ANALYTICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
Lorand Ambrus-Lakatos
Term: Fall 1995
Department of Political Sciences, Budapest
CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY




I. General Theory

1. Individual Decisions and Rationality (3 lectures)

Topics:
Methodological Individualism
The Logic of Individual Decision Making
Descriptive and Normative Theories of Rationality

Assigned Readings:
Winch, Peter (1958): The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul;
Gilbert, Margaret (1989): On Social Facts, Routledge, 22-57;
Tversky, Amos - Daniel Kahneman (1986): Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in R. Hogarth- M. Reder (eds.): Rational Choice, University of Chicago Press, 67-94;
Kreps, David (1988): Notes on the Theory of Choice, Westview Press,1 -7;
Elster, Jon (1983): Ulysses and the Sirens, Cambridge University Press,135;

2. Interactive Decision Theory (5 lectures)

Topics:
The Realm of Game Theory
Self-Enforcing Agreements
Games in Time
Games and Information
Repeated Games and Social Norms

Assigned Readings:
Kreps, David (1990): Game Theory and Economic Modelling, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 9-65, 77-91;
Schelling, Thomas (1960): The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Chapter 2;

3. Social Situations and Institutions (5 lectures)

Topics:
Strategic Behavior on Markets
Bargaining, Auctions, and Contracts
Voting
Acquiring Reputation
Rumors and Herd Behavior

Assigned Readings:
Arrow, Kenneth (1963): "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care", American Economic Review 53, 941-973;
Hotelling, Harold (1929): "Stability in Competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57;
Hayek, Friedrich (1945): "The Use of Knowledge in Society", American Economic Review 35, 519-530;
Tirole, Jean (1988): "The Theory of Industrial Organization", MIT Press, 21-34;
Schelling, Thomas (1975): Voting Schemes, Harvard University, manuscript;
Kreps, op. cit., 65-77;
Kapferer, Jean-Noel (1990): Rumors, Transaction Publishers;

4. Rationality and Knowledge Revisited (3 lectures)

Topics:
Common Knowledge
Bounded Rationality
Multiple Selves

Assigned Readings:
Binmore, Ken (1990): Aims and Scope of Game Theory, in his Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory, Basil Blackwell,1-42;
Pettit, Philip - Robert Sugden (1989): "The Backward Induction Paradox", Journal of Philosophy 86, 169-182;
Rubinstein, Ariel (1991): Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory, Econometrica 59, 909-924;
Simon, Herbert (1976): From Substantive to Procedural Rationality, in: S. Latsis (ed.): Method and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge University Press; 129-148;
Schelling, Thomas (1985): "Enforcing Rules on Oneself", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1, 357-374;
Johnston, Mark (1988): Self-Deception and the Nature of the Mind, in: B. MacLaughlin - A. Rorty (eds.): Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press;

II. Focusing on an Area (10 lectures)

A field from among the following will be reviewed and analyzed:

a. Common Knowledge and Collective Intentionality
b. Knowledge and Time
c. Man a Machine - Society a Machine
d. Rules
e. The Analysis of the Interaction of a Large Number of Individuals
f. Techniques of Deception

Grades will be based on:
Midterm Exam (after the General Theory part): 50%; Essay (after the course): 50%



Digitized version prepared by the Curriculum Resource Center (CRC)
CEU Budapest, Hungary
Revised: April, 1996

Amb_Analytic.F95PS.v5


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