predictor of antisemitism, but that its explanatory power disappears after putting stronger predictors in the model.

2. Sex. The overt interest in sexual affairs due to the projection of unconscious motives to outgroups (attributing them especially to Jews, who are generally and stereotypically regarded as a sexually hyperactive group, without any inhibitions) is a core idea of the psy-
choanalytically oriented original authoritarianism theory, but this idea does not seem to be supported by our results.

The overall explanatory power of this model, however, seems to be low (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .021$).

Because the examination of the background factors of antisemitism was the focus of our interest, we calculated a logistic regression model predicting the antisemitism based on socio-demographic variables (Table 5). The overall explanatory power of this model was almost equally as low as that of the authoritarian attitudes (Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.028$, $p = 0.000$). Education level (less educated persons were more likely to be antisemites),
gender (men were more likely to be antisemites), size of the town (inhabitants of small villages were more likely to be antisemites), and religion (religious people were more likely to be antisemites) proved to be significant predictors of antisemitism. The predicting power of age, employment status, and household income was not significant.

**Anti-Roma Attitudes**

In order to decide if the different dimensions of authoritarianism that were found to be significantly predicting antisemitism are “antisemitism-specific,” we ran the same logistic regression model, putting discriminatory attitudes toward Roma in the model as the dependent variable (Table 6), along with authoritarian attitudes among the independent variables.

This model also has weak explanatory power that does not differ from the one we established for the explanation of antisemitism (Nagelkerke \( R^2 = .027 \)).

In this case, we found that anomie had stronger predicting power (\( B = .551, p = 0.000, \text{Exp} [B] = 1.736 \)). Authoritarian aggression (support for the death penalty) is also a significant predictor of anti-Roma attitudes (\( B = .294, p = 0.001, \text{Exp} [B] = 1.342 \)). Religious fundamentalism is a predictor as well of discriminative anti-Roma prejudice, but in the reverse direction—which means that the stronger the (overwhelmingly Christian) religious beliefs are, the less likelihood there is that the person rejects a Roma as his or her neighbor (\( B = -.394, p = 0.000, \text{Exp} [B] = .674 \)). The remaining three dimensions (conventionalism, sexuality, authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes) don’t seem to be significant predictors of anti-Romaism.

The three most important differing factors within this logistic regression model and the one that examines antisemitism are:

- Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes, which was the most important authoritarian dimension predicting antisemitism, yet doesn’t have a significant impact on anti-Romaism;
- Conventionalism, which is not associated with anti-Roma prejudices;
- Religious fundamentalism, which seems to be associated with pro-Roma sentiments (while in the case of antisemitism, there was no significant association, and the direction was positive).
TABLE 6
PREDICTORS OF ANTI-ROMAISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp (B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventionalism</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>.707</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>1.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.761</td>
<td>.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian aggression</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>11.563</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fundamentalism</td>
<td>-.394</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>20.175</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomie</td>
<td>.551</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>28.593</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.443</td>
<td>1.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-.560</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>22.477</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stereotypes Toward the Abstract Ethnic Outgroup
(people of a different race)

In order to examine the original idea of the theory of the authoritarian personality, which stated that authoritarianism is associated with general ethnocentrism, we ran the same regression model using “people of a different race” as the dependent variable (Table 7). In this case, we saw a different template of predictors than in the previous cases. The explanatory power was on the same low level as the previous cases (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .02$).

TABLE 7
PREDICTORS OF GENERALIZED RACISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp (B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventionalism</td>
<td>-.145</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.639</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes</td>
<td>.289</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>3.767</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>1.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian aggression</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.937</td>
<td>.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fundamentalism</td>
<td>-.261</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>4.315</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anomie</td>
<td>.728</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>21.640</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>4.504</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>1.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-.2374</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>176.662</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We found a significant impact in the case of three variables (Table 7): anomie, with a very strong predicting power ($B = .728, \ p = 0.000, \ \text{Exp} [B] = 2.070$); sexuality ($B = .303, \ p = 0.034, \ \text{Exp} [B] = 1.354$); and religious fundamentalism ($p = 0.38; \ B = .261, \ \text{Exp} [B] = .770$)—a negative direction.
The distinctive feature of this model lies in the significant predictor power of sexuality on rejecting “people from a different race” (see the possible explanations below).

CONCLUSIONS

Our “back to the roots” approach seemed to bring about some results that are far from being self-evident. In short, the more-than-60-year-old finding of the authors of TAP on the role of authoritarianism behind antisemitism still appears to return some truth. The authoritarian attitude syndrome, however, doesn’t seem to be a robust or strong predictor of antisemitism. On the other hand, our findings seem to support Raden’s (1999) finding on the diminished association between authoritarianism and antisemitism. Authoritarian attitudes don’t seem to be better predictors of antisemitism than of anti-Roma attitudes in Visegrad countries—a result that seems to support the ethnocentrism concept of Adorno and his colleagues.

The components of antisemitism, authoritarian anti-establishment attitudes, conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, sex, and anomie are found to be significant determinants of discriminative antisemitism.

**Authoritarian Anti-Establishment Attitudes**

This variable seems to be the most important authoritarian component predicting antisemitism. Those who score high authoritarian anti-establishment points have a 1.75 times higher chance of being antisemites than the ones who have low scores on antisemitism. Furthermore, this submissive, democracy-critical stance seems to be a distinctive, “antisemitism specific” predictor: it is neither a significant predictor of anti-Roma sentiments nor of generalized racism.

The need for a strong leader, along with a critical attitude toward democracy due to its inefficiency and inability to maintain order and discipline, is the central idea behind all authoritarian ideologies. Its specific relation to antisemitism may be rooted in the view that democracies are soft, liberal, “Jewish,” or “Jew-created” systems, or, in more radical form, tools for realizing plans of the Jewish world conspiracy. This is a typical myth of the authoritarian movements and was the central idea behind the Protocols of Elders of Zion, which influenced the development of the “Völkisch” ideology that was taken up by Nazi Germany (Cohn, 1996). If we accept that non-democratic authoritarian submissive attitudes are an important background factor behind antisemitism, we may conclude that antisemitism can
be (even if not in all cases, of course) a code of an anti-establishment, democracy-critical stance and an anti-status quo position.

**Conventionalism**

Surprisingly, this variable was found to be a negative predictor of antisemitism: the high level of conventionalism (agreement with the items: “Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them”; “Obedience should be learned by the children”; “Greater respect for authority is important in the future”) was found to reduce the likelihood that the respondent is antisemitic by 40 percent (Exp [B] = .596). The need to obey and follow the rules is a key feature of any kind of authoritarian ideology. A plausible explanation may be that antisemitism can be more strongly related to conventionalism in countries where antisemitism is a conventional norm. It could have fit the reality when Adorno and his colleagues made their investigations in the ’30s in Germany and ’40s in the United States, but is definitely not currently true for the countries of post-Holocaust Europe. And it is obvious from the low rate of respondents who expressed their open antisemitic opinions (this view is shared by only 12% of the adult population in these societies; see Table 2, which reinforces that discriminative antisemitism is far from being a norm. The fact that we didn’t find a similar negative relation between conventionalism and anti-Romaism, a tendency that is much more widespread in these societies (a 45% average is anti-Roma) seems to support this explanation. On the other hand, this result raises the question of whether conventionalism and obedience are still the most important features of contemporary authoritarian movements. Krekó and Kovács (2012), for example, have found in their investigations of the voters of Jobbik (an openly antisemitic and authoritarian ultranationalist parliamentary party in Hungary) that they were the second least traditionalist and the least conventionalist group among all voter groups. These results indicate that authoritarianism nowadays, when the core norms of democracy have become widespread in European countries (even, of course, if not totally consensual), and liberal democracy became the norm itself, authoritarianism is much more about questioning and rejecting the status quo and its ruling norms (including tolerance toward Jews) than maintaining them. Contemporary authoritarianism, therefore, should be interpreted more as a revolutionary or rebellious attitude set rather than a conventional and conformist one.
Authoritarian aggression (in this case: support for capital punishment), according to the original theory in TAP, provides a good possibility for the authoritarian personality to have an outlet for its unconscious impulses and hostility that can be directed, without punishment, toward the minority and deviant groups in society (see also Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, & Craig, 1999). In the revised, non-psychoanalytic interpretation of Adorno’s theory of right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), aggression also plays a central role when it asserts that referring to traditional values and authorities serves as a reward for aggression toward minorities. It seems to be a general feature behind ethnocentrism that proved to be a significant predictor of both antisemitism and anti-Roma attitudes.

Sex

According to our results, sexuality—the “exaggerated concern with sexual goings-on” (Adorno et al., 1950)—and prudishness are not predictors of antisemitism. The overt interest in sexual affairs as the projection of the unacceptable sexual motives to outgroups is a core idea of the psychoanalytic authoritarianism theory. Because Jews are stereotypically regarded as a sexually hyperactive, promiscuous group who lack inhibitions, it would be plausible to think that prudishness has an impact on antisemitism—a linking that is not supported by the data. On the other hand, this kind of sexual concern seems to be a significant predictor of generalized racism. Such a finding may be explained partly by a general tendency of the “racist” respondents to reject any kind of new stimuli (including “atypical” sexual habits) as well as a motive for maintaining racial and ethnic purity, the “caste-maintenance orientation,” as two new scholars of authoritarianism put it (Sidanius & Pratto, 2004).

Anomie

The endemic mistrust toward other people is a predictor of all the three discriminative attitudes examined: antisemitism, anti-Romaism, and generalized racism. Negative, hostile attitudes toward others and the cynical view that everybody is fighting for his or her self-interest are inherent features of the “jungle fighter” approach of authoritarian people, connected to the Social Darwinist view that everybody should fight for his or her own survival. The mistrust of authoritarians is, not surprisingly, strongly articulated toward ethnic outgroups, i.e., the “Strangers.”
Religious fundamentalism (in this case, strong Christian religiosity), contrary to common wisdom and the findings of former studies, does not seem to be significantly related to discriminative antisemitism. On the other hand, we could establish the significant predictive power of religiousness in the socio-demographic model; furthermore, stronger (Christian) religiosity reduces the chance that the respondent is prejudiced against Roma and has a generalized racist attitude.

Socio-demographic variables also provide a weak explanation for the variance of discriminative antisemitism. Contrary to the general explanation of the Frankfurt School—that social status provides a key to understanding antisemitism and authoritarianism—employment status and income do not explain antisemitism. The prototypical antisemite, according to our data, is minimally educated, male, lives in a village, and is religious. What other demographic and attitude factors may better explain antisemitism should be the target of researches in the future.

This research reveals both the advantages and the disadvantages of using international survey databases at the same time. The advantage is that it allows the researcher to use bigger representative samples and therefore reach more well-founded and better underpinned conclusions regarding the background factors of the target of his or her interest (in our case, antisemitism) that go beyond country-specific researches; the disadvantage is that the measurement of antisemitism (if it is included) is oversimplified in these datasets and therefore is unable to capture the variety of shades of antisemitism. Involving other dimensions of antisemitism (e.g., religious, political) in the investigations may lead to a more sophisticated and even a slightly different picture.

And, of course, the question remains: if not really authoritarianism and not really socio-demographics, what then can explain antisemitism? If we take the above-mentioned code function of antisemitism seriously, party preferences, strong national identification (especially chauvinistic nationalism), and identity and status threats may be the most important factors to better explain prejudices against the Jews—especially political antisemitism and maybe discriminatory antisemitism as well. Another possible explanation may be that discriminatory antisemitism, which is becoming more

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3. The EVS database seems to be a good tool to use for comparing to compare the construct on authoritarianism in these countries. Given that in post-socialist countries there hasn’t been any thorough comparative representative research using traditional scales of authoritarianism (F scale, D scale, RWA scale), there is no better solution than using these international “giga-surveys.”
marginalized nowadays as an anachronistic form of hostility against the Jews and less loudly articulated by mainstream political forces,\(^4\) may have lost its political psychological importance, giving way to the more subtle and modern forms of political antisemitism and anti-Zionism—and therefore as an “empty” attitude is not deeply embedded in any definable set of attitudes.

But to decide which explanation may be correct, we should analyze datasets in the future, when we are likely to have a better, multidimensional measurement of antisemitism and a broader range of background factors we can use for explaining antisemitism at the same time.

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*Péter Krekó is the director, Political Capital Institute; assistant professor, Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences; and co-chair, EU Radicalisation Awareness Network Prevention of Violent Radicalisation Working Group. e-mail: kreko@politicalcapital.hu.

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4. Jobbik in Hungary may be a notable exception, but it is important to mention that their first real political success (entering into the European parliament by gathering 15 percent of the votes) happened in June 2009, after this survey was conducted; therefore, the political impact of Jobbik was much more emphatic afterward.


Antisemitism and Criticism of Israel: A Methodological Challenge for Peace Research

Wilhelm Kempf*

One of the merits of antisemitism research is its sensitivity to the various ways in which antisemitism may manifest itself beyond traditional prejudices against Jews. This has led to distinctions among various facets of modern antisemitism, ranging from traditional prejudice (manifest antisemitism) via secondary antisemitism and latent antisemitism to anti-Zionism and antisemitic criticism of Israel. One of the shortcomings of antisemitism research, however, is its neglect of alternative motivations that may lead to statements that sound as though they could contain antisemitic content—particularly problematic in the investigation of the relation between antisemitism and criticism of Israel. This article reflects on the methodological deficits of several approaches and introduces latent class analysis as an alternative methodology. In doing so, criticism of Israel and anti-Zionism appears to be motivated by other factors, e.g., peace orientation and/or human rights considerations.

Key Words: Antisemitism, Anti-Zionism, Israel, Palestinian, Peace Movement

About five years ago I began to develop a research project, “Criticism of Israel: Dealing with German History and Differentiating Modern Antisemitism.” I knew that I was shaking a hornet’s nest, and in fact protests were not long in coming. Scholars from Islamic sciences and a Jewish colleague feared that I wanted a priori to discredit all criticism of Israel as antisemitic. Initially, the only accusation that was not made was the reverse: that I wanted to trivialize antisemitism. Quite the contrary, in fact; Israeli and Jewish colleagues in Germany and the United States proved extremely cooperative and interested in my research.

The accusation of trivialization was made only later by a German blogger, whose name is irrelevant here. In his blogs, he reported that as a young man he protested against the Gulf War until Lea Fleischmann’s book Gas opened his eyes to the fact that protests against the Gulf War were antisemitic. Since then, he has been extremely sensitive to antisemitic tendencies of every sort, and feels obligated to act against this.

What irritated him most about my research was that I had questioned notions that he takes for granted. Besides that, he complained that I had previously been unknown in antisemitism research; that my background is
in conflict and peace studies; that at the beginning of my scientific career I had published a book, *Mathematical Models for Social Psychology* (Kempf and Repp 1977), and not least, that I am twenty years older than he and thus cannot be so naïve.

As for naïveté, I only hope that *is* the case. In the other points I can only agree with him. But perhaps it is precisely these points that can counter my supposed naïveté.

**Methodological Axioms**

Just the all-inclusive question of whether criticism of Israel is *essentially* antisemitic is naïve and can only lead to the confirmation of existing or the creation of new prejudices. If we want to avoid this, we must take a position outside of this dispute and accept facts before they are interpreted in this or another way (Martín-Baró 1991).

Above all, however, we must take into account that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not just between Jews and non-Jews, but rather a *conflict* that is influenced by the same social-psychological mechanisms as other conflicts.

We should not be content with mechanically applying the usual methodological standards. This already includes sampling methods: If we consider the possibility that there are various ways of criticizing Israel, then a sample representative of Germany does not really help. Certainly, we need such a sample in order to determine how widespread these forms of criticizing Israel are in Germany. But in order to do this, it is not enough just to ask the man on the street, who is possibly not at all interested in the topic of Israel. We must examine how—and why—critics of Israel position themselves in relation to the conflict.

It is also a matter of constructing the questionnaire, in which the usual methodological standards of social psychology lag more than a half century behind the contemporary state of psychological test theory (see Davier 2012; Kempf 2012; Rost 2004).

In this usual approach, one takes certain indicators for a postulated attitude either without examining at all whether a common attitude dimension actually underlies them, or—if one does so—making a factor analysis that is in fact unsuitable for this purpose (Kempf 2009). As an index for the postulated attitude, finally, one forms a sum score without examining whether it provides at least a rank order with regard to the attitude dimension to be measured.

If one then studies the connection between various attitudes, one again makes factor analyses or—if one is methodologically somewhat more experienced—develops a path model or a structural equation model.
All these methods are ultimately based on the calculation of correlations. They are, however, unsuitable, because they rely on a range of presuppositions that—in the best case—lead to a trivialization of the findings and—in the worst case—to misleading results.

First, they assume that one is dealing with quantitative variables that can be measured on metric scales. Ruled out from the start is that a variable—as, for example, the manner in which study subjects position themselves in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—is revealed not simply in the frequency of their agreement with statements critical of Israel, but also in the specific patterns of how their evaluations of Israeli and Palestinian politics relate to each other.

Second, they study only the linear relationships between the variables. The possibility that, for example, not only the supporters but also the critics of Israeli policies could be guided by human rights considerations is thereby from the outset not representable, and diminishes the correlation between the human rights engagement of the subjects and their position on a continuum that ranges from a position in favor of Israel on the one pole to a position in favor of the Palestinians on the other.

Third, these methods are also unsuitable because they take into account only the paired dependencies between two respective variables, and cannot represent complex higher order dependencies (Rost 2012).

Not least of all, however, they are also unsuitable because they postulate a universally valid connection between the various variables and are not in a position to differentiate between various subpopulations on which various lawlike regularities may possibly have an effect.

**Peace Research—Antisemitism Research**

As peace researchers, we would do well to remember what our actual epistemological interest is and what understanding we have of the subject—i.e., what questions are appropriate to the subject and what our ideal of knowledge consists; in other words, what types of answers are satisfactory (Hoyningen-Huene 1989).

Only when we do this can we detach ourselves from the mechanical application of certain standard methods and instead employ methods that actually can satisfactorily answer the questions that are relevant to our epistemological interests.

In comparison to the historically developed disciplines—as, for example, social psychology—peace research has the advantage here that already at its beginning it had a clearly defined task—the reduction of violence with nonviolent means (Galtung 1993)—and an understanding of violence that includes not just physical, but also structural and cultural violence.
The reduction of cultural violence means, among other things, the reduction of the mutual discrediting, defamation, and demonization of the conflict parties—and here is where I see a central task of peace psychology. As is particularly clear from the Middle East conflict, however, this also means having to cope with ambivalence: many Israelis, Holocaust survivors and their descendants, and as well non-Jewish Germans who have learned the lessons of history, rightly fear a revival of antisemitism. And many non-Jewish and Jewish critics of Israeli policies fear that they will be silenced by accusations of antisemitism.

Neither of these two possibilities can be dismissed a priori. The question with which we approached the topic of “Antisemitism and Criticism of Israel” can thus not be simply whether criticism of Israel is essentially an expression of antisemitism, or whether the critics of Israel deserve blanket exoneration from the accusation of antisemitism. This question, which continually provokes disputes among peace scientists (or those who aspire to be ones), is idle and simply wrongly formulated.

That “not each one-sided or undifferentiated criticism of Israel” is antisemitic was also recently stated by an Expert Commission of the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag 2011). But that is only paying lip service and does not advance us any further. The question that we must pose and that permits us to measure the suitability of our methods is not whether criticism of Israel is antisemitic, but rather how we can distinguish between antisemitic criticism of Israel and other ways of criticizing Israel.

The methodological problems begin with the construction of the scales with which we attempt to measure antisemitism and criticism of Israel.

A great merit of antisemitism research consists in its sensitivity to the various elements that might be motivated by antisemitism. Thus, today we distinguish between various facets of antisemitism (Bergmann and Erb 1991a; Bergmann and Erb 1991b; Frindte 2006; Heyder 2005; Schönbach 1961):

- **Manifest or classical antisemitism** refers to the openly performed defamation, drawing on traditional prejudices, of Jews as Jews, going as far as equating being Jewish with not being German.
- **Secondary antisemitism** refers to the way Germans deal with the Nazi past, the Holocaust, and the question of guilt and responsibility. It consists of the relativization, trivialization, and denial of the Holocaust, and the call to close the books on the past. It goes as far as the insinuation that the Jews provoked their persecution.
- **Latent antisemitism** refers to attempts to avoid publicly talking about intentionally staged discrimination against Jews as Jews per se.
- **Anti-Zionism** consists in the defamation of Israel’s Zionist state ideology and blames the Jews as a group for this.
Antisemitic criticism of Israel, finally, employs criticism of the state of Israel’s politics as a medium in which antisemitic contents—in the sense of an ersatz communication—are presented in a socially accepted manner.

One serious deficiency of antisemitism research, however, is that it seldom asks what alternative meanings statements that may express antisemitism could also have.

By applying item-response theory, we can show that manifest, secondary, and latent antisemitism are actually just various different expressions of antisemitism, so that each of these facets defines the same rank order among the subjects with regard to their antisemitism. However, the rank order of the subjects with regard to their anti-Zionism is different, which indicates that anti-Zionism cannot be understood simply as a facet of antisemitism (Kempf 2011b) (Figure 1).

Antisemitism and anti-Zionism are attitudes that do indeed correlate, yet they must be distinguished. There are also subjects who, although they have strongly anti-Zionistic attitudes, nevertheless reject antisemitic attitudes as prejudices.

Especially serious is the problem of the possible variety of meanings in the measurement of antisemitic criticism of Israel. Even comparisons between Israel and National Socialism, which Germans really should refrain from making, need not necessarily result from an antisemitic perpetrator-victim reversal or from a smug neo-German contempt for Jews.

I have met many colleagues and journalists in Israel who speak of proto-fascist circumstances, and a Jewish colleague once told me that whether the statement “What the Israelis are doing to the Palestinians resembles what the Nazis did to the Jews” is a supportable opinion depends on what phase of National Socialist history one is referring to.

Are they all “self-hating Jews”? Or do such NS comparisons perhaps serve a different function—perhaps the function of dramatizing negative conditions to induce people to try to change these conditions? Namely, in the political left, dramatization through NS comparisons has a long tradition in Germany—and indeed with conflicts that really have nothing to do with the persecution of the Jews, as, e.g., the Central American civil wars in the early ’80s.

In any case, we should conclude from this that antisemitic criticism of Israel cannot be simply measured by means of the usual questionnaire methods. Whether criticisms of Israel are antisemitic or result from a different motivation can only be decided if we investigate the patterns with which they are grouped with antisemitic attitudes, on the one side, and with

1. All figures appear after the reference list.
other attitudes and orientations that come in question as possible motivations on the other.

Even if we cannot deny from the outset that criticism of Israel’s policies represents a medium in which antisemitic contents can be articulated in a socially acceptable manner, we must start from the conflict-theoretical perspective that criticism of Israel can arise from a multiplicity of different sources.

For this reason, we must first of all distinguish between anti-Israeli attitudes and the way people make meaning of Israeli-Palestinian conflict—or with other words: with what mental models they attempt to understand it (Kempf 2011a).

Research by Morton Deutsch (1973) and Daniel Bar-Tal (1998) provides a sound basis for the reconstruction of these mental models. Deutsch has shown that competitive conflicts are accompanied by specific perceptual distortions that become all the stronger the more escalated the conflict is, and Bar-Tal has shown that in long-lasting intractable conflicts these perceptual distortions harden into societal beliefs. These are components of the psychic infrastructure that enables the members of a society to endure such conflicts.

These beliefs contain, among other things, belief in the justice of one’s own cause and one’s own victim role, belief in delegitimizing the enemy, and belief in the maintenance of personal and national security through a policy of strength.

Thus, there arises the suspicion that antisemitism behind criticism of Israeli Palestine policy can either exist or be only part of the above-named perceptual distortions and support the delegitimizing—of not only of the enemy, but also of third parties and/or of minorities within one’s own society who deviate from the basic societal consensus.

As in every conflict, there are perceptual distortions on both sides, both sides seek supporters and coalitions, and both sides take the risk that third parties will side with the opposing party. Thus, even siding with the Palestinians does not necessarily prove the existence of antisemitic attitudes, but rather in the given case “only” that a person is opposed to Israel (even if with the corresponding enemy image).

If we seek a peace solution, we must overcome these perceptual distortions and replace the above-named beliefs (which, so to speak, form a war frame) with another frame of interpretation: one that admits the justification (of at least some) of the demands of the opposite side, recognizes shared victim roles, gives up the delegitimization of the opponent, and attempts to achieve personal and national security through a peace solution.
This necessarily implies criticism of both sides, and thus also criticism of Israel. A further factor is that highly escalated conflicts have a polarizing effect: “Those who are not for us are against us.” Criticism of Israel based on a peace frame, therefore, risks the danger of being interpreted as antisemitic or at least of seeming to express the lack of solidarity.

In the concrete case, however, the situation is more complicated: Israel has not only been in a state of permanent war for decades, but—despite all setbacks—for some years also engaged in a peace process. This has led to a weakening of the above-named societal beliefs in Israel. Both frames coexist in Israel today, at times even within the same person, who swings back and forth between these two frames.

These frames not only represent cognitive interpretation patterns, they are also emotionally anchored, and in an ambivalent manner at that. Both frames promise security and at the same time create insecurity. The war frame offers security because people can continue to use tested behavioral models, but it also creates insecurity because there is a danger of continuing violence. The peace frame offers security because it promises an end of violence, but it also creates insecurity because new behavioral patterns must be tried whose effectiveness is still uncertain (Kempf 2011b).

Thus, criticism of Israel resulting from a peace frame does not necessarily mean a lack of solidarity with Israel or even antisemitism, but to the contrary can also arise from supporting the life interests of Israelis.

How Germans position themselves in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no less ambivalent.

The lesson of the Second World War, “Never again fascism, never again war,” implies a tendency toward a peace frame (never again war). It is, however, ambivalent with regard to the human rights question (never again fascism), which can be interpreted in two ways (Kempf 2011b):

• First, as taking the side of the immediate victims of National Socialism. This suggests a tendency to unconditional solidarity with Israeli policies and can lead to a weakening of the peace frame, going as far as reversing into a war frame: Never again fascism, therefore war.

• Second, as acting in the interest of human rights worldwide, which suggests a tendency to distance oneself from at least some aspects of Israeli policy and a certain degree of empathy with the Palestinian side. Although this at first means a strengthening of the peace frame, the danger is also inherent of reversing into a war frame.

Therefore, with regard to positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in Germany position patterns should also be identifiable that can be either critical of Israel or pro-Israeli. The antisemitic components in the given case are, however, only identifiable when we relate these positioning pat-
terns not only to the various facets of antisemitism, but also to other variables that can be decisive for how subjects position themselves in relation to the conflict: whether they sympathize more with Israel or with the Palestinians, and whether they understand the conflict more from the perspective of a peace frame or of a war frame.

**Research Project**

In our research project, we first developed a range of scales (Kempf, Thiel, and Dengler, forthcoming) three subscales for measuring manifest antisemitism, two subscales for secondary antisemitism, a subscale for measuring latent antisemitism, and a subscale for estimating whether subjects think the Holocaust could have been prevented.

From this scale, we had expected that it would (in the sense of relativization and staving off guilt feelings) also capture secondary antisemitism. The scale analyses showed, however, that this is not the case.

In addition, we constructed two subscales for measuring anti-Zionism, three subscales for measuring anti-Israeli attitudes, and three subscales for measuring anti-Palestinian attitudes, a quiz on Israel, by means of which we captured knowledge about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a scale for measuring emotional closeness to the conflict, a scale for reconstructing the frames by means of which subjects interpret the conflict, a scale for capturing their sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace, and as a two-part scale for capturing the subjects’ human rights orientation.

In addition, we employed the Moral Disengagement scale of Eckstein-Jackson and Sparr (2005), the Pacifism scale of Cohrs, Kielmann, Moschner, and Maes (2002), as well as a single item that creates a direct connection between criticism of Israel and antisemitism, and that has proved to be particularly sensitive to displaying the deterioration of criticism of Israel into antisemitism. This item reads: “If we want to recognize the true face of the Jews, we need only see how they treat the Palestinians.”

The sample that we based our study on consists of two subsamples: a quota sample representative of Germany according to age, gender, and school education, and an online sample of active critics of Israel, whom we recruited through various different organizations and contact persons based on the snowball principle.

**Results**

With the reconstruction of the positioning patterns (Figure 2), we obtained a range of noteworthy results, indicating that the majority of
Germans have attitudes critical of Israel and that pacifism and human rights engagement thereby play an essential role (Kempf 2011b).

Though there is a relatively large group of subjects (15.4% of the quota sample) that takes no position at all, the overwhelming majority (45.1%) interprets the conflict in a peace frame with in part a pro-Israeli (12.1%) and in part a pro-Palestinian tendency (33%). A large group (20.8%) interprets the conflict in a pro-Palestinian frame that is already very clearly polarized and “on the edge of a war frame.” Pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian hardliners who interpret the conflict in a war frame are, with 9.8% or 8.7%, respectively, approximately equally large minorities.

With the exception of the pro-Israeli hardliners, all these groups (even those who sympathize with Israel) share the view that the goal of Israeli policy is the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, they condemn Palestinian terror attacks (almost throughout) more harshly than the Israeli military operations. The latter are condemned more harshly only by pro-Palestinian hardliners, but they do not justify terror attacks.

That pacifism and human rights orientations play a role in the evaluation of Israeli policy does not yet imply that one could exonerate criticism of Israeli policy of any possible accusations of antisemitism. We can only determine what forces actually underlie criticism of Israel if we investigate how positions on the conflict and all the other variables that may constitute criticism or support of Israeli policy are combined into typical patterns.

Therefore, in a second step latent class analysis was applied in order to reconstruct these patterns (Kempf, forthcoming). We found in all nine that there are different classes of supporters and critics of Israeli Palestine policy who systematically differ not only in their pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian orientation, but also in the radicalism of their position (Figure 3).

Two of these classes (which together make up 30.6% of the German population) capture more a pro-Israeli position, in which those who rather position themselves in a peace frame, despite their tendency to support Israel, share some antisemitic prejudices and very often take no position at all (which suggests that with this class we are dealing with latent antisemitism). The other class positions itself largely in a pro-Israeli war frame and shows no antisemitic attitudes.

The overwhelming majority of the German population (69.4%) positions itself from relatively to very strongly in favor of the Palestinians, and can be subdivided into two groups: (1) antisemitic critics of Israel (25.7%), who take a rather strong position in favor of the Palestinians and express strong to very strong antisemitic prejudices; and (2) critics of Israel (43.7%), whose position in favor of the Palestinians ranges over a spectrum
from relatively strong to very strong, and (almost) completely rejects antisemitic prejudices. Only a small subgroup of the most radical of these critics (2%) displays some antisemitic prejudices.

If one contrasts these two groups, it appears that two completely contrary motivational systems underlie them: The non-antisemitic critics of Israel are better informed and display greater emotional proximity to the conflict. Their peace orientation is more strongly marked, and their human rights orientation is more consistent (Figure 4).

Their position in favor of the Palestinians is more radical the better they are informed about the conflict, the greater their emotional proximity to the conflict and the more strongly marked their pacifism, the more consistent their human rights orientation (Figure 5), the more they reject limitations on human rights, the less they tend to moral disengagement, and the more they are concerned for the victims of human rights violations (Figure 6).

The antisemitic critics of Israel are just the opposite. The more radical their position in favor of the Palestinians, the less they are informed, the less emotional proximity they have to the conflict, the less pacifistic their attitudes, the more inconsistent their human rights orientation, and the less they are concerned for the victims of human rights violations.

Antisemitic critics of Israel prove to be generally burdened by prejudices (Figure 7). They share strongly antisemitic, anti-Zionistic, anti-Israeli, and anti-Palestinian attitudes and position themselves less radically in favor of the Palestinians than the non-antisemitic critics.

The non-antisemitic critics of Israel, to the contrary, reject not only antisemitic, but also anti-Palestinian, prejudices. The more radical among them, however, display anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli attitudes.

Non-antisemitic critics of Israel who position themselves in a peace frame nevertheless display heightened sensitivity to the ambivalence of their frame. They are aware of the Israeli security dilemma or at least display uncertainty about whether a peace solution could offer Israel security. What causes them to position themselves in a peace frame are their strong peace orientation and their marked human rights orientation, as well as their strict rejection of all prejudices, be they antisemitic, anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli, or anti-Palestinian in nature.

Critics of Israel who were not originally motivated by antisemitism, however, are also in danger of gradually developing antisemitic prejudices: Those who take a position most radically in favor of the Palestinians are divided into two groups, of which one displays no antisemitic prejudices, while the other tends to the belief that the treatment of the Palestinians in Israel “shows the true face of the Jews” and that there is an international
Jewish conspiracy (without which Israel could not carry out its policies). Therefore, they would also like to close the books on the German-Jewish past.

In comparison with the no less radical critics of Israel who do not develop such attitudes, they are somewhat less well informed about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and have somewhat less emotional closeness to the conflict. Their peace orientation is somewhat less strongly marked, and their human rights orientation is somewhat less consistent. They tend somewhat more strongly to justify limitations on human rights, show a somewhat greater tendency to moral disengagement and are somewhat less concerned for the victims of human rights violations (Figure 8).

CONCLUSIONS

Before I conclude, I would first like to state briefly how the various types of critics of Israel are distributed in our samples and within the electorate of the German political parties (Figure 9):

1. The active critics of Israel in our online sample show (as expected) no pro-Israeli pattern and position themselves quite antagonistically in favor of the Palestinians, but they display no antisemitic pattern.

2. In the online sample of active critics of Israel, the more radical among the critics of Israel who are not antisemitic present the pattern that appears most commonly. They are, however, quite rare in the German population overall, and none are found in the center of society (among the voters of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP). If we had made our study merely on the basis of a representative sample, we would never have been able to identify these patterns, or at least differentiate them, and as a result could not become aware of the danger of sliding from radical criticism of Israel into (some) antisemitic prejudices.

3. Antisemitic criticism of Israel is typical of the neo-Nazis, but is also firmly anchored in the center of society (especially among CDU/CSU voters). With the Greens and the Linke party, it appears somewhat less often.

4. The suspicion became stronger that with the apparent supporters of Israel, who tend to position themselves in a pro-Israeli peace frame but mostly do not take any position, latent antisemitism could be in play: Besides openly antisemitic criticism of Israel, this is the only pattern that is found with right-wing extremists (neo-Nazis), and in fact more frequently than in all other parts of society. It is again Green and Linke party voters with whom this pattern is somewhat less common.
In view of these findings, we must ask what is actually behind these results and what consequences they can have for the revival of antisemitic prejudices if the German Parliament and the German media tar all criticism of Israel with the same brush and brand it as antisemitic. The parliamentary debate on the supposed antisemitism of the Linke and the recent media uproar over the poem by Günter Grass are dramatic examples of this. If one is sufficiently naïve, it is all too easy to again see behind this an international Jewish conspiracy and scapegoat the Jews for the lack of political culture in Germany. But this is only a supposition. To give a robust answer, we still first need an additional research project. I am saving this for my retirement, which will probably comprise more of an ongoing series of research semesters. And I look forward to this—even if I will miss my students.

*Farewell lecture from the 25th Annual Conference of the German Peace Psychology Association, University of Konstanz, June 2, 2012. Wilhelm Kempf is the editor of *Conflict and Communication Online*, http://www.cco.regener-online.de/*.

REFERENCES


**Figure 1**

A severe shortcoming of anti-Semitism research, however, is that it doesn’t ask what other meaning statements that are suspect of anti-Semitism could have as well.

Item-response theory reveals:

- Scales for manifest, secondary and latent anti-Semitism all define the same rank order with regard to the subjects’ anti-Semitism.
- The rank-order with regard to anti-Zionism, however, deviates from that with regard to anti-Semitism.
- There are also participants who share strong anti-Zionistic attitudes but reject anti-Semitic attitudes as prejudice.
- Conclusion: Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism are correlated but different attitude dimensions.

**Figure 2**

Pro-Israel hardliners are the only group who doesn’t believe that the aim of Israeli policy is the continuous oppression and displacement of the Palestinians.

Pro-Palestinian hardliners are the only group who doesn’t condemn Palestinian attacks more heavily than Israeli military operations, but even they do not justify them.
Figure 3

Figure 4

Anti-Semitic and non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel result from contrary motivational systems.

Non anti-Semitic critics are better informed about the conflict and emotionally closer to it than the anti-Semitic critics.

They are more consistent in their human rights orientation.
**Figure 5**

Anti-Semitic and non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel result from contrary motivational systems.

- They position themselves the more radically in favor of the Palestinians, the better they are informed, the greater their emotional closeness.
- And the more consistent their human rights orientation is...

**Figure 6**

Anti-Semitic and non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel result from contrary motivational systems.

- Non anti-Semitic critics position themselves the more radically in favor of the Palestinians, the more they are concerned for the victims of human rights violations...
- ...the more they reject human rights restrictions, and the less they tend to mental disengagement.
- maximization of reduction — concern for victims: more disengaged
Anti-Semitic and non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel result from contrary motivational systems.

Non anti-Semitic critics reject anti-Semitic and anti-Palestinian prejudices, the more radical among them, show anti-Zionist and anti-Israel attitudes, however.

Anti-Semitic Israel critics are resentful and share strong anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist, anti-Israel and anti-Palestinian attitudes.

Initially non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel is in danger to deteriorate into anti-Semitic prejudice, however. Compared with those who do not deteriorate into anti-Semitic prejudice, they are somewhat less informed and have somewhat less emotional closeness to the conflict. Their human rights orientation is less consistent. They are less positive, and...
Figure 9

Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel is typical for Neo-Nazis, but also found in the middle of society, particularly among the conservatives.

Active Israeli critics position themselves in an antagonist way. They display clearly no anti-Semitic patterns or patterns that are suspect of latent anti-Semitism, however.

The most radical types of Israeli criticism are found in the middle of society.

Anti-Semitic patterns and patterns that are suspect of latent anti-Semitism are less frequent among Jewish Party and Left Party voters.
Jewish Girls and Their Experiences of Antisemitism

Nora Gold*

The effect of antisemitic experiences on Jewish children has not been fully explored. To that end, a qualitative study of sixteen Jewish girls (ages 10-12) was conducted over a three-year period. The data suggests that all respondents were adversely affected by their antisemitic experiences—e.g., internalizing antisemitism, hiding their Jewishness, and contemplating conversion. These girls spontaneously related antisemitism to both Israel and the Holocaust, and in the first year of this study, over 40% reported decreased life satisfaction ratings because of antisemitism. Future research is needed both to advance our theoretical knowledge and to formulate effective ways of supporting Jewish children facing antisemitism.

Key Words: Anti-Israelism, Antisemitism, Children, Girls, Holocaust, Israel, Mental Health

Antisemitism has existed for over 2000 years, and since World War II, numerous scholars have sought to understand this phenomenon, including its causes and effects (e.g., Cohen et al, 2009; Cotler 2009; Fineberg, Samuels, and Weitzman 2007; Langmuir 1990; Lappin 2008; Laqueur 2006; Maccoby 1996, 2006; Millman 2009; Poliakov 1965; Wistrich 1991, 1999, 2010). One area that has not yet been empirically explored is the effect of antisemitism on contemporary Jewish children. There are historical accounts and memoirs written by Jewish adults, including Holocaust survivors, that describe Jewish childhoods deeply damaged by antisemitism. Yet, there are no studies that employ social science research methods to document and analyze the experience of contemporary Jewish children. The lack of these studies is a significant lacuna, given that antisemitism is and has been for the past two decades on the rise globally (B’nai Brith 2010; Penslar, Marrus, and Stein 2005). This increase includes Canada, which has a long history of antisemitism (Abella and Troper 2000; Brym, Shaffir, and Weinfeld 1993; Davies 1992; Penslar, Marros, and Stein 2005; Tulchinsky 2008). In a recent national survey (Statistics Canada 2010), about two-thirds of the religiously motivated hate crimes in Canada were committed against “the Jewish faith.” Judaism was the most commonly targeted religion, and the number of antisemitic hate crimes—165—represented an increase of 42% over the previous year.
Children are not immune to the violence that surrounds them, including ethnically related violence (Cummings et al. 2010; Maschi, Perez, and Tyson 2010; Pachter et al. 2010), even when their parents try to protect them. It is crucial, then, to try and understand the impact of contemporary antisemitism on Jewish children, both to address this gap in theoretical knowledge and to be able to help those who are confronted with antisemitism.

The following study evolved from a previous project conducted by this researcher: a national study of Canadian Jewish women and their experiences of antisemitism and sexism (Gold 1997, 1998, 2004). This study, which involved focus groups in Phase One and a random sample of Jewish women from across Canada in Phase Two, demonstrated clearly the extent of the antisemitism and sexism that Canadian Jewish women encounter in their everyday lives. It also showed the different mental health implications of these two kinds of oppression: The women in this study who reported having had many antisemitic experiences in the past had significantly higher scores on the Beck Depression Inventory than the other women in the sample. No such relationship was found, however, between sexism and depression (Gold 2004). Another intriguing finding was that when the women in this study were asked where their encounters with antisemitism had taken place, the second most frequent response was “at school.” Given that some of these respondents were as young as 18, such responses led this researcher to wonder whether present-day public schools were sites of antisemitic encounters for Canadian Jewish girls. Consultations with colleagues involved in anti-oppression work at several Canadian school boards revealed that antisemitism was definitely a problem in at least some of the schools (e.g., Russell et al. 1993). A search of the literature, however, turned up no research at all on contemporary Jewish girls’ (or boys’) experiences of antisemitism. The present project was therefore initiated to explore this issue.

In terms of conceptual framework, this research, like the Jewish women’s study, is grounded in Jewish feminist scholarship (e.g., Beck 1995; Cantor 1995; Elior 2004; Goldstein 2009; Hyman and Ofer 2006; Nadell and Sarna 2001; Nashim 1998–present; Pinsky 2010; Prell 2007; Siegel, Cole, and Steinberg-Oren 2000). Jewish feminist scholarship focuses on the complex ways that the lives of Jewish women and girls are shaped by the dual oppression of antisemitism and sexism. This Jewish feminist work is, in turn, part of the broader feminist literature on dual oppression, which analyzes the double vulnerability of being both female and part of any diverse ethnic or cultural group (i.e., sexism + racism), as well as the additional vulnerabilities (multiple oppressions) women can experience, related to classism, ageism, ableism, and/or heterosexism.
Since this study of Canadian Jewish girls was originally conceptualized as paralleling the Jewish women’s study (i.e., studying sexism + antisemitism), only girls were included. It became clear, however, in the course of this study, that these girls, at ages 10 and 11, were not interested in discussing sexism and had little to say about it. In contrast, they were quite preoccupied with antisemitism and wanted to comment on this at length. Hence, this research project became focused almost exclusively on antisemitism.

METHOD

The overall objective of this study was to qualitatively explore the antisemitic experiences of a sample of Canadian Jewish girls as well as the emotional or psychological impact on them of these experiences, and whether this was related to any characteristics of their families or their schools. There was also interest in examining how these girls’ experiences or understanding of antisemitism changed over a three-year period, as they matured cognitively, emotionally, morally, and socially. In order to explore these questions, this researcher made use of qualitative methodology, since this is most appropriate for exploratory studies in areas not previously investigated (Grinnell and Unrau 2005; Merriam 2009). The research design used was a longitudinal one, which is ideal for tracking developmental changes over time (Statistics Canada 2008).

SAMPLING

The girls selected for this study were 10 years old at the beginning of this research, and were located through advertisements in newspapers—one Jewish and one non-Jewish, to reach participants with varying degrees of affiliation with the Jewish community. The respondents were also located through more informal methods, such as putting up signs at schools and community centers, ads in synagogue bulletins, and word of mouth. Because this researcher found in her previous project that Canadian Jewish women’s experiences of antisemitism and/or sexism were significantly related both to their socioeconomic backgrounds and the amount and kind of Jewish education they had received, half the participants in the girls’ study (8 Ss) were drawn from Jewish day schools and half from public schools, and the sample as a whole reflected socioeconomic diversity.

1. The Jewish schools in this study, it should be noted, included schools affiliated with three different streams of Judaism: Orthodox, Reform, and Conservative, and the public schools were not all typical public schools, even though funded by
With reference to geographical location, no differences were found in the Jewish women’s study in the incidence of antisemitism by region of the country or by province; therefore, all the participants were selected from the same city, Toronto. In terms of attrition, one girl left the study after the first year, and one left after the second, so in the third year of this research, there were 14 girls taking part. See Table I for a summary of several demographics.

**Table I—Sociodemographic Profile of the Girls and Their Families (Year 1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination/Philosophy</th>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>Parents' Marital Status</th>
<th>Siblings</th>
<th>Annual Household Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Orthodox</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Conservative</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reform</td>
<td>Secular (Public)</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conservative</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$200,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Reform</td>
<td>Secular (Public)</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$150,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Conservative</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Conservative</td>
<td>Secular (Public)</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Culturally Jewish</td>
<td>Secular (Public)</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Traditional Egalitarian</td>
<td>Secular (Public)</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Orthodox</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$250,000-$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Orthodox</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$200,000-$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Conservative</td>
<td>Secular (Public)</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Conservative</td>
<td>Secular (Public)</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$100,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Orthodox</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Conservative</td>
<td>Secular (Public)</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Secular/Non-Practicing</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$200,000+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROCEDURES AND METHODS**

Participants for this research were recruited via phone contact by this researcher. Each respondent received an explanation about the study and appointments for interviews were set up. The interviews were held once a year for three years, lasting approximately one hour each, and each candidate was asked to complete an informed consent, as were their parents. During the first interview only, the parents completed a brief questionnaire that included information about the family’s income, the parents’ occupations, and the girl’s developmental and academic history. For all three years, in the first part of each interview, each girl completed the Child Attribution Style Questionnaire (CASQ) (Shatte et al. 1999), which measures public monies. For example, one girl attended a French immersion public school that also taught mandatory Mandarin, another girl went to a prestigious, publicly funded performing arts school, and a third attended a very small alternative school situated within a regular public school.
children’s well-being. Following the completion of the CASQ, each girl was shown a poster with seven topics on it, and was asked to talk about these topics in any order she chose. These topics were: friends, family, holidays, hobbies, school, being Jewish, and being a girl. An eighth topic, the bat mitzvah, was added in the second and third years of the study; at ages 11 and 12, all the girls were planning their bat mitzvah celebration. These eight topics were selected to learn as much as possible about these girls’ everyday lives—essential to understanding the meaning and impact of the antisemitic events they experienced as this was the context in which they occurred.

The girls in this study were not asked explicitly about antisemitism, because this is not a word that most 10- to 12-year-olds know. Instead, the questions regarding antisemitic experience were indirect—e.g., “How do you feel about being Jewish? What are some of the good things about it (if any)? What are some of the bad things about it (if any)? Has anything good or bad ever happened to you because you are Jewish? If so, what was it? How did you feel and react at the time?” If a girl mentioned an incident that seemed to her clearly antisemitic, she was asked why she thought that had happened or why she thought things like that happen in the world. Toward the end of each interview, the girls were also asked: “If 10 is a perfect life, and zero is a terrible life, what number would you give your life right now?” Then they were asked why they had given this numerical rating to their lives. (This question was developed in the course of the Year 1 interviews, so during that year this question was asked of only 12 out of the 16 girls.) In addition to the individual interviews, most of the girls also participated in focus groups that occurred once a year on two out of the three years (each year there were two groups of about eight each). During these focus groups, occurring after the last of that year’s individual interviews, the girls discussed the same seven or eight topics they had already discussed individually.

At the end of the three years of this study, the data from the interviews and focus groups was analyzed, using thematic content analysis on the girls’ responses to the above questions, examining the data separately for each of the three years. The girls’ comments about antisemitism were analyzed with reference to the numerical ratings they gave their lives, their scores on the CASQ, the type of school they attended (public or Jewish), and the kind of Judaism with which their family identified. All of the individual interviews and focus groups were also filmed, and out of this footage, this researcher made a 13-minute documentary film, entitled Jewish Girl Power (see www.noragold.com).
Results

Positive and Negative Aspects of Being Jewish (Excluding Antisemitism)

In order to put into context these girls’ experiences of antisemitism, it is important to note that all of the girls, throughout the three years of this study, felt that being Jewish was overall a positive experience. They all liked the Jewish holidays (the family get-togethers, the special foods, and the presents), some of them liked going to synagogue or “believing in God,” and others enjoyed learning Jewish history or Jewish languages (one girl said that having Hebrew was like having “a secret language”). Several girls felt that being Jewish was “important” to them, and that it made them feel proud. A few girls said also that they liked being Jewish because they liked “being different.” Finally, a girl in Year 1 of the study, when she was 10, indicated that she liked Judaism because of monotheism (although she did not yet know this word):

I like being Jewish because you know that there’s only one person out there who controls you, you don’t have to worry about praising everything . . . like a god for every single thing . . . There’s only one and I know I only have to trust one.

In terms of the negative aspects of being Jewish (other than antisemitism), participants identified four main categories:

1. Jewish dietary restrictions: having to keep kosher, fasting on fast days, eating special foods on Passover, etc. (One girl admitted to “cheating,” i.e., eating non-kosher food when outside her home.)
2. Other religious prohibitions: not traveling on major Jewish holidays (and therefore having to miss field trips from public school), or not being allowed to pierce one’s bellybutton (because Judaism prohibits body piercing).
3. Feeling singled out because of being the only Jew, or one of the only Jews, in one’s class or school.
4. Attending Hebrew school or synagogue, which is “boring.”

Items 1 and 2 were issues only for the religiously traditional girls in the study, item 3 pertained only to girls attending public schools, and item 4 (being bored at synagogue or Hebrew school) was shared by girls from all types of schools and religious backgrounds.
Antisemitic Experiences

The experiences of antisemitism that the girls in this study identified can be divided into two groups: direct ones (incidents experienced personally by the girls themselves) and indirect ones (incidents occurring to these girls’ relatives, friends, and acquaintances, or in the larger environment).

1. Direct Experiences

In terms of direct experiences, there were two direct incidents described by these girls in each of the first two years of this study, and one incident in the third year, that these girls felt were antisemitic. All five of these incidents took place in public schools.

- In Year 1 (age 10), a girl heard a group of her classmates saying that there was a book about Hitler they’d heard of and wanted to read, because Hitler was “cool.” In the second incident, a girl’s music teacher decided to teach the class a Jewish song for Chanukah, but an Iranian girl told the class, “I’m not allowed to do a Jewish song because Jews are my enemy.”
- In Year 2 (age 11), one girl heard a boy in her class tell the rest of the class (referring to her), “I don’t like her because she’s Jewish.” Another girl heard “offensive comments” at her school about Jews.
- In Year 3 (age 12), a girl was sitting next to a classmate who drew a swastika on his hand and showed it to her, clearly intending to upset or offend her.

2. Indirect Experiences

Regarding indirect incidents, girls in all three years reported events that they had heard about, and experienced, second-hand from relatives, friends, or acquaintances. They also had indirect experiences of antisemitism from the larger environment, but this sort of indirect experience was a major factor for these girls only in Year 1 of this research. During that year, there were three very dramatic antisemitic attacks in Toronto all in one weekend in March. Within three days, the windows of a synagogue were smashed, tombstones at a Jewish cemetery were destroyed, and half a street in a Jewish neighborhood had its front doors spray-painted with swastikas. The girls in this study were deeply affected by these events, and in the nine interviews that took place after that weekend, all of the girls brought up at least one of these incidents. Some of them also mentioned with concern the additional fallout from that weekend—for example, seeing antisemitic graffiti on the outer walls of their (Jewish) schools, and having to have guards
posted there at the entrance doors. Two girls were very upset about the
cemetery desecrations, because their grandparents were buried at the ceme-
tery that was vandalized (two of the grandparents were “in the front row”),
but fortunately none of their tombstones were broken. Two other girls knew
people living on the street where the swastikas had been spray-painted on
the doors (in one case it was a cousin, and in the other a school friend). The
second girl, too young to be certain about the word swastika, said that her
friend’s house had been “Suzuki’ed.” Another girl alluded to the high-pro-
file murder two years before of an Orthodox Jewish man by a skinhead on
one of the main streets of the Jewish neighborhood, and said that she was a
little scared of what was happening now in Toronto. A fourth girl said she
was worried about “the pushing down of the Jew.”

In contrast to Year 1, in Year 2 of this study there were no such dra-
matic antisemitic events in Toronto, and none of the girls mentioned inci-
dents of antisemitic vandalism in their interviews. Two girls, however, still
did describe disturbing indirect events. In one, a girl was told an anecdote
by her Hebrew school teacher. This teacher’s father’s car had broken down
and he had to call a towing company. The man with the tow truck arrived
and asked him if he wanted to stop somewhere on the way for a coffee, and
the teacher’s father declined, saying he wanted to just get his car fixed as
soon as possible. Soon afterward the tow truck driver’s cell phone rang, and
he said to his daughter, “I’m with this guy, and I asked if he wanted to stop
at a coffee shop, but the Jew wouldn’t buy me a coffee.”

In the second Year 2 incident, a girl had a classmate, an Orthodox boy
(who therefore wore a skullcap), and one day he was riding on a bus, and a
woman who was sitting down kept kicking him. He said to her, “Excuse
me, you’re kicking me. Can you please stop?,” but she didn’t say anything,
and kept on kicking him. Then the bus got to her stop, she stood up, and, and,
trying to get through the dense crowd to get off, she gave this boy a push,
saying to him, “Move away, Jew boy!”

In Year 3, also a year without unusually dramatic antisemitic events,
eight girls described indirect incidents. One girl had a Hebrew school
teacher who worked part time in a synagogue. One day, this teacher
answered the phone there, and it was an antisemitic hate call. A woman
started screaming obscenities at her into the phone, shouting, among other
things, “You Jews are the fault of every death in the world.” Another girl
said she knew people who had been insulted that year or made fun of
because they were Jewish—for instance, being called a “dirty Jew.” A third
girl was told a joke by a Jewish boy who had had it told to him: “What’s the
difference between a Jew and a pizza? Pizzas don’t cry in the oven.”

In Year 3, some of the girls also spoke about antisemitism in the larger
environment. This is consistent with the developmental changes these girls
were undergoing at age 12, especially as many of them were switching that year from elementary school to middle school, and were becoming more aware of, and interested in, the world around them. In Year 3, two girls brought up the antisemitic vandalism in Toronto two years before, one of them having seen a story about it on the news. Two other girls either read in the newspaper or heard from someone else about the Jews in Iran being forced to wear an identifying symbol on their clothing, “like a Jewish star.” Another girl referred to how dangerous it was to be a Jew in Afghanistan nowadays, because that country is “strongly antisemitic.”

3. Antisemitism, the Holocaust, and Israel

In these interviews, there were two particular themes that emerged from the girls’ comments about antisemitism, and these were the Holocaust and Israel. In these girls’ minds, there were clearly strong connections between antisemitism and the Holocaust, antisemitism and Israel, and the Holocaust and Israel. This was all the more striking given that in this study they were never asked about either the Holocaust or Israel; these were associations they spontaneously made themselves. This also happened more frequently as the girls grew older. In Years 1 and 2, a third of the girls related antisemitism to the Holocaust, but in Year 3 more than half of them did this (8 out of 14, or 57%). Similarly, regarding Israel, in Years 1 and 2 about a third of the girls related antisemitism to Israel, but in Year 3 this nearly doubled, with almost two thirds of the girls making this connection (9 out of 14, or 64%).

a. Antisemitism and the Holocaust

Regarding the Holocaust, one girl in Year 1, after talking about the antisemitic vandalism in Toronto, said, “It’s like the Holocaust again,” and two other girls expressed the same idea. One of these girls went on to say that the Holocaust scares her, “because I can’t believe they did that and stuff, and like I could never survive and stuff.”

In Year 2, the girl who described the incident with the tow truck driver, after saying “The Jew wouldn’t buy me a coffee,” continued:

Which is sad. I was, like, sad that someone would say something like that, especially, like, after the Holocaust and, like, stuff. And also, that guy on, like, the Internet denied the Holocaust. I don’t know who he is, but I heard [him] on the radio. Well, it [the incident with the tow truck] is not as bad as that, except it’s still, like, that’s how it all started, you know. Well, like, with people excluding Jews, or, like, saying bad things.
about them one by one. And then it got bigger and bigger. And then the concentration camps.

Similarly, in Year 3 the girl who related the story about the antisemitic phone call at the synagogue began talking about an antisemitic incident that had happened not long before in France, and then she spoke about the Holocaust:

Wow, there’s people in my area doing this. That’s pretty scary. Like, if this were to ever happen again, which it could. Like, did you hear about the thing in France with the guy who got tortured? Like, these things are still happening, and if, if it comes back again I don’t know if we’re going to able to, like, deal with it any more. So many of us are lost . . . Like, to think—six million. You just . . . Like, how could this many people be lost?

Some of these girls seem to have been encouraged to think about the Holocaust by being given books to read about it by their teachers or parents. In Year 1 of this study, only one girl mentioned reading a Holocaust book, but in Years 2 and 3, about a third of them referred to books they were reading about the Holocaust (usually for school, but not always). In addition, in Years 2 and 3, the girls alluded to other types of Holocaust-related educational experiences they had been exposed to: one saw a movie about it, another saw a play, and one was taken to visit a Holocaust museum. These girls were very affected by these experiences. They also seemed, as a result of them, to identify strongly with what happened to Jews during the Holocaust, and in some cases to identify especially with the Jewish children in that period. For example, one girl in Year 3 spoke about pictures she saw at a Holocaust museum, including photographs of Nazis making people remove their clothes:

If they didn’t strip they’d be killed. Or they, like, they tested with little boys, like 5-year-old boys, to see how long they can go without food. And then . . . And it’s just disgusting, like, what they did. And, like, to know all these people were Jewish and they were, like, kids like me.

Because of this identification, light-hearted comments these girls sometimes heard about the Holocaust (e.g., about Hitler being cool, or the joke about the pizza) were very painful to them.

In all three years there were some girls in this study who thought that the Holocaust could never happen again. Others felt, however, that it definitely could, because “some people don’t even believe it happened,” and even among those who do, many “haven’t really learned the lesson from it.”
b. Antisemitism and Israel

In terms of the connection between antisemitism and Israel, Israel was very much on the minds of the girls in this study. As with the Holocaust, they repeatedly brought up the subject of Israel unsolicited. In all three years they recognized that the conflict in Israel was a political problem and a complex one, and different girls in this study had different political opinions (most likely reflecting their parents' views). Basically, though, the girls all saw what was happening in Israel as a Jewish issue and as related to antisemitism. For instance, one girl in Year 1 said that Israel keeps getting bombed “because that’s the Jewish homeland.” Another one offered, as an example of antisemitism, that “A lot of people are having wars with the Jewish people . . . Like in Israel.” Many of the girls in this study were worried about the terrorist attacks in Israel. One girl had a friend who had been quite close to a bomb that had exploded there. Two other girls heard of bombs going off in places in Tel Aviv, where they themselves had been visiting a week or two before. Most of the girls felt some attachment to Israel, and six of them also had close relatives, including siblings, living there. Several girls had visited Israel, some numerous times; one girl in Year 2 was going to sleepover camp there that summer, and another girl was planning to celebrate her bat mitzvah there. Because of all these personal, cultural, historical, and religious connections, any attack on Israel (physical or ideological) was experienced by these girls as attacks on them as Jews, and therefore as antisemitic events. For example, in Year 2, one girl’s sister, who was a university student, came home very upset because there had been an anti-Israel rally on her campus, which to this girl and her whole family was an antisemitic demonstration. Similarly, in Year 3, another girl heard from a friend of hers that one day she was strolling through a mall with another friend, and this friend was wearing a shirt with the insignia of the Israeli army on the front. Someone walking by them made a sour face and a rude gesture toward her friend’s shirt, as if to say, “Yuck, disgusting.” The girl in the study who heard this story was very distressed by it, and said that although she, too, has the same Israeli shirt, after this incident, she will no longer wear it when she goes to the mall, “just in case . . .”

In Year 3, at age 12, two girls in this study commenting on the political situation in Israel were clearly trying to view it with some objectivity, and were obviously struggling with the competing claims of Jews and Palestinians for the land. For example, one girl said about the Palestinians:

. . . In their Bible they kind of think that we’re on their land. Like that it’s their land, given to them by their people. Which it also says in ours. They
can’t both be true . . . We think ours is right, but obviously from their point of view . . . they must think that theirs is right . . . Like, we think they’re evil cause they want to steal our land from us, but they probably think that we’re evil cause we have their land and we won’t give it back.

Two other girls in Year 3 commented on the role played by the Canadian media in influencing the way many Canadians regard Israel. For instance, one said, “You don’t really hear about the good stuff that happens there. You only hear about the bad.”

In general, the girls in this study were quite disturbed by the lack of peace in Israel. One girl in Year 1, after talking about a terrorist attack, said:

Everything that’s happening in Israel right now makes me really sad that so many people are dying and getting injured with, well, not really a reason—well, not a good reason . . . Because it’s just not right for someone to do such a thing and people shouldn’t like even think about doing stuff like that. And what my question would be is: Why were weapons invented? Like, why were guns and bombs and stuff invented in the first place? Because right now they’re not coming to any good use . . .

This view was also echoed by several other girls over the three years of this study. And in Year 2, two girls out of 15 gave their lives lower ratings (an 8 instead of a 9, and a 7.5-8 instead of a 9), because of the lack of peace in Israel.

c. Israel and the Holocaust

With reference to the connection between the Holocaust and Israel—and implicitly the three-way connection between antisemitism, the Holocaust, and Israel—with some of the girls it was quite noticeable how they switched quite seamlessly back and forth between these topics. For example, one girl in Year 1, talking about the Holocaust, said, “I don’t think [the Holocaust] would happen now—except in Israel,” and then went on to talk about the bombs going off there. Another girl in Year 1 said she worries about antisemitism and what’s happening to Jews around the world, because “like in Israel how there’s like, when, like there’s so much bombings and stuff . . . Well, the Holocaust is obviously worse, but this is still really bad.”

A third girl referred to a Holocaust book she had read where the girl in the story had had her parents taken away, and people around her were getting shot. The girl in this study then said:
And sometimes you hear on the news just like people who’ve done bad stuff to Israel, like if they want the land of Israel, they’ll just go to war because they want the land, and then people just . . . and then people . . . like, they just war, and then people die.

Another way in which the Holocaust and Israel were connected conceptually for some of these girls was through the idea of historical antisemitism, and the way Jews have often been unjustly blamed by the countries in which they have lived. One girl in Year 2 said she saw Israel as getting all the blame for the problems in that region, continuing:

That’s how World War II started. Cause Hitler, um, convinced Germany that, like, everything that’s a problem, that’s wrong with the world is because of the Jews. Like, the Russian president, or something like that, like, he told his country, like, he was, like, really bad. Like, he took advantage. Like, he always took the money and everything and when they would complain, he goes, “It’s all the Jews’ fault. Everything that’s bad is the Jews.”

The associations in these girls’ minds between antisemitism, Israel, and the Holocaust were very striking, and the implications of this are discussed below.

*Emotional and Psychological Impact*

The direct and indirect antisemitic incidents described above had both emotional and psychological effects on the girls in this study. In all three years, when the girls were recounting their antisemitic experiences, they also expressed feelings of fear and anxiety, and although most of them thought it unlikely that anything bad would happen to them in Canada because they were Jewish, some felt otherwise. In Year 1, for example, one girl said she could see something bad happening to her in Canada because she was Jewish. Another girl that year said that, as a result of recent antisemitic events in Canada, she is now sometimes a little afraid of people who are not Jewish. A third girl, the one who had the incident with the Iranian girl, said she was “sometimes really happy, but sometimes really sad” that she’s Jewish.

In Year 2, after telling the story about the boy being kicked on the bus, this girl said that she was glad that, unlike Orthodox Jewish boys with their skullcaps, she is not identifiable as a Jew when she goes out in public. She thinks she is safer that way. That same year, another girl, talking about her (public) school, said: “I don’t point out that I’m, like, a Jewish person. If somebody doesn’t ask me I’m not going to go . . . tell everybody I’m Jew-
ish . . . I don’t fully make myself a contact.” In Year 3 one girl, when
talking about her (public) school, said, “Sometimes I’m scared to tell people
there my religion cause, like, you never know, like, there could be people in
the world who, like, are antisemitic.”

Two other psychological effects were noted, as well. One girl in Year
1 showed some evidence of internalized antisemitism. “I wonder,” she said,
“If I wasn’t Jewish, would I make fun of Jewish people? I just wonder that.”

And in Year 2, several weeks after her bat mitzvah (which was a very
positive experience for her), a girl spoke about the possibility of converting
to Christianity because of the dangers of antisemitism:

Sometimes I feel like I want to be Christian, because I always hear about,
like, this stuff about, like, people killing Jews because they’re Jewish . . .
I usually hear about it in Israel, but sometimes . . . like, near me, like in
Toronto. Like, I think once I heard about this guy, he shot someone cause
he saw that he was Jewish or something. And so he shot him.

The following year this girl repeated this idea, saying that she could
see herself converting at some point in the future, but not at the moment.
When asked what sort of thing in the future might persuade her to convert,
this girl answered:

Well, I know that there’s been, like, some shootings or, like, in Toronto,
just because people are Jewish or, like, they’ve, like, graffiti on some
houses. That wouldn’t make me convert, but it would make me, persuade
me a little bit maybe. Just like, safety.

In terms of the overall emotional or psychological well-being of the
girls in this study, no relationships were found between their CASQ scores,
the antisemitic experiences they related, the types of schools they attended,
or their families’ religious affiliations. There was a relationship, however,
between these girls’ experiences of antisemitism and the ratings they gave
their lives, though only for Year 1. (In Year 3 there was no such relation-
ship, and in Year 2 this relationship showed itself with only two girls out of
the 15, the ones who lowered their life ratings because of the lack of peace
in Israel.) In Year 1, however, out of the 12 girls who were asked to give
their lives a rating, five of them rated their lives lower than they would have
otherwise, because of antisemitism. This appears to be related to the week-
end of antisemitic vandalism in March of that year, because all five of these
girls had interviews that fell after that weekend, rather than before. These
girls came from both kinds of schools and all religious backgrounds,
and constituted 55% (5 out of 9) of the girls interviewed after that particular
weekend. When asked the reason for her lowered rating, one girl, who had
given her life an 8 instead of a 10, said, “Because I’m really happy with everything that’s happening [to me], but people for our culture, things aren’t so good.” Someone else who lowered her score said: “Because of what goes on to people who are Jewish.” The fact that 5 out of 12 10-year-old girls in Year 1 (41%) rated the quality of their lives lower because of antisemitism strikes this researcher as disturbing.

_These Girls’ Conceptualization of Antisemitism_

Given the well-established relationship between cognitive and emotional processes (Oatley 2004), it is important to understand how these girls not only felt about antisemitism, but also how they thought about it. All the girls in this study who described antisemitic incidents were asked why they thought that that incident had occurred, or why things like that happen in the world. Below are some of their answers, according to each year of this study.

**Year 1**

“People think that they [the Jews] are lesser people. That we’re lesser people.”

“Because they have to blame their problems on someone, so they decided on Jews.”

“Because being Jewish . . . there’s always going to be hatred towards you.”

“People are making out that being Jewish is something like that’s a bad thing, but there’s nothing bad . . . it’s just a different . . . just believing different things.”

“Because they hate Jews . . . But I don’t know why they hate us—I don’t think we did anything bad to hurt them.”

“I don’t get why people would ever do that just because of a religion. Like, I don’t think we’re bad or mean or anything like that.”

**Year 2**

“There always is going to be [antisemitism], cause some people just feel that way. Like some people feel that we should not be here . . . They don’t like us. They’re followers of Hitler.”

“I think they have their own problems and sometimes it’s just them, like they may be sick. But sometimes it might be just, like, people who dislike Jews because of their own reasons. And I don’t know what those are.”

One girl in Year 2 expressed some self-doubt because of antisemitism, and perhaps some self-blame. She said that when an antisemitic incident
happens, she asks herself, “Is there something wrong with us?” This researcher asked her if she believes there is. Her answer was equivocal:

“I’m not really to say because I haven’t learned all the history of our past, of our present. I’m not fully in contact about what’s happening in Israel, what’s going on everywhere. If we’ve done something to those people. So I don’t think I can really, like, fully answer that question.

Year 3
In this year, the conceptualizations of antisemitism reflected these girls’ increased intellectual maturity, for example, in these two comments on the idea of stereotypes:

“Well, sometimes they [antisemites] have their own personal problems. I don’t know what their problems would be, but, pretty much all, all in all they stereotype. They think that all Jews are bad and it’s like one Jewish person was mean to them. Like they usually just stereotype one bad person.”

“People just don’t like other people to be different or they just, they stereotype and they think that, let’s say, all the Jewish people are mean, or are rich, or, as I’ve heard, have big noses.”

Antisemitism and Other Oppressions
In Year 3, these girls’ greater intellectual maturity and sophistication was reflected as well in the understanding that antisemitism is one form of hatred among many others. In the first two years of this study, two girls each year showed evidence of this understanding, but by Year 3 it was manifested in almost half the girls (6/14). This ability to see the link between antisemitism and other kinds of oppression reflected increased maturity, not only intellectually, but also in terms of these girls’ moral development.

In Year 1, the two girls who connected antisemitism with racism attended the same (Orthodox Jewish) school, and there they had been shown a puppet show about Black and Hispanic children getting stereotyped. One of the girls said that in that show, “a white person told a Black person that they were, like, lesser because they were Black. It’s so stupid, because it’s just a pigment.” Then she drew a parallel between racism and ageism: “I don’t think anyone [should] be . . . less treated. Well, I think that kids are less treated than adults.”

In Year 2, one girl connected the historical struggles of the Jews with the struggle of Black people for their freedom, and said it makes her angry whenever people—any people—“aren’t treated the same.” Another girl in
Year 2 talked about going with her class to see a performance by a group of people with disabilities, and in describing it, related ableism to antisemitism and racism.

In Year 3, one girl related antisemitism to racism, sexism, and homophobia:

Discrimination . . . makes me sad. Discrimination against Jewish people and against women, and against other people, like Chinese people and Black people and Native people . . . And the way the Nazis and some of the Germans treated the Jews was just terrible. And that makes me sad and it makes me angry that people can treat other people that way. It doesn’t really matter who you are . . . what your background is. They’re just people. I mean, they’re, we’re all people. We’re all equal. I don’t get how they could feel that they’re higher than the gypsies and the Jews and the homosexuals.

Similarly, another girl in Year 3, speaking about the Holocaust, connected this to racism, homophobia, and ableism: “It’s not just the Jews that were affected. Like, a lot of other people were affected: Homosexuals are affected, gypsies are affected, people with special needs are affected.”

At the broadest level, these girls were talking about hate. This came up explicitly in Year 3 in one of the focus groups, where a discussion took place among the girls about the hate in the world, and what they could do to fight it. One girl said that it is not possible to get rid of the hate in the world, because “even if there are just two people in a store, they will want the same item, and they’ll start fighting, and sooner or later someone will say, ‘I hate you.’ ” Another girl said that at school they were discussing To Kill a Mockingbird, and how good things could be “if everyone would just accept each other, and if there was not hate in the world.” Someone else mentioned that at school they were reading The Giver, and in that book there is the idea of a pill that could make everyone love each other. In response, one girl said that to make the world perfect, someone would have to put a magic spell on everyone, “and then, everyone would become nice and no-one would hate anyone.” Finally, one girl said, “We need more love in the world and less hate.”

Similarities and Differences by Religious Background and Type of School

In this study, no differences at all were found between the girls from the various religious backgrounds. This is the case regarding the girls’ antisemitic experiences, their life ratings, and their CASQ scores—a very interesting finding because there were very large differences in lifestyle and worldview between, for example, the girls from Orthodox and Reform
backgrounds. The similarities between these girls, however, obviously outweighed the differences.

With reference to the different types of schools attended, there were no differences between the girls on their indirect experiences of antisemitism, their CASQ scores, or their life ratings. It was only the girls from public schools throughout the three years of this study, however, who had direct experiences of antisemitism. The girls from Jewish schools may have direct experiences of antisemitism later in life, but for the time being, from a developmental perspective, their type of school is a protective factor for them, since according to the literature the younger one is when exposed to environmental stressors, the more vulnerable one is (Davies 2004; Webb 2006).

In terms of developmental similarities common to all the girls in this study (from both kinds of schools, and from all religious backgrounds), at the beginning of this research, when the girls were 10, their families acted as the main filter through which their information about, and understanding of, antisemitism was conveyed and interpreted. This parental centrality is typical for this age and developmental stage (Davies 2004). At age 11, these girls’ Hebrew school teachers also began playing a role in shaping their ideas about antisemitism. By age 12, however, as these girls approached adolescence and their general awareness of the world around them increased, they were influenced as well on this topic by peers, acquaintances, current events, the media, and the Internet.

Finally, one more similarity among all the girls in this study was that there was no relationship between their scores on the CASQ and the ratings they gave their own lives, or between the CASQ scores and their experiences of antisemitism. This latter point may be because the CASQ focuses on the general personality trait of optimism vs. pessimism (Shatte et al. 1999), whereas the question about life rating picked up on the girls’ more transient feelings of the moment, and therefore may have been more sensitive to external events like antisemitic incidents.

## Discussion

This research was initiated out of concern for the emotional and psychological well-being of Jewish girls in Canadian public schools, because a previous study suggested that antisemitism there may be putting them at risk. The findings of the current research indicate that to some extent this is the case. All five of the antisemitic incidents experienced directly by the girls in this study occurred in public schools. In addition, this research found that indirect incidents of antisemitism were experienced by girls from both public and Jewish schools. When they discussed these incidents, the
girls in this study expressed worry, fear, anxiety, sadness, anger, and self-doubt. In addition, some of them responded to their antisemitic experiences by trying to hide their Jewishness, internalizing the antisemitism, or considering converting to Christianity. Over 40% in Year 1 had lowered life satisfaction ratings linked to antisemitism.

All the above seems cause for concern. So is the fact that, as early as age 10, before most of these girls even knew the word antisemitism, they were aware of, and in varying degrees, worried about this phenomenon. In the first year, and in the two subsequent years, girls were able to identify by name those countries where they had heard antisemitic incidents had occurred, such as Afghanistan, Iran, France, and Russia, and they also grasped with remarkable acuity that the essential characteristic of today’s “new antisemitism” is anti-Israelism (Cotler 2002; Macshane 2008; Penslar et al. 2005; Stern 2006). As previously noted, these girls also repeatedly connected antisemitism with the Holocaust. This connection appeared to be encouraged at Jewish schools and by some of the parents, and although this focus on the Holocaust gave these girls some sense of Jewish history and identity, it also seemed to give them an increased sense of personal vulnerability. In addition, it was striking how, for some girls, the Holocaust was a barometer against which they measured their own experiences of antisemitism (e.g., “The Holocaust is obviously worse, but this is still really bad”). It gives one pause to think of 10- to 12-year-old girls using the genocide of six million Jews as a frame of reference for analyzing their own lives.

In terms of trying to understand what these antisemitic experiences really meant to these girls, it seems from these interviews that, for them, Israel and the Holocaust were their two touchstones for antisemitism: The Holocaust, on the one hand, was antisemitism past, while Israel represented antisemitism present and future. This may explain at least somewhat why two-fifths of the girls in Year 1 responded to the vandalism weekend with lowered life satisfaction scores. While community violence may generally have a major impact on children (Cummings et al. 2010; Maschi, Perez, and Tyson 2010), it is also possible that that weekend of antisemitic violence brought close to home both Israel (since these events took place in the context of the second intifada) and the violence of the Holocaust (since it was the swastika, the Nazi symbol, that was spray-painted on all those front doors). This dual image, both aspects of collective annihilation—past or potential—would have greatly intensified the psychological impact on these girls of that weekend’s events.

In terms of future research, this project is a first step toward understanding how Jewish girls—and Jewish children in general—experience, and are psychologically affected by, antisemitism. Additional research is necessary to build on this work. Future studies may wish to compare the
experiences of Jewish girls with those of Jewish boys, conduct an international project on Jewish children from many different countries, and employ (as this research did) both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, as well as a variety of different instruments to measure children’s psychological resilience and well-being. It will also be valuable in future to compare the antisemitic experiences of Jewish children with the ways that non-Jewish children experience other forms of oppression, for example, racism.

Finally, it is heartening to note that, in spite of their experiences with antisemitism, all the girls in this sample liked, or were proud of, being Jewish. This is very important, and we, as Jewish adults, need to do whatever we can to help Jewish children build on the positive aspects of their Jewish identities, rather than inadvertently fostering negative Jewish identity by overemphasizing antisemitism in Jewish education or at home. It is challenging, to say the least, to put antisemitism in realistic perspective when communicating about this topic with young people, and to help them find a balance between denying and exaggerating this phenomenon. Research like this, however, has a crucial role to play in helping us to understand the external reality that surrounds us, the factors related to how Jewish children process this reality, and what we, as scholars, parents, and educators, can do to protect the next generation of Jewish children, and at the same time prepare them for the future.

*Nora Gold is an associate scholar at the Centre for Women’s Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto (OISE/UT). She is the founder of two Canadian Zionist organizations, including JSpaceCanada—a progressive, pro-Israel, Toronto-based group—and is the editor for an online literary journal, Jewish Fiction.net, as well as a prize-winning author of fiction. Gold wishes to acknowledge with gratitude The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for its financial support of this research; Paula Bourne, former director of the Centre for Women’s Studies in Education at OISE/UT, for giving this project a home; Natalya Timoshkina, for her capable assistance with this research; and the remarkable, delightful, and fascinating girls who took part in this research, and their parents for making this possible.

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Antisemitism in America: An Update 1995-2012

Leonard Dinnerstein*

In recent decades, Jews have become the most successful, admired, and respected religious group in America. They have attained a place in society and a level of security and success in the United States that would have been thought unimaginable in the middle of the twentieth century. They are comfortable as citizens, they are hired for jobs based on their qualifications rather than their faith, they can live almost anywhere they can afford, they vacation where they will, and their children are educated at some of the finest schools in the country. All this does not mean, however, that antisemitism has disappeared; it has not. But there is no critical mass, no respectable political party or faction, and no prominent industrialists or religious figures who speak negatively of the Jews in public, except for the Black Muslim leader Louis Farrakhan, movie actor Mel Gibson, and white commentator Pat Buchanan, who is careful in the words that he uses but is a suspect “fellow-traveler.” In fact, antisemitism is rarely a basis for discussion in most American venues, and if it were not for Jewish organizations that zealously look for it and publicize every incident that comes to light, there would rarely be any media mention of antisemitism. Moreover, Jews, both as a group and as individuals, have power in the United States and never hesitate in exercising it. On some issues, Jews constitute a lobby that is both feared and respected in Washington. Almost all American Jews,

except for recent immigrants and those who are old enough to remember, or were victimized by, the Holocaust are completely at home in America.

Jewish power exists because Jews, and several organizations that represent their interests, understand how to make use of First Amendment freedoms such as the rights to contact their representatives and to express both privately and publicly their opinions and beliefs. Moreover, Jews as a group have much influence in the United States because their organizations are well run and well financed, and people in government are aware of the huge percentage of them who vote and make financial contributions to both major American political parties. In addition, some prominent Jews and organizations have the ear of people in Washington who could be helpful in obtaining their goals. Jews generally support liberal positions and their financial support goes mostly to the Democrats, but Republicans also fare well. For politicians Jews favor, and for causes that they champion, their support is immensely valuable; few national, state, or local politicians are elected to office who ignore Jewish concerns, and the few who do generally remain in office for short periods of time.

Moreover, Jews are not only heard but are catered to as well. At present, the security of Israel is the major issue that binds most American Jews. In March 2012 in Washington, at the major annual policy meeting of AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee), both Republican and Democratic leaders, including vice president Joseph Biden and president Barack Obama, spoke. The president reminded the almost 14,000 members in attendance that “at every juncture—at every fork in the road—we have been there for Israel. Every single time.”2 This has not always been true, but since the 1960s American support for Israel has been just about axiomatic. Polls show that most Americans join with their legislators and other elected officials in endorsing this position. As a writer for *The National Review* noted in 1995, “The happy fact is that antisemitism in America has dramatically declined in the last fifty years.”3

Jewish groups are concerned with the welfare of American Jews and, to a lesser extent, of others who suffer from economic deprivation and public displays of bigotry. Among the groups in the forefront of protecting Jewish interests and promoting congenial inter-group relations are the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of B’nai B’rith. In the past half century, domestic issues regarding prejudice and discrimination based on race, religion, and ethnicity have been brought to the attention of lawmakers, who recog-

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nized the need to make the United States a less bigoted nation. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the prime example of the changes Congress made. (Of course, the civil rights movement of the 1950s-1960s also influenced passage of that act.) More careful measurement and analysis of American attitudes toward Jews is regularly recorded by the ADL, which collects annual statistics on antisemitic activities in the United States and does a major in-depth poll every few years that measures antisemitic attitudes of the general population. Since the early 1990s, the results have been fairly similar.

Fifteen percent of Americans polled by the ADL in 2011 held deeply antisemitic views. In general, and in public, Americans are tolerant of the Jews in their midst. The most well-educated Caucasians have the fewest antisemitic attitudes. About one-third of non-Jewish Americans believe that Jews were responsible for the death of Christ, 30% suspect that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States, and about 20% think Jews “have too much power” in this country. Alone, these ideas smack of bigotry, but they do not necessarily mean the individuals expressing such thoughts are antisemitic. How often these ideas penetrate non-Jewish minds when they are not being polled is difficult to say.

Despite the fact of the acceptance of Jews, their status and security are always concerns of the leading Jewish organizations in the United States. As a consequence, there are many Jewish community and public relations groups reaching out and working together with other Americans for common goals. Most Jews just want to be accepted as individuals who have a different religion but who are like other Americans in all other ways: they are Republicans and Democrats, workers and homeowners, and people who have independent opinions on a variety of topics that Americans concern themselves with. The reality of that view is that it is not true. Jews are not like everyone else. They are richer and better educated than other Americans, tend to be much more involved with cultural activities like museum going, literature, and classical music, and generally prefer occupations that require brains rather than brawn. Moreover, their financial contributions to charities, the commentaries in their periodicals, and their voting records suggest that they are much more involved than are other Americans in helping the downtrodden live better lives. Most Jews are Democrats. Most other Caucasians in the United States are Republicans. There is nothing to be

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uncomfortable about in these characteristics, but many Jews are insecure enough in their status as Americans to just accept that. Too often the thoughts and actions of Jews who remember the Holocaust revolve around the concern for “what will the goyim think?” As a group, therefore, Jews are different from many other Americans, but they have no cause to worry about it. Yet many Jews absolutely refuse to accept the fact that their status is secure and they are not part of a marginal group simply waiting for the next pogrom. As Jerome Chanes wrote in the American Jewish Yearbook in 2004: “The paradox [is] that as the number of antisemitic incidents declined over more than two decades, Jewish perception of antisemitism rose.”

Nonetheless, antisemitism still exists among a minority of Americans and to a greater extent among the two largest minority groups in the country: Hispanics and African Americans. ADL polls have shown that about one-third of the foreign-born Hispanics, about twice the percentage of American-born Hispanics, have strong antisemitic feelings. The roots of Hispanic attitudes are complex; those of African Americans less so. The distinguishing factor among foreign-born Hispanics is the influence of Catholic religious teaching prevalent in Latin America, which is not mitigated by other aspects of their various cultures. As a reporter for The Chronicle of Higher Education noted in 2008, “to meditate on antisemitism in the Hispanic world, and particularly in Latin America, without invoking the victims of the Inquisition [mostly in 15th-century Spain], is to decontextualize the phenomenon. . . .”

African Americans, about 80% of whom are Baptists, are also a strongly religious group and the church has a much more important role in their culture than it does in the different Caucasian cultures in this country. As scholar Hubert G. Locke wrote in 1992: “Educationally, socially, and culturally, the Black church continues to be an institution around which the movement activities of many Black Americans revolve as well as where many of their attitudes, values, and outlooks are shaped.”

Below are the findings of recent ADL surveys of how Americans of different backgrounds differ in their antisemitic attitudes:

9. Locke, Black Antisemitism, 32.
The ADL also keeps an annual record of antisemitic incidents throughout the United States that it labels “Audits.” No other group tests public attitudes toward religious groups as frequently as the ADL. An organization founded in 1913 to promote positive public images of Jews and to expose and denounce those who displayed bigoted attitudes, the ADL grew strongly in the 1930s and after World War II became one of the major American defense, or, as most Jewish organizations prefer to be called, “community relations” agencies. By the 1990s, almost everyone in the United States who thought about the subject recognized that American antisemitism had declined considerably from its high point somewhere around 1944-1946. It was in 1979, however, that the ADL inaugurated and began publishing an annual list of antisemitic incidents in this country.

Aside from seeing whether the numbers and percentages of antisemitic events go up or down from year to year, however, few insights may be garnered from these figures. Without knowing context and details, the numbers of vandalisms, harassments, threats, assaults, and killings offer little in the way of understanding the antisemitic aspects of these incidents. Given that there are over 309 million people in the United States, the statistics listed below cover the actions of only a fraction of 1% of the American population; in addition, it cannot be ascertained whether each incident was done by a different person or whether some people engaged in more than one affront. Certainly, if one were to count only the antisemitic incidents reported, collectively it could be assumed that 99+% of the population is not hostile to Jews. That conclusion would be absurd; there are many more Americans who possess negative sentiments toward Jews. The one thing that might be concluded from the following audit numbers is that, except for 2010, antisemitic incidents in the United States have been declining in the current century.\(^{11}\) (The peak year for the audit was 1994, when 2066 incidents were noted.)

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<th>All Americans</th>
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<th>Native-Born Hispanics</th>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>15%</td>
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\(^{12}\) ADL, “Antisemitic Propensities.”
Most of the incidents and events are little remembered. Some, however, have received national attention: outspoken criticism of Israel on university campuses; Mel Gibson’s 2004 movie, *The Passion of the Christ*; and two scholars’ assessments of the “Israel Lobby” on American foreign policy decisions. Although each of these items caused a great deal of concern, stress, and fears of the beginning of a “new antisemitism,” within a year or two of their occurrences they were barely remembered. Nonetheless, some actions create hysteria in parts of the Jewish world.

A review of some of the antisemitic incidents during the past fifteen or so years suggests that they have had little impact on how Americans view Jews, but at the time of their occurrences they provoked much more anxiety than any of the activities warranted. For example, on several university campuses in the past decade or so, there have been public protests about Israel’s handling of Palestinian demands for its own homeland. Students have called for boycotts of Israeli goods, have denounced Israeli leaders, and have even physically attacked pro-Israel activists, while protesting Israeli policies toward Palestinians. At some universities, rocks have been thrown at buildings that housed Jews, individuals have been called “Zionist pig” and worse, and on occasion the police have been called out to prevent physical brutality from escalating. Protests calling for corporate divestment of investments in Israel have occurred at Princeton, Columbia, MIT, Howard, and the universities of California, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, among others, but those are not the campuses where most of the violence against Jewish students occurred. At some schools, like the University of California-Irvine, Rutgers, and San Francisco State, there were much more intense physical and verbal attacks. During these various protests, some student supporters of Israel received assistance from security guards attempting to quell violence inaugurated by pro-Palestinians. No other


administrative support came from these institutions, which, when they issued statements at all, denounced all forms of antisemitism.16

Calling for a Palestinian state, or denouncing the policies of Israel toward Palestinians who are aggressively fighting to become independent, does not constitute antisemitism, although there can be no doubt that antisemites do participate in these protests on American university campuses.17 But to equate anti-Zionism with antisemitism would be a mistake. Many Jewish students, as well as their elders, who are not “self-hating Jews” have also called for reexamination of Israeli policies toward those wanting a separate Palestinian state. And, according to the 2002 ADL survey, only 3% of university students are antisemitic.18 This statistic is probably still accurate because there have been few, if any, college graduates who have aligned with antisemitic organizations once they graduated.

Another event that caused a great deal of concern within some Jewish circles was the release of Mel Gibson’s film, The Passion of the Christ, in 2004. The film depicts ancient Jews as arrogant, rich, cruel, hard-hearted, and instrumental in bringing on the Crucifixion.19 Many people at the ADL believed that “the film could fuel hatred, bigotry and antisemitism,” 20 but that was just a sign of apprehensiveness. As Jerome Chanes noted in the American Jewish Yearbook the following year, “There was no evidence that the film affected most people’s attitudes toward Jews.” 21

A third concern about an antisemitic revival resulted from the 2006 publication, in the London Review of Books, of an article (later a book) on the “Israel Lobby.” 22 Written by two highly respected American political scientists, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, who basically argued that the U.S. administration’s policies toward Israel and other nations in the Middle East reflected the views of members of the “Israel Lobby” and were not necessarily in the best interests of the United States. The article received a great deal of notice because no other respectable scholars had argued that

point before in public. It also generated attacks upon Mearsheimer and Walt as antisemites. Several Jewish critics publicly dismissed both the article and the authors as bigoted. The ADL denounced the essay as “a classical conspiratorial antisemitic analysis invoking the canards of Jewish power and Jewish control,” while Edward I. Koch, a former mayor of New York City, argued almost the same way by stating that the “underlying message of their paper appears to be no more than the old canard that Jews are disloyal and dangerous.” Although Jewish groups do have power and do influence American policies toward Israel, they prefer that it not be discussed publicly. Despite their strong position in the United States, many older Jews still see themselves as an embattled group that will surely be victimized by Christians if it appears that Jews have “too much power.” Most Americans generally support existing governmental policies in the Middle East, but in 2010 one college student noted something about his grandparents that is probably reflective of what tens of thousands of Jews think. They believe, he wrote, that “the whole world is out to get us [Jews] and the whole world is out to get Israel.”

Ironically, institutions of American higher education once considered particularly antisemitic have made great efforts to recruit and please Jewish students. Unlike the 1930s, 1940s, and beyond, many colleges are now trying to recruit Jewish students because of their reputation as brighter than average. Some universities, including the most prestigious, have already employed Jews as presidents. Included among those seeking Jewish students are Vanderbilt, Allegheny College, and Franklin and Marshall, while Princeton, Yale, Harvard, the University of Michigan, and the University of Cincinnati have already had Jewish presidents. Jewish studies and Yiddish-language programs have also been inaugurated in universities throughout the nation, and several schools have also installed kosher kitchens.

Younger adult Jews are no longer embarrassed that their parents speak with heavy accents, klezmer music has become popular, and new Yiddish theaters have begun. None of these things would have happened had antisemitism been on the rise in the United States. As the editor of the Jewish Faculty Roundtable has written: “Today’s under-40s are seen as comfortable in living as Americans and as Canadians who are Jewish.

Period. They fortunately live in a world where antisemitism is not a daily factor in their own Jewish life. They do not live in a world where their own identity is maintained through a connection with the state of Israel.”

And the same may be said about the plague of antisemitism: most American Jews don’t see it, feel it, or fear it. What the future may bring is impossible to know, but what might be said about the climate of bigotry in the United States today is that antisemitism is too minor an issue to disturb the daily lives of American Jews.

*Leonard Dinnerstein is professor emeritus, Department of History, the University of Arizona.

Rachel Corrie and the Rest of the Story

Ben Cohen*

I am writing this column with great reluctance. In a rational world, the accidental death of Rachel Corrie, the pro-Hamas activist who was crushed by a bulldozer in Gaza almost ten years ago, would no longer have a place in the news cycle. Sadly, we do not live in a rational world, and therefore Corrie’s fate, along with that of her insidious group of allies that mushroomed following her death, continues to plague us.

Here’s what we know: After much careful deliberation, an Israeli court in Haifa finally dismissed a civil suit brought by Corrie’s parents, ruling that her death was not a homicide, but a consequence of Corrie’s decision to stand in front of an armored bulldozer whose driver could not see her.

Further, we know that Israel is a country where the clear separation of powers that is essential to democracy exists. Israel’s courts are not beholden to the government or the IDF. Rather, they are robustly independent, unafraid of reaching decisions that might be unpopular with the imperatives of whomever happens to be in government.

Case in point: In 2003, Israel’s Central Elections Committee (CEC) banned Balad, an anti-Zionist party based among Israeli Arabs from running in the elections of the same year. The CEC argued that Balad’s rejection of Israel’s character as a Jewish state disqualified the party’s participation. But Israel’s Supreme Court overruled that decision, thereby allowing Balad to run in the elections. One of Balad’s leaders, Ahmad Tibi, praised the court for “blocking the anti-democratic avalanche of the right-wing.”

Yet, when an Israeli court arrives at a decision that the “Zionism is racism” chorus disagrees with, all of a sudden the entire judicial system is corrupt. In responding to the Corrie verdict, Amnesty International talked,
ludicrously, of a “pattern of impunity” when it comes to alleged violations by the IDF (clearly, Amnesty does not remember the case of Lt. Col. Ya’akov Gigi, who was imprisoned and demoted in 2008 after being convicted in the wrongful killing of a Palestinian civilian). Former president Jimmy Carter, who depicts Israel as an apartheid state, dutifully chimed in with similar wording: “The court’s decision confirms a climate of impunity, which facilitates Israeli human rights violations against Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Territory.”

Frankly, we shouldn’t expect anything else from individuals and groups like these. They are predisposed to believe the slander that Israeli institutions are built on the principle that Jews are more equal than non-Jews. Still, the cumulative effect of these statements leads unwitting readers to believe that the only issue worth considering is Israel’s behavior. Their authors do not indeed, will not ask what Corrie was doing in Gaza in the first place, nor do they question the ugly, genocidal politics that this deeply misguided young woman subscribed to.

Corrie was a member of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM)—a misnomer if ever there was one, since Palestinians are the sole subject of the dubious “solidarity” they offer. You will not find ISM volunteers in Syria, documenting the unspeakable atrocities committed by Bashar al Assad’s regime. You will not find them in Russia, monitoring the kangaroo court that recently convicted the feminist punk band Pussy Riot to two years’ imprisonment on the charge of “hooliganism.” Nor will you find them in Venezuela, the homicide capital of the world, standing alongside the innocent civilians murdered by gangsters aligned with the tyrant Hugo Chavez.

You will not find them in these places for two reasons. First, the ISMers have a soft spot for authoritarian regimes, so long as these are sufficiently anti-American. Second, they are cowards: Israel and the Palestinian territories are ideal spots for war tourists of this ilk, since, statistically speaking, there is very little chance of death or injury at the hands of the IDF, and you can get a shower and a decent meal at the end of a day’s “solidarity” work.

At the same time, the ISM is not stupid. It is an integral part of the current of opinion that has essentially beatified Rachel Corrie. Since she died, her supporters have portrayed her as an unimpeachably noble soul, on a par with—unbelievably—Anne Frank. Writing this week in Counterpunch, an online antisemitic rag that is a favored destination for the ISM, Jennifer Loewenstein had the temerity to conclude, “I believe Anne Frank would have agreed with Rachel’s mother, Cindy, who when asked if she thought Rachel should have moved away from the bulldozer replied, ‘I
don’t think that Rachel should have moved. I think we should all have been standing there with her.’ ”

Raiding the memories of the Holocaust to score points for the Palestinians is a long-established tactic of the ISM and similar groups. But what really matters here is the moral gulf that separated Anne Frank from Rachel Corrie. Read Anne Frank’s diary, and what comes across is a humanism extraordinarily rare for someone so young. Corrie, by contrast, frequently accused Israel of practicing genocide—an absurd claim, given the year-on-year increase in the Palestinian population—while happily taking up membership in a group that seeks to destroy Israel with what it euphemistically terms the “one-state solution.”

There are few examples in history of nations giving up their right to self-determination without bloodshed. A single state from the Mediterranean to the River Jordan would have to be imposed on Israelis, and most of them would have to die or be expelled for it to take shape—that bald reality is the true legacy of Rachel Corrie, and one that leaves her and her allies omitting the rest of the story.

*Ben Cohen is a writer based in New York City. His work on Jewish affairs and Middle Eastern politics has been published in Ha’aretz Commentary, the New York Post, the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism, and other key periodicals. Cohen’s article “Saints or Sinners? Meet Rachel Corrie’s Allies,” published September 2, 2012, JNS.org, is reprinted here as “Rachel Corrie and the Rest of the Story” with the author’s permission.
Contemporary reactions to the topic of the Holocaust may provide a researcher of antisemitism with material of interest and importance on many levels. This is naturally the case regarding problematic responses of various kinds. The best-known assault on the history and memory of the Holocaust has been Holocaust denial. Alongside straightforward denial, however, there have appeared in recent years different types of more sophisticated and less easily definable forms and trends of misuse and distortion of the Holocaust. Due to their certain vagueness, they are also generally more accepted—hence the frequent challenge in pointing to their problematic dimensions. One of the most conveniently accessible arenas today for observing reactions and responses originating from the general public is the feature of comments written in response to online news articles. When tapping into this type of research material, one can expect to find out something about current public sentiments, moods, and attitudes, as well as about larger trends developing from these factors.

When it comes to public discussion on the Holocaust in the Finnish context, there was a lively exchange of opinions that took place online in Finland in August 2010. The discussion arose in response to a news item reporting that, due to Finland’s aspirations to become a member of the ITF (The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research), the Finnish National Board of Education had given specific instructions that Holocaust teaching would be introduced into the national elementary and high school curricula. The news was published in Helsingin Sanomat (HS), the largest newspaper in Finland, on August 14, 2010, under the headline “Holokaustin opetuksesta tuli määräys opetussuunnitelmiin” (Instruction was given to include Holocaust teaching in the
school curricula). It drew a barrage of 550 comments on the newspaper’s Web site; 400 comments also appeared on the Web site of another popular Finnish newspaper, Ilta-lehti (IL). The online responders expressed both irritation and opposition to this news.

For my thesis, I studied these discussions with a twofold objective: First, by looking into this Finnish public discussion on an issue inherently related to the Holocaust, my aim was to observe what types of reactions and opinions this news event prompted in general, as well as what kinds of sentiments and attitudes were discernible. My second and subsequent goal was to view the more problematic reactions and attitudes within a broader framework of abuse of Holocaust history and memory, and to consider them in the light of contemporary manifestations of antisemitism.

What emerged most strikingly from the comments was the overall negative response that the news aroused in the general public throughout the comment chains. Roughly, out of IL’s total of 400 comments, only 35 or so could be regarded as clearly positive toward this news or in some manner providing factual information about the Holocaust and related matters to other discussion participants. Responses to HS were even more negative: out of the total of 550 comments, approximately 70 could be regarded as exhibiting a positive attitude toward the news and/or bringing in accurate and factual information on matters related to the Holocaust. This small number of positive responses was in itself noteworthy. There were inevitably a number of comments that could not be categorized—i.e., strayed from the topic—but it became clear nonetheless that the prevailing sentiment throughout the discussions was that of negativity and opposition.

From within the negative responses, four categories of themes emerged. Because, however, a good deal of these negative comments contained elements common in all these themes, an attempt to provide accurate percentages for the categories cannot be completely successful. Nevertheless, the most easily observable themes can be grouped and summarized, along with some of the pertinent and typical responses, as follows:

- **General negativity toward the news** (approximately 29%): “Why should Finland become a member of this organization [ITF]? This is an outside intrusion into our national matters as well as a politically driven enterprise. The Holocaust has been and is already being taught enough in our schools; consequently, there is no need to introduce it separately into the curriculum.”

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1. HS.fi: [http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/artikkeli/Holokaustin+opetuksesta+tulii+mitotta+on+opetuussuunnitelmiin/1135259324418](http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/artikkeli/Holokaustin+opetuksesta+tulii+mitotta+on+opetuussuunnitelmiin/1135259324418); [http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Holocaust+to+be+included+in+national+core+curriculum+for+basis+education++/1135259413393](http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Holocaust+to+be+included+in+national+core+curriculum+for+basis+education++/1135259413393).
• Theme of Israel: Irritation against Israel’s assumed role in the matter (= 25%): “Israel is behind this enterprise. Why should we care about what Israel thinks of our curriculum, and why do we let Israel dictate our schoolbooks? It is quite a bit of Finlandization from us to bow to the pressure from the criminal and racist State of Israel.”

• Theme of Jewish suffering and victimhood in relation to other victim groups and genocides: Resentment over the perceived injustice that the Holocaust and Jewish victims should receive such singular and special emphasis to the exclusion of other victims and other genocides (= 20%): “Why is it always only the Jews that are being remembered and mentioned? Everyone surely knows enough about Jewish suffering. Why are other victims not mentioned—are they somehow less valuable and less important than Jews? Other genocides should be included in the curriculum, too, not just the Jewish Holocaust. The Jewish lobby has money and power—that is why their issue is kept on the agenda.”

• Theme of Stalin versus Hitler: Demands for more emphasis on Stalin’s crimes (= 7%): “Why are Stalin and his crimes not given any attention? He was as bad as Hitler, if not even worse in terms of numbers of victims.”

In addition to these themes, there was also a longer discussion held on the less glorious Finnish wartime history (Finnish-German cooperation, Finnish volunteer SS men, etc.), including demands that these aspects should also receive more emphasis within the curriculum.

To begin with, a general observation that one was able to make from these discussions was the level of ignorance as well as the lack of any deeper understanding when it came to the fundamentals, particulars, and immensity of the Holocaust. The “but” in the oft-heard comment, “Yeah, the Holocaust was quite awful but . . .,” was a sufficient indicator of some level of ignorance. The claim that “We know enough about the Holocaust” likewise popped up repeatedly, yet the widespread diminishment of the Holocaust indicated the opposite. Moreover, the role of the Holocaust as a watershed event in modern European and world history was clearly not perceived that way by the bulk of the responders. As a consequence, many voiced their opposition to the assumed exclusive teaching of Jewish/Zionist history that was now about to make its way into the Finnish school curricula, as children and young people were soon to be “force-fed” the Holocaust and learn about the Jews as the principal victims. Quite understandably, as a result of this line of thinking, it was beyond comprehension to many why the Holocaust should be taught in any special fashion in Finnish schools.
Aside from the general opposition to the proposed amendment of the curriculum and to Finland’s joining the ITF, one can also discuss the responses in terms of their more problematic dimensions, related to wider trends of contemporary distortions and misuse of Holocaust history and memory. To begin with, there were some clear instances (around 20 comments or so) of either straightforward or slightly indirect and implied Holocaust denial, particularly on the IL Web site, where it typically appeared as the questioning of the number of victims and hinting at the alleged lack of proof concerning killing methods. More important, however, the larger themes that emerged from the responses seemed in the end to point to some other, in some ways vaguer but no less disturbing, trends also taking place in the Finnish context. One can argue, first of all, that the clearest larger trend seemed to be Holocaust relativism, resulting in a considerable downplaying and minimizing of the Holocaust on the whole. This became apparent first and foremost by the repeated demands that the Holocaust should not receive any special emphasis in relation to other genocides, neither as part of the school curriculum nor in general. Alternatively, one could also refer here to the trend of Holocaust equivalence, in that the major part of the comments clearly hammered home the notion that there was nothing unique about the Holocaust and hence it should be seen in equal terms with any other mass atrocity, be it that of Stalin’s or any other genocide. Furthermore, there was also quite a bit of “Holocaust fatigue” in the air, which is a rather curious phenomenon considering that the Holocaust has never loomed large in the Finnish public consciousness or assumed a disproportionate part of the school curricula.

Third, in many ways related to Holocaust relativism and equivalence, was an apparent trend of de-Judaization of the Holocaust. The Jewish element of the Holocaust and its victims seemed to cause considerable resentment, an irritation brought up by numerous responses along the lines of “the Jews were not the only victims and yet their suffering is the sole thing we hear about,” or “this endless fuss over the Holocaust must stop—other victims in the world deserve our compassion, too.” It became clear that the bulk of the responders simply preferred to hear less about the Jews in connection with the Holocaust; furthermore, some commenters voiced their indignation that the term “Holocaust” was being applied only to Jewish victims. All of the above indicated that the core antisemitic dimension of the Holocaust did not really register with most of the discussion participants, let alone the long tradition of European antisemitism leading up to it. And fourth, with regard to Israel, there were some clear instances of Holocaust inversion, whereby the commenters implied that actions of the State of Israel today were not at all so different from those of the Nazis in the past. This message was brought home with such comments as “just look at
‘the chosen people’ and their genocidal activities today—that’s what should be in the curriculum,” or by referring to “Israel’s ‘final solution’ to the ‘Palestinian question,’ ” among other opinions. In sum, it emerged from these larger themes that the Holocaust as a particularly Jewish catastrophe was resented; instead, more emphasis on other genocides and atrocities was called for, and the general preference was to hear more about other victims and less about the Jews. And, finally, the discussions were also illustrative of the inflated role that the State of Israel often receives in contemporary Holocaust discourse on the one hand, as well as of the hateful tones of that rhetoric on the other.

When looking for possible explanations for the overwhelmingly negative reaction by the Finnish public, it was relevant to first pay attention to the construction of the news article itself. The article left a slightly negative aftertaste, most likely due to its emphasis on the reactions of Finnish teachers, who were mentioned to have been astonished by this new amendment (teachers’ critical response being a matter of interest and significance as such). Another, a smaller but no less significant detail, seemed to have been the article’s brief reference to the critical word “Israel.” This was picked up by the readers, and—not very surprisingly—in a negative way. People interpreted it to mean that it was first and foremost Israel that was pressuring and pushing Finland to join the ITF, which was not the case. It was thus quite evident that editorial choices in this specific news item ended up being rather crucial, determining to a certain extent the ways in which the readers interpreted and (mis)understood the news. Hence, one can in this particular case as well point to the key role of mainstream media in creating certain sentiments and sometimes misguided conceptions in mind of the general public.

Aside from media influence and the misguided sentiment that our national sovereignty had been encroached, however, there remained some peculiar attitudinal and emotional dimensions within the responses that could not simply be explained away with media-initiated sentiments. First and foremost, the vehemently opposed and annoyed attitude toward the Jewish character of the Holocaust and its victims, as well as against Holocaust education as such, cannot be traced to the news article. Why should the teaching of the Holocaust, an indisputable historical event, prompt so much opposition in the first place? Moreover, the prominent position that Israel ended up having within the discussions was something that also requires a second thought, considering the fact that the news was not related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, when it came to looking for some further explanation, one had to take into account possible antisemitic dimensions since the comments proved to offer some food for thought in that regard as well. One of the initial hypotheses of my thesis was that often
public reactions and responses to the Holocaust in contemporary discourse on the topic may in one way or another reveal something about deeper anti-Jewish sentiments and undercurrents currently evolving. On the basis of this case study, the following argument could be made: that there were some clearly noticeable anti-Jewish/anti-Israel sentiments intertwined in this contemporary Finnish public discourse on the Holocaust; and that there seems to be a somewhat predisposed, reflex-type of readiness to draw the State of Israel into the picture by the smallest hint and in a negative way.

Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to point out that some traces of the old European deep culture of anti-Jewish prejudice and animus seemed to linger over this Finnish public discussion as a whole. As one of the commenters, representing minority voices, noted:

When reading the crude distortion of history by these “diplomats” and other closet Nazis, accompanied by a big choir of ignorant people, one cannot but come to one, grave conclusion: in the future, once again, anything is possible [emphasis in the original]. Sure enough, not by these people themselves, but their kindred spirits existing all around the world, also in leading political positions. In a word: the writing on the wall is scary.

Or, as another commenter pointed out, also testifying to the general mood of the discussions:

By way of summary, after a quick and even cursory reading of the contents of this response chain, one could draw a conclusion that yet another calamity, equal to the Holocaust, will happen to the Jews. Such was the amount of hatred and ignorance of various degrees—also lies—that was targeted against the Jews in this chain, though there are some civilized comments as well. Some “vent out” their feelings uninhibited, whereas others are capable of expressing their antipathy toward Jews in a more “civilized” manner. The same ingredients existed also prior to the previous Holocaust, so history seems to be repeating itself. The secular media, unfortunately, has been probably the most effective opinion former as regards anti-Israel sentiment.

In many respects, it was indeed surprising to come across, in these kinds of prominent Web sites, such unmistakably antisemitic ideas and tropes (“force-Judaized history teaching,” “the Jewish lobby,” “the Jews, money and power,” etc.), coupled with a heavy anti-Israel mood, manifested in such high volumes and in such an outspoken manner.

As for the anti-Israel sentiment, the virulence with which Israel was being referred to in a host of comments was noteworthy. This sentiment exposed the unique loathing and animosity that one particular country in the
world can trigger in people, including Finland. This phenomenon was also telling about the extraordinary propensity by the public to buy into false interpretations and perceptions concerning Israel. A good illustration of this was the responders’ readiness to believe that it was mainly due to pressure from Israel that Finland had made the decision to join the ITF, an idea bordering on the absurd. Furthermore, unsubstantiated accusations of Israel’s genocidal activities against the Palestinians clearly are not constructive criticism of some specific Israeli policies; instead, they are meant to demonize Israel and by necessity Jewish Israelis. But in Finland, much like elsewhere, there seems to be plenty of room under the umbrella of “legitimate criticism” of Israel. It should be noted, moreover, that there appears to be a considerably higher toleration of slander and hateful rhetoric when it is directed against a state, that state being without exception Israel. For example, when a leftist politician in Finland made a comment some time ago on “the genocide that Israel perpetrated in Gaza,” from the little that was reported on the incident afterward, one could walk away feeling that the question had only been about “criticism of Israel’s policies,” which can neither be hate speech nor antisemitism. So a question is when could it be, or is it altogether inconceivable, that a state—inevitably including its people—could be a target of antisemitic attitudes and hateful discourse? One cannot help but conclude that, in addition to the more traditional anti-Jewish tropes and resentful sentiments expressed in this public discussion, the vitriolic discourse on Israel exuded in many respects the “longest hatred” itself. But even if one is hesitant to touch the issue of contemporary antisemitism and especially that of the “new antisemitism” with respect to Israel, one can nevertheless summarize as follows: If nothing else, this particular discussion revealed that among Finnish public there exists, at least to some extent, an attitudinal inclination to react—knowingly or more unconsciously as a result of media influence and groupthink—in an emotionally charged and negative manner to issues having something to do with Jews—here, the Holocaust, its Jewish victims, and the State of Israel. In this connection, one must nonetheless clearly point out that there are still also sizable numbers of pro-Israel Finns, mostly Christians, who do not shy away from giving their open support to Israel, especially during the periods of heightened tension in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that the level of awareness regarding contemporary antisemitism is generally rather low in Finland. Antisemitic sentiments intertwined in the Israelophobic discourse and in antagonistic attitudes toward the Jewish state are either unidentified or tolerated, while similar expressions about Muslims would raise charges of Islamophobia.

If one accepts FRA’s working definition of antisemitism with reference to the State of Israel (http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2011/work-
When it comes to a more solid grasp of contemporary antisemitic developments in Finland, it seems that the following essentials must first be internalized—which clearly was not the case, as this public discourse on the Holocaust and related matters revealed. First and foremost, to get a grasp of the uniquely Jewish dimension of the Holocaust requires knowledge and a deeper understanding of the long history of European antisemitism prior to the Holocaust. And, as for today, if we hope to educate the wider public as well as the younger generation on the more contemporary developments of antisemitism, we would also need to touch on the issue of Israel as the face of the Jew of today, arousing deep feelings and inexplicable disdain and animosity. But if there already was among teachers considerable opposition
even to have the Holocaust—a historical event whose Jewish and antisemitic elements are well researched—included in the curriculum, how can we in that case expect that the “new antisemitism” as an even more politically charged issue would make its way into Finnish curricula, as part of human rights education, for example? This is a particular matter of concern if research in general focusing on contemporary antisemitism is either discouraged on the whole, judged as resting on an anecdotal and subjective basis, or as exhibiting too much political “advocacy” and too little academic analysis.

This news event, along with the ensuing public discussion, offered a good venue for observing reactions and attitudes that at least some parts of the general public in Finland today exhibit toward the Holocaust, the Jews, and the State of Israel. One cannot, however, draw any further conclusions on how prevalent these kinds of sentiments might be among the wider Finnish public, apart from those nine hundred or so online comments examined for this case study. This was only one case and one news event, and much additional research is needed to be able to say anything more all-embracing about Finland.

To conclude, the case for Holocaust education in Finland can be made rather pointedly if the primary reasons for this negativity were indeed media influence and the groupthink phenomenon, let alone deep-rooted European anti-Jewish attitudes. But especially in light of the reportedly critical response by Finnish teachers toward the news, there remains in the end a certain gray zone, which may be of importance but is not so easy to gauge—namely, the attitudes of the teachers themselves. A question of the extent to which an individual teacher’s strong anti-Israel attitude, for example, may determine the manner in which the Holocaust is approached in class or is used to educate students about other human rights issues of a more contemporary nature remains for the most part a matter of guesswork.

*Sirpa Bağman received her MA degree from the University of Helsinki, Finland, in semitic studies, English philology, and communications. She has interned at the Christian Desk of Yad Vashem and is currently a research student at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
This report explores how the series of harassments and threats against my life—which have most recently embittered my life—began, as well as how I am trying to resist and get beyond this frightening and paralyzing situation. Above all, I am trying to comprehend and make sure that others become aware of the processes in Hungary that resulted in this situation. I do this to assure that the political situation in Hungary is improved and does not worsen, which in my opinion are the natural and likely dynamics if there is no attempt to curb current anti-democratic and neo-Nazi activities.

Antisemitism, hatred of the Roma, and violent acts committed against minorities have clearly been increasing in the last few years in Hungary. People who oppose fascism thought these were isolated incidents, but it has become obvious that one party (Jobbik) in the Parliament and the conservative governing party (Fidesz) have been moving toward espousing extremely right-wing ideas. Unfortunately, the present situation is well described by the fact that in the Hungarian Parliament, an MP verbally abused Jews, shouting antisemitic slogans, all on live television.

The number of atrocities is on the increase. In recent years, some of the attacks on Roma people claimed lives. Although outlawed, in the last two years the extreme right-wing Magyar Guard has been growing, and is perpetrating an increasing number of violent acts. One must recognize clearly that the Hungarian government and the Hungarian Parliament violate the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty concerning Hungary.

Probably that is why a young man was roughed up in the street simply because he was visibly Jewish, and Chief Rabbi József Schweitzer was verbally assaulted and threatened in public. In another case, Dr. Péter Dániel, a well-known lawyer and opponent of the policies of the government, had to be rescued by the police from a mob ready to lynch him. Most recently, Vilmos Hanti, chairman of MEASZ and FIR, suffered serious injuries in an assault. And the threats against those who protest against László Csíszik-
Csatáry, currently one of the most wanted war criminals, perfectly fit this pattern. This essay tells the story of this particular incident.

Jobbik is an extreme right-wing political party in Hungary. It is antisemitic and racist, and makes its platform clear to the Hungarian public. We have now got to the point where they have posted a reward for all those, including me, who protested against Csizsik-Csatáry, a convicted war criminal. Immediately after the July 10, 2012 protest, in fact, kuruc.info, the far-right Web site closely affiliated with the Jobbik party, launched a campaign of fear and intimidation. The site published personal information, including photographs, of all those they were able to identify as having participated in the protest.

Many, including me, have been constantly harassed and my life has been threatened more than once since then. Despite appeals to the police, I have received no protection. Many, including me, think that the current government partially tolerates the extremist Jobbik party’s politics of hate. In the two and a half years since their election, the government has not made sufficient efforts to curb verbal or physical abuse by the openly racist and extremist Jobbik party. As a result, the political atmosphere in Hungary is sometimes significantly and intensely overt, blatant, and extremely nationalist and racist.

In such a milieu, in a country with a long history of extremism, it is not surprising that Jews and the Roma are routinely scapegoated and targeted. They are the ones made out to be responsible for all the social ills that the country faces, including high unemployment, the decline in living standards, and growing poverty and crime. Jobbik’s politics have been legitimized and made to appear more acceptable through the ever-growing cult around the late regent Miklós Horthy—Hungary’s authoritarian interwar leader and Hitler’s ally.

Along with Horthy’s image, some of the vilest symbols of the former fascist regime have been resurrected, rehabilitated, and being turned into icons. The government has made it clear that in several ways the politics of Hungary between the two world wars is seen as exemplary and worth following. Miklós Horthy was Hungary’s ruler from 1920, and during the era when Hungary’s Jewish community was deported and exterminated. Hungary may have been to first to restrict the rights of Jews by the *numerus clausus* law of 1920. Even prior to the German presence in Hungary—i.e., 1941, Hungarian authorities deported close to 19,000 Jews to Kamenetz-Podolsk, where they were murdered. In addition, the state played a key role in the cruel treatment and significant loss of life of Jewish forced laborers. With German occupation, by 1944, the state deported 437,000 Hungarian Jews, actively assisting with their transportation to the death camps and theft of their possessions.
The far right represents Horthy as a hero. In one town, the local council named a park in his honor, while in another community a life-size statue was erected in his memory. In yet another location, a marble plaque on the wall of a school again bears Horthy’s name, which had been removed in 1947. Yet the government does not vigorously oppose the rehabilitation of Horthy; instead, it invariably encourages Jobbik and until now dormant fascist sentiments.

Two Fidesz MPs participated in a fundraising event for the erection of a Budapest-based Horthy statue. Reflecting on the large number of events organized in Horthy’s memory, prime minister Viktor Orbán stated in an interview with Austria’s Die Presse: “The decision to hold such events is one that must be made by the local community”—failing to mention that Fidesz politicians control nearly all municipalities in Hungary, with local councils comprising Fidesz representatives almost exclusively.

After the 2010 election, Fidesz used its two thirds’ parliamentary super-majority to curtail the powers of the Constitutional Court and passed a new constitution that cements the party’s power and places nearly all media under state supervision. Many groups, including the European Union, objected.

Neo-Nazis in Hungary use an array of scare tactics to break and silence opponents. These include threats of physical violence, including murder, and publishing the most personal and private forms of information about those who dare to engage in social and political protest against the actions and rise of the extreme right. They target those who dare to protest and upload personal information of the latter to the most viciously fascistic news sites. Hundreds of thousands of people read these Web sites, and they can easily make the lives of democratic activists a living hell. No one should have to read hateful and abusive e-mails such as this: “Rotten Jewish whore! Get lost from my country, along with your treasonous, filthy Jewish race. How dare you harass elderly people, you dirty Jewish whore.” (For similar statements see the original 2012 PDF footnote.)

Online harassment is much more dangerous than verbal scare tactics. Threats expressed over the Internet have a far more detrimental and lasting impact on the victim than the occasional verbal insult and abuse. It is also clear that Hungarian authorities have a range of digital tools at their disposal that could be harnessed in an effort to stop such harassment and intimidation.
I have been harassed and my life has been threatened multiple times since July 2012. Nevertheless, the Hungarian police failed to ensure that the personal data of protesters is removed from a Web site that has no qualms about calling for the murder of those who dare to protest against their actions. The pervasive nature of Internet-based communication and the speed at which misinformation spreads mean that the victims of abuse have nowhere to hide. Psychological problems are now rampant, with several developing eating disorders and insomnia as a result of constant fear. They feel constantly threatened and nervous as anxiety and nightmares fill their days and nights.

Much of Jobbik’s open hate-mongering is allowed without sufficient government action to curb it. Everyone in Hungary, including the government, knows that the neo-Nazi party has no reservations about engaging in open intimidation, verbal abuse, and harassment. There is no governmental will or desire on the part of the government to bring an end to these threats.

Hungary’s extremist allies help draft laws aimed at instilling fear in those who live in abject poverty, those who are unemployed, as well as in employees, small businesspeople and, indeed, in everyone and everything that moves. Free people by nature oppose and try to stop scare tactics designed to control them. On the other hand, the post-World War I history of Hungary and Europe shows that small but determined groups can quickly and radically change the political atmosphere and reality. In the past hundred years, Hungary experienced this with radical swings between totalitarian, brutal communism and genocidal fascism.

Well-known psychological research projects have shown that, dismayingly, many people can be rapidly manipulated and controlled to support and willingly perform inhuman actions they would not normally engage in. Under certain circumstances, many if not most people can be influenced to
do things normally against their conscience, yet each individual is fully responsible for his or her actions regardless of the “madness of crowds.”

Just as a large number of people can be influenced to engage in negative and even cruel activities, one day the same social force could help Hungary separate from its past political patterns in order to bring a positive social and political atmosphere. There is hope for a better tomorrow.

We must aim to ensure that the current atmosphere of fear and intimidation is curtailed before there is further escalation of hatred and its resulting effects. The European Union is now faced with a Hungarian government that came to power through democratic means, but that went on to use its power in an anti-democratic manner. What is currently happening in Hungary is not an internal matter just for Hungary; rather, it is a litmus test of whether the European Union is able to defend basic democratic values. Thus far, the EU efforts have been minimal.

Antisemitism and racism are becoming stronger all over Europe, but most worrisome is the Hungarian government’s trying to make this acceptable to the public. I don’t know of any other nation in the EU where the government would not officially condemn the rise of antisemitism. All other European governments take a clear and very determined stand against antisemitism; here in Hungary, it is different.

For example, there are some taxi drivers who refuse to take Jewish passengers. It is shocking that the EU doesn’t take more determined steps against antisemitic statements and anti-Roma politics.

“Greater Hungary:
Would you rather travel with them or with Communists, Jews, and Gypsies?”
—Budapest taxi bumper stickers

In democratic nations, war criminals are held responsible for their deeds. Yet in Hungary it is those who call for justice when war crimes have been committed who face persecution. In democratic societies it is unnecessary to turn to protests and international pressure in order to convince authorities to simply do what is their duty.

Not in Hungary. For nearly a year, Hungarian authorities have refused to take László Csiszík-Csatáry—the infamous, sadistic convicted Nazi murderer—into custody.

Kuruc.info, whose editors sit in the Hungarian parliament, offer money to informants who provide information on those involved in the July protest. I have felt on my own skin what fate awaits those whose personal information is published by this neo-Nazi Web site. According to the site’s call to arms: “Those who send in the most relevant personal information on
the largest number of people involved in the flash mob will receive 100,000 Hungarian forints (US$450 = UK£282), of which 75,000 was offered by our comrade Béla Varga, in the United States. Happy hunting!”

I am listed on a Web site where the regular readers celebrated the deadly terrorist bombing in Bulgaria, which targeted ordinary, innocent Israeli civilians. The Web site followers are those who yelled “dirty Jews” during a friendly soccer match between Hungary and Israel. They are the ones who cheer Mussolini, wave Iranian flags, and turn their back to the soccer field when the Israel national anthem is played.

According to Dr. Efraim Zuroff, the director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Israel office: “The events that occurred in the Puskás Ferenc Arena are reflective of problems that impact the entire nation.” Hungary is unwilling to confront its past—thus toxic and dysfunctional patterns of the past continue.

SAYING NO TO FEAR

I must not be afraid! We must not be afraid! Fear destroys the human spirit. Journalists who interview me write that I live in terrible fear: “I am afraid to leave the apartment. I go to work only if accompanied, otherwise I don’t go because I can’t take the risk, etc.” This is not exactly so! I come and go freely and live my life as before, but periodically look around to see the people around me! It is true that for now I am careful not to attend anti-fascist demonstrations, since there I would be easy prey to the neo-Nazis. At such events, violent individuals wait to attack those who wish for a society where there is peace, democracy, tolerance, justice, and kindness.

Unfortunately, these days I can’t represent the same humane spirit, since the chances are small that I would remain alive. But those who live in fear don’t live! Journalists write that I live in constant fear. In reality I am not afraid and refuse to fear!

WHEN WORDS BECOME ACTION

At first, of course, I was taken aback. Family and friends advised me not to walk in the streets and took me to work by car. I realized that I cannot live like that. The constant harassment by telephone and the ringing of the phone when no one is on the other side still troubles me, just as do the extreme right’s aggressive messages on Facebook. I deactivated my Facebook page when the harassment started and have not reactivated it. Looking at the constant flood of filthy, threatening messages is as bad as fear. Many friends advised me to change my mobile number and that I
should open a new Facebook page under a new name. Doing this would be
totally against my basic values.

Should I ask for an unlisted phone number as if I were a secret agent or
a criminal? Where do we live? I have always been an open and healthy
person without frustrations. I am not going to change my lifestyle and val-
ues because of a group of neo-Nazis whose goal and joy in life is to hate.

Let them call me: I will not pick up the phone. They will tire of it after
a while. I can live without Facebook until things become more positive, or
until the government miraculously starts finally exercising its responsibility
and using the full force of the law to stop the neo-Nazis.

I will not change telephone numbers;
 I will not change my place of work;
 I will not appear on Facebook under a false name;
 And I will not remain silent!

This is exactly what they want! We must not live in fear and be
silenced, because then hatred would triumph. I will not fade away and exist
as my shadow under a false identity.

—Budapest, September 8, 2012

*Excerpted from Eszter Garai-Édler’s PDF Threatened and Intimidated. For the
full PDF, e-mail to eszteredler@gmail.com. The author is desk editor at Geographi-
cal Research Institute Hungarian Academy of Sciences H-1112 Budapest, Budaörsi
út 45/H-1388 Budapest P.O. Box 64; Skype: eszter_garai.
Postcards from Switzerland and Holland

Manfred Gerstenfeld*

INTERVIEW WITH SIMON ERLANGER

“There are about 18,000 Jews in Switzerland. This is about the same number as in 1900. The general population, however, has more than doubled since then to over 7.8 million. The number of Swiss Jews and their descendants living in Israel is 14,000. Because it was usually the young and active who left for Israel, the Swiss Jewish community today tends to be older, with many members on the periphery of the communities. Demographically, Jewish life is centered today in Zurich and to lesser extent in Geneva and Basel. Only in Zurich the number of Jews remains constant at about 6,000. The Basel Jewish community, for instance, has diminished by about a third in the past thirty years and now numbers around 1,100. Many small communities had already vanished by the 1990s, and others are likely to disappear within a generation.”

This is the observation made by Simon Erlanger when I interviewed him last year. Erlanger teaches Jewish history at the University of Lucerne and is also the editor for a television station in northwestern Switzerland. In my interview with him, he had this to say:

“Following the Six Day War, the anti-Zionism of the New Left became a political factor in Switzerland overriding the traditional pro-Israel stance of the social-democratic left.¹ Antisemitic incidents were rare during

the 1970s but began to multiply after the Lebanon War of 1982. By then, for example, cemeteries were desecrated almost on a regular basis.\(^2\) During the 1980s and 1990s, a militant extreme right also emerged. Due to the country’s liberal laws, Holocaust deniers and revisionists used Switzerland as a base. This changed for the better by 1994 with the introduction of an ‘anti-Racism law.’ By 1987, when the First Intifada broke out, most of the Swiss mainstream media had become hostile toward Israel and the general atmosphere for Jews had deteriorated. Since then Switzerland has seen an unprecedented upsurge of both traditional antisemitism and its newer disguise, ‘anti-Israelism.’

“A 2007 poll found that over 86 percent of Swiss Jews deplore media bias and distortions. They consider that this has contributed to a major decrease in personal and communal security. There are many verbal and sometimes physical attacks. They are rarely recorded. In 2007, the SIG, the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities, set up an institution to collect data and provide statistics. Another organization, CICAD, reports on anti-Semitic incidents in the western, French-speaking part of Switzerland. Most Swiss Jewish communities employ important security measures.”

Erlanger continued:

“A specific Swiss element in the rise in antisemitism was the affair of the dormant Jewish bank accounts during 1992-1998. For many years, descendants of Holocaust victims had claimed accounts that their murdered relatives had held in Swiss banks. This issue was raised immediately after the war and then again in the 1950s. After payment of small sums by the banks to Jewish organizations and the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities, the matter had been considered settled. Restitution issues were reopened in Europe in the 1990s. Concerning Switzerland, this developed into a controversy about the country’s record during World War II. This included economic collaboration with the Nazis, laundering of stolen gold, and the anti-Jewish refugee policy. The government initially refused to cooperate with Jewish claimants, as did the banks. Later on, major Jewish organizations and the US government became involved. This led to the worst Swiss foreign policy crisis in decades. Ultimately, a financial settlement was reached between Swiss banks and Jewish organizations. The Swiss then had to face a past that did not correspond to the heroic self-image they had cherished. The myth of neutrality, while at the same time resisting Nazi Germany, was largely discarded. Many Swiss felt coerced by a hostile outside world—mainly Jews and Americans—seeking to damage

Switzerland’s self-image for political and financial purposes. Thereupon, a sizable rise occurred in overt antisemitism and anti-Americanism.

“In 1996, then Swiss president Pascal Delamuraz referred to the restitution debate as ‘blackmail’ and asked whether Auschwitz was located in Switzerland. This gave antisemitism a new respectability. The debate on the Swiss wartime record relegitimized antisemitism in many parts of society and unleashed an antisemitic wave. There was another antisemitic wave in 2001. Then economics minister and federal counselor Pascale Couchepin suggested, along with the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities, to abolish the prohibition of shechita [ritual slaughter]. Not only militant animal rights groups, but much of the public was outraged by this proposal. Articles and letters to the editor openly used traditional antisemitic language that would have been unacceptable earlier. The government dropped the proposal to keep internal peace.”

Concerning the future, Erlanger concluded our interview with this warning: “Many young Swiss Jews have emigrated over the decades, while many others have opted out of the organized Jewish community and often out of any form of Jewish life. The future of the community—however well established and affluent—is cause for concern.”

**INTERVIEW WITH ELMA DRAYER**

“September 11, 2001, was a turning point for the Jews in the Netherlands. On September 12 of that year, I visited psychologist Bloeme Evers for a story about a synagogue in the western part of Amsterdam, of which she is the inspirational founder. I was still somewhat in shock from watching the attacks in the United States on TV all day. Evers said to me, ‘This will have repercussions for us Jews.’ I asked her, ‘What are you talking about? Muslims executed the attacks yesterday.’ I didn’t understand what she meant at all.
“Afterwards, I thought a lot about what she said. Within three days, the perpetrators became the victims and the victims had become perpetrators. A change of roles had taken place. Since then, I have seen similar examples of this phenomenon.

“In the weeks following 9-11, there was unrest in Amsterdam West, where many Muslims live. A few weeks later, Moroccan youngsters threw stones at Jews who were coming out of the synagogue. I still had to finish my article on the synagogue. I called the police to check what was happening. The police spokesman said, ‘I would prefer if you don’t pay too much attention to this incident. These people are already in an unfavorable position.’ He wasn’t speaking about the Jews at whom the stones were thrown, but about the Muslims who threw the stones.”

The writer of these paragraphs, Elma Drayer, worked at the Dutch daily Trouw from 2001 until 2010 as an editor and columnist. Now she is a freelance journalist. “This incident must be seen in a larger context,” Drayer says. “In recent years, one hears public statements that were deemed socially unacceptable in the Netherlands after the Second World War. After the war, antisemitism was heavily suppressed. Now people speak about the Jews in an increasingly condescending way. This is also related to the changed position of Israel. One cannot separate the anti-Israel mood from antisemitism. The antisemitism, which was latent after the Second World War, now has reemerged with great force.

“To this has to be added that many people do not take Muslims seriously, but view them with pity. This is a new form of the ancient paternalism. Yet if one states that this construct plays a major role in the judgment about Israel, one receives responses like, ‘You are never allowed to say anything about Israel because then you are immediately termed an antSemit.’ ”

Drayer continues, “In a column about the conference of Holocaust deniers in Teheran in 2006, I wrote: ‘Maybe I missed it, but I haven’t seen any angry Jews shouting in our streets, marching toward the Iranian Embassy. I didn’t hear them chant ‘All Muslims are liars.’ Nowhere have I seen an effigy of Ahmadinejad in flames. Yet, this conference was an incredible provocation. On the other hand, the Muslim world requires far less provocation in order to explode. One only has to remember the reactions to the Danish Muhammed cartoons. His followers started riots; tens of people were killed as a result. Yet many Dutch bloggers and opinion makers expressed their solidarity with the Muslims.

“In many places, there was a call to respect Muslim sensitivities. We should understand that one should not joke about them and our cartoonists should show more restraint. There were no similar expressions of support
Drayer cites another issue: “In 2007, a report from the Center for Information and Documentation on Israel [CIDI] was published. It gave a nuanced view of antisemitic incidents in the Netherlands, which had increased in 2006 by 64%. The three main national ‘quality’ papers, of which my own is one, did not publish this information. The Amsterdam daily Het Parool published the report on the opinion page, as if antisemitism is an opinion with which one can agree or disagree.

“I wrote a column about that. I explained how antisemitic incidents were registered, what was included as such and what was not. I also wrote that the CIDI did not register critical opinions about Israel as antisemitic, an approach that I agree with. CIDI also does not include antisemitic remarks on websites because antisemitism on the Internet is followed by another monitoring organization. Had they included these, the number of registered antisemitic incidents would have been twice as high.”

In her column, Drayer also mentioned that the main reason for the increase of antisemitic incidents according to CIDI was the second Lebanon War between Israel and Hizbollah. “The report put it somewhat long-windedly: ‘Problems in the Middle East apparently bring up so many emotions, that Jews outside of Israel who are not personally involved in these incidents are seen as targets for venting one’s anger on.’ ” Drayer translated this in popular terms: “As soon as there is a mess in the Middle East, this slumbering antisemitism rises from the ground.”

She continued: “One of my colleagues was very angry that I had written that the report hadn’t been mentioned in our paper. He said that CIDI was a Jewish lobbying organization—which I had explicitly mentioned—and that the data weren’t so bad. This kind of totally unfounded statement would never have been made about any other monitor of racism. As soon as it concerns Jews, the report is suddenly ‘subjective and unreliable.’ After such a trying day, I had to seek support from one of the few journalists at the paper who shared my views. Sometimes I felt very lonely working there.”

Drayer added, “When the tree which Anne Frank saw from her hiding place almost collapsed in 2007—in 2010 it actually fell over—a national debate took place. I wrote that we in the Netherlands grant honor to dead Jews. We, however, don’t want much contact with living Jews, especially those in Israel.”

Drayer told me about a meeting she attended in which world problems were discussed. “At a certain point, Israel came up. People expressed anger toward Israel and commiserated with the Palestinians in a way that I do not...”
hear on any other issue. The victims in Darfur should wish that they could ever raise as much sympathy as the Palestinians. I have frequently noticed that Israel is measured by standards that are not applied to any other country in the world. Whatever happens there is put under a magnifying glass.”

“What I write about Israel seems not to be considered a normal opinion,” she noted. “It is apparently something very different. As soon as you write about Israel and the Jews, it takes on very different proportions than what is normal. One can summarize it best by saying that people do not want to face what is happening there—they become emotional or angry.

“People often say: ‘Mrs. Drayer, you must be Jewish.’ They think that only Jews can voice opinions like mine. I would consider it an honor to be Jewish, but I’m not. I just express my points of view. I have even heard colleagues say that Jewish journalists should not write about non-Western immigrants because they are prejudiced. I consider that statement very antisemitic. On the other hand, I receive many positive reactions from readers, which offers a welcome balance.”

Drayer concluded, “I’ve read the Hamas Charter, which promotes the murder of all Jews. Yet people do not care to find out what is written in it. One of the oft-heard comparisons in the Netherlands is that of Jews and Muslims. A false impression is given that Muslims are similarly the victims of the Dutch people as the Jews once were. It is expressed as: ‘Islamophobia is the new antisemitism.’

“For many years now, I have lived near a synagogue in Amsterdam. When there are services on Saturdays, police are on guard. This doesn’t shock anyone in the neighborhood. Yet it is scandalous that this is necessary.”

This portion of the essay is an adaptation of an interview with Elma Drayer by Manfred Gerstenfeld, from Gerstenfeld’s The Decay: Jews in a Rudderless Netherlands (2010).

*Manfred Gerstenfeld is emeritus chair (2000 to 2012) and member of the Board of Fellows of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He has authored fifteen books, edited five, and is a frequent JSA contributor and founding JSA board member.
Islamic Antisemitism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Joseph S. Spoerl*

In his 1979 book, *The Question of Palestine*, Edward Said attacks those who accuse Palestinians or Arabs of harboring antisemitic prejudices or genocidal intentions vis-à-vis the Jews. Said writes: “To speak of the Palestinians rationally is to stop speaking about war or genocide and to start dealing with political reality.”¹ “Palestinians,” Said asserts, “are refugees not because they are antisemites, but because the Zionists simply kicked many of them out.”² Far from being antisemitic, Said writes, “we [Palestinians] are clearly anticolonialist and antiracist in our struggle”³ and are committed to “a secular democratic state in Palestine for Arabs and Jews.”⁴ It is the Zionists, Said suggests, who have a monopoly on exclusive nationalism, discrimination, and racism, and who indeed are guilty of “apartheid.”⁵ A gifted rhetorician, Said preemptively delegitimizes anyone who would dare accuse Israel’s enemies of antisemitism or of genocidal intentions; such people are not “speaking rationally” and are not “dealing with reality.” Over and over again, Said insinuates that Palestinians without distinction are committed to a secular democratic state and are opposed to discrimination of any sort, whereas all Zionists are racist colonizers committed to a form of apartheid.

Another way of preemptively delegitimizing anyone who would accuse Israel’s enemies of antisemitism is to diagnose them with a kind of cognitive disability that has come to be known as “the Holocaust syndrome,” a phrase coined by historian Avi Shlaim.6 According to New York psychologist Baylis Thomas, this syndrome involves the delusional belief that “Palestinian and Arab national resistance was an extension of the Holocaust.”7 The “Holocaust syndrome” has led Israeli leaders to have an unhealthy and destructive obsession with national security, Thomas suggests, and it has led Westerners to blame Arabs and Palestinians for the endemic violence that, in fact, is the fault of a ruthless, unscrupulous, and belligerent Zionist and Israeli leadership. Authors like Said, Shlaim, and Thomas consistently portray Arabs and Palestinians and their leaders as weak and innocent victims of an all-powerful and aggressive Zionist enemy whose morally unjust military victories have been a foregone conclusion from 1947 to the present.

As this essay will demonstrate, however, antisemitism of an especially virulent sort, often genocidal in its import, has always been and continues to be a significant factor in the Arab-Zionist conflict. From the founding father of the Palestinian Arab national movement, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, in the 1920s, to the present-day leadership of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, extreme antisemitism has undermined chances for peace and fueled deadly violence in the Middle East.

AL-HUSSEINI AND THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT 1921-1949

Hajj Amin al-Husseini (ca. 1897-1974) “was born to one of the leading Palestinian families,” the Husseini clan, “which had been exerting political influence for generations” in Palestine. His family background “paved the way for him to enter into politics and guaranteed his acceptance by a substantial segment of the Palestinian population.”8 By the early 1920s, Husseini came to occupy two key offices under the British Mandate: mufti, or chief Islamic jurist, of Jerusalem, and president of the Supreme Muslim Council, which oversaw religious endowments (waqf), Sharia courts, and

other Islamic institutions. By virtue of these two offices, Husseini “became the most influential Arab in Palestine.”9 Husseini and his clan were notable for their ruthless treatment of political opponents, especially the rival Nashashibi clan. The Nashashibis were open to compromise and peaceful co-existence with the Zionists, while the Husseinis were adamantly opposed to any compromise, “but the Husseinis generally set the tone of Palestinian Arab politics . . . and from the mid-1930s dominated the national movement.”10 During the Arab uprising of 1936-9, Hajj Amin al-Husseini became president of the Arab Higher Committee, a united front of all the Palestinian Arab political parties. The fighting and lawlessness of 1936-9 offered an occasion for Husseini to assassinate and terrorize his political opponents, who included any Palestinian Arabs not categorically rejecting cooperation with the Jews.11 When the British convened the Peel Commission in 1937 to investigate the causes of the Arab revolt, Hajj Amin was called to testify. He not only rejected the creation of a Jewish state on any part of Palestine, however small, but insisted that the vast majority of the Jews (all who had arrived after 1914) should be expelled altogether from Palestine, on the grounds that they would otherwise tear down the Al Aqsa mosque and rebuild their temple.12

Expelled by the British from Palestine for his role in fomenting the Arab revolt, Hajj Amin fled in 1937 to Lebanon and in 1939 to Iraq. Husseini had since 1933 repeatedly reached out to Nazi German officials and received money from the Germans to fund the revolt.13 In Iraq, he played a central role in organizing a pro-Axis coup that took place in early 1941, necessitating a British invasion.14 The mufti then fled, via Iran, first to fascist Italy and then to Nazi Germany, arriving in Berlin on November 6, 1941. In Berlin, he met with foreign minister Ribbentrop and, on November 28, with Adolf Hitler himself. Already in September 1940 Hussein’s private secretary had met in Berlin with top Nazi officials, where he had

14. Gensicke, The Mufti of Jerusalem, 50: “There can be no doubt whatsoever that, but for the Mufti’s ceaseless political agitation, the coup in Iraq would not have occurred in the first place.”
asserted that Palestine and the other Arab lands wanted to “solve” their “Jewish problem” in the same way that Germany and Italy were doing. In the meeting on November 28, 1941, Hitler hinted “that he intended to extend the Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe to Jews living outside the Continent.” Hitler assured the mufti that German troops, which had invaded the USSR in June of 1941, would wheel south upon reaching the Caucasus and drive into the Middle East via Iraq, thus liberating the Arabs from British imperialism. “Germany’s objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power.”

Jeffrey Herf observes that “Husseini was a true comrade in arms and ideological soul mate” to Hitler. Their meeting was not merely a piece of political pragmatism on Husseini’s part; rather, it was “a meeting of hearts and minds.” Both men hated Jews and wanted to kill them en masse. Hajj Amin al-Husseini would stay in Germany until the bitter end, supporting the Nazi war effort in any way he could, working energetically to help the Nazis organize a Bosnian Muslim SS Division to help with the pacification of Yugoslavia, for example.18 His main value to the Nazis, however, lay in propaganda. From January 1942 until March 1945, Husseini helped the Nazis with Arabic-language short-wave radio broadcasts to the Middle East and North Africa. From 1942 on, “appeals to Muslims as Muslims with explicit references to religion became an important feature of Nazism’s Arabic-language propaganda.” Husseini’s broadcasts portrayed the Jews as inveterate enemies of Islam, intent on securing Palestine so as to control the Arab world and “wipe out Islam.” Husseini used quotes from the Koran and the biography and sayings of Muhammad to build his case against the Jews: the Koran says that the people most hostile to the believers are the Jews; the Jews opposed the prophet, broke their agreements with him, and tried to kill him; Jewish animosity to the Arabs dates to the dawn of Islam; the Jews have always betrayed the prophets and never waver from their policy of intrigue and evil-doing; their character is unchanging from one era to the next. Muhammad “drove the Jews completely out of the Arab countries,” and in so doing he “gave us a great example”; tolerance toward the Jews is “a stupid plan and a shameful crime against the father-

16. Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 76-78.
17. Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 76; also 154, 172.
19. Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 91.
20. Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 147, 162.
land . . . expulsion of all the Jews from all Arab and Muslim countries . . . is
the only remedy. It is what the prophet did thirteen centuries ago.” 22 Most
disturbing are the overt calls to kill the Jews in Arab lands and open boasts
about the ongoing Nazi program to “annihilate the Jews.” 23 “There is no
room on earth for both Arabs and the Jews.” 24 “Kill the Jews wherever you
find them.” 25 “The world will never be at peace until the Jewish race is
exterminated . . . The Jews are the germs which have caused all the trouble
in the world.” 26 In a November 1943 radio broadcast, Husseini extolled the
Germans because they had “decided to find a definitive solution to the Jewish
danger.” 27

This last quotation brings us to the issue of the mufti’s awareness of
and support for the Holocaust. Based on archival evidence, Klaus Gensicke
states that “by mid-1942 at the latest the mufti was fully aware of what was
happening in the concentration camps.” A member of the mufti’s staff,
together with other Arab officials, visited the Sachsenhausen camp in July
1942; according to Nazi officials, “‘In particular the Jews aroused the inter-
est of the Arabs.’ The visit left the Arabs with a ‘very favorable impres-
sion’. ” 28 Gensicke also stresses that Husseini had an excellent intelligence
apparatus that gave him remarkable knowledge of goings-on within the
Nazi government and Nazi-occupied Europe more broadly. On numerous
occasions, he got wind of diplomatic efforts to broker the emigration of
Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe or from Nazi satellites like Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, sometimes in exchange for money, some-
times as an effort by the Germans themselves to arrange for the repatriation
of German nationals stranded abroad upon the outbreak of war. On these
occasions, Husseini worked energetically to prevent the release of Jews,
suggesting instead that they be sent to Poland, where they could be kept
under “strict control.” 29 One German Foreign Office official who had
extensive dealings with the mufti in these cases remarked in a memoran-
dum: “The Mufti was a sworn enemy of the Jews and made no secret of the
fact that he would rather see them all killed.” 30 Finally, in his own memoirs,
Hajj Amin al-Husseini admits that he was informed by his good friend

22. Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 170, 187; also 215-216.
25. Gensicke, The Mufti of Jerusalem, 117, 129; Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the
Arab World, 213.
26. Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 184.
27. Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 187.
28. Gensicke, The Mufti of Jerusalem, 169 n. 54; also 118-9, 127.
Heinrich Himmler in the summer of 1943 that the Nazis had by that time already liquidated some three million Jews.\textsuperscript{31} Klaus Gensicke sums up: “It was of supreme importance to him to have as many Jews as possible killed before the collapse of the Third Reich.”\textsuperscript{32}

In May 1945, Husseini fled to Switzerland. Swiss officials handed him over to the French, who placed him under house arrest. Under pressure from the Arab League, Western officials decided not to prosecute him for war crimes, and in May 1946 Husseini escaped from France and was flown to Cairo.\textsuperscript{33} The most important Palestinian Arab political party, the Palestine Arab Party (PAP), controlled by the Husseini clan,

\begin{quote}
did everything in its power to prepare the Palestinian Arabs psychologically for the mufti’s return and the restoration of his leadership. He was hailed incontestably as the leader par excellence and there could be no substitute for him. Untiring propaganda was conducted on his behalf; all the more so as almost all of his henchmen were amnestied and allowed to return to Palestine.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

Contemporary reports from the US Embassy in Cairo tell us that the PAP was “the most active political organization in the country and [one that] retains the allegiance of the vast majority of Palestinian Arabs.” The report notes that the PAP benefited from “the great respect and esteem which Hajj Amin al-Husseyni enjoys in all levels of society.”\textsuperscript{35} In November 1945, the Arab Higher Committee had been reestablished as the leadership body for all Palestinian Arab parties, and Hajj Amin al-Husseini was chosen to be its president upon his return, with the approval of the Arab League.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, the Arab League ensured that the AHC was composed entirely of Husseini loyalists—the more moderate Nashashibis were left entirely out in the cold.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, upon returning to Cairo in May 1946, Hus-

\begin{itemize}
\item Gensicke, \textit{The Mufti of Jerusalem}, 123.
\item Gensicke, \textit{The Mufti of Jerusalem}, 150.
\item Gensicke, \textit{The Mufti of Jerusalem}, 182.
\item Herf, \textit{Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World}, 240-1.
\item Herf, \textit{Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World}, 240; Gensicke, \textit{The Mufti of Jerusalem}, 182-3.
\item Morris, \textit{The Origins of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited}, 23: “. . . in March 1946 the Arab League stepped in and appointed a new AHC composed only of Husseinis and their allies. Its leading members were Amin al Husseini (president), Jamal Hussein (deputy president), Husayn Khalidi (secretary), Ahmed Hilmi Pasha and Emil Ghawri. The Opposition was left out in the cold.”
\end{itemize}
seini was once again the single most important Palestinian Arab leader. Jeffrey Herf observes that by late 1945,

Palestinian Arabs knew Husseini both from his activities in the 1930s in Palestine and his speeches on Axis radio during the war. His actions and beliefs were a matter of very public record. Yet, far from bringing his political career to an end, Husseini’s wartime actions contributed to his appeal in the postwar years.38

Husseini’s popularity was not confined to the Palestinian Arabs but extended across the Arab world. Upon his arrival in Cairo, he was greeted by adulatory articles in all Egyptian newspapers. US ambassador to Egypt Pinckney Tuck observed that the warm welcome for Husseini was “widespread and genuine.”39 Most effusive in his praise was Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who hailed Husseini for his “great services for the glory of Islam and the Arabs,” calling him “what a hero, what a miracle of a man . . . this hero who challenged an empire and fought Zionism, with the help of Hitler and Germany. Germany and Hitler are gone, but Amin al-Husseini will continue the struggle.”40 These words were penned in the summer of 1946, when the whole world knew exactly what the Nazis had done to the Jews of Europe. In their radio broadcasts during the war, the Nazis and Husseini had openly called for the killing and expulsion of all Jews in Arab lands. Praise for Husseini’s wartime activities clearly connoted approval of the Nazi genocide and murderous intentions regarding the Jews of Palestine.41 In 1947, knowing full well what Husseini had done during the war, Hassan al-Banna appointed the mufti as his deputy and the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine (albeit in exile, since the British would not allow his return to Palestine).42

As leader of the Palestinian national movement in the crucial years 1946-1948, Hajj Amin al-Husseini continued to reject any compromise over Palestine.43 He utterly dismissed the notion of partition, and indeed asserted in talks with British officials in 1947 that “as soon as the British Forces were withdrawn, the Arabs should with one accord fall upon the Jews and

According to Benny Morris, Husseini also rejected the notion of a binational state with one government granting equal rights to Jews and Arabs; he insisted instead that all Jews who had entered Palestine after 1914 (or, in another version, 1917) must be forced to leave; the percentage of Jews in Palestine could be no higher than 7 percent, as it was at the end of the First World War. From November 1946, Morris notes, “a veritable campaign of terror (a la 1937-8) was unleashed against” Palestinian Arabs associated with the Nashashibis and other Palestinians suspected of deviating from the Husseinis’ hard line. “By the end of March [1948], the Husseinis had managed to still the moderate voices in the Arab camp and had gained control over almost all Arab Palestine.”

Zionist leaders were well aware that Husseini had helped Hitler to destroy Jews. They had good reason to fear that a military loss in 1947-8 would have meant a second Holocaust for the 650,000 Jews of Palestine. Husseini was not alone in his sentiments. Morris points out that wherever Arab forces managed to conquer Jewish settlements—as in the Etzion Bloc and the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City—those settlements were razed after their inhabitants had been killed, expelled, or incarcerated. He writes:

These expulsions by the Arab regular armies stemmed quite naturally from the expulsionist mindset prevailing in the Arab states. The mindset characterized both the public and the ruling elites. All vilified the Yishuv [the Jewish community in Palestine] and opposed the existence of a Jewish state on “their” (sacred Islamic) soil, and all sought its extirpation, albeit with varying degrees of bloody-mindedness. Shouts of “Idbah al Yahud” (slaughter the Jews) characterized equally street demonstrations in Jaffa, Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, both before and during the war.

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44. Gensicke, *The Mufti of Jerusalem*, 183. At a conference called in London in early 1947 by the British government to facilitate peace in Palestine, the Arab participants “expressed the view both privately and on occasion in public, that historical conflicts are always settled by force of arms and that one might as well have the struggle right away and get it over.” Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 577.

45. Morris, *1948*, 408-9. Zionist leaders who expressed interest in the idea of a binational state were consistently stymied by a total lack of reciprocal interest on the Arab side: see Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, 251-4, 266, 539, 579, 595.


and were, in essence, echoed, usually in tamer language, by most Arab leaders.49

In October 1947, the secretary-general of the Arab League, Abdul Rahman Azzam, was quoted in an Egyptian newspaper as saying that the war over Palestine “will be a war of extermination and momentous massacre.”50 It is not surprising, therefore, that fear of a new Holocaust was a principal motive driving Zionist forces to fight in 1947-8.51 Victory was not guaranteed. Morris writes: “The Yishuv was genuinely fearful of the outcome—and the Haganah chiefs’ assessment on 12 May [1948] of a ‘fifty-fifty’ chance of victory or survival was sincere and typical.”52

The so-called Palestinian refugee problem can only be understood against this background. The refugees mostly fled due to the inevitable fears and chaos created by war, a war initiated by the Palestinian Arabs themselves in November 1947. Some Arabs became refugees when expelled from their homes by Zionist forces, as in Lod and Ramla, but expulsion by Zionists was a desperate measure taken in a war for survival. To the extent that Zionist leaders endorsed population transfer of Arabs out of Jewish zones, this

was in large part a response to the expulsionist ideology and violent praxis of al-Husseini and his followers during the previous two decades. . . . Arab support for a Nazi victory and Haj Amin al-Husseini’s employment by the Nazis in World War II Berlin also played a part in this thinking. Zionist expulsionist thinking was thus at least in part a response to expulsionist, or murderous, thinking and behavior by Arabs and European Christians.53

49. Morris, 1948, 409-410; see also 490 n. 19: “The phrase—‘to drive the Jews in Palestine into the sea’—was reportedly used, for example, by Izzedine Shawa, a representative of the AHC in London, in a conversation with an American diplomat . . . In his memoirs, Kirkbride quoted Arab League secretary-general Azzam saying to him, just before the invasion: ‘We will sweep them into the sea . . .’ ”


The refusal of the Arab nations to make peace with Israel in 1949, and the open statements by Arab leaders to the effect that returning refugees could be used as a fifth column that would facilitate the destruction of the new state of Israel, understandably made Israeli leaders unwilling to allow the repatriation of the 700,000 Palestinian refugees.54

A REFUGEE PROBLEM

This history is of course not of purely academic interest; it is vitally relevant to debates about Middle East peace that continue today. Consider the May 17, 2011, New York Times editorial by Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the PLO and president of the Palestinian National Authority. In Abbas’ version of the history of 1947-8, after the UN partition resolution of November 1947, “Zionist forces expelled Palestinian Arabs to ensure a decisive Jewish majority in the future state of Israel, and Arab armies intervened. War and further expulsions ensued.” Ever since, Israel has denied to the refugees “that most basic of human rights,” the right to return home. Capable historians have thoroughly demolished this inaccurate and self-serving distortion of what actually happened in Palestine in 1947-8.55 I will only add here that President Abbas fails to advert to a most important aspect of the Israeli War of Independence, namely, that it was a genocidal war in which the 650,000 Jews of Palestine faced the very real threat of liquidation at the hands of a foe with a proven track record of collaboration with the Nazi genocide. Abbas’ political agenda is clear: his aim is to portray Zionist forces as aggressors who initiated violence against innocent Palestinian civilians in order to achieve a Jewish-majority state. This inversion of the truth obviously places the moral burden of solving the Palestinian refugee problem on the alleged aggressors, namely, the Zionists.56 An accurate and honest historical narrative would not suit Abbas’ purpose nearly as well, for

54. Karsh, Palestine Betrayed, 221-9; Morris, 1948, 411.
56. In The Question of Palestine, Edward Said also completely ignores the role played by Hajj Amin al-Husseini in driving the violence of 1936-9 and 1947-8. Indeed, the name “Hajj Amin al-Husseini” does not appear even once in Said’s book. He thus is able to portray the Palestinian refugee problem as solely the product of alleged Zionist racism and aggression, as if Arab antisemitism had nothing to do with poisoning relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and wrecking any possibility of a peaceful compromise as the British mandate drew to a close. On the general failure of Arab and Palestinian writers to deal honestly with the career of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, see Litvak and Webman, From Empathy to Denial, 297-307.
it would have to mention that Palestinian and other Arabs, driven by murderous Jew-hatred, initiated a genocidal war of extermination against the Jews of Palestine in violation of the very UN resolution that Abbas so piously invokes. Nor would it serve Abbas’ interest to mention that roughly 800,000 Jews were driven from their homes in Muslim countries in retaliation for the founding of the state of Israel—expulsions that Hajj Amin al-Husseini had encouraged in his radio broadcasts from Nazi Germany.\^57

**Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood Antisemitism**

Nor, alas, is the threat of genocide against the Jews of Israel a thing of the past. Extreme antisemitism has spread like wildfire across the Arab and Islamic worlds since the mufti and the Nazis spewed their vitriolic propaganda during the Second World War. Jeffrey Herf, Klaus Gensicke, Matthias Küntzel, Bernard Lewis, Robert Wistrich, Ian Johnson, Itamar Marcus and Palestinian Media Watch, Yigal Carmon and the Middle East Media Research Institute, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Andrew Bostom, Neil J. Kressel, and others have exhaustively documented the phenomenon of Islamic antisemitism, both in recent decades and in history.\^58 Indeed, several of


these authors—for example, Andrew Bostom and Neil J. Kressel—demonstrate an even deeper truth, namely, that anti-Jewish prejudice has deep roots in Islam going back to its very origins. As Kressel puts it, "...far from being a by-product of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Jew-hatred has roots in the long history and complex theology of Islam."\(^{59}\) It is thus no coincidence that Israel’s most implacable enemies—the ayatollahs of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and the global Muslim Brotherhood—are today in the grip of an especially ugly type of extreme and thoroughly Islamic antisemitism.

In the rest of this essay we will focus on the antisemitism of Hamas, for several reasons. Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the global Muslim Brotherhood, an organization to which Hajj Amin al-Husseini had especially close links and whose world view he shared.\(^{60}\) Moreover, there is a striking continuity between the contemporary antisemitism of Hamas and that of Hajj Amin al-Husseini. In the words of German political scientist Matthias Küntzel, “Today Hamas in particular carries on the policies of the Mufti.”\(^{61}\) The antisemitic rhetoric of Hamas, like that of Husseini, is overtly genocidal in its import. Hamas is, by its own declaration and actions, at war with Israel and intends to obliterate the state and its people.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine adopted the name Hamas in 1987-8 during the first intifada and issued its covenant, or statement of

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60. On the close connection between the mufti and the Muslim Brotherhood, see Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 240-245; Küntzel, Jihad and Jew-Hatred, 36-7, 44-6, 48, 52, 58; Gensicke, The Mufti of Jerusalem, 190; Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 55-6; Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of An Islamic Mass Movement (Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing/Ithaca Press, 1998), 154, 179-180, 237; and Gudrun Krämer, Hasan al-Banna (Oxford: One World Publications, 2010), 48-9, 77. See also Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 32: “The Muslim Brotherhood opened new branches in Palestine in the late 1940s: more than 1,000 people attended the opening of its Jerusalem branch in Said al-Husseini’s garden in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City in May 1946... The speeches were made by figures drawn from many well-known Jerusalem families, including Jamal al-Husseini...”

foundational principles, on August 18, 1988. The Hamas Covenant asserts that Palestine, having been conquered by Muslim arms in the seventh century, is Islamic property (waqf) in perpetuity, so that no Muslims have the right to cede any of its territory to non-Muslims. Negotiations are futile, and only jihad or violence will restore Palestine to its rightful owners, the Islamic ummah. An international Jewish conspiracy, which controls global media and finance, deliberately fomented both world wars in order to bring about the creation of Israel. This global conspiracy includes the Freemasons, the Rotary Clubs, the Lions Clubs, and B’nai B’rith: “When Islam is at the helm, it will totally eradicate these organizations, which are hostile to humanity and to Islam” (Article 17). Jews, indeed, are behind all wars and revolutions in the history of the world, and are the agents of colonialism and imperialism in order to spread moral corruption and seize natural resources the world over. The Zionist plan has no limits, and after seizing Palestine they intend to expand their territory from the Nile to the Euphrates, and on and on indefinitely. World conquest is their aim, as laid out in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (cited, in Article 32, as if it were a reliable source). The Jews are the true Nazis of world history; ceasing to participate in the struggle against Zionism is high treason. The “Covenant” adduces dozens of verses from the Koran and hadiths (traditions of the prophet) to illustrate the perfidy of the Jews and the eternal nature of the conflict between Jews and Muslims.

There are many examples of statements by Hamas leaders calling for genocide against the Jews—not just Zionists or Israelis, but Jews without distinction. A few illustrations will have to suffice. In an interview on the Hamas TV station Al-Aqsa TV on February 28, 2010, Abdallah Jarbu, the Hamas deputy minister of religious endowments, said:

The Jews . . . are thieves and aggressors . . . They want to present themselves to the world as if they have rights, but in fact they are foreign bacteria—a microbe unparalleled in the world . . . May He [Allah] annihilate this filthy people who have neither religion nor conscience. I condemn whoever believes in normalizing relations with them, whoever supports sitting down with them, and whoever believes that they are human beings. They are not human beings. They are not people.
In a public address broadcast on Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV on November 5, 2010, Mahmoud Al-Zahar, a top Hamas leader who at the time was Hamas foreign minister, said:

We ask the people of the world today: Why did France, in 1253, expel and uproot the Jewish entity, which was represented by the ghetto? Why did they expel them? Because they sucked the blood of the French, because they shed the blood of the French, slaughtered them, stole their money, and conspired against them. At the end of the day, the French had no choice but to expel them in 1253. [There follows a long list of nations that expelled the Jews allegedly in self-defense: Britain, Belgium, Hungary, Austria, Holland, Spain, Russia, Egypt under the Pharaoh, Germany in medieval times and again under Hitler.] The series of expulsions continues to this day . . . and Allah willing, their expulsion from Palestine in its entirety is certain to come. We are no weaker or less honorable than the peoples that expelled and annihilated the Jews. The day we expel them is drawing near . . . We have learned the lesson—there is no place for you among us, and you have no future among the nations of the world. You are headed to annihilation.65

Hamas interior minister Fathi Hammad, interviewed on Al-Aqsa TV on December 14, 2010, said:

The Jews have become abhorred and loathed outcasts, because they live off corruption and the plundering of peoples—not only the Arab and Islamic peoples, but all the peoples of the world. The world has begun to be aware of this corrupting danger, and to applaud Hamas . . . Therefore, I expect that in the future, support for Hamas will grow. I also expect that, in addition to the aid convoys, Hamas will get some “heavy stuff,” which will help it to be victorious.66

65. Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch No. 3373, November 12, 2010, http://www.memri.org/report/en/print4761.htm. See also http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/ipc_e141.htm. Writing in the 1960s, Yehoshafat Harkabi noted: “It is repeatedly argued in Arab writings that Germany’s actions [under Hitler] were justified because of the evil the Jews did her and the danger they constituted for the country. These actions, it is explained, were necessary for self-defence.” Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel, 276. See also Litvak and Webman, From Empathy to Denial, 193-214, on “Holocaust justification” in the Arab world. The premier theorist of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, wrote a famous antisemitic tract, “Our Struggle with the Jews,” in which he also describes Hitler as an agent of divine punishment of the Jews: see Sayyid Qutb, “Our Struggle with the Jews,” in Andrew Bostom, ed., The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism, 361.

Hamas cleric and MP Yunis Al-Astal, interviewed on Al-Aqsa TV on May 11, 2011, said:

The Jews are brought to Palestine so that the Palestinians—and the Islamic nation behind them—will have the honor of annihilating the evil of this gang . . . . All the predators, all the birds of prey, all the dangerous reptiles and insects, and all the lethal bacteria are far less dangerous than the Jews . . . In just a few years, all the Zionists and all the settlers will realize that their arrival in Palestine was for the purpose of the great massacre, by means of which Allah wants to relieve humanity of their evil . . .

Note that these are all statements by members of the Hamas government in the Gaza strip broadcast on the official Hamas television station. The logic of genocide is clear: since the Jews are the source of all corruption on earth and are the eternal enemies of Islam, out to destroy the one true and final religion, it follows that Muslims have a religious duty to fight them to the death.

Hamas, let us recall, is the Palestinian branch of the global Muslim Brotherhood. As such, it looks to the larger world of the Brotherhood for moral and religious guidance. By far the most respected religious authority for the world-wide Muslim Brotherhood is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian who teaches Islamic law at the University of Doha in Qatar.

Martin Kramer describes Qaradawi’s influence over Hamas:

This dependence [of Hamas] on the Muslim Brotherhood continues today, quite obviously in the case of moral leadership. Hamas itself has no authoritative religious leaders. It depends on a number of non-Palestinian religious authorities, the most prominent being Qaradawi.

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tinian religious persons who reside abroad, and who issue rulings on Islamic law that bind Hamas in its operations. One of them is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian who resides in Qatar and who has a popular television show on the Al-Jazeera satellite channel. Qaradawi is the paramount source of the Islamic rulings that have governed Hamas’ use of suicide bombings. For example, it was Qaradawi who permitted women to carry out suicide missions, and allowed them to approach their target unveiled and alone, without the usual accompanying male required of believing women who venture out in public. 70

Qaradawi is popular not only within the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, but across the entire Sunni Muslim world. He “is easily one of the most admired and best-known representatives of Sunni Islam today. Indeed, it is difficult to identify any other Muslim scholar or activist who could be said to rival his status and authority, at least in the Arab-speaking world.” 71 According to The New York Times, Qaradawi’s “program ‘Islamic Law and Life’ on Al Jazeera satellite television makes him about the most influential cleric among mainstream Sunni Muslims, the majority sect.” 72 The Wall Street Journal has described him as “the nearest thing Sunni Islam has to a pope.” 73

Qaradawi and other Islamic legal experts working under his tutelage have elaborated an interpretation of Islamic law that makes it a moral duty for all Muslims to work for the destruction of Israel and that sanctions suicide attacks and other indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians. 74 Qaradawi’s casuistry on this issue is a veritable theology of genocide. It is thus no surprise that Qaradawi, like the Hamas leadership that looks to him for guidance, has indulged in genocidal diatribes against the Jews of Israel. In a Friday sermon broadcast on al-Jazeera TV on January 9, 2009, Qaradawi said the following:

The nation on which abasement and humiliation was inflicted, and which drew the wrath of Allah—the people most covetous of life [i.e., the

71. Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen, Global Mufti, 1.
Jews]—we have become their victims... But Allah lies in wait for them, and He will not forsake this nation. He will not allow this people to continue to spread corruption in the land. We wait for the revenge of Allah to descend upon them, and, Allah willing, it will be by our own hands... This is my message to the treacherous Jews, who have never adhered to what is right, or been true to their promises... O Allah, take this oppressive, tyrannical band of people. O Allah, take this oppressive, Jewish, Zionist band of people. O Allah, do not spare a single one of them. O Allah, count their numbers, and kill them, down to the very last one.  

Qaradawi, like many other Muslim antisemites today, regards Hitler’s violence against the Jews as just retaliation for the Jews’ alleged crimes. On January 30, 2009, on Al Jazeera TV, Qaradawi said:

Throughout history Allah has imposed on the Jews people who would punish them for their corruption. The last punishment was carried out by Hitler... even though they exaggerated this issue. He managed to put them in their place. This was divine punishment for them. Allah willing the next time will be at the hands of the believers.

So speaks one of the most respected religious authorities in the Muslim world today and the leading moral guide for Hamas and the global Muslim Brotherhood. The fact that Qaradawi both influences the Muslim Brotherhood and reflects mainstream Brotherhood thinking puts the rise of the Brotherhood to power in Egypt in an especially ominous light.

CONCLUSIONS

What conclusions are we to draw? There are several. First, Muslim antisemitism has been an important factor in the Arab-Zionist conflict from at least the 1930s on. It cannot be dismissed as a mere byproduct of the alleged crimes of the State of Israel; rather, it was a principal factor driving the leader of the Palestinian national movement, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, to refuse to accept any compromise with or tolerance for the Zionist project in Palestine. Husseini’s unbending refusal to compromise, and his insistence that the Jews be either killed or forced out of Palestine, made the birth of

Israel a far bloodier affair than it needed to be. The Jews of Palestine in 1947 were willing to accept partition and live in peace beside an Arab Palestinian State. It was the Palestinian Arab leadership that rejected peaceful coexistence with the Jews and initiated hostilities, thus creating the Palestinian refugee problem, which persists to this day.

Second, the genocidal antisemitism that drove Hajj Amin al-Husseini as leader of the Palestinian national movement in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s is still with us today, in the ideology of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood and in their Shiite allies, Hezbollah and Iran.

Third, a disturbing number of people today, for a variety of reasons, refuse to acknowledge the reality of Muslim antisemitism and its important role in driving the Arab-Zionist conflict. Mahmoud Abbas refuses to acknowledge it because to do so would destroy his case that Israel is in effect a robber state that drove Palestinian Arabs from their homes in 1947-8 out of sheer lust for conquest, a conquest allegedly motivated solely by Jewish nationalism with no basis in legitimate self-defense. By ignoring the genocidal Jew-hatred of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, Abbas can shift the blame for the Palestinian refugee problem entirely onto the shoulders of Israel, with the implication that the costs of implementing a “just resolution” of this problem (whatever that means) should be borne disproportionately by Israel. Palestinians like to refer to Israel’s victory in 1948 and the ensuing refugee problem as the \textit{nakhba}, or “catastrophe.” What they fail to admit is that this “catastrophe” was largely self-inflicted.

Israel’s many critics also show a disturbing tendency to ignore the extreme antisemitism of Israel’s foes. Efforts by Israel to weaken or block its enemies, such as the security barrier in the West Bank, or its wars with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in 2008-9, or its blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip, all elicit the same predictable condemnation from “progressive” political voices across the world. These voices inevitably focus on the suffering inflicted by Israeli measures on civilians, without showing any appreciation for the vicious ideology and deadly intentions of the enemies against whom Israel is trying to defend itself.

*Joseph S. Spoerl is a professor in the Philosophy Department at Saint Anselm College in Manchester, NH. He holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Toronto and an undergraduate degree in philosophy and German studies from Boston University. Professor Spoerl, who has research interests in applied ethics, war ethics, antisemitism, and radical Islamist ideology, has published in Comparative Islamic Studies, Journal of Conflict Studies, and the American Journal of Jurisprudence. He can be contacted at jspoerl@anselm.edu.*
Double Standards for Israel

Manfred Gerstenfeld*

The use of different standards concerning Jews when compared to others has been a major element at the heart of antisemitic activities and incitement over many centuries. This was often so obvious that it was self-understood, for instance, when Jews were confined to living in certain parts of a town, were not free to wear the clothes they wanted, and could not work in most professions. This meant that the double standards against them profoundly permeated most aspects of their lives. Such discrimination of Jews was frequently accompanied by their demonization. Contemporary antisemitism in post-modern societies is more difficult to analyze, yet its key characteristics are the same ones as those used in previous centuries.

In the current demonization process of Israel, many verbal methods are used. These include lies, false accusations about the future, and exaggerations. A far more complex category of verbal abuse employed against Israel in the demonization process is fallacies. This category cannot easily be understood and needs detailed study.

Fallacies differ from false factual information in that they are based on reasoning where the arguments brought forward do not back up the conclusion drawn from them. Major categories of fallacies of argument include emotional fallacies, ethical fallacies, and logical fallacies. Double standards are one class of ethical fallacies.

Similar in nature to those employed against Jews over the centuries during the past decades, double standards against Israel have been used in attempts to turn the country into the embodiment of evil. This has led to the updating and adjusting of the definitions of antisemitism to include anti-Israelism. Natan Sharansky, when stating how to investigate antisemitism concerning Israel, invented the “3D test”—Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization.
Sharansky mentioned with respect to double standards that: “When criticism of Israel is applied selectively; when Israel is singled out by the United Nations for human rights abuses while the behavior of known and major abusers, such as China, Iran, Cuba, and Syria is ignored . . . this is antisemitism.”

Definitions

Definitions of a “double standard” are rather simple. The *Oxford Dictionary* describes it as “A rule or moral principle that is unfair because it is used in one situation, but not in another, or because it treats one group of people in a way that is different from the treatment of another.” Cambridge Dictionaries Online puts it even more succinctly: “A rule or standard of good behavior which, unfairly, some people are expected to follow or achieve but other people are not.”

The definition of antisemitism set forth by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, formerly the EUMC)—a body associated with the European Union—also recognizes the important role double standards play in the discrimination of Israel. The document that contains this definition mentions that manifestations of antisemitism “could also target the State of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity.” It refers not only to such matters as calling for or justifying the killing of Jews, dehumanizing and demonizing them, accusing them of imagined wrongdoing, denying the Holocaust, and charging Jews with being like Nazis, but also with denying Jews the right to self-determination and applying double standards by requiring behavior of Israel that is not expected of any other democratic country. This definition thus distinguishes “regular” criticism of Israel from antisemitic expressions against it.

The FRA definition of antisemitism, however, contains a major flaw as far as double standards are concerned. According to the more precise definitions from the dictionaries mentioned, non-democratic countries should not be measured by different standards than democratic ones. The universal declaration of human rights is similar for all. It is mistaken to apply different definitions to double standards according to the way countries are ruled.

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The number of instances where double standards are applied against Israel is almost unlimited. To best demonstrate the various aspects of this phenomenon, therefore, I present in this essay examples from the various categories of double standards used against Israel, as compared to others. My examples, described below, are grouped in seven categories: biased declarations or reporting; omissions; disproportional behavior; interference in Israel’s internal affairs; discriminatory acts; double standards in international law; and humanitarian racism.

**Biased Declarations or Reporting**

One category of double standards applied against Israel is biased declarations or reporting. Such declarations or reporting can come from the United Nations and other international organizations, governments, parliaments, church bodies, media, trade unions, NGOs, and academic bodies, as well as individuals.

One occasion where the use of such double standards was particularly clear was after Israeli military actions taken against the Gaza flotilla on May 31, 2010. On June 2, 2010, the German Parliament, the Bundestag, adopted an unprecedented resolution when it stated that there was strong evidence that Israel violated the “principle of proportionality” in the raid.

European Info Press commentator Dean Grunwald pointed out that in the history of the Bundestag, it had never issued a resolution against any of the true “rogue states in the world, no matter how inhuman they are.” The Simon Wiesenthal Center noted in a public statement that “We heard no such unanimity from German politicians when Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists targeted Israeli civilians, including Holocaust survivors and their families.”

Gert Weisskirchen, an antisemitism expert and former German Socialist parliamentarian, wrote that before voting, the parliamentarians should

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have inquired who had organized the flotilla and which propaganda purposes it served.\footnote{Gert Weisskirchen, “Anmassende Abgeordnete,” Jüdische Allgemeine, July 8, 2010.}

Regarding Israel’s Gaza Cast Lead war (Operation Cast Lead) at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated while addressing his country’s parliament: “They say my criticism is harsh; I assume it is not as harsh as phosphorus bombs or fire from tanks. . . . I am reacting as a human and a Muslim.” He also claimed that “the dignity of humanity is being killed in Gaza.”\footnote{“PM Erdoğan Says Words Not Harsher than Bombs,” Hurriyet, January 14, 2009.} It is highly unlikely that Erdoğan ever used similar language concerning the widespread murderous behavior in the Muslim world.

Historian and political scientist Rory Miller analyzed Irish politics in the Middle East over a number of decades. He noted that Irish parliamentarians in session will regularly discuss Israel’s shortcomings, but not one of them mentions Palestinian suicide bombings. Double standards so characteristic of the anti-Israeli mutation of antisemitism are typical for the Irish government. It regularly condemns Israel but, for instance, in 1990, refused to denounce King Hussein’s and Yasser Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.\footnote{Rory Miller, Ireland and the Palestine Question, 1948-2004 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005), 147.}

The Sheikh Yassin and Osama Bin Laden Killings

A typical case of biased declarations concerned condemnations from many countries of the Israeli killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 2004. The flurry of international reactions to the killing of Bin Laden by the US Army could have provided Israel with a major opportunity to demonstrate the double standards applied against it by so many in the West and around the world. All one had to do is compare the reactions of various leaders and institutions to this killing with those after the death of Sheikh Yassin. This terrorist was directly responsible for many lethal attacks on Israeli civilians, including suicide bombings.\footnote{For a more detailed analysis, see Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Bin Laden versus Yassin,” Ynet, March 5, 2011.}

The United Nations’ declarations in these cases illustrate the bias well. UN secretary General Ban Ki-moon told reporters that “The death of Osama Bin Laden, announced by President [Barack] Obama last night, is a
watershed moment in our common global fight against terrorism."  

After the killing of Sheikh Yassin, then-UN secretary general Kofi Annan said, “I do condemn the targeted assassination of Sheikh Yassin and the others who died with him. Such actions are not only contrary to international law, but they do not do anything to help the search for a peaceful solution.”

The now-defunct UN Commission on Human Rights condemned “the tragic death of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in contravention of the Hague Convention IV of 1907.” In the Security Council, the United States had to use its veto power to prevent condemnation of Israel.

After the Bin Laden killing, the leaders of the European Council and the European Commission stated that Bin Laden’s death “made the world a safer place and showed that terrorist attacks do not remain unpunished.” Following the Yassin killing, then-EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said, “This type of action does not contribute at all to create the conditions of peace. This is very, very bad news for the peace process. The policy of the European Union has been consistent condemnation of extra-judicial killing.”

British prime minister David Cameron congratulated President Obama on the success of the assassination of Bin Laden. Cameron considered it a massive step forward in the fight against extremist terrorism. Former prime minister Tony Blair welcomed Bin Laden’s demise as well.

The killing of Sheikh Yassin, however, was called by then-British foreign secretary Jack Straw “unacceptable” and “unjustified.” The official spokesman of then prime minister Blair condemned the “unlawful attack” and observed: “We have repeatedly made clear our opposition to Israel’s use of targeted killings and assassinations.” A cynic taking the spokes-

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18. Ibid.
man’s statement literally could now say that this statement was right: his boss was only against Israel’s use of targeted killing.

France’s president Nicolas Sarkozy hailed Bin Laden’s killing as a coup in the fight against terrorism. He called President Obama, praising his determination and courage and that of all others who had pursued the head of Al Qaida for ten years. Sarkozy added that the two heads of state had agreed to continue the just and necessary fight against terrorist barbarity and those who support it. 19

The Basayev Killing

Harvard law expert Alan Dershowitz had already referred to the double standards about targeted killings in 2006: “Every time Israel kills a terrorist who has murdered Israeli civilians the international community and America’s hard left goes crazy, condemning, boycotting, and divesting from the Jewish state. But it totally ignores the indistinguishable actions of other nations. Yesterday, Russia targeted and killed Shamil Basayev, a Chechnyan terrorist who was also ‘Vice-President’ of Chechnya’s separatist movement. The international community applauded the killing of this terrorist, who Russia’s President Putin said, ‘deserved retribution.’ The international community also applauded the targeted killing by American and Allied forces of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi earlier last month.”

Dershowitz further commented: “I join the applause for the targeted killings of these two mass-murdering terrorist leaders. But I also applaud the targeted killing of anti-Israel terrorists who are engaged in ongoing attacks against Israeli women and children. I regret when innocent people are killed in the process of targeting terrorists, but the fault for that lies entirely with the terrorists who hide behind innocent women and children in order to induce Israel to kill civilians. Yes, Palestinian terrorists want Israel to kill Palestinian women and children. That is part of their strategy.” 20

The Goldstone Report

The anti-Israel bias of the Goldstone Report on Operation Cast Lead in Gaza has been exposed by many. 21 The media watch organization CAM-ERA has specifically listed the double standards applied against Israel by

19. “Ben Laden: Sarkozy salue la ‘détermination’ d’Obama, le combat se poursuit,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), May 2, 2011.
the Goldstone Commission. The analysis concludes: “The Report tends to base its acceptance of evidence less on the source of that evidence, and more on its target. That is, evidence damning Israel is normally deemed credible, whereas evidence exonerating Israel or damning Palestinians is explicitly or quietly dismissed.”

A few examples of this, CAMERA noted, are: “When an NGO asserted that one Palestinian fighter denied using human shields and others admitted to it, the Report in effect dismissed the admission and accepted the denial. Similarly, information by other NGOs are given weight when they suggest Israeli culpability, but are ignored or minimized when they suggest Palestinian guilt. Purported contradictions and falsehoods by Israel were deemed a blow to Israeli credibility, while the same by Palestinian and pro-Palestinian sources were dismissed or ignored. Assertions by Palestinian political leaders are said not to constitute evidence, whereas statements by Israeli political leaders are considered to constitute evidence.”

The BBC

Litigation lawyer Trevor Asserson has analyzed the BBC’s reporting a number of times, and has published many examples of its double standards. For instance, Asserson compared reporting on British military in the Iraq war and Israeli soldiers: “Coalition troops are described in warm and glowing terms, with sympathy being evoked for them both as individuals and for their military predicament. In contrast, Israeli troops are painted as faceless, ruthless, and brutal killers, with little or no understanding shown for their actions.”

Asserson added: “The BBC goes to considerable lengths to explain, excuse, and mitigate any civilian deaths at the hands of coalition troops. Israeli troops receive totally different treatment; little sympathy is shown for their situation, and mitigating arguments are brushed aside or scorned, if voiced at all. At times, the reporting of events in Israel amounts to distortion and at other times to what appears to be discrimination against Israel.”

Asserson and his assistant, Lee Kern, devoted an entire section to what they call “mitigation”: “When coalition culpability is conceded, efforts are made to excuse, explain, and even justify the loss of civilian life.” On the other hand, “when an Israeli weapon causes civilian death, the BBC is quick to criticize and slow to explain, excuse, or indeed show any significant level of understanding of the military difficulties faced by Israel.” The report gives tens of examples of such mitigation as far as coalition forces

are concerned, while “the BBC’s reporting of Israeli troops, far from seeking to displace blame, goes out of its way to ensure that blame is ascribed.”

One might add here that discriminatory action against Jews or Israel is rarely an isolated phenomenon. Usually it is an indicator of a widespread, morally distorted attitude that comes to light at a later stage. One example of this occurred in the autumn of 2012, when the BBC found itself in a crisis after it was accused that it had covered up lengthy sex abuse by one of its star presenters, Jimmy Saville. A few weeks later, its Newsnight program falsely accused a former Conservative politician of child abuse.

*The New York Times*

CAMERA has exposed many examples of double standards by major news agencies, and primarily ones by American media. For instance, as far as the intentional avoidance of words such as “terrorist” and “terrorism” is concerned, *The New York Times*’ public editor (ombudsman) Daniel Okrent has admitted some shortcomings regarding his paper. The analysis by CAMERA of some of Okrent’s publications shows that the paper’s bias is far more encompassing than he first revealed.

For example, Okrent wrote in 2005: “I think in some instances *The Times*’ earnest effort to avoid bias can desiccate language and dilute meaning. In a January memo to the Foreign desk, former Jerusalem bureau chief James Bennet addressed the paper’s gingerly use of the word ‘terrorism.’

‘The calculated bombing of students in a university cafeteria, or of families gathered in an ice cream parlor, cries out to be called what it is,’ Bennet wrote. ‘I wanted to avoid the political meaning that comes with “terrorism,” but I couldn’t pretend that the word had no usage at all in plain English.’ Bennet came to believe that ‘not to use the term began to seem like a political act in itself.’ ”

Okrent added: “I agree. While some Israelis and their supporters assert that any Palestinian holding a gun is a terrorist, there can be neither factual nor moral certainty that he is. But if the same man fires into a crowd of

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civilians, he has committed an act of terror, and he is a terrorist. My own definition is simple: an act of political violence committed against purely civilian targets is terrorism; attacks on military targets are not.”

Another example of the use of double standards by *The New York Times* that CAMERA pointed out was that when four terrorists committed bomb blasts in London, the paper had as its heading: “4 from Britain Carried Out Terror Blasts, Police Say.” An article on a bombing in a Netanya mall, however, did not mention the word “terrorism” other than as a quote by an Israeli spokesman. CAMERA stated that there were 27 occasions in the text of the *Times* article where the words “terror,” “terrorism,” or “terrorists” could have been used.

The World Council of Churches

The World Council of Churches (WCC), an umbrella organization of about 350 Protestant and Orthodox churches, founded in 1948, has frequently been hostile to Israel. CAMERA’s Dexter van Zile has analyzed its anti-Israeli bias in great detail. As one example of double standards he mentions that the WCC made only obtuse statements about the many massacres in the civil wars in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s: “The WCC offered vague and diffuse condemnations of massacres in Lebanon in those decades, failing to provide details about either the identity of the victims or the identity and motives of the perpetrators. But when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, WCC institutions forcefully condemned Israel while attributing malign intent to it.”

Rijk van Dam, a Dutch Christian former Euro-parliamentarian, visited the WCC with other Christian representatives in mid 2005 after the organization had called for divestment from Israel. He mentions that they asked the WCC executives they met: “Why doesn’t the WCC condemn what goes on in Darfur, or in North Korea?’ They replied: ‘In Africa and Asia we have member churches. They will object if we take a stand on their countries. In Israel we do not have influential churches.’

“We told them our conclusion: ‘What you in fact say is that you take a one-sided, biased action against Israel because you get no protest.’ They

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had no choice but to admit that.”

A second category of double standard is omission of relevant information. One way to omit is by deleting context. Trevor Asserson and one of his assistants revealed in one investigation seven examples of how the BBC frequently distorts or masks true facts. He showed, for instance, how when BBC correspondent Kylie Morris reports from Gaza on Israeli retaliatory actions, she omits the Israeli army’s claim that buildings destroyed had been used for attacking Israel. The BBC’s behavior on this subject was very different from that of other media sources that Asserson’s assistant had recorded for comparison.

According to Asserson, the BBC’s distortions of the truth regarding Israel morph into many other forms. When it quoted a study undertaken by the Human Rights Watch that found that Palestinians severely tortured their prisoners, the BBC chose to conceal that aspect of the report—which was highly critical of the Palestinians—by seeking to deflect the criticism onto Israel and even blame Israel for Palestinian shortcomings. In another distortion, the BBC Web site failed to mention the existence of virulent, racist, anti-Israel material put out by institutional Arab government-controlled affiliates.

Thomas Friedman of The New York Times published—many years later—the observation that Western correspondents stationed in Beirut before 1982 did not even offer a hint about the well-known corruption of the PLO leadership there. He also noted that these correspondents judged the PLO with much more largesse than they did the Phalangists, Israelis, or Americans. One major reason was that the correspondents had to stay on good terms with the PLO because otherwise, when their foreign editor arrived, he would not get the much-coveted interview with Yasser Arafat.

It is most likely that behavior similar to that exposed by Friedman is still practiced by many correspondents in the Arab world. They all need

32. Ibid., 197.
34. Ibid.
favors from the authorities. Thus their criticism, if it exists, must be kept muted.

Israel’s Military Attack on the Gaza Flotilla

A number of issues involve a combination of several categories of double standards. In the Gaza flotilla (Mavi Marmara) case, one also often finds—besides the discrimination against Israel in many declarations—major omissions of comparable cases. For instance, on September 4, 2009, a German officer in Kunduz, Afghanistan, ordered an airstrike that killed up to 142 Afghans. Among these, an estimated eighty were civilians. A NATO report revealed that the deadly operation “was the result of a combination of ineptness and deliberate misinformation, without which the airstrike would never have occurred.” As a result of what became known as the Kunduz affair, former German defense minister Franz Josef Jung was forced to resign from his new job as labor minister. The chief of staff of the German Army, Wolfgang Schneiderhan, also resigned. A parliamentary investigative committee was set up to examine the incident.35

This incident, with a far bigger number of deaths than the Mavi Marmara incident, triggered neither international outrage nor resolutions by parliaments of foreign countries. Yet in Kunduz, civilians, who had not taken part in any provocative activities, were killed. The participants in the Gaza flotilla, however, knew well beforehand that they were taking risks, and most of those killed had stated their desire to become “martyrs.”

Questions also emerge concerning accusations about Israel’s possible disproportionate use of force in the Gaza flotilla. If it existed at all, how small was this “disproportional” behavior compared to the actions of many European countries at present or in the past during the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars? Muslim countries had not launched any military attacks or terrorist acts against the European countries contributing to the Western forces. This issue gains even more weight in view of the killing of many civilians by Western soldiers or their allies in both countries.36

Another example is when murderous fighting broke out between Hamas and Fatah in Gaza in June 2007. Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre said Israel “was partly to blame.”37 This was not only an exam-

ple of Støre’s frequent hate mongering against Israel; his statement also fits the omission category of double standards, as he remained silent about Egypt’s allowing large quantities of weapons to be funneled to Hamas.

Another, very different, example: It took until 2012 for French president François Hollande to officially acknowledge that Algerians were massacred during an independence rally in Paris in 1961. Some sources claim that the number of those murdered was about 200.38

Self-Censorship and Censorship

Omissions by journalists are often the result of self-censorship, but only rarely does the media admit this. One example was Riccardo Cristiano, a correspondent from the Italian state TV network RAI, reporting from the Palestinian territories. He announced at the time that if he could, he would have intentionally hidden negative facts about the Palestinians from the public. It is one of the few irrefutable testimonies there are of foreign pro-Palestinian journalists who knowingly distort their reporting.

On October 12, 2000, two Israeli reserve soldiers were lynched by Palestinians in Ramallah. The Italian private TV network Mediaset filmed the murder and smuggled the pictures out. These included, among others, one of a Palestinian murderer who stood at a window with “his bloodied hands raised in triumph to signal to the crowd below that the soldiers had been killed.”

Riccardo Cristiano wrote a letter, published on October 16 in the Palestinian newspaper Al-Hayat al-Jedida, in which he disclosed the name of the Italian station that had taken the pictures. As a result, Mediaset had to withdraw its correspondents from the area to avoid Palestinian revenge. Cristiano also declared that he would never have published the pictures had they been taken by him.39

In many other cases, double standards express themselves in censorship. In February 2008, three people were arrested in Denmark and accused of plotting to kill Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, who had drawn a picture of Muhammad wearing a bomb-shaped turban. In response, eleven Danish dailies reprinted the cartoon. Norwegian papers decided not to print them.

On that occasion, the editor-in-chief of the Norwegian daily Aftenposten, Hans Erik Matre, declared: “We have always been cautious about our

use of text, pictures and photos.” 40 In 2006, however, his paper published an extreme antisemitic article by well-known writer Jostein Gaarder that will have a prominent place in any anthology of 21st-century antisemitic texts in Europe. 41

NGOs, Churches, and Trade Unions

NGOs are a prominent category of perpetrators of double standards against Israel, and omissions of relevant information are rife among them. The watch organization NGO Monitor has exposed many examples of this. In 2007, for example, it published a detailed report on the double standards of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Christian Aid, concluding: “NGOs have largely remained silent regarding the intense fighting [emphasis in the original] between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian terror faction Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in Northern Lebanon. This silence stands in sharp contrast to the frequent condemnation of Israeli anti-terror operations, such as in Jenin during the IDF’s Operation Defensive Shield in 2002.” 42 There are similar reports by NGO Monitor such as the one in early 2009, which examined HRW’s double standards and post-colonial ideology in 2008. 43

In the Christian world, many examples of anti-Israeli double standards can be found in liberal Protestant churches. It is difficult to provide an overview, as there is no systematic monitoring of church bodies; analysis has thus mainly focused on specific cases. Abe Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, has for instance exposed the double standards of the US Presbyterian Church as it expressed itself at its biennial General Assembly in 2010. 44

There are also many other somewhat masked ways of applying double standards. In September 2011, all 97 board members of a Norwegian trade union and many of its employees had to go through a “Gaza Checkpoint” on their way to union offices as a sign of solidarity with the Palestinians. It

was a role play to illustrate how Israelis misbehave toward Palestinians.\textsuperscript{45} A Norwegian blogger wrote: “Let me know when they organize a role play on rocket attacks and suicide bombings, I can play the awful silence that grips you when the person next to you on the bus is dead.”\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{Disproportional Behavior}

A third category of double standards involves disproportional behavior. One example of this is when the media report in detail on negative news about Israel and barely mention far more important negative news about Muslim states. The Muslim countries together have more than 100 times the population of Israel. A huge number of transgressions of human rights as well as war crimes take place there. Which European media gives anywhere near this proportional attention to these countries? Though no country is without blame, many media stress Israel’s shortcomings and remain noticeably silent about the great majority of the huge crimes in the Muslim and Arab world. This continued disproportional reporting by the media has been a major factor in the demonization of Israel.

There is much more information today about past torture in some of the Arab countries where dictatorships have been overthrown. But there was more than enough information before the Arab Spring on this issue, as well as on other major crimes; important Western media did not want to give attention to it. One can research the archives of various major TV and radio stations, along with newspapers, to expose how little attention they gave to these issues compared to the far fewer cases involving Israel.

CAMERA has also published examples of how disproportional behavior concerning Israel appears in \textit{The New York Times}. It counted for part of a month the paper’s stories reliant on “man in the street” interviews and human-interest focus, and found that the emphasis was on presenting the Palestinian narrative, which outnumbered those focusing on Israeli perspectives by nine to five. One story represented both perspectives.\textsuperscript{47}

Disproportional Behavior of NGOs

NGO Monitor has exposed how Human Rights Watch in its publications uses disproportional behavior to demonize Israel. In 2008, NGO carried out a quantitative analysis of HRW’s publications. It found that this NGO portrayed Israel as the second worst abuser of human rights in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia, but ahead of Iran, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

In that year, HRW condemned Israel for violations of “Human Rights Law,” “Humanitarian Law,” or “International Humanitarian Law” 33 times, compared with 13 citations for the Palestinians, six for Hezbollah, and five for Egypt. NGO Monitor pointed out that HRW in that year placed Israel on a par with Sudan and leaders from the former Yugoslavia, Congo, and Uganda.48

In October 2009, Robert Bernstein, who founded HRW, accused the organization of anti-Israeli bias, saying that it had lost critical perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel had been attacked by Hamas and Hezbollah, “organizations that go after Israeli citizens and use their own people as human shields.” Bernstein added: “These groups are supported by the Government of Iran, which has openly declared its intention not just to destroy Israel but to murder Jews everywhere. This incitement to genocide is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”49

Interference in Israel’s Internal Affairs

A fourth category of double standards is interference in Israel’s internal affairs. An example of this is the aforementioned resolution adopted by the German Bundestag after the Gaza flotilla incident, which claimed that Israel’s action did not “serve the political and security interests of Israel.” Gert Weisskirchen wondered how the German parliament could possibly decide what serves the interests of Israeli security—and even if it did, how could it make such a decision without an intense dialogue with the Israeli Knesset?50

Another example: The Liberal party leader Nick Clegg, deputy prime minister of Great Britain, said about the Israeli government: “... in my

estimation the long-term interests of the people of Israel are not being met properly at this time.” The Israeli daily *Haaretz* entitled the interview with him “Nick Clegg to *Haaretz*: ‘I admire Israel, but won’t stop criticizing its government.’”51 Would Clegg dare to say that about Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, or Turkey?

What would have happened if an Israeli prime minister had discussed in an interview the major failure of the British government and police to deal with the riots in London and elsewhere in August 2011? One can only imagine what the reactions would have been in the UK if he had said to a British newspaper, “In my estimation the long-term interests of the British people are not being met properly by the way your government handles problems.”

**Discriminatory Acts**

A fifth category of double standards are discriminatory acts against Israel. These may overlap for instance with the earlier-mentioned category of biased declarations. Already almost a decade ago, Irwin Cotler, who later would become the Canadian minister of justice, referred to the United Nations as a paradigm of double standards practiced against Israel. Cotler said, “Despite the killing fields throughout the world, the UN Security Council sat from March to May 2002 in almost continuous sessions discussing a non-existent massacre in Jenin.”52

He also mentioned the UN Commission on Human Rights meeting in spring 2002:

Forty percent of the resolutions passed were against one member state of the international community, Israel, while the major human rights violators in the world such as China and Iran enjoyed exculpatory immunity with no resolutions passed against them. This moral asymmetry not only prejudices Israel, but it further undermines the UN’s integrity under whose auspices this occurs, and the authority of international human rights law in whose name these indictments are passed.53


53. Ibid., 219.
Cotler also referred to the Geneva Convention, noting:

During more than 50 years after the Second World War atrocities continued. Among the best known are the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan and Sierra Leone. Despite these horrific breaches of the Geneva Convention, which was adopted in 1949, the contracting parties were never convened to discuss them. The only time this happened was in December 2001 when the contracting parties to the Convention gathered in Geneva to accuse Israel of human rights violations and breaches of the Convention.54

Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly

Former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations Dore Gold related that in July 1997, the Arab states successfully convened an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly dealing with Israeli building practices in East Jerusalem at Har Homa—a barren hill. “I was Ambassador at the UN in 1997, when the aforementioned Emergency Special Session convened to discuss Israeli building at Har Homa,” Gold said. “It recommended that the High Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that is, the signatories of the 1949 Convention that deals with the protection of civilians in times of war, be convened to take measures addressing Israeli violations of it.”

He added:

In order to prepare myself, I asked my colleagues in the Israeli Foreign Ministry over which issues the High Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention had convened before to discuss so-called violations. I inquired whether it met when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan or Czechoslovakia? When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, Turkey invaded Cyprus, India invaded Pakistani territory, or Morocco invaded the Western Sahara?

The reply was that in none of these cases were Emergency Special Sessions of the General Assembly convened. It turned out that in about fifty years of the Fourth Geneva Convention’s existence the international community had never recommended the convening of its High Contracting Parties concerning any conflict. This despite many major cases violating international peace and security. The only case that remains until today is the building of condominiums on a Jerusalem hill. This was done with full European support. This assault additionally leads to the

54. Ibid., 219.
politicization of international humanitarian law, and the undermining of international conventions.\textsuperscript{55}

A British Cartoon

Yet another illustration of this phenomenon was when the British daily The Independent published a cartoon by Dave Brown depicting Ariel Sharon as a child-eater, a new mutation of the medieval blood libel. This vilification of Jews, the belief that they use the blood of Gentile children for religious purposes, originated in England during the Middle Ages. In response to protests, the UK Press Complaints Commission cleared the cartoon.\textsuperscript{56}

Subsequently, it won the Political Cartoon Society’s Political Cartoon of the Year Award for 2003. The competition was held in November 2003 on the premises of the well-known weekly The Economist, and the award was presented to Brown by Labour MP and former minister for overseas aid Claire Short.\textsuperscript{57}

The discriminatory character of this cartoon was emphasized by the then Israeli ambassador to the UK, Zvi Shtauber. Shtauber asked the Independent’s Jewish editor, Simon Kelner, whether the paper had ever published a similar caricature of a public figure. Kelner had to go back 18 years to find one.\textsuperscript{58}

Boycotts and Divestments

Another type of discriminatory act that expresses double standards against Israel is the promotion of divestments and boycotts. One example among many is that of the Norwegian state pension fund, which divested from shares of some Israeli companies while keeping the shares of a number of highly unethical companies in its portfolio.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{55} Dore Gold, interview by Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Europe’s Consistent Anti-Israel Bias at the United Nations,” in Israel and Europe: An Expanding Abyss?, 51-53.
\textsuperscript{56} www.politicalcartoon.co.uk/html/exhibition.html.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Zvi Shtauber, interview by Manfred Gerstenfeld, “British Attitudes on Israel and the Jews,” in Israel and Europe: An Expanding Abyss?, 188.
Divestment movements have been active in the academic field for about a decade. In many other areas, including several liberal Protestant churches, such campaigns continue to be promoted.

In 2007, a British lawyer, Anthony Julius, and Alan Dershowitz wrote in the *Times* of London that British boycotters, in excluding “from consideration the many nations with far worse human rights records than Israel . . . are merely practicing sophistry in defense of their own double standards.”

Julius and Dershowitz cited two reasons to regard the boycotters’ position as antisemitic. First, it resonated with earlier boycotts of Jews that were all based on a “principle of exclusion: Jews and/or the Jewish State, are to be excluded from public life, from the community of nations, because they are dangerous and malign.”

Second, the boycott was “predicated on the defamation of Jews.” Julius and Dershowitz provided several arguments for this point, concluding that: “Boycotters may have Jewish friends, some may be Jews themselves—but in supporting a boycott they have put themselves in antisemitism’s camp.”

### Double Standards in Applying International Law

A sixth category concerns double standards in applying international law. International lawyer Meir Rosenne, former Israeli ambassador to the United States and France, expressed an even stronger opinion: “There are two types of international law. One is applied to Israel, the other to all other states. This comes to the fore when one looks at the way Israel is treated in international institutions . . .”

Rosenne cites as a typical example of double standards in international law the 2004 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Israeli security fence. “In its judgment The Hague court decided that the inherent

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63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.
right of self-defense is enforced only if one is confronted by a state. If this were true, that would mean that whatever the United States undertakes against Al-Qaeda is illegal. This cannot be considered self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter because Al-Qaeda is not a state.  

Another international lawyer, Alan Baker, a former deputy director general of the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has analyzed discrimination against Israel in the United Nations. He wrote: “Sovereign equality is a fundamental component of the 1945 UN Charter. The principle of equality is set down in the introductory paragraph, which states; “We the peoples of the United Nations [are] determined . . . to reaffirm faith . . . in the equal rights . . . of nations large and small.”

Baker remarked that this equality is only true in theory: “This is especially evident in Israel’s case where the assumptions inherent in sovereign equality—judicial equality, equality of voting, equality in participation in all UN activities and processes, and equality in membership in all forums—break down and leave Israel isolated and discriminated against.”

In addition, Baker noted that similar double standards, to a lesser degree, also exist with the International Red Cross movement, which has, “for over sixty years since the establishment of the state of Israel, avoided acceptance of Israel as a fully-fledged member of the movement, despite the operation by Israel of a well-organized medical and humanitarian assistance organ, under the emblem of the Red Shield of David.”

Humanitarian Racism

A seventh category of double standards might be called humanitarian racism—one of the least recognized forms of racism. It can be defined as attributing intrinsically reduced responsibility to people of certain ethnic or national groups for their criminal acts and intentions. Many left-of-center parties, human rights organizations, and development aid agencies are riddled with such racists. One also finds humanitarian racists elsewhere, for instance among progressive academics and in several mainstream Protestant denominations.

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67. Ibid., 150.
68. Ibid., 148.
These people judge misbehavior and crime differently: they go according to the color and power of those who commit them. White people are held to different standards of responsibility than people of color are, for example. Israelis are blamed for whatever measures they take to defend themselves; Palestinian responsibility for suicide bombings, murderous missile attacks, and the glorification of murderers of civilians is reduced, at best. This humanitarian racism is very different from the ugly old racism of say, US senator Robert Byrd, a Democrat, when he was still a member of the Klu Klux Klan and remained a racist thereafter for many years.

Humanitarian racism can appear combined with demonization. In 1984, Swedish deputy foreign minister Pierre Schori, a Social Democrat, visited Israel. At that time, he praised Arafat and his “flexible policy.” In addition, in an article he claimed that “the terrorist acts of the PLO were ‘meaningless,’ while Israel’s retaliatory acts were ‘despicable acts of terrorism.’”

In many European socialist parties, one finds examples of white-washing Arab terrorism. Greek Socialists have always severely condemned domestic terrorism. Following a judicial investigation, however, the Athens Court of Appeals and the Greek Supreme Court decided that Abdel Osama Al-Zomar, an alleged Palestinian terrorist apprehended in Greece, should be extradited to Italy to face charges of bombing the synagogue of Rome in October 1982, injuring 34 people and killing a three-year-old child. Greek Socialist justice minister Vasilios Rotis used his authority to overrule the court’s decision, stating that Osama’s acts were part of the “Palestinian struggle for liberation of their homeland, and, therefore, cannot be considered acts of terrorism.”

Another easy-to-identify example of humanitarian racism can be found in the election platform of the Dutch Labor party for the 2010 Dutch parliamentary elections. When dealing with foreign policy, the platform cited

the areas of unrest in the world. It devoted one sentence to the Horn of Africa; the only other conflict in the world that was referred to was the Israeli-Palestinian one, with a heavy anti-Israeli slant. The platform devoted a number of paragraphs to it.

Dutch soldiers fought in Afghanistan until early 2010. Afghanistan, however, was not mentioned in the Labor Party platform; the threat to humanity at large from Iran was not evoked either. It quickly became even clearer how biased this platform was, when—in the beginning of 2011—a series of revolutions broke out in Arab countries in which tens of thousands of people were killed.

Other Examples

The examples given above are clear. There are many other cases, however, where double standards are less evident because they cannot be proven—for instance, one can assume from their behavior what other countries would have done had they been in Israel’s position. Here, double standards by necessity take on a hypothetical character. Arrogance and double standards toward Israel often go hand in hand. Would Norway and Sweden have remained democracies if they had had to cope with the kinds of challenges Israel has faced in the past decades? There are some indications that this would not have been the case.

In May 2008, Håkan Syrén, commander of the Swedish armed forces, warned that if security conditions were to deteriorate, the country would not have the protection it needed.74 In 2008, in Norway, General Robert Mood, inspector-general of the army, described “the army’s current capability as only being able to defend perhaps one neighborhood in Oslo, much less the entire country.”75

Combating Double Standards

The combating of double standards is a crucial issue in the fight against the delegitimization of Israel. In a fragmented post-modern society, there are many such perpetrators of Israel-hate, and a number of them employ more than one category of double standards.

Several individuals and organizations who apply double standards toward Israel do so frequently; their statements and acts can be followed on the Internet. One can choose a few such antisemites to be carefully moni-

tored and exposed. Most people are cowards. Many enjoy free antisemitic lunches—yet once it becomes clear that some have to pay heavily for that meal, the number of such diners will likely drop.

**Monitoring Organizations**

A greater role in combating double standards can be played by monitoring organizations that follow perpetrators of anti-Israelism and antisemitism in specific areas. As such organizations know the main perpetrators in these fields well, they can publish articles about their double standards, while also referring to earlier cases. In this way a fuller picture of misbehavior of specific organizations and individuals is created.

As mentioned previously, NGO Monitor has already been doing this on a number of occasions. It has frequently followed a “naming and shaming” strategy. With regard to the United Nations, for instance, much work has been done by two monitoring organizations, UN Watch and Eye on the UN. Similarly, one could and should investigate a variety of church bodies, but presently there is no monitoring organization in this area.

Some media are monitored. A big handicap is that there are so many of them and they appear in many different languages. This means that one can only observe the big media in a few countries, as is done for instance by media watch organizations such as CAMERA and HonestReporting. An alternative is to study a single medium. CIF Watch, for instance, reacts to *The Guardian*’s Comment Is Free blog, and in particular to the antisemitism on it. Continuous monitoring, however, requires substantial financial and human resources.

**Other Approaches**

In the fight against those who use double standards against Israel, grassroots organizations and individuals can also play a major role. It makes no sense to aim widely. Each body or individual has to pick a few targets and monitor their demonizing of Israel and their application of double standards.

Typical examples of worthwhile targets are large parts of the Norwegian cultural elite, including the current Norwegian government and two of the parties supporting it—the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party. This government is in many ways an indirect supporter of anti-Israeli terror-
The other government member, the Centre Party, is the only government party in Europe that wants to forbid male circumcision. Yet another way of combating double standards is public figures coming out against double standards and other phenomena of delegitimization. One example of a leader who did so is Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper, who said in 2010:

We must be relentless in exposing this new antisemitism for what it is. Of course, like any country, Israel may be subjected to fair criticism. And like any free country, Israel subjects itself to such criticism—healthy, necessary, democratic debate. But when Israel—the only country in the world whose very existence is under attack—is consistently and conspicuously singled out for condemnation, I believe we are morally obligated to take a stand. Demonization, double standards, delegitimization, the three D’s, it is the responsibility of us all to stand up to them.

Use of All Resources

There are many other ways to expose those who apply double standards. For example, after the misplaced reaction of Germany’s Bundestag to the Israeli action against the Gaza flotilla, one could send all members of the parliament e-mails when they do not make similar statements in far more severe cases. The more people spread this corrective, the more it may prevent future repetition.

Similarly, one has only to copy a few aforementioned broadcasts of the BBC and thereafter replace British soldiers with the Israeli ones. One can put such a short film on YouTube, showing what the BBC did, and then insert inverted scenes where Israeli troops are described in warm and glowing terms, with sympathy being evoked for them both as individuals and for their military predicament. In contrast, British troops can be painted as faceless, ruthless, and brutal killers, with little or no understanding shown for their actions.

In 2011, HonestReporting took a press release from the Associated Press on a NATO spokesman speaking about Libyan human shields in the

military campaign there. It replaced the statements of the NATO spokes-
person by an IDF spokesperson and the reactions of the Khadaffi govern-
ment by statements from Hamas spokespeople during the Cast Lead war. 
The texts sound very similar. What HonestReporting points out is that the 
major media, including The New York Times, question the veracity of 
Khadaffi’s statements about casualty figures, but had no problem publish-
ing casualty figures from Hamas terrorist sources.79

As there are so many ongoing cases of double standards, one could 
even open a Web site that once a week mentioned new incidents of this type 
of antisemitism. Many people who have no compunction in using double 
standards might find it unpleasant to be exposed as antisemites.

Legal means may be used in some cases where double standards 
express themselves through discrimination of individuals. Ronnie Fraser 
has been the forerunner in the fight against Israel-bashers on British cam-
puses. In July 2011, his lawyer, Anthony Julius, wrote in a letter to the 
University and College Union that it had breached the Equality Act of 2010 
because it had harassed Fraser due to his Jewish background and created 
“an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating” and/or “offensive envi-
ronment for him.” In September 2011, it was announced that in view of 
UCU’s unsatisfactory answer, Julius has filed a claim with the Employment 
Tribunal, which states that the UCU exhibits institutionally antisemitic 
behavior toward its Jewish members.80

One should aim for increasing intensity and a more systematic 
approach in combating anti-Israeli double standards. That will also bring 
with it more sophisticated and efficient methods of combat in the future.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of double standards used against Israel shows that they 
appear in a large number of fields and have permeated many aspects of 
Western society. The application of such double standards against Israel has 
a cumulative effect of demonization and a slow buildup of support for its 
delegitimization.

One can see this well from some of the many examples mentioned in 
this essay. If for instance Israel is condemned by the Bundestag while rogue 
states have never been denounced, this embodies an underlying message 
that Israel is most evil. If HRW devotes in a particular year more attention

HonestReporting, June 19, 2011.
Jerusalem Post, September 20, 2011.
to Israel than to any of the extreme dictatorships other than Saudi Arabia, this is a demonizing act. If the BBC presents Israeli soldiers negatively while British soldiers in similar situations are presented positively, this whitewashing delegitimizes the Israeli army. The WCC is far less influential, but some of its anti-Israel hate-mongering trickles down to Christian organizations in several countries. Individuals contribute to demonizing Israel as well—for instance, those so-called Middle East experts who blame Israel for the stalled peace negotiations without even mentioning the peace offers of prime ministers Barak and Olmert.

It is a major failure that successive Israeli governments and their leading officials have understood far too little of the nature of this demonization and delegitimization process and how double standards are used in it. At the same time, following this process also gives many insights into the moral degradation of contemporary societies, including Western ones. Jews have been a witness to the moral depravity of many societies and elements throughout the ages. The same is now true as far as Israel is concerned.

*Manfred Gerstenfeld is emeritus chair (2000 to 2012) and member of the Board of Fellows of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He has authored fifteen books, edited five, and is a frequent *JSA* contributor and founding *JSA* board member.
Portia, Shylock, and the Exclusion of Israeli Actors

David Hirsh*

Is the Merchant of Venice an antisemitic play or is it a play that intimately depicts the anatomy of persecution, exclusion, and bullying?

A classic speaks differently to each individual and in each new context. On Monday, May 28, 2012, I saw The Merchant of Venice performed by Habima, the Israeli National Theatre. The venue was the replica of Shakespeare’s wooden, roofless Globe Theatre. It was a hot London night and the noise of flying machines occasionally confronted our fantasies of authenticity, if the fact that the performance was in Hebrew didn’t.

But first more context. London is, after having been the hub of the British Empire, now a multicultural world city. The Globe hosted theater companies from all over the world to perform Shakespeare in their own languages; Shakespeare from Pakistan, South Africa, Georgia, Palestine, Turkey, China, and everywhere else.

Since some rather nasty medieval stuff, London and Jews have got on fairly well. London stood firm against Hitler, and the local Blackshirts too; it didn’t mind much whether Jews stayed separate or whether they immersed themselves in its vibrancy; it didn’t feel threatened, it didn’t worry, it just let Jews live engaged lives. But London’s very post-nationalism, and its post-colonialism, have functioned as the mediums for a rather odd new kind of intolerance.

Sometimes, we define our own identities in relation to some “other.” Early Christianity defined itself in relation to the Jews, who refused to
accept its gospel, and it portrayed them as Christ-killers. If people wanted to embrace modernity, then they sometimes constructed themselves as being different from the traditional Jew, with his beard and coat, standing against progress. Yet if they were afraid of the new, then they could define themselves against the modernist Jew. Nineteenth-century nationalists often defined the Jew as the foreigner. Twentieth-century totalitarianisms, which had universal ambition, found their “other” in the cosmopolitan Jew. These processes created an invented image of “The Jew,” and the antisemites portrayed themselves as victims of “The Jew.” Antisemitism has only ever portrayed itself as defensive.

Some people who love London’s relaxed, diverse antiracism look for an “other” against which to define themselves. They find Israel. They make it symbolize everything against which they define themselves: ethnic nationalism, racism, apartheid, colonialism. London’s shameful past, not to mention in some ways its present, is cast out and thrust upon Israel. London was within a few thousand votes last month of reelecting a mayor, Ken Livingstone, who embraced this kind of scapegoating.\(^1\)

We can tell that this hostility to Israel is as artificially constructed as any antisemitism by looking at the list of theater groups against which the enlightened ones organized no boycott. Anti-Zionists have created a whole new “-ism,” a worldview, around their campaign against Israel. Within it, a caricature of Israel is endowed with huge symbolic significance, which relates only here and there to the actual state, to the complex conflict, and to the diversity of existing Israelis. If the Palestinians stand, in the anti-Zionist imagination, as symbolic of all the victims of “the West” or “imperialism,” then Israel is thrust into the center of the world as being symbolic of oppression everywhere. Like antisemitism, anti-Zionism imagines Jews as central to all that is bad in the world.\(^2\)

One of the sources of energy for this special focus on Israel comes from Jewish anti-Zionists. For them, as for many other Jews, Israel is of special importance. For them, Israel’s human rights abuses, real, exaggerated, or imagined, are sources of particular pain, at times even shame.\(^3\) Some of them take their private preoccupation with Israel and try to export


it into the cultural and political sphere in general, and into non-Jewish civil society spaces where a special focus on the evils of Israel takes on a new symbolic power. But the “as a Jew” anti-Zionists are so focused on Israel that they often fail to understand the significance of the symbolism they so confidently implant into the antiracist spaces of old London.

When I see a production of The Merchant of Venice, it is always the audience that unsettles me. The play tells two related stories. One is the story of Shylock, a Jewish money lender who is spat on, excluded, beaten up, and in the end mercilessly defeated and humiliated. The other is an apparently light-hearted story about an arrogant, rich, self-absorbed young woman, clever but not wise, pretty but not beautiful, and her antisemitic friends. Shakespeare interleaves the grueling detailed scenes of the bullying of Shylock with the comedic story of Portia’s love match with a loser who has already frittered away his large inheritance.

Shakespeare also gives us an intimately observed depiction of antisemitic abuse. Each time the story reaches a new climax of horribleness, he then offers hackneyed and clichéd gags to see if he can make us laugh. It is as if he is interested in finding out how quickly the audience forgets Shylock when off stage, and his tragedy. And the answer, in every production I’ve ever seen, is that the audience is happy and laughing at second-rate clowning, within seconds. And I suspect that Shakespeare means the clowning and the love story to be second rate. He is doing something more interesting than entertaining us: he is playing with our emotions in order to show us something, to make us feel something.4

Now, the audience at this particular performance was a strange one in any case. It felt to me as if London’s Jewish community is out to demonstrate its solidarity with Israel and to protect the Israeli cousins from the vulgarities their city was about to offer. The audience was uneasy because it did not know in advance what form the disruption was going to take. In the end, the atmosphere was a rather positive and happy one, like an easy home win at football against an away team that had threatened a humiliating victory. Solidarity with Israel meant something different to each person. One man ostentatiously showed off a silky Israeli flag tie. Others were Hebrew speakers, taking the rare opportunity in London to see a play in their own language. Some in the audience would have been profoundly uncomfortable with Israeli government policies but keen to show their oneness with those parts of their families who had been expelled from Europe two or three generations ago and were now living in a few small cities on the eastern Mediterranean.

The audience may not have been expert either in Shakespeare or in antisemitism. Most people think that *The Merchant of Venice* is an antisemitic play. Shylock is thought to be an antisemitic stereotype, created by Shakespeare for audiences to hate. Are we supposed to enjoy the victory of the antisemites and the humiliation of the Jew? But what was this audience thinking? If it is simply an antisemitic play, why would we be watching it, and why is the Israeli National Theatre performing it? And if it is a comedy, why aren’t the jokes funny, and why does Shakespeare offer us a puerile game show rather than some of his usual genius? I don’t think this audience really cared much. It was there to face down those who said that Israeli actors should be excluded from the global community of culture, while actors from all the other states that had been invited to the Globe were celebrated in a festival of the Olympic city’s multiculturalism. So, the audience was happy to laugh loudly and to enjoy itself. We saw on stage how Shylock’s daughter was desperate to escape from the Jewish ghetto, the darkness and fear of her father’s house, the loneliness of being a Jew. We saw how she agreed to convert to Christianity because some little antisemitic boy said he loved her; we saw how she stole her father’s money so that her new friends could spend it on drunken nights out. And we saw Shylock’s despair at the loss and at the betrayal and at the intrusion. Perhaps his unbearable pain was also fueled by guilt for having failed his daughter since her mother died.

And then the audience laughed at silly caricatures of Moroccan and Spanish princes, and at Portia’s haughty and superior rejection of them. And now, not representations of antisemites but actual antisemites, hiding among the audience, unfurl their banners about “Israeli apartheid,” and their Palestinian flags, and they stage a performance of their own. How embarrassing for Palestinian people to be represented by those whose sympathy and friendship for them had become hatred of Israel; to be represented by a movement for the silencing of Israeli actors; to be represented by those who show contempt for Jewish Londoners in the audience, who dehumanize them by refusing to refer to them as people but instead simply as “Zionists.” And a “Zionist” does not merit the ordinary civility with which people in a great city normally, without thinking, accord to one another.

The artistic director of the Globe had already predicted that there might be disruption. There often was, he said, at this unique theater. Pigeons flutter onto the stage, but we ignore them. And today, people should not get upset, they should not confront the protesters, they should allow the security guards to do their job. One protester shouted “No violence” as the security guys prepared to take her away. They took a few away; the actors didn’t miss a word and the audience, largely Jewish but also English, showed their stiff upper lips and pretended nothing had hap-
pened. Some time later, another small group of protesters, who had wanted to exclude Israelis from this festival because of their nationality, stood up and put a bandage over their own mouths to dramatize their own victimhood. Antisemites always pose as victims of the Jews, or of “Zionism,” or of the “Israel lobby.” And the claim that Jews try to silence criticism of Israel by mobilizing a dishonest accusation against them is now recognizable as one of the defining tropes of contemporary antisemitism.5

Meanwhile, on stage, the antisemitic Christians are positioning themselves as the victims of Shylock. They have spat on him, stolen from him, corrupted his only daughter, libeled him, persecuted him, and excluded him. Now he’s angry. He’s a Jew, so he can be bought off, no? They try to do this. But for Shylock, this is no longer about the money. It is about the desperate anger of a man whose very identity has been trampled upon throughout his life. And at that moment, I could sympathize with him more than ever. I imagined my own revenge against the articulate poseurs who were standing there pretending to have been silenced. Shylock is a flawed character. But how much more telling is a play that shows the destruction of a man who is powerless to resist it? Racism does not only hurt good people, it also hurts flawed and ordinary people; it has the power to transform good people into angry, vengeful people. Obviously, these truths can be followed around circles of violence in these contexts, from the blood libel, Christ-killing, and conspiracy theory, to Nazism, to Zionism, and into Palestinian nationalism and Islamism. Only the righteous ones imagine it all comes out in the end into a morality tale of good against evil.

What are they thinking, the protesters? Do they understand the play at all? Are they moved by the sensitivity of the portrayal of the anatomy of antisemitic persecution? Perhaps they are, and they think that Shylock, in our day, is a Palestinian, and Jews are the new Christian antisemites. One man exclaimed, full of pompous English diction: “Hath not a Palestinians eyes?” He was referring to the wonderful universalistic speech with which Shylock dismantles the racism of his persecutors. This protester mobilized the words given by Shakespeare to the Jew, against actually existing Jews. The experience of antisemitism was totally universalized, as though the play was only about “racism in general” and not at all about antisemitism in particular. And the point that a longing for vengeance is destructive and self-destructive, no matter how justified it may feel, was of course totally missed.

5. David Hirsh, “Accusations of Malicious Intent in Debates about the Palestine-Israel Conflict and about Antisemitism.” Transversal (Graz, Austria), January 2010.
Somebody replied with comedic timing: “Piss off.” Everybody cheered. There was an understanding that the boycotters had shot off all their ammunition now, but the target was left untouched.

Or do the protesters think that this is an antisemitic play? Perhaps they felt that this was the “Zionists” rubbing the history of antisemitism in the faces of London and then by proxy the Palestinians. Isn’t that the source of Zionist power today? Their ability to mobilize Jewish victimhood and their ownership of the Holocaust. This, again, is an old libel—that the Jews are so clever and so morally lacking that they are able to benefit from their own persecution. When will the world forgive the Jews for antisemitism and the Holocaust?

The climax of the play sees Antonio, the smooth-tongued antisemitic merchant who has borrowed money he now cannot pay back, tied up in the center of the stage like Christ on the cross. The antisemites are demanding that the Jew display Christian forgiveness. But the Jew, who has been driven half mad by antisemitic persecution, does not forgive: he wants his revenge.

Naturally, the antisemites, who have state power in Venice, are never going to allow him his revenge. Portia, the clever, erudite, plausible antisemite, offers a wordy justification, and before you know it, Antonio is free, and Shylock is trussed up ready for crucifixion. And the Christians do not forgive either; they show no mercy. They humble Shylock, they take his money, and they force him to convert to Christianity. He ends up on his knees, bareheaded, without his daughter, without his money, without his livelihood, and he says: “I am content.”

And what do I see? I see another Jew, in the 21st century, preparing a court case in which he too may be humiliated by a clever display of words. Ronnie Fraser, a member of the University and College Union (UCU), the trade union that represents university workers in Britain, is taking a case to court later this year. Fraser may well end up being portrayed as the wicked, powerful Zionist looking for revenge, in a British courtroom. Represented by Anthony Julius, he argues in this case that the campaign that wanted to silence the Habima theater company is, in effect if not intent, antisemitic, and it has created a situation inside his trade union where antisemitic ways of thinking and antisemitic norms of institutional governance have become ordinary. This case will be huge and the stakes are high.

The anti-Zionist elite, with all its access to the media and with all its Jewish, political, celebrity, and intellectual support, will portray itself as being silenced by Ronnie the “Zionist,” and it will ask the court to set aside all the evidence of antisemitism in favor of a smart but ambiguous form of words.
Portia said that Shylock could have his pound of flesh but only if he could extract it without spilling a drop of blood. The form of words in Fraser v. UCU that would humiliate the plaintiff would be that while he is protected from antisemitism by the Equality Act of 2010, hostility to Israel is not antisemitic.

The day after the performance, one of the leading boycotters, Ben White, tweeted a picture of the beautiful Jewish face of Howard Jacobson, an opponent of the exclusion of Israeli actors from London. White added the text: “If you need another reason to support a boycott of Habima, I present a massive picture of Howard Jacobson’s face.”

Confronted with this, it is hardly controversial to insist that “criticism of Israel” can sometimes be antisemitic. Let’s hope Ronnie’s judge does not take advice from a contemporary Portia.

*David Hirsh is a lecturer in sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London.*
INTRODUCTION

Christian Zionism is a general label for a specific orientation and emphasis within evangelicalism that ascribes vital theological, and often eschatological, importance to the Jews living in Israel. Christian Zionists are distinguished from evangelicals more broadly by their two intense and intertwined emphases: Israel and the Jews. Those two passions bring together Christians across the evangelical spectrum into both broad, international parachurch ministries such as the International Christian Embassy of Jerusalem (ICEJ) or Christians United for Israel (CUFI), and local organizations and smaller ministries. Christian Zionists see their Zionism and focus on the Jews simply as a logical extension of their evangelical commitment to God and his word. In their reading of the Bible, God has decreed a special role and status for the Jews sealed in an eternal covenant, together with a promise to restore them to their land. Thus, Christian Zionists see their own solidarity with the Jews and the modern nation-state of Israel as paying homage to the God of Israel.

Despite Christian Zionism’s contemporary image as supporters of Israel and lovers of the Jews, the movement is not without its dark history. William Trollinger notes that the ambivalence toward the Jews inherent in premillennial dispensationalism meant that while most adherents remained sympathetic to the Jews, some made “the not so enormous jump” into

ideas that put the Jews at the center of an international conspiracy. It was Henry Ford’s *Dearborn Independent* and its 1920 publication of a collection of articles, *The International Jew*, that brought *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* to the attention of the American public. William Bell Riley, arguably “the most important fundamentalist minister of his generation,”2 also embraced the *Protocols* and asserted a Jewish-communist-modernist conspiracy. Arno Gaebelein, for all his eager immersion in Jewish culture, believed that the possible legitimacy of the *Protocols* and held ideas about an international Jewish-communist conspiracy to destroy Christian civilization.3

Nor should this be thought of as simply the dirty past of Christian Zionism’s forerunners. A tape released in 2002 of a conversation between Rev. Billy Graham and President Richard Nixon included Graham’s agreement with Nixon that left-wing Jews dominate the news media. Graham is then heard to remark that “They’re [the Jews] the ones putting out the pornographic stuff,” and that the Jewish “stranglehold has got to be broken or the country’s going down the drain.” In the recording, Graham also explains that “…a lot of the Jews are great friends of mine; they swarm around me and are friendly to me because they know that I’m friendly with Israel. But they don’t know how I really feel about what they are doing to this country…”4 Rev. Jerry Falwell, in the middle of a public defense of Israel at a 1987 rally in Richmond, Virginia, joked that a Jew “can make more money accidentally than you can on purpose”5 and shocked Jews with his 1999 assertion at an evangelism conference in Tennessee that the Antichrist will “of course” be Jewish. In 1980, the president of the Southern Baptist Convention, Rev. Bailey Smith, insisted, in front of some 15,000 attendees of the National Affairs Briefing in Dallas, that “With all due respect to those dear people, my friend, God Almighty does not hear the prayer of a Jew.” Some two weeks following his comments in Dallas, Smith wondered aloud

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3. Gaebelein’s beliefs about the existence of this plot through history were published in his 1933 *The Conflict of the Ages*, where he carefully distinguished between “good” Jews who were faithful believers in the Bible, and “bad”—apostate—Jews.


in a sermon: “I don’t know why he [God] chose the Jews. I think they got funny-looking noses myself.” 

While Christian Zionism indeed has much to say about the importance of Israel’s place and promise, this goes hand in hand with a complicated and often ambivalent relationship with Jews and Judaism. This essay offers a necessarily brief examination of some aspects of the ambivalence toward Jews and Judaism that is embedded in Christian Zionism. Christian Zionists believe that Jews are, on the one hand, chosen by God and a source of blessing to the world. At the same time, the religious practices of Judaism are felt to be misguided and even contrary to the will of God. For Christian Zionism, it is precisely this severing of Jewish ethnicity from the religion of Judaism that permits them to profess a love for the Jews and to support evangelism to the Jews in various forms, a combination that is impossible for the mainstream Jewish community to accept.

JEWISH CHOSENNESS, CHRISTIAN DEFENDERS

Christian Zionism sets itself up as the defender of the Jews as God’s eternal chosen people, counter to those Christians who would see Jews replaced with the Church as the new Israel and true heirs to God’s promises. For Christian Zionism, “replacement theology” comes to serve as the greatest fundamental error they seek to battle. Simply a clearer and more evocative name for classical supersessionism, replacement theology is the idea that with the rejection of Christ, God transferred his favor from the Jews to the Church. As with so many issues, the scriptural record is complex and able to support a multiplicity of interpretations concerning the role of the Jews in God’s plan, following Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion. But regardless of the scriptural support that this idea may or may not be able to harness, no doubt the assertion that God has abandoned his people has served to allow and even justify centuries of persecution and Jewish suffering.

The only problem with this argument, as made by Christian Zionists, is that there simply aren’t many Christians, at least in Western Christianity, who believe that any longer. In fact, a brief look at public statements made

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7. Indeed, there is no lack of sources in the New Testament that one might call on to support the idea that the new community of believers under a new covenant of grace had replaced the old community of kinship, with their obsolete covenant of Mosaic law. Some of the most obvious scriptures here include Acts 13:38-39; 2 Corinthians 3:6-8, 3:14-16; Galatians 3:10-14; Hebrews 7:18, 8:13-14; Luke 3:8.
by various Christian churches, denominations, and organizations might lead one to think that it is in fact contemporary evangelicalism that has been slow to speak out in support of Jews and their enduring relationship with God. While this undoubtedly has more to do with the decentralized and independent nature of evangelical fellowships than anything else, one is immediately struck by the many sincere statements made in the last few decades by mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic bodies. Thus, it requires a remarkably narrow view of the post-Holocaust Church to suggest, as did Malcolm Hedding, then the executive director of the ICEJ, that “Though centuries of Christian anti-semitism heap shame upon us, it is true that in recent decades a revolution in Jewish/Christian relations has taken place, with the ICEJ at the forefront.”

But the image works because most Jews remain ignorant of theological developments within Christianity, still envisioning a church rife with supersessionism and allegations of deicide. In addition, Christian Zionism’s adamant rejection of replacement theology is attractive to those Christians who are themselves righteously indignant at the notion that there might be other Christians who believe that God has rejected and punished the Jews. In this sense, replacement theology, while by no means extinct, serves Christian Zionism as something of a straw man, one whose dismantling carries great emotional resonance and demonstrates the Christian Zionist commitment to battle antisemitism. Not only are the Jews viewed as exceptional, by being God’s chosen people, but Christian Zionists see themselves to be members of a select group that knows the Jews’ true identity as God’s chosen, and as such serve as their valiant defenders.

**Jews as Source of Blessing**

For Christian Zionists, the Jewish people is one chosen to serve as a primary source of blessing to the world. They see the Jews as extraordinary, by virtue of their special relationship with God, serving as a unique conduit of divine blessing (and curse) to the world. Perhaps the most common scripture appealed to by Christian Zionism is that of Genesis 12:3, which enables Christian Zionists to assert that blessing the Jewish people brings God’s blessing in return, while cursing the Jewish people brings God’s punishment. It is interesting that this mechanism is felt to work not only for individuals who might be blessed for helping Jews, but also for nations. In fact, how a country treats its Jews—the “apple of God’s Eye” (Zachariah 2:8)—is commonly viewed by Christian Zionists as the source of a nation state’s rise and fall.

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In 1984, the influential international Bible teacher and Pentecostal evangelist Derek Prince wrote, in Our Debt to Israel, that:

... in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Spain was the dominant nation of Europe, with a high level of culture, a powerful army and navy, and an empire that spanned both hemispheres. But within a century of expelling all Jews from her territories, Spain declined to a struggling, second-rate power... Britain emerged victorious from two World Wars, retaining intact an empire that was perhaps the most extensive in human history. But in 1947-48, as the mandatory power over Palestine, Britain opposed and attempted to thwart the rebirth of Israel as a sovereign nation with her own state... From that very moment in history, Britain’s empire underwent a process of decline and disintegration so rapid and total that it cannot be accounted for merely by the relevant political, military or economic factors. Today, less than a generation later, Britain, like Spain, is a struggling, second-rate power. This represents, in part at least, the outworking of a divine principle stated in Isaiah 60:12: “For the nation and kingdom that will not serve thee shall perish; yea, those nations shall be utterly wasted.” God here promises Israel, and also warns all the Gentiles, that He will bring judgment on any nation that opposes His purposes of redemption and restoration for Israel.9

In the Christian Zionist imagination, the Jewish people cannot possibly be a “normal” people like the (Gentile) nations of the world. Instead, they are always exceptional and stand in a unique relationship with God, whose effects are universal, touching individuals, nations, and the Church.

At the same time as this sense of the Jews as a people requiring special treatment, and one whose special treatment results in God’s favor, there exists as well an appreciation for the nation of Israel in their ascribed theological role as the original and “natural” children of God. In contrast with those strains of Christian thought that saw the Church replacing Israel in the divine economy, Christian Zionists see themselves, through the Christ event, as joining Israel and becoming party to the covenant between God and the nation of Israel. Christian Zionists regularly appeal to parts of Romans 11, together with verses such as Ephesians 2:11-22, to support the image of believers as the adopted sons of God, the “wild olive shoot” grafted on the root of “natural” Israel:

[Paul] explains that Gentile believers do not replace Israel but enlarge her. Gentiles are being added or “grafted into” the existing natural olive tree of Israel, according to Romans 11:17-21; while in Ephesians 2:11-22 we who were once “excluded from the commonwealth of Israel” are

being “brought near” or included through Jesus, now “fellow citizens . . . in God’s household.” Thus we are considered one people, one tree, one commonwealth, one house, one family, all sons of Abraham . . .

Similarly, and in striking contrast with those expressions of Christianity that have sought to emphasize their disjuncture from their historical Jewish (or Hebraic) roots, Christian Zionism specifically highlights those historical roots and encourages a Christian appreciation for them. Christian Zionists see themselves as profoundly indebted to the Jewish people as the source of their own scripture, prophets, and Savior. As Pastor Bob explained to his Christian tour group in Israel:

It’s important to realize that God has chosen Israel for specific purposes. He has chosen them to be a light to the nations. Many of us from the Christian Church think He has chosen them to have ultimately brought forth a Jew by the name of Jesus. And I’m thankful . . . and I was thirty years old before I began to identify with this fact, that Jesus is Jewish, my Bible is Jewish, all the prophets are very, very Jewish. That Christianity is Jewish. This was a revelation that changed my life. When I began to not only understand that, but I began to realize that God has not only chosen Israel for these purposes, I began to identify with how God has chosen those who are not Jewish, to bless the Jewish people. To honour them. To love them. To serve them . . . Paul said that because of the rich spiritual blessing he received through them—Jesus was Jewish, the Bible is very Jewish—we owe them a material blessing.

Using the olive tree metaphor of Romans, Willem Glashouwer, president of Christians for Israel International, brings these themes together and reminds his readers of Christian indebtedness to the Jewish foundation of their faith:

We should celebrate two thousand years of Christianity with a deeply felt conviction of guilt concerning our treatment of the Jewish people. If God does not save all the natural branches, He will not save all the engrafted wild branches either . . . and Gentile Christians may also be cut away. Those who look only to the New Testament, leaving out the Old, are like those trying to build the second floor of a house, without building the

11. All interviewees are identified by pseudonyms.
first floor. Only when the sap starts flowing from the root again, can the real fruit grow.\textsuperscript{12}

Yet within these words, we can find another recurring Christian Zionist theme concerning the Jews: a concern that Jews are not being properly “Jewish” and that the sap that flows from the Jewish root and might nourish the fruit-bearing tree has dried up and is not yet flowing freely.

JUDAISM: DOES THE SAP REALLY FLOW?

In many ways, evangelical Christians have an easier time relating to Orthodox Jews than they do to more liberal Jews, by virtue of their shared religiosity. That they share a significant piece of scripture—the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament—and that this scripture is similarly imbued with the authority of revelation make a solid basis for conversation. Evangelical Christians and Orthodox Jews also share a general worldview of faith—one that includes a feeling of reliance and trust in God, a belief that things happen according to his will. Both groups tend toward a similarly conservative orientation in terms of social values, rejecting such practices as homosexuality, abortion, sex outside of marriage, and voluntary childlessness.

While all observant Jews are, by definition, “commandment keeping” [\textit{shomer mitzvot}], there is a wide spectrum to be found in Orthodox lifestyles based on different cultural practices, family traditions, and degree of accommodation to modernity and Western culture. The most natural alliance is between evangelical Christians and “modern Orthodox” Jews—also called “religious Zionist” Jews in Israel. Christian Zionists and modern Orthodox Jews share all the commonalities listed above, together with a passionate Zionism and a similarly cautious and selective approach to modernity.

There are, of course, critically important differences between evangelical Christians and Orthodox Jews. The most basic is the Jewish rejection of the New Testament and the figure of Jesus as the fulfillment of biblical promises of a redeemer, while Christians reject the authority of post-biblical Jewish literature. Religious Jews and evangelical Christians look very different, speak differently, and live in different kinds of places. They worship in different languages, follow different rituals, eat different foods, and consume different media. These differences are both intriguing and perplexing to Christian Zionists seeking the Jewish roots of their faith.

On one hand, modern Orthodox, Zionist Jews are believed to possess a powerful and heady authenticity. On the other hand, however, for Christian Zionists, the ultimate Jewish life is to be found not in rabbinic Judaism but in the ideal presented in the Hebrew Bible—in their eyes, the Judaism that Jesus would have practiced. This Torah example of “true Judaism” is strictly differentiated from the religion of the post-biblical rabbinic tradition that developed. In good evangelical form, it is common for Christian Zionists to distinguish between “having a relationship vs. having a religion,” in which religion is man-made and fallible, and no substitute for being in a relationship with God. Thus, Christian Zionists hold up the Hebrew Bible as setting the standard for the Jews to be in “right relationship” with God, whereas the rabbis constructed a religion that obscures the truth and simplicity of that original relationship. Biblical Judaism is held up as an ideal most fully revealed in Jesus, and from which rabbinic Judaism has dangerously deviated.

Joel, a Christian Zionist in Canada, rued the discrepancies he felt when he spoke to me, as did many others, about the difference between “biblical” Judaism and “rabbinic” Judaism, leading to the chasm he describes below between his understanding of contemporary Jewish practice and the practices of the biblical figures he so admires:

[At home I have a] . . . picture of the man at the [Western] Wall. It’s kind of a dark picture, but there’s this little guy and he’s got his kippah and he’s got his frontlets and he’s got his tzitzit and his got his hands on his hips. He’s about 4, and he’s looking at these guys and he’s going, “I don’t get it.” You know? And when I get to Jerusalem, which is often, I see the weirdness of the ones that have gone into, you know, the strange kind of stuff. I mean, they’re [religious Jews] all there at the Wall. It’s lovely to see. It’s a cultural experience, but when I read the scriptures and I see Gideon and I see Abigail, I see, you know, different characters that I absolutely love. I don’t want the ones [Jews] of today to miss the purity of their [biblical] expression and to get bogged down in all the other [rabbinic] stuff . . . Walking through Meah Shearim [an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood in Jerusalem] is a real experience, and on the Day of Atonement, they do things that are strange, with a chicken over the head and things like these. It doesn’t hold true to what the scriptures say, and so, I think to be a biblical Jew is a wonderful experience, and we’re grafted into that biblical Jewishness. And, I want to relate to that kind of brother and sister in the Jewish world that are not burdened by all the other extraneous stuff.

Thus, true Jewishness is found not in Judaism, but being in “right relationship” with the God of Israel as revealed in the Hebrew Bible, knowing one’s role and destiny, and striving to implement a vision of righteousness
in the world as a “light unto the nations.” The religion of Orthodox Judaism is viewed as unnecessary for that role, to the point of even impeding true Jewishness, making it irrelevant at best, and possibly even a dangerous distraction. Pastor Weine is an outspoken Christian Zionist leader who has lived in Israel for almost 40 years. He became noticeably agitated when we discussed this issue, complaining loudly that:

We are finally here where we can freely express our Jewish calling. And the rabbis know the Talmud better than the *Tanach* [Hebrew Bible]! . . . They are not looking at the situation in a *Tanachi*, in a biblical, way. I don’t know what it is. It’s nearly ungrippable. I get so angry, or irritated, with Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and all the kissing of his hand. And he says “*pikuach nefesh*” [“to save a life”]. I say, whose “*pikuach nefesh*”? You would give this country, Judea and Samaria, with one stroke of the pen because of “*pikuach nefesh*”?! Because it might save lives, we can give it, the holy land, to fornicators, homosexuals and the murderers of God’s people?! . . . How can he, with one stroke of the pen, be so unbiblical?!

Weine went on to express his disregard and distaste for the “man-made” tradition of the Oral Law, in contrast to the essential Jewish belief in the oral law as divinely revealed:

Really, the oral tradition has the same authority [in Judaism] as the written word of God, and sometimes even more. Sometimes it supercedes. I want to know where is it that such a doctrine is based. When I read in your *Tanach* not to add to or diminish from this book . . . You [Jews] add to the words of God with all these additions, so that not only you do against what God says, but you call it holy. Oral Tradition. Give me one verse in the *Tanach* that says “Thou shalt listen to the Lord thy God and remember Oral Tradition.” Where?! Where?!

Thus, the issues that divide the Jewish community internally—participation of women, attitudes toward intermarriage, Shabbat and dietary practices, liturgical reform—are not the criteria used by Christian Zionists to assess the difference between Jews. The traditional markers within the Jew-

13. Weine’s use of “we” and “our” as a Gentile who feels a “Jewish calling” is not accidental.

14. It is Sephardic Jewish practice to kiss the hand of a rabbi or Torah scholar.

15. “*Pikuach nefesh*” is the halachic principle insisting that the keeping of the commandments should not endanger one’s life, apart from the three “cardinal” commandments against idolatry, adultery, and murder. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef applied the rabbinic principle of *pikuach nefesh* to the Israel-Palestine conflict, arguing that land should be surrendered if it would definitively save Jewish lives.
ish community—Talmud learning or religious observance—are deemed irrelevant. For evangelical Christians, commitment to Jewish law does not determine a more or less authentic or committed Jew.

For Christian Zionists, Orthodox Jews, particularly of the modern Orthodox variety, manage to get some things right (authority of the Bible, conservative social values, Zionism) and some things wrong (belief in an oral tradition, legalistic approach to practice, tendency to separatism). Liberal Jews, however, possess different weaknesses and strengths for Christian Zionists. Liberal Jews also get some things right (a more inclusive attitude toward Gentiles, more flexible ideas about what constitutes Jewish practice), and some important things wrong.

Liberal Jews are understood by Christian Zionists to have the tendency to lose the sense of their holy mission as Jews and fall prey to the values of the world, usually glossed as liberal social values (particularly gay rights and abortion). A serious problem of liberal Jews, according to Christian Zionists—and second only to their support for liberal social values—would be an inadequate attachment to Israel. What precisely this means will vary depending on how right-wing the Christian.

The “problem” of liberal Jews for Christian Zionists, then, is not a deficiency in their religious practice or Jewish learning, but is found in their normalization and assimilation, in their lack of identity as a holy people with a special role in the world. Christian Zionists don’t care if Jews keep kosher, but do care deeply if Jews are not fulfilling the prophetic role believed to be assigned to them by God. The ideal Jew will have a sense—at least—of her people’s unique role in the cosmos as a separate, holy people called out by God to fulfill a special mission of spreading universal morality and being a “light unto the nations.” At a minimum, the “right kind” of Jew is one with a sense of his Jewishness and a commitment to his cultural heritage and ancestral homeland.

Evangelism

If that is the minimal vision of the “ideal Jew,” the maximal vision is rather different. For evangelical Christians, the ideal Jew is, no doubt, a Jew who has “come to faith” in Jesus Christ.

Eveline, a Christian Zionist from Canada, offered me her picture of the ideal Jew: “I believe that a Jewish person that knows Yeshua [Jesus] will have a fuller understanding or experience because they’ll have that direct access with God. What does an ideal Jew look like? One that accepts Christ and what he’s done.”

The equation of Jew plus Jesus is impossibly dissonant to mainstream Jews. But this equation is precisely the basis of messianic Judaism, a move-
ment of people who identify as Jews and self-consciously embrace—
although to degrees that can differ quite widely—Jewish culture and reli-
gious tradition, while at the same time maintaining a belief in the divinity of
Jesus, the Trinity, and the authority of the New Testament. Despite the deep
theological, financial, and organizational involvements of much of the
movement with evangelical Christianity, messianic Jews do not consider
themselves to be Christians per se but rather as Jews who have “come to
faith” in Yeshua. Messianic Jews believe that faith in Jesus Christ is God’s
cosmic plan for the Jews, and that in becoming “believers” they become
“fulfilled” or “completed” Jews. The possible and fruitful separation of
Jewish ethnicity from the “religion” of Judaism, and its potential connection
with Jesus-belief, is an assumption that Christian Zionism shares with mes-
sonian Judaism as a function of their shared evangelical worldviews.16

It is here that the fraught issue of evangelism enters to disturb the
picture of Christian Zionist love for the Jews and Israel. The idea that
Christians ought to share their beliefs and encourage others to follow them
comes from the Great Commission in Mathew 28:19-20, where the resur-
rected Christ instructs his followers to share his teachings with all the
nations. For evangelical Christians, a foundational belief is that this first-
century Galilee charge to the disciples is in fact a responsibility incumbent
on all Christians everywhere, at all times.

But evangelism matters not only “just” because Christ commanded it,
but also because of what is felt to be at stake. The evangelical drive to
mission is based on the simple idea that one achieves “salvation” in the
form of deliverance from eternal punishment and the promise of eternal life
only through a recognition of Jesus Christ as Savior. The premise that “no
one comes to the Father except through Me” (John 14:6) is used to promote
the idea that only those who fully and consciously accept the gift offered—
in the form of the atoning death of Jesus on the Cross—will be saved. The
logical corollary of this assertion is the insufficiency of any other path to
salvation.

Due to increasingly diverse religious environments in North America,
together with a postmodern climate of discomfort with absolute truths, an
exclusivistic approach to truth claims has taken a beating in the modern
West, even among evangelicals. A 2008 Pew Survey of American Chris-
tians’ attitudes toward non-Christian religions offers telling results: among

16. Christian Zionism is closely and often uncomfortably related to messianic
Judaism. Space does not permit a full discussion, but see Faydra Shapiro, “Jesus for
Jews: The Unique Problem of Messianic Judaism,” Journal of Religion and Society
white evangelicals, almost half of evangelicals (47% of white and 49% of blacks) said that many religions can lead to eternal life.\textsuperscript{17}

In reaction to those 2008 survey results, Albert Mohler, president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminar, admitted that “the exclusivity of the Gospel is the most vulnerable doctrine in the face of the modern world.”\textsuperscript{18} A 2011 Pew survey of global evangelical leaders, however, showed rather different results, almost unanimously agreeing that Christianity is the one true faith leading to eternal life.\textsuperscript{19} Exclusivism, expressed in an organization’s public “statement of faith,” remains the official stance of many evangelical organizations large and small, including the Southern Baptist Convention (reiterated in 2000),\textsuperscript{20} the Assemblies of God, Campus Crusade for Christ, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, the Promise Keepers, and Focus on the Family. This suggests a real tension, either between American evangelicals and global evangelicals or between leaders and those in the pews.\textsuperscript{21}

When it comes to Judaism, this issue of exclusivism takes on a special significance, and is particularly challenging for evangelical Christian Zionists. One of the characteristics that define Christian Zionists is their rejection of antisemitism and a deep shame at the history of Christian treatment of the Jews. They find themselves faced with a delicate dilemma: How to

\textsuperscript{17} Almost three-quarters (72%) of those white evangelicals who assert that many religions can lead to eternal life can specifically name at least one non-Christian religion that can lead to salvation. While \textit{Time} magazine referred to this as “a major shift in the pews,” this actually reflects a decline in the number expressing similar attitudes in 2007. See http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599.1817217.00.html, accessed September 10, 2011.
\textsuperscript{21} In 2011, this tension over the issue of exclusivity exploded into public Christian controversy when popular evangelical pastor Rob Bell openly challenged established dogma about hell and salvation in his book \textit{Love Wins: A Book About Heaven, Hell, and the Fate of Every Person Who Ever Lived} (Harper One, 2011). Despite the fact that Rev. Franklin Graham called the author “a false teacher” and “a heretic” on national television (see http://www.samaritanspurse.org/index.php/Samaritans_Purse_Today/post/franklin_graham_on_fox_news/, accessed September 21, 2011), the ensuing controversy made it clear that the actual picture of evangelical belief is more divided on this issue than the exclusivist doctrinal statements above would suggest and raised questions about the plausibility and sustainability of exclusivist doctrines in pluralistic contexts. For a sense of the range of views, see Mark Galli, “Heaven, Hell, and Rob Bell: Putting the Pastor in Context,” http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2011/marchweb-only/rob-bell-universalism.html? start=1 (posted March 2, 2011, accessed September 21, 2011).
love the Jews and yet at the same time affirm Christ to a people who have been persecuted by his church? Out of his concern for precisely this ambivalence, Pastor Wayne Hilsden explained the difficulty clearly in 2006 to an evangelical audience in Jerusalem:

The problem is that as we [Christians] want to be apologetic for everything we have done against the Jewish people, we can never be apologetic for the teaching of God’s word. We can apologize for our behavior but we cannot apologize for what God says in his holy word. And the Bible says that there is only one way. What did Jesus say? I am the way, the truth, the light. No one comes to the Father except through me . . .

Christians find it hard on the one hand to express genuine sorrow for not having done something to prevent the Holocaust and at the same time tell Jewish people they need to accept the Messiah to be saved from an even worse calamity.22

My Christian Zionist respondents reflected this tension, but not because any of them denied the exclusivity of the gospel; in fact, they overwhelmingly expressed ideas consonant with the belief that the sole path to salvation was through a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. But their ambivalence was often very clear. I regularly got the impression that my respondents hated that this was indeed the case, particularly when it came to Jews and Judaism.23 This ambivalence—a love of Jews coupled with a deep fascination with specific aspects of Judaism and complicated by a doctrine that asserts the insufficiency of Judaism for salvation—sets the groundwork for one of the greatest theological concerns of Christian Zionism: often called “dual covenant” theology, it is the argument, railed against by Christian Zionist leaders, that Jews have their own path to salvation.24

Don, an American, serves in a senior position with a major Christian Zionist organization in Israel. He struggled to articulate his ambivalence about discussing the unhappy ultimate destination of the unsaved Jewish soul, because of the historic role played by Christianity in Jewish suffering:

22. At the ICEJ Feast of Tabernacles, October 13, 2006.
23. For a period of time, in order to clarify issues, I would ask evangelical Christian informants if they believed that I, as an Orthodox Jew who does not believe in Jesus, am going to hell—a question that likely was a very uncomfortable position to put them in, reflecting the ambivalence above. While the answer was always in the affirmative, it was painful for them to express, especially true when asked face to face to an Orthodox Jew, in Israel.
It’s not easy for me as a Christian because of the Christian cultural basis for the Holocaust, especially after the Holocaust, to tell a Jew “you’re not going to heaven unless you accept Jesus.” It’s very difficult to do that. But in my reading of the New Testament it’s hard to give a Jew any hope outside the New Testament.

That said, despite the insufficiency of Judaism for salvation, Don insists that the Jews themselves play some kind of critical role in God’s plan. The Jews possess a unique relationship with God, one that gives meaning and significance to their suffering. As a Christian, Don feels himself to be the recipient of the blessings of this special role and suffering:

Obviously God is the ultimate judge. Jesus said, “I am the door. No one comes to the Father but by me.” This is something between God and the Jewish people. The Bible—my New Testament—tells me, based on Tanach, that the Jewish suffering and what the Jewish people have gone through, the very difficult journey down through time from biblical time down through history, has been for my sake. Something in God’s dealings with Israel, you’ve played a certain birthing role, that you birthed it to the world—Paul says this in the New Testament—the covenants of the law to natural Israel, to the Jewish people, that you birthed for us the worship of God, the service of God, the commandments of God, and actually the Messiah of God. For me as a Christian it’s Jesus. All these things came to be as a Gentile before I ever knew God or sought after Him, that you were there suffering and going through things to deliver things into the world, to suffer for them. I should therefore have a very deep appreciation for the Jewish people and for God’s unique relationship with you. Even the fact of your rejection of Jesus was for my sake, the New Testament says. Therefore this is something I just have to leave in the hands of God, because it’s beyond what I can understand . . .

Recognizing the strain the practice puts on building bridges with the Jewish community, several large Christian Zionist organizations have agreed not to engage in active proselytism.25 As the director of one Christian Zionist ministry in North America explained:

It’s a Christian ministry because we’re fulfilling Genesis 12:3. We are obeying the scriptures in everything we do. So as an organization we don’t proselytize, we don’t do any evangelism to the Jewish people. There are, as you know, many evangelical Christian organizations that that is the main goal, to evangelize the Jewish people, and they are involved in proselytism. So, even though I agree that everyone, including me and you, needs to be born again through Jesus Christ—doesn’t matter

25. It is precisely proselytism, not evangelism, that is disavowed. The distinction becomes important for Christian Zionists.
the gender or religion, or whatever—there are organizations that are engaged in that type of work. And we don’t support those organizations financially or anything. We’re not linked to any of those organizations. But that doesn’t mean that we disagree with what they’re doing. It’s just that we’re not engaged in that type of work.26

Early Protestants exhibited little interest in an ideal of global evangelization. It was the 19th century that saw a major expansion of organized missionary efforts around the world, receiving the label “the Great Century” by historian Kenneth Scott Latourette as a result.27 This period also witnessed, in America and in Britain, the growth of specific missions to the Jews. Jonathan Sarna discusses the multiple ways that Jews strove to mitigate the effects of this movement:

Historically, Christianity posed a menacing challenge to the Jewish people. By undertaking active missions, Christians forced Jews back into an age-old battle. Not only live souls were at stake; centuries of martyred souls were too. In Jewish eyes, the war against missionaries became a war of affirmation, a war to prove that eighteen hundred years of Jewish civilization had not been in vain.28

For contemporary Jews, missionary activity directed at them by Christians comes as a rude shock. Despite Judaism’s universal mandate, it is a religious system most focused on a particular people—Jews—and how that people needs to respond to God’s will. Historical realities sharpened this focus and encouraged an inward turn. While Judaism clearly includes provisions for those who are not Jewish, those provisions, in the form of the Noahide laws, are very basic and broad. Modern Jews cherish that Judaism

26. The International Christian Embassy, for example, is a large, mainstream Christian Zionist organization. The ICEJ does not engage in active Jewish evangelism, yet it often hosts speakers on the main stage at its Feast of Tabernacles celebration who do. The 2011 Feast of Tabernacles included Avi Mizrahi, the director of an evangelistic outreach center to Jews in Tel Aviv and pastor of a messianic Jewish congregation, on the main stage. The 2007 Feast of Tabernacles featured Jack Hayford, who was instrumental in establishing the Messianic Jewish Studies program at the Pentecostal/Charismatic college he founded. The 2006 Feast of Tabernacles included Wayne Hilsden actively encouraging evangelism of the Jews, in a lecture entitled “One Covenant for All.”

27. Most notably, the London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews was established in Britain in 1809, while both the Female Society of Boston and the Vicinity for Promoting Christianity among the Jews and the American Society for Evangelizing the Jews emerged in 1816.

does not expect non-Jews to become Jewish as an ideal that resonates with modern Western notions of freedom, pluralism, and equality. Christian ideas of exclusivism, singularity, and the need to “share the gospel” with other cultures and religions strike modern Jews as illiberal, coercive, and triumphal.

It is this distinction—between Jews, true Jewishness, and Judaism—that, for example, allowed Pastor Smith speaking to his tour group in 2007 to construct David Ben Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, as a religious exemplar, the paradigmatic man of God, who was “never found without the word of God close to him.” Yet for Jews, Ben Gurion is emblematic of secular, political Zionism. What constitutes “religious” or “faithful” or a “man of God” for Jews and evangelical Christians is quite different. So when one tour participant heard this and, looking at photos of Ben Gurion, asked if he wore a kippah, the question was dismissed by Smith as utterly irrelevant. The pastor compared Ben Gurion to Moses and took pains to explain to me specifically that Ben Gurion had a real PhD: patience, humility, and dependence on God.29 David Ben Gurion’s “empty cart” bemoaned by the Hazon Ish is in fact a “full cart” for Christian Zionists.30

It is also this distinction between Jew as ethnic category and Judaism as religion that makes it simple for evangelical Christians to suggest that Jews can practice Christianity—although they would prefer to refer to “Jews who follow Yeshua.”31 And it is this Jew without (rabbinic) Judaism, and thus the possible Jew with Yeshua, that allowed that same Christian Zionist tour group to stand in prayer over a young messianic Jew who had recently moved to Israel and was about to begin her army service. Without any hesitation, Smith pronounced his absolute certainty that this woman’s story—as a Jewish believer in Jesus returning to her homeland—would have put a smile on the face of David Ben Gurion, that man of God, because she was truly fulfilling his vision.

29. As opposed to that of the researcher. Moments later the attention of the group would be riveted by the many Bibles (including New Testament) and commentaries found in Ben Gurion’s Negev home, not to mention the copy of Hal Lindsey’s Late Great Planet Earth, as evidence of his deep spirituality.

30. In a 1953 meeting between Prime Minister Ben Gurion and the Chazon Ish (Rabbi Avrohom Yeshaya Karelitz) about tensions between religious and secular Jews in the young state, the Chazon Ish made what would become a famous statement about secular Zionism. The discussion is built on the rabbinic idea (Sanhedrin 32b) that an empty wagon must make way for a full wagon to pass. The Chazon Ish understands the wagon of religious Jews in Israel to be full of Torah and commandments, while the wagon of secular Zionism is empty and should give way to the religious vision of Jewish life.

31. See n16 above.
Christian Zionists decry supersessionism. Jews often read this as a recognition and respect for the validity of Judaism as a path to God and “salvation.” Yet, Christian Zionists use the term in its classical, theological sense, to refer to the idea that God’s covenant with the Jews has been superceded by a new covenant with the Gentiles. Christian Zionists would argue both that God’s covenant with the Jews remains in effect and that Jews need to come to faith in Jesus Christ in order to be saved and avoid eternal damnation.32

CONCLUSION

No doubt there are plenty of observers, both scholarly and popular, who are eager to portray evangelical Christians as hopelessly antisemitic, as part of their ostensible larger intolerance and parochialism. Stephen Haynes is correct when he plainly states that “the assumption that conservative Christians are antisemitic is itself a stereotype, and one that dies hard.”33 The desire to discredit evangelicalism generally makes the Jews, and attitudes toward them, potentially useful pieces of putative evidence, a litmus test of evangelical civility and tolerance. There are strong critics of Christian Zionism who, based on the persistent strain of End Times speculation within the movement, are eager to make the rather wild assertion that “Quite simply, Christian Zionism is the most complete and brutal realization of antisemitism still acceptable in mainstream political discourse.”34

There is obviously a great deal at stake in how we label conservative Christian understandings of the Jews. Many observers are eager to dismiss or encourage evangelical Christian support for Israel and the Jews for political and/or religious reasons, arguments that can be buttressed by the ability to convincingly assert that Christian Zionism—and fundamentalism more broadly—is or is not antisemitic or philosemitic. Yaakov Ariel explores this question directly, concluding that “Evangelicals, in the last analysis, are

32. Of course, they would also argue that as such they do not stop being Jews. Here Jewish becomes an ethnic category, stripped of religious content. Just as there are Chinese believers and Arab believers, there are also Jewish believers. This separation of (ethnic) Jewishness from (religious) Judaism is one that has significant implications for the plausibility of messianic Judaism.


neither philosemites nor antisemites, but merely loyal to their own faith and work to promote their own cause.”

But the question itself tells us something important, because antisemitism and philosemitism are essentially two sides of the same coin, in which the Jews, loved or despised, are always abnormal and representing forces larger than themselves. It’s not especially useful to assert that Christian Zionists are either antisemites or philosemites. What Jews are, more than anything else for Christian Zionists, is exceptional. They are fraught with significance, and their Jewishness is the most important thing about them. They cannot and should not try to be “normal.”

In his broad historical investigation, Steven Haynes pays careful attention to different articulations of Christianity and locates something more nuanced, and perhaps more insidious because of its subtlety, than brute anti-Judaism or antisemitism in what he calls the “Witness People Myth.” In his examination of the Jews being afforded this exceptional status in Christianity, he notes that:

Ultimately it was this assumption [of the Jews as God’s chosen people] which allowed Jews to persist in a relative secure state within pre-modern Christendom. But it also determined that Jewish actions and beliefs would become objects of unnatural scrutiny and bizarre fantasy. Furthermore, most Christians through the ages have believed that they understood the Jews’ history and destiny with greater probity than Jews themselves. For in the Christian imagination the existence and survival of the Jew have been invested with religious significance, even—and especially—when Jews refuse to recognize this significance.

This essay does not seek to adjudicate where philosemitism ends and antisemitism begins. Instead, I explore some of the major contours of contemporary Christian Zionism attitudes toward the Jews and Judaism. I would characterize this attitude primarily as being a complex combination of feelings of both fascination and repulsion toward Jews and Judaism. Christian Zionists view the Jews to be extraordinary—chosen by God and the conduit of blessing, and the true Christian Zionist as the one uniquely able to recognize this. As such, evangelical Christian supporters of Israel eagerly place themselves in relation to ostensible “other” Christian traditions as lovers of Israel and rejectors of “replacement theology.” Their recognition of the Jews as being in a special relationship with the God of Israel is stymied, however, by liberal Jews, who do not understand their true role


and destiny. These Jews are problematic and not “properly” Jewish. At the
same time, even Orthodox Jews suffer from a disabling attachment to
rabbinic Judaism, and all Jews, no matter how beloved by God they might
be, are in danger of suffering eternal damnation if they do not find faith in
Jesus Christ and his sacrifice.

*Dr. Faydra Shapiro is director of the Galilee Center for Studies in Jewish-Christian Relations at Yezreel Valley College (Israel) and the author of Building Jewish Roots: The Israel Experience (McGill-Queen’s University Press), the 2006 National Jewish Book Award Winner. Her e-mail is jcrelations@yvc.ac.il.

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Hatefest
Shimon T. Samuels*

For the tenth year, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre was the only organization to monitor incitement to hate and violence on the display stands of the Frankfurt Book Fair, October 10-14. With 7,384 exhibits from 100 countries and some 300,000 visitors, this is the largest annual international gathering of the publishing industry. As part of my assessment of the event, I met with the president of the fair, Juergen Boos, in which I praised the intervention—based on our reports—against heavily antisemitic literature on Turkish stands two years ago and against last year’s “Worst Offender,” Malaysia. “In 2011, Turkey’s Publishers’ Association informed that subsequent to our center’s protest, Frankfurt authorities had warned exhibitors that display of hate literature illegal in Germany could breach their contracts with the fair,” I noted, adding that “this year, Turkish and Malaysian stands were hate-free, though Iran had now become the ‘Worst Offender.’ ”

But even with that observation, there was still much on display that was deeply dismaying. The role of Frankfurt as the point of reference for regional book fairs cannot be minimized. Tolerating the intolerable from hatemongering state exhibitors is a passive endorsement for the Tehran book fair’s Holocaust denial industry and the Casablanca ad Cairo book fairs’ obsessive-compulsive displays of world Jewish conspiracies.

Iran

Outside the hall, protesters at three NGO stands expressed support for the opposition, with campaign materials that included “No to Sharia and to Martyrdom,” “Stop Stoning Women,” “Close the Iranian Embassy: Terrorist Centre,” “International Committee Against Executions,” “Stop the Bomb,” and “Expel Iran from the Book Fair.” The center’s previous reports had highlighted Iranian children’s literature extolling suicide and martyr-
dom, which this year continued at The Iran Cultural Fairs Institute stand with such titles as: *The Broken Money Box*, by Mohsen Barabani, Ghadr Press, Tehran State Publishing, 2012; *Teenage Patriot*, Kanoon, Tehran State Publishing, 2012; *Long Road to Happiness*, poems by Babak Niktarak, Kanoon. Similar texts are displayed at the stand of the Iranian Institute for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults—e.g., *If I Were a Pilot* by Ahmad Akbapour, Elmi-Farhangi Publications, Tehran, 2008.

Even more worrying is the Association of Defa Moquaddassah (Holy Defense) Publishers. This state military consortium—a first timer at the fair—represents 38 publishers focusing on war, martyrdom, and Jihad. These include:

- *Palestine and the Zionist Regime in View of the Supreme Leader*, Ghadr Velayat.
- *The Exchange—Lebanon 2005-2008*, Vahid and Saeed Faraji, Saghi Publications, 2011. This lavish photo album, an ode to Hizbollah, was launched last year on Revayat Fath Institute’s stand, and this year went viral on several Iranian displays, including the military Defa Moquadassah. The volume extols the “heroism of Sami Kuntar and 4 other Hezbollah fighters who were among those exchanged for three Israelis, two of whom were handed over as corpses. It should be noted that Kuntar had slaughtered a family of five slitting the throats of the babies in their cots, exclaiming that this was the fate for all Jews . . . .”

The Wiesenthal Centre’s report stressed that such iconization of a monster, in full view of visitors to the fair, is a “whitewash for terrorism that demands a public condemnation of the Iranian authorities and a reevaluation of their future participation in the Fair.” The same book was also featured at the Saghi Publications stand under a poster for the “2nd International Book Award for Resistance, Culture, Literature, Art and Knowledge.” Arab stands were clearly more cautious this year, apart from the constant recidivists.

**Qatar**

The Qatari government stand once again displayed *The Open Veins of Jerusalem*, by Munir Akash and Fouad Moughrabi, Jusseer, Doha, 2010. On the same shelf, same book, same time last year and this, the Jewish connection to Jerusalem, is here superceded by a “Palestinian autochthonous identity.”
EGYPT

The Arab Publishers Association, Cairo, displayed an outrageous text in English, *Jerusalem in Focus*, by Ash-Shahhat Ahmad, At-Tahhan, Al-Kalimah, Egypt. This antisemitic screed promotes fatwas, ostensibly issued from Al Azhar Islamic University, that prohibit peace with Zionists and call for the killing of Jews.

The Egypt Collective stand featured *The Alienation of the Jewish Personality in Modern Hebrew Literature*, by Ahmad Hammad, General Egyptian Authority for Books, Cairo, which discredits the Jewish connection to the Holy Land.

The Al Ahram Centre, Cairo, displayed *Pawns on the Chessboard—The Elders of Zion and How Their Sons Manipulate the World*, by Issam Abdul Fatah, Sharif Mus Publishers, 2012. Fictional conspiracy theories are an annual staple of Al Ahram’s display; I requested that Boos “take measures to blacklist exhibitors, which continually abuse their presence to foment hate.” Boos’s reply? “We will consult with the public prosecutor in this regard,” he said.

SYRIA

A weird double take greeted visitors to the Syrian stand, Atlas for Publishing and Distribution, Damascus. Its main feature was a poster promoting a book entitled *The Dream and then the Nightmare—The Syrians Who Boarded the Titanic*; prophecy or farce, wondered a passing American publisher.
*Shimon T. Samuels is the director for international relations at the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, Paris, and chair of the Board of Directors of the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism.
An Intergenerational Blood Libel

Daniel N. Leeson*

In the Polish city of Tarnobrzeg, a quotation from the Memorbuch can be found as “The House of David” by Rabbi David Schlissel (1866-1940),¹ a recounting of a blood libel that occurred in 1757.

Rabbi Schlissel was a fifth-generation descendant of Rabbi Joske Skolnik, a rabbi from the village of Tarnobrzeg, Poland, who was charged with murdering a Christian boy for purposes of ritual cannibalism. One of Rabbi Skolnik’s duties was the ritual slaughtering of animals, a not so strained leap for accusations that a Jew would cut the throat of Christians—the notorious “blood libel.”² Rabbi Schlissel, who was to perish in the Holocaust, offers the names of several generations of his ancestors from whom the details of that horror were transmitted. His report begins:

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¹ Tarnobrzeg-Dzikow Community Book of Remembrance and Testimony (Orli, Tel Aviv, 1973).
² The term “blood libel” refers to an 800-year-old calumny, which continues to be repeated to this day. It accuses Jews of using and ingesting the blood of Christians for ritual purposes—including, but not limited to, the making of Passover matzo and Purim cakes. Its purpose was, allegedly, to eliminate the so-called foetor Judaicus (i.e., “the Jewish stink”), and other grotesque and repulsive purposes. In 1758, a Catholic priest, one G. Pikulski, claimed that Jews in Lithuania consumed 30 gallons of human blood annually, and even more in Poland. The allegation is different from, though often confused with, another false accusation known as “ritual murder,” in which Jews are said to crucify Christian children in order to show contempt for Jesus. The most serious blood libel to have occurred in the United States was in Massena, NY, in 1928, though less serious accusations occurred both before and after that year.

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This is the story that I heard from my father Rabbi Nata Shlomo Schlissel, who heard it from his father, Rabbi Leibush Schlissel [son of Chana, the daughter of] Rabbi Joske Skolnik.

The details of the narrative, representing Jewish communal memory of the events and transmitted entirely by word of mouth for five generations, are as follows:

Bartholomiej Kubacki, a 15 year-old boy employed as a Sabbath gentile, vanished around the time of Passover, and four Jews, Rabbi Skolnick being one of them, were accused of murdering him for ritual purposes. Eventually, a kangaroo court condemned 12 people to death on the basis of testimony from Countess Rosa Konstancja Tarnowska, who swore on her honor that the accusation was true, though how she would have been able to be a reliable witness to an event that, we shall see, never occurred is difficult to understand.

The accused were all found guilty and sentenced to death, though one of them had already died during torture. Of the remaining eleven, two accepted conversion to Christianity in anticipation that this would save their lives, but this concession allowed them only to be beheaded instead of immolated. The sentence for the remaining nine was carried out by nailing them into individual wooden barrels containing axle grease—intended to stimulate an intense burning—and then rolled into a fire. Countess Tarnowska then dispersed the ashes of the consumed in the waters of the Vistula, but wind blew ash particles into her eyes and she became blind.

Some time later, the “murdered” Bartholomiej Kubacki returned to Tarnobrzeg, having wearied of the circus that he ran away to join in 1757. In contrition, the Tarnowska family solemnly declared that, in perpetuity, they would provide timber over the winters and flour for matzos for the needy Jews of Tarnobrzeg. The pledge was kept until the drought of 1927 (other accounts say the frosts of 1928), at which time Count Jan Zdislaw Tarnowski declared that the Jews were responsible for the drought (or the frost). He then revoked the vow of contrition, asserting that the evil behavior on the part of the Jews nullified his ancestor’s oath. The following winter, a fire broke out in the manor of the Tarnowski family and the count, interpreting the conflagration as a divine message, reversed his decision and reinstituted the promise made by his ancestor.

Because no Jewish community record book exists to document the events as they occurred, these word-of-mouth transmissions do not constitute evidence. On the other hand, the communal memory of Tarnobrzeg’s Christian citizens with respect to these occurrences is sustained by histori-
Tarnobrzeg is located on the eastern bank of the Vistula River, 140 kilometers (225 miles) northeast of Cracow. Jews have lived there from time out of memory, though proof of the earliest possible date disappeared with the destruction of the old cemetery in 1941-42. While it is known that Jews lived in Tarnobrzeg as early as 1593, the first documentary evidence supporting their presence there dates from 1718, when 1,000 Polish florins were lent to the Jewish community by the Dominican friar Antoni Dembowski (or the Countess Katarzyna Glokowska—sources contradict each other on the identity of the lender) for the purpose of building a synagogue.

In 1765, for the purpose of tax assessment, 569 Tarnobrzeg Jews were classified as heads of families. By 1880, there were 2,768 Jews in the village. Shortly before the Holocaust, 3,800 Jews lived there, about 50% of the population. On the day of the town’s occupation, in 1939, the Wehrmacht murdered many of the village’s Jews. A small minority of those who survived left Tarnobrzeg for Russian-occupied Poland, and some of this group endured to return at the end of the war. The Jews who remained were expelled on August 9, 1940, and almost all were murdered in various concentration camps, including Chelmno and Maly Trostenetz. Today, few Jews remain in the town.

Libel Perpetuation

On June 6, 1993, as part of the commemoration of Tarnobrzeg’s quadracentennial, a plaque, intended to solemnize the memory of the city’s lost
Jews, was unveiled on the wall of what was the village synagogue, the same building for which funds were lent to the Jews in 1718. Miron Gordon, then Israel’s ambassador to Poland, attended the dedication. In preparation for the events, and with genuinely good intentions, the city organized an exhibition of Jewish artifacts and published the journal *The Historical Files of Tarnobrzeg*, edited by the chairman of the historical society, Tadeusz Zych. The issue was devoted almost entirely to the subject of the town’s vanished Jews.

Unfortunately, the sympathetic and laudable reasons for devoting almost the entirety of the issue to the memory of Tarnobrzeg’s lost Jews were neutralized by a variety of unfortunate statements in the journal. By far, the most egregious was the description and uncritical acceptance of the details surrounding the 1757 blood libel. In an article by Adam F. Baran, of the Institute of Political Studies at the Polish Academy of Science, the now more than two-century-old libel was restated as if it were true:

Cultural separateness, [and] differences in dress, behavior, and many customs sometimes motivated human hatred and dislike. This especially concerned a memorable event, which for several generations in Tarnobrzeg and elsewhere was associated with the production of the Passover “matzo,” the holiday cake.

Immediately following this introductory material, a paragraph of Polish text translated from a Latin document contemporary with the events 1757 was presented:

In the year 1757 on April 19, Vincent, previously called Berek, the Jewish lessee of a brewery in Miechocin, was buried in the Church of Dzikow, having been baptized before his execution. Likewise, a second man, named Pinches, was buried in the same church and baptized in like manner. The above-named, and those to be named below, cruelly (as became apparent from the investigation) slew a 15-year-old boy called Bartholomiej Kubacki of Miechocin. Joseph Skolnik [and] Lejbusz [Leib], remaining utterly stubborn in their faithlessness, were condemned to burn. A third, Mosiek [Moshe], died following torture. There were also many others involved in this heinous crime who were sentenced to be *captivatio* [imprisoned?].

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3. “*Captivatio*” was incorrectly translated into the Polish equivalent of “beheaded” in Tarnobrzeg’s historical journal. The actual meaning of the word is unclear in this context, but cannot be accurately rendered with the word “beheaded.” It does not mean that. “Imprisoned” is the general idea involved.
The uncritical repetition of this paragraph is referred to as “fact” in the Latin commentary. So some two and a half centuries after twelve innocent Jews were legally murdered, the city fathers of Tarnobrzeg expended funds for the perpetuation of a libel, simultaneously denying that the journal was an official Tarnobrzeg document. In their wish to remember the town’s former Jewish residents, the Tarnobrzeg Historical Society felt it necessary to restate a blood libel dating from 1757 both as a fact and as an example of a traditional Jewish activity.

POLISH BLOOD LIBELS

Poland is steeped in legend and folklore and the blood libels are part of that culture’s folk life. Some eighty or more blood libels have been documented over the last several centuries. But the fact is that as early as the 13th century, Polish law gave no credence to the accusation. In 1264, Duke Boleslaus The Pious of greater Poland introduced legislation, the “Act of Kalish,” that rendered it illegal to slander Jews falsely with a blood libel. It reads:

Likewise we ordain by decree that [if] any Jew is to be prosecuted by any Christian alleging that the Jews . . . use the blood of Christians annually . . . the statutes and constitutions of Pope Innocent [issued in four separate papal edicts between 1247 and 1253] teach us that in such matters they are not culpable, since this is against their own law.

A person who falsely accused a Jew of this crime was condemned to suffer the punishment the Jew would have received were the accusation true. King Casimir The Great reconfirmed the statute in 1334, and broadened its applicability to include all of Poland, which was carried out by King Casimir Jagiellon in 1453, and King Sigismund I The Elder in 1539.

RIGHTEOUS POLES

Not all contemporary Poles are so blind to the truth. Professor Jerzy Tomaszewski of the history department of the University of Warsaw attacked The Historical Files in the Polish satirical journal Polityka, mocking the Tarnobrzeg Historical Society by making reference to the “Society for Ridiculing Tarnobrzeg.” He wrote that:

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publishing such stupidity . . . and informing the whole world that in Tarnobrzeg here were two authors who believed in “ritual murder” would have been a small matter. It would have exposed them to ridicule in their uncritical approach to sources . . . [But in] the Historical Files of Tarnobrzeg another author, whose name I do not mention because of pity, repeats the same stupidity with complete credence and seriousness. Hence we have in Tarnobrzeg more stubborn experts in “ritual murder.”

Even the rigor of evidence from a Polish court and presented to the officials of Tarnobrzeg on multiple occasions appears to have no effect on their attitude. A court document located in the Biblioteka Czartoryskich and written 17 years after the deaths of the Jews accused of the Tarnobrzeg libel of 1757 states that the murdered boy, Bartholomiej Kubacki, was alive as late as 1774. That document, apparently part of a legal process in which other Jews were accused of infanticide, states the following:

. . . One can allow that Jews have sometimes killed children since murders happen and they have been judged for it, but at the same time it cannot be denied that they have been judged as murderers although they did not kill at all, as in the particular example of the Sandomierz case, where, for the supposed killing of a boy from the lands of the Counts of Tarnow, several Jews were sentenced to death and executed on the basis of false evidence, whereas the man in question is happily alive to this day, and is even personally known to many people in this area.”

CONCLUSION

And so it goes. A retraction, it appears, is not forthcoming from the officials of Tarnobrzeg; they state that they are reciting the historical record and do so without evil intent. Promises are made about revisions for future issues of their journal, though such commitments have never been honored, nor are they likely to be. The mayor of Tarnobrzeg, Stanislaw Zwirug, tires of the problem, as does the journal’s editor, Tadeusz Zych, a teacher in the public senior high school in Tarnobrzeg and a member of the City Council.

Expressions of concern made to Mayor Zwirug are responded to by suggesting that the writer should contact Mr. Zych; i.e., The Historical Files is said not to be a city-government effort and must, therefore, be handled by the Tarnobrzeg Historical Association. Both men protest the attack on efforts that they perceive as having been made to do good. I do believe the initial intentions were honorable; nonetheless, the ultimate conclusion is

5. Ibid., 134, note 207.
that, while public funds were spent to restate and perpetuate a libel, no money or will is available to retract or correct it.

Requests for assistance from Professor Krzysztof Sliwinski, at that time the Polish ambassador to the Jewish Diaspora, are neither acknowledged nor acted upon. Efforts to solicit the intercession of Pope John Paul II were constrained by his advancing age and failing health.

The town officials have produced something that negates their good intent, reestablishes and thus perpetuates a slander of innocent former Polish citizens, and disgraces the honor of Poland. There is an unfortunate inverse parallel to be found when contrasting the actions of 1993 Tarnobrzeg with the events of two other small villages some 200 kilometers upstream on the Vistula, namely Oswiecim and Brzezinka, better known by their German names, Auschwitz and Birkenau. In these latter places, a portion of the greatest evil of the previous century was perpetrated. Yet some unknown number of mindless people in Europe, the Americas, and the Muslim world now suggest that the mass murder of Jews, gypsies, and Christians in these places never happened.

In Tarnobrzeg, by contrast, we have the exact opposite, where thoughtful people understand that an invented myth leading to a terrible and wicked injustice was true.

The image of the Vistula as it flows toward the Baltic Sea gives rise to an unusual panorama of the continuity of hate: the ashes of the innocent victims that were cast into the river at Oswiecim/Brzezinka meet and mingle with the ashes of the innocents burned alive in the Tarnobrzeg tragedy of 1757 and 1993.

*Daniel Leeson is a retired businessman and former symphonic orchestra musician. His previous pieces for the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism were on Mormon baptisms of the Jewish dead, Judensau depictions in today’s Europe, and antisemitism in Wagner operas.
As introduced in Part I, Boris Brasol was a one-time Imperial Russian judicial official and military officer who spent much of his life as a tireless promoter of anti-Jewish hatred and inveterate intriguer. In 1916, he came to the United States, which remained the base for his activities in the following decades. The initial installment largely focused on Brasol’s background in Russia, his connection to the translation and dissemination of the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion in America, and his resulting association with persons and activities linked to auto maker Henry Ford. This installment, Part II, delves further into Brasol’s tangled and sometimes bewildering dealings with an array of fellow White Russians, assorted American antisemites, official (and unofficial) agents of the Third Reich, and, for good measure, Soviet operatives.

In his book Who Financed Hitler, James Pool proposes Brasol as a bagman between Henry Ford and a then struggling, minor German political figure, Adolf Hitler. Another figure in this scenario is Kurt Georg Wilhelm Lueddecke, a globe-trotting German adventurer of dubious character and later the author of I Knew Hitler. There is much in Lueddecke’s early doings
that smack of an intelligence operative, though just whose is an open question. Pool’s story is basically this: in 1921, Luedecke, “one of Hitler’s lieutenants,” came to the United States, where he met Boris Brasol, who was “then the Grand Duke Cyril’s representative in the United States [who gave] me a letter of Introduction to Cyril and other Russians.”1 Letter in hand, Luedecke sped back to Europe to hit up the Grand Duke for money to aid the budding National Socialists. Once a New Order was established in Berlin, the logic goes, Hitler would repay the debt by crushing bolshevism and restoring the Romanovs to their rightful place. Luedecke quickly concluded that Cyril and his grand duchess had scant money to give. Nevertheless, during 1922-23 Cyril somehow managed to come up with no less than half a million gold marks to “support nationalist German-Russian undertakings” via Gen. Erich Ludendorff, then a close collaborator of Hitler.2 So where could it have come from? Pool supposes that the money was really Ford’s carried to Europe by Brasol and “laundered” through Cyril. The key to this arrangement, Pool explains, was Brasol’s many trips to Europe, which afforded him “plenty of opportunity to convey substantial sums of Ford’s money to Hitler.”3

But Pool is off the mark when it comes to basic chronology. Luedecke was neither Hitler’s lieutenant nor even a Nazi in 1921; they wouldn’t even meet until the summer of 1922. Nor did Cyril proclaim himself Protector of the Russian Throne nor Brasol become his representative until that year as well. Moreover, Luedecke’s account says nothing about approaching Ford for any money until early 1924, at Hitler’s request—and Henry said no. The letter from Brasol also seems placed in 1924, in any case certainly not ’21.

Nevertheless, Pool’s basic supposition may not be wrong. Luedecke did come to America in 1921 and mentions a visit to the Detroit offices of the Dearborn Independent, where he met its editor, William Cameron, and eagerly sought copies of some of the International Jew articles. Brasol, of course, supplied material for those articles and knew Cameron as well as Ford’s staunchly pro-German secretary, Ernest Liebold, the person who was instrumental in acquiring the Brasol material and getting it published. Luedecke remained in the United States through early 1922, allegedly supporting himself as a private investigator in the employ of Ford’s chief detective

in New York, C. C. Daniels. As journalist Norman Hapgood documented in his 1922 expose of Ford’s “Jew-Mania,” Brasol was likewise linked to Daniels’ outfit. Thus it seems possible, even probable, that Brasol and Luedecke first got acquainted at this time; it even may be that Brasol was the man Luedecke had actually first come to see in America.

Although not yet a Nazi, Kurt Luedecke was already ensconced in the ranks of the nationalist antisemites. One such outfit, also based in Munich, was the so-called Aufbau Vereinigung (Reconstruction Organization), a conspiratorial group that included Hitler associates such as Max Amann (the Nazis’ business manager), Alfred Rosenberg, Max von Scheubner-Richter, and Gen. Ludendorff, along with reactionary White Russians like General Vasili Biskupsky and Feodor Vinberg, both old acquaintances of Brasol.

Another member, Aufbau’s American representative no less, was Boris Brasol. Scheubner-Richter lauded him as “one of the leading personalities in the Russian émigré circles of America.” In November 1921, Brasol sent the US State Department a translated copy of the protocols of the Aufbau-sponsored “All-Russian Monarchial Convention” held at Bad Reichenhall, near Munich, earlier that year. So, one must wonder, did Luedecke initially come to the United States not to raise money for the Nazis, but for Aufbau?

In his articles, Hapgood recounts a meeting in New York with some Russian émigrés in December 1921 where one, identified as “Mr. A.” (in fact, Nikolai Avksentiev), former head of the “Constitutional Government at Omsk,” swore that “I have seen the documentary proof that Boris Brasol has received money from Henry Ford.” Avksentiev had just come over from Paris. There was no indication, however, of just for what or for whom the supposed money was intended, and Hapgood never really found the proof.

If this were the only thing linking Brasol to Ford’s secret funding, we could forget the matter. But it isn’t. On December 20, 1922, The New York Times ran an article about rumors making the rounds in Berlin that claimed “Henry Ford . . . is financing Adolph Hitler’s nationalist and anti-Semitic movement in Munich.” A local paper, the Berliner Tageblatt, appealed to the American Embassy for an immediate investigation. The article went on

5. Ibid., 131.
to note that Hitler and his associates lately had been spending money “lavish-lavishly” and that adorning the wall of Hitler’s “spacious” and “splendidly furnished” office was a portrait of the American auto-maker. Henry was held in high esteem among the National Socialists, but rumors are not facts. The only response from the Ford camp was issued by Brasol’s sometime collaborator Ernest Liebold, who insisted that Ford “knows nothing about the reports concerning him current in Berlin.”

This brings us back to Brasol’s trips to Europe. On September 2, 1922, he sailed from New York to Southampton and returned to the United States on October 22. Where he went in the interim is unknown, but he had ample time to visit Paris, Munich, Berlin, or just about any other city on the continent. Passenger records reveal that among Brasol’s shipmates to England was his old boss for War Trade Intelligence, and still bosom friend, George H. Bodman. Bodman had reverted to his civilian job, that of Wall Street investment banker. His expertise might have come in quite handy in the delicate matter of laundering funds, say, through a convenient London bank. Coincidentally or not, it was also in October 1922 that Kurt Luedecke finally joined the Nazi Party.

So what did Brasol do in London—or wherever he ended up? In later questioning of Brasol, he dropped what may be a relevant clue. Asked about Cyril’s son, the future Grand Duke Vladimir Kirilovich, Brasol noted that he had only met the boy once, when he was 5 or 6 years old, at Cyril’s home in France. This would put the visit in 1922 or at the latest 1923, with the former more likely as it was when Brasol first signed on as the grand duke’s representative.

All the above is very curious, yet still little more than coincidence and speculation. But there is more. In September 1923, Brasol made another trip to Europe, and again returned to New York in late October. This was shortly before Hitler’s “Beer Hall Putsch” of November 9, when he, along with Scheubner-Richter and Ludendorff, would try and ignominiously fail to overthrow the Bavarian government.

Brasol did not travel abroad in 1924, a year which Hitler mostly spent cooling his heels in prison. It was in the aftermath of his arrest that Hitler dispatched his now-trusted agent Luedecke back to America, where he arrived on New Year’s Day, 1924. It’s at this time that Luedecke later recorded his unsuccessful appeal to Ford for money—or was it more money?—and a like string of rejections from other wealthy Americans. Little wonder, really: Hitler seemed to have shot his bolt and was yesterday’s news. But it is also at this time that Luedecke seems to have received his introduction to Grand Duke Cyril, courtesy of Brasol. In December 1924, another “Weird Tale Regarding Henry Ford” appeared in the American
According to this report, which had first appeared in the Berliner Zeitung am Mittag (December 13), Ford and other unnamed Americans were promising financial support for Grand Duke Cyril in exchange for Siberian railway and gold-mining concessions once the Bolsheviks were sent packing. Cyril allegedly received money from the Auto King to raise a new White Army. The intermediary for all this financial intrigue was said to be the “banking house of Brasol & Co. of New York.” The article noted that a quick check showed no such firm in the city, but that the address given did correspond to a Russian bookstore run by one Boris Brasol. When approached, Brasol deferred making any statement, while a Ford spokesman curtly dismissed the story as a “lie.”

Maybe it was, but it is surely curious that the story surfaced just as Cyril’s wife, Grand Duchess Victoria Melita, was in New York and being feted by a bevy of rich, adoring Americans—and Boris Brasol. One of the few things Brasol readily admitted under later questioning was that he had been Grand Duke Cyril’s representative in America from 1922 to 1924. On the other hand, he never offered any details on what duties the post entailed. According to reports reaching the German Foreign Office, Brasol “managed to gather large sums of money for [Cyril] in 1924 when Viktoria visited America.” He certainly was in the right company. The adoring Americans were part of the self-proclaimed “500” and members of the Monday Opera Club organized by the socialite Mrs. Henry P. Loomis, who identified its defining characteristic as “fastidious taste.” Brasol would have taken satisfaction in the claim that “no Jew has ever attended a meeting of the club.” One news report identified Brasol as a kind of master of ceremonies for the Grand Duchess’s appearance at the Plaza Hotel. When she at last appeared to her admirers crowding the lobby, he ostentatiously “flung himself on one knee before kissing her hand.” At Victoria Melita’s farewell dinner, a reporter buttonholed Brasol, who took the opportunity to denounce the “discredited” report that he had been involved in some deal between Ford and Cyril. Perhaps to spare his well-heeled friends any
embarrassment, he went on to deny that he was an antisemite and even denied that he was the same Brasol who had been connected to the Beilis case—Beilis, a Ukrainian Jew, had been accused, then acquitted, of the ritual murder of a Christian boy—and anything involving the Protocols. That, he insisted, was the work of another officer, also named Brasol or Brasul. He was, of course, lying.

There may have been more to the Monday Opera Club than first meets the eye. According to a history of the Sovereign Order of St. John (basically, the Knights of Malta), the club was a “society program” of the SOSJ and a part of its bigger effort to aid Russian exiles and their cause. Brasol, in this account, was a member of the order’s Russian Priory, along with his antisemitic brother-in-arms Count Arthur Ivanovich Cherep-Spiridovich, a Serbian and Russian intelligence officer, through which they supposedly battled the “globalist’s agenda.” As for Grand Duke Cyril, the same history identifies him as the “Protector of the Order” and, as of 1922, the “financier of the Order’s field operations.” Also counted among the SOSJ’s members were many in prominent positions in American business, finance, and government.

Whether or not the order was anywhere as powerful as claimed, or that Brasol was part of it, there is no question that he was linked to numerous persons associated with it, among them an American physician, Dr. William Sohier Bryant. To no great surprise, Dr. Bryant was well known to Mrs. Loomis, to George Bodman, Brasol’s banker buddy from War Trade Intelligence, and to Brasol’s old comrade in Protocols-peddling, Dr. Harris Houghton, who had collaborated with Brasol in the production of the 1918 Protocols. Like Bodman and Houghton, Bryant also had a wartime connection to intelligence. Beyond this, Bryant served Brasol for years as a front for obtaining subscriptions to various publications, notably Jewish ones such as the Forward and Jewish Examiner. (Some years down the road, Bryant would become a prominent member of the America First Committee). What all this boils down to is that when Brasol implied that he had friends in high places, or at least influential ones, he wasn’t joking. Boris

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
Brasol was a man who networked thoughtfully and effectively, and his connections provided opportunities, cover, and protection.

While he was far from universally admired, there is also no question that Brasol exercised significant influence among right-wing Russian émigrés in the United States and elsewhere. In the fall of 1922, he compiled a report on Russian monarchist organizations and activities in the United States and sent a copy to Baron Peter Vrangel, former commander of the White Army in the Crimea and one of the main émigré leaders in Europe.\(^{21}\) In this report, Brasol admitted that Russian monarchists faced an uphill battle in America, in part because of the millions spent by the “Jew Schiff” in spreading anti-tsarist propaganda. The only real support could be found in some conservative Christian circles and, more important, in the person of Henry Ford, who had committed himself to the battle against “Jewish intrigue.” Brasol bemoaned that fact that pitted against the 500,000-600,000 Russians in the States were millions of Jews. Moreover, only a small portion of these Russians could be counted partisans of the monarchist cause. Still, he could take some satisfaction that his own organization, the Association Unity of Russia, at 700 members, was larger than the 400 belonging to the rival Socialist Revolutionary group. He also boasted of having friends in the US State Department—a claim, as we will see, not without some validity.\(^{22}\)

A 1923 confidential memorandum from State’s Division of Russian Affairs labeled Brasol “the brains of the Russian Monarchial Group in the United States” and a “very clever and astute politician.”\(^{23}\) But it also warned that however “able and brilliant,” he also was “not entirely trustworthy.” This opinion was at least partly inspired by the steady stream of letters and unsolicited reports that Brasol sent to State decrying any moves to recognize the Soviet regime and revealing fresh, nefarious plots by the ruthless Judaeo-Bolsheviks.

One revealing example is a January 1922 letter addressed to secretary of state Charles Evans Hughes. Writing on behalf of the so-called Russian Monarchial Delegation, Brasol lambasted the upcoming economic conference in Genoa as a scheme to “ruin Russia, converting her into a mere colony of Judo-British and German-Jewish finance.”\(^{24}\) This conspiracy, he argued, was the work of the “Hugo Stinnes-Mendelsohn Group in Ger-

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22. Ibid., 11.
23. A. W. Kliefoth, Memorandum, June 2, 1923, USDS, 811.108 B73.
many, and the Sassoon interests in England.” In essence, he asserted, the conference was nothing but an opportunity for Jewish interests in London and Berlin to “reach an understanding” with the Jewish masters of the Kremlin for the division and despoiling of Russia.

Yet, whatever their misgivings, some persons at State were willing to seek Brasol’s advice when the need arose. One such instance involved a libel suit brought in Paris by Princess Nina Zizianov against Donald Bigelow, an American consular official. The princess, describing herself as “dramatic artist,” had come to the United States at the end of 1924, right on the heels of the departing Grand Duchess Victoria. She garnered some press with tales of persecution by the Bolsheviks and then returned to France in the latter part of 1925. When she tried to return to New York later that year, Bigelow turned down her visa request, ostensibly on immigration grounds. Zizianov insisted that she was the “victim of Bolshevik propaganda.”25 In January 1926, the State Department’s special agent in New York, Robert S. Sharp, turned to Brasol for information about Zizianov.

Sharp was doubtless one of the supporters in the State Department mentioned above. Like Brasol, he was a convinced antisemite, or at the very least a dedicated consumer and purveyor of anti-Jewish conspiracy theories.26 Brasol placed Zizianov (née Johanna Kriebel) firmly in that context by branding her a tool of Soviet intrigue. This information made its way to Paris and Bigelow, who in September 1926 passed it on to a local reporter for the **Boston Sunday Post**. This resulted in an article accusing Zizianov of being an “international spy,” a German agent in Russia during the World War, and most recently Grigory Zinoviev’s personal agent in America, sent to spy upon and disinform “patriotic organizations.”27 Princess Zizianov promptly sued for libel and won, precipitating a legal and diplomatic wrangle that dragged on for years.28

Brasol was willing to cultivate allies wherever he could find them, and, as with Sharp, antisemitism often proved the common denominator. One case was a White Russian refugee from the Far East, Gen. Konstantin Sakharov. The former chief of staff for deceased Siberian ruler Adm. A. V. Kolchak, Sakharov was another true believer in the Judaic character of the Bolshevik regime. Brasol and he met, or met again, in New York in 1920.

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26. See, for example, Sharp to Robert C. Bannerman, December 18, 1924, and attachments, USDS, CSA file 215.
According to the history of the SOSJ, Sakharov was the “head of the military division of the Russian Grand Priory” of the order. Whatever the case, Sakharov soon after departed for Munich, where he joined Aufbau. He also became an intimate of budding Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, who would later compliment Sakharov’s work “as perfectly suitable to convince simple-minded people of the role of Jewry in Bolshevism”; twenty years later, Brasol’s own relations with Rosenberg were reported to be “very close.” Sakharov also served as Grand Duke Cyril’s director of intelligence, and in that capacity it would be reasonable to assume that Brasol acted as one of his key agents.

It was with Sakharov in New York that Brasol made the acquaintance of another man, an American, William Rutledge McGarry. A sometime publicist, general wheeler-dealer, and occasional spy, McGarry was the author of a bizarre book, Rescuing the Czar, which purported to reveal how Nicholas II and the rest of his family escaped death with the assistance of brave Anglo-American agents. Brasol was no fan of Romanov survival theories, since they drastically undercut the Imperial Family’s value as martyrs to a murderous Jewish conspiracy, but he may have felt that McGarry’s work had propaganda value nonetheless. At one point in the book, a desperate Nicholas rails against Jews and their propaganda and laments that “there is hardly a Yiddish banker in the world who didn’t blame ME personally for inspiring Shcheglovitov [Russian minister of justice] to have the Jews executed for ritual murder” and that nefarious Jewish influence would doubtless be used to destroy Russia just as “poor Nilus [Russian religious writer and self-described mystic] predicted.” It’s hard not to suspect that these references to the Beilis case and the Protocols were suggested or inspired by Brasol.

Brasol also soon came into contact with another Russian fleeing the Far East, Ataman (Chieftan) Grigori Semenov. A part-Mongol Cossack officer, during the Russian civil war Semenov made himself overlord of the Siberian Transbaikal region and waged a ruthless struggle against bolshevism and anyone he suspected of sympathy toward it. The excesses committed by him or under his name earned Semenov a reputation as a pillager,
a mass murder, and a pogromist. Among his many enemies were former officers of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, who held him responsible for the killing of US soldiers and citizens. Semenov was probably guilty of most of the crimes of which he stood accused, though his status as a true antisemite is debatable, or at least contradictory. On the one hand, there is no question that officers under his command harbored such sentiments and robbed and murdered Jews with relish and impunity. His forces allegedly distributed copies of the *Protocols* among Japanese forces in Siberia. 35 On the other hand, Semenov did issue an order against pogroms and maintained some security for Jews in his stronghold of Chita, at least for a time. 36 In these measures, he likely was influenced by his Jewish mistress, Mashka Sharaban, whom antisemites in his entourage eventually forced him to exile. 37 When things started to fall apart for him, Semenov’s command proclaimed that “Jews have ruined Russia and must be killed.” 38

In late 1921, Ataman Semenov decided to head for Europe via America. In November of that year and again in January 1922, Brasol lobbied the US State Department to grant him a visa. Brasol’s effort succeeded, and Semenov disembarked in Seattle on March 14. His arrival did not go unnoticed, however, and from the moment he set foot on American soil he was the target of protests and legal actions, the biggest coming from the assignees of the defunct Youraveta Home and Foreign Trading Company of New York. They charged that Semenov had looted $500,000 in goods and supplies belonging to the company, thus forcing it into bankruptcy. Soon after Semenov arrived in Manhattan in April, police, apparently much to his surprise and chagrin, arrested him, and held him at the Ludlow Street jail. As news of this spread, “angry Russian Jews” protesting against Semenov gathered around the lockup. 39 Brasol, who became involved in the case, later told Army interrogators that he was acting only in a legal capacity and at the insistence of Semenov’s young wife; 40 specifically, he raised Semenov’s bail. As usual, though, with Brasol, this was not quite all there was to it. In 1922, he told Baron Vrangel that Semenov had given his backing to Unity of Russia, backing that may have included finan-

37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 292.
40. Brasol hearing, 74, FBI, File 100-15704.
cial support.41 None of this really helped Semenov. He avoided prosecution, but faced a deportation hearing before the US Senate and ended up back in the Far East.

From Brasol’s perspective, the Jews demonstrating outside the jailhouse were but a minor manifestation of the conspiracy against Semenov. He did not fail to notice that the firm at the root of Semenov’s troubles, Youraveta, was the very same outfit Brasol had described as “practically taken over” by his bête noire, Jacob Schiff, in a 1919 report to the Military Intelligence Division.42 The fact that the opposing attorneys questioning Semenov were David Kahn and E. S. Greenbaum must have added to Brasol’s suspicions of semitic intrigue.43

Brasol also did not miss the fact that a leading proponent of Semenov’s deportation was US senator William E. Borah. A maverick Republican and chairman of the influential Foreign Relations Committee, Borah was an outspoken champion of Soviet recognition and an associate, knowingly or not, of pro-Soviet individuals and front organizations. To Brasol, Borah was a dangerous enemy and, possibly, a secret Jew (he wasn’t). Little wonder, then, that Brasol’s name should pop up in intrigues aimed at discrediting him.

Rumors that Senator Borah was in the pay of the Soviets circulated as early as 1925, but it wasn’t until 1929 that the whole matter exploded in a Berlin courtroom.44 There, two White Russian émigrés, Vladimir Orlov and Mikhail Pavlnovsky, stood trial on charges of having sold faked documents to an American journalist, Hubert Knickerbocker; the documents purported to prove that Borah had taken money from Red agents. At the trial, a “German secret service agent” named Harald Siewert testified that in 1925 Boris Brasol came to Berlin to negotiate with Orlov’s partner Pavlnovsky about obtaining documents that could be used in Ford’s legal battle with a New York Herald reporter Herman Bernstein (discussed in Part I).45

According to Siewert, Brasol ultimately paid Pavlnovsky $17,000 for a mishmash of authentic and fake papers supplied by Orlov. Pavlnovsky testified that Orlov more recently had been busy preparing some sort of forgeries and had been “in conference with a man who described himself as Mr.

42. Report #16, January 2, 1919, Military Intelligence Division (MID), File 10111-920/108.
43. “Move to Deport Semenoff Begins,” NYT, April 1, 1922, 13.
Brasol, an American attorney from New York.46 On the Communist side of the equation, veteran Soviet agent and propagandist Ernst Henri (Semen Rostovsky) fingered Brasol as the key intermediary between Orlov and a clique of American reactionaries determined to impeach Borah.47 Brasol indeed visited Germany in the fall of 1925, and again in late 1928. The first documents incriminating Borah surfaced immediately after.

The truth was that Brasol and Orlov had a long personal history going back to their days as prosecutors for the tsar, when they had worked on some of the same cases.48 While the fortunes of war had taken Brasol to America, they left Orlov in Russia, where he initially adapted by serving the Bolsheviks. Although he later went over to the Whites, there were many in that camp who always suspected him of being a Red agent, or at least a double one.49 And they were undoubtedly correct. Orlov’s partner, Pavlushnovsky, alias Sumarokov, was himself a long-time OGPU (Soviet secret police) officer who had “defected” in Berlin, and another of Orlov’s closest collaborators, Nikolai Kroshko, was later revealed to be an undercover Soviet agent. Researcher Natalie Grant compiled a survey of Orlov’s career that makes a convincing, if largely circumstantial, case that Vladimir Orlov was a conscious Soviet agent from 1918 on.50

Orlov’s allegiances are important because they touch upon those of others with whom he and Brasol were connected and, ultimately, Brasol’s own. One such mutual associate was an even more dubious and devious character best known as Sidney George Reilly, sometimes dubbed the “Ace of Spies” and, quite unjustifiably, a prototype for James Bond. For some years during and following WWI, Reilly was connected to the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and briefly managed to convince the British to engage Orlov as an asset. The relationship between Brasol and Reilly is less obvious, perhaps because Reilly, whose original name (as best as can be determined) was Rosenblum, was a Russian Jew. He was not only an almost perfect stereotype of the rootless, scheming Jew antisemites so feared and detested, but was also an example of something else they found irresistible: a Jew who agreed with them, or pretended to. While many of

48. Most notably, the wartime prosecution of ex-minister of war Gen. Sukhomlinov.
49. Orlov trial transcript, 5th Session 2, 5, USDS, File 811.44—Borah, William E.
his numerous business and espionage associates were also Jewish, Reilly openly complained about Jews’ dominance of American banking and commerce, the pro-Bolshevik sympathizers of many Jewish immigrants, and the foolish American immigration laws that had let such people in.51

An association between Brasol and Reilly almost certainly goes back to 1916-17, when Reilly was a war contractor doing business with the Russian Supply Committee in New York and Brasol was in charge of vetting those contractors. Later, they were connected through the so-called Anti-Bolshevik League, which also included Count Cherep-Spiridovich and other rightist White Russians such as Peter Afanasieff and Nikolai Rybakoff, all associates of Brasol.52 The Anti-Bolshevik League suddenly appeared at the end of 1924, right after Reilly returned to New York from Europe and almost exactly at the same time as Grand Duchess Victoria Melita’s visit. Jew or no Jew, the history of the SOSJ claims Reilly as another member of the order, and makes the Anti-Bolshevik League one more gambit of the order’s secretive intelligence-propaganda activities, activity that also included dissemination of the Protocols.53

Perhaps, however, the most intriguing detail about Reilly is that, like Orlov, he was widely suspected of being a Soviet double agent.54 Having spent almost twenty years digging into his convoluted career, this author has to agree that those suspicions were correct. A year after the formation of the Anti-Bolshevik League, Reilly abruptly and inexplicably returned to Russia. Whether he ended up dead or whether it was a disguised defection remains uncertain.

With all the above in mind, it should not come as any great surprise that the following is found in Brasol’s FBI file:

In 1925 BRASOL was called to Washington with reference to the controversy about money left here by the Imperial Russian Government, at which time he gave an opinion favorable to the Soviet, and in that way made a good contact with the Soviet. In the following eight or nine years, he was an agent of Amtorg [the Soviet trade bureau in New York] and


53. SOSJ.

G.P.U. while on the other hand keeping close contact with the White Russians.55

The same charge, almost verbatim, occurs in an Anti-Defamation League report on Brasol compiled in 1941. This could be because Brasol’s old antagonist, Casimir Pilenas (discussed in Part I), who had renamed himself Palmer, was the common source. But the ADL report also mentions that a Russian émigré, a Mrs. Epanchine of Columbus, Ohio, “has documentary evidence substantiating this fact.”56 The same ADL report also notes Brasol’s association, through the Pushkin Society, with Gen. Viktor Yakhontoff, a former Imperial officer who was an active pro-Soviet propagandist in the United States. And an FBI report from 1942 records that among New York’s Russian community there were those who believed Brasol to be “an informant for the present [Soviet] government” who sought to ferret out Moscow’s enemies by posing as one.57

While it is hard to imagine Brasol as some sort of secret Bolshevik, it’s not hard to suppose that he would hedge his bets and, as always, seek allies where he could find them. After all, by the mid-20s it was evident to anyone with common sense that the Romanov restoration movement was going nowhere. In 1925, the same year he supposedly made his Soviet contacts, Brasol appears to have terminated his role as Cyril’s representative in America, something that neither he nor anyone else ever sought to explain. As early as 1923, a Munich police report indicated that among Cyril’s supporters in Aufbau was a faction that favored tactical collaboration with the Bolsheviks;58 Brasol may have been part of it. It also may be significant that 1925 saw a major shift in Soviet politics. In the wake of Lenin’s death, a struggle for power was clearly underway between Trotsky, a Jew, and Stalin. Over the next few years, Stalin would drive Trotsky from the USSR and cast other prominent Jewish Bolsheviks, like Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev, into political oblivion. Brasol must have relished that, and it could have been a means for Soviet agents to induce his cooperation.

But there have been a more personal factor involved. In his testimony at a later exclusion hearing, Brasol dropped the fact that his mother had been living in Minsk.59 At the time, the city was under German occupation, but from 1920 through 1941, it lay within the territory of the USSR. The

56. ADL, Report of December 5, 1941, 2.
58. Kellogg, 163-164.
59. Brasol hearing, 3, FBI, File 100-15704.
diligent Soviet secret police hardly would have overlooked the fact that the elderly mother of a virulent émigré enemy lay under their thumb. It was leverage of the most brutal and basic kind, leverage that Brasol would have had no problem understanding.

In the late 1920s, Brasol’s overt political activity dropped off and he devoted more time to criminological and business affairs. In 1925, he wrote an article, “Institute of Scientific Criminology,” which advocated the creation of forensic labs in major police departments, an example of some of his more forward-thinking ideas. This, in turn, led to his 1929 book, The Elements of Crime, and that to his association with the Criminological Survey Committee of Columbia University Law School. Brasol used these crime-fighter credentials to make an overture to the country’s top lawman, J. Edgar Hoover. In 1930, Brasol wrote Hoover inquiring about the Bureau’s fingerprint files, and, naturally, advertising his own expertise. In response, he received a long, if entirely formal, reply from Hoover. That, so far as can be told, was the full extent of their dealings, though ever after Brasol would boast that “I know Mr. Hoover.”

From 1926, Brasol served as Russian legal adviser to numerous New York banks, law firms, and insurance companies, including National City Bank, Guaranty Trust, New York Life, Equitable Life, and the Cravath and Coudert Brothers law firms. His association with the Coudert firm, especially its leading light, Frederic Rene Coudert, Jr., is of particular note. Coudert had been the Russian imperial government’s legal representatives in the United States, which is how Brasol first forged the connection. From the 20s to the 40s, F. R. Coudert was a tireless champion of right-wing, anti-Communist, and, according to some, antisemitic causes, which made him a natural patron for Brasol. In 1941, as a representative in the New York State legislature, Coudert presided over an inquisition into Red influence in the New York public schools, the notorious Rapp-Coudert Committee. According to investigative journalist George Seldes, among the committee’s special advisers was Boris Brasol. Indeed, Seldes claimed to be “authoritatively informed” that Brasol had been “retained by Coudert Brothers” and, in fact, worked out of their offices. FBI informant Walter

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60. Brasol to J. Edgar Hoover, December 18, 1930, FBI, File 100-22487.
61. Brasol hearing, 51, FBI, File 100-15704.
63. “Brasol and Coudert,” In Fact, June 30, 1941, 3.
Winchell reported that “to contact Boris Brasol, all you have to do is call the Coudert firm’s phone number!”

Brasol’s connections in American business and politics paid off in many ways, and it is not hard to see how his business and legal affairs might have been useful to new friends at Amtorg. In 1926, Brasol also took the step of becoming an American citizen. On his application, he described himself as “legal adviser and writer,” but perhaps the most interesting detail is the two who witnessed it. His old banker buddy from War Trade Intelligence, George Bodman, was one, and the other was William E. Sims, a prominent Wall Street attorney. In addition, Bodman and his wife repeatedly rendered Brasol financial assistance in the form of unsecured personal loans.

In 1923 or 1924, US attorney general Harry Daugherty tapped Brasol as a Russian adviser on legal affairs, a position Brasol quietly maintained for several years. In 1931, for example, he accompanied assistant attorney general Charles B. Rugg to Paris on an assignment that resulted in controversy over Brasol’s expenditure of official funds. In early 1933, his connection to the Department of Justice resulted in an unwelcome public exposure and embarrassment both for him and the government. He appeared as the department’s expert witness in a case involving the Russian Volunteer Fleet, vessels originally contracted by the tsarist regime, then seized by the US government, for which the Soviets claimed compensation. Moscow’s case was put forth by Charles Recht, a long-time advocate for Soviet interests in the United States. Recht’s tactic was to put Brasol, or at least his credibility, on trial. In cross-examination, Recht attacked Brasol’s legal credentials, but mostly he argued that the former tsarist prosecutor was so prejudiced in his view of the Soviet regime that he could not render an honest opinion. “He labors under the belief or affects to believe [that] to be a Bolshevist is to be a Jew,” Recht insisted, “and that accordingly, all of his views of Soviet issues are colored by this anti-Jewish phobia.” Brasol denied it all, but was stunned when Recht brought forward a witness of his own—Casimir Pilenas, a once trusted associate of Brasol’s who testified to

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64. Winchell to J. Edgar Hoover, October 31, 1942, FBI, File 100-22487, Section 2.
65. Memorandum for the director re: Boris Brasol, March 14, 1944, 2, FBI, File 100-22487, Section 2.
66. Harvey H. Bundle to the attorney general, September 28, 1931, USDS, 411.61R92/76.
Brasol’s long association with antisemitic propaganda. It was only now, it seems, that Brasol finally realized Pilenas’s true colors.

The courtroom revelations prompted several Jewish periodicals and organizations to demand that attorney general William D. Mitchell dismiss Brasol from Justice’s employ. The American Hebrew Association charged that the Russian was “a public enemy” and “a professional fomenter of religious strife and group hatred in the United States.” What action, if any, Mitchell took is unclear.

During the 1930s, Brasol maintained a wide array of contacts among right-wing Russians in the United States, as well as home-grown “nativists,” antisemites, and pro-fascists. Among them was “Count” Anastase Vonsiatsky, a White Russian refugee who landed a rich, older American wife and used her fortune to fund his grandly titled Russian National Revolutionary Labor and Workers Peasant Party of Fascists. Of course, Brasol later insisted to his American inquisitors that he was “bitterly opposed to Fascism,” and Vonsiatsky evidenced rather lukewarm enthusiasm for either monarchism or antisemitism. He definitely was chummy, however, with Brasol’s old friends Biskupsky and Sakharov in Berlin and Semenov in Manchuria. Under later questioning, Brasol took his usual stance of denying any association. “I never saw him in my life,” he insisted, though he admitted to knowing Vonsiatsky. The only contact between them, Brasol claimed, had occurred in 1927, when he wrote Vonsiatsky concerning financial help for a mutual Russian friend. That friend, as it turns out, was the above-mentioned Col. Nikolai Rybakoff, who had come to San Francisco in 1923 and landed a job at the Ford Motor Company in Detroit with Brasol’s helping hand. In 1933, Rybakoff had relocated to New York, where he somehow found the resources to launch a newspaper, Rossiya, which ran a steady stream of monarchist, anti-Bolshevik, and antisemitic articles, some from Brasol’s own hand. It surely wasn’t mere coincidence that Rybakoff also published Vonsiatsky’s periodical, Fascist.

In any case, Vonsiatsky identified Brasol as an associate at his trial, and at Vonsiatsky’s grand jury Brasol swore, contrary to his above statement, that in 1930 Vonsiatsky had tried to get him to take over leadership of the American branch of the Brotherhood of Russian Truth (Bratsvo Russkoi

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68. Pilenas/Palmer to Isaacs, March 25, 1933, Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Nathan Isaacs Papers (NIP), Box 2, File 12.
70. Brasol hearing, 46, FBI, File 100-15704.
Pravdy), another rightist, Berlin-based émigré outfit. Interestingly, the brotherhood not only included Vladimir Orlov as a prominent member, but also its nominal chief, Orlov’s pal Alexander Kolberg, was one more White who would reveal himself to be a Red.

Vonsiatsky also was very close to the German-American Bund and its leader, Fritz Kuhn, someone else Brasol denied ever meeting, and another organization he claimed to have nothing to do with. As usual, there was information to the contrary. According to an FBI source inside the bund, in 1941, Brasol had asked his help in getting bund operatives to investigate a man named Bardolli, whom Brasol believed to be a dangerous Soviet against and, furthermore, the same Jurowsky who had been involved in the murder of the Romanovs. Brasol argued that bund members would be less obvious in this activity and promised to return the favor “anytime the Bund would need anything.”

It was Vonsiatsky’s dealings with the bund that mostly led to his arrest and conviction for violating the Espionage Act in June 1942. Army investigators were angling to lay the same sort of charge on Brasol—and he was just as determined to do everything he could to avoid it. American investigation connected Brasol to the following, by no means exhaustive, array of anti-Communist and anti-Jewish crusaders.

- James True: From 1933 the author of the anti-New Deal and antisemitic newsletter Industrial Control Reports and purveyor of the patented Kike Killer billy club. In 1942, Brasol described True and his wife as “very charming people” and judged True’s reports to be “about 90% correct.”
- Colonel Eugene Sanctuary: Author of The Talmud Unmasked and leader of the American Christian Defenders; collaborated with Gerald Winrod and the KKK.
- Allen Zoll: Founder of the American Patriots and close associate of Father Charles Coughlin’s Christian Front; accused “racketeer and blackmailer.”

73. Grant, 34-35.
74. Subject: Boris Brasol, November 13, 1942, FBI, File 100-15704.
75. Brasol hearing, FBI, File 100-15704, 31-32.
76. ADL, report of December 5, 1941; informant information dated January 21, 1940.
77. Brasol hearing, 32, FBI, File 100-15704.
• Laura Ingalls: Aviator, friend of Charles Lindbergh, and member of the America First Committee; later convicted of being an agent of the Nazi regime.

• William Dudley Pelley: One-time screenwriter, occult philosopher, and leader of the Silver Shirts movement, who claimed that “Christianity and anti-Semitism are synonymous.”

• Elizabeth Dilling: Author of *The Red Network* (1935), and another firm believer in the principle that Jews and Communism were synonymous.

• Leslie Fry (Paquita de Shishmareff, née Louise Chandor): The American widow of a Russian officer, she published *Waters Flowing Eastward* (1931), yet another take on the Protocols.

• Father Charles Coughlin: Sometimes dubbed the “Fascist Radio Priest,” Coughlin trumpeted the Depression as the work of “international Jewish bankers” and published *Social Justice*, for which Brasol allegedly wrote under the name “Ben Marcin.”

Under questioning, Brasol’s response in almost every case was to first deny any connection, but under further probing to admit some innocent casual contact. For instance, he first insisted he had “never” had any dealings with Pelley, then admitted knowing of him, next to having seen him, and finally to having spoken with him, albeit years ago. Brasol regarded Pelley as a kind of religious poseur, and this apparently had caused them to part company even though, supposedly, there really was never any company to part. It was much the same story with Leslie Fry. She liked to claim that she was the first to put a copy of the Protocols in Henry Ford’s hands, which may have rankled Brasol. In 1942 he described her as “a personal enemy.”

As for Colonel Sanctuary, Brasol first claimed to have no association with him whatsoever, but then admitted that, yes, he knew him and then that Sanctuary used to stop by his house once or twice a year for no particular reason. James True he met “once in Washington;” Allen Zoll he met several times but was “not at all in love with [him].” He also admitted


80. Brasol hearing, 68, FBI, File 100-15704.

81. Ibid., 81-82.

82. Ibid., 72-73.

83. Ibid., 73

84. Ibid.
knowing Elizabeth Dilling, though he could not remember just where or when he last saw her and denied having any “relations” beyond brief social interaction. As for Laura Ingalls, he had seen her but once, when she came by his office to beg some pamphlets. Brasol certainly wasn’t being forthright about these associations, but extremely cautious. By 1943, Ingalls stood convicted, and Dilling, Fry, Pelley, Sanctuary, and True faced indictment, and eventual trial, for sedition.

Coughlin was a more complicated matter. He ties in, perhaps, to Brasol’s most bizarre association. Brasol, typically, later declared his connections to Coughlin to be “none whatsoever” and claimed he rarely listened to his broadcasts or read Social Justice. He also pointedly denied being Ben Marcin or writing anything for the paper. Brasol did concede, however, indirect contact with Coughlin through a friend, “Father Duffy.” The man in question was actually Father Peter Baptiste Duffee, who in early 1939 was interviewed by none other than Casimir Pilenas-Palmer, then acting as an investigator for the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League. In Pilenas’s report, Duffee linked Brasol to a peculiar body called the Ancient and Noble Order of the Blue Lamoo. According to an FBI source, Brasol was “a power” in Blue Lamoo. Headquartered in Black Hills, South Dakota, the Blue Lamoo advertised itself as an Aryan spiritual and chivalric society based on the mystical wisdom of ancient Atlantis. This hocus-pocus, Duffee insisted, disguised the order’s true function as a “Nazi propaganda organization”—somehow linking up with another, better known German propaganda front, the Fichte Bund, of which Brasol was allegedly a representative. To add to the strangeness, the whole thing was tied up with a rogue branch of the Knights of Malta headquartered in Pennsylvania and the ubiquitous Sovereign Order of St. John.

Another rightist whose name cropped up in Brasol’s questioning was George Paganelli. Brasol admitted knowing him, and little more. Unknown to Brasol at the time—and probably unknown to his interrogators—Paganelli wasn’t who he claimed to be. In fact, he was Arthur (Avedis) Derounian, an Armenian-American investigator for the anti-fascist Friends

85. Ibid., 29.
86. Ibid., 28.
87. Ibid., 49.
88. Ibid., 49-50.
90. Boris Brasol, May 17, 1943, 2, FBI, File 100-22487, Section 2.
of Democracy. Writing in 1943 as John Roy Carlson, he published the book *Under Cover,* in which he revealed his ruse and encounters with Brasol and others. Derounian found Brasol an “elusive” figure, hard to track down, who preferred to “work in semi-darkness.”92 By reputation, Derounian knew him to be an intimate of the “Park Avenue Patriots”; “in political cunning and craft,” Derounian avowed, “Brasol towered above the average America Firster.” Brasol avoided attention, and censure, by declining virtually all requests for interviews. Derounian finally chased down his quarry at the Manhattan headquarters of the Russian-American National Committee.

Derounian was immediately struck by Brasol’s resemblance to Goebbels. Assuming he was speaking to a sympathetic ear, Brasol boasted: “I know them all in the Movement except Lindbergh. I’ve never met him. I’d like to have a long conversation with him some day.”93 He admitted to knowing Elizabeth Dilling “very well,” as he did Colonel Sanctuary and many others. He regarded Father Coughlin as “a great man,” but again denied having written for *Social Justice.* In parting, Brasol directed “Paganelli” to two other simpaticos, Baron Charles von Wrangell, “head of the Investigation Unit of the America First Committee,” and a minor Midwestern Jew-baiter named Carl Mote.94 But perhaps Brasol was not taken in as thoroughly as Derounian thought. “During the hour I spent with the man,” Derounian recalled, “he did not utter one anti-Semitic remark.”95

Charles Lindbergh was the “elephant in the room” when it came to Brasol’s American associates; even his interrogators seemed unwilling to broach the subject. As noted above, Brasol denied any direct connection or simply refused to say anything where Lindy was concerned. That may have reflected the truth of the situation, or it may have been Brasol exercising great discretion. What is certain is that they shared some of the same friends and associates. While Lindbergh openly condemned Nazi persecution of German Jews, he also had great admiration for the country and publicly criticized what he saw as the negative influence of Jews on American politics and economic life.96 The closest one can get to putting Brasol and Lindbergh in the same room appears in an ADL report in which the informant claims that “[Brasol] was on the platform at the Lindbergh rally in Madison Square Garden, October 30 [1940]. He is one of the

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93. Ibid.
94. Memorandum re: Further Information Needed on Boris Brasol, November 11, 1942, 6, FBI, File 100-22487, Section 2.
95. Carlson, 207.
principal advisers, or members of the ‘brain trust’ of the America First Committee . . .”

Brasol’s most obvious links to Lindbergh were two Russian émigré aviators, Igor Sikorsky and Boris Sergievsky, both of whom shared Brasol’s monarchist and anti-Red convictions, and both of whom were close friends with Lindy. Back in 1925, Sikorsky had served as vice chairman of Brasol’s Association Unity of Russia. As recently as June 1941, Brasol helped persuade Sergievsky to join him in signing a letter to President Roosevelt condemning American aid to Stalin. An ADL informant described how Vonsiatsky tried and failed to bring Col. Sergievsky “over to the German side” but that Brasol had finally succeeded.97 In September 1941, another ADL source reported that a link between Brasol and Lindbergh was Lawrence Dennis, “America’s No. 1 intellectual Fascist.”98 According to the source, “Dennis has done a good job getting the alleged Jewish viewpoint from Brasol which he naturally twisted, and then gave to Lindbergh to fit his own design.”99 Finally, another common thread between Brasol and Lindbergh was the above-mentioned Charles von Wrangell, and probably there were others.

Lindbergh’s name, of course, is also indelibly linked to the tragic abduction and murder of his young son in March 1932. Of the myriad rumors and theories swirling around this case, arguably the most sinister was that the child’s death was a Jewish ritual murder or a killing designed to look like one. It’s not hard to see how Brasol’s fertile mind could have spun it as such. According to an ADL source, dated 1940, Brasol was “responsible for the French stories of the Lindbergh child ritual murder.”100 The identical accusation appeared in an FBI report.101

Brasol clearly had ample association with Nazi sympathizers in America as well as with White Russian Nazi collaborators in the United States and Europe. Indeed, as we’ve seen, those links went all the way back to the early 20s with Ludecke, Cyril, and Aufbau. But did such connections continue in the 30s and did Brasol have any direct dealings with Nazi officials in America and Germany? He did. A hint of this was offered by his nemesis Casimir Pilenas right after Hitler came to power. In March 1933, Pilenas wrote his long-time confidant, professor Nathan Isaacs:

97. ADL, report of December 5, 1941, 2.
99. ADL, report of December 5, 1941, 5.
100. Ibid., 4.
101. Memorandum re: Further Information Needed on Boris Brasol, November 11, 1942, 7, FBI, 100-22487, Section 2.
I know that most of the German patriots know nothing against the Jews, and they could not prove no subversive acts against them. It is for this reason the Hitlerites and other anti-semites worship Boris Brasol as their benefactor. It was Boris Brasol who contributed much to their “knowledge.” All the Hitlerite intelligence is based on Brasol’s and other documents gathered through the medium of Mr. Ernest G. Liebold, Henry Ford’s General Secretary.\textsuperscript{102}

US Army investigators subsequently found it more than a little suspicious that Brasol had visited Germany almost every year between Hitler’s rise to power and the outbreak of the war; he justified these visits as necessary for his legal business or for the treatment of a heart condition. His inquisitors were especially curious about his trips there in ’38 and ’39. In the first instance, Brasol confessed he had actually seen Hitler, though merely in a passing car. In the second, which coincided with the German invasion of Poland and the outbreak of the war, he admitted to having been taken aside by Gestapo agents and subjected to “a real inquisition,” though his American interrogators doubtless smelled something else in the episode.\textsuperscript{103} A Maj. Rich, quoted by the ADL, claimed that while in Europe in 1939, Brasol had “furnished political leaders with information.”\textsuperscript{104}

Brasol admitted to having had contact with two representatives of the Nazi regime in the United States, but only, he insisted, in a very limited and entirely harmless context. The first of these men was Dr. Richard Sallet, who first came to the United States in the early twenties, attended Harvard, taught at Northwestern, and in 1931 published a still well-regarded book on Russian Germans in America. Brasol claimed that he first encountered Sallet in Washington, DC, in a purely social context.\textsuperscript{105} Although he did not get around to joining the Nazi Party until 1936, two years earlier the Hitler regime tapped Sallet as an “expert on American affairs” and dispatched him back to the States as the special attaché of Joseph Goebbels’ new Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. In that role, he reported to Berlin on Russian émigré and Jewish activities in America and was “instrumental in launching an anti-Semitic campaign.”\textsuperscript{106} Thus, it seems a safe bet that his and Brasol’s interaction was something more than casual. For good measure, Sallet also handled the affairs of the \textit{Fichte Bund}, to which Duffee linked Brasol.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{102} Palmer-Pilenas to Isaacs, March 29, 1933, NIP.
  \item \textsuperscript{103} Brasol hearing, 57, FBI, File 100-15704.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} ADL, December 5, 1941 Report, 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Brasol hearing, FBI, File 100-15704.
\end{itemize}
Brasol admitted meeting Sallet again, in Berlin, just before the outbreak of the war. He described Sallet as then a “minor official” in the German Foreign Ministry who had invited him to his home. Brasol insisted that his 1939 trip to Germany was purely business related and his visit with Sallet a just a private gesture. As usual, though, he concealed more than he admitted. According to Ulrich Freiherr von Gienanth, Sallet’s replacement in Washington, Sallet was in ’39 chief of the American desk of the Foreign Ministry’s press department—i.e., still deeply involved in propaganda work.

It was von Gienanth himself, however, who probably was Brasol’s most significant Nazi contact in America. Not incidentally, he was the very German official who would enlist Laura Ingalls, thus setting the stage for her indictment as Nazi agent in 1941. A self-described “ardent Nazi,” von Gienanth joined the SS in 1931, the same year he first came to the United States as a “student.” He must have done something right, because after Hitler’s rise to power, he was hand picked by Himmler’s office for an assignment in New York, and in April 1935 landed there to head up the German Library of Information. In due course, von Gienanth found himself the chief agent of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst—the intelligence/security arm of the SS) in America and, in 1937, Sallet’s replacement as propaganda attaché. Contrary to rumors in and outside the German Embassy, von Gienanth denied that he had any association with the Gestapo. He was, however, the resident eyes and ears of the party and personal representative of the Reichsführer der SS. As for his role as attaché, he admitted in his postwar interrogation that its number-one priority was “political propaganda.” His investigators grilled von Gienanth about his association with many Americans, but Brasol’s name never came up.

To his own interrogators, Brasol typically characterized his association with von Gienanth as casual and innocent. They first met, he recalled, in 1935 or 1936 (that is, soon after the German’s arrival) at a cocktail party hosted by mutual acquaintances. They bumped into each other again, a year or two later, at a New York hotel. Soon after the war began, Brasol recalled, he went to von Gienanth for help in locating his wife’s brother, who had been living in Poland but with whom they had lost contact as a result of the fighting. Von Gienanth readily gave his assistance and even offered to cable

110. Von Gienanth testimony, 9.
Berlin, generous help indeed for a presumably casual acquaintance. Relating
to the same matter, Brasol claimed, von Gienanth twice visited Brasol’s
office and a third meeting took place at another hotel. 111 Whether the missing
brother-in-law was ever located, he did not say.

Brasol’s interrogators were unconvinced that he was being complete or
honest about von Gienanth, and they were almost certainly correct. In their
summary, they offered that “there may have been a deeper association
between the subject and [von Gienanth], concerning which the information
before the board is insufficient for the purposes of determining the true
relationship.” 112

The decision to bring Brasol before an Army Exclusion Hearing Board
came down in September 1942, and he received a notice appear on Decem-
ber 21. The hearing took place two days later in a room at 50 Broadway.
The examining officers were Lt. Col. Aaron Melniker, Lt. Col. Eugene

The overall conclusions of the board were unanimous and damning. 113
Despite Brasol’s often “plausible and disarming explanations,” the officers
believed that in many cases his testimony had been “willfully false,” espe-
cially when it came to his associations with suspect individuals. Among his
many denials and rationalizations, none was more unbelievable that his
assertion “as to my anti-Semitism, I wish to deny that emphatically.” 114 He
had only ever, he insisted, attacked those Jews he knew to be supporters of
communism—like Jacob Schiff.

The investigating officers were unconvinced by his argument in this
instance and others. They saw overwhelming evidence that Boris Brasol
had given support to “organizations of questionable, if not outright subver-
sive character,” that he was a “bitter, implacable, unrelenting and fanatical
foe of the present Russian regime,” and “obsessed with a passion for
revenge.” All this “indelibly stamped him as a particularly dangerous threat
to the security and war effort of the United States” and justified his immedi-
ate exclusion from any “vital defense area.” Specifically, the board argued
that he should be banned from the “entire Eastern Military Area.” 115

Brasol’s immediate fate would seem to have been sealed, and the
inconsistencies in his testimonies left him open to charges of perjury. But

111. Brasol hearing, FBI, 24-35, File 100-15704.
112. Report of Exclusion Hearing Board, February 20, 1943, 29, FBI, 100-
15704.
113. Ibid., 30-32.
114. Ibid., 10.
115. E. E. Conroy, special agent in charge to Col. S. V. Constant, director of the
Intelligence HQ, Governors Island, July 6, 1943, ibid.
the exclusion board only made a recommendation; the decision to act upon it rested with the US attorney general for Southern District of New York. When more than four months later no apparent action had been taken, an inquiry from the New York FBI office discovered that the US attorney, on March 13, 1943, had “advised that he did not concur in the exclusion recommendation” and that the case “had been abandoned.”116 The US attorney in question was Mathias F. Correa, an FDR appointee who had held the post since 1941. He was an experienced and active prosecutor in many cases such as Brasol’s, so his inaction here is a bit puzzling. It may have been as simple as Correa’s deciding that Brasol was not important enough to consume the limited resources of his office, or that the evidence was insufficient, but maybe, just maybe, there was something else.

Simply put, did Brasol cut some sort of deal, agreeing to act as an informant, in exchange for dropping his case? Or, was the whole exclusion hearing a sideshow to obscure the fact that he already was one? In his interrogation, Brasol made a point of mentioning that soon after Pearl Harbor he had offered his services to the Military Intelligence Division. Not long after, he added, he went to see “Mr. Hoover” (though he failed to see him personally) and offered his full cooperation to the FBI.117 There is absolutely nothing to suggest that either the FBI or the MID took him up on these offers, but someone else may have. In that supposition, Correa’s subsequent career could offer a clue. In addition to being a lawyer, he became an important figure in US intelligence. In June 1943, Correa left his prosecutor’s job and joined the OSS, later running counterintelligence operations in Italy. After the war, he would be connected to the National Security Council and the newborn CIA.118

Brasol wasn’t completely out of the woods, though. The notion of prosecuting him as an unregistered foreign agent had first surfaced back in 1942, and with the collapse of the exclusion case, the FBI took renewed interest. Brasol got wind of this, and on March 4, 1944, presented himself at the bureau’s New York office. He lamented that he was being “subjected to discrimination and persecution by the Jewish race” on account of his “past record as an anti-semite” and most recently because of Carlson’s book.119 He claimed that his employers and potential employers had been threatened

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117. Brasol hearing, 51, FBI, File 100-15704.
with boycotts and that a Jewish concern had taken over his office building and was forcing him to vacate. The agent in charge explained to Brasol that the FBI had no jurisdiction in such matters, but Brasol adamantly insisted that he knew Director Hoover “personally” and was going to Washington to put his plight before him. This caused some consternation at the DC headquarters, where immediate steps were taken to prevent the dubious Russian from getting anywhere near Hoover. In any event, Brasol’s threat proved to be an empty one, but so did the registration investigation, which was abandoned in August 1944.120

For several years following the war, Brasol kept a low profile, but with the advent of the Cold War and especially McCarthyism, he saw a chance to renew activity and created the All-Russian Monarchist Front Executive Bureau, of which he, of course, was the head. Its activities largely involved denouncing “communist” groups and individuals, most of which, to no surprise, were Jewish. In July 1951, Brasol resurfaced in the FBI’s files when he appeared at its New York office to make a complaint concerning the Russian school of Middlebury College in Vermont. According to a source “whose identity he was not at liberty to expose,” Brasol alleged that the school did not employ a single real Russian and that it was headed by Aaron Pressman, born in Odessa, whom Brasol accused of being an “active, pro-communist propagandist,” and the same for Pressman’s wife and others associated with the school.121 Brasol offered to try to put his source in touch with the bureau if they were interested; at the same time, he contacted the Indianapolis office of the FBI to denounce Michael Ginsburg, head of another Russian school at the University of Indiana, as an “avowed pro-communist.”122

Brasol, not surprisingly, became a fervent fan of Sen. McCarthy. In 1954, he dispatched an angry letter to Sen. Ralph Flanders, attacking his “relentless and baseless vituperations against Senator McCarthy,” and included a list of persons “lending their support to pink and red sympathizers,” including Herbert Lehman, Arthur Hayes Sulzberger, Anna Rosenberg, and Dorothy Schiff.123 In 1958, Brasol once more tried to curry favor with director Hoover by sending a letter heaping praise on Hoover’s recent book Masters of Deceit, though taking exception to Hoover’s reference therein to “czarist tyranny.”124 The FBI’s response was that “in view of his

120. Assistant attorney general Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, September 22, 1944, FBI, File 100-22487, Section 2.
122. SAC Indianapolis to SAC New York, July 2, 1951, FBI, File 100-15704.
123. Brasol to Ralph Flanders, July 29, 1954, FBI, File 100-22487, Section 2.
unsavory background, it is felt that his letter should not be acknowledged.”

Brasol’s last communication with the bureau, another letter addressed to Hoover, arrived in September 1960. Its contents were an anti-Khrushchev flyer put out by the Monarchist Front and an anti-communist broadside reprinted from a Russian paper in Buenos Aires. This, too, elicited no comment. On March 19, 1963, Boris Brasol’s angry voice and busy hands were stilled forever.

So, what is one to make of Boris Brasol and his almost half century of resourceful, unrepentant Jew-baiting? In one respect, he is a kind of human embodiment of the resiliency of antisemitic sentiment and myths. Like those malevolent strains, he transcended limitation to any particular time or place. His career connects the antisemitism of pre-revolutionary Russia with that of 20th-century America and Western Europe, Weimar and Nazi Germany, and perhaps even Stalin’s USSR. He can be seen as a central figure in what might be called an “Antisemitic International” that schemed and fulminated throughout the first half of the century, and doubtless still does. At the risk of sounding sacrilegious, if antisemitism was a Church, Brasol surely would merit sainthood. All that said, the above does not do total justice to the man. For reasons of focus and brevity, his literary efforts have been largely ignored, nor have his myriad contacts been mapped out to their full extent. That requires a more in-depth study.

Perhaps the last words about him, though, an epitaph of sorts, should go to one of the ADL informants: “Brasol is a crafty man. You feel this in your conversation with him. He is very careful about how he words his sentences and there is always the feeling of the cat and mouse.”

*Richard B. Spence has been a professor of history at the University of Idaho since 1986, and past department chair. Focusing on Russian, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern history, espionage, antisemitism, and the Holocaust, Professor Spence has published numerous articles and books, including *Boris Savinkov* (Columbia University Press, 1991), *Trust No One* (Feral House, 2002), and *Secret Agent 666* (Feral House, 2008). He has been a consultant to the History Channel, the International Spy Museum, Radio Liberty, and the Russian Cultural Foundation.

125. Jones to Gordon A. Nease, July 17, 1958, ibid.
126. ADL, report of December 5, 1941, 4.
Why There Is No Peace in the Middle East

Itamar Marcus and Nan J. Zilberdik*

In response to the film depicting Islam’s prophet Muhammad negatively, using terms like “child molester” and “murderous thug,” Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Mahmoud Abbas “condemned the insult to [Islam’s] prophet” and added that he rejects “freedom of belief or freedom of expression when it comes to criticizing religion.” Dr. Abbas’s condemnation of the defamation of Islam is in sharp contrast to the PA policy of defamation of Judaism, demonization of Jews, and promotion of antisemitism, all of which are integral messages expressed by PA leaders and transmitted through the structures under their control.

Recent examples of this policy can be found in all areas of PA expression. The moderator at a Fatah ceremony demonized Jews as “the descendants of the apes and pigs.” A PA TV narrator said that Jews praying at the Western Wall are “sin and filth.” Senior PA official Jibril Rajoub referred to Jews as “Satans” and “Zionist sons of bitches” on PA TV. The PA mufti and other religious leaders have defined Jews as the “enemy of Allah,” even preaching the following Hadith in PA TV sermons: “The Prophet says: ‘You shall fight the Jews and kill them.’ ” Indeed, what these and many other examples document is that in the PA, not only is demonization of Jews and Judaism common practice, but also is sometimes promoted as a religious Islamic imperative.

Significantly, the PA’s promotion of hatred of Jews is not limited to religious leaders and PA officials. PA TV featured young girls on children’s programs saying that Jews and Christians are “inferior and smaller, more cowardly and despised” and that “our enemy, Zion, is Satan with a tail.” Following classical European antisemitism, a history program on PA TV teaches that “Jews are hated in every society in which they have lived,
because of their behavior relating to their great love of money.” On Israel’s independence day, the official PA daily, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, said Israel’s goal was to turn a “Jewish monarchy in Palestine into a basis for their [the Jews’] eternal rule over the world, that others, ‘goyim’ (non-Jews), must submit to their will.”

PA hypocrisy is evident. Abbas condemns the recent video about Muhammad and states that “insulting religions, faiths, or religious symbols” is not protected “freedom of expression.” At the same time, his own government’s policy is to indoctrinate Palestinians to hate Jews and to defame Judaism.

The hate-monitoring group Palestinian Media Watch (PMW) has collected representative examples of antisemitic speech from 2011–2012; these examples are presented below. Documentation of previous years can be found on www.palwatch.org.

Sheikh Taleb Al-Silwadi, columnist on religious affairs in the official PA daily:

“One of the established facts is that the voice of falsehood does not rebel [against the truth] except where those who hold the truth [Muslims] forego their truth. Then there becomes room for falsehood, such that it can kill, behave violently, spill blood, and desecrate sacred things. That is what Allah’s enemies, the children of Zion, are doing before the eyes and ears of the entire world.

[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, June 1, 2012]

PA:

Young girl: [Christians and Jews] are inferior and smaller, more cowardly and despised. They are remnants of the [Christian] crusaders and Khaibar [i.e., Jewish village destroyed by Muslims in 629] . . .

Lina, young girl: Our enemy, Zion, is Satan with a tail . . .

[PA TV (Fatah), May 8, 2012]

Senior PA official Jibril Rajoub:

We are prepared to bring the Executive Committee in helicopters . . . so they will see no Jews, no Satans, no Zionist sons of bitches.

[PA TV (Fatah), May 17, 2012]

Moderator at Fatah ceremony:

Our war with the descendants of the apes and pigs (i.e., Jews) is a war of religion and faith. Long Live Fatah!

[PA TV (Fatah), January 9, 2012]

PA mufti Muhammad Hussein:

The reliable Hadith (tradition attributed to Muhammad), [found] in the two reliable collections, Bukhari and Muslim, says: “The Hour [of Resurrection] will not come until you fight the Jews. The Jew will hide
behind stones or trees. Then the stones or trees will call: 'Oh Muslim, servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.'

[PA TV (Fatah), January 9, 2012]

PA daily:
Anyone with eyes in his head sees that there is no limit to the greed of the Jews . . . The nibbling away at the body [land] by the Jews continues at all levels.

[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, December 30, 2011]

PA TV documentary on Jerusalem:
The golden dome [of the mosque] shines with colors of the sky, with the white of clouds, while the joyous holiday [Eid Al-Adha] is good to the residents. The light rain cleanses the steps of the foreigners [Jews] so that the feet [of Muslims] in prayer will not step on impurity.

[PA TV (Fatah), November 6, 2011]

PA Arafat Memorial Broadcast:
Girl: He [Arafat] was our former president . . . The Jews poisoned him and I hate them very much. Allah will repay them what they deserve.
Boy: He [Arafat] died from poisoning by the Jews. Well, I don’t know what he died from, but I know it was by the Jews.

[PA TV (Fatah), November 10, 2009, 2010, and 2011]

Secretary of Fatah branch (Jerusalem), Omar Shalabi, on Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin murder:
If the Jews were murderers of prophets, why shouldn’t they murder a Prime Minister who signed a peace agreement?!

[PA TV (Fatah), November 11, 2011]

Op-ed in PA daily:
The hatred towards Israeli Jews is not related to racist discrimination, and there is no nation, people, or country which started any hatred against them. It is the Jews who have always started every struggle and hostility; they view themselves as better than all the nations and more honored than all the peoples (since they are God’s Chosen People).

[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, October 2, 2011]

PA daily’s religious lesson—Sheikh Ishaq Feleifel teaches religion:
Sixty-three years ago, the Israeli Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, stood at the UN after the entire world granted recognition to the malignant cancerous growth known as the State of Israel . . . The conflict between us and the Jews is not a conflict about land and borders, but rather a conflict about faith and existence.

[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, June 3, 2011]

PA daily on Israel’s Independence Day:
Zionism is an extreme religious ideology whose aim is political hegemony and the transformation of a Jewish monarchy in Palestine into a
basis for their eternal rule over the world, that others, “goyim” [non-Jews], must submit to their will, which is drawn from the will of God.

[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, May 15, 2011]

PA daily quotes children:

“Our Lord, Jesus Christ, Christ redeemed us, with his blood he bought us, and today we are joyous while the Jews are sad,” and “Jews, Jews! Your holiday is the Holiday of the Apes, while our holiday is the Holiday of the Christ.”

[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, April 19, 2011]

PA daily on rabbis:

The rabbis of death and the promoters of pagan Zionist thought have continued to spew their poison among the Jews, in order to stir up and rouse feelings of animosity and hatred against the Palestinians, since the European and American forces of evil facilitated for them the fulfillment of the idea of the “national home,” in order to be rid of them and to remove from the European social fabric the results and implications of the Holocaust which they carried out against the Jews of Europe in Nazi Germany.

[Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, January 19, 2011]

*Both authors write for Palestinian Media Watch. Reprinted with permission from the September 24, 2012, issue, published under the title “PA Hypocrisy: No Defaming Religion (Unless It’s Judaism).”
Antisemitism and Hollywood—
Part II: Mel Gibson

Daniel Vahab*

Famous people are role models, whether they like it or not. Be they music industry and film industry celebrities, reality television stars, political pundits, radio and television broadcasters, or other notables in entertainment and the media, the masses watch them on a screen and read about them in the daily papers. Their faces are recognizable and their actions are recorded. They are hounded by paparazzi that eagerly wait for a chance to snap a revealing shot. Knowing that nothing is private and how influential they are, it is shocking how many are antisemitic.

But while there are those guilty of antisemitism, there are also those who have fought it by exposing it, and those who were falsely accused of being antisemitic.

Yes, we all make mistakes. Yes, we all say things we shouldn’t have said, things that we don’t really believe but just happen to have slipped out. That doesn’t make us antisemitic. But we must be very careful what we say so that we are not perceived as a racist or bigot.

One celebrity in particular, though, really is antisemitic. His roles in films like *Braveheart* and Roland Emmerich’s *The Patriot*, where he plays a courageous hero, a martyr no less, who fights injustice, belies his role in real life. He has become the classic Hollywood antisemite, and his case provides deep insight into this Oldest Hatred.

Off screen, Gibson’s image has become synonymous with that of a raging alcoholic bigot. Alcohol makes people say and do stupid things, but it is not a good enough excuse for Gibson’s notorious tirades. Alcohol can
serve as a truth serum, though, making people feel unafraid to express what’s on their minds.

After his arrest for DUI in July 2006, Mel received three years’ probation. Gibson’s drunk-driving escapade had him asking the officer if he was Jewish and then remarking that “the Jews are responsible for all the wars in the world.” This DUI is now off Gibson’s record.

He would later attempt to excuse his comments in a September 2011 interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic, in which he said: “I was loaded, and some stupid shit can come out of your mouth when you’re loaded.” He added, “That day they [Israel] were marching into Lebanon. It was one of those things. It was on the news.”

Does Gibson really believe that Jews, who make up less than half a percent of the world’s population, are responsible for World War I, World War II, the Civil War, and wars in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere? One could surmise that he also believes Jews are responsible for great calamities and natural disasters like tsunamis, earthquakes, and floods. I suppose Jews are even at fault for global warming. But, of course, Jews control what poison gets emitted into the sky. (I wonder what Al Gore would say about that.)

Yet Gibson wasn’t the first person to blame Jews for provoking war. In 2003, when war with Saddam Hussein was forthcoming, U.S. congressman Jim Moran claimed the Jews were the cause for the war with Iraq. This claim was not unlike the charges by isolationists, who claimed Jews got America involved in World War II solely to eliminate an enemy of the Jews—Hitler—and so were self-serving. By saying Jews were to blame for getting America into the Iraq War, Moran was, by extension, saying that Jews should also be blamed for the deaths and destruction of the war. What’s ironic, however, is that out of president George W. Bush and his key administrators—vice president Dick Cheney, secretary of state Colin Powell, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice—no one is Jewish. Likewise, British prime minister Tony Blair, who also strongly supported the war, isn’t Jewish. Moreover, the decision to go to war was split among the Jewish community at large.1

Another thing: If Jews have all this power, then why does everyone hate them? Why don’t Jews use their power to mind-control people into liking them? Indeed, if Jews had so much power, as ascribed in the czarist forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the international, perennially best-selling antisemitic book, then why allow themselves to be persecuted through the centuries; why allow for all the pogroms and banishments; why

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allow for all the endless lies and conspiracies to be perpetrated on them; why allow for all the discrimination; why allow for the Holocaust?\(^2\)

To add to this, if Jews controlled all the banks, Wall Street, and money, why allow for Jews to lose money, too, and go bankrupt, in the stock market and in general? And if Jews are so greedy and cheap, then why are there so many charitable Jewish organizations and Jewish philanthropists? (There is even a Jewish word for giving charity—*tzedakah*—and it is considered a practice all Jews should engage in.) If Jews control all the money and are thus at fault for financial disasters, then you have to wonder why they would purposely incite a catastrophe that would hurt them,\(^3\) and them more than most—not to mention the fact that they probably realized a financial catastrophe would be blamed on them, too.

The bubonic plague pandemic of medieval times was blamed on Satan, and Jews were seen as agents of Satan, doing his evil work. In Toledo, Spain, thousands of Jews were massacred because they were accused of poisoning the wells to kill Christians. In several instances, Jews, like so-called witches, were burned alive. Massacres of Jews occurred throughout Europe.

Not everyone sought to massacre the Jews, however. The then pope, Clement VI, professed their innocence. For support, he noted that many Jews died from the plague like everyone else and that plague victims included those from areas where no Jews resided, meaning there were no Jews around to poison the community.\(^4\)

When conspiracy theories clash with reality, you find that there is no second reality or other reality. There is just reality.

“If you get raped by a pack of n***ers, it will be your fault.” So said Mel Gibson in a tape recording that was released to the media in 2010. The notorious Hollywood actor and director was also reported to have said “wetback,” among other racist slurs. The comment was said in the context of Gibson’s displeasure with the way the mother of his baby, Oksana Grigorieva, was dressed and using the threat, whether he truly believed it or not, to get her to stop dressing so “provocatively.”

The truth came to light when a journalist released an exclusive interview with Gibson on the incident. Deadline.com’s Allison Hope Weiner’s conversation with Gibson showed him all but admitting to the validity of the tape recording by describing the incident as “one terribly awful moment in time, said to one person in the span of one day, and doesn’t represent


\(^3\) Marvin Perry and Frederick Schweitzer, *Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 146.

\(^4\) Ibid., 79-80.
what I truly believe or how I’ve treated people my entire life.”5 Psychologist and antisemitism author Phyllis Chesler wrote that if one person is antisemitic, chances are that person is anti something else—hence Gibson’s rant against Grigorieva, marking him as a misogynist and racist toward black and Hispanic people. Other examples include: chess champion Bobby Fischer, who spewed antisemitic and anti-American remarks; renowned fashion designer John Galliano, who reportedly made antisemitic and anti-Asian remarks; talk-radio host Don Imus, who made bigoted comments toward Jews, black people, and women; and comedian and actor Andy Dick, who made antisemitic remarks along with a racist comment toward African Americans and engaged in misogynist activities. One who is not antisemitic but is bigoted or prejudiced toward another group is just as bad as someone who is antisemitic.

Not surprisingly, Gibson has also made homophobic comments. Gibson had warned now-deceased actor Heath Ledger, who costarred in The Patriot with Gibson, to turn down the role of a gay cowboy in the 2005 film Brokeback Mountain because it went against his “morality,” the New York Daily News reported, citing a private investigator source. Ledger went against Gibson’s advice and the film became a great success, with Ledger getting nominated for an Oscar. On why he decided after all to play such a part, Ledger, in a 2006 interview with London’s Evening Standard, said, “[I]t was kind of a reaction against the comparison that I’m the new Mel Gibson.” And, in a December 1991 interview with the Spanish newspaper El País, Gibson said, “[Gays] take it up the a—,” adding, “This is only for taking a s—.”7

Jewish actor Winona Ryder, in an interview with GQ magazine in December 2010, recalled a time at a Hollywood party when an intoxicated Gibson made antisemitic and homophobic remarks. Ryder, who was with a homosexual friend, said Gibson “made a really horrible gay joke. And somehow it came up that I was Jewish. He said something about ‘oven dodgers,’ but I didn’t get it. I’d never heard that before. It was just this


weird, weird moment. I was like, ‘He’s antisemitic and he’s homophobic.’ No one believed me!”

Surprisingly, though, openly lesbian actor Jodi Foster supports Gibson. In an interview with More magazine, Foster, who costarred in The Beaver with Gibson, said of him: “[He is the] easiest, nicest person I’ve ever worked with. . . . The second I met him [working on 1994’s Maverick], I said, ‘I will love this man for the rest of my life.’ ” A More article on the interview notes that the comments came before the alleged audio recordings of Gibson’s incident with his ex-girlfriend. Later, after the recordings became public, Foster continued to support Gibson. She said: “When you love a friend, you don’t abandon them when they are struggling. . . .” While it is admirable to stick with a friend through a tough time, we must be careful to draw a line when, after attempting to dissuade them of hateful and bigoted views, they refuse to budge.

But Foster isn’t the only fellow actor to support Gibson; on an episode of The View, actor/comedian Whoopi Goldberg also defended him. Goldberg said that although she “doesn’t condone” and “think it’s right” or “smart” when referring to his behavior, in her experience with Gibson as a personal and family friend he is not a racist. She claimed she would be more inclined to know because she’s a black woman. Goldberg went on to say that “I myself am a racist” as a way to defend Gibson, not necessarily by trivializing racism but by saying that society’s standards for racism are broadly defined to include everyone; she offered the example of being cut off in traffic and glancing at the offender to identify as either black, white, or woman so that she may curse that individual specifically.

Is Gibson’s remark really racist, or do people reach for insulting associations when they’re upset with someone? Is calling someone an offensive ethnic slur the same as insulting someone for their hair color, baldness, or other personal characteristic? “Everyone’s a little bit racist,” as is said in the award-winning Broadway musical Avenue Q. Or are they?

And then there is Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ. In 2004, Diane Sawyer interviewed Gibson on ABC News’s PrimeTime. He claimed that both he and his controversial film, which depicted Jesus’s crucifixion, are not antisemitic. Before I go any further, I must admit that although I’m a proud Jew I’m not particularly religious and by no means a religious expert, so it’s hard for me to comment on one’s interpretation of the Bible. This is

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what I’ve come to know, though: that there is an ongoing debate on who killed Jesus; fingers point to both Romans and Jews. Jesus, born a Jew, is said to have upset the powers that be with his preaching and was turned over to the Roman authorities. History tells us that the Romans were in charge, not the Jews, and had the power to kill Jesus. The Romans also had the power to write history at the time, and to blame the Jews for Jesus’s death. And anyone who disagreed with the Roman rulers or put them in a negative light, such as fledgling Christians by charging them with deicide, would surely have been put to death.

Moreover, Princeton University professor Bernard Lewis notes in his book *Semites and Anti-Semites* that it was the Romans, not the Jews, who were the “unchallenged rulers of Judaea” and who used crucifixion as a “form of capital punishment.” Thus, if you are a early Christian seeking to convert Roman pagans, the less negative you portray them the more favorably they will look toward Christianity. One could well suppose that, realizing this, Christians seeking converts made the executioner, Rome’s governor, Pontius Pilate, seem sympathetic to Jesus when in reality history paints Pilate as a tyrant who ruled with an iron sword, never hesitant to execute anyone.

To this point, Steve Baum, the editor of the *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism*, when interviewed about who killed Jesus, noted that “the Romans convert to Catholicism so you’re not going to blame someone inside Christianity.”

Or, to be seen as part of being in a collective enemy of the Jews, Christians seeking to survive in their fragile beginnings may have sought an ally in the Romans by depicting Pilate as sympathetic and scapegoating the Jews. As the saying goes, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Christians, like Jews, were seen as threats to the Roman Empire for their monotheism in an era when nothing could be viewed as above the empire. Thus, Jesus could have been seen as one seeking to usurp power, as he was known as “King of the Jews,” king being the highest authority figure; indeed, Pilate’s question to Jesus that ultimately led to Jesus’s being found guilty was “Are you the king of the Jews?” Christians may not have posed a real physical threat but more a symbolic threat by their God and Jesus. So Jesus may have been considered a political criminal and charged as one. In addition, it’s been suggested that the Jewish leadership was pressured into trying Jesus by the Romans, who saw Jesus as a problem and, seeing that Jesus was a Jew, they demanded that the Jews deal with the problem inter-
nally—otherwise, Jews would be massacred. It’s also possible that Jews wouldn’t want one of their own, i.e., Jesus, to be executed.

Scholars have also pointed out that at the time of the so-called trial of Jesus by Jews, which was on the eve of the Sabbath, no courts were allowed to be convened. But could Jesus’s special case been an exception to the rule?\(^\text{12}\)

As shown, many questions come into play when attempting to answer the question of who killed Jesus. Included among those questions are: Should the Christian Bible be taken at its literal word? Do you interpret the Bible through a historical lens? Do you see the Bible as divine or do you see it as a product of man’s imagination? And, as Gibson noted in his interview with Sawyer, an answer for a Christian would be that everyone killed Jesus, as he “died for the sins of all mankind.”

The literal definition of antisemitism is hatred of Jews, which takes many forms, such as discriminating against Jews in the workplace, spraying a swastika on a Jewish gravestone, saying all Jews are cheap, or beating up a Jewish person precisely because he is Jewish. Antisemitism is not necessarily the belief that Jews are responsible in any way for Jesus’s death; the complication sets in, however, with the question of how does a Christian not feel hatred for those he feels killed his Lord?

So how powerful is the deicide charge? “To be a murderer of God means to be an opponent of anything decent, anything humane, anything moral, anything ethical,” said Richard Rubenstein, professor emeritus of religion at Florida State University and president emeritus of the University of Bridgeport (Conn.), in the television documentary *The Longest Hatred*.\(^\text{13}\)

Moreover, only Jews (and Romans), as a “people,” are accused of killing one’s God; religious groups such as Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims are not. Others may be seen as nonbelievers, devils, and those who are earmarked for hell or just not earmarked for heaven or salvation, but they are not seen as God-killers. This is a crucial distinction in why Jews have been persecuted so harshly by Christians as compared with others.\(^\text{14}\)

For a Christian who does believe Jews killed Jesus, I would ask: Do you believe Jesus, who preached love and compassion and forgiveness for all people, would want you to hate all Jews for all time? Gibson, in his own words, told Sawyer that he believes both “the Romans and Jews were evil agents” in Jesus’s death. But he claimed he’s not antisemitic. In fact, he

\(^\text{12}\) Ibid., 29.


\(^\text{14}\) Perry and Schweitzer, *Antisemitism: Myth and Hate*, 20.
says, “To be antisemitic goes against the tenets of my faith, to be racist in any form, to be antisemitic is a sin.” Then, sighing, he added, “To be antisemitic is to be un-Christian.” Indeed, it’s irrational to hate Jews if you’re a Christian. But there are those who abuse the religion to rationalize their antisemitism. I ask: Do all those Christian antisemites hate themselves because Jesus was a Jew—as were the first Christians? Not to mention the fact that Christianity’s monotheism and the belief in a moral God derived from Judaism. In 1938, amid the rise of Nazis, Pope Pius XI condemned antisemitism as “unacceptable” and added that “spiritually [Christians] are all Semites.” Gibson’s antisemitism stems at least in part from his background and personal beliefs. He adopted the Traditional Catholic beliefs of his father, a Holocaust denier. The Traditionalists never accepted the Second Vatican Council’s efforts in 1965 to make peace between the two faiths with the sweeping declaration of Nostra Aetate. The declaration notes the special relationship shared by Jews and Christians and the roots of the former to the latter. It specifically addresses the charge of deicide, stating: “True, the Jewish authorities and those who followed their lead pressed for the death of Christ; still, what happened in His passion cannot be charged against all the Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today.”

While that declaration did say Jews “pressed” for Christ’s death, it was groundbreaking in that it cleared the Jews “then” and “today” of being responsible for the death of Jesus.

More recently, Pope Benedict XVI, in his book *Jesus of Nazareth*, published in March 2011, reiterated what was made official church doctrine more than four decades before. On the subject of Jesus’s “accusers,” the pope wrote that the biblical line, “His blood be on us and our children” (Matthew 27:25)—which has for centuries been used to justify the persecution of Jews—“does not cry out for vengeance or punishment; it brings reconciliation. . . . It is not poured out against anyone; it is poured out for many, for all.” He added, “These words are not a curse, but rather redemption, salvation.”


Furthermore, in recalling the different gospels, he wrote that John’s version, where “the Jews” were the accusers, isn’t meant to refer to Jews in the collective sense; rather, he stated, it’s meant to only refer to the “Temple Aristocracy.” “After all,” he notes, “John was ethnically a Jew, as were Jesus and his followers. The entire early Christian community was made up of Jews.”

And whether you are a Christian or not, it’s irrational that someone could hate Jews, as in all Jews, because how can you hate someone you never met? And it’s impossible for someone to meet every Jew (although, comparatively there’s not a lot of Jews in the world). But even for someone who has met a few Jews and now hates Jews collectively, did that person really take the time to get to know those Jews? How can you presume to hate someone you don’t really know?

This is not the same as saying that one hates all terrorists or child abusers—there is a legitimate reason for this feeling.

The ridiculousness of antisemitism can also be seen in that a person could have had friendly relations with a Jew and not even know he was a Jew. But only when he finds out that the person is a Jew does he hate him, even though nothing about that person has changed. The Jew could have been the doctor that performed life-saving surgery on the antisemite or the speech therapist that cured the antisemite’s child of a chronic stutter, and yet be hated by that antisemite.

The 1947 Oscar-nominated film *Crossfire* illustrates this perfectly. A detective investigates a murder of a Jew named Samuel. And while initially one suspect, a soldier named Mitchell, ostensibly had the means to commit the crime—he didn’t know where he was at the time of the crime because he had been extremely intoxicated, but could have had the time and been in the right place to commit the crime—he had no motive. He hadn’t known Samuel previously, and for the brief period of time he met with him at a bar, it wasn’t long enough to harbor such strong feeling against him to murder him. Often, the detective noted, you “have to know something about a man for reason to kill him.” The detective cited two examples of reasons that might trigger a murder: a man cheating on another man’s wife, and for money. Both examples, however, wouldn’t work in this circumstance because Samuel was broke and without a wife. Realizing this, the detective no longer had a clear-cut case.

Who was guilty, then? The detective explained that it had to have been an antisemitic person, someone who could hate Samuel strong enough to kill him without ever having really built a relationship with him. It is later revealed that the guilty person is a soldier named Monty (Montgomery),

18. Ibid., 185.
who had called Samuel “Jew boy” and said “I don’t like Jews, and I don’t like nobody who likes Jews,” and that “Jewish people live off the fat of the land.”

After Leroi, a soldier who had also been at the bar that evening with Samuel and the other soldiers, pleads to the detective that he doesn’t see Monty killing Samuel, the detective explains how hate killed Samuel. Hate, he says, builds up until it is triggered and explodes. In this case, it led to murder.

While the Anti-Defamation League (ADL)’s Abraham Foxman told Diane Sawyer that both The Passion of the Christ and Gibson aren’t antisemitic, he did say the film has “the potential” to spark antisemitism. (Note: Foxman’s comments were said in 2004, two years before Gibson’s incident with those antisemitic remarks and other notorious incidents that followed.) Foxman advised Gibson to include a postscript at the end of the film with this simple statement: “Don’t leave [the film] with hate for the Jewish people.” To counter this point, Gibson said that putting in such a disclaimer would be tantamount to saying his film could evoke hatred of Jews, which he doesn’t see. Nevertheless, the film topped the list of “most controversial movie ever,” according to an Entertainment Weekly magazine survey. In addition, The Passion is listed among the Los Angeles Times survey of “faith-offending films”; the single group that is offended is Jews. Who would have thought that?

And at least one report came out on actual violence spurred by the film. The Associated Press reported on a Georgia couple who, upon seeing The Passion, were arrested for violence caused by a heated argument on whether “God the Father in the Holy Trinity was human or symbolic.” The wife’s injuries were on her arm and face and her husband’s injuries included being stabbed in his hand with scissors.

Consider another example. In the documentary film Constantine’s Sword, former priest turned writer James Carroll explores Christian antisemitism with the classic notion of Jews being hated for being known as the people who killed Christ. His exploration takes him to Colorado Springs, Colo.

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There he interviews Mikey Weinstein, a former U.S. Air Force Academy cadet, who recalls that his son Casey, then a cadet, confided in his father in 2004 about how angry he felt—so angry that he might become violent. The anger was stemming from Casey’s being cursed by fellow cadets because he was Jewish and being told that Jews were responsible for killing Christ.

In one interview, Amanda Weinstein, Casey’s wife, a lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force, described how at the academy’s big lunch hall there were fliers at every place setting promoting Gibson’s controversial The Passion of the Christ. Casey said the flyers could be found for three straight days.

Amanda said that she told Casey he would have to see the film for himself to determine if it was in fact antisemitic. After they saw it together, Casey, now able to make his own informed opinion, described how he felt: “[I] felt terrible watching [it]. Just absolutely terrible seeing how they portrayed Jews . . . [My] people; we’re being portrayed as the people who killed Christ. How can believers look at that and not get pissed and angry at the Jews? It’s scary.”

In his defense, Gibson admitted cutting one sensitive scene because the Jewish actor who played Jesus’s mother, and whose grandfather was exterminated in Auschwitz, advised against the scene, in which Jews were said to curse themselves for Jesus’s death. Gibson’s comments are misleading, however. The scene wasn’t entirely cut; it still existed, but there just weren’t English subtitles. Instead, the words spoken were in Aramaic, which most people don’t understand. In another scene, “a Jewish bystander who is forced out of the crowd to help [Jesus carry the crucifix] interlocks arms with a bloody Jesus as they struggle with the cross.” Gibson said, “That’s his brother, you know; we’re all children of God, it doesn’t matter what you are.” And I will say this about the film: It did help start a discourse on Jewish-Christian relations and antisemitism.

Controversy also came from The Passion’s depiction of the Jewish high priest Caiaaphas and a Jewish mob with that of the Roman governor Pilate, who presided over Jesus’s death. Pilate was seen as being “pressured” (Gibson’s and Sawyer’s word choice) by Caiaaphas into killing Jesus and not actually desiring to do so. Certainly, a Jew seeing the film could feel uncomfortable and offended by such a scene. Had the scene been an undisputed historic fact, the Jew would still be offended, but would have to come to terms with it as historic and factual. But the whole controversy of exactly who killed Jesus and what part they played in the killing is perhaps the most highly contested and timeless question.

A study group filled with religious scholars was organized by Catholic priest Father John Pawlikowski, known for efforts in bridging the religious gap, to scrutinize the script.\(^\text{23}\) Some of the group’s findings (aside from the finding that the film was historically inaccurate) are:

The Temple—and by extension Judaism—is presented as a locus of evil. . . . A Jewish mob is shown in ever-increasing size and ferocity. The mob is plainly identified as representing the Jewish people as a whole, portraying them as such as “bloodthirsty,” “frenzied,” and “predatory” . . . Jewish figures are particularly associated with evil uses of money.

Viewers without extensive knowledge of Catholic teaching about interpreting the New Testament will surely leave the theater with the overriding impression that the bloodthirsty, vengeful and money-loving Jews simply had an implacable hatred of Jesus.\(^\text{24}\)

Antisemitism expert Kenneth S. Stern of the American Jewish Committee argued that the best approach for dealing with Gibson’s \textit{Passion} story was to recognize the sensitivity for both Jews and Christians and react, not in a polarizing Jews-against-Christian way, but in a more engaging, welcoming-of-civil-discussion manner that explores the question: “How do Christians tell it faithfully and at the same time avoid promoting antisemitism?”

The publicity derived from attacks on the film, said Stern, was inadvertently counterproductive because it helped the film more than hurt it by promoting it. As it has been said, all publicity, even negative publicity, is good publicity. (Of course, though, no celebrity wants bad press.)

Yet, Stern admitted that Jews had an obligation to respond to its release for several reasons: antisemitism was then on the rise; the inherent controversy surrounding the story (\textit{Passion} plays have historically caused violent acts of antisemitism); and Gibson’s own controversial religious beliefs and the fact that his father was a known antisemite and Holocaust denier.\(^\text{25}\) (Had Gibson’s 2006 antisemitic DUI incident already occurred, Jewish concern would have been even more justified.)

A month after the 2004 premiere of \textit{The Passion}, the Pew Research Center conducted a poll asking Americans if Jews are to blame for Jesus’s death. While only a minority of the 1,703 people polled blamed Jews at 26


\(^{24}\) Ibid.

percent, or roughly one in four Americans, that figure had increased by 7 percent as compared with a 1997 ABC News survey.

What Pew called “a relatively large proportion of people who have seen the movie,” 36 percent blame Jews for Jesus’s death. This is in comparison to the 17 percent who also blamed Jews but weren’t interested in seeing the movie, meaning that a larger percentage of those who saw Gibson’s film versus those who didn’t see the film blame Jews. There was also worry that the film could have swayed people into blaming Jews and thus could be propaganda.26

Pew’s poll was complemented by a poll commissioned by the ADL on the same question. Some 25 percent of the 1,200 respondents from ADL’s poll, taken on the eve of Gibson’s Passion premiere, blamed Jews for Jesus’s death. ADL’s findings remain consistent with ADL polls from the past four decades, adding even more credibility to its findings.27

But both the Pew and the ADL poll are disputed by an ABC News/PrimeTime poll that ran in February 2004 and polled more than a thousand adults nationwide. According to that poll, a mere 8 percent believe “all Jews today bear responsibility for the death of Jesus.”28

The ADL noted, however, that the ABC News/PrimeTime poll, unlike its own poll, asked if Jews “today” are to blame for Jesus’s death as opposed to just Jews in general and not necessarily Jews of today. The implication was that had the “today” been left out of the question, the percent would have been more like ADL’s findings.29 Still, there isn’t a clear consensus on the numbers regarding the question of Jewish deicide.

Ironically, Gibson’s production company, Icon Productions, along with Warner Bros, is making a film on Judah Maccabee. The Jewish hero led a revolt against the Greek-Syrians for control of the temple in Jerusalem. The story is commemorated in the celebration of Hanukkah, the “Festival of Lights.”

The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, however, wrote that the news wasn’t news to him. This is because he had known of Gibson’s interest in the Judah project from the journalist’s research on him for a forthcoming biography, Goldberg recalled an interview a few years back with Gibson.

29. “ADL Poll: One in Four Americans.”
According to Goldberg, Gibson wasn’t interested in making the picture for “the money”; rather, Gibson was doing it because the Maccabee stories are “ripping good reads.” In addition, Gibson appeared to admire the courage of the Maccabees, saying:

It’s almost like . . . They profaned his Temple. They killed his father. . . .
In the face of great odds for something he believed in. Oh, my God, the odds they faced. The armies they faced had elephants! . . . Even Judah’s dad—what’s his name? Mattathias?—you kind of get this guy who more or less is trying to avoid the whole thing, but he just gets to a place where had enough, and he just snapped!30

Goldberg’s account of Gibson’s interest in the Maccabee story is complemented by the Los Angeles Times, which reported that Gibson has been “fascinated” by the “hammer” (maccabee in Hebrew) for several years and even once “considered this as a follow-up project to The Passion of the Christ in 2004. Gibson’s camp describes the film in terms that resonate with past Gibson projects, such as Braveheart or The Patriot.31 Both of Gibson’s films, like the Maccabee story, portray a martyr of some kind.

Perhaps Gibson also feels the film is a way for him to seek redemption from Hollywood and the Jewish community at large for his antisemitic comments. Jewish leaders, however, have expressed their outrage at the news. Rabbi Marvin Hier of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, in a statement, said: “. . . Casting him [Mel Gibson] as a director or perhaps as the star of [a film about] Judah Maccabee is like casting Madoff to be the head of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or a white supremacist as trying to portray Martin Luther King Jr. It’s simply an insult to Jews.”32

Also ironic is that the proposed screenwriter for the film is Joe Eszterhas, who was given an award for his writings regarding the Holocaust in Hungary and has fought for civil rights and published a memoir where he mourns the news that his father was a Nazi in Hungary. That made the headlines.


But perhaps most ironic is that Eszterhas directly responded to Mel Gibson and *The Passion* in his 2008 memoir *Crossbearer*. At a church screening of the film, Eszterhas, a devout Christian, was told by a theologian present that the film “seemed to him to be an adaptation of a book called *The Dolorous Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ* by an eighteenth-nineteenth-century nun named Catherine Emmerich.

After reading Emmerich’s book, Eszterhas agreed with the theologian’s comparison. But, he also noted that her book was not credited in the film. “The movie was, very simply, a screen depiction of Emmerich’s hallucinatory vision,” he wrote. He then proceeded to say why he thought her book wasn’t credited—“besides being dark, spooky, and powerful, [it] was also scurrilously and viciously antisemitic, filled with descriptions like ‘the cruel Jews’ (101), ‘the crime of the Jews’ (85), and ‘the Jews, having exhausted their barbarity . . .’ (122).”

It’s thus no surprise that the 2004 Sawyer interview revealed that one of Gibson’s biggest influences in researching *The Passion* was this notoriously antisemitic nun. Gibson, though, claimed that in his research he didn’t encounter her antisemitism.

Eszterhas, who saw *The Passion* six times and studied the Holocaust and wrote about it extensively, questioned whether the film was antisemitic. He came to the conclusion, however, that the film “itself” wasn’t antisemitic, and that Gibson “had worked very hard as a director to absolve himself of those charges and to strip his film of the anti-Semitism that suffused Emmerich’s book.” For support, he cites his close friend and publicist, Alan Nierob, who was also Gibson’s publicist, and who had family that perished in the Holocaust. Eszterhas says of him:

> I knew Alan well and respected and admired him and felt sure he wouldn’t work so hard for a man who was either anti-Semitic himself or had created something that would fuel the flames of anti-Semitism worldwide. In other words, nothing could convince me that a proud and strong Jew like Alan would put his energy and talent to work on behalf of something that would make people hate . . . him.

But of Gibson he was less supportive. After learning of Gibson’s drunken-driving antisemitic tirade, Eszterhas didn’t have such kind words for him. He wrote: “So that was it. Ball game. Open and shut. No doubt now. Mel was a raving anti-Semite. The man who had composed his prayer of a movie about Christ shared the mind-set of Adolf Hitler.

34. Ibid., 66-67.
35. Ibid., 200.
In addition, he described Gibson in these words once he found out that Gibson’s father was a Nazi: “I decided then—in 1989—that my father was a true-believing, heartfelt anti-Semite (like Mel Gibson’s), one of those sick Christian freaks who still blamed ‘the Jews’ for crucifying Christ.”36

Not only was Eszterhas’s father not just any Nazi, but he was influential in book burnings and writing Jew-baiting propaganda, which Eszterhas questioned: “Did those who read his words abuse and exterminate the Jews they found in their Hungarian neighborhoods? Did my father’s words cause the injury or death of human beings? Because if they did, then my father was as guilty of murder as those who actually pulled the trigger or slit the throat.”37

When Eszterhas was interviewed by Andrew Goodman of The New York Times in February 2012, however, he seemed to have changed his mind on Gibson’s DUI incident, saying he merely “concerned” about it.

In the context of his being duped into believing that his father was a decent man after his Nazi past was revealed, Eszterhas even suggests that he may have misjudged The Passion by asserting it isn’t antisemitic. He writes: “I still maintained that The Passion of the Christ was a prayer and not anti-Semitic filth, but then I was stubborn and I had certainly been wrong about a great many things in my life.”38

Gibson is no doubt antisemitic. Knowing this, one would think that The Passion might be at least partly influenced by his antisemitism.

An episode on South Park entitled “Passion of the Jew” parodied the film. Gibson was shown as crazy and the people who love him are mindless followers. The episode didn’t say that Jews were bad, but told us that Gibson believes “Jews are the devil.” The character of Cartman is dressed up like Hitler as he presides over a meeting for people who love Gibson’s film. He opens with, “We all know why we’re here, and I think we all know what needs to be done.” A woman in the front row screams, “We sure do,” followed by applause and cheers from the crowd. The crowd, in fact, seems unaffected by Cartman’s appearance as if they are unaware or unconcerned with who Cartman resembled and what he implied. Cartman continues, “But we shouldn’t say anything about it until we have most of them on their way to the camps.”

An episode of Family Guy satirized Gibson as well. The episode featured a made-up Gibson antisemitic apology to Jews: “I’m really, really sorry about your big noses. I’m really sorry about how greedy you are. But

36. Ibid., 202.
37. Ibid., 204.
38. Ibid., 201.
most of all, I’m really sorry about your dirty, un-handed [sic], back-stab-
bing ways.”

These are more than just satires to provoke laughter; they are a form of
social commentary—which shows the depth and extent of Gibson’s animus
as society sees it.

In another interview, Gibson downplayed the Holocaust. In an inter-
view with Reader’s Digest in March 2004, Gibson was asked to publicly
proclaim that the Holocaust actually happened in light of reports that his
father is a Holocaust denier. “Atrocities happen. War is horrible,” he
answered. “The Second World war killed tens of millions of people. Some
of them were Jews in concentration camps. Many people lost their lives.”

While Gibson didn’t outright deny the Holocaust, his comments did
downplay the genocide by not giving it the distinction it deserves as one of
the world’s worst human rights disasters ever. The Holocaust didn’t just
happen; it was revolutionary and the world has never been the same since.
And not just anyone died, but specifically Jews in addition to Gypsies,
homosexuals, the mentally disabled, anyone with dissenting opinions, and
other undesirables, were targeted in addition to others and in a specific
manner—millions, including women and children, were exterminated.

He also seemed to imply that the Holocaust was merely a normal—
albeit “horrible”—byproduct of war, thereby linking the innocent civilian
Holocaust victims under the umbrella of fallen soldiers in battle—legiti-
mate casualties of war. Jewish casualties, such as misfires with Jews who
just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, weren’t accidents.
Rather, Jews were deliberately targeted as victims of genocide with the
intent of wiping out the entire Jewish race.

Gibson’s father certainly provided a model. Hutton Gibson’s anti-
semitism has been widely publicized. Christopher Nixon wrote an article on
Enough?,” describing a series of interviews he had with Hutton Gibson in
which Hutton revealed himself as a conspiracy theorist and antisemite.
Among other conspiracies, he reportedly refused to believe that al Qaeda
terrorists hijacked the planes on 9/11. Instead, he said, the planes went
down by remote control. In regard to Jews, Hutton told Nixon that the Sec-
ond Vatican Council was “a Masonic plot backed by Jews.”

He also disputed the number of Jews who perished in the Holocaust.
“Go and ask an undertaker or the guy who operates the crematorium what it
takes to get rid of a dead body. . . . It takes one liter of petrol and 20

39. Peggy Noonan, “Mel Gibson Interview: Keeping the Faith,” Reader’s
article26802-1.html>.
minutes. Now, six million?” he asked as a challenge. His wife, Joye, who had not said much during the interview until this point, commented, “There weren’t even that many Jews in all of Europe.” “Anyway, there were more [Jews] after the war than before,” Hutton added.

Then he flatly denied the Holocaust. In doing so, he contradicted his earlier claim by disputing the number of Jewish deaths in the Holocaust; if it never occurred, then there could not have been a debate about how many Jews died. He claimed that the Holocaust was invented as part of a plot involving Hitler and “financiers” (Jews) to migrate Jews out of Germany to Israel to “fight the Arabs.” Hitler, according to Hutton, was just “supposed to make it rough on [Jews].” So I suppose Hitler just went a little too far! Making it rough on Jews would have been . . . what?—killing three million instead of six million?

Nixon questioned whether Mel shares in any of his dad’s conspiracy theories. To this point, Nixon noted a 1995 interview Mel had with Playboy in which Mel described one conspiracy theory he held involving presidential assassinations that he credited his dad with, adding that if he revealed too much he’d “end up dead.”

On another occasion, Hutton spewed more conspiracies. Steve Feuerstein, host of the radio show Speak Your Piece! on WSNR-620 AM, interviewed Hutton on February 25, 2004, the eve of Gibson’s Passion premiere. Writing for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Feuerstein listed all the things he “learned” from the interview. Included in the list are: that the Holocaust was “fiction”; that there were “no concentration camps during the Holocaust, only work camps”; that the pope is actually Jewish, not Catholic; and “that ‘Japs’ who died in ferocious battles during World War II simply were fools and human waste to be cleared off the front line like disposable trash each morning.” Hutton even committed an act of sedition against America by supposedly lecturing Feuerstein “that America must be violently overthrown and that all states must secede from the union.”

You can’t blame someone for the faults of their parents since they don’t have a choice in the matter. One can, however, choose not to go along with the views of one’s parents, and if you are a public figure like Gibson, you can publicly separate yourself from your parents’ views while still loving that parent. This is particularly so when the father is notoriously


antisemitic and the son is making a film controversial to Jews. In my research, Gibson has yet to condemn his father’s views. In fact, in his Reader’s Digest interview he went so far as to say that his father “never lied to me in his life.”42 A father is naturally a role model for his son. And who knows how much Gibson’s father influenced his son? Sadly, all the controversy surrounding the actor/director leads one to conclude that, in this instance at least, “the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree.”

Hutton Gibson’s antisemitism presents the question of whether you excuse the antisemitism and racism from older generations because at that time it was commonplace and acceptable—or do you blame them for not changing with the times, for living in the past? It also makes one wonder whether you ignore someone like Hutton Gibson and hope people will see through his lies. To do so would mean having faith in humanity’s ability to know right from wrong.

Hutton’s comments remind us that with a clearly crazy person, you must be smart and pick your battles, as sometimes it’s not worth any energy or time disputing his claims in an effort to convince that person of a different point of view. Often, the antisemite refuses to even entertain the idea of being proven wrong; he blocks out the truth. Antisemites believe in something that doesn’t exist, something that only exists in their heads. It isn’t real and therefore can be unlearned. Their stubborn, prejudiced notion of what does exist, however, precludes the possibility of what doesn’t exist.

Furthermore, challenging and confronting a crazy person might actually be counterproductive and would legitimize—at least in his mind—his argument as something worth arguing over. In the same vein, you would ignore a crazy person on the street uttering conspiracy theories about the world ending. If said person, however, is a celebrity or some sort of a public figure, then he must not be ignored.

Gibson was not unchallenged, though. He was fired from his cameo role in the comedy The Hangover 2 following complaints by the cast. He had also been fired a few months prior, in July 2010, from his talent agency.43 Apparently, the agency figured their reputation wasn’t worth the money.

According to a piece in the New York Post, “A source close to Gibson” said, “[Gibson] doesn’t understand why Mike Tyson, a drug user who turned his life around, was given a second chance while he [Mel] was

42. Peggy Noonan, “Mel Gibson Interview.”
kicked to the curb.” Gibson’s cameo role would have been different from the role that Tyson played in that Tyson was playing himself whereas Gibson was playing a character. Thus, Gibson is expendable or replaceable. What does that say? “Even without Gibson . . . the movie’s story line remains unchanged,” said the film’s director, Todd Phillip, in an interview with MTV.com. “Mel was never playing Mel in the movie in the way that Mike Tyson was playing Mike Tyson.”

In an ironic twist, Liam Neeson, the actor who was said to replace Gibson in The Hangover 2, had the leading role in Steven Spielberg’s legendary Holocaust film, Schindler’s List. Also ironic was that the complaints regarding Gibson came from actors who starred in a film where morals are anything but in high esteem—a film featuring drugs, alcohol, strippers, assault, and complete recklessness and debauchery. The fact that these actors were offended by a mere small role by Gibson says a lot about how offensive he really is.

The cameo that Gibson was set to play would have been his “comeback,” according to the Post. While Gibson may be a big celebrity, he sure isn’t treated like one anymore.

But in all the good news there is also bad news to report. In 2010, a 60 Minutes/Vanity Fair poll asked the question, “Are you less likely to see a Mel Gibson movie as a result of his recent [ex-girlfriend] scandal?” A total of 847 adults across the country participated in the poll, which ran August 5-7. Some 76 percent of Americans answered, “No, no effect,” while only 20 percent answered, “Yes, less likely.”

A few months after Gibson’s antisemitic DUI incident in July 2006, a Gallup Panel poll of more than a thousand adults asked respondents how they approached the films of thirteen movie stars. Participants were asked if they would make a special effort to see movies the star appears in, consider it, or avoid seeing it altogether. For Gibson, the results were: 26 percent of Americans said “Make special effort,” 57 percent “Would consider seeing it,” and only 15 percent “Would avoid seeing it.” The biggest percentages of people said they wouldn’t see a Tom Cruise film at 34 percent, more than double the percent of Gibson. For “Make special effort,” Gibson ranked 6

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45. Ibid.

down the list. That came to only 1 percent below Sandra Bullock and Will Smith in popularity, meaning seven other big stars ranked below Gibson.\textsuperscript{47}

And just one month after his 2006 antisemitic DUI incident, a CNN poll conducted by Opinion Research Company of a little more than one thousand people asked whether Gibson is antisemitic. A majority, 52 percent, didn’t think so, while 23 percent felt he is antisemitic, and 24 percent didn’t know. The poll asked a follow-up question regarding his fans or lack thereof, given his then-recent antisemitic DUI incident. An even bigger majority, 58 percent, said they’re remaining his fan, and only 7 percent are no longer a fan, while 27 percent weren’t a fan to begin with, and 8 percent were undecided.\textsuperscript{48}

The results from the polls show that support for Gibson’s movies is still quite high despite all the controversy surrounding the actor himself. Whether that’s because people are willing to forgive him, don’t find his actions offensive, are ambivalent, agree with his actions, or feel his success as an actor offsets his bigotry as a person remains to be seen. But there is still the question: What will become of Gibson? Will he just disappear and become a big joke? Or will more bad news surface in the future? And if Hollywood alienates him, will he act for antisemitic dictators like Iran’s president, who shares his views of Jews, gays, and women—that is, of course, if he isn’t also bigoted toward Muslims and Middle Eastern people.

Gibson’s antisemitism doesn’t make him any less talented, but it does mean that one should not praise him as a person, said Phyllis Chesler. There must be a clear distinction made.\textsuperscript{49}

Mary Elizabeth Williams, writing in Salon.com, tackled the question of whether Gibson’s artistic brilliance stops us from boycotting him. She brought up an important point on why such a decision may be tough to make—if the artist is offensive but not the work itself, as might be the case with Gibson. As she noted, there have, no doubt, been calls to boycott Gibson. And it’s easier to boycott a film of his that isn’t good, but what if it’s an amazing film? Williams concluded by saying Gibson’s career hinges on his ability to make another amazing film. That is, any moral stand taken against him will ultimately succumb to the success of his talent.\textsuperscript{50}

We can’t expect movie stars—or any celebrity—to be perfect moral examples. Many of them behave very poorly indeed, get into fights and

\textsuperscript{47} See http://www.gallup.com/poll/25804/Americans-Evaluate-Movie-Stars.aspx for poll results and description.
\textsuperscript{48} See http://www.pollingreport.com/hollywoo.htm.
\textsuperscript{49} Phyllis Chesler, “Mel Gibson: Misogynist, Racist, Anti-Semite.”
drunken and drugged-up escapades. The situation has become so prevalent, in fact, that there is even a popular VH1 reality show called Celebrity Rehab. Perhaps this is society’s fault because we tolerate this behavior. After all, we buy their movies and watch their shows, are entertained by them, and idolize them.

There is a level of tolerance we accept. We let celebrities destroy their bodies and embarrass themselves. We cannot, however, accept racism and bigotry in any form. By accept, I mean continue to watch their shows, see their movies, and support and revere them.

Forgiveness can be tough to do, tougher even for those who have been personally insulted or hurt in some way by the person seeking forgiveness. For little offenses, a mere apology will usually suffice. But for bigger ones, ones that really sting, that is an entirely different question.

Forgiveness is a religious virtue. Christ preached it and it is a word used in the observance of Yom Kippur, when sins can be forgiven. And, as Washington Post religion columnist Brad Hirschfield noted, it came to light one week after the Day of Atonement, when Robert Downey Jr., giving a speech at an award ceremony, asked that Hollywood forgive Mel Gibson.

“Unless you are without sin, and if you are, you are in the wrong fuck-ing industry; you should forgive him and let him work,” Downey said.

In support of his plea, support, the Iron Man actor recalled how Gibson hired him when no one else would because of his substance-abuse issues.

He noted, “[Gibson] said if I accepted responsibility—he called it hugging the cactus—long enough, my life would take meaning. And if he helped me, I would help the next guy. But it was not reasonable to assume the next guy would be him.”

Proponents of forgiving Gibson have noted that Hollywood was willing to forgive convicted rapist Mike Tyson, who starred in The Hangover, the sequel of which Gibson was fired from. To this point, I would say that two wrongs don’t make a right. I would also note that Tyson served time in jail for his offense—allthough Tyson’s and Gibson’s offenses are not equal and a rapist should never be forgiven.

Gibson’s admirable actions toward Downey (he also reportedly sought help for Whitney Houston with her drug issues) show that bad people can have good in them, but they are still bad and the former doesn’t offset the latter.

Others have noted that Gibson is not a real physical threat to Jews, unlike Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists, for example. That is true, but he has the power to influence others with his celebrity status, wealth, and millions of fans.
Psychologically speaking, people seem to want to forgive Gibson, to release their guilt for hating him and see him as an admired celebrity once again. But does he deserve to be forgiven?

True, we all sin. True, Gibson apologized multiple times. He also, however, committed multiple offenses, which shows he didn’t learn from his wrongdoings. Moreover, practically every celebrity who makes a bigoted or racist slur apologizes.

As for Downey, people can forgive him because he didn’t hurt anyone but himself, unlike Gibson, who hurt whole groups of people. He has made racist and bigoted remarks toward African Americans, Hispanics, and Jews, along with homophobic and misogynistic remarks. And the claim that he was intoxicated during each offense is no excuse. How many intoxicated people resort to spewing such remarks? Perhaps if it were only an isolated incident he could be forgiven, depending on the offense and his punishment and efforts to make amends. But that is just not the case.

Yet, I find myself asking what more Gibson’s punishment could be? After all, he’s already been fired from one potential role (and who knows how many others he’s missed out on that weren’t publicized), along with being fired from his talent agency. He has become a Hollywood outcast, publicly tarnishing his reputation. Brad Hirschfield said he “wasn’t sure” when Gibson can be forgiven. And I am not sure, either; he just doesn’t seem forgivable to me right now. This doesn’t mean that he can never be forgiven, but I highly doubt that I will ever be able to forgive him.

*Daniel Vahab is a freelance writer, proofreader, and copywriter. He is currently writing a book on antisemitism. Part I of his series on antisemitism in Hollywood was published in the June 1012 issue of the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism.

Global Antisemitism: Old Hatred, New Threats

Abraham H. Foxman*

An important element of the American Defamation League’s centennial year is a celebration of how far we have come in diminishing antisemitism in America. When we recall where we were in 1913 and where we are now in 2013, it is a remarkable story. Quotas, exclusion from neighborhoods, social clubs, some industries, and words like “Christ killers” and “kikes” were all part of the cultural landscape in 1913. Things are drastically different today, and the ADL’s role has been pivotal in bringing about that change.

At the same time, even as we commemorate our successes, I am appalled at the resurgence of antisemitism around the globe. The last decade has witnessed the most serious and dangerous manifestation of Jew hatred since World War II.

Let me now list a few of the serious incidents of antisemitism that have occurred in recent months.

• In August 2012, the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, spoke of a centuries-old Jewish conspiracy to rule the world and said that “behind the scenes of the major power circles, in political, media, monetary, and banking organizations in the world, they have been the decision makers.” His vice president, Mohamed-Reza Rahimi, speaking at a UN-sponsored conference in Tehran on the illegal drug trade, declaimed that Zionists are in firm control of it.

• On October 28, an openly antisemitic party, Svoboda, garnered over 10% of the vote in Ukrainian parliamentary elections. In Greece, another antisemitic party, Golden Dawn, exploited the financial crisis to win 7% of the vote in June and enter Parliament for the first time. Once there, a Golden Dawn lawmaker read out a passage from
The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion about prosecuting Jews for their “abominable and filthy crimes.”

- In Malmo, Sweden, there was a series of attacks against Jews and the Jewish community, including an explosive device detonated at a Jewish community center.
- In the United States, Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam is using his website to expand the audience for his conspiracy theories about Jewish control and power.
- The president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, warned in a Rosh Hashanah greeting to Jews of the European Union about a rise of antisemitism in Europe.
- Conspiracy theories spread that Jews were behind the anti-Islam film, *Innocence of Muslims*, even though it was clear that the filmmaker was a Copt, not a Jew.
- Cartoons abounded in the Arab world prior to the US election depicting Jews as controlling both candidates in order to achieve their allegedly sinister goals.
- The Iranian government-controlled satellite news network Press TV is now one of the world’s leading dispensaries of conspiratorial antisemitism in English.
- Jewish security officers in Finland warned Jews not wear a *kippah* in public.
- A US State Department report refers to a “rising tide of global antisemitism.” The report cited diverse manifestations of antisemitism, including desecration of synagogues, Holocaust denial, and blood libel charges, in Venezuela, Egypt, France, Hungary, and Ukraine, among other countries.

What is all this about and what does it say about the challenges we face as we start on our second century? First, it reminds us of what is unique about antisemitism as a phenomenon. We at ADL like to focus on the commonalities among various forms of prejudice—racism, xenophobia, homophobia, Islamophobia, antisemitism. We talk about countering this competition for victimization among different groups as counterproductive.

Like a physician, however, we also have to diagnose not only the commonalities but what makes antisemitism different. It shares many things with other forms of hatred—stereotyping, discrimination, being seen as the other. But one needs to determine what is unique about antisemitism to explain the anomalies about it that have been written about in scores of books—how long it has endured; how lethal it has been; how Jews can be accused of contradictory things at the same time; how there can be antisemitism without Jews. All these things make sense only when we recognize that the hard core of antisemitism is the notion that Jews are not
what they seem to be, they are not regular folk, but rather the reality of the Jew is something hidden, something poisonous, something powerful, and something conspiratorial.

That’s what the infamous Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion was all about. The importance of this is that because reality with regard to the Jew is not as it seems; whenever there are social, political, or economic crises, it is easy to blame it on that unseen enemy, the Jew.

There’s a long and tragic history here—the Black Plague in the Middle Ages, the Dreyfus Affair in France, the anti-communists in Russia, and, of course, Hitler in Germany. All blamed secret Jewish power and control exercised for sinister purposes with devastating consequences. In our present time, beginning with 9/11, a new era of anxiety hit the world. Ever since, the combination of international terror, financial collapse, Islamic extremism, and turmoil in the Middle East has created the perfect storm for “blame the Jew” scenarios. Whether it was 9/11 itself, the financial collapse, or the lack of peace in the Middle East, a wave of anti-Jewish scapegoating has emerged—and continues to this day. We even see it here in the United States with the Mearsheimer-Walt phenomena, blaming alleged Jewish control of American Middle East policy for all the wrongs there and here.

A second factor in this resurgence, besides the distinctive aspect of antisemitism, is related to the time that has elapsed since the Holocaust. When the world first saw the pictures of Auschwitz 67 years ago, it provoked shame about antisemitism. It didn’t mean that antisemitism disappeared; it surely did not. But because of this shame about what antisemitism could lead to, manifestations of antisemitism were constrained. And we benefitted from this in the world scene. The embarrassment of being called an antisemite after Auschwitz had impact—surely not everywhere, but it made a difference. Now, more than 60 years after World War II, that shame is eroding, at least in some circles. The passage of time, the passing of survivors, the rise of new generations for which Auschwitz is ancient history all play a role. In addition, the constant attacks on Israel as Nazis and as evildoers undermine that belief that attacks on Jews are immoral and dangerous.

So as time continues to move on, that loss of shame can be a major factor in making antisemitism even more acceptable than it is today.

A third element in the resurgence of antisemitism is what is often referred to as the “new antisemitism.” This is the term for the Jew hatred surrounding Israel. The distinction between the old and the new antisemitism has been useful in highlighting how Israel has been the lightning rod for antisemites. It also has been useful for us to distinguish between legitimate criticism of the Jewish state and when it is merely a camouflage for
antisemitism. Still, the more I see it and the more I think about it, it's a distinction without a difference. The bottom line is that the so-called new antisemitism has many of the characteristics of the old—alleged evil Jewish power; blaming all the problems on the Jews; and stereotypes like the blood libel, poisoning the wells, corrupting the minds of the young. In other words, classic stuff, but now it isn't coming mostly from Christians but from Muslims and left-wing intellectuals who should know better.

The fourth factor underlying this resurgence is, of course, the Internet. We’ve talked about this a lot, seeing the Internet as a force for good but also a gift for the haters of the world. It is a remarkable vehicle for disseminating antisemitism to those who are eager to consume it, and sometimes for those who unwittingly meet it. Conspiracy theories about Jewish control, about Holocaust denial, about Israel as Nazis have a new and expanding market around the globe because of the Internet. What has been noted so often—extreme hate, no longer wrapped in an anonymous brown paper envelope—is now sitting there on an equal footing in people’s homes with other media, such as mainstream newspapers.

All of this creates a fairly bleak picture. But there is the other side: our ability to do something about it—an ability that didn’t exist decades ago.

First, there has been the commitment to “Never Again” of the American Jewish community and for ADL. Because we are the freest Jewish community in the history of the Diaspora and because we live in the country that is the global superpower and has committed to standing up to protect Jews in danger, we accepted our special responsibility and have been able to accomplish great things: the freeing of Soviet Syrian and Ethiopian Jewry; the forums in Europe, urged by the United States and us, to confront antisemitism in Europe; the establishment of a unit in the state department to monitor antisemitism around the world.

Our work starts with our partnership with US administrations of either party and with Congress. We testify before congressional committees and we are constantly challenging our government to speak up and act whenever antisemitism rears its ugly head. In addition, of course, we use one of our precious assets that have meant so much over these 100 years: the voice of ADL, calling on the carpet those who tolerate antisemitism and praising those who stand up.

We have other assets as well. The fact that we stand up for other minority groups here and abroad enables us to call on others to be allies against antisemitism. Our commitment to education about the Holocaust, which, as you know, is very serious at ADL, becomes even more important as time marches on—not only to those who want to deny history, but for the millions who don’t know the true story unless they are educated.
Similarly, our work with Christian leaders who in many cases have become allies in the fight against antisemitism is critical as well. We just learned that Cardinal Koch, the official at the Vatican responsible for the relations with Jews, has reiterated the critical importance of *Nostra Aetate* to the Church. We worry about the views of several Christian groups. We know there is no ground for complacency.

There is also the challenge of the antisemitism of the Muslim world. ADL does a good deal of work here in America to stand up for Muslims. We formed the Interfaith Coalition on Mosques to defend the rights of Muslims to live full religious lives, and we oppose stereotyping of Muslims and Islam.

The fact is, though, that according to the highly regarded polling conducted by Pew Research, Muslims around the world have very negative attitudes toward Jews. How much of this is related to Israel, how much is a reflection of traditional attitudes, and how much is due to the rise of Muslim extremism is hard to determine. It is, however, a dangerous circumstance for the future and must be faced, first by Muslim leaders, but also by government leaders around the world.

As we begin our second century, another critical asset ADL can utilize in the fight against antisemitism is our ability to educate. Hatred is learned and it can also be unlearned. By educating about the history of antisemitism as well as its modern-day manifestations, we can continue to create change. We can ensure that the next generation of young people are not exposed to the hatred and bigotry heard by their parents and grandparents. We can empower Jewish youth with the knowledge and skills to speak up when they are the targets of antisemitic comments and so-called “jokes.” Through education, we can mobilize our allies to take action.

We have launched a new centennial year initiative to educate about antisemitism. Through a partnership with Mr. Leonard Stern, we will be distributing copies of the book *A Convenient Hatred: The History of Antisemitism*, written by Phyllis Goldstein and published by Facing History and Ourselves. The book will be offered to participants in our Confronting Antisemitism and Bearing Witness™ programs, in addition to being available to ADL lay leaders, young professionals, and others. Through this partnership, we will expand our reach in educating Jewish youth in how to confront antisemitism and will further educate Catholic school teachers and their students about the history of antisemitism. The book is an essential resource as we work together to put an end to hatred and bigotry.

On the occasion of our one-hundredth year, we have had discussions about whether or not to call it a celebration. I believe we should because of all the progress we’ve made, particularly in America, and all we contributed to that progress.
This is also a time of recommitment—recommitment to continue the struggle to meet the immense challenges that face us still. I am reassured that together we will emerge triumphant.

*Abraham H. Foxman is national director of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). He is a contributor to the Huffington Post and The Jerusalem Post website, and the author, most recently, of Jews & Money. This essay is the text of his speech given at the Annual Meeting of the ADL National Commission held November 16, 2012, in Chicago.


Steven Leonard Jacobs*

It comes as no surprise that this modern forgery—*The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Protocols)*—continues to generate interest for academics and antisemites alike. Its “truths” of an ongoing worldwide Jewish conspiracy sustains beyond all logic both anti-Judaists and anti-Zionists, despite both legal and logical refutations, neither of which apparently has an impact on the haters, who so readily discount such “lies” and read them as further evidence of the supposed power of the Jews to manipulate lesser mortals. These three volumes under review are, perversely, tributes to the enduring legacy and questionable success of the *Protocols.*
Taken together, Landes and Katz, and Webman, provide readers with 31 important essays (15 and 16, respectively) regarding the Protocols. License to Murder, however, Grobman’s thin volume (text 99 pages; endnotes 40 pages) is far more problematic: It covers material already well known to anyone who has read the Protocols and the ancillary literature, though it does so rather succinctly. Perhaps, in his capacity as director of the American-Israel Friendship League, Grobman, a worthy academic with a solid publishing record, had a different agenda: to place into the hands of those who know little of this antisemitic text important summary data as they, too, continue to address the scourge of antisemitism and anti-Zionism and participate in relevant conversations on both antisemitism and Israel. More than this, however, this reviewer cannot say, as Grobman does not tell us, though the back cover informs us the book was “written for a popular audience,” and “is a vital tool for resisting hate-speech wherever found.” (How this text is to be used is equally problematic, as Grobman does not consider this either.)

Turning next to Landes and Katz, the essays in The Paranoid Apocalypse were originally presented as papers at the 2005 conference held at the Elie Wiesel Center for Jewish Studies at Boston University in collaboration with the Center for Millennial Studies. (Seven years, however, is far too long to wait for this important contribution.) As Landes and Katz note in their Introduction:

The chapters in this volume attempt to provide the reader with a range of information and analytic tools to understand four major questions:
1. What are the cultural origins of the Protocols?
2. What explains the Protocols’ continued appeal?
3. Under what conditions does belief in the Protocols get activated and produce atrocities?
4. What, if anything, can be done to oppose the spread of belief in so dishonest and disastrous a libel?

Three major themes emerged from the conference in terms of the power exercised by the Protocols: (1) the psychological nature of paranoia in its appeal; (2) the problem of “truth” and the exegetical shiftiness that detaches the text from its empirical moorings as a forgery; and (3) the power of apocalyptic belief in “activating” the text as a social and political player (Landes and Katz, 3).

Turning to a number of the essays/contributions themselves to provide a “flavor” of this important collection: Landes, himself a specialist in millennialism, in the first contribution notes that “[The Protocols] is actually a reasonably sophisticated text that works entirely from the main axioms of
premodern philosophy” (25), but even more important, for that self-perceived victim of modernity, the Protocols provided him with “a clearly defined enemy—the Jews—and permission to wipe that enemy out” (28). Charles Strozier, on the other hand, ramping up the conversation, sees those who accept the validity of the Protocols to be paranoiacs for whom the potential for (increasing) violence against Jews (and others in other contexts) is always just around the corner. Johannes Heil interprets the Protocols as the continuing legacy of Middle Ages conspiratorial thinking framed by a Christian context, and posits four elements of similarity (60-63), while at the same time stressing differences as well (64-66), foremost among them the lessening control of thinking by organized Christianity. Michael Hagemeister, perhaps for the first time in English, provides readers with solid information regarding the primary Russian apocalyptic expositor of the Protocols, Sergei Nilus. David Redles reminds us that “the German version of the Protocols would reach thirty-nine editions by 1939, and continues to be a source of anti-Semitic propaganda to this day” (114). Intriguingly and perversely, the Protocols would wend their way to Japan, as David Goodman notes—the negative result of anti-Christian and anti-foreign prejudices, and “positively” in tribute to the supposed power and economic acumen of the Jews of the West. That the Protocols have been equally refracted for their own purposes in texts and reflected in editorial cartoons by the Palestinian Authority, as Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook painfully reveal, comes as no surprise to any reader given the current climate. Michael Barkun even presents an “alien outer space” component, replete with antisemitic overtones, which would be otherwise laughable lest one forget that included among the paranoiacs and apocalyptics are those who take such manifestations seriously and are not outside the circle of violence. Other fine contributions include those of Jeffrey Woolf, Jeffrey Mehlman, Deborah Lipstadt, and Chip Berlet.

Somewhat strangely, perhaps, is Stephen Bronner’s contribution, which moves from Europe to the Middle East and rightly so, but veers a bit off course regarding a negative discussion and critique of Israel’s governmental and military policies regarding the Palestinians, and which occasions a concluding response, again from Landes. (Katz, however, is strangely silent on this whole matter, and he himself, given his own erudition, has no additional contribution other than the co-written Introduction.) Finally, the threads that tie these fine essays together are those of paranoia and apocalyptic-millennial thinking taken to extremes. In so doing, they provide other researchers with much food for thought and potential directions for future and substantive work.
One year prior to the Boston University conference, Tel Aviv University, in collaboration with the Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung in Berlin, hosted a gathering “to mark the one hundredth anniversary of their publication in Russia” (Webman, 1), and as editor Webman correctly notes that “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion has become a code for antisemitism that can be employed arbitrarily in any cultural context” (7). The collection starts off with two excellent pieces enlarging our understanding even further with regard to the Russian context of the Protocols: Lev Aronov, Henryk Baran, and Dmitri Zubarev’s piece on the mysterious Mme. Glinka and her role in supposedly acquiring the spurious document, and Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern on the Russian weltanschauung in the 19th century, who writes: “Blinded by antisemitism, terrified Russian conservative thought once again pointed to the perfidious secret Jewish Sanhedrin concealed in the labyrinth of the Paris catacombs as the foremost enemy of the Russian people and Russian statehood” (62).

Moving to Germany in the aftermath of World War I, Wolfram Meyer zu Utrup writes: “For many Germans the message of the text assumed an existential meaning: it seemed to explain the reasons for Germany’s defeat in the war, the political chaos of the revolution, the loss of the Kaiser and the Reich political order, and the country’s economic straits” (70). More important, however, “Hitler’s unique achievement was to revise the antisemitic tradition so that it was based on the Protocols, and to apply this concept in propaganda and politics” (73). (It must be noted and appreciated that this particular contribution includes numerous and quite disturbing graphics, which serve to bolster zu Utrup’s insightful arguments.)

Transitioning into the present moment, Yaakov Ariel shows how fundamentalist American Christianity initially accepted but later rejected the heavy antisemitic hand of the Protocols; Graciela Ben-Dror shows how Argentine antisemite Hugo Wast used them to his political and religious advantage; Thomas Williford understands them to be an integral part of the La Violencia in Columbia, 1920-1946; and Beate Kosmala writes disturbingly on the reintroduction of the Protocols in Lodz, Poland, in 1968.

Further and significantly, Juliane Wetzel provides readers with a fine overview of how the Internet itself continues to play a large role in making available copies of the Protocols in a multiplicity of languages for easy downloading, printing, and distributing on a global scale never before possible. Coupled with other all-too-easily available antisemitic documents and publications (e.g., Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf), today’s haters of Jews and Israel are far better positioned to do violence than ever before, armed not only with the cold instruments of death but the warm ones of words as well.
David Goodman (along with Michael Hagemeister—the only two participants in both conferences) returns us to Japan, this time writing on four significant writers who all used the Protocols to their advantage in a country with a truly miniscule population of Jews; one of whom, Ohta Ryu, has also translated Martin Luther’s *On the Jews and Their Lies* into Japanese.

Webman’s own contribution, “Adoption of the Protocols in the Arab Discourse” (175-195), reveals how far too easily the antisemitic trope of the Protocols has morphed into the Arab-Muslim/Palestinian context, and with it changing the parameters of the conversation. A most welcome addition to the overall conversation regarding the Protocols is the fine work of Orly Rahimiyan on the Protocols in Iranian political and cultural discourse, a topic I would dare say is little known to most Western researchers and all the more relevant in light of the denialist rhetoric continuously spewed forth by its president, Mahmoud Amadinejad. Ironically, Rahimiyan writes that “The Jew portrayed in Iranian versions of the Protocols rarely resembles Jews in the Middle East, and never Iranian Jews who are regarded as indigenous Iranians” (203), and who, this reviewer notes, remain an increasingly smaller and vulnerable community primarily in Tehran. (A goodly number of YouTube videos that detail their present predicament are available.)

Moving on to Turkey, Rifat Bali writes that “over 58 years—from 1946 to 2008—the tract was published 102 times” (221), and remains very much part of Turkey’s present anti-Israel discourse. Egyptian scholar Abd al-Wahhab al-Misiri, while seemingly rejecting the Protocols’ antisemitic tendenz, reconceptualizes it as a Western screed to undermine classical Arab-Muslim intellectual and cultural creativity as well as the umma itself, as Goetz Nordbruch writes. Michael Hagemeister, in good historical fashion, revisits the Berne, Switzerland, trials of 1933-1937, which pitted the Jews, unsuccessfully, against the Nazis, successfully: the question of the authenticity of the Protocols deemed irrelevant, and thus their dissemination not adjudged a criminal act. Milton Shain, perhaps the foremost authority on South African Jewry and antisemitism there, points to its fertile ground for the Protocols, as does Luis Nazario in the case of the Brazilian denialist S. E. Castan, founder of Revision Publishing Company in Porto Allegre, which was shut down by the government.

Taken together, Landes and Katz, and Webman, and the conference presentations they have well edited in these two volumes and the excellent introductions to both have greatly increased our overall knowledge not only of the Protocols themselves, but their precedents and antecedents as well. In addition, they have collectively provided a solid, if somewhat perverse, travelogue of the many, many countries where the Protocols have found a home, where haters continue to gather, and where Jews remain falsely per-
ceived as the perennial enemies of humankind. Reading these enlightening essays makes for somber reading, but combating the perniciousness of the Protocols requires knowledge of the highest order. These essays are an important part of the arsenal.

*Steven Leonard Jacobs holds the Aaron Aronov Endowed Chair of Judaic Studies at the University of Alabama. A practicing rabbi, he is a JSA associate editor and frequent contributor. Professor Jacobs is the author of several books and professional papers, including Dismantling the Big Lie: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Ktav 2002). He can be contacted at sjacobs@bama.ua.edu.
In 1982, historians Irving Abella and Harold Troper published an important study of Canadian immigration policy as it applied to Jews during the war years. *None Is Too Many* documented the abysmal record of the Canadian government in responding to the Jewish refugee crisis created by Nazi Germany. One of the questions that resulted from the study was why Canada acted in this manner during the 1930s and 1940s. That is the question this new collection of seven essays, edited by Ruth Klein, attempts to answer.

To provide some indication of the Canadian mindset as it existed during the years of the Nazi regime, this collection investigates attitudes in the public sphere through an analysis of an assortment of phenomena: press coverage in a number of contexts, two university administrations, literary works, Jewish advocacy movements, and Canada’s participation in the 1936 Olympics.

The collection begins with a contextual essay by Doris Bergen on the conditions faced by Germany’s Jews between 1933 and 1939, a period during which only 2,000 European Jews were allowed into Canada. Following the example of Marion Kaplan’s excellent study, *Between Dignity and*
Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany, Bergen uses the personal testimonies of German Jews (housed at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum) to illustrate the complex realities facing these refugees as they struggled to survive in Nazi Germany and as they fled the regime, a few of them for Canada.

The debate over Canadian participation in the Olympic Games of 1936, hosted by Nazi Germany, is the subject tackled by Richard Menkis and Harold Troper. Despite a boycott campaign led by the Canadian Jewish Congress, and a public debate in the national newspapers, the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) decided to follow the British decision to accept Germany’s invitation to the Games and passed the motion unanimously. The question investigated by Menkis and Troper is to what degree the Canadian public, and the COC, was aware of Nazi Germany’s racist and antisemitic policies at the time. Their examination of the Canadian press from 1933 to 1935 demonstrates substantial coverage of the new leadership in Germany; the editorial views of that leadership, however, ranged widely between condemnation and optimistic respect. The press reported on the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 and the resulting discrimination against Germany’s Jews, as well as the antisemitic speeches given by Nazi leaders. The somber conclusion drawn by this chapter is that Nazi antisemitism was not considered by the COC to be an issue of significance in their decision to participate in the Games of 1936. Of higher regard was the desire to follow Great Britain and to support Canadian athletes and their nationalist hunger for medals, as well as diplomatic and economic considerations.

Amanda Grzyb’s analysis of the mainstream Canadian press from 1938 to 1939 is one of the most important contributions to this volume. What exactly did the average Canadian know about the Nazi assault on the Jewish people across the Atlantic? Research into American press coverage of the Nazi period, particularly that of the Jewish-owned New York Times, stresses the lack of detail given to the Jewish identity of refugees and to the antisemitism of the Nazis. Not so in Canada: readers may be shocked to discover the wide and detailed coverage of the plight of Jews in Germany provided by the Canadian press. Focusing on increased coverage during three major events (Kristallnacht, the MS St. Louis, and antisemitic agitation in Quebec), Grzyb analyzes the content of articles, editorials, and letters published in The Globe and Mail and six other English dailies. Not only was Nazi antisemitism a subject of discussion in these papers, but the genocidal intent of the Nazi regime was also made clear in articles and editorials that quoted Hitlerian rhetoric (extermination, extinction, and liquidation) accurately. Nazism was clearly depicted as both a barbarous threat to civilization and a specific threat to Jews. Editors criticized the failure of prime minister Mackenzie King to publicly condemn Kristallnacht, as Roosevelt
and Chamberlain did, and the papers covered protests by the Canadian public after November 9-10, 1938. One of the most fascinating discoveries Grzyb shares is the Nazi response to this Canadian press coverage. In an attempt to minimize and relativize their own criminal behavior, the Nazis used their party paper *Völkischer Beobachter* to accuse Canada of similar crimes in its treatment of Aboriginal people. By the summer of 1939, however, press coverage declined to a trickle. Grzyb concludes that the press and public had grown complacent and perhaps, given the indifference of the Canadian government, become “overwhelmed by a sense that Jewish suffering was somehow unsolvable, inevitable, eternal” (106).

Another innovative chapter covers the Jewish immigrant reaction to the Holocaust by examining the Yiddish media in Montreal, Toronto, and Winnipeg and comparing its contents to the English-language Jewish press. Rebecca Margolis argues convincingly that the assault on Jewish Europe was a central focus in the Yiddish press (as it was in the United States) and that Yiddish papers demonstrated an obsessive engagement with the fate of Jewish brethren in Europe and a desire to help. The vast majority of Jews in Canada during the war years spoke and read Yiddish as a first language and so the Yiddish press can be seen as representative of the Jewish experience in Canada. The better known, more muted, approach of the English-language Jewish press appears in relation to Margolis’s work, which illustrates Yiddish press coverage of the destruction of millions of Jews in detail, often through first-hand European accounts, the attempts of the community to rescue and assist the *shares-hapleyte* (survivors), and community concern over the fate of the *Serpa Pinto* refugees. The Yiddish press provided insider coverage of catastrophic events affecting families, however extended, from a much more personal and arguably authentic point of view.

Michael Brown and Norman Ravvin cover the exclusive environments of the Canadian campus and literary establishment. The thirties were a time of Jewish student quotas and exclusion from faculty ranks at Canadian universities. Brown’s examination of policies and official administrative correspondence at McGill and the University of Toronto reveal an Anglo-Saxon elite committed to excluding Jews from its ranks and limiting their effect on Canadian society based upon common stereotypic associations between Jews and materialism on the one hand and communism on the other. Ravvin examines the most important novels, poetry, and writing in Canada between 1935 and 1945 to discover that there is almost no literary response to the key political crises of the day. His chapter discusses the work of some exceptions: the work of A. M. Klein; three important figures of the 1940s who do address Jewish themes—Ralph Allen, Hugh Garner, and Gwethalyn Graham; and Mordecai Richler and Gabrielle Roy as the dominant voices from Quebec and French Canada.
The last chapter, written by James Walker, is a detailed study of the establishment and development of Jewish defense organizations in Canada and their principled struggle for Jewish inclusion. From 1930-1945, Jews were excluded from hotels and beaches, university programs and occupations, clubs, neighborhoods, and resorts. Like Margolis’s chapter on the Yiddish press, Walker’s work upends the notion of a quiet, deferential, submissive Jewish community and in its place presents a discussion of their legislative initiatives and legal challenges, public campaigns and coalitions, as well as episodes of direct conflict. Both the Canadian Jewish Congress and B’nai Brith are presented in this fascinating chapter as helping to lay the groundwork for the advancement of general human rights legislation in the postwar period with a distinct critique of “racial” inequality in Canada. Walker’s work illustrates how British justice and the rule of law, both universalist in nature rather than practice, were available to Canadian Jews as the vehicles through which they could remedy discrimination against their own people and all other (non-British) Canadian citizens of various ethnic and religious backgrounds.

While no chapter in this book states it explicitly, Jews simply do not matter in these decades in Canada. The elites of the country were Anglo-Saxon Christians, who had a profound religious-cultural bias against Jews and Judaism leading to the exclusion of Jews from many aspects of society, including entrance into the country itself. This was not simply some kind of generic racism or xenophobia but a deeply ingrained way of thinking and feeling about Jews that was part and parcel of Western culture, resting on the bedrock of the Christian religious imagination. The general sensibility in elite Canadian circles was that of English antisemitism, which is characterized primarily by feelings of contempt for Jews and a knowing superiority over them. As in Great Britain, the Canadian establishment worked hard to exclude Jews, regardless of their specific backgrounds, talents, or abilities, from their social and professional circles and to prevent them from entering these same circles in the future. Quebec is a more complex, multi-layered case given its British Protestant elite and its large French population, which fell under the determinative influence of the Catholic Church and harbored a more fear-based form of continental antisemitism. Reading this book reminds us of the frustrating inadequacy of the word antisemitism when we use it to explain so many different types and manifestations of anti-Jewish hostility and hatred.

That, of course, does not mean that people in Canada were without compassion for Germany’s Jews, who were being brutalized and threatened with extermination. It is quite possible to hold traditionally negative views about Jews and never dream of physically assaulting a Jewish person or trying to force a Jew out of the country. That is precisely what these chap-
ters demonstrate. One should not make the assumption that the principled criticism of Nazi Germany we see throughout Canada during this period has anything to do with a fondness for Jews or a lack of antisemitism. While the latter may have existed on an individual basis, as an organized society dominated by a British cultural elite Canada was exclusionary and discriminatory, and that reality was to be maintained at all costs.

*Catherine Chatterley is the founding director of the Canadian Institute for the Study of Antisemitism (CISA) and adjunct professor of history at the University of Manitoba. Her *Disenchantment: George Steiner and the Meaning of Western Civilization after Auschwitz* (Syracuse University Press, 2011) was a National Jewish Book Award finalist, and her second book, *The Antisemitic Imagination*, is forthcoming. She can be reached via www.canisa.org.
Forms More Subtle and Less Obvious than Swastikas

Edward Alexander’s
*The State of the Jews: A Critical Appraisal*

Florette Cohen*

*The distinguishing feature of the new antisemitism is criticism of Zionism or Israeli policy that whether intentionally or unintentionally has the effect of promoting prejudice against all Jews by demonizing Israel and Israelis and attributing Israel’s perceived faults to its Jewish character.*

—Contemporary Global Antisemitism: A Report Provided to the US Congress (2005), 4

Edward Alexander’s book *The State of the Jews: A Critical Appraisal* is nothing short of a masterpiece. It is a thoughtful and systematic account unconditionally equating anti-Zionism with antisemitism. Alexander begins his critical appraisal by tracing the history of modern antisemitism from the Victorian age until the present through the eyes of prominent historians, politicians, and literary scholars. Beginning with his account of Thomas Arnold, his son Matthew, and John Stuart Mill, through his focus

1. For the purpose of this review, anti-Zionism must be distinguished from justified criticisms of Israeli policies: it must be defined as a baseless hatred of Israel the Jewish state, analogous to the definition of antisemitism defined as a baseless hatred of Jews.
on Jewish writers such as but not limited to Abba Kovner, Cynthia Ozick, Ruth Wisse, and Hillel Halkin, Alexander tackles a question as old as antisemitism itself—that of the natural right of Jews to live both as a people and as a people in their own homeland.

His collection of essays reveals the true nature of anti-Zionism as a cover for modern antisemitism; better yet, the theories presented have been scientifically supported or are systematically testable from an empirical standpoint. Alexander’s discussion of the increasingly popular Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement has already found experimental support through recent social psychological studies (Cohen, Jussim, Harber, and Bhasin 2009). Following up on Alexander’s claims, the research found that under stressful conditions (particularly those of existential threat): (1) participant levels of classical antisemitism and pro-Israeli support were inversely related; (2) participants expressed significantly greater levels of antisemitism and lower levels of pro-Israeli sentiment, specifically when told that they would be caught in the act of lying; (3) participants perceived the size of Israel, but not of other countries, to loom larger; and (4) participants increased opposition to Israeli oppression more than they increased opposition to Russian or Indian oppression by imposing harsher punishments (sanctions, boycotts, divestments, military actions, etc.) against Israel but not other countries committing the exact same human rights violations.

Subsequently, three follow-up studies (Cohen 2009) dealt with the demonization and delegitimization of Israel. Results again confirmed that under stressful conditions (particularly those of existential threat) participants increased support for punishing Israeli transgressions more than those of other countries, thus confirming that double standards were routinely applied to Israel.

As Alexander points out, unfair criticism of Israel is not reserved solely for gentiles. Many Jews, including members of the press, have publicly articulated the notion that the creation of Israel was a mistake—a failed experiment (Cohen 2006). Others have implied that Israel’s credibility has been in steady decline since the Six-Day War in 1967 (Judd 2006). The implication that Israel will not be able to stay in a Muslim-dominated region or that it was never meant to succeed as a nation demonstrates that the proponents of delegitimating Israel have already made considerable inroads. The Noam Chomskys and Norman Finkelsteins of the world condemn Israel under the pretext of freedom of the press and academic freedom, and appear to be legitimately criticizing Israeli policy, but they are no more than expressions of anti-Jewish hatred. Alexander cleverly presents case after case of liberal Jews advocating Palestinian rights in the name of
enlightenment. But why? Why would Israeli academics build their reputations on research criticizing the existence of the State of Israel?

From a social psychologist’s perspective, studying modern antisemitism through the previous question can only be answered by research devoted to the following three empirical research questions. First, why is anti-Zionism or modern antisemitism unrecognizable to so many liberal scholars as a form of prejudice? It may be, as Alexander points out in his chapter “Afrocentrism, Liberal Dogmatism and Antisemitism at Wellesley College,” that most scholarship seeks to combat prejudice as based on some form of unfair disadvantage inflicted on particular demographic groups (e.g., Greenwald and Krieger 2006). Jews, however, unlike other minorities in the United States, are not (in general) socioeconomically disadvantaged; quite the contrary, in fact: at least in the democratic west (Europe and North America), Jews have been very socioeconomically successful over the last 60 years (e.g., Burstein 2007). Within that context, Israel, the Jewish state, has been highly successful, both economically and militarily. Therefore, to the extent that scholarship on prejudice starts with the implicit “Who is disadvantaged?,” the answer “Jews” is not likely to readily emerge.

Second, what has changed between the Victorian era and now to make liberal scholars, especially Jewish ones, believe that antisemitism is a thing of the past and no longer worthy of studying? One possible explanation may be that the United States, and Canada in particular, are among the least antisemitic countries in the world. They have no history of government policies oppressing or harassing Jews, no history of expulsions or state-sponsored violence against Jews, and, in general, have provided a relatively safe and welcoming environment for Jews. As Alexander documents, Jews were academics, writers, and magazine publishers—free to express an “intellectual openness to Jewish religion” (Burstein, 89). It would appear that studying antisemitism in an environment so favorable toward Jews would be a real nonstarter.

Third, why has the issue of the Holocaust become more of a hindrance rather than a benefit to the study of antisemitism? Alexander devotes several chapters to the Holocaust and its relationship to anti-Israeli propaganda. Within these chapters, he acknowledges that nearly all discussions of antisemitism include the Holocaust. While the attention paid to the Holocaust, both in documenting it and in understanding it, is clearly a good thing, nonetheless there appears to be an unintentional side effect to the relentless emphasis on the Holocaust. First, recent research (Imhoff and Banse 2009) has shown that acknowledgment of ongoing Jewish suffering resulting from the Holocaust increased German participants’ prejudice against Jews. Second, as Alexander correctly implies, all the attention applied to the Holocaust—both Holocaust studies and Holocaust denials—
has unintentionally provided political cover for modern antisemites. Invoking the Holocaust in reference to modern antisemitism often raises what Avishai Margalit refers to as “Operation Holocaust Memory”—or, an overdone plea for sympathy.

The reason for this may be twofold. First, to the extent that Nazism is implicitly equated with antisemitism, the bar for identifying antisemitism has been significantly raised. The possibility exists that, for many people, advocating exterminating Jews equals antisemitism. If so, then even when a person endorses and promotes all sorts of other beliefs and actions hostile to Jews, as long as he or she stops short of advocating extermination or blatant exclamations of hatred—e.g., “I hate Jews,” vandalizing synagogues, and similar displays—that person may frequently fail to be recognized as an antisemite.

Second, reminders of the Holocaust seem to have contributed to modern antisemitism by equating Zionism with the new Nazism. While the Nazi Holocaust has been acknowledged as one of the greatest human rights violations in history, Palestinian casualties in Jenin and the West Bank—commonly referred to as the Occupied Territories—are often compared to Jewish Holocaust victims (Israel News Agency 2006). This comparison is a double standard of the worst kind. It simultaneously belittles the experience of Jewish victims at the hands of the Nazis while at the same time compares the Israelis to Nazis by implying that the death of 2,000 Palestinians is equivalent to the systematic murder of 6 million Jews.

Most notably, the UN’s short history is rife with double standards applying to Israel, particularly with human rights violations. The UN frequently demonizes Israel within the structure of international human rights protection, with Israel being the most frequently targeted nation in the history of the UN for human rights violations against the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. This is anomalous, considering that Israel’s democracy is comparable to that of many other European countries, and its human rights record, while subject to valid criticism, is superior to that of all of its surrounding neighbors and many countries in Africa and Asia (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2005). In direct contrast to Israel, there have not been any resolutions about the repression rights in China, the rights denied to women in Saudi Arabia, or the racism perpetrated against hundreds of thousands in Zimbabwe. The recent genocide in Darfur—which has led to over a million deaths—evoked hardly a peep out of these very same UN members, who righteously condemn “Israeli aggression.” This is a double standard writ large (see Cohen 2012).

When an Israeli Air Force strike against a building in the village of Qana killed many Lebanese civilians during the most recent Israeli-Arab conflict, it drew international criticism. When nine Turkish nationals were
killed in 2010 on the MV *Mavi Marmara*—one of six Turkish flotillas—Israel was again condemned internationally. Though Israel regretted the loss of life in both of these incidents, media reports portrayed Israel’s strike as a deliberate attack on civilians. No such criticisms were directed at the NATO forces that bombed the Serb military in Kosovo in the late 1990s, resulting in 500 civilian deaths (NATO, May 21, 1999). Double standards consequently occur when pro-Palestinian sympathizers righteous condemn Israel for inflicting suffering on innocent civilians fail to just as righteousness and loudly condemn those who inflict suffering on innocent Israelis. Of course, if one is motivated by a sincere moral revulsion to the suffering of innocents, this is exactly what one *would* do.

There are many examples of this manifestation of double standards. Despite the fact that in 1948 the leaders of the surrounding countries called for Israel to be “pushed into the sea,” despite the fact that the surrounding countries initiated wars with Israel in 1948 and 1967, and despite the fact that innocent Israelis have been routinely victimized by terror attacks for decades, and despite crafting dozens of resolutions condemning Israel, the United Nations has never focused on nor created a resolution condemning antisemitism. Indeed, neither antisemitism nor the Holocaust is mentioned in any UN treaties and declarations (see Cohen et al., 2009).

These general factors—Jewish success, the relative friendliness of North America toward Jews, and the implicit equating of Nazism with antisemitism—have combined to lead many in the West (including social scientists) to completely miss the fact that modern antisemitism masked by criticism of Israel exists all. It is for these reasons that make Alexander’s book so timely and significant.

*The State of the Jews: A Critical Appraisal* dramatically highlights anti-Zionism as the newest manifestation of antisemitism—a form more subtle and less obvious than painting swastikas on synagogues and chanting antisemitic slurs. Alexander’s compilation of essays emphasizing the historical and modern occurrences of antisemitism are consistent with the existent social and political theories of modern antisemitism and will pave the way for subsequent empirical research acknowledging that modern antisemitism is rarely blatant bigotry. Alexander’s *The State of the Jews* accomplishes what many other accounts have failed to do—it provides a rare glimpse into both the liberal Jewish and non-Jewish proponents of modern antisemitism.

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2. Israel apologized for the loss of life in Qana but defended its raid on the *Mavi Marmara*, contending that its passengers were members of a hardcore activist group that initiated the attack against the Israeli military.
*Florette Cohen is a professor of psychology at CUNY College of Staten Island and the author of several research papers linking anti-Zionism to antisemitism. She is an associate editor and frequent contributor to the JSA, and the co-editor, with S. L. Jacobs and S. K. Baum, of Antisemitism in North America (Brill, forthcoming).

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Frederick M. Schweitzer

An intriguing feature of Robert Wistrich’s new book is the brief autobiography he supplies at the outset, giving the reader, as it were, an important key to the work that follows. Wistrich was born in Kazakhstan just after World War II to Polish Jewish parents of leftist sympathies and affiliations who had been displaced to that Muslim republic by Stalin’s tyranny. His father had been imprisoned by the NKVD during the war; his mother suffered less from Soviet oppression but had vivid memories of interwar Poland’s distinctly Catholic antisemitic persecution. Whatever misgivings he carried about the Soviet utopia with which he might have been imbued at home, Wistrich began to be radicalized as he grew up and attended grammar school in London in the 1950s. In 1961, he spent a month on a “far left” kibbutz in Israel and pondered the Shoah the more intently as the Eichmann trial proceeded; he steeped himself in Marxism at Cambridge and Stanford universities, where he also was a ’68er and engaged in protests against the West’s evil trinity of capitalism, racism, and militarism. Along the way he found himself trapped in Prague at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The following year brought him back to Israel to be
one of the editors of a left-wing magazine and something of a peacenik, participating in ideological debates and criticizing both people and the government for their complacency following the resounding military victory in the June war. Tours in east central Europe brought home to Wistrich the communist regime’s cynical exploitation of antisemitism and anti-Zionism as a political weapon, revealing how little freedom of any kind was permitted in the Soviet bloc and how far the colossal experiment fell short of its ideals: To each according to need, From each according to ability. These experiences, and his disillusionment with communism and the left generally, induced Wistrich to take up the subject of socialism and the Jewish question in central Europe for his doctoral dissertation. Advised that University College, London, would be the optimum location for access to sources among other advantages, in the early 1970s he embarked on what has been his lifetime pursuit. In the four decades since he has made himself the master—utilizing, I note with envy, his command of twelve languages—of the whole history of antisemitism; witness his magnificent treatise of 2010, *A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad* (reviewed in the June 2010 [Vol. 2, No. 1] issue of the *JSA*). Over those years, Wistrich has written numerous general works, monographs, and specialized articles as well as reviews and journalistic pieces, a great many of which follow through to the present on the themes and concerns first addressed in his dissertation at the University of London, *Socialism and the Jewish Question in Germany and Austria 1880-1914* (1974). *From Ambivalence to Betrayal* synthesizes his own contributions and those of many others to the field as well as original archival research filling in lacunae and imparting a unifying interpretative thesis to the full sweep from the 1830s to the present—namely, the consistency and continuity, east and west, of antisemitism and anti-Zionism from the socialist pioneers of the early nineteenth century over that long span of time and in many countries and regions to the present. Thus, Wistrich is a man from the left who has been exercised these many years by antisemitism on the left, and his book is an inquiry “whether antisemitism was a movement of the left or right, radical or conservative—or whether it belongs to some more heterogeneous, hybrid category.” In another passage, he states (not definitively, much less dogmatically) that antisemitism on the left was primal and original, that on the right it was derivative, that Nazism “was an anti-Jewish mutation of the socialist idea which the European Left was singularly ill-prepared to confront.”

Although *From Ambivalence to Betrayal* is an extraordinary achievement, it has flaws, one regarding the UK that is considered later in this review. Comparing it to his masterpiece, *A Lethal Obsession*, the book is somewhat disappointing for the reader. There are many repetitions, e.g., the
chapter about Karl Kautsky follows on an earlier reference of four or five pithy pages devoted to him that summarizes that story; this is also true of his presentation of Eduard Bernstein, Franz Mehring, Otto Bauer, and some others. The chapters do not read as consecutive installments of the book’s theme but like collected essays written on different occasions for different purposes; several chapters focus on individuals and these offer brilliant insights but in one or two instances tend to turn into biographical essays that steer away from the narrative theme (his chapter on Bruno Kreisky shows this tendency). His editor and copyeditor could have served him better had they insisted on considerable reorganization of the book to dispose of repetitions and assure a unified narrative sweep; also, the endnotes and bibliography should have included the works’ publishers, the bibliography ought to have been divided into separate subject categories instead of a single listing of the secondary sources, and there should have been a much more detailed index. As it stands, one has the impression of a sense of hurry in putting the book together. Rather often, the exposition proceeds in an accusatory voice. While I agree with Wistrich’s strictures on writers who denigrate Israel, especially when they are Jews of the Diaspora or Israel and by any measure are simply antisemites and/or anti-Zionists, but his broadsides recur too often and impart an aura of belligerence to his text. He cudgels these “self-flagellating and attention-seeking anti-Zionist Israeli academics” of “the ultra-Left” indulging in “hysterical rhetoric [that is] totally divorced from any semblance of historical truth,” or those who espouse the antisemetic/anti-Israel/anti-Zionist cause to “overcome their own marginality, intellectual mediocrity, or unresolved individual neuroses as Jews.” Such polemics, even when warranted, detract from the book as a work of the highest erudition, and obscure the fact that historical debate and theological contention over Zionism and rebuilding the ancient nation versus acculturation in the foreign country of one’s birth have a long history. Everything said here, however—even the intemperateness—amounts to no more than flaws or blemishes confined to style and organization, for in content and substance From Ambivalence to Betrayal is a twin to the superlative A Lethal Obsession. Together, they contribute not only much to our understanding of antisemitism but also to our understanding of general history.

For Wistrich’s book, the central document is Marx’s notorious essay of 1844, “On the Jewish Question,” the charter text of socialist/communist antisemitism in its ideology, vocabulary, and vituperation. Its extremism and nihilism are confirmed by Marx’s letters and personal exchanges and other writings that are replete with gross antisemitic barbs and name-calling that he never retracted. For Marx, the Jews are not a people or nationality; “the chimerical nationality of the Jew” was nothing more than a class or
caste of greedy hucksters and exploiters. The “essence” of their religion is capitalism; moreover, the Jewish capitalist has infected the Christian world with his capitalist ethic: “What is the object of the Jew’s worship in this world? Usury/huckstering, capitalism. What is his worldly god? Money. Very well then; emancipation from usury/huckstering/capitalism and money, that is, from practical, real Judaism, would constitute the emancipation of our time. The organization of society so as to abolish the preconditions of usury/huckstering/capitalism, and hence its possibility, would render [the existence of] the Jew impossible . . . . The social emancipation of Jewry is the emancipation of [Christian] society from Jews/Judaism.”

Come the revolution and the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, capitalism and with it Judaism and Jews would disappear from the world stage. All this has been long known and analyzed by scholars. But Wistrich treads new ground in his systematic demonstration that Marx’s antisemitism did not evaporate into the ideological air as apologists have claimed, but was transmitted generation by generation, country by country to socialists, planting antisemitism in the labor movement to the present day in the many countries with a Marxist party or movement and later in the Arab-Islamic sphere. On the Continent, in particular, there were frequent reissues and translations, sanctified by approving commentary and exposition that turned the 1844 essay into a sacred text, even for those who sharply disagreed with Marx on every other subject and contemptuously gave vent to their antisemitic ire against him. The more inapplicable Marxian analysis was to changing socioeconomic conditions, the more popular and dogmatic did adherence to it become.

Over the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, antisemitism became increasingly acceptable to socialists as an anti-capitalist weapon, predicated as it was on the supposed fact that Jews/Judaism and capitalism were synonymous, had risen together and would fall together. According to Marxist doctrine, predatory capitalism was destroying the socioeconomic basis of peasants, artisans and shopkeepers, and workers, driving them all into the proletariat until—inevitably—the war of the shrinking bourgeoisie with the swelling proletariat would bring the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and with it, automatically, the extinction of antisemitism, its twin. Socialists had some telling examples before them of how populist antisemitic rabble rousers and demagogues on the right, like Böckel, Ahwardt, Fritsch, and most notoriously Karl Lueger, were able to mobilize the victims of capitalism with a stream of anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, antisemitic rhetoric that was coupled with democratic or even semi-socialist programs that stole some socialist thunder, calling variously for universal suffrage, progressive income taxes, nationalization of some industries, reduction or abolition of peasant debt, and so on. But these populist dema-
gogues of the right had no use for socialist internationalism: they pitched their appeal in stridently nationalist “fatherland” terms, laying the basis for what became the dual appeal of Nazism in particular and fascism in general, nationalism and socialism combined. The success of the immensely popular Lueger in being voted repeatedly into office as mayor of Vienna—the only instance in Europe until after World War I that a party officially and vociferously antisemitic was to do so—on the strength of his antisemitic oratory should have sufficed to compel socialist intellectuals to abandon their belief that the workers and left-wing parties preferred internationalism to nationalism and were impervious to racial or religious prejudice, but with few exceptions they and socialist leaders never snapped out of their somnolence. Rather, they were impressed with Lueger’s success in rallying the workers to his banner, so much so that they preferred utilizing instead of combating antisemitism. The populist antisemitic rhetoric was also directed against the established moderate and liberal parties, which was also welcome to socialists as undermining those parties, putatively their worst enemies, and giving an advantage to the socialist cause. Some socialists crowed that antisemitism was “the cultural manure for socialism” and “the seedbed of Social Democracy,” and that the antisemites were “incipient Socialists.” A more simplistic, unrealistic reading of history and prognosis of the future is hard to imagine, for it assumed that antisemitism is a simple matter of social economics, utterly forgetting its ancient religious and cultural roots and its tenacious staying power. Hitler, unfortunately, was a more clear-eyed observer of Lueger and the populist demagogues than were the socialists. A parallel development occurred in France with the populist demagogues on the right—Drumont, Morés, and Barrés—who trumped the left by what Wistrich calls a “cross-fertilization” of antisemitic ideas between the extreme left and right that provided the basis for a nationalist-socialist or fascist ideology for which antisemitism served as the integrating force of such disparate elements. Wistrich’s understanding of this complex subject is one of the keenest insights he affords the reader, one he extends in the form of generalizations positing that nationalism cannot be ignored, that successful communist revolutions in Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Third World countries and societies succeeded because they spliced socialism and nationalism together, and that the perpetual invocation of internationalism amounts to little more than ideological tinsel.

Given their species of analysis, it is not surprising that in the face of antisemitism the socialist parties, particularly in Austria and Germany, were passive or worse, and one may wonder if Wistrich’s use of ambivalence in his title is too generous a term, that it might better be indifference or something harsher. Almost all socialists adhered steadfastly and dogmatically to Marx’s 1844 analysis. Hence, they theorized—and argued vehemently—
that anything like philosemitism, admiration, friendship, or support for Jews was more dangerous to the socialist movement than antisemitism, because it strengthened Jewish identity and thereby strengthened capitalism, and thus delayed the revolution and the onset of the new era of humanity. It is truly depressingly to realize that Jewish socialists, as Wistrich emphasizes, were, if anything, the lead in condemning Jews and Judaism as irredeemably backward and moribund, out of step with the march of history. Equally dangerous and reactionary, allegedly, was Zionism. In denying nationhood and culture to the Jews, Marx was as vehement as any anti-Zionist since his time (even though the word was not minted until long after, as was the term antisemitism, yet both apply to him). To the great majority of socialists, Jewish or Gentile, Zionism would only stall by misdirecting up a blind alley the inevitable historical progression to a classless international society. This was the view, most emphatically, of international Marxists like Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, Otto Bauer, and many others who exemplify what Wistrich calls “the ethnic death-wish displayed by many assimilated Jewish leaders.” The Austrian Bauer was typical in zealously hewing to the Marxist line. He too reduced Judaism to a cult of huckstering greed and Jews to predatory capitalist exploiters, and likewise equated them with the ethic that had Judaized Christendom into being a capitalist society. Zionism was a “nationalist deviation” from Marxism; the nation-state was an anachronism, mere “superstructure” slated to disappear with the revolution; the “history-less” Jews were not a people, only a “caste.” With regard to nationality, there was a “double standard” that Jewish socialist and labor Zionists like the incomparable Joseph Bloch protested against: their socialist comrades, Bauer among them, admitted (with the precedent set by Marx himself) the claims of even the “smallest, backward, obscure peoples” to national self-determination, but refused it to the Jews of Russia and eastern Europe. The great historian Simon Dubnow had people like Bauer in mind when he wondered, “How much a Jew must hate himself who recognizes the right of every nationality and language to self-determination but doubts it or restricts it for his own people whose ‘self-determination’ began 3,000 years ago.” Thus the path of destiny for Jews was to doff their Jewishness, the shopworn assimilation-disappearance formula to exit history’s stage (oddly, Bauer cited the converted Benjamin Disraeli as an example Jews should emulate).1 Bauer shared the widely held belief of continental socialists and

1. Such anti-Zionism predated the socialist movement and can be traced back to the grant of Jewish emancipation by the French Revolutionaries in 1790: the bestowal of full rights on the individual but none for the community. Such disparagement of Judaism and Jews was inherited from the Enlightenment and Voltaire most emphatically by his qualifying clause that barely stopped short of some form of annihilation: “still, we shouldn’t burn them,” which the Portuguese Inquisition
labor leaders that nothing much was to be gained, indeed much would be forfeited in their popular appeal, in fighting antisemitism; they, like him, and with some truth, denied that they were antisemites or that they tolerated it in their ranks, yet they rejected any role of defending Jews in society at large. He too scorned the liberals and moderates as defenders of the bourgeoisie and capitalism, the movement’s worst enemies—worse than the radical right of antisemitic populists, conservatives, militarists, and reactionaries—preferring to support or tolerate those parties, fatally so in the Weimar Republic. They did not anticipate the rightist populist demagogues deploying antisemitism to mobilize the masses to form a national movement that would carry all before it, including the destruction of the socialist parties, and persisted in believing, as a 1930s quip had it, that “the antisemites plow and sow but we socialists shall reap”—as indeed they did, but it was the whirlwind. Bauer died in exile in 1938 shortly after the Anschluss, which had grimly brought home to him that the Marxist prescription of assimilation was a mirage.

It is a melancholy fact that Wistrich can offer very few examples of socialists, Jewish or Gentile, who awoke to the stark fact that their analysis and assumptions on the Jewish question were absolutely wrong and unfounded. One of these was the Frenchman Bernard Lazare, who began his writer’s career as a Jewish antisemite, an assimilated self-hating Jew, and wrote two articles in 1890 praising Drumont’s denigration of Jews and Judaism in his enormous 1886 treatise, *La France Juive* (which is still in print). Exactly like Drumont, Lazare distinguished between foreign Jews and Israelites, native, assimilated, civilized Jews like Lazare himself as opposed to the rest, a contemptible riffraff. Both men were anti-capitalist and anti-national, denying that Jews were a people or nation (essentially the Marxist schema, but to which they came by a native French route). The Dreyfus affair turned Lazare about completely and inspired his history of antisemitism, which, since he died prematurely, remains a problematic work: the first chapters persist in his castoff assimilationist and antisemitic views and Jew-Israelite distinctions, so much so that Drumont praised the book and antisemites continue to quote those parts of it as confirming antisemitic stereotypes. But from an extreme assimilationist Lazare became an extreme Zionist, the leading Jewish defender of Dreyfus and mortal enemy of Drumont (they fought a duel) in a series of pamphlets and speeches. He contradicted the socialist line that antisemitism was an essential or appropriate part of the class struggle against capitalism and high

was still doing. Voltaire’s demand to “crush the infamous thing” was directed at Christianity, but that led on to another infamous thing—Judaism as the foundation source of Christianity that also ought to be crushed.
finance and would all disappear come the revolution. Lazare depicted antisemitism as rooted in the New Testament and Church Fathers, and had given rise to the lethal accusations of deicide, ritual murder, host desecration, the Judas image, and the like, and that modern racism and anti-capitalism were simply piled onto the medieval original. Wistrich’s chapter on Lazare is superb in its research, interpretation, and eloquence.

Some other Jews effected much the same grand reversal as Lazare. The marvelous poet Heinrich Heine, having been a witty, sharp-tongued “Young Hegelian,” successfully resisted what Wistrich calls “the racist temptation.” A more striking instance is Moses Hess. In earlier years he was a close comrade of Marx (six years his junior) and had a significant part in radicalizing him. Hess was as extreme as or worse than Marx in his defamation of Jews and Judaism, such as “The Jews . . . had the world-historic mission to bring out the [capitalist] predator in mankind. They have completed their task.” The creative life had gone out of the Jewish people, Hess said, for they had degenerated into being a mere “phantom” and ceased to be a nation. But then Hess was convulsed by the 1840 Damascus affair, when Jews were persecuted and murdered on the strength of the baseless but entrenched medieval blood-libel accusation. It “dawned on me for the first time,” he said “. . . that I belonged to an unfortunate, maligned, despised, and dispersed people,” that emancipation-assimilation, conversion to Christianity, class struggle and abolition of capitalism, etc., were false and unattainable goals. Thereafter, Hess’s writings constitute a total turnabout and rebuttal of Marx’s “On the Jewish Question.” He called for a “return to Judaism,” the realization of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine—reconciling socialism, which he said derived from the Mosaic law and the prophetic tradition, with Jewish national consciousness. Jewish national liberation, Hess believed, would encourage other submerged nationalities and be an inspiration to all humanity. This vision of the future found confirmation for him in his assessment of the likely fate of Jews in German lands: German “Aryanism,” antisemitism, nationalism, and authoritarianism meant that Jews would never be accepted but held in suspicion as “aliens.” The future, he foretold, would bring more racial and national conflicts than class warfare. This he summarized vividly in a frequently quoted declaration in Rome and Jerusalem (1862): “The Germans hate the religion of the Jews less than they hate their peculiar noses.” As Wistrich notes, Hess was one of those “marginal, assimilated Jews” content to remain such until struck by a cataclysm, whether the Damascus or Dreyfus affair for Theodor Herzl, that drove them to recognize the claims of their people to national self-determination and the vitality of their religious and cultural heritage.

Eduard Bernstein, one of the most attractive and significant human beings in Wistrich’s pages, is remembered for the challenge he threw down
to Marxism and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), for which he was bitterly castigated by most of his comrades across the Continent. In the 1890s, Bernstein took the lead in a grand critique that contradicted Marx’s fundamental tenets, earning the designation “Revisionism.” He argued that material conditions were getting better rather than worse, that neither revolution and the fall of capitalism nor the disappearance of the bourgeoisie were inevitable, that history proceeds by evolution rather than the inverted Hegelian dialectic in a crude materialist process, that by themselves the workers and their party could not achieve socialism, that vote-getting and majority-seeking in a parliamentary system of alliances and cooperation is preferable to the unreal notion of “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” that the SPD must be reconstructed to become a democratic socialist party, and many more fundamental amendments. Wistrich makes the somewhat disconcerting point that most socialists were, but Bernstein was not embarrassed by his Jewishness or ever felt he had to conceal it; and that although he did not espouse Zionism, he was a sympathetic admirer of the labor Zionists and socialist Zionists (he sought what he called “a free league of [all] peoples on the basis of national self-determination within the framework of civilized humanity”). It’s striking that an especially perceptive study of Bernstein’s life and work, Peter Gay’s *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: The Challenge of Eduard Bernstein to Marxism* (1952, 1962; not cited by Wistrich) informs the reader only that Bernstein was born Jewish, grew up in a non-observant home, and “abandoned Judaism” in his twenties to join the SPD, but without considering the possibility that his critique of Marxism—particularly his attempt to reintroduce ethics into the understanding and practice of politics—was significantly shaped by Jewish thought and values. More important to most Bernstein scholars is the fact that he spent 1888 to 1901 exiled in England; there, he was unquestionably impressed by the anti-Marxist Fabian socialists, whose principle was “the inevitability of gradualism.” By this they meant the attainment of socialism by legislative installment, dispensing with revolution and violence, and denying the automatic Marxist process that with the mere passage of time the dictatorship of the proletariat would inevitably arise and all would be well. In this connection, it is edifying to take note of the Cambridge historian Eric Hobsbawm, whom Wistrich has portrayed as another of those self-hating, anti-Zionist Jews (he died at 95, after *From Ambivalence to Betrayal* appeared). Wistrich rebukes him as learning nothing from the history that he studied so long and wrote about so voluminously. In his dissertation on the Fabians, Hobsbawm ridiculed them, and believed that Bernstein was not worth writing about except to dismiss. Hobsbawm acknowledged the failure of the great communist experiment and even said that it had been doomed from the start, but unforgivably, he refused to
admit the misery it had caused and still thought, at the end of a long life of communist dedication, that the deaths of millions of Soviet citizens under Stalin would have been perfectly acceptable if a genuine communist society had resulted. This is the familiar justification of perpetrators: they—ideologues, secret police, desk killers, and the like—characteristically resort to ideological abstractions to justify the butchery for which they are responsible. Hobsbawm’s career testifies once more to the seeming immortality of Marx’s abstract formulae and denigrations in his 1844 tirade “On the Jewish Question,” as Bernstein’s does to the possibility of breaking its viselike grip.

Most Jewish socialists shunned anything Jewish. Rosa Luxemburg exemplified the extreme Marxist internationalism and alienation from her Jewish heritage. “Luxemburg hates Jews,” a party comrade remembered of her, for she acted and talked “like a goy.” She swallowed whole Marx’s explications in “The Jewish Question,” reducing its simplicities even further: there are only two “nations,” the exploiters and the exploited, and only two “religions,” capital and labor. Since Jews were not a nation, Zionism was to Luxemburg as contemptible as it was unreal, and she insisted—a profoundly mistaken judgment—that nationalism was bourgeois, socialism international, and ne’er the twain would meet; and that come the revolution, the one would disappear and the other triumph. Leon Trotsky was as ignorant and contemptuous of everything Jewish as Rosa Luxemburg. He was callously indifferent about Jewish starvation and massacres during the Revolution and the civil war that followed—which as war commissar he, more than any other individual, was responsible for winning and thus securing the triumph of the communist regime in Russia. But in exile in Mexico until he was assassinated by Stalin’s agents in 1940, Trotsky admitted the validity of Jewish claims to be a nation or nationality, retracted some of his criticism and dismissal of Zionism, and accepted the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine in the interim until the international revolution created the “United States of the World,” when all nationalities would meld into one classless community. He persisted in the notion that Nazism was “the agony stage of capitalism” and may have agreed with the leader of the German communists that “Hitler will clear the road for Communism.” Yet, Trotsky was quite perceptive in analyzing Nazism and in the aftermath of Kristallnacht in 1938 predicted the Holocaust, saying that “the physical extermination of the Jews” is in the offing. Wistrich does not merely summarize his biography of Trotsky (1982) but refines its analysis and conclusions; he calls Trotsky’s life a “tragedy,” by which I think he means that Trotsky in some measure escaped the trammels of the Marxian petrifaction of “the Jewish Question” happening since its publication in 1844, but that it came too late to make any difference in the fate of the Jews. He notes the irony
that the so-called Trotskyites of today are fixated in the Marxist dogma and are oblivious of their hero’s moderate revisions and adaptations.

One can only be baffled by the longevity of the original Marxist construct of 1844, simplistic and devoid of reality from the start, and progressively contradicted by experience. One of several striking examples offered by Wistrich is his chapter on the Social Democrat Bruno Kreisky, Austrian chancellor for thirteen years (to 1983), never defeated in an election and the only Jew ever to lead a German-speaking country; Kreisky spent 1938-46 exiled in Sweden, losing many relatives to Hitler’s executioners but remaining indifferent to the Holocaust and to Jewish suffering and dislocation that came after it, as he was to Austrian participation in mass murder. As a socialist he was heir to the party’s Marxist antisemitic stance, by which Jews were expected to assimilate to the disappearance point because there was no Jewish nationality, while Jewish culture and religion—of which he was studiously ignorant—were of no value. As a guarantor of the country’s amnesia, Kreisky facilitated Austrian self-exculpation for its responsibility in the Holocaust by his speeches and diplomacy villainizing Israel in the anti-Zionist manner, minimizing the Holocaust, recognizing the PLO (his was the first government to do so), admitting former Nazis and war criminals to his government, and quarreling vehemently and contemptuously with the Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal. Kreisky’s attitude to Jewishness has to be seen as an atavism, another latter-day re-embodiment of Marx’s 1844 essay. Such throwbacks continue to the present, more numerous than one would expect and in places that surprise, as one reads on through Wistrich’s careful and precise enumeration.

It took a very long time to realize how blind socialist leaders had been for well over a century. It seemed perfectly legitimate and logical to accept the repeated protestations that the socialist parties were the Jews’ best friends and defenders; that they had supported Jewish minority rights and condemned antisemitism as the bodyguard of reaction and prejudice; and that antisemitism contradicted socialist ideals of equality, tolerance, democracy, dignity, anti-racism, and ending poverty, tyranny, privilege, and so on. Historiography contributed to preserving what was in fact a myth. Thus Paul Massing, an exiled German Social Democrat, wrote what was in effect an apologia in his very influential book on the German antecedents of the Holocaust, Rehearsal for Destruction (1949). The first historian to shatter the myth was Edmund Silberner, in a series of essays in the 1950s, concluding that socialism exhibited a “long-standing antisemitic tradition,” that there was a distinct form of “Socialist antisemitism” that dates from the 1830s, was enunciated by Marx in the 1844 essay, and consistently adhered to for more than a century. In the later 1960s George Lichtheim confirmed Silberner’s approach and broadened the analysis to include France. Wistrich
has provided the knockout clincher, a massively documented account that is
global in scope and carries down to the present.

Some historians of British antisemitism will disagree with Wistrich’s
chapter on the UK, “Great Britain: A Suitable Case for Treatment?” It’s not
clear why a chapter should be dedicated to the UK; equally compelling
reasons would dedicate chapters to France, Germany, the United States, and
other Western countries, or incorporate the group in a composite chapter as
Wistrich does in chapters dealing with European countries before 1914.

Wistrich cites his perfectly sound article, “Antisemitism Embedded in Brit-
ish Culture” (2008), but I cannot imagine any country in the West or much
of the rest of the world where that is not true. He has written many books
and articles—monographs, biographies, analytical studies—for the coun-
tries on the Continent, but his output on the UK is limited to a number of
articles. I find this chapter somewhat one-sided, reading at times like an
attorney’s brief and occasionally verging on polemic, with substantial por-
tions treating the subject in a rapid journalistic way that he does not permit
himself elsewhere in the book, perhaps reflecting personal disappointment
with the UK. Of the three schools of Anglo-Jewish historiography—1) the
venerable one represented by Cecil Roth, who spoke of “the alembic of
English tolerance” operating in “this happy land” where Jews have flour-
ished as heirs of “two noble histories”; 2) the “warts and all” school, repre-
sented by Tony Kushner and Geoffrey Alderman among several others,
who refer to the “myths of Britain’s essential toleration and decency” and
dismiss Roth and Roth-inspired works as “public-relations history”; 3) a
moderate and more positive school, in some degree a synthesis of these two
perspectives, will be found in the work most notably of W. D. Rubinstein.

Wistrich gives the impression from his opening sentence that Anglo-Jewish
historiography is yet to throw off the spell of Cecil Roth: “The self-congrat-
ulatory and somewhat sanitized history of Anglo-Jewry since the mid-17th-
century ‘return’ of the Jews to Britain [is] traditionally depicted as a trium-
phal passage from servitude to freedom or from darkness to light.” The
question then becomes, “If things have been so good, how come they are so
bad?” To be sure, Wistrich’s exposition follows closely in the wake of the
“warts and all” practitioners. He attaches no positive significance to the
great caesura in Anglo Jewish history, from the 1290 expulsion to Crom-
well’s readmission of Jews in 1656, assuming that it resulted not in any new
beginnings but confirmed or even deepened the ancient lethal hatreds. Also
like the “warts and all” historians, Wistrich cites Chaucer, The Merchant of
Venice, Dickens’ Oliver Twist but not George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda; the
Balfour Aliens Act of 1905 but not the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (other
than efforts to sabotage it by the likes of General Glubb and Foreign Secre-
tary Bevin); the origin of the medieval blood libel but not the unique 1732
decision in Rex v. Osborne that made such accusations punishable as seditious libel; that the notorious Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion had widespread acceptance in Britain but made bare mention of the fact that it was in Britain as well where it was decisively discredited by proof of its being a forgery. Britain is the country where Benjamin Disraeli, though baptized as a child and outwardly a practicing Anglican, was maligned all his life by friend and foe alike as “the Jew,” “Alien,” “Oriental,” “un-English,” “un-Christian,” pursuing “Hebrew” aims, and the like, but nevertheless served twice as prime minister and thirty years as leader of the Tory party in the House of Commons and then in the House of Lords, for he was beloved by Queen Victoria, who ennobled her favorite prime minister as Earl of Beaconsfield. For the 1880s to 1914, Wistrich deals incisively with H. G. Wells, J. A. Hobson, H. N. Hyndman, and the Boer war, as well as the early Labour party and its Jew-bashing leaders Keir Hardie and John Burns; Wistrich might have noted the fact that there never was in the UK the left’s addiction to Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” as a sacred text—one that, on his showing, had and has so poisonous and pervasive an influence on continental parties of the left. Wistrich’s account of the UK could have been well served by reference to Susanne Terwey’s Moderner Antisemitus in Grossbritannien 1899-1919 (2006) and Eugene C. Black’s Social Politics of Anglo-Jewry 1880-1920 (1988); Black concludes, for example, that antisemitism, “covert or overt, was, all in all, a minor factor” in the aliens controversy and legislation in 1904-5. Wistrich reminds readers that Oswald Moseley and his Black Shirt thugs were an antisemitic menace but not that he spent World War II in jail and that Parliament passed the 1936 Public Order Act, which made punishable speech that was “likely” to incite violence as well as the “intention” to incite violence, even when in either case no actual violence erupted; under the act’s power to curtail “threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour,” fascism was effectively throttled in Britain prior to and during World War II as well as neo-Nazism in the 1960s. Wistrich mentions the “obsessive fear” of fifth columns and enemy aliens during World War II, but that is hardly surprising given the fix the country was in, “alone” and awaiting Hitler’s “Operation Sea Lion” from June 1940 to June 1941.

Historians no longer write as adherents of the “noble” Roth school, yet equally they should not see British antisemitism solely through Continental lenses, for while elements of Judaeophobia were imported, more important were the native strands. Modern British antisemitism finds its origins in the reactions to Disraeli’s government of 1874-80, particularly to the crisis of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 (Disraeli purportedly was bound by kindred “blood” to support the “unspeakable” Turks in massacring their rebellious Balkan Christian subjects). A study of the Jews of the English-
speaking world would provide an instructive contrast to the history of the Jews of the Continent. Illuminating as well would be a comparative history of British prejudice and bigotry toward other minorities; toward Italian, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and other immigrants; toward Quakers, Baptists, Methodists, and Unitarians; and toward the Scots and Irish. Nothing in post-1656 Anglo-Jewish history parallels the Penal Laws enacted by Parliament in 1691-1721. The “no popery” phobia, founded on religious (Catholic) and racial (Celtic) stereotypes, resembled antisemitism in its structure and intensity and its justification of persecution. Embodied in law and policy, it inflicted lasting degradation and poverty, humiliation, and contempt on the Irish, remnants of which are still experienced in Northern Ireland.

As noted earlier, one of the recurring themes in Wistrich’s writings is his deep chagrin over the large number of Jews whose works are anti-Jewish and/or anti-Zionist: in the UK chapter, he condemns their “nihilistic folly,” finds in them as much “self-congratulatory narcissism” as “self-loathing” in playing a prominent role “in directing the suicidal charge into the abyss,” and ends this chapter dubious that any “treatment” for this “malady” will help, that perhaps there will be “only a post-mortem.” It is perfectly true that antisemitism/anti-Zionism of the ugliest kind has sprouted up in contemporary Britain, but it had also sprouted up there after 1967, rose ferociously with the 1976 UN resolution equating Zionism and racism, and continued with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, but subsided decidedly by the end of the 1980s. So one may believe with some assurance that the present extremism will also fade and be seen in retrospect as an aberration. My judgment, for what it may be worth, is that, as an essentially political phenomenon, Westerners bashing Israel is more likely to shrink away as political and diplomatic conditions change than millennial antisemitism and Jew-hatred ever will. Whatever the future turns out to be in the UK, I’m sure it will not require the observer’s conducting Wistrich’s lugubrious “post-mortem.” Everything depends on the existence of countervailing factors, and in Britain there are countervailing voices and actions, such as the response to Wistrich’s salvos by the president of the Board of Guardians of British Jews, “We’re Alright, Professor Wistrich.” It was the initiative of two Gentiles who were disappointed with the Global Forum on Antisemitism in Israel, the Labour MPs John Mann and Dennis McShane, who launched what may prove to be a historic landmark, the Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism (ICCA). Its London Declaration (2009) emphasizes the responsibility of legislators and forcefully draws attention to the dangerous resurgence of antisemitism: “We [representatives from nearly fifty nations] call upon national governments, parliaments, international institutions, political and civic leaders, NGOs, and civil society to affirm democratic and human values, build societies based on respect
and citizenship, and combat any manifestations of antisemitism and discrimination.” Its Ottawa Protocol (2010) marked a milestone in that for the first time a formal document addressed to the international community sets forth the criteria for distinguishing legitimate criticism of Israel from anti-Zionism that in reality is antisemitism. Its impact might be limited for the present to atmospherics but as the governments and organizations called upon to act do so, the ICCA will build up the body of international “soft law.” It is certainly exhortation of a very compelling kind that follows upon and energizes actions and initiatives taken or contemplated earlier by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe, as well as the UN. The ICCA delegates expressed great concern that the worldwide resurgence of antisemitism continues to accelerate, and were “appalled” at the persistent manifestations of age-old stereotypical myths: the blood libel, poisoning of wells, conspiracies to dominate governments, the economy, the media, public institutions in the manner of a “new Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” and Holocaust denial elaborated as a big lie to justify the creation of Israel and to depict Israelis as behaving like Nazis. More recently, the ICCA is focusing on regional and topical gatherings to “turn our words into action”—for example, the 2012 Brussels meeting to energize the European Parliament in its commitment to effectively counter antisemitism that “is still widespread across the countries of Europe and fighting it should be in the very DNA of the European Union,” as well as to implement the guidelines of its Internet Hate Task Force. These initiatives are not the small change of international discourse; see ICCA’s website: www.antisem.org.

Not surprisingly, Joseph Stalin looms large in these pages. Of particular interest is Wistrich’s account of Stalin’s great reversal of Jewish policy during World War II. In an effort to rally world Jewry, who would rally world public opinion in support of the war effort (it’s the familiar antisemitic motif that the Jews are immensely powerful and influential, control the press, and determine matters from behind the scenes), Stalin sanctioned and encouraged the Anti-Fascist Committee of prominent Soviet Jews who, individually and collectively, at home and abroad, in speeches and writing, celebrated the unity and solidarity of all Jews worldwide. The war won, Stalin reverted to murderous form, what Wistrich elucidates—more fully and convincingly than I’ve seen elsewhere—as the paradox of Stalin’s seeming inconsistency: simultaneous persecution of Jews in the USSR and vigorous support abroad for Israel: 1) in Soviet Russia, the Marxist policy of Jews to be assimilated and disappear or persecuted for rootless cosmopolitanism or claims to be a nationality, accompanied by mass arrests, systematic murder of members of the Anti-Fascist Committee, Yiddish artists and writers, and many others, and the annihilation of Yid-
dish culture, all borne on a vicious antisemitic propaganda campaign; 2) abroad, the expression of great sympathy for Jews as victims of the Holocaust, foreign secretary Gromyko’s “Zionist speech” and vote in favor of the UN resolution to sanction Israel’s 1947-48 rebirth, support of survivors seeking to emigrate to Palestine/Israel, and supplying war materiel—what was in fact indispensable in the War of Independence—to the Zionist insurgents. Stalin’s aim, in which he was quite successful, was to weaken Britain’s imperial position in the Middle East and split the Anglo-American alliance over Israel, for while the Labour government and its foreign secretary Ernest Bevin (another illustration of Wistrich’s thesis of the affinity of the socialist left for antisemitism) were putting every possible obstacle in the way of Israel’s rebirth as a state and turning Holocaust survivors and would-be immigrants back to Europe and holding them in former concentration camps, the Truman government supported the refugees and wanted Britain to renounce its mandate and withdraw, which it did in May 1948. Stalin may also have felt, as Wistrich suggests, that since a high proportion of the Zionist leaders were leftist Russian Jews, Israel would be a socialist republic and ally.

Stalin executed still another reversal: in his last years and intensely under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the Soviets turned belligerently on Israel and formed an alliance with the Arab states, underwriting them with economic support and military weapons, but, more lasting in effect, unleashing a tremendous propaganda offensive to the Middle East. That campaign, if anything, deepened the enduring impact Hitler and Nazi antisemitic propaganda had on the area. Moscow vilified Israel with a massive barrage of antisemitic and anti-Zionist abuse out of the same calculation that had induced Stalin to support Israel: to weaken the British and French empires and divide them against the United States, plus the obvious fact that there are far more Arabs than Israelis. A crescendo of vituperation came with the 1967 war (a stunning defeat for their Arab allies), culminated in the 1976 UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, and persisted until 1989 and the fall of the USSR. The Kremlin’s massive assault included reissuing the Protocols, extending that fabrication with new fabrications to fit changed circumstances, and trotted out every stereotype and libel from the age-old antisemitic arsenal, characteristically deploying them in the crudest form imaginable. To dodge the charge of antisemitism and for the benefit of their Arab allies, the Soviets used or forced anti-Zionist Jews calling themselves the “Anti-Zionist Committee” to denounce Israel in unmitigated terms. A kind of remission came by 1990 under Gorbachev, when an editorial in Pravda acknowledged, “Considerable damage was done by a group of authors who, while pretending to fight Zionism, began to resurrect many notions of the anti-Semitic propaganda [of] the Black Hundreds [under the
tsars] and of fascist origin. Hiding under Marxist phraseology, they came out with coarse attacks on Jewish culture, on Judaism, and on Jews in general."

A parallel development to nazi-fascist antisemitism, equally insidious though much less studied and analyzed, is what Wistrich in his last chapter calls the “Marxist-Islamist Alliance”; here too he is the pioneer and leading interpreter, although in a sense all the preceding chapters lead up to and culminate in that one. Early on, initiated by Lenin himself, the communist rulers looked to mobilize Arab/Muslim societies by exporting revolution to them and igniting revolts against their Anglo-French colonial masters. Moscow’s efforts would readily, as Stalin thought, “Bolshevize” the Arab/Muslim masses. Thus as early as the 1920 meeting of the Communist International in Baku, Russian spokesmen fired up the delegates representing the “enslaved popular masses of the East” to launch “a really holy war [jihad] against the [colonial] robbers and oppressors”; they were to be roused to militant action by the warrior spirit of their ancestors and “the great conquering Caliphs of Islam” as well as the example of Genghis Khan(!). Together, Muslims and Marxists would “create a new civilization under the banner of Communism.” The “Manifesto” issued that same year repeatedly—like an instrument with one string sounding one note—called for “Holy War” on the part of the “Peoples of the East” and blasted the British Mandate of Palestine as “imperialism.” Visceral anti-Zionism made its Arab-Muslim debut. Though radically different in belief, Marxists and Islamists share a Manichean concept that divides the world into capitalists and exploited/oppressors and oppressed, who are locked in apocalyptic war until the messianic vision of universal social justice is inevitably achieved.

Forty years later, the Arabs and Iranians showed themselves to be attentive pupils of Soviet antisemitism and anti-Zionism, as they took up the corpus of Judaeophobia that runs the whole gamut from deicide to genocide. The Soviet propaganda mill invented the combination of Holocaust denial and Holocaust inversion—namely, that Zionists had collaborated with the Germans in murdering their own people and then committed genocide against Palestinians, making the Israelis into Nazis. This “Zionist Nazism” idea, Wistrich comments incisively, is the same conspiratorial formulation as Hitler’s “Jewish Bolshevism,” one segment of a ferocious anti-Zionism that utterly delegitimizes Israel and makes it the center of a global conspiracy, initially to destroy the USSR and the Soviet bloc, then adapted to make Israel the cat’s-paw of the United States in imperial domination of the Middle East and Third World. By the 1960s, the melding process of Marxism and Islam had proceeded sufficiently to produce Egyptian president Nasser’s fairly typical version of “Arab socialism,” an amalgam comprising nationalization of the Suez Canal, murderous destruction of Israel,
antipathy for the United States and the West, and alliance with Soviet Russia. In Iraq, the Baathist party and Saddam Hussein combined both hybrids (Islamo-Marxist and Islamo-Nazi), a weird eclecticism that drew on Arab-Muslim, Marxist-socialist, Stalinist, and Nazi motifs. An equally toxic fusion of Marxism and Islam, “Red Shiism,” was synthesized by Ali Shariati, the Paris-educated Iranian who exercised great influence over the future totalitarian dictator of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini. Shariati’s “Marxifying” made much of the example of the iconic Latin American Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara and heavily emphasized martyrdom, imparting to that traditional Muslim concept the morbid addiction to death and slaughter so endemic at present in the Middle East. Central to Khomeini’s worldview is the Marxist class warfare of oppressed versus oppressor, to which he annexed the Leninist model of a centrally directed revolutionary vanguard that seizes power, mobilizes the masses, and ignites world revolution by messianic jihad as well as the “crown” of the Trotskyite concept of “permanent revolution.” For Khomeini, the great obstacle and threat to fulfillment of Islam’s teleological goal are, predictably, the Jews: his antisemitism/anti-Zionism was as livid and fierce as that of any of the proponents of “Red Jihad.” Other examples of this bizarre Islamist-Marxist mixture will be found in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Palestine (Hamas and others), and Pakistan (Jamaat-i Islami and others). It also has not a few aficionados in Europe, academics and intellectuals of the stature of Michel Foucault as well as some NGOs in Britain and France and elsewhere. It is exemplified in Spain by the former Socialist prime minister José Zapatero; and, perhaps the strangest exemplar, the recently reelected dictator-president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. His state-sponsored antisemitism replays the whole antisemitic cacophony from “Christ-killers” to Holocaust denial and condemnation of Israel as “racist” and “Nazi”; Chávez takes many a cue from the Iranian propaganda mill and finds flattering allies and diplomatic leverage in fraternizing with presidents Ahmadinejad of Iran and Bashar al-Assad of Syria, as well as the Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah. Chávez’s “socialism” is more akin to state capitalism and the nationalization-confiscation of businesses and industries. The Chávas trinity is Marx, Muhammed, and “the descendants of those who crucified Christ.” One parts from Wistrich’s monumental treatise with a foreboding sense that the insidious power of Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” to shape attitudes, policies, and events has not ended.
*Frederick M. Schweitzer is professor emeritus of history at Manhattan College in the Bronx, NY. He is the co-editor, with Marvin Perry, of *Jewish-Christian Encounters over the Centuries* and the author of *A History of the Jews Since the First Century A.D.* as well as the landmark *Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present* (Palgrave Macmillan 2002) and *Antisemitic Myths* (Indiana Press 2008). He is currently completing a study of Benjamin Disraeli’s ideas on race, religion, and conspiracy.

Paul Reitter’s *On the Origins of Jewish Self-Hatred*  
166 pp. $26/£18.00

Steven K. Baum*

Be it a “heartbreak kid” or a whining Woody Allen character, the concept of Jewish self-hate has continued to perplex and elude readers. Recall Kurt Lewin (1941), or Sander L. Gilman’s major treatise (1986) on the subject, and we learn more than we care to know about the underlying social, philosophical, and conceptual analyses. Gilman’s book focused on “how Jews see the dominant society seeing them and how they project their anxiety about this manner of being seen onto other Jews as a means of externalizing their own status anxiety” (Gilman 11), just as Lewin noted on distinctions of Eastern European, Yiddish-speaking Ostjuden from their more sophisticated Western European counterparts. Adding insult to injury are the British anti-Zionist writers who argue that Israeli critics should not be considered self-hating Jews, e.g., Lerman (2008).

In the earlier works, we learned who was a Jew hating-Jew, but we still did not understand why it occurred. Enter Paul Reitter, professor of German at Ohio State University, who sets out to explain why the concept deserves further inquiry (Part 1). He then goes on in Part 2 to focus on a new name in the field, viz., Austrian journalist Anton Kuh, who coined the term *Jewish self-hate* in 1921. Kuh and Hanover physician Theodor Lessing, as Reitter notes in Part 3, in *Der jüdische Selbsthaß* (1930) offer “affirmative and even redemptive Ur-meanings” (Reitter 122)—for example, Lessing’s underscoring of the productive values of Jewish self-abnegation and
worldly alienation: “He [Lessing] refers to the Jew’s ‘creative self-hatred’ and their ‘self-hatred of genius,’ genius being something the Jews are incapable of in Lessing’s other writings on them” (117).

So, even at this point in history, we still do not have a clear understanding of why some Jews hate things Jewish. This is not the author’s fault—it is a scant literature, with not much written on the subject in the last fifty years. The reason for this is because, as Volkov (2006) suggests, Jewish self-hate rarely occurs. When one researcher administered a standard test of antisemitism to Jewish subjects, no Jews endorsed antisemitic themes (Baum 2010). The few studies that found slight statistical support for antisemitic ideas among Jews found themes of authoritarianism, parental rejection (Sarnoff 1951), and “distrust of others and a less than adequate sense of security” (Demarkovsky 1978, 58). To date, no one has offered comparative self-hates of other groups to Jews—e.g., Catholics who hate Catholicism, Hindus who are critical of Hinduism, and other examples of self-hate.

Jews who held contempt for Israel were not necessarily antisemitic, either. Gilman initially suggested that anti-Zionism was related to antisemitism, but the findings of the research studies are not consistent. Anti-Zionism may be statistically correlated with an increase in antisemitism (Baum 2009; Cohen, Jussim, Harber, and Bhasin 2009) but the correlations are at best moderate and far from the ideal 1:1. Other studies find no relationship between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, as Mick Finlay (2005) and the British hard left suggest. Though not a Jewish population per se, Wilhelm Kempf (2012) found subjects who held anti-Zionism views wanted peace and were not antisemitic. Suffice it to say that the two concepts of antisemitism and anti-Zionism may not at times be necessarily related.

Reitter’s On the Origins of Jewish Self-Hatred is well written and accomplishes what it set out to do—it offers an improved conceptual analysis and clarification surrounding the term “Jewish self-hate.” The reader is provided with new material. Reitter weaves an interesting narrative that enriches the history of Jewish self-hate literature. But if the reader is searching for the answer of why some Jews hate all things Jewish, it is fair to say that they will not find it in this book—and the mystery continues.

*Steven K. Baum is the editor in chief of the Journal for the Study of Antisemitism. He is the author of Antisemitism Explained (UPA, 2012) and co-editor, with Steven L. Jacobs and Florette Cohen, of Brill’s North American Antisemitism, Volume 15 (forthcoming).
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Coming Attractions: Caliphates?

Bat Ye’or’s Europe, Globalization, and the Coming Universal Caliphate
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Richard L. Rubenstein*

In the past few years, it has become all too apparent that the nations of the European Union (EU) have made a catastrophic mistake when they created a common, one-size-fits-all currency, the euro, ignoring the vast differences in productive capacity, financial resources, work habits, and culture of the member nations. The full consequences of this mistake have yet to unfold, but the instability in the world’s financial markets may be a foretaste of darker troubles ahead.

While the financial crisis has been recognized, a far worse error of judgment has yet to be acknowledged, at least by Europe’s leaders: the surrender of Europe’s cultural identity as a consequence of the introduction of a largely unassimilable Muslim population into the EU. According to the US Department of State’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 2005, the EU’s Muslim population numbered 23.2 million and has continued to increase since then. In France alone, the report estimated that there were between five and six million Muslims, about 10 percent of the population. Moreover, as Harvard historian Niall Ferguson has noted, the fundamental problem facing Europe’s indigenous population is “senescence.”

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This is not true of Europe’s Muslim population. With or without further immigration, it is expected to increase considerably. Moreover, as Bat Ye’or points out in her new book, *Europe, Globalization, and the Coming Universal Caliphate*, the rising number of Muslims constitute only a part of the problem. Far more worrisome have been the political, economic, and cultural motives that led to Europe’s fateful decision to permit this unprecedented mass immigration.

To explain that decision, Bat Ye’or begins with a discussion of the concept of *dhimmitude*, a term she characterizes as “concealed knowledge.” Although “few terms are as significant for the understanding of current events,” she reports that the term is “unknown by the general public and taboo in academia.” Dhimmitude, she argues, designates the civilizations “conquered by jihad and subject to sharia law.” It is Bat Ye’or’s conviction that the nations of the EU are now in the process of submitting to that subordination. Alternatively, as she demonstrates, dhimmitude can be understood as arguably the most effective and enduring system of religiously legitimated domination human beings have ever created.

A *dhimmi* is a non-Muslim belonging to the civilization of dhimmitude. Either he or his ancestors had surrendered to the armies of jihad and consequently lost their sovereignty and their territorial rights in exchange for “protection” in the form of a contract of surrender (*dhimma*) against jihad. Such protection renders dhimmis essentially powerless and subject to the humiliating conditions imposed upon them by their masters. It should be further noted that dhimmitude is a condition that can only be altered by a highly unlikely reversal of military fortune or, far more likely, conversion to Islam.

According to Bat Ye’or, the concept of dhimmitude is relevant today because, with the exception of Israel, Islam’s jihad ideology of world conquest is once again flourishing in every corner of the world, while the governments of most target nations are in denial concerning jihad’s existence and its global aspirations. Global jihad is driven by the 56-nation Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Since its creation in 1969, the OIC has been dedicated to the destruction of the State of Israel and to the eventual implementation of sharia over the Western world. The OIC’s often-stated objectives have not prevented either the European Union or the United States from seeking close ties with the organization. At least theoretically, dhimmitude represents an interim status in which Islam conditionally accepts defeated subject peoples into its midst, provided they abide by the controls and limitations imposed upon them by their Muslim overlords. This willingness on the part of Islam to create a religiously legitimated civilization of domination and submission is often misleadingly characterized as tolerance.
In 1990, the OIC issued the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. It represented the culmination of Muslim dissatisfaction with the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNHDR), a strictly secular document. The Preamble to the UN Declaration states: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Article 1 states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”

Both statements are clearly contrary to the fundamental tenets of Islam, where there is no such thing as the “inherent dignity” or the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.” Neither the unbeliever nor the dhimmi have “inalienable rights,” nor can such “rights” be the “foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.” In Islam, Allah is the source of human rights, all of which are conditional upon faithful obedience to his law as expressed in sharia and the hadiths.

This was clearly understood by Muslim leaders at the UN in 1948, but at the time there was little they could do about it. On December 7, 1984, however, Said Rajaie-Khorassani, the Iranian ambassador to the UN, declared that the UNHDR represented “a secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition” that could not be implemented by Muslims. He argued that “human dignity could not be reduced to a series of secular norms and that Iran recognized no authority or power but that of Almighty God and no legal tradition apart from Islamic law.”

The sectarian character of the Cairo Declaration is clear. Article 24 states: “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari’a.” Lest there be any doubt about the intent of the Cairo Declaration, Article 25 states: “The Islamic Shari’a is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration [emphasis added].”

In Europe, Globalization, and the Coming Universal Caliphate, Bat Ye’or cites Bassam Tibi, a world-class Muslim scholar, to clarify how utterly different the Cairo Declaration is from the UNHDR. According to Tibi, “Peace only exists between Muslims, and not between Muslims and non-Muslims [and] non-believers can only achieve peace with Muslims through conversion or submission (dhimmitude).” Tibi further explains that for a Muslim, “striving in the path of Allah to spread Islam in the world [aka jihad] is not war but a pious, just action and a religious duty.” Hence, non-Muslims who obstruct their nation’s Islamization must be considered aggressors. They are to blame for their resistance to Muslim conquest. Put differently, a non-Muslim who remains faithful to his own inherited tradition is ipso facto guilty of failing to accept the “truth” of Islam. By resisting Allah’s will and compelling Muslims to wage jihad against them, they
alone bear the full guilt for the hostilities.” As Bat Ye’or comments, the logic espoused by the OIC is completely at odds with the secular values of the nations of the European Union:

There is in reality an unbridgeable gap between the way European scholars see both their own history of imperial conquest and Islam’s. Although the facts are known by both the Europeans and their Muslim counterparts, Muslims see their own conquests as historically beneficial for both conquerors and conquered alike, beneficial to the conquered because defeat offered them the opportunity to convert to the sole true religion and serve the only true God. Since the whole world is considered a waqf, a trust bestowed by Allah, its Creator, on those who obey him, military conquest and the harsh measures inflicted upon the vanquished are entirely just. In reality, what non-believers regard as conquest is, in reality, restoration to its proper owners, since Islam regards the vanquished as the true usurpers.

Western scholars have tended to regard Western imperialism and conquest as the illegitimate seizure of what was not theirs. Hence, they often feel that they must make amends to formerly conquered peoples. Unfortunately, such expressions of guilt only confirm Muslims in their conviction that they have been the historically aggrieved party and that Islam has done no wrong in its conquests.

In reality, competent Western scholars have been fully aware of the history of Muslim aggression and conquest, but they have been reluctant to spell it out. It is government policy in both the EU and the United States to characterize acts of violence committed by Islamist terrorists as “extremism,” as if there were no religious motivation involved. Thus, when on November 5, 2009, Major Nidal Hassan gunned down 45 service personnel, killing 13, at Fort Hood, Texas, while shouting, “Allahhu Akhbar,” he was charged with murder and attempted murder but not terrorism. Unfortunately, authorities in the West are all too often in extreme denial when it comes to identifying Islamist terrorism.

Bat Ye’or claims that such denial has been a deliberate strategic choice. In the case of the EU, it has served as the basis of a policy of rapprochement with the Arab and Muslim world for forty years. That policy has been implemented through multilateralism, namely, “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states,” and multiculturalism, the doctrine that several different cultures can coexist as equals within a single state. Unfortunately, as Bat Ye’or argues, Europe’s multiculturalism is more of a surrender of its own indigenous culture to Islam than genuine coexistence. Moreover, a principal aspect of that surrender has been the EU’s intensified hostility toward Israel and, to a certain
extent, the United States. Because of its unique history and the hazards of its geography, Israel could not possibly abandon its sovereignty as have the EU nations.

Given Israel’s size in comparison to the vast territories conquered by Islam, Bat Ye’or asks, “Why would [Muslims] keep plotting to destroy Israel” and “do so with such poisonous hatred?” Why, she asks, “is Israel considered so alarming?” There have been many attempts to answer that question. This writer has attempted to offer an answer from social psychology, namely, the rage experienced by so many Muslims that a people whom they have known primarily as dhimmis and, as such, have been the objects of contempt and/or condescension for fourteen hundred years should have defeated Muslims militarily not once but several times since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948.6

Undoubtedly there is more to it than that, and Bat Ye’or offers a very credible answer from the perspective of the history of religion and theology: “What Israel possesses is the Bible that Muhammad claimed was the unaltered version of the Koran [sic] uncreated and consubstantial with Allah before Jews and Christians falsified it” [emphasis added]. The Muslim claim is astounding. Documents that were written in most instances more than a thousand years before Muhammad appeared on the scene are regarded in Islam as deliberate falsifications of the Qur’an. As is well known, there are irreconcilable discrepancies between narratives in the Bible and the Qur’an. In the Hebrew Scriptures, the patriarch Abraham is commanded by God to offer his son Isaac on Mt. Moriah in Jerusalem (Gen. 22:1-18). At a very early stage in the Islamic tradition, it was determined that Abraham was commanded to sacrifice Ishmael, not Isaac, at Mount Mina near Mecca. Rejecting historical evidence, Muslims solved the discrepancy between the Bible and Qu’ran by claiming that the Qur’an was the original Torah and that Jews and Christians are guilty of tahrif, that is, distorting the actual biblical text or its meaning.

Moreover, as Bat Ye’or points out, while the land of the Bible is replete with the original names of the towns, villages, and places cited in the Bible, no town or village in Israel is mentioned in the Qur’an or in the biographies of Muhammad. Nevertheless, Muslims claim Palestine as an originally Muslim land usurped by the Hebrews in ancient times and once again by the Jews in modern times. As a result, any attempt to assert the historical connection of contemporary Israeli history and settlement with the Bible is regarded by Islam as a profound act of usurpation that must be terminated by the rightful possessors of the land, the Muslims.

Thus, there is in Islam an unconditional imperative to destroy Israel’s history by destroying any trace of continuity between contemporary and ancient Israel in order to recover the land’s alleged Islamic past. Nor can
this be done without Islamizing Christian origins as well, which Muslims claim are properly depicted in the Qur’an and not in the Bible. Even when Muslims refer to the three “Abrahamitic” religions, ostensibly as a means of facilitating dialogue, they are not creating a neutral space where Jews, Christians, and Muslims can meet as equals, something that Jewish and Christian partners in dialogue tend to overlook. As Bat Ye’or reminds us, “Muslims insist that Abraham is a prophet of Islam rather than a Patriarch and “the father of many nations . . .” (Gen. 17:5). Similarly, Jesus is Isa, also a prophet of Islam, and not the divine-human person of the Trinity.

Since the Israeli victory in the Six Day War of 1967 and especially after the 1973 war, Europeans have tended to call Israelis “colonizers” and “occupiers.” They thereby deny any Jewish historical or religious connection to the land in spite of both the testimony of the Bible and the accumulated evidence of excavations, artifacts, inscriptions, and ancient manuscripts from the Biblical period testifying to its Hebrew roots. In contrast, there is neither effort nor serious interest among Muslims to find concrete evidence validating their claims about the Qur’an as the original document. Of course, no such scientific or scholarly validation is necessary because of the dogmatic character of Islam’s claims and the harsh penalties that can be inflicted on those who publicly question such claims.

For two millennia, Jewish memory of the loss of Jerusalem and the Land of Israel and yearning for its restoration have been expressed in daily and Holy Day prayers and ritual. Moreover, there has been a deep Christian attachment to the land, the prophets, and the heroes of Israel. Unfortunately, there have been Palestinian Christians and their Western accomplices who today are more than willing to cooperate in denying any intrinsic connection between the Bible and modern Israel. As I read about these efforts, I was reminded of the efforts of the Nazi-era Deutsche Christen to de-Judaize Scripture—and, as we shall see, the connection is far-fetched.

Having offered a theological explanation of Muslim attempts to deny any connection between contemporary Israel and its biblical counterpart, Bat Ye’or turns to the subject of Europe’s cooperation with Muslim hostility to both Israel and Jews. She claims that the European Economic Community’s Arab policy was situated “in a precise, strategic, coordinated framework called the Euro-Arab Dialogue” that was in turn the fruit of agreements between the nine EEC governments and the countries of the Arab League in 1973-75. That framework defined a semi-official, quasi-secret policy that had the effect of transforming Europe politically and demographically into Eurabia. Her pathfinding views were first published in French in December 2002 in an article entitled in English “The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Birth of Eurabia.” They have since been expanded in 2005 in a book, Eurabia, in which she argued that the mass Muslim immi-
migration that began in the 1970s fit into a European ideology that aimed at the creation of a unified Euro-Arab Mediterranean civilization, Eurabia. Her analysis rejected the conventional wisdom that Muslim immigration, an unprecedented demographic upheaval, was a consequence of European guilt for the Holocaust and the determination not to turn its back on the contemporary victims of economic and political misfortune. Inevitably, the introduction of a very large population ethnically and religiously alien to the European mainstream resulted in considerable opposition from elements of the indigenous population. This led to the accusation that those opposed to the mass Muslim migration were guilty of the same sort of racism that led to the Holocaust.

In reality, the extermination of Europe’s Jews in 1940-1945 and the mass migration of Muslims to Europe starting in the 1970s were in no sense comparable. Mass Muslim migration, the demographic outcome of Eurabia, grew out of a Euro-Arab alliance against Israel that was allied to an Arab policy whose unconditional objective was Israel’s destruction. The Euro-Arab alliance was the source of a fundamentally Judaeophobic policy and culture in Europe, complete with attacks on Jewish targets perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists working under the protection of European police and security services, at a time when a former officer Reinhard Heydrich’s Sicherheitsdienst, Paul Dickopf, was president of Interpol (1968-1972). We return to Dickopf and his Nazi associates below.

The creation of Eurabia entailed a Euro-Arab alliance that sought with considerable success to revive European antisemitism. Nevertheless, its fundamental objectives were far more encompassing. It sought to replace Europe’s nation states with an order of world governance managed by unelected, unaccountable international bodies.

Although the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) negotiations that led to the creation of Eurabia have never been made public, according to Bat Ye’or, the movement is known to have started in France in the 1960s among the French Catholic left and the Quai D’Orsay, the French Foreign Office. These organizations sponsored pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Europe, Lebanon, and Cairo that recalled the collaboration of Nazi and fascist regimes in the 1930s and during World War II with Muslim political and religious leaders.

According to Bat Ye’or, during the war, the Germans found that Muslim defectors and prisoners of war from a region then known as Soviet Turkestan, but comprising present-day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, bitterly resented their communist overlords and saw the Nazis as liberators.9 The Nazis also found a powerful ally in Haj Amin al-Huseini, mufti of Jerusalem from 1921 to 1937. After participating in the leadership of a failed, pro-Nazi coup in Iraq in May 1941, the
mufti made his way to Berlin, with a brief stay in Rome, during which time he met Benito Mussolini. Upon arriving in Berlin, he had a 95-minute meeting with Hitler that was attended by Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Nazi foreign minister. The mufti established his wartime headquarters, the Büro des Grossmufti, in Berlin and actively cooperated in the creation and indoctrination of a Muslim Waffen SS division in Bosnia in 1941. In addition to his meetings with Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, the mufti was in close contact with officers of the SS organization directly responsible for the implementation of the so-called Final Solution.

In addition to the British, the Muslims and the Nazis had two other common enemies, the Soviet Union and the Jews. After the war, some of the most committed Nazis, such as Johan von Leers, who converted to Islam, and Alois Brünner continued the war against the Jews in Egypt and Syria. In the 1960s, the Quai d’Orsay and the French Catholic left sponsored numerous pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Europe, Lebanon, and Cairo. These activities reawakened the Euro-Arab relationships that had fostered active wartime collaboration between the Nazi and fascist regimes in Europe and Arab religious and political leaders, especially the Palestinians. This renewed activism recalled the Nazi-Muslim partnership against the Soviet Union that developed during the war. In 1941 Hitler had appointed Alfred Rosenberg head of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete (Reich minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories). His colleague, Gerhard von Mende, director of the Ostministerium, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, became the architect of the collaboration between the Wehrmacht and the battalions made up of defecting Muslim soldiers from the region that today comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.10

In spite of German-Jewish rapprochement, especially under Chancellor Willy Brandt (1963-1974), former Nazis and their sympathizers found places at the highest levels of the German and French governments. A sense of solidarity was revived between the former Nazis and their collaborators and their wartime Arab partners in enmity toward both America and the Jews. This development was encouraged by the Quai d’Orsay, which regarded the possibility of a Euro-Arab alliance as a means of diminishing and eventually eliminating American influence in Europe.

In November 1970, in a lecture given in Cairo, Georges Montaron, editor of the left-wing Catholic journal Témoignage chrétien, offered his formula for countering the pro-Israel sentiment then largely prevalent in the countries of the European Union. He told his audience: “If you manage to make authentic Frenchmen or authentic Englishmen be at the same time authentic Eastern Arabs, how great will then be your influence.” Montaron was correct. Massive Muslim immigration into Europe was an important
factor in transforming European politics and diplomacy. He was, however, mistaken in assuming that the vast majority of Arab immigrants had any interest in becoming “authentic Frenchmen or authentic Englishmen.” As Bat Ye’or makes clear, Muslims did not come to Europe to assimilate to Western secular culture. Willy-nilly, the effect of the unprecedented mass migration was to resume a 1,400-year-old struggle for Islamic religio-political dominance—and it is Bat Ye’or’s contention that they are largely succeeding.

Montaron’s Cairo speech was an indication of what some European elites were thinking, but more than a lecture was necessary to effect the transformation. Israel’s victory in the Six Day War of June 1967 can arguably be seen as one of the turning points. In the 1950s, there was a tacit alliance between France and Israel. France was Israel’s principal weapons supplier. Most of the Israeli aircraft employed in the 1967 war were manufactured by the French firm Dassault. Moreover, the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona was built with French cooperation and assistance in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The tacit French-Israeli alliance coincided with the bitter counter-insurgency war France fought to suppress the Algerian independence movement. When the war ended, De Gaulle attempted to maintain his ties to Israel while cultivating political and economic relations with the Arabs. The balancing act became untenable with the Arab-Israeli war. De Gaulle announced his pro-Arab choice in his semi-annual press interview on November 25, 1967, in which he denounced Israel for its preemptive strike against its Arab enemies and characterized the Jews as “an elite people, self-assured and domineering.” As Raymond Aaron later wrote, “General de Gaulle has knowingly and deliberately initiated a new phase in Jewish history and perhaps of anti-Semitism.” As Aaron, previously a political ally of De Gaulle, understood, De Gaulle was not interested in separating antisemitism from anti-Zionism. He was putting the Jews of France on notice. From then on, France took the lead in fostering a Euro-Arab alliance based on hostility to Israel, the United States, and Europe’s Jews.

Having failed to defeat the Israelis militarily in the 1973 war, the Arabs turned to their “oil weapon.” A series of hikes in the price of crude oil was combined with an embargo against the shipment of petroleum to the United States, which had supplied Israel with replacement weapons to counter Soviet shipments to Egypt and Syria. The oil embargo was also enforced against those countries, such as the Netherlands, that had permitted American aircraft carrying military supplies to Israel to refuel at their air bases. NATO allies that had refused to permit US aircraft to refuel, such as Britain, France, and Germany, were exempt from the embargo. The countries of the European Community quickly fell into line and adopted a uniformly hostile policy toward Israel.
According to Bat Ye’or, October 1973 is a “key date” when Europe definitely took sides “with the Arab League’s jihad against the Jewish state.” On November 6, 1973, the EC issued its Brussels Declaration, calling upon Israel to withdraw to its 1949 armistice lines, a call echoed by President Barack Obama in 2012. The EC also officially recognized the “rights” of the Palestinians, who, Bat Ye’or points out, were in fact a “newly created people” hitherto known simply as Arabs. In the same month, a British and a French parliamentarian began an initiative whose purpose was to improve Europe’s relations with the Arab world. The two organized a conference in Paris in March 1975 that brought together 33 parliamentarians from seven of the nine EC countries and was the origin of the Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation (PAEAC).

Out of the PAEAC came the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), characterized by Bat Ye’or as “the founding body of Eurabia.” Arab parliamentarians set up a counterpart organization to the PAEAC, the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU) to reinforce cooperation between the Arabs and the Europeans. The policies were particularly supported by Arab Christians, some of whose religious leaders sought to employ a specious “Palestinian liberation theology” to separate Christianity from Judaism and Islamize Christianity.

The pro-Arab policy was strongly backed by France and Germany. Nevertheless, before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a number of EC countries did not share the French and German policies. In addition to the oil embargo, it took a series of plane hijackings and repeated Palestinian acts of terror on European soil to convince hitherto reluctant European nations to conclude alliances with the Arab League countries, which included the following points of agreement:

- Recognition of the PLO at a time when the latter organization’s charter rejected the very fact of Israel.
- Cooling off of relations with the United States as a condition of Euro-Arab rapprochement.
- And, politically the most consequential, approval of a policy of large-scale Arab immigration into Europe.

In addition, European Jews and their institutions were subjected to attacks, partly facilitated by indifferent public authorities, in public places and schools. Or so it seems, but we now know that there was active connivance on the part of important European authorities with Palestinian and other Muslim terrorists. Bat Ye’or makes known something of the extent of the malicious betrayal of a community that was under the illusion that they enjoyed the protection of their own government on territory under its con-
For example, at the end of the war, the Italian government offered all Jews on Italian soil full citizenship. Almost all declined. They understood that in times of stress, citizenship as a minority in a European nation-state might prove as worthless as had been that of Germany’s Jews.

The sad wisdom was partially validated by a July 8, 2008, interview in Corriere della Sera by Francesco Cossiga, who served in a series of Italian government positions from 1976 to 1992 as minister of the interior, prime minister, president of the Senate, president of the republic, and senator for life. In the interview, Cossiga revealed the existence of an agreement dating from the early 1970s between prime minister Aldo Moro and Yasser Arafat’s PLO in which the PLO was granted the freedom to come and go, as well as stock weapons on Italian soil, in exchange for immunity for Italy’s domestic and foreign interests. Cossiga admitted that Italian Jews had been excluded from that protection. The results were soon forthcoming. On October 9, 1982, six terrorists fired on members of Rome’s Great Synagogue, wounding dozens and killing a two-year-old child. The congregation’s police protection had been withdrawn several hours before the attack. There were other such attacks. One of the worst was the Strage di Bologna (massacre at the Bologna Railway Station), in which 85 were killed and 200 wounded. Italian authorities blamed neo-fascists, but in his interview Cossiga acknowledged that the railroad station explosion was an accident and that the real perpetrators were members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who had intended to target Jews, not Italians, with their explosives. The Italian government made no attempt to prosecute the perpetrators. In December 1985, Palestinian terrorists killed 16 people and wounded 13 at the El Al ticket counter at the Rome airport. (Bat Ye’or incorrectly writes that “eighty people” were killed, but the pattern was the same.) According to Cossiga, Italian security agencies received prior warning of the attack but did not bother to share their information with the Israelis.

There were other horror stories, not confined to Italy. The massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics was one of the most spectacular Palestinian terror attacks. On July 23, 2012, the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel revealed that there were “Explicit warnings that a terrorist attack might take place at the 1972 Munich Olympics.” On the basis of “previously classified documents” made available to Der Spiegel by various official agencies, the journal was able to assert that there were extraordinary efforts to cover up the extent of the failure of German authorities to prevent the murder of the Israelis. There had been a number of accurate warnings that an Olympic attack was being planned. For example, the same issue of Der Spiegel noted that on August 14, 1972, three weeks before the Olympic Games, a German embassy officer in Beirut reported
that “an incident would be staged from the Palestinian side during the Games in Munich. On September 2, three days before the athletes were taken hostage, the Italian publication Gente wrote that Black September was planning a “sensational act during the Olympic Games.” The prediction proved accurate, but it was ignored for several days by German authorities.

The unwillingness of German authorities to act upon available information concerning the peril facing the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics becomes more understandable when one considers the role of so-called “former” Nazis in both the German police and Interpol. Bat Ye’or draws our attention to Paul Dickopf (1910-1973). As a young man in the nineteen thirties, Dickopf was a fully committed Nazi, a member of both the Sturmabteilung (Brown Shirts) and the SS. He began his police career in 1937 in the Kriminal-Polizei (Kripo), which during the Third Reich was under the control of the SS. In 1939, Dickopf, by then an officer, became a member of the general SS. There is little record of his wartime activities because his SS file for the period is, not surprisingly, incomplete.

After the war, Dickopf continued his police career. As Bat Ye’or points out, in 1965 Dickopf became head of the German criminal police, Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), and from 1968 to 1972 served as president of Interpol, a position he had gotten with the support of the Arab States. His former Nazi connections proved no obstacle. It is worth noting that in 1938, Interpol, previously headquartered in Vienna, was moved to Berlin at the time of the Anschluss. Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the agency responsible for the implementation of the Final Solution, became Interpol’s president. After his assassination in 1942, he was succeeded by Arthur Nebe, a senior SS officer who played a major role in the extermination of both Jews and Gypsies. Nebe was succeeded as president in 1943 by Ernst Kaltenbruner, condemned to death at the Nuremberg trials. According to Bat Ye’or, under Dickopf “Interpol did nothing to stop [Arab] terrorism, nor the wave of hijacked planes and the 1972 Munich massacre of the Israeli athletes.”

Bat Ye’or also characterizes the EU’s appeasement policy as “Palestination.” Unelected EU officials sought to create a common domestic and foreign policy for the states on both sides of the Mediterranean. It was, of course, an impossible enterprise. There was no way that the policies of the relatively secular EU nations that extend full equality of status to Muslims could be harmonized with those of the Muslim nations in which only Islam
has full legitimacy and whose ultimate objective is to create a world in which Islam is universally dominant.

The obvious contradiction between the Enlightenment culture of Europe and its Muslim partners does not appear to trouble the European leadership. The endemic, religiously legitimated violence present in Muslim societies has been habitually explained as due to “root causes,” such as the alleged humiliation, deprivation, and “injustice” caused by the Israeli occupation of what is claimed to be Arab land. Unlike postwar Germany, which finally came to accept defeat and which makes no right-of-return claims regarding formerly German lands and settlements, the Palestinians, and for that matter a goodly portion of the Muslim world, has been unable to regard the military strength of the Israelis, gained in the face of constantly repeated threats of annihilation, as anything but injustice and undeserved humiliation. There are, of course, good reasons, both political and religious, for the refusal. For the Palestinians to accept defeat, they would have had to experience a breakdown as complete as was the German defeat in 1945, but that came after two horrendous world wars, the bloodiest in human history. The principal contenders in the European war shared a common religious inheritance that even National Socialism could not obliterate.

The Israelis and Palestinians share no common religious inheritance, and the Palestinians have a theological motive for a permanent state of war. It is succinctly stated in Article 11 of the Charter of Hamas: “. . . the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [trust] consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day.” The charter further states: “This Waqf remains as long as earth and heaven remain.” There is no place for secularized wiggle room here. Moreover, as Bat Ye’or points out, the “root causes” strategy has a further utility. It allows the perpetrators and their accomplices to shift blame to their victims. A similar strategy is effective in the widespread attempt to criminalize “Islamophobia” so that the accusation can serve as a strategic weapon with which Muslims seek to control what can and cannot be said about Islam. This is evident in the efforts of the OIC and its Western allies to get the UN to declare Islamophobia a punishable crime. And, as we have seen, the alleged “root causes” are said to be the poverty, humiliation, frustration, and “injustice” that the Israelis have alleged to have inflicted upon the Palestinians.

According to Bat Ye’or, a major consequence of the EU’s attempt to utilize unelected networks of parliamentarians, bureaucrats, and assorted other participants in the Euro-Arab Dialogue to harmonize important aspects of EU domestic and foreign policy with those of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has been the subordination of European policy and even sovereignty to the OIC. While the EU has worked earnestly to accommodate the religious, cultural, and political demands of the OIC,
there has been absolutely no reciprocity. For example, Muslim are free to practice and proselytize their religion in Europe, but no such freedom exists for Christians in Muslim lands. Bat Ye’or argues that the EU has had “zero influence” in the Muslim world, whereas the EU has made every attempt to accommodate Muslim religious and political sensibilities. Put simply, since the 1970s the Europeans have been acting like dhimmis in their own countries. And, central to this Christian-Muslim rapprochement has been the claim, continually asserted by the OIC and parroted by the EU, that Israel is the principal instigator of “war, terror, and injustice” throughout the world. In spite of a history of fourteen hundred years of Christian-Muslim conflict and combat, the newly reconciled EU holds that “Israel is the only obstacle to peace between Islam and Christianity.” The result has been that de facto, if not de jure, the OIC seems to be “restoring in the 21st Century the Caliphate, the Supreme Controlling body of all Muslims.”

Bat Ye’or is not optimistic about the future of Europe and, to some extent, an Obama-led United States. She shares her concerns with her readers in her conclusion:

While writing this review, I was reminded of a question that greatly troubled me twenty-five years ago when researching Les Chrétientés d’Orient entre jihad et dhimmitude (1991). How did Christian peoples and states, some with powerful armies and the richest cultures of their times, collapse when faced with the onslaught of jihad and dhimmitude from the seventh to the fifteenth centuries? Now I no longer ask myself this question. The breakdown process that I used to study and documented in old chronicles I have seen taking place in today’s Europe. When I examined the past I saw it repeated in the present, under my very eyes. Indeed, the present situation is reminiscent of the one that followed the Muslim conquests. Keeping Christian officials in their positions maintained a semblance of continuity. Behind their foggy screen, Islamization could penetrate within every stratum of the vanquished societies. With time, however, the collapse of this edifice revealed the true role of these ministers, whose job was to enforce upon their people the caliphate’s orders, under pain of death. I was missing one essential link in the chain of events: the motivations of human beings that lead them in an unswerving direction within the chaos of events, the undeviating route toward an ultimate objective. Now this link is revealed in the mix of fears, cowardice, corruption, hatred and short-term ambitions that within the space of forty years have led Europe along the road to Eurabia, an interim stage in an even more profound change.

Bat Ye’or has once again written an important book that both requires and rewards diligent study. She has uncovered a process, largely hidden from public view, by which the national identity of the nations of Europe is
in the process of being progressively and surreptitiously wiped out while the religio-political identity of the Muslim *ummah* [nation] is being unified and strengthened through the OIC and the UN with its 56 Muslim member nations. The goals of the OIC, which Bat Ye’or characterizes as “the modern associative Caliphate,” are clear, global Muslim religio-political supremacy and the destruction of Israel. She has warned us that it has happened before and that conditions are ripe for a contemporary repetition.

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*Richard L. Rubenstein is president emeritus and Distinguished Professor of Religion at the University of Bridgeport; he is also Lawton Distinguished Professor of Religion Emeritus at Florida State University. He received his rabbinical ordination from the Jewish Theological Seminary, a master of theology degree (STM) from Harvard Divinity School, and a PhD in the history and philosophy of religion from Harvard’s Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; he was also a fellow at Yale’s National Humanities Institute. Rubenstein is a JSA Board member and contributor. His most recent book is *Jihad and Genocide* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).

**ENDNOTES**


17. Ibid., 165.

18. Ibid., 183.
Alexander Traum*

Given the alphabet soup of agencies, bureaus, and commissions that is the federal government, perhaps it is no surprise that there is a position focused exclusively on fighting antisemitism. In his new book, Gregg Rickman, the inaugural special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism at the US State Department, shows why combating the anti-Jewish hatred demands a singular focus by America’s foreign policy apparatus. Part social science, part memoir, Rickman’s *Hating the Jews* details the distinct challenges in confronting an animus that traverses religious, national, and political boundaries.

In May 2006, Rickman, a former congressional staffer who had led the Swiss Banks investigation, was sworn in as the State Department’s special envoy. The position was the brainchild of a bipartisan group of legislators who for years stood at the forefront of the fight: the late senator George Voinovich, the late congressman and Holocaust survivor Tom Lantos, and congressman Chris Smith. Rickman explains that despite congressional support, officials at the State Department opposed the position’s creation. In an internal memo, these un-named officials warned that a position concentrated on the plight of a single people—i.e., the Jews—would create issues of “imbalance, favoritism, [and] diminished credibility.” As Rickman dem-
onstrates in this relatively slim volume, the phenomenon of contemporary antisemitism, at once simple and complex, fixed and evolving, subtle and brazen, requires such specialized attention.

The book spans the globe. Rickman takes his readers on a tour of the classical antisemitism that flourishes in the Arab and Muslim world and, due to representational voting, dominates international institutions like the United Nations’ General Assembly and the affiliated Human Rights Council; the antisemitism imported to Europe via mass immigration from that world and the European fixation on multiculturalism that ignores, if not encourages, this hostility; and the violence that confronts public displays of Jewishness in the former Soviet Union, where leaders cavalierly dismiss such attacks as mere expressions of youthful rebellion or “hooliganism.”

Though his survey is broad, Rickman acknowledges that not all antisemitism is created equal. To his credit, Rickman does not shy away from recognizing that the most potent and prevalent manifestations of antisemitism today emanate from the Arab and Muslim communities of the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and Europe. Rickman presents a compelling argument of why leaders should recognize the reality of antisemitism and not fear demonization. Communities and even cultures must be vulnerable to criticism.

Rickman’s account of contemporary antisemitism and its multifaceted manifestations is hardly novel, borrowing from the popular press, academic literature, governmental reports, and the efforts of non-governmental organizations. Yet, Rickman’s succinct and well-structured compilation of this previous work, coupled with his own observations as special envoy, makes for a compelling read.

Not content to merely diagnose and dissect the disease, Rickman prescribes five antidotes that, although not curing the scourge of antisemitism, can help to alleviate its symptoms. First, governments need to “enforce the laws that are on the books regarding hate crimes, crimes against property, and of course crimes against persons” and conduct thorough investigations and prosecutions in the wake of antisemitic crimes. Second, European countries should not “lump hatred of Jews, Muslims, and Christians into one overriding category of hatred” but rather recognize the unique characteristics of antisemitism, just as governments ought to recognize the distinct aspects of those other hatreds. Third, criticism of Israel “is acceptable as long as it is based on fact, not ethnic, racial, or non-political reasons”; blaming Jews collectively for the actual or perceived faults of Israel is unacceptable. Fourth, European governments need to accurately collect data on antisemitic attacks and train their law enforcement to recognize antisemitic attacks for what they are. Fifth, the double standard that exists at
the United Nations and its affiliated institutions, where Israel is perpetually demonized and delegitimized, must be curbed.

Though these policy proposals are certainly appealing, Rickman is short on the details of how such proposals can be effected. This vagueness allows Rickman to avoid some of the more challenging policy choices. For example, how should the United States hold foreign governments accountable for perpetuating or ignoring antisemitic incitement and violence? Should foreign aid be tied to the prevalence of state-sanctioned antisemitism? Similarly, should the United States withhold financial or other support to the United Nations for its constant confrontations with fellow member-state Israel? Or should the United States encourage the UN-affiliated International Criminal Court to prosecute antisemitic agitators like Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the crime of incitement to genocide? Do the anti-Holocaust denial laws of many European states, though commendable in intent, actually reduce antisemitism or instead martyrize the deniers? Surely, questions like these are by no means simple or straightforward.

Regrettably, readers of Rickman’s new book do not fully benefit from the author’s unique experience and insight as these particularly thorny issues are not even raised.

Despite the book’s shortcomings, the book is a welcome addition to the burgeoning literature on contemporary global antisemitism. Rickman successfully navigates the complex phenomenon of antisemitism early in the 21st century. The book concisely reviews various theories on the presence and persistence of antisemitism today while offering personal anecdotes from America’s former diplomat charged with combating the world’s oldest hatred.

*Alexander Traum is a student at Fordham University School of Law and a former Brechner Legal Fellow at the Anti-Defamation League.*
Before There Was a “Christian” Jesus

Daniel Boyarin’s
_The Jewish Gospels: The Story of the Jewish Christ_

John Pawlikowski*

Daniel Boyarin has been on the cutting edge of scholarship regarding the initial era of the Christian-Jewish relationship. This new work represents the boldest vision of the nexus between Judaism and early Christian theology to date.

Boyarin presents his perspectives in a basically popular style, which makes the book very readable beyond the scholarly world. Yet he does provide comprehensive references and notes for those who may look at the text with more scholarly glasses.

In his introduction, Boyarin sets out a bold assertion. The notion of Jesus as Divine Messiah—in fact, the earliest version of Christology—is profoundly Jewish in its core. The seeds of what became incarnational and trinitarian thought were present in the Jewish world in which Jesus was born. For Boyarin, the Council of Nicea first created a powerful wedge between Jewish beliefs and a newly emergent Orthodox Christianity. In effect, according to Boyarin, Nicea parented Christianity as we know it today and in a strange way defined the limits of Jewish identity as well. Previous options that combine the belief and practice of Christianity with a continuing Jewish context were firmly sealed off. Often, antisemitism was used by church leaders and thinkers to reinforce this totally new separate identity, which crystallized in the years between Nicea and the Council of Constantinople.

In the first thematic chapter of the book, Boyarin explores the meaning of the terms “Son of God” and “Son of Man” in their Jewish context and the
application to Jesus. He argues that Christian writers have generally misinterpreted these terms. “Son of God” referred to the earthly King David’s seat, not to Jesus’s divine nature. It was the title “Son of Man,” rooted in the vision of the book of Daniel, that gave Jesus his divine dimension. Boyarin maintains that the Jewish tradition at the time of Jesus would be a God/Man. With such an assertion, Boyarin significantly undercuts one of the supposed classical distinctions between Judaism and Christianity.

In his reflections on Son of God/Son of Man, Boyarin raises Christology’s significance of the Sabbath healing of a deformed man’s arm. The rabbis, he insists, allow for the same exception as Jesus, though they appear to have sanctioned violation of the Sabbath law when it saved a fellow Jew. On the other hand, Jesus seemed to extend that to all human beings. For Boyarin, this is a case of Jesus as Lord of the Sabbath as envisioned by the eschatological Daniel. In effect, Jesus was not breaking the Sabbath law as much as fulfilling its full meaning according to Daniel; thus, there is considerable meshing among messianic notions in Daniel—e.g., messianic interpretations of Jesus in the gospels and messianic understandings found in post-biblical Jewish literature, such as Enoch and Fourth Ezra.

These documents clearly reveal, Boyarin notes, a Christological “job description” that was well fashioned before it was applied to Jesus. That is why a substantial number of Jews at the time were willing to accept his claims to divine messiahship. The Book of Enoch becomes a critical text for a linkage between Jewish messianic understanding and that found in the New Testament. Hence, Boyarin devotes an entire chapter to First Enoch plus Fourth Ezra.

Boyarin concludes that in fact there is nothing new about the Christological vision applied to Jesus—that it is actually old in terms of Jewish tradition. What is new is Jesus and the declaration that he has assumed the Christological vision articulated in Daniel, First Enoch, and Fourth Ezra.

In a chapter intriguingly titled “Did Jesus Keep Kosher?,” Boyarin introduces an important distinction between keeping kosher and maintaining purity laws—a distinction integral to Jewish tradition. As Boyarin sees it, Jesus’s battles with the Pharisees had to do with keeping kosher and maintaining purity. Contrary to what has been the prevailing view on the Pharisees’ relationship to Jesus, Boyarin insists that Jesus found them not from a liberal but a conservative perspective. Jesus stood for tradition; the Pharisees stood for modification of certain practices.

In my judgment, the reasoning in Jesus and the Pharisees is the weakest part of the book. Unlike the theological questions, where Boyarin provides considerable textual support, not much evidence is put forth here, and there are no other views of Phariseeism presented. Nonetheless, his thesis should be given a hearing.
The final chapter takes up the notion of the suffering Christ and links to the Jewish tradition. Once more, Boyarin argues for a deep-seated tradition of Midrash from the Book of Daniel. He strongly affirms that such “suffering” was commonplace in Jewish thought regarding the people of Israel—not a messianic figure and a minority viewpoint until modernity.

Boyarin has presented both Jewish and Christian scholars with a considerable challenge. While some of his claims need further discussion and textual evidence, his perspectives and ideas cannot be ignored. His views have severely cracked—perhaps even begun—the actual destruction of the theological wall that has separated Jews and Christians for centuries, and for this he should be commended.

*John Pawlikowski, OSM, PhD, is a Servite Order priest and professor of social ethics at the Catholic Theological Union. He is the director of the Catholic-Jewish Studies program and is a JSA Board member.
Aktive Ignoranz/Active Ignorance

Neil J. Kressel’s The Sons of Pigs and Apes

Matthias Küntzel*


Kressel geht hingegen von einem komplexen Geflecht verschiedener Ursachen aus:

The religious tradition and history of Islam offered a firm foundation for the growth of intense Jew-hatred. European antisemites exported voluminous and virulent hostility, which was piled high upon this existing foundation. As the Arab-Israeli conflict heated up in the twentieth century, conditions were ripe for the transformation of a dispute over land into a race-based and religion-based antisemitism at levels not seen before in the Muslim world. The simultaneous growth of Islamism fed anti-Jewish fires by reviving all the worst historical and theological precedents, many of which had been relatively weak for centuries. With Israel’s military and economic successes, Arab political failures, and the growing centrality of the Palestinian issue in Muslim consciousness, hostility toward Jews turned from a sideshow into an obsession. Finally, when the most extreme elements in the Muslim word—e.g., the PLO, Hezbollah, Khomeini, Hamas, al Qaeda—appeared to be winning and leading the path to the future, many people marched behind their banners, one of which was the flag of noxious antisemitism (163f).

In einem zweiten Schritt zeigt Kressel, dass die Akteure des Westen “have largely ignored, misunderstood, or deliberately downplayed this growing epidemic of hate.” An der Spitze dieser “conspiracy of silence” stünden “human rights activists, academics, social scientists, left-leaning political leaders, liberal journalists, progressive Christian sects, United Nations officials, and others whom one might expect to stand stalwartly opposed to overt bigotry” (11). Kressel gelingt es, seine zentrale These von der “conspiracy of silence” eindrucksvoll zu belegen.


Kressel zitiert den renommierten Orientalisten Martin Kramer, der den Zustand der Middle Eastern Studies an amerikanischen Universitäten beklagt: They became “a field where scholarship took a backseat to [pro-Palestinian] advocacy, where a few biases became the highest credentials,
where dissenting views became thought-crimes.” Diese Studienfelder hätten den Regimes des Mittleren Ostens angeglichen: “full of rhetoric about liberation, but dead-set against all expressions of dissent” (94-95).


Kressel möchte jene Weigerung aber nicht nur beschreiben, sondern ihren Ursachen auf den Grund gehen. Warum, fragt er, haben so wenige Beobachter außerhalb der jüdischen Gemeinschaft den Willen und die Fähigkeit bewiesen, die gefährliche Natur des revitalisierten Antisemitismus im Nahen Osten zu verstehen? “What really motivates those who deny or minimize the significance of Muslim antisemitism? . . . My goal here is to document and begin to explain that failure” (57).

In dieser Hinsicht kommt sein Buch über “a beginning” allerdings wirklich nicht hinaus. Kressel listet, um das ominöse Schweigen zu erklären, Schlagworte auf, anstatt Ursachen zu analysieren. So sieht der Autor “apathy, ignorance, confusion, bigotry, ideology, purported pragmatism, misguided multiculturalism, and other reasons” am Werk sowie “avoidance, minimization, denial” or “political alliances . . . and lazy habits of mind that eschew the gathering of data” (11, 56-7).

Gleichzeitig werden Aspekte, die für die Ignoranz des muslimischen Antisemitismus von großer Bedeutung sind, heruntergespielt. So etwa bei
Kressel’s Ausführungen zum Thema Islamophobie. Der Autor weist zutreffend darauf hin, dass der islamischen Antisemitismus auch deshalb so selten thematisiert wird, weil diejenigen, die sich weigern, den Judenhass unter Muslimen zu ignorieren oder herunterzuspielen, in bestimmten Milieus als “islamophone” Rassisten diffamiert und eingeschüchtert werden.

Ich bin der Überzeugung, dass schon der Begriff “Islamophobia” irreführend und deshalb abzulehnen ist:

It mixes two different phenomena—unjust hatred against Muslims and necessary criticism of Islamism—and condemns both equally. It is not only used to counter the critique of antisemitism but was in my opinion at least partly created for this very end.

The invention of opposite terms in order to parallel and downplay Nazism or antisemitism or the Holocaust is nothing new. The opposing term to Nazism is known to be “Zionism”—as we were told again and again. The opposite term to the Holocaust is known to be “Nakba”—though there is not the slightest basis for such kind of comparison; and the opposing term to antisemitism is—of course—“Islamophobia.” In May 2005, this term was introduced to the Council of Europe on behalf of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and since then wrongly paralleled with antisemitism again and again.

Ich kann diesen Punkt an dieser Stelle nicht weiter ausführen, möchte aber andeuten, wie wichtig die begründete Zurückweisung derartiger Wahrheitsverfälschungen ist. Hier geht Kressel jedoch einen anderen Weg. Sein Kapitel über Islamophobie stellt diesen Begriff nicht infrage. Im Gegenteil: “There is reason to believe that a substantial component of that negativity [towards Islam and Muslims] derives from fear—whether justifiable or not—and thus the term ‘Islamophobia’ makes sense” (135).

Demgegenüber lehnt Kressel die These, “that many deniers and minimizers [of Muslim antisemitism] across the globe are themselves at least mildly antisemitic . . . This approach does not seem useful or convincing” (144). Auch bei dieser Bewertung habe ich große Zweifel. Zwar stimmt es, dass nicht jeder, der den Antisemitismus minimiert, automatisch antisemitisch denkt. Gleichwohl gilt, was der Antisemitismusforscher Leon Poliakov vor einigen Jahrzehnten schrieb: “Anyone who does not denounce anti-Semitism in its primitive and elementary form, and does not do so precisely because it is primitive and elementary, will have to face the question as to whether he is not thereby sending out a sign of secret approval to anti-Semites all over the world.”

Kressel kann auf Basis seiner oberflächlich geratenen Anamnese wenig Vorschläge entwickelt, wie die westliche “Konspiration des Schweigens” aufgebrochen werden kann. Stark und innovativ ist hingegen
sein Schlusskapitel, in welchem er die Auseinandersetzung über den Antisemitismus im Milieu der Muslime untersucht. Ausgangspunkt dieser Untersuchung ist die wichtige Einsicht, dass der Judenhass unter den Muslimen von außen kaum gestoppt werden kann, sondern hauptsächlich von den Akteuren des innermuslimischen Diskurses zurückgedrängt werden muss.

Hier rückt Kressel die “heroic opposition to Jew Hatred” von bekannten Muslimen wie Irfan Khawaja und Khaleel Mohammed (beide aus den USA) von Scheik Abdul Hadi Palazzi (Italien), Irshan Manji (Kanada), Morad El-Hattab El-Ibramini (Frankreich) und Bassam Tibi (Deutschland) in ein angemessenes Licht. Er listet auch die ehemaligen Muslime, die den muslimischen Antisemitismus explizit bekämpfen, auf: Hirsi Ali, Nonie Darwish, Wafa Sultan, Mark Gabriel, Ibn Warraq, Kamel Asl-Najjar und andere. Das “critical problem” bestehe darin, dass weder die eine noch die andere Gruppe über eine nennenswerte Zahl von Anhängern aufweisen kann. “The first and most important step,” schreibt Kressel überzeugend, “is to make the world safe for Muslim critics of antisemitism—physically safe, socially safe, organizationally safe, even academically safe” (201).


*Matthias Künzels is a political scientist and the author of Jihad and Jews. He is an external research associate at Hebrew University’s Vidal Sassoon International Centre for the Study of Antisemitism; his work there involves antisemitism in current Islamic thinking, Islamism, Islamism and National Socialism, Iran, and German and European policies toward the Middle East and Iran. His essays and articles have been translated into ten languages and published in The Wall Street Journal, The New Republic, The Weekly Standard, Telos, Policy Review, The Jerusalem Post, Standard, Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, and Internationale Politik.
Asaf Romirowsky*

Jewish humor and folklore have always been an integral fabric of Jewish survival throughout the centuries, affording the Jewish community another tool to rationalize the environment they found themselves in. A clear testament to this is the amount of Yiddish jokes and idioms that entered the American lexicon at the beginning of the 20th century.

Jewish folktale characters like the golem and the dybbuk were used to showcase the community’s challenges and sensibilities. The folklore took on a new spin when it began to appear in the pages of comic books; as most newspapers and ad agencies would not hire Jews and most of the comic book publishers were Jewish, these books became a fertile ground for Jews to get out their message. Consequently, many of the creators of the most famous comic books, such as Superman, Spiderman, X-Men, and Batman, as well as the founders of Mad magazine, were all Jewish. This is illustrated in the TV show Mad Men, set in an ad agency during the 1960s. The Jewish aspect in the show emerged following the hiring of the first Jewish copywriter, named Ginsberg, in Season 4, which caused a great deal of brouhaha. Then of course there was Gregory Peck’s masterful portrayal in Gentleman’s Agreement of a journalist who goes undercover as a Jew to conduct research for an exposé on antisemitism in New York City.

The above serves as the background for why Jews found a natural home in comics. Enter Fredrik Stromberg and his book Jewish Images in the Comics, in which the author traces Jewish history through comics look-
ing at history, culture, antisemitism, the Holocaust, and Israel—all out of the lens of comics. Stromberg defines comics as “juxtaposed images in deliberate sequence.” Others, like comic writer William Erwin “Will” Eisner, defined the entire art as “the arrangement of pictures or images and words to narrate a story or dramatize an idea.” Both, however, agree that dramatizing and sequence are what tell the story. There is no doubt that much of Jewish history needs to be told, which Stromberg illustrates so well.

Furthermore, the uniqueness of this medium is that it allows the message to cascade without personal offense per se, as Stromberg demonstrates by lining up this historical visual while showing the Jewish values, aspirations, and anxieties that are sometimes deeply encoded in comic book characters.

Antisemitism in all its many forms, from the blood libel and Nazism to Islamism, has embraced cartoons as part of its soft-power campaign to propagate the notion that Jews are demonic and the root cause of all evil in the world. Stromberg here skillfully arranges the cartoons to depict the historical sequence and makes the message vivid and pertinent. From what he has done, it can be seen how antisemitism takes on different forms and continues to arise over and over with radicalizations through religion, genocide, or a combination of both. The identification of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as a primary source is significant, because when one wants to track antisemitism, all one has to do is look for references to this pamphlet. Ayatollah Khomeini, Hitler, pre-eminent Islamist intellectual Sayyid Qutb, Arafat, and today Abbas are all graduates of the school of modern antisemitism, where they learned to circulate as many variations of the Protocols.

Despite all the use of cartoons to promote an antisemitic message, Stromberg concludes that he did find that Jewish artists are not any different from other comic artists, but rather an integral part of the long tradition of storytelling that has deep roots in the culture of comics. But above all, the author agrees that Jewish humor has had a tremendous effect on the field at large.

What is so evergreen about comics is that even more so in the age of social media, visuals speak louder than words, so the ability to capture moments and events in history and display them in a few slides carries a great deal of weight—more than any other historical text. Thus, as visual history continues to dominate the way history and culture are seen, it would serve all those who observe Jewish history to note how this history is depicted through eyes of the comic artist.
*Asaf Romirowsky is the acting executive director for Scholars for Peace in the Middle East (SPME) and an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Forum and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Hezbollah’s Academy Award Nominee?

Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala’s *L’antisémite*  
(online, DEFC [Documentary and Experimental Film Center], 2012). DVD $30

Shimon T. Samuels*

A once-admired champion of anti-racism, the French West African comedian Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala (Dieudonné) recycled his image to become a Holocaust denying, Israel-bashing, and self-styled “anti Zionist,” including becoming a supporter of Osama Bin Laden, Ahmadinejad, Chavez, Carlos Illich Sanchez, Lyndon LaRouche, Thierry Meyssan (from 9/11 denier fame), and Jean-Marie Le Pen (godfather to Dieudonné’s daughter). The only common denominator among this gallery of Islamists, far-rightists and leftists, conspiracy theorists, Holocaust deniers, racists, and terrorists is their attitude to Jews, the Holocaust, and Israel.

Breaking with his longtime stage partner Elie Semoun, thereby ending his Black-Jewish anti-racist duo act, Dieudonné has been marginalized on the French thespian scene. He has continued, however, with publicized provocations from his shoebox-size Paris theater, La Main d’Or, an un-Islamic alcohol-serving, extreme-right bar, the Hizollah Club. It was at La Main d’Or that he received Neturei Karta anti-Zionist rabbis in a demonstration against the French ban on Hizbollah Al-Manar television broadcasts.

A close friend of the late historical revisionist Robert Faurisson, Dieudonné was also frequently condemned for public defamation in calling the Holocaust “memorial pornography” and, especially his 2003 television antics as a Chassidic rabbi/Israeli settler, goose-stepping, arm raised in a Hitler salute screaming “Isra-heil.” The judge viewed the skit not as an
attack against Jews in general, but as against a type of person “distinguished by their political views.”

Later examples of Dieudonné’s intent were not judged so lightly. He has been sued in France for “apology for crimes against humanity,” “provocation to discrimination, hate and violence” and “bringing injury to a group of persons under the cover of humour.”

Another court judgment argued that Dieudonné’s object was to offend the memory of the Jewish people, in “turning the deportation and extermination of the Jews by the Nazis in the Second World War into a derision that constitutes an outrageous and contemptuous expression regarding the Jewish community.”

As co-founder of the French “Anti-Zionist Party,” Dieudonné campaigned in regional elections and, as a candidate of the “Euro-Palestine party” in the European elections, on a platform to combat “Zionist domination in Western societies” and “submission to the Shoah, which has become a new religion.”

Without giving undue importance to Dieudonné’s latest film, the 90-minute, tedious L’antisémite proves two arguments: a) that Judeophobia, anti-Zionism, Holocaust denial, and Protocols conspiracy theories are not stand-alone ideologies that may or may not contain elements of antisemitism. Indeed, they are the building blocks of antisemitism itself, and b) that antisemitism is a self-destructive disease that is contagious and, at a certain point, becomes incurable.

The film opens in black and white, where Dieudonné, as a US marine, is “discovering” Auschwitz and feeding a morsel of bread through the barbed wire to an emaciated inmate, who takes him on a tour of a “gas chamber” with bathroom-type hand showers. The human bone fragments in the crematoria are presented as if they were the remains of a barbecue.

Dieudonné physically abuses the cast, his wife, his psychoanalyst (Dr. Goldstein), and his homosexual film director—for all are Jews, thus justifying his antisemitic paranoia. The bottom line is: “The Jews control everything; media, finance, politics—we have no choice, we must exterminate them!” Filmed within a film in the Main d’Or theater, it ends with a mad party of the audience dancing with the so called “Shoahnanas” (Shoah girls).

The film—available only online—has been ostracized by cinema chains and television channels can only be purchased online. The sleeve claims an award nomination at the Fajr-Tehran film festival; indeed, Le Monde reported that the movie was co-produced with Iran.

Cannes film market director Jerome Pouillard rejected a public screening, as would be the case “for any movie that affects public order and relig-
ious conventions.” It was similarly dropped from screening programs in Montreal, Brussels, and London.

Dieudonné has even claimed Zionist implication in the African slave trade. Nevertheless, he was heavily criticized by an African group for betraying their history of suffering and as current victims of discrimination. His alliance with the anti-immigrant National Front led him to be called “the Uncle Tom of Le Pen.”

A neurologist described Dieudonné’s antisemitism as “a complex chemical process in the vast synaptic network, that, in his case, is overheating to the point of explosion.”

In sum, Dieudonné is not influential, nor is his film. It is what he and his film stand for, in their tedium and depravity: the holistic, integrated nature of the antisemitic matrix.

This is particularly the case in France, where deconstructionist influences of Derrida, Chomsky, and their acolytes have encouraged the explosion of all official histories into multiple and even contradictory versions of “truth.” Thereby, in a world without the “truth,” the most extreme lies can be accepted.

Perhaps Dieudonné should be thanked that his dreadful waste of celluloid ends all debate on the fine distinctions between the unacceptable antisemitism and the so-called legitimate anti-Zionism among genteel society.

*L’Antisémite* has torn away the pretextual camouflage. Now it is finally clear: cocktail chitchat against Israel leads directly to cocktail Molotovs against neighborhood synagogues and, most recently, a massacre in a Jewish school.

*Shimon T. Samuels is the director for international relations at the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, Paris, and chair of the Board of Directors of the *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism.*
All in the Family

Arnon Goldfinger’s The Flat
(Germany-Israel, ARTE Productions 2012)

Joanne Intrator*

It may be that the more mysterious and painful the memory, the more important that it never be lost to the world. Israeli filmmaker Arnon Goldfinger just happened to bring a camera along to his German-Jewish grandmother’s Tel Aviv apartment shortly after she passed away at the age of 98. He mistakenly thought he would be recording—for his family’s private viewing only—the dispersion of the matriarch’s worldly goods.

Growing up Israeli, Goldfinger suffered sharply conflicted feelings about his maternal grandparents’ abode. On the one hand, he enjoyed the Tuchlers’ penchant for things continental, including apfelstrudel and hot chocolate in the afternoons. On the other hand, though, he could never reconcile his knowledge of the Holocaust with his grandparents’ enduring affinity for a German Heimat—and culture—that pathologically rejected them only because they were Jews.

Scrutinizing the Tuchlers’ Nachlass in the apartment, the family comes across copies of Der Angriff, Joseph Goebbels’ Nazi propaganda organ.

Oy vey! What in the world is that schmutzige rag doing in this apartment? Closer inspection reveals that in 1933, the Tuchlers had journeyed to the Middle East with Leopold von Mildenstein when he was researching his article series A Nazi Travels to Palestine.

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In a dry historical sense, during the mid-1930s, ever-harder anti-Jewish discrimination in Germany increased German-Jewish interest in Zionism, leading some Nazis to believe that all Jews could successfully be forced out to Palestine, thus resolving the insultingly named “Jewish problem.” That toxic Zeitgeist brought the German-Jewish Zionist leader Kurt Tuchler, the Nazi von Mildenstein, and their wives together for a Middle East sojourn.

As the SS officer in charge of the Nazis’ Judenpolitik of the mid-1930s, von Mildenstein failed to satisfy his higher-ups’ putrid master race ambitions and got pushed out of the position. While von Mildenstein personally may not have been the most rabid of antisemites, he did hire Adolf Eichmann—a leading architect of the Holocaust—into the SS’s Jewish affairs office, then known as department “II 112.” At his trial in Jerusalem, Eichmann testified that von Mildenstein taught him everything he knew about Jews.

Yet, neither Goldfinger nor his mother, Hannah, had ever heard in any specific detail about the Tuchlers’ relationship with von Mildenstein. Profoundly intrigued, Goldfinger latched onto the topic heart and soul. His enthralling, multiple award-winning film The Flat (Ha-dira) documents his attempts to research—as best he can—the relationship between his grandparents and the von Mildensteins.

Goldfinger’s unique personal cinematic voyage of discovery—apropos of his family’s past, during a time of world war accompanied by the demented drive to exterminate Jews—unfolds against a contemporary backdrop of peace, prosperity, and good will. The two most startling of the filmmaker’s discoveries are that his maternal great-grandmother, Suzanne Lehmann, had perished in the Holocaust, and that after the war, his grandparents conducted an apparent friendship with the von Mildensteins.

How could it possibly be that Goldfinger’s great-grandmother died in the Holocaust, yet his own mother, Hannah, never talked to him about that fact?

Goldfinger is just absolutely flabbergasted by his mother’s evident lack of knowledge about—and disinterest in—the Tuchlers’ relationship with the von Mildensteins. He pushes her on that point, until the tensions building between them lead to her snapping at him that she had had her own burden of living with her parents. Whatever exactly that might mean, the moment represents a breakthrough in the film. Thereafter, Hannah grows increasingly supportive of her son’s quest.

They travel to Wuppertal, Germany, where von Mildenstein’s daughter Edda welcomes them with open arms, as she knew the Tuchlers well from their frequent postwar visits with her parents. Manifestly a decent human
being. Edda is open to any amount of exploration that Goldfinger wants to carry out. Sadly, as it happens, his explorations lead to Edda unsettlingly having to confront the fact that her father was more deeply involved with the Nazi Party than he in his lifetime had given her to believe.

The core of *The Flat*, then, is a “third generation” Israeli prodding a “second generation” Israeli—and contemporaneously, a second-generation German—into confronting the wrenching realities of their families’ pasts.

On the micro and macro levels, it is essential for people like Goldfinger to pursue details of history that, for whatever reasons, have fallen between the cracks. Beyond the rich artistic merits of his film, Goldfinger’s discoveries suggest that more scholarly work is needed on von Mildenstein. It seems he spent a year during the war in the United States, and that after the war, he succeeded in not being tried as a Nazi, with the alibi that he had been a covert CIA agent.

I have personal experience of an unwavering determination to dig for family truths, leading to discoveries that have meaningful implications for Holocaust scholarship: My parents escaped Hitler’s Germany; I was born in New York. Only toward the end of my father’s life did I learn that our family had once owned real estate at 16 Wallstrasse in Berlin, which the Nazis stole from us in a forced auction. While fighting the German courts for restitution, I hired a detective to research the history of our family’s property. An heiress of the Nazis was still staking a claim on our place, 16 Wallstrasse—where, it turned out, Nazi banners, flags, and uniforms were produced before the facilities were turned over to the mass production of yellow Star of David armbands.

Toward the end of *The Flat*, Goldfinger and his mother are seen in a streaming rain searching through lush overgrowth in a Berlin cemetery for the gravesite of Suzanna Lehmann’s husband. Whether they actually find his burial place may matter less than the fact that they are searching for him. Thanks entirely to Goldfinger’s iron resolve to learn ever more, neither Lehmann nor his wife, the Holocaust victim Suzanne Lehmann, shall be forgotten any time soon.

*Joanne Intrator is a New York-based psychiatrist. She thanks writer Scott Rose for his assistance with this review.*
Apology for Terror

John Adams’s *Klinghoffer*—The Opera

Shimon T. Samuels*

On Saturday night, a controversial work, *The Death of Klinghoffer*, premiered at the English National Opera in London. One hundred ninety-seven members of the press packed the seats—the entire playhouse was sold out. This was surprising, since the two-act piece—based on the 1985 Palestine Liberation Front hijacking of the Mediterranean cruise liner *Achille Lauro*—was written in 1989 and has been staged intermittently since 1991 in the United States, Europe, and New Zealand.

Almost 500 passengers and crew on the *Achille Lauro* had been held hostage for four days by Palestinian terrorists, ostensibly to gain the release of 50 associates held in Israeli jails. They were liberated after the captain told negotiators and the media that “all on board were safe and unharmed.” He had lied. A paralyzed, 69-year-old American Jew, Leon Klinghoffer, had been shot in his wheelchair, his body dumped in the sea. A year later, his widow—separated from him below deck—died of cancer. In 1991, the couple’s two daughters sat anonymously in a performance of the opera at the Brooklyn Academy of Music and wrote:

> We are outraged at the exploitation of our parents and the coldblooded murder of our father as the centerpiece of a production that appears to us to be anti-Semitic . . . Moreover, the juxtaposition of the fight of the Palestinian people with the murder of an innocent, disabled American Jew is both historically naive and appalling (*The New York Times*, September 11, 1991).

The Brooklyn opening created such a protest that Los Angeles and the Glyndebourne Opera Festival canceled their contracts with the production. In the wake of the furor, the opera’s Jewish-born librettist, Alice
Goodman, reportedly converted to Christianity. Following 9/11, the Boston Opera also canceled a performance of *The Death of Klinghoffer*, as a member of the chorus had lost her husband when American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the Twin Towers. In 2009, a member of the Julliard Association protested a performance at that school, New York’s foremost, saying: “Julliard has honored an outrageous and immoral justification of the murder of an American citizen and an aged Jew as a work of art . . . . The Julliard School, in presenting this opera, is responsible for giving sanction to an anti-Semitic and criminal act.” University of California musicologist Richard Taruskin said about the opera: “If terrorism is to be defeated, world public opinion has to be turned decisively against it, no longer romanticizing terrorists as Robin Hoods and no longer idealizing their deeds as rough justice . . . *The Death of Klinghoffer* is anti-American, anti-Semitic.”

In response, the composer of *Klinghoffer*, John Adams, claimed: “In this country, there is almost no option for the other side, no space for the Palestinian point of view.” He attacked the Los Angeles Opera administrators for canceling, claiming that they had “gotten the heebie-jeebies” (quoted by Martin Kettle in “The Witch Hunt,” *The Guardian*, December 15, 2001).

Little wonder that his claim of evenhandedness in the opening “Choruses of Exiled Palestinians and Exiled Jews” rings hollow. The first sings of how “My father’s house was razed in 1948, when the Israelis passed over our street,” against a backdrop of graffiti daubed on a concrete wall, intriguingly proclaiming “Warsaw 1943, Bethlehem 2005.” Enter the exiled Jews, all in *kippot* and head scarves, passively planting trees on the allegedly usurped land.

In the second act, a Palestinian woman—presented as Abraham’s slave/concubine Hagar—sings to her son, Ishmael, agonizing that he, the scion of the Arab people, was apparently born on the wrong side of the blanket. Whereupon, she morphs into a spiteful “Um Jihad,” urging her hijacker son to wreak vengeance on the conflated image of his half-brother Isaac—the first generic Jew available to kill: “Do not grow old in years like those Jews./My heart will break if you do not walk in Paradise within two days.”

After a frenzied dance, the psychotic young terrorist shoots the helpless, wheelchair-bound Klinghoffer in the back, as a ritualized execution. (Perversely, the disabled are often the target of hate crimes, and especially neo-Nazi violence. Three hundred thousand handicapped were exterminated by Hitler.) The *Achille Lauro* captain sums up a new banality of evil in his record: “I did get very worried when I saw Klinghoffer coming towards me in his wheelchair . . . His slowness in getting around the ship was becoming a source of irritation to the Palestinians.”
At one point, the captain embraces the terrorist leader, for which Klinghoffer’s widow chides him: “The touch of Palestine is on your uniform.”

During the 30-minute recess, speaking with several of the educated audience, I felt the touch of Palestine on my own British thinking. Nothing appeared to them to be amiss when the singing terrorists called for segregation of “Americans,” “British,” and “Jews” among the passengers. When the curtain descended, heralding a torrent of enthusiastic applause, I was disconcerted: were they cheering for the performers or for the cause?

O’Brien Fires Back

Darren O’Brien

An academic review of a published historical work should provide the reader with an assessment of the book based on careful reading and considered thought concerning the historian’s methodology, arguments, and the subject matter of the book. Christian Bale’s review of my *The Pinnacle of Hatred: The Blood Libel and the Jews* (Vol. 3, No. 2, December 2011) falls short on all of these counts. The review is cursory and inaccurate, colored more by Bale’s personal assumptions and antipathy toward those historians he thinks reduce critical historical inquiry to worthless subjective superlatives rather than to a concerted reading and appraisal.

As an antisemitism historian, one of my goals is to collect the entirety of the known historical facts, analyze and interrogate them, and provide an educated interpretation of those facts, rendered as commentary or historical narrative.

When it came to the blood libel, I found that no previous collection of such documents or rendering of them into English analyzes this massive corpus of information. I do not understand how a fellow historian reviews my work and finds that he was overwhelmed (“bludgeoned”) by my rendering of this primary historical data—the empirical data—into the tables, maps, and diagrams included in my work. The narrative of the history is based on this empirical data, as it must be. The fact that Bale was unable to digest it, or didn’t bother to examine the collection of ancillary documents freely available on the Web site companion to the book, has led him to draw unfavorable conclusions in his review of my work.

Despite Bale’s assertion otherwise, *The Pinnacle of Hatred* was written without predestined historical outcome. My interest and fascination lies in the employment of hate ideation—in this case, “degrees” of anti-Jewish murder allegation—for the commission of murder and mass murder. I permitted the historical documents related to the blood libel to lead me where they would. It was an editorial decision to “place” the chapters on the twentieth century at the beginning of the work and then to “return” to the beginning of the story, in much the same way as a *Law and Order* episode so often begins with “the murder” and then retraces the preceding narrative. The work was not conceived nor written in a preordained order. Nor, if the reviewer had looked more thoroughly, does my collection explore 500 “cases” of blood libel; far from it. That is one of the central points of my work. There are significant differences in the allegations that can only be understood through examination of the empirical data. My early chapters,
far from being too short, as the reviewer asserts, contain previously uncited and unexplored facts evidencing the use of the blood libel by a succession of high-ranking Nazi officials, including Rosenberg, Himmler, and Dietrich. These facts were unfortunately missed by Raul Hilberg, Gerald Fleming, and Max Weinreich in their writings referencing some of this material. They also appear to have been missed by Bale.

New documents and new analysis can necessitate new terminology and new commentary, and sometimes force refinement of definitions. Anti-Semitism is an ugly term for what was and remains an ugly reality. I claim no rights to its invention. Conor Cruise O’Brien coined the term many years ago, and I do not use it with his intended meaning in my work; Jews were hated by some because they were Jews. Bale correctly indicates that anti-Semitism was never a medieval word. Nor was antisemitism, blood libel, or ritual murder. Studies such as mine point to the problems of definition, as they should. There was no blood libel in England before 1290, when Jews were expelled from that country. Why do authors persist in saying otherwise? The blood libel allegation did not start there. The allegation of crucifixion murder was not leveled against Jews in Germany before 1286, almost 150 years after it was raised in England and France. Is this important or not? My work attempts to explain the differences and why. New facts point to a literary tradition underscoring Monmouth’s account of the crucifixion murder of William of Norwich. The Catholic mystery of transubstantiation should be removed from the list of possible motivational origins for the charge. Continued use of the term “ritual murder” to explain such concepts is extremely problematic. The new book by Hannah Johnson remains enmeshed in non-factual definition.

An account of the older scholarship on blood libel—Abulafia, Yuval, Rubin included (plus Saperstein, Stacey, McCulloh, Langmuir, and more)—is amply incorporated in The Pinnacle of Hatred. Rather than lament its omission, Bale only had to turn to the book’s index to find the names of these scholars he claims were not referred to in my work. A careful reading of my work would have spelled out how my interpretation differed or affirmed those authors’ views. I learned much from them over the years I spent working on The Pinnacle of Hatred and I continue to do so with their more recent work. I make no claim that I have all the answers.

“Exposing” blood libelers is very different from judging them, as Bale asserts. That was my point in using the term “exposing” in my book. The Pinnacle of Hatred is a study of specific places and times where lies were taken and used as justification for murder. This was not “fascinating imaginative violence.” It was very real. The lists of dead victims of anti-Jewish violence derived from memory books and included in English translation for the first time in my collection of documents attest to this reality.
Present-day usage of the blood libel underscores the fact that the allegation remains very real today. There are valid reasons to explore the gradation of hate if we place any credence in seeing it as a motivational factor in murder, mass murder, and genocide. I would be most interested to know what obsessions Bale considers lethal and which hatreds he thinks are at the top of the list.

Darren O’Brien, PhD
Honorary Senior Research Fellow
University of Queensland
Antisemitica

*Remembering Pogroms—
Toronto, London, New York*

A pogrom occurred at Christie Pits (Willowvale/Beaches) Park in Toronto that lasted six hours. The precipitating event was a quarter-final baseball game between two local sport clubs—the Jewish Harbord and the Catholic St. Peter’s teams. During the series’ first game, a swastika was displayed by local Beaches residents. After the final out of the second game, a blanket with a large swastika painted on it was displayed. Jewish young men who had heard about the previous swastika incident rushed to the swastika sign to destroy it, supporters of both sides (including Italians who supported the Jews) from the surrounding area joined in, and a riot ensued. There was criticism of the police for not being ready to intervene, as they had been doing during previous potential problems in the Beach area. Mayor William J. Stewart warned against displaying the swastika to provoke, and no further incidents were recorded.

A march in 1936 initiated by Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists provoked local Jewish, socialist, anarchist, Irish, and communist groups. An estimated 7,000 Fascists, 300,000 anti-Fascists, and 10,000 police clashed on Cable Street in London. The demonstrators fought with sticks, rocks, chair legs, and other improvised weapons. Rubbish, rotten vegetables, and feces were thrown at the police by women in houses along Cable Street.
the street as police attempted to clear roadblocks and permit the march to proceed. After a series of skirmishes, Mosley abandoned the march. The Fascists were dispersed toward Hyde Park, while the anti-Fascists rioted with police. Several members of the police were kidnapped by demonstrators. An estimated 175 people were injured and 150 arrested.

Max Levitas

Jewdas (radical London-based Jewish group) member Daniel Nemenyi believes Cable Street provides the raw material for a political identity that is both British and Jewish. "It’s about people saying, no, we live here and we want to live here and this is where we’re fighting fascism—right here,” Nemenyi says. “So that’s very inspiring for us today as British Jews. For too long we’ve allowed ourselves to be defined by the Holocaust and to think of ourselves as eternal victims. Cable Street and that radical Jewish history offer something beautiful and positive and affirming.” Ninety-six-year-old Cable Street veteran Max Levitas says, “Cable Street has always been remembered as the place where fascism was beaten. But that doesn’t mean there aren’t still fascists about. It means that we’ve got to bring the lessons of Cable Street into the struggles we have today.”

New York (Crown Heights, Brooklyn), August 19, 1991

The Crown Heights (New York) Riot was a three-day confrontation that began August 19, 1991. Crown Heights was predominantly an African-American and Jewish neighborhood—home to the Lubavitch sect of Orthodox Jewish Hasidim. The riots began after a child, Gavin Cato, was accidentally struck by an automobile in Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson’s motorcade and later died. Rioters marched through Crown Heights carrying
antisemitic signs and burning an Israeli flag. Rioters threw bricks and bottles at police; shots were fired at police and police cars were pelted and overturned. An additional 350 police officers were added in an attempt to quell the rioting; after episodes of rock and bottle throwing involving hundreds of blacks and Jews, and after groups of blacks marched through Crown Heights chanting “Death to the Jews!,” an additional 1,200 police officers were sent to confront rioters in Crown Heights. Riots escalated to the extent that a detachment of 200 police officers was overwhelmed and had to retreat for their safety. On August 22, over 1,800 police officers, including mounted and motorcycle units, had been dispatched to stop the attacks on people and property. By the time the three days of rioting ended, 152 police officers and 38 civilians were injured, 27 vehicles were destroyed, seven stores were looted or burned, and 225 robberies and burglaries were committed. Twenty-nine-year-old Jewish Australian graduate student Yankel Rosenbaum and a Christian man mistaken for a Jew were killed. Over a hundred arrests were made. Property damage was estimated at one million dollars.
Jenny Tonge

January 2004: Jenny Tonge, MP, was asked to step down as the children’s spokeswoman by Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy after she said of Palestinian suicide bombers: “If I had to live in that situation—and I say that advisedly—I might just consider becoming one myself.” Tonge refused to apologize.

March 2006: “The pro-Israeli lobby has got its grips on the Western world, its financial grips. I think they’ve probably got a grip on our party.” In response, Liberal Democrat leader Sir Menzies Campbell chastised Tonge, saying that her remarks were “unacceptable” and had “clear antisemitic connotations.” An all-party group of lords led by the former Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, said her comments evoked a classic anti-Jewish conspiracy theory.”

November 2008: Tonge, along with Lord Ahmed, Clare Short, and some MEPs, visited the Gaza Strip, where Tonge compared the situation in Gaza to apartheid. Yad Vashem chairman Avner Shalev accused her of “malicious distortion” and for comparing the conditions of Palestinians in Gaza to the Warsaw Ghetto under Nazi rule.

January 2009: Tonge asked in the House of Lords about investigations into alleged Israeli war crimes in the Israel-Gaza conflict.

February 2010: The Palestine Telegraph, of which Tonge is a patron, published an article questioning whether an Israel Defense Forces emergency aid hospital in Haiti was harvesting organs and selling them on the black market after the 2010 earthquake. On February 12, 2010, Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg removed Tonge from her position as health spokeswoman in the House of Lords because her patronage had lent credence to allegations of organ harvesting in Haiti. He called the comments “wrong, distasteful and provocative” and said she had apologized “unreservedly” for any offense she had caused.

February 2012: Baroness Tonge appeared, alongside former US Marine Kenneth O’Keefe, during Israeli Apartheid Week at Middlesex Uni-
versity and said: “Beware Israel. Israel is not going to be there forever in its present form.”

February 29, 2012: Baroness Tonge resigned the Liberal Democrat whip immediately after being given an ultimatum by party leader Nick Clegg to apologize or resign.
Top Ten Anti-Israeli Lies

LIE #1 Israel was created by European guilt over the Nazi Holocaust. Why should Palestinians pay the price? Three thousand years before the Holocaust, before there was a Roman Empire, Israel’s kings and prophets walked the streets of Jerusalem. The whole world knows that Isaiah did not speak his prophesies from Portugal, nor Jeremiah his lamentations from France. Revered by its people, Jerusalem is mentioned in the Hebrew Scriptures 600 times—but not once in the Koran. Throughout its 2,000-year exile there was continuous Jewish presence in the Holy Land, with the modern rebirth of Israel beginning in the 1800s. Reclamation of the largely vacant land by pioneering Zionists blossomed into a Jewish majority long before the onset of Nazism. After the Holocaust, nearly 200,000 Shoah survivors found haven in the Jewish State, created by a two-thirds vote of the UN in 1947. Soon 800,000 Jews fleeing persecution in Arab countries arrived. In ensuing decades, Israel absorbed a million immigrants from the Soviet Union and thousands of Ethiopian Jews. Today, far from being a vestige of European guilt or colonialism, Israel is a diverse, cosmopolitan society, fulfilling the age-old dream of a people’s journey and “Return to Zion”—their ancient homeland.

LIE #2 Had Israel withdrawn to its June 1967 borders, peace would have come long ago. Since 1967, Israel has repeatedly conceded “land for peace.” Following Egyptian president Sadat’s historic 1977 visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David peace accords, Israel withdrew from the vast Sinai Peninsula and has been at peace with Egypt ever since. In 1995, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel but neither the Palestinians nor 21 other Arab states have done so. In 1993, Israel signed the Oslo Accords, ceding administrative control of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority (formerly the PLO). The PA never fulfilled its promise to end propaganda attacks and drop the Palestinian National Charter’s call for Israel’s destruction. In 2000, Prime Minister Barak offered Yasser Arafat full sovereignty over 97% of the West Bank, a corridor to Gaza, and a capital in the Arab...
section of Jerusalem. Arafat said NO. In 2008, PA president Abbas nixed virtually the same offer from prime minister Olmert. In 2005, prime minister Sharon unilaterally withdrew from Gaza. Taken over by terrorist Hamas, they turned dismantled Jewish communities into launching sites for suicide bombers and 8,000+ rockets into Israel proper. In 2010, prime minister Netanyahu renewed offers of unconditional negotiations leading to a Palestinian State, but Palestinians refused, demanding more unilateral Israeli concessions, including a total freeze of all Israeli construction in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

LIE #3 Israel is the main stumbling block to achieving a Two-State solution. The Palestinians themselves are the only stumbling block to achieving a Two-State solution. With whom should Israel negotiate? With President Abbas, who, for four years, has been barred by Hamas from visiting 1.5 million constituents in Gaza? With his Palestinian Authority, which continues to glorify terrorists and preaches hate in its educational system and the media? With Hamas, whose Iranian-backed leaders deny the Holocaust and use fanatical Jihadist rhetoric to call for Israel’s destruction? Today, it is a simple fact that while the State of Israel is prepared to recognize all Arab states, secular or Muslim, these states adamantly refuse to recognize Israel as a Jewish State and demand “the right of return” of five million so-called Palestinian “refugees”—a sure guarantee for Israel’s demise.

LIE #4 Nuclear Israel not Iran is the greatest threat to peace and stability. Though never acknowledged by Jerusalem, it is generally assumed that Israel has nuclear weapons. But unlike Pakistan, India, and North Korea, Israel never conducted nuclear tests. In 1973, when its very survival was imperiled by the surprise Egyptian-Syrian Yom Kippur attack, many assumed Israel would use nuclear weapons—but it did not. Contrary to public condemnations, many Arab leaders privately express relief that Israeli nuclear deterrence exists. While Israel has never threatened anyone, Tehran’s mullahs daily threaten to “wipe Israel from the map.” The U.S. and Europe can afford to wait to see what the Iranian regime does with its nuclear ambitions. But Israel cannot. She is on the front lines and remembers every day the price the Jewish people paid for not taking Hitler at his word. Israel is not prepared to sacrifice another six million Jews on the altar of the world’s indifference.

LIE #5 Israel is an apartheid state deserving of international Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions campaigns. On both sides of the Atlantic, church groups, academics, and unions are leading deceitful and often antisemitic boycott campaigns demonizing what they call the Jewish “apartheid” State. The truth is that unlike apartheid South Africa, Israel is a democratic state. Its 20% Arab minority enjoys all the political, economic,
and religious rights and freedoms of citizenship, including electing members of their choice to the Knesset (Parliament). Israeli Arabs and Palestinians have standing before Israel’s Supreme Court. In contrast, no Jew may own property in Jordan, and no Christian or Jew can visit Islam’s holiest sites in Saudi Arabia.

LIE #6 Plans to build 1,600 more homes in East Jerusalem prove Israel is “Judaizing” the Holy City. Enemies of Israel exploit this phony issue. Jerusalem is holy to three great faiths. Its diverse population includes a Jewish majority with Muslim and Christian minorities. Since 1967, for the first time in history, there is full freedom of religion for all faiths in Jerusalem. Muslim and Christian religious bodies administer their own holy sites. Indeed, the Waqf is allowed to control Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, even though it rests on Solomon’s temple and is holy to both Jews and Muslims. Meanwhile, Jerusalem’s municipality must meet the needs of a growing modern city. The unfortunately timed announcement during U.S. Vice President Biden’s visit of 1600 new apartments in Ramat Shlomo was not about Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, but for a long established, heavily populated Jewish neighborhood in northern Jerusalem, where 250,000 Jews live (about the same population as Newark, N.J.)—an area that will never be relinquished by Israel.

LIE #7 Israeli policies endanger U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The charge that Israel endangers U.S. troops in Iraq or the AF-Pak region is an update of the old “stab in the back” lie that Jews always betray their own friends, and the libel spouted by Henry Ford and *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* that “Jews are the father of all wars.” U.S. General Petraeus has stated he considers Israel a great strategic asset for the U.S. and that his earlier remarks linking the safety of U.S. troops in the region to an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal (which 2/3 of Israelis want) were taken out of context. A resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would benefit everyone, including the U.S. But an imposed return to what Abba Eban called “1967 Auschwitz borders” would endanger Israel’s survival and ultimately be disastrous for American interests and credibility in the world.

LIE #8 Israeli policies are the cause of worldwide antisemitism. From the Inquisition to the pogroms, to the 6,000,000 Jews murdered by the Nazis, history proves that Jew-hatred existed on a global scale before the creation of the State of Israel. In 2010, it would still exist even if Israel had never been created. For example, one poll indicates 40% of Europeans blame the recent global economic crisis on “Jews having too much economic power,” a canard that has nothing to do with Israel. The unsettled Palestinian-Israeli dispute aggravates Muslim-Jewish tensions, but it is not the root cause. During World War II, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, a notorious Jew-hater, helped the Nazis organize the 13th SS Division, made up of
Muslims. Unfortunately, in addition to respectful references to Jewish patriarchs and prophets, the Koran also contains virulent antisemitic stereotypes that are widely invoked by Islamist extremists, including Hezbollah (whose agents blew up the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in 1994), to justify murdering Jews worldwide. The disappearance of Israel would only further embolden violent Jew-haters everywhere.

**LIE #9 Israel, not Hamas, is responsible for the “humanitarian catastrophe” in Gaza. Goldstone was right when he charged that Israel was guilty of war crimes against civilians.** The Goldstone Report on Israel’s defensive war against Hamas-controlled Gaza, from which 8,000 rockets were fired after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in 2005, is a biased product of the UN’s misnamed Human Rights Council. The UNHRC is obsessed with false anti-Israel resolutions. It refuses to address grievous human rights abuses in Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and beyond. Faced with similar attacks, every UN member-state, including the U.S. and Canada, would surely have acted more aggressively than the IDF did in Gaza. Yet, Richard Goldstone, a Jewish South African jurist, signed a document prepared by investigators whose main qualification was rabid anti-Israel bias. He accepted every anonymous libel against the IDF. But he insisted that hearings in Gaza be televised, guaranteeing that fearful Palestinians would never testify about Hamas’ use of civilians as human shields and their hiding of weapons in mosques and hospitals. Harvard professor Alan Dershowitz denounced the Goldstone Report as a modern “blood libel” accusing Israeli soldiers of crimes they never committed.

**LIE #10 The only hope for peace is a single, bi-national state, eliminating the Jewish State of Israel.** The One-State solution, promoted by academics, is a non-starter because it would eliminate the Jewish homeland. However, the current pressures on Israel are equally dangerous. In effect, the world is demanding that Israel, the size of New Jersey, shrink further by accepting a Three-State solution: a PA state on the West Bank and a Hamas terrorist state controlling 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza. All this, as Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, stockpiles 50,000 rockets, threatening northern and central Israel’s main population centers. In 2010, most Middle East experts believed that the only hope for enduring peace is two states with defined final borders. But too many diplomats, pundits, academics, and church leaders ignore the fact that current polls show that while most Israelis favor a Two-State solution, most Palestinians continue to oppose it.
Antisemitic Festivals, Riddles, and Proverbs of Eastern Europe

Polish sociologist Alina Cala documents folk festivals in which ceremonial Jews are displayed, or people join the procession wearing Jew masks and clothing. The Corpus Christi Church in Poznan, Poland, has a crypt of the well where Jews allegedly threw a desecrated Host. At the Feast of Booths (Sukkot), Jews are celebrated as rainmakers.

The Myth of St. Eli—God tells Eli to kill the Jews, but leave one. Eli kills the last Jew, so God punishes him with lightning and thunder. That is why it always rains on July 21, St. Eli’s Day. It is said that Jews can bring rain. (Romania)

At auspicious occasions, such as weddings, it is important to invite a Jew to attend, as Jews ward off evil. Yet, there is no such thing as a good Jew. In terms of vocation, Jews are never peasants—they are bank owners, traders, merchants, builders, cart drivers, farmers, jewelers, and ragmen. Jews own pubs, and position the pubs near churches, where at times they have poisoned unsuspecting Orthodox Church parishioners after services. In terms of appearance, Jewish women are thought to be elegant, beautiful, and good dancers; in contrast, the men have goat faces with big noses and sideburns (pais). They are physically big people and red-headed. Sometimes the Jews are dirty because they wandered and ate onions and garlic. The Jew’s personality is likened to fleas, and said to be fearful of dogs and wolves. They are not hunters. They are cowards and make poor soldiers.
Religiously, Jews are spiritually deaf and dumb, and blinded to Christian ways—"In flacarite"—in the flames of hell. Jews are also witches (vrajitor). (Romania)

RIDDLES

Why do the Jews have freckles? St. Mary went to the cross, where some Jews were cooking a rooster. St. Mary said that Jesus would reincarnate the rooster, whereby the rooster jumped out of the bowl and was alive. In the process, however, boiling water was splattered onto the Jews, and that is how they developed freckles. (Romania)

Why the Jews do not eat pork? The Jew is a pig, and cannot eat himself. Originally, the belief was that while Jesus was on the cross his blood spilled on a piglet; because Jews couldn’t remember on which side of the pig the blood splattered, they refused to eat any part of him. (Romania)

PROVERBS

1. It is unlucky to have a Jew look through your window or enter your house on a Monday. The unluckiness lasts all week and there is nothing you can do. (Romania)
2. A Jew cheats two Armenians; an Armenian, two Greeks; a Greek, two Romanians. (Romania)
3. If one has bad breath, he has "kissed a Jew." (Romania)
4. "Devil’s skin"—name of cloth used for Jewish caftan. (Romania)
5. Devil dances on the wall, with his Jewess by the scruff. (Romania)
6. Go to the Jews—aka Devil (curse). (Romania)
7. One, two, three times, To hell with the Kikes. (called out at dances). (Romania)
8. Out pops the devil from under the grass, The Jew leads him by his lock. (Romania)
9. The Jew is the Devil’s drill. (Hungary)
10. He thought he caught a Jew by the beard, but he held the Devil by the horns. (Poland)
11. Where the Devil cannot act, the Jew can. (Poland)
12. Each year, when the Jews take their holiday in autumn, the Devil must steal one Jew from each synagogue and take them to hell. (Romania)
13. As Jesus was born of a Jewish woman, so she must spawn the Devil. (Romania)
14. Jews are good luck for Christians. Because the Jew is the Devil, evil spirits enter him and not Christians. Christians are spared bad luck, as it is absorbed into the Jew. (Romania)
Antisemitica

Lebanese-Brazilian cartoonist Carlos Latuff on Israel’s “real” intentions re: Hamas-Israeli conflict of November 2012

CIRCULATING E-MAIL 2012

An Arab is going to have open-heart surgery. The doctor is preparing the blood transfusion. Because the gentleman had a rare type of blood, it couldn’t be found locally. So the call went out to a number of countries. Finally, a Jew was located who had the same blood type and who was willing to donate his blood to the Arab. After the surgery, the Arab sent the Jew a thank-you card for giving his blood, along with an expensive diamond and a new Rolls Royce car as tokens of his appreciation. Unfortunately, the Arab had to go through a corrective surgery once again. So, his doctors called the Jew, who was more than happy to donate his blood again, believing he will receive more gifts from the Arab. After the second surgery, the Arab sent the Jew a thank-you card and a box of Almond Roca sweets. The Jew was shocked to see that the Arab this time did not acknowledge the Jew’s kind gesture in the same way as he had done the first time, so he phoned the Arab and asked him why he had expressed his appreciation in not a very generous manner. The Arab replied: Dear Friend, you have to remember: I have Jewish blood in my body now.

FOR THE RECORD?

DAVID SOKOL’S CD Shylock Sings the Blues
http://www.amazon.com/Shylock-Sings-the-Blues-Explicit/dp/B008D8D4WM

Secrets are sacred—safeguards of sentimental sensitivity.
—Hugh Mann

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