Competing National Ideologies, 
Cyclical Responses:

The Mobilisation of the Irish, Basque and Croat 
National Movements to Rebellion Against the State

By

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ABSTRACT:

The 1960s was to herald a significant change in the political environment of modern Europe. Established means of seeking political redress through traditions of parliamentary enfranchisement and elite consolidation was to be met by a new challenger from the peripheries of established nation-states. At the core of these changes was the re-emergence of national movements and nationalism, as an ideology, as a means of addressing the perceived state engendered marginalisation of peripheral communities. The failure of ‘Social Movement’ theory to deal with movements that would proffer an ideological alternative was to leave a gap in the discipline vis-à-vis state centralisation and peripheral oppositional mobilisation.

‘Social Movement’ theory’s two predominant paradigms of ‘Resource Mobilisation’ and ‘New Social Movement’ theory would fail to adequately explain the emergence of movements that were not mono-generational in nature. The former’s negation of ideational movement mobilisation, and the latter’s downplaying of the state, was to ignore two factors in the mobilisation of peripheries to rebellion. That is
the state and the political opportunity structures formed in the processes of state transition in creating ongoing cycles of reform-protest-reform that are necessary to continued heightened levels of peripheral mobilisation.

In this thesis I will explore the role of the state as a catalyst for movement mobilisation, through the dynamic process of state centralisation and reciprocal peripheral activism against the centre. What emerges is a parallel, yet interdependent, development of centre-periphery mobilisation. The state, hence provides the frame in which the challenge from the periphery occurs and also the ideological preconditions for peripheral counter movement mobilisation. Nationalism, as such, provides a social movement with an ideological and strategic link with past conflicts that allow protest communities to attain a level of historicity and continuity that more traditional forms of social movements would find difficult to achieve. It is within the cyclical formation and re-formation of state that political opportunity structures emerge between expanding and consolidating state centres and reactionary peripheries.

What develops is a reciprocal shaping and reshaping of centre-periphery identities, as movements tend to expand their own repertoire and demands according to those employed by the elites they oppose. A ‘mimicking’ of the ‘other’ that allows for the state to re-place itself at the centre of any future resolution of the conflict. This thesis proposes to demonstrate national movements are but children of this process of continuous state ideological development, which formulates contentious repertoires as alternatives to state organisational options. In studying the Republican Irish, Basque separatist and Croatian national movements since the 1960s to the present, I wish to show how all these mobilisations are by-products of the very state identities they refute.

It is the inability of the Northern Irish, Spanish and Yugoslav state centres to provide a more inclusive doctrine of state that led to the initial mobilisation against the centre. Yet it is this failure to incorporate newly polarised peripheries that feeds the cycle of reciprocal centre periphery development. With each new encroachment of the centre upon the periphery, the periphery ‘mimics’ the centre until one of two events occur, ie, the startiation of the crisis, and a perpetuation of conflict that has little chance of resolution; or the successful attainment of statehood. The nation is henceforth to be interpreted as a vehicle to societal liberation as long as it has a target in the state to justify its existence. Thus, the mobilisation of the national movement to rebellion cannot emerge without the dynamic and reciprocal development of the state centre and periphery.
INTRODUCTION

It was in February 1996, whilst taking a break from my doctoral field work in Seville, that I was to have an experience that would change the nature of my research. This was the period of Carnevale and the ascension to Lent. The allure of Carnevale’s expectant festivities played a large part in my decision to head south to Andalusia; as well as the fact that it was in the opposite direction from where, until then, all my attention had been focused. Seville that morning was glorious in its promise of sun, festivity and Moorish culture. A far cry from the bleak European winter that had awaited me in Belfast, Coleraine, Zagreb and Bilbao.

Whilst admiring the Sephardic architecture and tree lined streets of the old city, with a group of Jamaican and Quebecois students, our early morning jaunt was halted by the sounds of discontent coming from nearby the old colonial Cathedral. Before us was a group of some eighty Romani protesting about the levels of poverty experienced in government funded housing projects, and the inadequacy of social welfare policies in dealing with ethnic specific cultural needs. However, neither the fact that the Romani were protesting, nor the looks of distaste that the Romani were receiving from the average Andalusian, angered by the disruptive nature of the protest, caught my attention. It was one sign. A powerful image of protest, which for me at that time seemed to be irrelevant to the Romani cause, much less the issue of public housing. This sign neatly sewn on the sleeve of a green army parker was the flag of the Basque Country. Worn by a Romani in his early forties, this brazen act of defiance towards Castilian ethnic rule was to question my intent to study the relevance of nationalism purely outside its role as a tool to social mobilisation for the initiation of collective action.

This move was brazen on behalf of the Romani, due to the fact that a week prior to the occurrence of this small public rally, some two million people marched through Madrid demanding an end to the Euzkadi ‘ta Askatasuna’ (ETA) movement’s ‘terror’, and a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Yet here in Seville, one week after the show of two million protesters moving towards a populist solution, there stood one Romani, a member of perhaps the most persecuted ethnic community of contemporary Europe, defiantly standing in the face of mass opinion, wearing the symbol of the people considered by many Spaniards as the cause of contemporary violent dissidence.

This was reminiscent of Charles Tilly’s experience in writing The
Contentious French and how he had, whilst researching the rise of popular rebellion amongst the French nation in the dusty library of Versailles, been similarly interrupted by the voices of a few hundred protesters who today still felt, nearly two hundred years after similar activism had successfully removed the monarchy, the necessity to take to the streets when more official avenues of access were denied them. For Tilly the nature of the protest and the cause were of little significance in comparison to the epiphany he felt when recognising that in many ways, such a movement of people was cyclical and would remain an integral part of peripheral expression of discontent as long as the state existed.

In my opinion, the power of this Romani evoking the symbol of the Basque was a throw back to the Francoist period whereby for most on the periphery the now vilified Basque radical movement ETA was once the symbol of open resistance to an overtly centralist Falangist regime. For this Romani, it was a symbol, a reminder of another time, when social movement activism was a means to political revolution as much as it was a manifestation of the cyclical nature of movement activism and state response. For me it was a reminder that the movement that I was studying was as relevant today as it was in the past, according to the nature of the state’s efforts to deal with it.

Progressively my research changed. Initially I desired to study the contemporary relevance of nationalism in the Irish, Basque and Croatian communities. Eventually though, I was to broaden my research to include the cyclical nature of social movement activism in challenging core ethnic elites at the centre of restructuring state entities. Sparked initially by the experience in Seville, after each interview undertaken with political activists from the movements researched throughout this thesis, it soon became clear that the problems these movements face today- in terms of responding to state policy changes and the mobilisation of the population in order to accrue popular legitimacy- were cyclical. What the Irish Republican Army (IRA) faced today in the Joint Frameworks Agreement, was played out ten years prior in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the Sunningdale Agreement a further ten years before that. The cyclical nature of this took my interest as I came to realise that nationalism itself could be seen as a tool of social mobilisation in cycles of activism against the state and, as such, should be studied in like terms.

The Thesis that will be Examined.

The rise of nationalist movements to political prominence throughout Europe in the 1960s has caused a dilemma for many social scientists. The study of national movement development had seemingly been
resolved, within the European context, by the completion of the two World Wars. Nation-building theory had provided a paradigm that explained the development of the modern nation-state in terms of increased state cultural, political, social, economic and communicative centralisation. Negating socio-psychological and peripheral reasons behind national mobilisation, ‘Nation-Building’ theorists seemingly ignored the significance of peripheral non-statist nationalist claims as being atavistic, sub-national and retrogradist. This had the effect of marginalising such movements as by-products of industrialisation, and as such should be given due consideration accordingly.

National movement theory, hence, became static- imprisoned within the status quo that reflected the make up of European state development. The nation, however, as a means of socio-political organisation, was far from static. What the rise of national movement mobilisation on the peripheries of the European state system had demonstrated was that the international state system was far from completed, and the nation-state as we know it is dynamic. In my opinion, states are dynamic in order to absorb the demands and tensions that emerge from society. States respond in kind to demands from the periphery, reflecting not just the nature of centre periphery relations, but the fluidity of the state as a means of conflict resolution between competing elites, communities, and ideologies of state. Where crises emerge, is when the state has failed in its role as arbiter, bringing a corresponding questioning of the state’s legitimacy to monopolise the control of state apparatus over society.2

Social scientists, in failing to recognise the dynamicism between the corresponding development of centre and periphery, have ignored an aspect of state-periphery development that could prove helpful in explaining the reasons behind increased peripheral national movement mobilisation. This dissertation will henceforth attempt to demonstrate that state and peripheral national development is parallel. At the core is the cyclical development of centre-periphery relations, whereby the state is placed at the centre of the expansion of centre consolidation and peripheral mobilisation. Through combining ‘Social Movement’ theory and a re-evaluation of nation state development it will be shown how national movement mobilisation is a reaction of the periphery towards greater state encroachment that must be taken from an historic paradigm.

The mobilisation of political communities to rebellion as a step response to the state’s own processes of reform and consolidation is what I call a ‘mimicking’ of the state.3 The movement is but a reaction, yet for rebellion to occur the mobilised community must chart its own expansion of repertoire according to the historic continuum it finds itself in. Radicalisation can only occur with the failure of the state to provide the necessary political opportunity structures to absorb the demands that
arise within the cleavages between consolidating state centre and mobilising periphery. For the movement to successfully achieve their goals of autonomy, or independence, they must ‘mimic’ the shifts in state, exemplified in the reform process, frame by frame, action by action. They must utilise the cycle of reform-protest-reform in order to wrest control over the pace of reform away from the centre through an intensification of the engagement of the state. The cycle provides the opportunity for this joint reshaping of the political environment to occur.

Central to this cyclical development of crisis is the recognition of the role of the state in the process of identity formation. My thesis will be that the state not only is integral to the formation of centralist ideology that forces the periphery to radicalise, but also to peripheral identification. With each frame by frame tactical ‘mimicking’ of the state, there develops a simultaneous ideological ‘mimicking’ of the other. This places great importance upon the state as both raison d’être and fulcrum for the rise of peripheral discontent. What occurs is not just a cyclical parallel, yet inter-dependent development between centre and periphery, but also between the competing ideologies of movement vis-à-vis the state. Thus, without the overt centralist nationalist ideology, there would be little room for the development of a competing peripheral nationalist ideology.

The nature of peripheral rebellion is a ‘mimic’ of the nature of state rule. Intensification of state centralisation, policing and militarisation policies at the completion of each cycle, provides for the reciprocation of movement response. A scenario which can be utilised to the advantage of both state and periphery alike. My premise is that for the centralist state to be successful they must provide significant opportunity structures in order to enfranchise the majority of the competing community and further peripheralise the radicals. This ability to restructure the nature of centre-periphery parallel development through cyclical reforms has two outcomes: the consolidation of the centralist state as a fluid entity of conflict resolution, or the stratification of the conflict whereby the movement is no longer defined in terms of its community, but rather within terms of its role within the conflict itself.

For the movement to be successful, the cycles of reform-protest-reform (Maguire 1998) must be ridden at a level that encourages further reform from the centre. The stratification of the crisis into a permanent polarity between the two communities must be avoided. Polarisation is significant for initial mobilisation as a distinguisher between the two competing communities, but it must not become the raison d’être for mobilisation itself. This resides in the state alone. The movement must ‘mimic’ frame for frame, action for action, the actions of the reshaping state, utilising the cycle of protest, as the national movement is but a protest community within the historic continuum of parallel state centre.
and periphery development. Intensification of the crisis may only serve to justify the radicalisation of the state’s own identity as a military counter-movement to that of the periphery, and the criminalisation of the minority community with the criminalisation of the crisis. Successful mobilisation, hence, occurs when the peripheral movement ‘mimics’ the state to reform, without falling into directly challenging the state physically. For only when a state has been created or attained that at the end of the cycle, can force be used to consolidate the new gains.

**Rationale Behind the Movements Chosen for Study.**

In undertaking a comparative study of the Irish, Basque and Croatian national movements I have chosen three communities from three varying political circumstances so as to test the applicability of my thesis. By incorporating movements that emerge from a democratic, fascist and communist state system, I wanted to test the dynamic and cyclical paradigm within these three unrelated systems, except of course in the nature of their battle against perceived ethnic centralist elites, so as to demonstrate the ubiquitous nature of parallel, and interdependent, centre-periphery development.

The commonalities that exist between the three empirical case studies lie in the nature of the development of centralist elite politics, and how all three peripheral communities have subsequently defined their own identities and action accordingly. The Irish, Basque and Croat national movements are far from aberrations on the political landscape of European state development. All three are placed within an historic continuum of state development and peripheral mobilisation that can be traced back two centuries. Sovereignty and autonomy, within a contemporary statist-nationalist paradigm, have been political catch-cries with the Irish since 1792, the Basques since 1832 and Croatia since the 1830s. This, allows all three to be perceived in terms of protest communities that have continuously redefined and reshaped their notions of community and identity in terms of the dynamic development of state and peripheral elites.

The Irish since 1968, the Basques since 1959 and the Croats since 1965 are examples of communities that have previously been seen to have resolved their nationalist aspirations within the pre-existing state structures. At the core of each movement was the mobilisation of cultural, political and social discontent that would manifest into direct political opposition to the centralist state. Originally culturally based, all three movements would manifest in the form of social movement mobilisation with civil rights, equal opportunity and full enfranchisement at the core of their doctrines. The state would become
the fulcrum of their activism as well as the raison d’être for their continued mobilisation. Each would prove highly responsive to the shifts in state structures, and similarly would sporn radical movements to directly combat the state’s own repressive apparatus.

Differences though, exist within the nature by which these respective movements have chosen to engage the state. In Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, the emergence of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and ETA respectively, would signify a radicalisation of peripheral political mobilisation as a response to increased state isolation of minority claims. To a lesser extent a similar occurrence would emerge within the Croat diaspora, with the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (CRB). Yet, the fact that they were never to gain a foothold within Yugoslavia would diminish their effectiveness. The Croats would come to be defined in terms of the ability of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) to foster underground political activity to use in times of state recentralisation against the centre. Formed along a populist leftist national liberation movement the LCC held a considerable advantage over the Irish and Basque movements. It provided a vehicle for nationalist aspirations to be explored within the structures of state power. This allowed for the development of the Croatian Spring Movement from 1967 to 1971 under the direct auspices of a wing of government. The Irish, facing electoral gerrymandering, were effectively excluded from all aspects of governmental policy formation, whilst the Basques were viewed as a cultural anomaly preventing the cultural Castilianisation of the state so desired by Franco and his own movement of nation renewal, the Movimiento Nacional.4

All three movements, in one way or another, are dependent upon the state system they oppose for the nature of their response. They, likewise, are defined in terms of the nature of the state centre’s own definition of the nature of state nationalism. Hence, the IRA is not only ‘mimicking’ the nature of government reaction to demands for reform from the periphery, but also the ideological tenants of extremist Protestant Ulsterism. ETA is also a child of repressive Castilianisation, and much of its distinctiveness from the rest of Spain’s diverse national polity is defined in opposition to the nature of Castilianisation which is at the core of the centre’s own identity. Similarly, Croatian nationalism can be viewed as a counter movement to the nature of Serbian centralisation of state and ‘Greater Serbian’ national movement development. The development of each of these movements and states are reciprocal, with each needing the ‘other’ to frame the reasons for their existence and the nature of their action.

What will be demonstrated throughout the empirical part of this thesis will be how the nature of the responses of each movement, to state
reform and reaction, within the cycle of reform-protest-reform, has shaped the development of each movement vis-à-vis the state they oppose. The development of two strands of Irish Republicanism from the successful Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA), ie, the IRA and Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), will become integral in demonstrating how the ability of the state to co-opt one section of the national community whilst peripheralising the other, leads to the stratification of the conflict. Further entrenching the Ulster state as integral to any future resolution of the crisis, as the conflict it has created has enabled the state to become the protector of both radical, and moderate, Protestant interests in opposition to Catholic Republican peripheral pressures. This at once stratifies the conflict and peripheries in a permanent state of mobilisation that prevents compromise to emerge between the two competing ideologies of state.

Similarly, the radicalisation of the conflict in the Basque Country has led to a polarisation of the two competing ideologies of state. The difference between the Irish and Basque examples is that, though initially intransigent, the ability of the Francoist elite to reform the nature of state identity through the democratisation process, has led to an opening of political opportunity structures of state that would enfranchise significant sectors of the Basque polity and isolate others. This hence minimised the role of ETA with each completion of a cycle of reform-protest-reform, as the state successfully sought to re-identify itself in an environment conducive to parallel dynamic centre-periphery development. This left ETA marginalised from its own constituency due to the nature of its actions. By keeping control of the cycle the Spanish governmental centre was able to rejustify the reasons for its continuance whilst questioning the relevance of not just ETA, but any rival Basque ideology of state.

A Working Definition of Terms.

The difficulties in undertaking a study that incorporates two strands of social science are many, especially when attempting to use working definitions from certain theoretical concepts. Attempting to combine definitions from ‘Social Movement’ theory and the wealth of literature on nationalism is no less difficult. Nevertheless, due to similarities between the two strands, within the discipline, more general working definitions were needed that were applicable to this thesis.

Social Movement

Social movements are entities that are defined by the nature of their struggle with the state. As entities defined by their action they become fluid in their ability to adopt and change ideology and strategy according
to the nature of the struggle with the state. Found within the cleavages that develop between shifting state centres and peripheries, they are born of struggle and conflict and must, therefore, be viewed in terms of their dynamic nature. Extra-parliamentary in nature, they have the ability of partaking within a given political system as long as their challenge to the system is not compromised. They are dependent on the ability of the state to either co-opt or repress them, through ‘political opportunity structures’ created in the conflict between state and movement, for their relevance to a protest community. Therefore, in this thesis I will utilise Sidney Tarrow’s (1995: 3-4) definition of social movements to best describe the movement in dynamic terms as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.”

**Cycle of Protest**

‘Cycles of Protest’, ie, the dynamic paradigm of social movement development will be the core theory of this thesis. The significance of this dynamic paradigm is the ability of it to explain the development of social movement mobilisation in terms of the historic development of social movement activism vis-à-vis the state. The two predominant paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s, ‘Resource Mobilisation’ and ‘New Social Movement’ theory, failed due to their tendency to view movement mobilisation in terms that negated the role of historic state ideational development (see chapter 1). By placing collective activism within an historic continuum, social theorists like della Porta (1995, 1996), Tarrow (1991, 1993a) and Tilly (1986, 1995) have recognised the significance of the state as an ever changing target and raison d’être for collective mobilisation. Social movements, accordingly, react likewise, mobilising in times of lulls in state reform and de-escalating activities when little gains can accrue from continued activism. What the ‘cycles of protest’ paradigm offers is a model that recognises that state and movement development are far from static. Rather they are dynamic and responsive entities that continue to evolve as long as discontent and crises exist. Thus, within this thesis Tarrow’s (1995: 153) extension of Tilly’s (1994a: 13-14) definition of protest cycles will be used:

referring to a phase of heightened conflict and contention across the social system that includes: a rapid diffusion of collective action from mobilised sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organised and unorganised participation; and sequences of intensified interaction between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution.

**Political Opportunity Structures**
The premise in this thesis that movements and nations are dependent upon ‘political opportunity structures’, created by the state in transition
for further mobilisation, is dependent on the dynamic parallel, yet interdependent, development of state-centre and periphery-movement. They may be designed as a response by the state to alleviate or intensify crisis, as an attempt to enfranchise or further isolate dissident communities; they may also arise incidentally within the cycle of protest itself. Henceforth, throughout this thesis when talking of political opportunity structures I will refer to Tarrow’s (1996: 54) definition of such structures being the “consistent- but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements.”

**Nation**

This thesis examines the dynamic nature of centre-periphery development vis-à-vis the state. The definition of ‘nation’, hence, must be seen as a reflexive and mutable entity that exists within the historic continuum of state development. Reference is often made throughout this thesis to ‘ethnicity’ and ‘kinship’, yet it would be a mistake to overemphasise the role of such notions in all cases of national development. While not negating aspects of the ‘nation’ that pre-date industrialisation, this thesis concentrates on the development of three specific nations within modern state contexts. Significantly, the ‘nation’ is defined here in terms of its discursive and dialectic nature, as well as its fluidity as a movement of societal discontent and organisation. Thus, Anthony Smith’s (1991: 14) definition of the ‘nation’ shall be used in this thesis and will be defined as: “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”

**National Movement**

In this thesis the nation is defined in dynamic terms, as such the ‘national movement’ is viewed as an extension of the politicised nation. This politicisation of the nation is a response to state centralist encroachment upon the periphery. Therefore, the ‘national movement’ is to be viewed as the ‘nation’ mobilised, ie, as a continuous extension of the responsiveness of given elites to shifts within the political environment. It is, therefore, a protest community that is in a state of continuous mobilisation within a given historic paradigm, that has as its main goal the attainment of statehood for the community it represents.

**Centre-Periphery**

The final definition that shall be addressed here is that of centre and periphery. Throughout this thesis the notion of centre-periphery conflict, development and mobilisation are common place. For the sake of simplicity, the definition of centre and periphery will be limited to the
dynamic development between state and movement that is explored throughout this dissertation. Henceforth, the concept of ‘centre’, and thus ‘centralisation’, will be equated with the culturo-national elite at the head of state. ‘Centralisation’ will, therefore, be described as the state ideological encroachment upon the periphery in the name of elite consolidation. ‘Periphery’ will be defined as the ideological counter-movement to the state’s centralisation, as defined within the national movement and community that is in direct opposition to the centre’s predominance of the political system.

Data and Methodology.

In the development of this thesis I have divided my research into three major sections:

1. Academic, biographical and popular literature that deals with ‘Social Movement’ theory, ‘Nation-Building’ theory and the overall historic development of state nationalism and periphery mobilisation;
2. Documents and pamphlets attained from archival and political party libraries; and
3. Interviews with political activists and politicians that were and are currently active within the movements discussed throughout the empirical chapters of this thesis.

Library Research and Literature Review.

The nature of the literature reviewed:

1. Material dealing with general ‘Social Movement’ theory which included ‘Resource Mobilisation’, ‘New Social Movement’ and the dynamic ‘Protest Cycle’ theories;
2. Material dealing with the development of the state, modern nation and contemporary peripheral European national movements;
3. The historical development of Irish, Basque and Croat national movements; also state based Ulster, Castilian and Serbian counter-movements; and
4. Political science and historical reports, articles, biographies and newspaper reports dealing with the contemporary rise of national movement mobilisation and conflict escalation with the state in Northern Ireland, Spain and the former Yugoslavia.
**Primary and Archival Research.**

The archival research was divided equally between all three case studies, though equally limited by the willingness of the movements concerned to allow me to access relevant material. In Northern Ireland much of the archival and pamphlet material was gained from the library at the University of Ulster, Coleraine, through the assistance of the United Nations’ Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution. In the Basque Country the archival research was conducted with the assistance of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) document and policy sections, where access was gained to their extensive collection of past and present documents. In Croatia, the research was attained from two sources. Firstly, the Archives of the Library at the University of Zagreb. Secondly, at the archives of the Institute for Applied Social Research in Zagreb. Most are in pamphlet and document form and are as such listed separately from the rest of the bibliography.

**A Brief Note on Interviews and the Original Primary Resources.**

In the course of the research, nineteen people were interviewed in two separate periods of this research. The first period, which was attained in the late winter of 1992, consisted of interviews that were recorded as follow up interviews for my Honours Thesis (Ercegovac: 1992). The reasoning for this unusual strategy was that at the time Croatia was at war, and there was little guarantee of whether the politicians interviewed would be willing to further conduct interviews in such busy times, and whether or not they would still be alive. In fact, in December 1995, whilst I was organising interviews in Madrid, Miko Tripalo, the Croat representative on the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), died, reinforcing the importance of attaining interviews for my future doctoral thesis whenever available. The second period of research occurred during the northern winter of 1995 and 1996. These were the interviews completed with councillors and politicians in the Basque Country and Northern Ireland.

The length of interviews varied, from fifteen minutes to one hour. However, due to certain circumstances five interviews were not recorded. Two because of equipment failure, though the interviews were hand written. The three others were purposefully not recorded at the bequest of the interviewees. This was due to their unwillingness to have their voices recorded, as they are members of Herri Batasuna and do not wish to express opinions publicly that may differ with the official party line. In these cases the interviewees were given pseudonyms, and their
responses were recorded by hand for obvious security reasons. All interviews for both periods are listed in Appendix 1 of this thesis.

Those chosen to be interviewed consisted of political activists who were prominent within the structures of their movements and parties for their input into the strategies and platforms of the movements they represent. In Northern Ireland, I concentrated on the Republican Nationalist community. Thus, the interviews were done with members of Sinn Féin and the SDLP. In the Basque Country, interviews were recorded again with members of the nationalist community. The spread of interviews over a broad political spectrum of movements and parties was intentional in order to gain a larger perspective into strategies of the overall nationalist movement. Therefore, the PNV, Herri Batasuna (HB)10 and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA)11 were given equal weight. Similarly, in Croatia, the interviews were conducted with members of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian National Party (HNS), ex-LCC and Croatian Democratic Party (HDS).

The questions were directed towards the national question, although, more often than not, the interviewees were encouraged to discuss points they considered imperative to the nature of their movement’s activism. For this reason I left much of the questioning open ended once the initial questions on nationalism were addressed. Central to this was my aim of utilising interviews to augment the theory proffered throughout this thesis, rather than concentrating on quantitative methods. Della Porta (1992), and della Porta and Tarrow (1986), noted that it was important to record quantitative methods in certain circumstances except when attempting to understand the rationale behind why people embrace movement activism and the significance that ideology plays as a mobiliser to action. It was with this in mind that I undertook my interviews in order to ascertain the personal motives behind why such activism was embraced.

Questions, therefore, corresponded with the ‘mood’ of the discussions. By ‘mood’ I mean the nature in which the interviewees desired to approach the interview. Nevertheless, the core questions put to the respondents were as follows:

1. The reasons behind their joining the national movement;
2. The significance of nationalism to their political beliefs;
3. The reasons to why they remained active;
4. The history of their activism;
5. The role of the opposing elite in mobilising their community through repression;
6. The aims of their movement;
7. The role of the state as fulcrum of protest activism and conciliator of societal cleavages;
8. The possibility of reforming the state and the desire for the attainment of a separate state entity.

A Brief Breakdown of the Thesis Chapter by Chapter.

This thesis will be divided into four parts. The first two parts will deal with the overall theoretical explanation of this dissertation, the third part with the empirical case studies, and the final part the conclusion.

Part I
Chapter 1 will examine the contemporary move by social movement theory to incorporate a more ideational, historical and dynamic model into the discipline. Thus, it becomes important to lightly examine the reasons why ‘Resource Mobilisation’ and ‘New Social Movement’ theory prove insufficient in explaining the reasoning behind the emergence of contesting ideational movements in the post-1960s European political environment. This will allow for the development of a dynamic statist analysis that will be further developed in the following chapter.

Chapter 2 shall explore the significance of the state as both target and fulcrum of peripheral discontent. Central to this chapter will be the importance of the state in the mobilisation of social movement activism in direct opposition to that of the state. It will provide a base for chapter 3’s analysis on the cyclical development of state centre and periphery.

Chapter 3 continues on from chapter 2 and places the state at the core of contemporary ideational movement mobilisation. This chapter examines the complimentary and reciprocal development of centre and periphery development. The core is to show how mobilised peripheral discontent, in the form of protest action, is a reciprocal response to the continuous development and encroachment of the state on the periphery of society. This is where my theory of movement ‘mimicking’ the state shall first be explored in full, with the intention of demonstrating how state and movement development is parallel, yet interdependent.

Part II
Chapter 4, the key to this chapter will be exploring why traditional ‘Nation-Building’ theory fails to explain the emergence of national movement mobilisation throughout Europe during the 1960s. Central to this will be the analysis of the cyclical nature of national mobilisation and how the great wave of nation building that occurred throughout
Europe in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles far from satiated the demands of Europe’s marginalised national communities. It will provide the lead into a further exploration of the reasons behind national movement mobilisation in chapters 5 and 6.

Chapter 5 explores the attractiveness of nationalism as a doctrine of social agency for protest communities seeking longevity within the established political order. The populist, democratic and mobilisational nature of nationalism will be explored within the context of peripheral counter mobilisation to the centre’s expansion. Nationalism, will hence be portrayed as a flexible movement strategy designed to ‘mimic’ the state’s official ideology. Furthermore, nationalism’s reciprocal dynamic nature and its ability to restructure the political environment according to the strategic needs of the periphery will be examined in detail. This will lead into the final theoretical chapter that will deal with the reasons behind peripheries choosing nationalism as the optimum form of societal liberation.

Chapter 6 will, as the final theoretical chapter, explore why nationalism has become seen as the cure all for marginalised disenfranchised political peripheries. At the core of this will be the recognition that as the predominant doctrine of state it ‘mimics’ the very state structure that the periphery seeks to reform. The nature of the state’s own ideology will be shown as the catalyst for such mobilisation. Thus, the ideological, social and cultural role of nationalism as a doctrine of socio-political liberation will be explored, with the aim of placing the state as the reasoning behind such peripheral mobilisation.

**Part III**

Chapters 7 & 8 will commence the progressive analysis of the empirical case studies within this thesis. The aim of these chapters will be to provide a base for the comparative study of the Irish, Basque and Croat national movements. This will be demonstrated by showing, in the context of the cyclical development of protest movement and state consolidation, how the Irish national movement has in fact stratified the conflict by the way they have chosen to respond to increased state centralisation and consolidation.

Chapters 9 & 10 demonstrate how the willingness of the Spanish state to open up political opportunity structures to the Basque community has enabled them with each completion of the cycle of reform-protest-reform, to co-opt the moderates on the periphery. This leads to a subsequent isolation of the radicals and a further legitimisation of the previously challenged state as the arena for further conflict resolution, thus, consolidating the position of the state in future centre-periphery development.
Chapters 11 & 12 will examine the development of the Croat national movement in the context of state initiated reform cycles. The key will be exploring the success of the Croats in polarising the political system through their activism as opposed to polarising the communities. This strategic ‘mimicking’ of the state, yet never directly challenging it physically, was to enable the Croats to see out successive cycles until they were in a position to demonstrate the inability of the state to reform.

**Part IV**
The Conclusion will review the aims of the research and conclude that the state as an ever reforming political entity plays an integral role in the parallel, yet interdependent, development of the centre and periphery. This is to be demonstrated by a summation of the role of the state in the instigation of the cycle of reform-protest-reform. It provides the fulcrum for peripheral mobilisation, as well as the target. Thus, whether or not the state or the movement is successful in attaining their goals is dependent upon the ability of one or the other to control the pace of the cycle of reform. Success is granted to the movement, be it state or periphery sponsored, accordingly. If both fail then there emerges a stratification of the crisis, as the conflict escalates to whereby both state and movement identify with the struggle itself. A perpetual continuation of the cycle of state consolidation and peripheral movement rebellion that will spiral into the future, with little chance of resolution.
CHAPTER ONE:  
From Political Opportunity Structures to Dynamic Paradigm

The transitory nature of social movement mobilisation and its consistent defining of political protest outside the structures of the state, has led to the emergence of two predominant schools of thought. One, ‘Resource Mobilisation’ theory, has concentrated on the ability of movements to mobilise via bargaining processes produced by state centres called political opportunity structures (Jenkins & McAdam 1995; McAdam 1996). The other, ‘New Social Movement’ theory, provides an alternate path of viewing the trend of re-emerging social movement activism throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as a rational political choice amongst political activists seeking solutions outside formal state structures (Kriesi 1995, 1996; Touraine 1995). In my opinion the fixed structure of both theories, the former’s over concentration on the role of the state’s bargaining process vis-à-vis political opportunity structures offered the periphery (Gellner 1977; Schwartz & Shuva 1992), and the latter’s negation of the state (Giddens 1981, 1994; McCarthy & Wolfson 1992), have limited not just the nature in which one can view movement mobilisation to action, but also the very reciprocal nature of state centre and periphery development.

In this chapter I intend to explore not just the inapplicability of both ‘Resource Mobilisation’ and ‘New Social Movement’ theory, but also the dynamic relationship between the centre and periphery in creating and expanding movement, and protest repertoire. The greatest problem I find with ‘Resource Movement’ theory is that as a paradigm it is more suitable to the North American environment from which it emerged. An environment that is geared to exploring the nature of extra-parliamentary protest activism in a democratic system, designed to incorporate and absorb differing political identities and issues through the bargaining processes of state (Mayer 1995; Przeworski & Laitin 1995). ‘Resource Mobilisation' theory has tended to concentrate on how movement activism has been able to attain full political enfranchisement of minority viewpoints through creating access points within departments of policy formation, even if only at an advisory level (McCarthy et al. 1996). It also presupposes the fact that every value held by mobilised groups is negotiable, and hence flexible. This at once negates the ideational nature of protest activism (Heberle 1995).

The problem with this American statist institutional paradigm is that it has little relevance in the re-emergence of social movement activism in Europe throughout the 1960s, where pre-existing elites viewed social
movements as a direct threat to their ethnic and class interests, as in Northern Ireland, Spain and Yugoslavia. Similarly 'New Social Movement' theory, whilst concentrating on the counter cultural nature of student, environmental, and sexual political activism, negated the state as anything but an object of derision for these mobilisations (Tarrow 1996).

In my opinion, the state remained the catalyst to extra-parliamentary mobilisation. Be it as the object of discontent, the target of protest, or the very institution within which these peripheralised movements sought redress. The problem with 'New Social Movement' theory was that it viewed contemporary post-World War Two protest activism in terms of life style choice (Habermas 1981). The ‘life style choice’ paradigm wrongly presumed that the combination of social democracy and free market capitalism automatically provided answers that forced people to seek solutions within alternative counter-cultural movements (Touraine 1995). Where this theory fails is in falsely presuming that ethnic, sectarian, class and gender issues have in some way been resolved. In reality, although Europe may be heading towards political integration (Balme 1995), the cleavages steeped in ethnic, sectarian and class prejudice still undermine many a political system governed by entrenched elites (Wallerstein 1985; Keating 1995). What is needed is a more flexible theory that may absorb the notion of political opportunity structures, that 'Resource Mobilisation' theory offers, and the routes to counter cultural movement proffered by 'New Social Movement' theory.

What I propose to demonstrate in this chapter is that no one theory is sufficient in explaining the rise of ideational movements in post-World War Two Europe without exploring the integral role of the state in mobilising peripheries, often inadvertently, to political action. I believe that the dynamic relationship that exists between the centre and the periphery is at the core not only of the movement, but, of state development as well. It is a cycle of perpetual shaping and reshaping that creates a level of interdependence between the two antagonists. My opinion is, that the state not only provides the reasoning behind initial mobilisation but also the target by which a movement may seek political inclusion or rebellion. As such, movement activism is a vehicle, for political mobilisation against the centre, and the creation of an autonomous political space, is a consequence of the failure of the state to facilitate the advancement of a given political community due to the exclusive nature of its competing ideational formation.

'Resource Mobilisation' Theory: The Failure to Grasp the Nature of the Dynamic Relation between the State and the Periphery.
The resurgence of social movement activity in the 1960s and 1970s was to play a significant role in the reinterpretation of socio-political relations in the post-World War Two era (Hobsbawm 1974b; Laqueur 1993). It was an epoch that had previously offered respite from the radical and revolutionary roads to political modernity that seemed to be the accepted path in the evolution of participatory democracy (Przeworski 1985). Within ‘Social Movement’ theory itself, the sudden rise of protest activity in both the First and Second World was to question more traditional means of interpreting protest action and social movement development; such as theories based on behaviouralism, mass society, relative deprivation and political sociology (Tarrow 1992; Lyman 1995a). Though integral to the formation of ‘Social Movement’ theory, some of these schools of thought concentrated too much on individualistic, and mass psychological value related systems, for the reasons behind extra-parliamentary collective mass political participation (Fromm 1991). These seemed to place the fault within the behavioural structures of individual activists (Popper), as opposed to the failure of the system to fully enfranchise certain sectors of society. The reason being that it was taken for granted that democracy, as it stood, was the apex of political development, and as such, the failure of democracy to be fully representative was never seriously taken into account (Wallerstein 1985; Fukuyama 1994).

The social psychological aspect of social movement research also tended to be inherently elitist and anti-democratic through its tendency to marginalise all social movement activity as an expression of discontent amongst those unable to compete within structures provided by the democratic state (Gamson 1992: 53). From this perspective, the rise of movement activism in the face of ever increasing wealth, education standards, housing, and disintegration of traditional class barriers, was to overturn any notions that it was a residue of deprivation induced by industrialisation (Burke 1992). The events of the 1960s brought a realisation that the road to political modernity, as well as political participation, could not be placed neatly into the established institutionalised paradigm of democratically inspired bargaining processes between competing interests, without fully taking into account the effectiveness of non-institutionalised means of effecting social policy and political elites (Laqueur 1992: 345).

It was in the face of such social upheaval that a new solution was sought that would explain the reoccurrence of movement activism (McClurg 1992: 5). This alternative was found with the development of the 'Resource Mobilisation' paradigm in the 1970s and 1980s through the extensive research of social movement theorists such as Jenkins (1977), McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977). The gap that 'Resource Mobilisation' theory was able to fill was the realisation that protest
activity was far from spontaneous and disorganised in nature (Klandermans 1992; Morris 1992). Thus, suggesting that those who participated in them were far from being the irrational actors that the regimes they opposed tended to portray (Ferree 1992: 29).

At the core of such activity was a structured extra-parliamentary response by communities to the inability of the government to actively deal with demands they thought were irrelevant to the set political agenda (Tilly 1978; della Porta & Tarrow 1986). 'Resource Mobilisation' theory hence sought to provide an organisational base for the study of movement development, with the aim of demonstrating the significance of organisation, mobilisation, and elite manipulation of popular culture in formulating constructive political demands from sections of the community that were previously unable to gain access to the processes of policy formation (McCarthy et al. 1991; McCarthy et al. 1992). 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists such as Zald (1992: 331) felt that the main fault with previous social movement theories, those that were based on social psychological and ideational paradigms, were that they tended to search for historical occurrences rather than ‘changes in theoretical assumptions.” As Margit Mayer (1995: 173) argues: 'Resource Mobilisation” theory assumes that mobilising grievances are ubiquitous and constant. Furthermore, RM authors thought that the role of ideology could be downplayed since the belief systems of most movements of the 60s and 70s were recognised as extensions of the basic liberal concepts that dominate American public discourse.

The tendency within this new paradigm to equate activism within the parameters of its role in the established political system, I feel, ignored those who defined themselves as political challengers to that system. To view them as simply new claimants would ignore groups such as national movements who sought more than the solidification of their interests within an oppositional paradigm (Tilly 1984b, 1993b; Gellner 1994b). Essentially, it ignored those groups seeking a complete redefinition of the nature of power relations within a given state (Lo 1992: 224).

This anti-ideational stance was, according to Oberschall (1973), derivative of the political environment that surrounded activism in the USA. The realities of the American political culture showed that grievances did not necessarily transform into political activism, nor was there a guarantee that the mobilised would come from the aggrieved group (Zald & Ash 1966; Snow et al. 1986). In a system, seemingly lacking the tradition of an oppositional culture, what seemed most likely to determine the success of one elite’s mobilisation campaign was their ability to control the relative resources made available by the state (Zald 1992: 332-333). Without established means of political
formation, and a tradition of official participation, the likelihood of successful mobilisation would be minimal.

What occurred was a convergence of political terms, such as ‘rights’, due to their strategic importance for minorities in guaranteeing full political enfranchisement, and ‘real politik’, in as much as accepting that no change could occur, and no further ‘opportunity’ could be granted without prior acknowledgement of the primary legitimacy of the system that had up till then oppressed these very minorities (Gamson et al. 1982; McAdam 1982). As Tarrow (1995: 189-190) stated, when talking of the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s: In the black middle class that was the movement’s main constituency, the concept of ‘rights’ and the attendant one of ‘opportunity’ were deeply embedded, allowing the movement to mediate between its major internal constituency and the white liberal ‘conscience constituents’ who bolstered it from the outside. It is in this very conciliatory aspect of 'Resource Mobilisation' theory, in its overemphasis on consensus (Gamson 1992a), that I believe we may find the limitations of the American school. These limitations were embodied in the failure to fully comprehend protest activism that sought to entrench itself as the oppositional, alternative force to that of the government. It is little wonder that Tarrow (1995: 196) saw the Europeans as leading the way in developing a new theory as they could build on more solid traditions of oppositional culture. The differences between the American and European experiences are fundamental. They inherently lie in the more eclectic nature of American social movement development that has led many 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists to include social protest, cults, crowds and collective behaviour under the heading of social movement activism (Mayer 1995: 170).

America was fundamentally, a more decentralised political system that had by the 1970s successfully halted violent polarisation between movement and government (McCarthy & Wolfson 1992). This enabled the ideology of movements to formalise their demands, through government extension of political opportunity structures, to become the dominant social ideology (Herman & Chomsky 1988). I believe, this ability of successive American governments to co-opt social movements, through emphasising the importance of maintaining populist models of independent organisation as guarantors of liberalism and individualism, explains why support bases for potentially radical alternatives such as the Black Panthers, or the United States Communist Party, are so readily formalised into the American electoral system (Jenkins & Eckert 1986).

For European movements, however, who seemingly lacked the ‘founding myths and liberal theories of dissent’ (Mayer 1995: 185),
they had to come to terms with dismantling the old order (Hobsbawm 1996: 287-319). The lack of structural means to fully absorb discontented minorities, due to the innate centralist orientation of most established European nation-states (Gunther 1992; Higley & Gunther 1992), was to lead to a polarisation of elites and a crisis of state legitimacy (Tilly 1975c, 1993b). This presented unique opportunities for the development of mass inspired extra-parliamentary modes of political participation and activism designed to exploit such ideological cleavages.

'Resource Mobilisation' theory came from the understanding of the significance of the role of social networks (Melucci 1992a), indigenous organisational strengths (McAdam 1996), political opportunity structures and resource pools (Gamson & Meyer 1996), when the mobilisation of communities were at a minimum. In this way it was to play a major part in determining the importance of non-governmental institutions in the formation of public activism. Yet, it still could not explain why movements remained dormant for so long, only to explode at a given time. The 'Resource Mobilisation' paradigm seems to ignore the very historical nature of peripheral activism (Tilly 1978), which is essential to the establishment of traditional institutions of social activism that were the foundation of past civil rights and national movements such as the Black Churches of the American South (McAdam 1982: 87), the Gaelic Athletic Association of Catholic Ireland (Sugden 1995: 204-207) or the cuadrillas of the Basque Country (Clark 1986: 304-305). This is a problem that Snow and Benford (1992: 135) believe is due to the lack of ideational factors in the construction of 'Resource Mobilisation' theory.

I believe much of this has occurred due to the tendency of 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists, such as Zald and McCarthy (1977), to emphasise the similarity between conventional and protest behaviour. This notion of what is normative and non-normative political behaviour, in itself, tends to become somewhat ambiguous once one undertakes an extensive study into the history of social movement activism throughout Europe over the past two hundred years (Tilly 1978, 1986). Even the processes of determining what has become viewed as normative or non-normative political action is derivative of the historic development of power relations between elites and minorities, or between centre and periphery, within the subject states under the peruse of the researcher (Inglehart 1977). Mayer (1995: 182) even proposes that theories on movements themselves are predetermined by historic machinations of the times, as they often arise at important conjunctions of history.

This problem, of the negation of the historic role of the state in reciprocal centre-periphery development, faces many ‘Social
Movement’ theorists when trying to apply 'Resource Mobilisation' theory to the problems of Northern Ireland or the Basque Country. Zald (1992: 327), in fact, believed this could be attributed to the predominance of the 'Resource Mobilisation' paradigm within the field of Social Movement theory throughout the 1970s. What constrains 'Resource Mobilisation' theory is its inability to find a meeting point between culture and structure, as it tends to reject totally the ideational role in political mobilisation and collective action (Morris 1992: 351; see also Melucci 1992a, 1992b). From this perspective, I feel, not only does 'Resource Mobilisation' theory fail to fully explain the rise of peripheral movements in contemporary Europe, clearly defined on ideational notions of class and sex, but it fails to provide an explanation for the emergence of new challengers of the political order that are clearly nationalist, sectarian or regional in ideology (Klandermans et al. 1988; Melucci 1996).

For a contemporary Europe that, at the governmental and economic elite levels, is clearly moving towards economic, social, and political union, movements based on nationalist and sectarian ideologies in Northern Ireland (Farrel 1976; Hedges 1988), the Basque Country (Burton et al. 1992; Llera 1993), and Croatia (Dodan 1991; Tanner 1997), have proven to be the greater threat to established nation-states than those who desire simple enfranchisement (Nairn 1977: 219). This minimisation of the ideational aspects of movement mobilisation places too much emphasis upon the nature of the relationship between social mobilisation and political opportunity structures made available by the enfranchising state. Thus, in turn, diminishing the role that grievance, collective beliefs, and collective identity in the mobilisation of people to political rebellion (Klandermans 1992: 78; see also Gamson 1992).

The aim of this thesis, nevertheless, is not to diminish the role of political opportunity structures provided by the state in the escalation of protest activity. I believe, in fact, state instigated opening of political opportunity structures is a necessary precondition of peripheral mobilisation. Nevertheless the fact that 'Resource Mobilisation' theory tends to place it at the centre of the escalation of protest activism, over emphasises the significance of political opportunity structures as objects of mobilisations (Burstein et al. 1995: 281). This tendency emerges from the desire of most 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists to separate reason from emotion in the course of organised political opposition in the name of state consensus (McCarthy & Wolfson 1992). Billig (1995), following on from Gamson’s (1995: 65) acknowledgement of the social psychological aspects of collective action, notes that 'Resource Mobilisation' theory tends to overlook the meaning of collective action as a source of identity proclamation for the participants. What has developed has been a school of thought that
concentrates too much on the machinations behind structures of organised political protest activism (Zald 1970; Morris 1992), without fully acknowledging the role of grievance, ideology, and collective goals, in the formation of such political activism (Giddens 1979; Melucci 1996).

'Resource Mobilisation' theory, in concentrating on the popular base and the political action tends to shy away from the link between the two which Gamson (1992: 57) feels lies in the traditional desires, actions and organisation of a given community that come together to form the "consciousness of identity." It is within this ‘consciousness of identity’, that a definition of the ‘other’, the competing elite and the state, come together to form a place within the collective psyche of a given community. An identity that places them at the centre of ‘an uphill symbolic struggle since every regime has some legitimating frame that provides the citizenry with a reason to be quiescent except in the pursuit of their civic duty” (ibid.: 65). For European Social Movement theorists unhappy with the discourse presented by 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists, and realising the historic nature of such transformation, 'New Social Movement' theory seemed to provide some ready made answers for the European experience (Melucci 1985, 1992a, 1996; Klandermans & Tarrow 1988; della Porta 1996).

'New Social Movement' Theory: The European Answer to the Rise of Ideational, Rather than Consensual, Social Movement Activism.

The intransigent nature of centre-periphery and elite-mass relations was to play a major role in the development of 'New Social Movement' theory throughout Europe (Tarrow 1977). In the 1960s a new generational elite emerged who not only had little memory of the horrors of the World Wars, Hitler and Stalin, but, had little time for a political system created on notions of exclusivity through the entrenchment of specific class and generational interests at the centre of the state apparatus (Hobsbawm 1996: 320-343; see also Giddens 1974). Rapid industrialisation in southern Europe had not necessarily been complimented by equivalent political restructuring (Hobsbawm 1996: 304; see Wallerstein 1985). Countries such as Spain and Yugoslavia, saw a continuation of the old ethnic order even in the face of massive demographic, social, political and cultural change, instigated through mass internal migration and greater class mobility (Laqueur 1993: 346). The pace of political inclusion continued slowly throughout the rest of Europe (Tilly 1975c). Except in, I believe, newly defeated Germany and Italy, where political restructuring was forced as a consequence of military defeat (della Porta & Rucht 1995). Difficulties of restructuring, or influencing, established modes of governmental redress, forced a
reappraisal of the legitimacy and validity of liberal democracy as the established means of resolving competing demands (Wilkinson 1971: 90). A new form of political organisation was needed in first communicating public discontent with the established bargaining processes of state, and secondly, in expressing individual and collective demands in organised anti-institutional ways. Party political organisations were not only dependent entirely on the continuance of the established electoral system, but their innately hierarchical structure meant that upcoming elites found it very difficult to get their demands heard (Gildea 1997: 35; see Melucci 1989). In such political circumstances, new forms of political expression were sought that aimed not only at forming a focal point for future mobilisation of political discontent, but also creating the political space considered necessary to facilitate political mobilisation outside government run political structures (Giddens 1994; della Porta 1995; della Porta & Rucht 1995). For those students of the 1960s searching for political consensus, as well as ultimately the inclusion of their political demands, it was the social movement that seemed to best facilitate the development of independent ideational political mobilisation (Kriesi 1996: 154).

The experiences of the Long May in Italy,2 from 1968 to 1973, as well as the extension of the non violent direct action (NVDA) into political terrorism in West Germany from 1968 to 1971, suggested that traditional means of redressing social discontent, found in the electoral system, no longer suited those who felt marginalised and isolated from political opportunity structures offered by the state (della Porta & Rucht 1995). Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that the natural consequence of mass social discontent was the development of violent anti-establishmentarian political action. Jürgen Habermas (1981: 33), following on from Ronald Inglehart (1977), noted that what arose instead was a “silent revolution” in societal values and attitudes. One that would manifest itself through a new politics that was not dependent upon state engendered issues of economic, social, domestic and military security, but “quality of life” issues (Habermas 1981: 34).

These issues were to deal specifically with what Habermas (ibid: 33) called the ‘threat to the life-world’. That is the organic environment of communally formed beliefs and issues that by-passed the official channels of communication offered via governmental institutionalisation, policy formation, and participation in the electoral system (Habermas 1994). This was an extension of Habermas’ (1973: 41-82) notion of the public sphere splitting politics from ethics so as to provide for discursive spaces to arise that would enable the individual and collective to create “counter-public spheres.” In my opinion such an alternative form of mobilisation is bound to fail as the societal values
they reject are extensions of social structures of state; leaving the state as a central target of mobilised discontent.

Nevertheless, what developed here, amongst 'New Social Movement' theorists, was what Melucci (1989: 56-57) called 'submerged-networks'; forming within the underlying social cleavages of post-industrial society in direct opposition to the political opportunity structures offered by the state as depicted by Touraine (1971: 38) and Giddens (1977: 157-158) critique on Habermas’ (1982, 1983) theory of social reflection and self-realisation. These submerged networks evolved due to the inability of the state to provide sufficient political structures for the incorporation of these newly marginalised post-industrial classes (Melucci 1989, 1992a; Giddens 1994). Ideologically, and sometimes ethnically, indefinable, these new social interest groups- often formed around issues of sexuality, disarmament, environmental and anti-nuclear concerns- were searching for their own organisational constructs independent of the state (Kriesi 1989; Klandermans 1990; Kriesi et al. 1995). The key was the ability of the individual to attribute specific meaning to social action, which places the significance of the action on a more personal level than any government instigated action could (Melucci 1996: 218).

'New Social Movement' theory was to be democracy in motion. Central to this was the organic nature of these new forms of social organisation in their ability to influence political party decision making processes, even when bypassing more established means of lobbying, bargaining and participation (Klandermans 1990; Touraine 1995; Kriesi 1996). For Melucci (1989: 41) the importance of such a new development in ‘Social Movement’ theory was that this new era promised a recognition that social conflict possessed more permanent structures, which inherently co-existed with established non-party political organisational forms of movement, such as classes, interest groups and associations. What emerged were new cultural codes of communication and organisation that are embodied in more flexible forms of collective action (Crelinsten 1987; Friedman 1992; Melucci 1992a; Morris 1992). Barbara Epstein (1991: 23), in the case of the civil rights movement of the American South, and Hanspeter Kriesi (1996: 160-165), in the environmental movement in Germany and Switzerland, show that it was the initial success of protest activism in restructuring aspects of governmental policy that convinced the public that a place could be found for the 'New Social Movement' as a political guarantor against further government encroachment.

Herein lies the importance of 'New Social Movements’, ie, in their ability to provide an alternative to more staid means of social and political organisation. Touraine (1995: 391) felt that the old style of movement, exemplified in the 'Resource Mobilisation' paradigm, was
too concerned with the influence of established elites and ascension to power, rather than the formation of other variant consociational models of dispute resolution. Under such guises they did not only offer a new perspective in Habermas’ (1981: 35) ‘life-world’, but provided an alternative space for social mobilisation, organisation, and stabilisation outside political options offered by the state, due partly to their porous and absorbent nature. Central to this development were increased tensions between those who supported more traditional forms of human political relations (McCarthy & Wolfson 1992; Zald 1992), and those who sought a redefinition of power systems (Touraine 1971). This had as much to do with an overall societal shift in values, as it did with the emergence of a new affluent generation that began to point out the contradictions between ideology and reality (Laqueur 1993).

According to Epstein (1991: 36), at the centre of this new mobilisation of discontent would be the formation of counter culture. A development of social and political expression that would drastically redefine power relations between generational elites. This fits into Melucci’s (1985: 792) belief that movements are societal constructs designed to facilitate the development of new political ideals, that are unacceptable to the established order, by creating a space outside the accepted means of conflict resolution. This rise of counter culturo-political organisations, however, was to bring around a crisis of identity which would question the value of tradition per se (Tilly & Tilly 1981; Melucci 1995; Zald 1996). Especially, when tradition was becoming viewed as a reactionary ideology designed to maintain the established social order by taking on the passive role of “bastion against social change” (Giddens 1994: 5). Accordingly, the dynamics of social discontent demanded that a more active agent be found to represent ‘non traditional”interests in contemporaneous political environs (Klandermans 1990).

When placing a movement’s empirical unity at the centre of ‘Social Movement’ theory, rather than concentrating on the starting point of political action as the cause of collective activism, 'New Social Movement' theorists sought to redress this new cleavage between traditional and non traditional modes of political activism (Touraine 1988, 1995). This was done through reintroducing the very ideational and social psychological reasons behind collective action that 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists had negated (Burke 1992; Morris 1992; Gellner 1994a). Melucci (1995: 44) feels that identity is important to this process, especially in post-industrial times, as the movement cannot exist without preformulated goals which are central to the survival of their mobilised constituency.

It is a relationship built within societal cleavages that allows for the ability of the individual, or the collective, to define one’s space in
which political action may occur according to the dictates of society rather than the dictates of the state (Gamson 1992b; Melucci 1995). More significantly, it is a recognition that movement activism tends to ‘reveal the irrationality upon which existing forms of inclusion/exclusion are based’ within the state system (Tazreiter & Morris 1996: 6). In this sense, the ability to define the movement, that is the action and culture of the movement, outside the structures of state, enables marginalised groups seeking redress to create their own political structures. As Melucci (1985: 789) argues: Though empirical features can vary widely, they become stable and irreversible components of contemporary social systems, because they are strictly connected to deep structural changes in these systems.

For 'New Social Movements’ this supposed permanent stratification has led to a parallel societal formation in direct opposition to state sponsored forms of socialisation (Oberschall 1973; Tilly & Tilly 1981; Abercrombie 1992). Called “submerged networks” by Melucci (1992b), these submerged channels of communication provide an alternate cultural perspective that is embodied in the formation of submerged identities through societal trends, sects and other counter cultural groups. The problem I find with Melucci’s (1995: 49) argument is the presumption that a movement finds its identity, rather than the movement being a by-product of the assertion of an established identity. I believe both, in fact, may occur as shown with the reinvention of Irish identity in Northern Ireland for the former, and the Croat national movement’s continuation of the one politic as an example of the latter.

'New Social Movement' theory fails due to its inability to find a role for the state in this restructuration of identity through collective action. Giddens' (1981) structurationist theory of the state best points out the effects of such action on human beings and the reaction of the state in turn. In my opinion, following on from Giddens (1979: 96), the very rejection of the state and its role in political mobilisation by ‘New Social Movement’ theorists ignores the central role of the state in the formation of alternative structural and societal identities. Thus, redefining the role of the state as catalyst of initial mobilisation becomes integral to any study seeking to understand why peripheral communities seek to offer political alternatives in the first place. The state’s role remains significant to movement mobilisation, because without it providing the target for discontent there would be little reason for the movement to mobilise in the first place. This indirectly implicates the state, even as a static target of dismay, as a reason behind alternative mobilisation.

If we take nationalist movements as an example, then there is little doubt that submerged networks can formulate new cultural codes of
communication in the form of stratified anti-statist oppositional identities. Without the initial understanding of the significance of belonging to the original mobilisation, then one would question why did they seek to initially join a national movement if it did not represent who they were as a political collective?

I do agree with Melucci’s (1989: 45) argument that the reliance on 'Resource Mobilisation' and traditional social psychological theories in studying questions of identity and codes of expressing discontent are too quantitative, and overtly mechanistic, a method of reviewing the reasons behind collective action. This is because in attempting to move away from overtly state centred and historical perspectives they have not fully investigated the nature of communal grievances- be they social, economic, cultural or political- in the mobilisation of historic communal identities to political activism. The significance of this creation of new identities and modes of cultural expression for political activism as a societal gel is at the centre of what Geertz (1973: 316-323) sees as the attempts of 'New Social Movements' and 'New Social Movement' theorists to redirect power away from the political centre to the cultural periphery. As Swidler (1995: 27) states: If culture influences action, then, it is not by providing the ends people seek, but by giving them the vocabulary of meanings, the expressive symbols, and the emotional repertoire with which they can seek anything at all.

Gamson (1992: 140) saw this as the creating of one’s own agenda outside the state’s influence; whilst Touraine (171: 103-106) felt this was a sign directed at the elite, that if they continued to ignore popular will, then the people would be forced to create their own political structures that would dictate new societal norms, which would in turn exclude the elite. What I believe such movements attempted to achieve was to provide linkages for collective utilisation of individual resources and self sustainability so as to avoid the communicative blocks that occur through bureaucratic and governmental channels. At the core of this is the recognition of the centreless nature of the political system (Melucci 1996: 18; see also Foucault 1980, 1984).

In such circumstances, what defines the system are relations set in place by independent and relatively autonomous structures within political society (Giddens 1979: 120). This, in turn, suggests that change cannot effect power relations within the state, as these relations are essentially multi-relational and lacking consolidated power (Giddens 1994: 93-94). In this case one must ask then, how can 'New Social Movement' theory address the question of the rise of national movements throughout Europe? The answer, Melucci (1996: 226) believes, is that the 'New Social Movement' is able to shed the concept of the simulacra, that of the information disseminated in protest activism ‘mimicking’ a reality of its own discontent- of itself, to create of an autonomous political
space. Yet the state still is integral in providing a target and it is here I feel that 'New Social Movement' theory falls down.

The Role of the State.

What I believe has occurred is a polarisation between established state means of culturo-political expression, and the counter mobilisation of the periphery, which places the state at the centre of peripheral development as the raison d'etre of a movement’s initial mobilisation. This, further entrenches the centre’s predominance. However, the significance of submerged networks in acting out cultural symbols, in order to signify manifest discontent to the elite, points out the futility of creating a theory that can so readily negate the role of the state as a major reason for peripheral mobilisation in the first place (Melucci 1985: 789). Such a view can be perceived as inflexible.

Della Porta (1992) and della Porta and Rucht (1995) highlighted that a crossover between movement and party political activism is quite common, suggesting that any attempt to further negate the role of the state, in either assisting in the formation of movement activism or providing a target for collective action, is misplaced. Social movements, therefore, must by viewed in terms of “action systems”, working within the confines of opportunities and limitations granted within a given political environment (Melucci 1985: 792). These action systems can move fluidly in and out of the established parliamentary system pending on the willingness of the government to accede to certain demands at varying times. In this way it is dangerous to ignore the role of the state in shaping a movement, either as a target for an expansion of protest repertoire or as an entity to ‘mimic’ once the goal is achieved.

The key here is the expansion of repertoire through reactionary responses to the ever more sophisticated methods of the centre’s co-opting of oppositional forces into the established political order (see: Zald & Useem 1987; McCarthy et al. 1991; della Porta 1995; Jenkins 1995; Weitzer 1995). Charles Tilly in his book The Contentious French (1986) highlights that the history of social movement activism suggests a predisposition of peripheral goals towards full political enfranchisement, or the usurpation of state. This is especially the case when dealing with ideational inspired movements like labour, student and regional movements (Louise Tilly 1981, 1995). This fact was highlighted by the May 1968 riots throughout Europe, which were not as concerned with formulating an alternative social system, as they were of rallying against the cumbersome pace of educational reforms under the de Gaulle Presidency (Gildea 1997). A situation further
emphasised in the rapid decline of protest activism with the implementation of the Faure reforms (Tarrow 1993c: 600).

Tarrow (ibid.: 582) notes that what has become predominant within the European political spectrum was the development of four elements of state engendered political opportunity structure that are at the heart of collective action throughout Europe: ‘electoral realignments, the opening of institutional access, the presence of influential allies, and divisions within the political elite.’ A fifth element would develop which could be misinterpreted by 'New Social Movement' theorists, that Tarrow (ibid.) defines as ‘the availability and extensions of new frames of meaning.’ I believe the significance of the state, either as a target of or as raison d’être for mobilisation, seems to be further demonstrated in studies based on similar movements that emerged in response to the May demonstrations in 1968, be it Germany (della Porta & Rucht 1995), Italy (Lange et al. 1990), Northern Ireland (Maguire 1996a), Spain (Hipsher 1996) or Yugoslavia (Ercegovac 1992).

What I think Tilly (1985), Tarrow (1996) and della Porta (1996) demonstrate in the European case scenarios, is that ‘New Social Movements’ somewhat idealistically ignore that many of these movements seek to resolve these crises of participation, inclusion, and representation, not by fully rejecting the state altogether, but by seeking to reconstitute the state in a form that can accept their future participation. This is especially the case with the Basque national movement that has sought to ‘mimic’ the state in miniature, through creating an autonomous regional state within the greater Spanish nation-state (Conversi 1997).

What the student protests in Paris, Bonn, Prague, Milan and Amsterdam demonstrated was that not one of these movements have survived, having dissipated once the state had met their aims (Oberschall 1978; Blanke & Sterzel 1983; Duchen 1986; Joppke 1991). One of the main reasons for this is the mono-generational nature of these movements and their lack of political continuancy, once the initial demands have been met (Oberschall 1978). Melucci (1996) himself has come to recognise this in later studies, and in doing so has accepted the importance in mending the distances between more structural statist approaches ('Resource Mobilisation' theory) and the ideational ('New Social Movement' theory). Klandermans (1992) and Gamson (1975) have also begun to realise the transient nature of these movements and the need for the expansion of repertoire in order to create a secure political environment wherein gains won cannot be wantonly rescinded by the centre without an established course of redress being made fully available to the general public.
The Dynamic Nature of State Reform and the Consolidation and Expansion of Social Movement Repertoire as a Means to Social Movement Continuance.

Where both 'Resource Mobilisation' and 'New Social Movement' theory fall down is in their lack of ability to combine the necessity of political opportunity structures in mobilising movement activism and ideational raison d’être for the continued existence of the movement, in direct opposition to that offered by the state. What they tend to ignore is what I believe to be the most important aspect of movement mobilisation— that of the dynamic relation between state and periphery in the mobilisation of communities to rebellion. Here the state is more than a target of movements. It is the means by which a movement defines its identity and strategy. This is achieved via ‘mimicking’ the process of reform, or shifting centres, in order to place their demands on the political agenda in ways that would otherwise be denied.

Hence, for peripheral movements to continue with demands for collective autonomy on specific issues, there must be a form of organisation made available to them which can act as a guarantor. Something steeped in communal continuance as, lets say, the imagined nation holds in the people’s mind (Anderson 1993, 1996). It is in their transient nature that 'New Social Movements’ fail to resolve the issues behind some of the most prevalent and long lasting social movements in contemporary Europe. Those movements that are clearly defined along statist, nationalist and sectarian lines, as is the case with the Croatian, Basque and Irish nationalist social movements.

I believe that this dynamic relationship can be best shown in an empirical study of the Irish, Basque and Croat national movements and their varying pushes for autonomy through ‘mimicking’ the very state centre they oppose. The state, therefore, is the reason behind peripheral mobilisation, but it is the periphery’s ability to manipulate the processes of state engendered reform through challenging the state’s instigation of a cyclical strategy of action-reaction-action that determines their success. Integral to this is how the movement chooses to expand its repertoire, in order to engage the state, without fully ignoring the political opportunity structures that emerge in the escalation of the crisis itself.

In this sense Northern Ireland and the Basque Country have also provided an anathema for social movement theorists, whereby in spite of continued government attempts to co-opt them politically through the increased reliance of social welfare policy in alleviating socio-economic grievances, people have clearly equated individual liberty with the collective experience of their national community (Gallagher 1991, 1995; Dunn 1993, 1995; Knox & Hughes 1995). Even
though 'New Social Movements' have recognised the significance of codification of discontent (Melucci 1992a, 1996), they have failed to fully acknowledge in what context mobilised discontent arose, and to what extent institutionalisation of identity played in the formation of organised collective action (Swidler 1995: 32). Della Porta and Rucht (1995: 233) have also recognised that 'New Social Movement' and 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists have ignored the spatial and temporal diameters which are found within national boundaries that heavily influence the nature of the demands put to the centre.

This is perhaps why Gamson (1995: 61), who has traditionally been associated with 'New Social Movement' theory, has called for a re-evaluation of Social Movement theory along two lines: firstly, by recognising the significance of the pre-existing social relations in the historical specific construct of the rise of mobilised political discontent, and secondly, a reappraisal of the role of organisational support systems in forming the needs that embody the movement’s collective identity. Essentially, what is needed is a coming together of the structural forms of state inspired collective action inherent in 'Resource Mobilisation' theory, and the ideational factors that have emerged from 'New Social Movement' theory. A re-evaluation that becomes important in a political environment whereby the re-emergence of old lines of societal cleavage with the growing strength of traditionalist movements throughout post-Cold War Europe, be they nationalist or regional oriented, is a common occurrence.
CHAPTER TWO:
Towards a New Direction in the Interpretation of Social Movement Activism

The move of incorporating the social psychological with the structural method of interpreting Social Movement theory was to form a major part of the works of Gamson (1968), Klandermans (1992) and Melucci (1989). Yet, it was with the emergence of the historical social approach of Tarrow (1993) and Tilly (1995, 1997), that of the cyclical nature of organised political mobilisation and protest, that the first signs of the regularity of movement mobilisation as an integral part of European democratic development in times of crisis, was to emerge. For Melucci (1992b: 240), the move to determining and recognising the significance of the relationship between the social actor and social systems was a key to the recognition of points of commonality between 'Resource Mobilisation' and 'New Social Movement' theory. One that Melucci (1996: 16) felt emerged from their association of movement activism with post-industrial systems. Gamson (1995; 85) himself felt that the only way to bridge this gap was through filling the cleavages left between the public discourse, expressed via mobilised discontent and protest activism, and the ‘coherent frame that supports and sustains collective action.’ A combination of attributes gained from both 'Resource Mobilisation' and 'New Social Movement' theory. It is movements, according to McCarthy, Smith and Zald (1996: 292), that in such circumstances act as ‘sponsors’ of the frame. Yet, both still tended to concentrate on theories that were firmly underpinned by 'New Social Movement' and 'Resource Mobilisation' theory.

The creation of oppositional spaces, juxtaposed to the political opportunity structures offered by the state, would still remain central to the new theories (Klandermans & Tarrow 1988; Klandermans 1990). Melucci (1992b: 241) though, would come to recognise the importance of the extension of citizen participation in redressing these demands. Nevertheless, the notion of subcultural identification and submerged networks still concentrated on the cultural nature of oppositional mobilisation without realising that cultural distinctiveness could be a mere catalyst, rather than a completion, of the cycle of discontent (Melucci 1996: 8-9). Both 'Resource Mobilisation' and 'New Social Movement' theorists, according to Mugny and Pérez (1991: 34), tend to neglect cultural distinctiveness first and foremost, as a ‘weapon of self preservation’
for communities seeking redress through established means of
conflict resolution, ie, the state. This was a negation of the role of
cultural distinctiveness as a progenitor of state oppositional
mobilisation (Gamson 1995: 95). In my opinion, the state and
cultural reactionism, for a lack of a better term, are not mutually
exclusive.

break significant ground is in their recognition of the parallel
development of peripheral mobilisation and the emergence of the
centralised state as the predominant form of elite political
organisation. In turn, each development in the nature of regime
formation brought around a corresponding structural change in
movement organisation (Tarrow 1995: 62). A ‘mimicking’ of the
‘other’ that will be the centre of my research. Tarrow (ibid.) notes
that it is no coincidence that nationalist movements arose in periods
of nation state development. Thus, in modern circumstances such
as in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and the former
Yugoslavia, the rise of nationalist movements were symptomatic of
the failures of national state development of the British, Spanish
and Yugoslav regimes in resolving the national question. The fact
that most of the societal strains are clearly defined along such lines
also suggests that it is these very issues, rather than the ‘quality of
life’ theories of Habermas (1981, 1982, 1983) and Touraine (1971:
209-226), which have the greater political relevance to the
populations of these states.

The ‘Mimicking’ the State, Mobilising the Periphery: The
Historical Relationship of the Dynamic Relationship between
the State and the Social Movement.

The commonalities found amongst centralising regimes surround
the fact that political formalisation through participatory means was
defined by elite created parameters of citizenry and class
differentiation (Giddens 1974; Gellner 1977; Burton et al. 1992;
della Porta & Rucht 1995). The fact that this created a
centre/periphery division based on ethnicity seemed to matter little,
as socio-economic development was seen to be the cure all of
cleavages that emerged as a by-product of industrial inspired state
centralisation (Deutsch 1963a; Wallerstein 1964; Hechter 1985).1
Many of these crises in legitimacy over centralisation between
centre and periphery, emerged in this period of industrialisation as
notions of centre/periphery reciprocity were to remain in the minds
of much of the newly marginalised rural elites (Hobsbawm 1996:
290; Tilly 1997: 96).
The key issue was the de-autonomisation that occurred as a direct result of centralisation, and the consolidated state was to provide a new target and rhetoric for collective action as the periphery did not believe that the divine right of Kings was necessarily transferable to the emerging elite of the new state system (Tarrow 1995: 62). The fall of the old monarchical order would redirect power relations to eventually accept inclusive forces pushing for full enfranchisement of many social strata through the democratisation of the ancien regimes (Anderson & Anderson 1967; Erget 1977; Hunt 1984; Greenfeld 1993a).

Tilly (1997: 96) felt it was here, in this push for state recognition, that elite formation was to play an influential role in defining the relationship between periphery and centre in citizenship terms. Yet this process was far from complete by the turn of the century, with the effect of the state being viewed as both target of the marginalised, as well as potential protector of citizens’ hard fought for gains (Tilly 1994a). More importantly, for communities defined by their exclusion from access points to policy formation, it would provide a fulcrum for protest action and societal discontent (Tarrow 1991; Heberle 1995; Tilly 1995). It was in this gap between exclusion and inclusion that the role of the movement as the expression of the ‘democratic will’ was to emerge.

The success of the collectivity lay in the realisation of those belonging to movements, that they have a commonality of purpose that could only be realised through combining and de-individualising the battle so as to create a barrier between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This de-individualisation of the group, was done through the socialisation and ritualisation of action, and the adoption of protest as a core identity of one’s own identity in direct opposition to the state (Hobsbawm 1996: 306). Thus, belonging to the mob became more than an expression of political discontent, it enabled the state to take a central role in perpetuating the continuous redefinition of peripheral identity according to the nature of state integrative processes.

At the centre of this was the legitimation of the mob as an expression of oppositional movement mobilisation against state encroachment. One that is rooted in eighteenth century European experiences of revolution being justified in the name of liberté, égalité and fraternité (Wilkinson 1971: 83; Baker 1990). That is, in the name of full political enfranchisement, and the state as the sole guarantor of “universal citizenship” (Wilkinson 1971: 83). More significant for the role of the movement as purveyor of social and political demands outside the established political system, is
the way in which civil society was to develop collaboratively with political modernisation; leading to the assumption amongst the masses of the inherent right of their political and social demands to be heard by the political centre (Touraine 1995: 380).

**State Centralisation as The Catalyst to Peripheral Mobilisation: The Reaction of the State towards Peripheral Movements as the Political Definer of Social Activism.**

To ignore the influence of the French Revolution in the standardisation of protest activism would be problematic. In the main this was due both to the role of the French Revolution in destabilising the traditional means of protest activism built on communal and corporate ties, and the placing of the state at the centre of popular sovereignty (Hunt 1984; Tilly 1986, 1994a; Greenfeld 1993a). However, it must be recognised that the formation of the Absolutist state under Cardinal Richelieu had already placed power in the body of the state, albeit in the embodiment of the Monarch (Parker 1984: 57). Hence, it was the French Revolution in commencing the spread of the doctrine of the state as protector of emerging elites, that shifted power away from the King to the new centre of estate interests (Rudé 1964: 65-67; Hufton 1970: 351-356).

It was in the French Revolution, Tarrow (1993b: 73) noted, that the state emerged as the new social definer and guarantor of social and natural rights. Allowing thus, for the state to become the creator of political resistance through its role as the predeterminer of the shape of future civil society. Correspondingly, della Porta (1996: 62-63) believed that too many political theorists have also failed to deal with how protest has directly effected our conceptions of democracy and citizenship. Within this there is also a further question to be addressed of how one aspect of repression, ie, policing (and I would add militarisation of internal power relations) has shaped the nature of protest activism and to what extent it dictates the nature of political conflict between centre and periphery?

The reasoning behind the emergence of extra political modes of collective action had as much to do, according to Tilly (1997: 99), with the military nature of state formation as it did with economic reasons for greater state centralisation. It is here that the notion of repression and perceived grievance become integral to the rise of extra-parliamentary political action, as marginalised populations began to take offence to the encroachment of military discipline
into everyday life in return for a minimal amount of political influence (Tilly & Tilly 1981: 14-15). The level of repression thus hinged upon the relevant levels of coercion, as well as capital distribution, implemented by the state and the ability of groups to organise effectively in order to get their demands heard (Hobsbawm 1973b; Tomlinson 1980; della Porta 1995, 1996). It was the state that defined the object of contention: hence, if it was centralisation based around industry and labour then the respondent collective action would take the form of labour interests (Sorter & Tilly 1974; Longo 1978; Rooney 1984; Morgan 1987; O’Connor 1996), if it was land tenure then land rebellion would be the form of collective action (Hobsbawm 1974a; Brockett 1991; Tilly 1997: 99-100). Interestingly, della Porta (1996: 64) feels that the direction of future protest activity is defined here at the point of original dispute between the state and movement, that is the point of initial contact with the law and periphery. A point of contact between centre and periphery that would shape all future methods of mobilisation and collective action of the movement.

It was both the expansion and consolidation of the nation state that provided the formation of movement activity, because while movements are formed in response to new structural change they are also initially more concerned with short term changes in political opportunity structures (Tarrow 1993b: 71). With the expansion of the activities of the nation-state into society as a whole the targets for collective action began to move away from private actors towards national decision making centres (Tarrow 1977, 1996; Higley & Gunther 1992; Tilly 1997). More importantly the state was now becoming associated as a mediator of antagonistic social interests and the creator of frames of reference for political identification (Tarrow 1995: 72-73). What Tarrow (1995: 81) did was recognise that it was the state alone that was able to provide emerging politicised communities with non institutional and institutional political opportunity structures that would ignite political mobilisation either through co-option or repression. Through this cycle of action and response state engendered political environments were able to create four “salient changes” in political opportunity structures that would determine the nature of all movement activity:

i. the opening up of access to institutions of political participation,

ii. the shifts that emerged between ruling alignments through such opening up of the state institutions,

iii. the availability of forging new alignments with other influential elites,

iv. and the preexisting cleavages that exist between elites (Tarrow 1995: 86).
What becomes clear is that long term changes in state strength, including divisions that have occurred amongst internal elites as a result of this, have tended to create new political opportunity structures for submerged, often resource poor, communities to seek access to the state in any form they can (Banton 1986; Avineri 1994; Tilly 1994b). It is here that the choices made in creating different political opportunity structures can also play a large role in the different formalisation processes opted by different movements. In fact, the nature of the political opportunity structure opted for can do much in shaping the movement (Tarrow 1995: 91). Repression itself plays a strong role in determining the essence of a movement and the nature of the collective action they employ (Tilly 1997: 101). Successive waves of repression and centralisation, on behalf of the state, may in fact create a further radicalisation of collective action, that in turn leads to a more effective form of oppositional organisation in placing the movement in the position as an alternative to the state’s ideological position (Tarrow 1995: 92-93; see also Deutsch 1969b; Ferrarotti 1978; della Porta 1983, 1996). As Tarrow (1995: 93) stated:

While it crushes resistance under most conditions, the centralisation of power in repressive states offers dissidents a unified field and a centralised target to attack, once the system is weakened.

Tilly (1997: 101) felt this was the reason behind increased feelings of injustice that underpin all collective action. Yet these actors would not undertake such action without accepting that they truly had a chance of influencing the state. It is here where 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists are correct in recognising that movements are far from ad hoc expressions of social discontent that disappear as rapidly as they emerge (Zald 1970: 49; Oberschall 1973). They are rather planned actions designed to attain maximum gains with minimum losses for the constituency they represent (McCarthy & Zald 1973; McCarthy & Wolfson 1991). Movements are formed around cultural and social frames of reference, that provide cultural cues and submerged codes in order to be interpreted by the marginalised when the right time has emerged to continue old grievances in new forms of collective action (Mayer 1996: 261-262).

Movements, thus, assert their autonomy from state engendered forms of conflict resolution, through utilising cleavages created in state formation between competing elites, to create and sustain new frames of structural opportunity so as to influence future policy directions (McAdam 1996: 340). The danger though is falling into the same trap that Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) have fallen into
of ignoring the significance of Zeitgeist, that of revolutionary opportunities placed before movements by elites in transformation at a given time, in creating the necessary political opportunity structures to be exploited. This was demonstrated by Hobsbawm’s (1974a) study of the Peruvian peasant rebellion during periods of elite transition of the 1970s, or Tilly (1993a) noting that movement activism would wax and wane in times of social crisis, such as increased taxation in eighteenth and nineteenth century Great Britain, in a somewhat cyclical nature.

The problem, however, with McAdam’s (1996) interpretation is that no matter how much space is created outside the state’s realm, even if they are declaring their rejection of the established structures of state, in doing so, they nevertheless define their opposition in terms of the environment created by the very state structure they refute. Havel (1985: 23) feels this is due to the fact that ‘dissent’, be it expressed or not, is a consequence of the state system that perpetuates itself. State and movement development is hence reciprocal. A cyclical restructuring of the political system is engendered, which is instigated by the state’s initial attempts at reform, and is perpetuated by the peripheries response (Tarrow 1977; Bugajski, 1987). Without the instigation of state centralist reform, the periphery would lack political opportunity structures to exploit (Tarrow 1993a). The expansion of movement repertoire, and its corresponding effectiveness, is hence dependent on its ability to engage the state when the state least expects it.

Elites may recognise this, and allow for the marginalised to operate in spaces they perceive as of their own construct so as to alleviate potential rifts, be it through policing or the allowance of counter cultural activity (Havel 1985: 23). It is, though, still the ability of the movement to react to political opportunity structures offered by the state that determines their relative success in either restructuring the state or creating a space outside it (Kriesi 1989; McClurg & Mueller 1992). Even if these political opportunity structures create undesired results, as in the rise of political terrorism in post-1968 Germany and Italy (della Porta & Pasquino 1983; della Porta & Rucht 1995), the polarised cleavages that were responsive to an increase in violence between the state and aggrieved community may indeed nominate, for the state, the level of discontent within the community at large (della Porta 1996: 79-81).

This notion, of the state fostering movement activism in order to placate interests that otherwise would not seek redress through state sponsored institutional means, is a concept that Kriesi (1996) explores quite successfully. Expanding on the four conditions of movement activity that was first postulated by Eisenger (1973), and
later reformulated by Tarrow (1977, 1989) and Tilly (1975c), Kriesi (1995, 1996) states that what determines the success of a movement is far from their extra-parliamentary methods. It is rather their ability to place their political agenda at the centre of the state’s agenda that determines the success of their activism (Kriesi 1996). The role of the state is to delicately balance party political interests with non parliamentary demands, through a controlled decentralisation of state (McCarthy et al. 1991). It is here, as an extension of the pluralism that the democratic state offers, where much of social movement activity is formulated in response to political opportunity structures offered by the state in transition (Zald & Useem 1987). For, as Jenkins (1995: 15) sees it, following on from Tilly’s (1978, 1985, 1993a) definition, a social movement by definition is “a sustained series of interactions between a challenging group and the state.” Without the state there would be no movement as such.

**Shaping up Against the State: Social Movement Activity as a Rational Choice in Oppositional Mobilisation of the Periphery Against the State Centre.**

What becomes clearer is that movements must be viewed as organisations that are rational in structure and rational in choice, in choosing forms of mobilisation, organisation, and action, as well as their target. As such, activists hold predetermined political goals and enjoin in movement activity as a product of rational choice (Ferree 1992). Thus, according to Jenkins (1995: 160), the state is central to the study of movement activism because the movement is inherently political. It is the state which is the main obstacle to political reform, and it is the state that creates the cleavages that cause discontent as the monopoliser of institutionalised central power (Zald & Useem 1987; Jenkins 1995). This is realised more commonly when there is a crisis of legitimacy surrounding the state’s mode of conflict resolution, which in Europe is traditionally embodied in the parliamentary system (Tilly 1995). Movements become the alternative to the party political system as a form of political mobilisation and organisation (Jenson 1995: 112; Melucci 1996: 112).

The fact that many people join due to the “outside nature” of the movement does not minimise the influence of the state; even if only as a target (Burstein et al. 1995: 277). It must not be forgotten that it is the institutional structure of the state, combined with ideology, levels of centralisation, policy formation capabilities, and structures of policy implementation, which creates the necessary environment
for movement activities to occur (Deutsch 1963b; Tilly 1994b). An aspect of state influence that Jenkins (1995: 16) agrees with:
Social protesters may demand fundamental changes in the nature of the state itself or they may seek more narrow institutional reforms, including those that are required to support changes in their personal lives, but, if their demands are to prevail and become part of the institutional landscape, the state has to become involved in institutionalising these claims. Put another way, social changes without the support of the state will not persist. The state is therefore a target for social movements.

A contemporary example that Tilly (1986: 380-381) gives on the effect that state policy has in the formation of peripheral activism, is in the post-May 1968 environment of France with the handing down of the 1977 Peyrefitte Committee’s findings on the cause of social unrest, popular mobilisation and extra-parliamentary collective action in urban France. The most interesting aspect of this report was the recognition that all causes for the rise in social discontent and mobilisation were attributed directly to the failure of state democracy to fully incorporate disparate communal groupings into the body polity of state (ibid.: 382). Tilly (ibid.) felt this was a recognition by the French government that the rise of popular discontent that transforms into popular contention, is not a disorderly reaction to failed state incorporation, but rather the failure of the state to enfranchise sectors of society previously considered inconsequential.

This fits into Tarrow’s (1992: 175) argument that what has become viewed as a seemingly new phenomenon, such as the sudden rise of protest action throughout Europe after 1968, is not derivative of the society that is perceived to have produced it, but rather the political tension that exists between the movement and its opponent- the state. For Tilly (1986: 5), the movement is but a contentious grouping organised in direct opposition to the state, and as such, the state’s significance in shaping the nature of contention is great. The two ways the state has greatest influence is in its “bulk and complexity” as well as in the “penetration of its coercive and extractive power” (ibid.: 6). This concentration of power would seemingly lead to conflict within the parameters of the state, and those organisations seeking redress outside the political system deemed too difficult to access would nevertheless challenge the state within state defined parameters (Gamson et al. 1982; Gamson 1995). Be they within the structures, borders and societies that the state defined, or in response to strategies employed by the centre (Giddens 1979).

Even the methods employed by the movement are seemingly
shaped by strategies that are aimed at combating the pervasiveness of state; suggesting the innateness of the state in relation to the pre-existence of the movement. This is demonstrated by the fact that, even if a movement was to create an ideational framework, in order to establish an ideological lynch pin for movement activity, it would have to provide a link between ‘societal mentalities’, ‘political cultures’ and ‘collective action frames’ which are all moulded from limitations placed upon movements by the state (Tarrow 1986: 176). It is in the intra-systematic and dynamic exploitation of political opportunity structures (Klandermans et al. 1988; Klandermans & Tarrow 1988), rather than the static cross sectional options offered by 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists (Ferree 1992; Hardin 1995), that Tarrow (1996: 42) feels is where the state impinges itself most upon movements.

What Tilly (1978, 1997), Tarrow (1993b, 1993c, 1996) and della Porta (1995, 1996) recognise is that it is the state that provides the routinised arena for political competition and conflict resolution in ways that the movement cannot provide on its own. What cycles provide, according to Tarrow (1996: 44), is the acceptance of the state as a form of political organisation perpetually which recreates and formulates itself. Thus, showing the significance of perpetual state restructuring in shaping movements, as responses to centralist state encroachment. As Tarrow (1996: 44) argues:

> entire political systems undergo changes which modify the environment of social actors sufficiently to influence the initiation, forms, and outcomes of collective action.

This is because it is the dynamic, ie, cyclical, paradigm that allows for social movements to attain goals through challenging the state directly (Snow & Benford 1992; Meyer 1993a; Traugott 1995). Hence, the role of the movement has become greater than that of the party political organisation as its main agenda is to address issues that are not necessary on the political agenda, whilst challenging the limits set by a preexisting social system of relations dictated by the state (Melucci 1989: 38).

**State Consolidation, Peripheral Mobilisation: The Failure of 'Resource Mobilisation' Theory and 'New Social Movement' Theory to Deal with the Reciprocal Nature of Social Movement Mobilisation.**

The traditional statist perspective, as espoused by 'Resource Mobilisation' theorists, fails because it under specifies subnational and subgroup variations, whilst simultaneously underplaying the
significance of the dynamics of protest cycles (McCarthy & Zald 1973; McAdam 1988). Taking from de Tocqueville’s (1954) first arguments on the consolidation of civil-democracy and state institutionalisation in the USA, Tarrow (1996: 46) shows how strong state centres have tended to desire a weak civil society, whilst weak states have been central to the encouragement of institutional participation, as opposed to confrontation and violence. The relationship is thus dynamic, as the strategies employed by the centre are reflected by peripheries seeking contemporary redresses for ancient struggles that manifest solely in times of reopening of cleavages by the state (Shorter & Tilly 1974; Tilly 1986, 1993a, 1995; Tarrow 1993b). The cyclical nature of reform-protest-reform supplies the necessary preconditions for subsequent movement mobilisation. Especially in societies such as Northern Ireland and the Basque Country which Maguire (1996b) classifies as ‘abnormal’.

Tarrow (1996: 48) argues that this not only places too great an emphasis upon the French model of state and peripheral relations, but also ignores the significant role that the state plays in forming a target for movements. They are a reflection of political discontent and, as such, aspirations for redress. Movement restructuration can only occur as long as the state remains dynamic. Yet, the state cannot change without the pressures of the periphery leading one to feed off the other. It is in the very processes of state consolidation that movements find the political opportunity structure in which they can best resist. It is only in times of elite shift that these social cleavages emerge so blatantly as to warrant a review of the status of the group within the framework of parallel state-periphery development.

Like state-building in general, each new policy initiative produced new channels of communication, more organised networks of citizens, and more unified cognitive frameworks around which insurgents could mount claims and organise (Tarrow 1996: 49).

It is when there is a consolidated state entity that movements, as well as national movements, arise to legitimately claim their place as organised opposition. Here Tarrow (1996) follows on from Tilly (1975b) who argued it is in the ‘consolidated state’ that people found grounds throughout Western Europe to embrace collective activism for the first time. Thus, it is not the movement itself that determines its nature but rather how the state reacts to the disenfranchised, in the sense of creating or denying political opportunity structures for a given minority, that determines the nature of oppositional collective action. This is why it is important not to fall into the trap of exploring the differences of each national
specific example, one should instead, and here I concur with Tarrow (1996: 49), concentrate on how state-building in general, has set the scene for the legitimation of extra-state activism as a form of external political representation, when state structures of conflict resolution have seemingly failed. This is due to the state’s corresponding failure to incorporate disparate minorities into a framework of state negotiated resolution of conflicting interests (Zald & Useem 1987; Valelly 1993).

I would add, though, that without the initial policy shift by the state centre the necessary preconditions for peripheral mobilisation and the commencement of the cycle of action-reaction-action, so integral for the active movement’s bid to dictate the pace of state initiated reforms, would fail to arise. A shift in elite relations that is also a reflection by the state of the ‘mimicking’ occurring from the periphery. This is further accentuated when generational elites find it difficult to access the state, or as what Hobsbawm (1996: 3-4) calls the ‘permanent present’, whereby they are cut from the organic public past of their era, in a post-industrial society, leading them to question the legitimacy of contemporary state structures.

It is only through exploring the dynamic relationship between the state and movement that I feel we can come to a further understanding of the essence of social movement activism. I believe, therefore, that it becomes important to explore the historical, state-social and cultural aspects of the parallel development of the state’s response to political opposition and the movement as a form of extra-parliamentary oppositional organisation. In my opinion this is best exemplified neither through 'Resource Mobilisation' theory’s total concentration on political opportunity structures offered by the state, nor by 'New Social Movement' theory’s emphasis upon counter cultural models that negate the role of the state, but rather by a combination of political opportunity and alternative societal structures offered in opposition to the state, by the movement. The key lies in recognising the dynamic nature that exists between state/social movement, and centre/periphery development, and political opportunity structures that develop from this in terms of increased protest repertoire. An increase of repertoire movement strategies that recreate themselves according to strategies implemented by the state centre, in attempting to resolve such conflict, and how the periphery ‘mimics’ this in the perpetuation of the cycle of protest. A theory that I will explore in the next chapter.

GO TO CHAPTER III
CHAPTER THREE:
The Dynamic Paradigm: The Cyclical Development of Movement and State

As discussed in the previous chapters, 'Resource Mobilisation' and 'New Social Movement' theory have failed to provide the necessary explanation behind the rise of contemporary ideational movements. The failure, as I have previously mentioned, lies I believe, in the negating of the state as the catalyst for oppositional mobilisation. The dynamic relation between state centre and periphery development has provided the political environment that is based on exclusion, and inclusion, which in turn, shapes the nature of movement activism, and the levels of anti-state activity from the margins of the state’s polity. Thus what develops is what I call a ‘mimicking’ of the state which places the state’s response to peripheral demands through policing, or acceding to demands, at the centre of the activism. Hence, if the nature of a state elite’s dominance is ethnic based, as in Spain and Yugoslavia, it will be countered from the periphery as such. Similarly, as in the case of Northern Ireland, if the ascendant elite is defined in terms of sectarian nationalism it will be countered likewise.

What develops is a cyclical reciprocity, a ‘mimicking’ of the other, that perpetuates the interdependent development of centre and periphery. That, due to the nature of the nation-state, can only be defined in terms of state centralist consolidation and expansion upon the periphery (Strayer 1963; Deutsch 1969b; Tarrow 1977). It is the perpetual shaping and reshaping of competing ideational movements that underpin the interdependent state and periphery development which predetermines the nature of movement development, as oppositional movements attempt to ride the cyclical nature of state engendered reform, through the implementation of a strategy of action-reaction-action, to shift their demands to the centre of the state’s political agenda.

This eventually leads, through ‘mimicking’ the state’s response, to entrenched social discontent and illegitimacy of the state centre’s rule over the periphery (Gamson 1968). It is from this cycle of action-reform-action that movements emerge ever more sophisticated and entrenched within the communities they purport to represent (Tarrow 1996, Maguire 1996b). In the case of communities mobilising behind nationalist and regional ideologies,
the cycle can grant their demands a sense of continuity that social
movements under other circumstances cannot claim (Tarrow
1993b; della Porta 1996). Thus, in this chapter, I wish to
demonstrate how the state, by providing the opposing ideology,
whilst formalising and consolidating power, provides the necessary
catalyst for the rise of peripheral movement activism.

The main premise will be that it is the shifting, reforming state
centres, and their subsequent inability to deal with emerging
demands on the periphery, that provides the catalyst for peripheral
mobilisation. By reviewing the work of Tarrow (1977, 1991, 1995),
(1985, 1989, 1996) and Maguire (1996a, 1996b) I wish to
demonstrate how the escalation of conflict through expanding
protest repertoire from NVDA to violent direct action (VDA), and
eventually into party political formalisation, provides the necessary
precondition for creating permanent peripheral movements as a
counter force within, not without, the established state system.

Political opportunity structures become integral, but they do not, as
in 'Resource Mobilisation' theory (Zald & Useem 1978; McCarthy
& Wolfson 1991), become the sole path to political inclusion. The
reason being that, in the case of many ideational movements, even
the appeasement of initial demands of enfranchisement satisfy few
movements when the expansion of repertoire brings a subsequent
widening of a movement’s own perception of its role in the running
of the state itself (Tarrow 1993c; della Porta & Rucht 1995). An
expansion of repertoire that entrenches itself on the periphery until,
only through gaining control of the very cycles instigated by the
centre’s reforms, specifically in terms of controlling the pace of
reform, can they create their own political centres interdependent of
the state’s. In doing this, movements are able to control the speed
of the state’s response, when they cannot control the direction of
the reform itself. Thus, the cycle of protest, and the ability of the
movement to respond to the state’s own attempts to redefine and
shape its future role in the development of political society, is at the
core of the rise of peripheral activism in post-World War Two
Europe.

The Cycles of Protest.

The importance of developing a dynamic theory based on the
relationship between the state and periphery in the reemergence of
movement activism since the 1960s, lie in the ability of the cyclical
paradigm to offer opinions on four problems that have not been
fully explored in more recent theories. The four problems that contemporary theories have not fully addressed are:

i. why a group of people who share an interest might act together;

ii. too many studies concentrate on one movement which fails to deal with the complex nature of movement activism that could be better explained in a cross movement analysis;

iii. the usage of static models for dynamic entities totally misses the mark; and

iv. there is too much emphasis placed upon causation and not enough on the purposeful dynamic nature of social movements (Tilly 1985: 717-718).

This means rejecting many seminal works from 'New Social Movement' theorists such as Touraine (1971) and Zolberg (1972) due to their overt concentration in ignoring the influence of overtly centralist regimes in peripheral movement mobilisation, as well as many theories of alienation like Fromm (1942) and Feuer (1969), since not all action is undertaken from a position of total exclusion. It is here that I feel that the temporality of the study of protest cycles proved significant. Giddens (1979: 120), of all the theorists, saw that time allows social change to be defined in terms of the dynamic nature of the state. Without which the framing of a cycle, especially the cultural and historical reasons behind the mobilisation of specific grievances, would be impossible. A situation that Snow and Benford (1992: 141) felt extended the cycle to incorporate temporal variations that increased the scope of incorporating national, regional and communal examples into a more general theory. In this sense movements are but a response, a signal that Melucci (1996: 1) calls the heralding of the arrival of “disenchanted prophets” that name the disruption as a form of communication, whilst the state dictates the direction in which it proceeds through its own actions.

It is Tarrow’s (1993c: 582) five characteristics of cycles of protest which I think best describes the overtly dynamic nature of movement activism. In addition, the influential role the state plays as determiner of the relationship between the centralised elite and the movement is also significant. Protest waves are but responses to the politicisation of society at the hands of a consolidating state that are implemented in order to take advantage of the cleavages that develop between the state and mobilised social discontent through the peripheral movement. It is in this context that the importance of the cyclical paradigm should be understood.

**Heightened Levels of Social Conflict and the Cleavage between**
the State Centre and Movement Periphery as a Cause of Peripheral Mobilisation.

In studying the nature of protest cycles, especially the initial stages of the mobilisation of discontent, one may find that cleavages emerge from a conflict of interests, as well as a conflict over the consolidation of political power (Tilly 1978: 7). On their own this may not necessarily lead to conflict between centralised state elites and marginalised peripheries. This is especially the case, when the centralised state elite may have so minimised the opportunity for action that it becomes almost impossible for movements to develop without great risk to their own constituency (Mitchell 1991); despite ample political opportunity structures offered by the state in incorporating dissident aspects of society in toto (Graham 1986). In combination, however, with historic precedence and sub-merged grievances, cleavages may prove large enough to define the nature of regime and periphery relations (Tarrow 1995: 155).

The greatest criticisms, made of Tarrow (1991, 1994) and Tilly (1984) have come from theorists, such as Piven and Cloward (1992), who take into account the roles ‘New Social Movements have played in the development of Social Movement Theory. Piven and Cloward’s (1992: 304) argument centred around the belief that both Tarrow and Tilly’s views concentrate too much on the idea of reactionism toward the authorities, hence, granting too much credence to the state in the creation of the environment. The fact that much activity has taken place as a direct result of state engendered social cleavage seems to weaken this argument. Melucci (1996: 5) believes that it is in the processes of state consolidation of power that the state formalises these cleavages into institutionalised conflict in order to solidify their advantage over the periphery.

Yet, for any cognizance to emerge, one must readily be able to view the difference that has arisen in the consolidation of power relations between elites and non-elites (Anderson & Dynes 1975: 17). There must be an awareness of inequality- be it political, social or economic- for cleavages to be individually realised, and for conflict to emerge in a collective sense (Tilly 1985: 730). Essentially, at the core of conflict development is the ideological polarisation between sections of communities which, through the development of oppositional ideational or communal belief systems, become considered even more important to the continued existence of the relevant community (Lo 1992). For this reason alone we have seen the emergence of ideational movements in direct opposition to those proffered by reforming state centres (Horowitz 1985, Safran 1987, Conversi 1997). It is where these
cleavages between state centre and peripheral oppositional ideology remain, and where the issues remain imperative to the participants, that we find the mobilisation of discontent into collective action (Tilly 1978).

What develops in the literature is a recognition of the parallel development of contention along side conflict, whereby contentious issues manifest, through general mobilisation of the periphery against the centre, into an expansion of a movement’s repertoire that embraces conflict as a means of engaging the state directly (see Tilly 1993a). Polarisation however does not occur here, rather an initial radicalisation emerges through collective frustration of the marginalised group’s inability to get their issues addressed. At the commencement of movement activity conflicting interests may emerge, but they tend to be manifested either intellectually, or through actualisation of socio-political stratification (Melucci 1992a). Polarisation occurs once the initial stage of protest has already been undertaken, and the challenge to the state, or its policies, is clarified (Tarrow 1991). Yet, none of this could happen without the shaping that occurs from the external environment that surrounds the movement. This emerges, according to Tarrow (1995: 10-11), because fundamentally all collective action is rooted in social structure, especially within social cleavages that emerge through political stratification. Tilly (1994: 6) feels it takes any form of radical change, be it revolutionary or socio-economic, to provide the necessary shift within an environment in order to shape the nature of state reform and periphery reaction.

It is in fact the stringent ideological divide, in which conflict festers, that enables a culture of political debate to arise which has heightened levels of political participation amongst younger, marginalised generations (Tarrow 1980: 168). When the state continues to block such incorporative tendency it is then, and only then, that groups threaten to go extra parliamentary, as grievance mixes with frustration and solidifies behind the need of the marginalised to reassert themselves upon the political scene (Gurr 1970; McAdam 1982, 1996). This, I feel, interestingly suggests that it is the dynamic relation between centre and periphery which in itself perpetually redefines the state. Thus, institutionalised conflict not only may be a cause of mobilisation, but also that of the struggle between state and movement.

Political grievance, therefore, does become important, contrary to 'Resource Mobilisation' theory, in mobilising a population to political action (Tarrow. 1989. p3). Yet, to say felt grievance alone is sufficient in mobilising a populace would be wrong. Even if a particular group felt aggrieved, due to the structural position in
which they found themselves within society, this grievance may not be enough to initiate political mobilisation because without state pressure it is doubtful the reason for oppositional mobilisation would exist (Wallerstein 1979: 1985). It is political specific factors, such as the nature of state accommodation, or repression, that determines whether the situation will spiral into a cycle of protest or remain submerged (Meyer 1993; della Porta 1995). For these to develop they must run sufficiently deep enough so as to ensure that the conflict is considered a defining point of communal identity (Tarrow. 1989. p9). Thus, the cycle only develops when structural cleavages designed to cope with popular discontent and grievances prove too deep, and too visible, too overcome ensuring that the established nature of elite isolation from the periphery is perceivable (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; della Porta & Rucht 1995; Ercegovac 1996).

For many marginalised communities conflict within itself may provide a perspective of historicity, as in the nature of sectarian relations in Northern Ireland to Irish Republicans and the way the marginalised Catholic views the Protestant as central to the denial of their civil rights (Carty 1996: 113-116). Without the existence of the recalcitrant readily identifiable privileged group, like the Protestants in Ulster, a movement of resistance would find it hard to justify its continuous state of heightened mobilisation (Lee 1995: 432). Historic state engendered polarisation creates an enduring conflict that allows competing national identities to develop simultaneously according to the needs of each group. As Tilly (1993a: 268) states:

> The action takes its meaning and effectiveness from shared understandings, memories, and agreements, however grudging, among the parties. In that sense, then, a repertoire of actions resembles not individual consciousness but a language; although individuals and groups know and deploy the actions in a repertoire, the actions connect sets of individuals and groups.

Tarrow (1985: 216) feels this may be due to the fact that it is in these transitional zones of societal development, where traditional and modern interests clash, that the state allows for these conflicts to become entrenched. The reason being that in the process of change one inflates the value of traditional interests amongst the yet to be incorporated intermediate strata which allows for subsequent social tensions to ultimately shape the nature of centre-peripheral relations in developing systems.

What allowed previously dormant discontent to mobilise is the nature of the regime’s response to initial non confrontational levels of discontent (Maguire 1996b). If the state is aggressive then the
periphery will follow suit, which in turn acts as a catalyst to further state intervention and expansion upon the periphery that continues the cycle of responsive action that underlies the struggle between centre and periphery. In this sense the state goes a long way in providing the reason, as well as political opportunity structure, for these movements to emerge onto the streets and eventually widen their influence throughout the rest of society.

**The Predicator Centre: The Diffusion of Law as a Catalyst to the Commencement of the Cycle of Protest from Centre to Periphery.**

Collective action itself is heavily dependent upon opportunity in determining the estimated costs and benefits of likely activity (Mayer 1993; Burstein et al. 1995; Klandermans 1995). These costs and benefits are related to the cycle of ‘repression/ facilitation, power, and opportunity/ threat’ (Tilly 1978: 99); which in turn, are all related to the extent in which collective action effects power relations within a given political environment (Gamson 1995). Yet, the relation between the two faces of repression/facilitation and collective action is not there. This is because the notion of power for the movement is non existent prior to the moment of action (Havel 1985). It is only at that moment of realisation of action, that repression translates into power through its physical manifestation (Jenkins & Klandermans 1995). Once the cost of collective action increases, then there is a corresponding rise in power relation tensions between governmental and non-governmental organisational structures (Tilly 1978: 100-101).

The question that then becomes for me imperative, is what causes this cycle to commence? As viewed in chapter 2, the fact that cleavages emerge in any process of power consolidation may not necessarily be a reason for a rise in conflictual circumstances, even if we accept that conflict is a precondition to mobilisation. What must be found is a facilitator of grievance manifestation, which I believe lies in the state. It is through the state that diffusion of laws, control, and societal norms occur that dictate acceptable means of societal and political organisation, for all communities found within the state’s bounds (Weitzer 1990). It is, hence, the action of the state in diffusing power over its subjects, ie, in the nature of the repression utilised in the name of power consolidation, that determines the nature of the marginalised group’s reaction (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Roberts 1986). A reaction that commences a cycle of conflict, that offers its own forms of political opportunity structure (Ercegovac 1996). At the peak of each cycle
each movement would have developed an expansive repertoire that clearly was responsive to political opportunity structures offered by states in transition, causing a spiralling outwards of demands from concentrated conflict, into direct challenges upon the state (Koopmans 1993; McAdam 1995).

What history has taught us from Martin Luther’s time to the present, is that people succeeded in their movement activism when they were led by actors ‘who possessed organisational or institutional resources’, (Tarrow. 1993b. p76) and when this coincided with periods of state/dynastic succession that created a shift in popular legitimacy that could create space for a broader confrontation. They were reactive to the state elite’s response to crisis in government. What highlighted this amongst fledgling nationalist movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and I suggest modern nationalist movements as well, was their adoption of actions that were designed to manipulate institutions rather than outright oppose the centre of power (Connor 1994f, 1994g). The politics of desired inclusivity emerged and they were based on more modular forms of direct action (Tarrow 1993b: 77). Their narrowness in scope, but flexibility in utilisation, allowed strikes, for example, to unite whole groups across the nation that open revolt could never have achieved before (Chevalier 1973; Morgan 1987; Touraine et al. 1987; Louise Tilly 1995).

The social movement itself became of struggle, allowing it to be a permanent threat in its ability to mobilise and act over a period of time, as well as allowing for the institutionalisation of conflict per se. One action could produce another, developing a ripple effect that could perpetuate, sustain, and maintain a cyclical action over time that creates counter networks to those offered by the elite (Lo 1992; Melucci 1992a). This in itself would create more crises, hence pushing states towards policy shifts earlier than intended. Through ‘mimicking’, one class could encourage others, creating not just more leverage to challenge rules, but extend the attack on the state. Thus, the way the state would react to these attacks would determine the durability of the movement. Greater state penetration created greater resistance, yet a spreading of the state’s concentration could also allow for more spaces to open so as to challenge the state (Tarrow 1993b: 83). The state, hence, provided more than a fulcrum for discontent, it set the pace of oppositional mobilisation through its integrative anti-periphery actions.

**The State as Reactionary Catalyst.**
The May 1968 Student Movement demonstrations in Paris perhaps best show how governmental centres may attempt to utilise movement activity as a vent for popular frustration (Gildea 1997: 166; also Sorter & Tilly 1974; Bridgford 1989). Like O’Neill in Northern Ireland (Kelly 1972: vi-vii), de Gaulle seemed content on riding the threat posed by the student movements in order to convince those not previously willing to listen, that if some form of reform was not implemented then the possibility of further disturbances would arise (Tarrow 1993c: 582). Governmental influence in creating the cycle of action-reaction-action seems to be an extension of state control in so much as that, by allowing such protests to occur the other, ie, the periphery, can be more readily recognised and a clearer understanding of their grievances be attained. No government can claim legitimacy through a continued reliance upon repressive modes of policy implementation without having space for tolerance and facilitation in their state (Weitzer 1995). Yet, the opening up of previously submerged cleavages by the centre may indeed allow for counter-movements to create space for themselves in the gaps left between the challenging group and the state (Tarrow 1995: 24).

This point was highlighted in Northern Ireland with the re-emergence of the Protestant Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) as a political force when the state was not seen to be reacting firmly enough against the fledgling Catholic led Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) (Boulton 1973: 116). In such circumstances the state can revert to their overtly centralist policies in order to maintain state security (Kelly 1972: 7-10). Each government responds variedly to different groups and actions taken against them, yet all are mindful that they themselves are sending out a message with each action undertaken against the periphery (Finer 1975; O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Klandermans et al. 1988). According to Tilly (1978: 106), there does seem to be two ways in which they may act in raising the cost of collective action:

(a) by simply diminishing the difficulty of specific varieties of mobilisation and/ or collective action, and (b) by providing positive incentives for specific varieties of mobilisation and/ or collective action. In its extreme form facilitation may also lead to punishment of those who refuse to comply to government incentives.

Both, however, are linked through their emergence in the process of the diffusion of law, order and state dictated societal norms. Yet without flexible, reactionary strategies, it is difficult for any movement to exploit grievances that emerge from consolidated centralist rule. Hence, the diversification of social movements, and their receptiveness to change, may determine the ability of the
movement to survive the collective monolith that is the state. No one movement can suffice in taking on institutions that are diversified in their formation of policing, legal, parliamentary, social welfare and media strategies, unless they seek to ‘mimic’ the diverse strategies of centralisation through an expansion of their own strategies of action (Tarrow 1983; Snow & Benford 1988). Tilly (1978: 156) recognised that in taking on the state, not only would a movement have to concentrate upon placing their own demands at the centre of the state’s agenda, but, they would also find themselves influenced by societal norms that had been moulded by the state through policing, law and education. As Jenkins and Klandermans (1995: 3) notes:

The state is therefore simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organiser of the political system and the arbiter of victory.

Notions of right and justice, the routinisation of daily life, the internal organisation of a national polity, the accumulated experience of repression in the face of past protest action, and the patterns of past repression within the state, I believe, have all greatly influenced the inability of a solitary movement to engage the state successfully. The Spanish social movement opposition to the Falangist state monolith, which in itself was ideologically defined in terms of a popular movement (Fraser 1986), would not have succeeded if it had not splintered into a multifaceted movement alliance that was able to take on the state monolith at different levels of engagement. Yet, it was still the state as target and creator of cycles of reform that provided the structures for the democratic opposition to formulate their strategy.

Similarly, it was the way that the Falangist state would respond to a diversification of movement repertoire and strategy, that could commence the reciprocal development of competing ideologies, ie, the next stage of the cycle (Apter 1979; Bell 1979; Boggs & Flotke 1980). Repression begat reaction, which in turn, begat repression, creating a cyclical responsive relationship between centre and periphery that would shape both the centre and periphery’s political actions, and hence identity (Conversi 1997: 231). A mutual codification of communication which entrenched conflict within the parameters of continual state development, and allowed for competing national movement ideologies to develop in direct opposition to one another.

Social Movements as the Source of the Legitimate Alternative Response to the Centre’s Encroachment.
The multiplous nature of movement activity lies in the source of its activism within the social sphere. Various studies have come to highlight that within most movements, the initiative for applied collective action arises within the subdued networks that it itself produces; thus, its activists tend to emerge from the restructuration of protest (see Melucci 1989; Maguire 1995, 1996a). This suggests that the socialisation and ritualisation of protest activism can act as an organisational or structural incubator for many a social movement (Kertzer 1988; Epstein 1991; Melucci 1992a). What the movement provides, and here I agree with Tarrow (1995: 22), are sets of social networks and institutions that can provide a link between participation and the development of traditional social orders of familial, religious and folk groupings found within the peripheral ethno-national community that many centralist states cannot provide. Trust and co-operation are central here to mobilisation, and it is within more traditional institutions of society that these movements tend to gain a sense of legitimacy. A sense of legitimacy that Tarrow (ibid.) believes is much harder to attain if the movement was to start without a sense of place within the continuity of day to day existence.

This is important in framing the movement’s significance to society, as well as securing space in which to create alternatives that could not be secured from a closed political system. Yet, they themselves do not manifest without a moment that acts as a catalyst that must eventually pass into popular legend so as to command lasting loyalty (Merkl 1986a; Melucci 1989). It is these moments of impetuousness, or ‘madness’ as Tarrow (1993a: 283) puts it, that determine whether or not a movement will engage in direct opposition to the processes of state development. It is in such circumstances that Hobsbawm (1974: 150) believes the movement to be less contrived and more spontaneous. A view, I feel, that negates the strategic nature in which movements seek to engage the state throughout highs and lows of the cycle.

In my opinion, it is in this reciprocal ideological development, that a stratification of centre instigated crisis runs the risk of codifying a peripheral movement’s identity within the processes of collective action itself. The dynamic perpetuation of a cycle of state reform and movement response thus points to the necessity of the state monolith in defining the very ideological strategic base of the peripheral movement as counterpoint to the state.

Giddens (1979: 96) felt it was society in motion, the ever developing dynamic state, which dictates the importance of movement activity in taking on the centre. Almost following on
from Foucault’s (1975) pan opticism, Giddens (1979: 96) saw the state as a centreless monolith which was innately inaccessible due to an ability to reform itself according to tactics derived from the institutionalisation of conflict between state and movement. This is why the state is always prepared to reform, as the state in permanent transition is designed to absorb cleavages through repression or co-option (Tarrow 1993b; Tilly 1997). Conversely, it is only through aligning and diversifying the point of attack that movements can attempt to dictate the pace of reform by ‘mimicking’ the actions of the state. This is because the state is a coalition of elite interest groups, as much as the movement is a coalition of oppositional forces (Mitchell 1981; Higley & Gunther 1992). It is within these cleavages that political opportunity structures emerge that may be exploited by a movement willing to expand their repertoire in order to engage the state to react:

The structure of a movement may be transformed in response to environmental pressures, and in some cases the very existence and viability of a movement may be threatened by external elements. The response of groups in power to a movement, and, in particular, the response of social control agencies, is important in determining its character (Anderson & Dynes 1975: 18).

The role of the movement, in effect, is to heighten the reflexiveness of local and global societal communities through increased diversification of political activity. The movement’s role may even be dedicated to accentuating the discreditation of specific governmental structures, but in doing so it still aims to open up more public space for increased public dialogue which is innately democratic (Maguire 1990, 1995). It uses the veneer of social issues to push political platforms that were previously left unaddressed. In this way it may even, in demagogic societies, according to Giddens (1994: 120) a leading structurationist, pave the way for democratisation when it manifests against anti-pluralistic forces. Movements, thus, tend to be the opposite of rigid statist structures in that they are built around more flexible decision making processes; which in itself makes the structure of the movement even more reflexive as it is but a response to the conditions created by the forces that they oppose. Yet, without this rigidity, the reason for mobilisation would not exist, it is hence dialectical, as Giddens (1994: 122) states:

All social change tends to be dialectical; a movement one way usually produces opposing trends also.

Herein lies the attractiveness of social movement mobilisation against the state, as opposed to party political formalisation within the state, in that the multifaceted nature of protest repertoire offers
the movement many more extra-state strategic options to affecting revolutionary political change of the entrenched political order (Maguire 1995). The fact that social movement activity can offer a wide variety of protest action, including violence, disruption and convention, signifies its malleability to respond more readily to state engendered changes within the perpetual cycle of reform-protest-reform (Wilkinson 1977, 1987; Tomlinson 1980; della Porta & Tarrow 1986; Wasmund 1986; della Porta 1992b). Movements that are able to grow are those that are able to combine this flexibility in repertoire with a “capacity to embody politically advantageous and culturally appropriate frames of meaning” (Tarrow 1995: 117).

The Periphery’s Response to the State: the Expansion of Protest Repertoires.

The significance of the rise of repertoire is its role as catalyst in the cycle of action-reaction-action which is at the heart of the dynamic relationship between complimentary state and movement development. Della Porta and Tarrow (1986: 611) both seem to feel that this catalyst role lies in the ability of the state to reshape the dimensions of the conflict through restructuring their consolidation in direct response to demands from those previously excluded. In turn, for movements, the repertoire of attack itself becomes an important indicator of their ability not only to survive the current political environment, but also how to influence the state through highlighting the cleavages that exist. It is Tilly (1986: 386) who recognises that movements are children of the conflict that emerge between the state and opposing claimants to power. As a symbol of open contention it is a producer of messages of the intent, capacity and possibilities of the aggrieved group to mobilise against the centre (Melucci 1996). In this sense the movement has developed parallel to that of its repertoire, as the repertoire is but a response to the state’s implementation of power structures (Tilly 1986: 386).

Pasquino and della Porta (1986: 169-172) found that there is a facet to the radicalisation of Italian politics that is heavily linked to attempts by the government to accentuate the incompatibility of reform with progress through initiating the cycle of violence in order to increase the intensity of policing. This is an extension of the rule of the centre and is a tactic commonly utilised by ever threatened elites in order to create the environment responsive to repressive actions. In Northern Ireland, this manifests itself in the co-operation between the state security forces and “illegal” Protestant paramilitaries such as the UVF and Ulster Defence
Association (UDA) (Bruce 1992; Dickson 1995). In Spain, it is found in the reidentification of the military with a new Greater Spanish militantism designed to counter the radical Basque national identity forged and defined in the very anti-state militancy of the Basque Land and Freedom Movement (ETA) (Alvaro Baeza 1995b).

The cycle of protest hence becomes a leverage between competing identities that solidify within the conflict. At once competitive and complimentary, this dynamic perpetuation of struggle produces a reassertion of identity that cannot allow one opponent to develop without the other following suit. Central to this ‘mimicking’ is the frame for reciprocal action that the state provides. The dynamic action-reaction-action cycle that underpins state and movement relations has as much to do with political opportunity structures offered by the state in transition as it does with the space that a movement creates by itself (Kriesi 1989; Klandermans 1990; McCarthy & Wolfson 1992). Hence, the importance of the development of cycles to the formation of state and movement relations which tend to combine experiences of shared contributions of past cycles into a mesh that forms the base for new activism (Tarrow 1988; Maguire 1990). It is a situation that allows for a convergence of spontaneity and structure that permits ready elites to exploit them in ways more formalised state opportunity structures could not provide.

In Yugoslavia it allowed for communist elites to exploit nationalist cleavages in order to foster a community strategy otherwise unattainable (Banac 1990, 1992; Dimitrijevic 1995). It is a combination of the spontaneous with the planned that gives the movement an almost organic legitimacy that enables a repertoire to develop in direct response to state strategies of co-option or repression. These “moments of madness,” according to Tarrow (1993a: 283-284);

do not transform the repertoire of contention all at once and out of whole cloth, but contribute to its evolution through the dynamic evolution of larger cycles of mobilisation in which the innovations in collective action that they produce are diffused, tested, and refined in adumbrated form or eventually become part of the accepted repertoire.

It is these political opportunity structures that give an external factor to movement mobilisation that becomes culturally inscribed within the communication structures of society to the extent that it becomes a learned convention of “society’s public culture” (Tarrow 1995: 18). The movement is designed to utilise these political opportunity structures that emerge within the conflict so as to,
through a delicate balance of alleviating the initial strain felt by its constituency and ensuring that the divisions remain long enough to be strategically exploited, attain maximum gain from their extra-parliamentary status. What the mass movement offers the disenfranchised, according to Hobsbawm (1973a: 12), is a grassroots alternative to the pre-existing state political structures. This was at the heart of the successful mobilisation of the civil rights and cultural movements in Northern Ireland (Kelly 1972) and Croatia (Johnson 1972; Kesar et al. 1990) throughout the late 1960s and in the Basque Country throughout the 1970s (Conversi 1996).

Frames, Ideas and Ideologies as Modes of Communication, Oppositional Cultural Construction and Reasons for Mobilisation that are Tested and Refined within the Protest Cycle.

One of the banes with Social Movement theory for Tarrow (1992: 174) is that throughout the 1970s and 1980s a great deal of research was conducted into gathering empirical data on the motivations behind those recruited into movements. Yet, not enough was spent on how leaders formulated ideological methods that would eventually be dispersed amongst the throng. Nor why some messages convinced people to take action and others did not. Tarrow (ibid.) raises an even more important question:

> do the belief systems and symbols that inspire protesters to take collective action possess autonomous mobilising potential, or are they simply the mechanical expressions of material interest, political opportunity, or power?

The problem is that the literature has failed to analyse sufficiently how collective beliefs are constructed, and how they eventually contribute to planned collective action. The common denominator of all kinds of movement activity is collective action; yet, a sustained interest can only be created through the incorporation of consensus into common meanings and value systems (Klein 1987; Gamson 1988; Klandermans 1988). It is when these political opportunity structures for change offered the periphery by the centre are transformed from potential mobilisation into action that, I believe, these recurring cycles emerge. This again places the state at the centre of the preconditions to collective action. The stimulus is more often than not the response of the state in increasing opportunities for participation, as only when conflict arises does the periphery radically mobilise (Davis 1988; McCarthy et al. 1991; Hill & Rothchild 1992). Tarrow (1995: 191), hence, is correct when suggesting it is the structures of the nation state in transition that
supplies the framework for citizenry participation. It is, thus, the corresponding development of crisis between reshaping state centres and reactionary peripheries which provides the cyclical reformulation of crisis necessary for peripheral oppositional mobilisation. The state’s aim is to consolidate, whilst the peripheries is to exploit the conflict so as to justify further resistance.

Poland during the 1980s was an example whereby the government provided the necessary political opportunity structures in order to facilitate separate “civil societies” so as to appease dissident cultural activities within the parameters of the martial state (Misztal 1995: 324). Yet Solidarity itself as a movement was doomed to fail if they had not taken political opportunity structures granted them by the failure of the state to incorporate dissident ideological, social, cultural, nationalist and religious sectors (Laba 1990; Ost 1990, 1994). The framing of the conflict between the ideologically competing Communist Polish state and the Solidarity Movement was integral to extending existing cleavages, through ideologically reinterpreting them, to the centre of the state’s agenda (Stokes 1993: 115-117). Moreover, without the initial moves of the state to reopen channels of cultural and social participation, it is doubtful whether these political opportunity structures for parliamentary reform could have been so readily exploited; even those found within the conflict itself.

Giddens (1979: 6) felt that ideology was to be looked at separately from other epistomological issues which would leave ideology open to be studied in terms of its meaning as a focal point of political mobilisation. Taking this into account I feel that when movements counter established doctrines of ideology, or nationality, they are combating rules of social and cultural mobilisation that are dictated from the centre in order to maintain the established order. The adoption of oppositional or rival identities is, in terms of communication, imperative in asserting an alternate identity; it is a rejection of the state’s right to impose one identity upon the periphery (Snow & Benford 1988; Melucci 1992a). National movements are prime examples of this proffering of the alternative in direct opposition to the views held by the state elite (Burke 1992: 294).

What is interesting about Giddens’ (1979: 11) argument is that the structurationist solution he offers accentuates the fact that the individual has no choice but to follow systems that have institutionalised these cleavages. Thus, suggesting that the sole way to legitimise participation can only be determined within the state structure that created it. It proposes that even the nature of
oppositional action is dictated by the centre. Within the movement
the alternate identity, hence, provides a structure of political
identification, a framing of the conflict, that leads to a variance in
the frame of action (Tarrow 1992; Melucci 1995; Zald 1996). As
Melucci (1992: 136-137) states:

The role of ideology is that of making sure that the actor comes
out of every confrontation with the most positive image
possible. In the case of a positive outcome to the conflict, the
situation will be symbolically articulated as the very victory of
the good and the righteous over arbitrary injustice. In the case
of a defeat, ideology will speak of the battle of the weak against
the powerful, and of unfair tactics. In either case, ideology
intervenes on the behalf of the actor in an attempt to increase
the consensus mobilisation.

It is the perpetual cycle of state shaping movement and,
correspondingly the movement’s reaction shaping the state’s
response, that refines a movement (Koopmans 1993). It is in the
process of placing one’s identity or ideology at the centre of the
debate that one legitimises the cause within the community they
represent (Melucci 1992: 132). Thus, providing space for the centre
to create their own ideological movement that intensifies with each
action of the periphery against the centre. A reciprocity of
identification emerges as competing identities refine their own
ideological base within the perpetuation of the cycle, as the
individual becomes equated with the historicity of the communal
struggle and protest action, but also grants historicity to the state’s
identity as protector of the centre. It was a process that, following
Hegelian lines, was built upon mutual recognition of the
importance that the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ play in creating conflict
that leads to a redefinition of the culture of conflict (Kellner 1992:
141). A ‘self’ which is reflexive of the state’s official identity, and
is formed within the environment produced by developing state
centre and the periphery’s responses. As Przeworski and Sprague
(1986: 7-8) point out:

Class, religion, ethnicity, race, or nation do not happen
spontaneously as reflections of objective conditions in the
psyches of individuals. Collective identity, group solidarity, and
political commitment are continually transformed-shaped,
destroyed, and moulded anew as a result of conflicts in the
course of which political parties, schools, unions, churches,
newspapers, armies, and corporations strive to impose a
particular form of organisation upon the life of society.

These frames are then a reference point to measure the success and
failures of the movement, as well as its durability, in ‘mimicking’
the state action for action, frame for frame. It is within the cycle of
action-reaction-action that is the cause of conflict between centre
and movement that these identity frames are refined. The very fact that collective identity itself is based on socio-cultural ties also suggests that there is a hint of the organic within the movement itself, that in turn becomes a symbolic communication of highly articulated interests in circumstances where the cycle of protest shows that access to the state centre for the marginalised group is limited (Melucci 1985, 1996).

This ritualisation of protest action and centre response enables, with each end of a cycle, for the further entrenchment of the centre and peripheral identity (Hoffman 1974; Tarrow 1992). The problem though is with each solidification of both positions, there runs the risk of a stratification of the conflict. The discursive nature of the movement’s ideological formation also underpins the nature of identity formation, or, a discourse that may bring the cultural and political aims of a movement into “constant cohesion” through the ritualisation of the struggle (Fine 1995: 129). This is a redefinition of an established oppositional culture in the case of national movements, according to political opportunity structures attained in the conflict with the state (Tarrow 1995: 119). In this sense it ‘mimics’ the state in recognising the need to ride the cycle in order to keep the community relevant in changing times. Thus the movement is an extension of the community mobilised not vice versa.

Tarrow (1989: 24) finds the search for a more tangible identity in order to sustain public loyalty as significant due to the fluid and transient nature of social movements, suggesting that the “extension of traditional interpretative frames is one of the main mechanisms for the diffusion of a protest cycle.” It is the threat of oppositional forces maintaining some greater link with the population that has pushed social movements to embrace more traditional forms of societal identification (Kertzer 1988), as those proffered by 'New Social Movement' theory seem to be highly generational, and hence transient. This is a problem that is faced by any theory that attempts to apply an ahistorical approach to any study of the social dimension of a movement’s activity (Abercrombie et al. 1992: 116).

Any such ahistorical approach is bound to fail due to the innate link between histories shared within state boundaries and social shifts that occurred world wide in post-industrial societies searching for the social ties lost as a by-product of industrialisation (Hobsbawm 1996: 325-328). The saliency of movements, in comparison to states, lies in their ability to be perceived as framed from the
rational choice of their participants. The creation of new frames of engagement, through ritualisation of protest, would promise new means of challenging the established order, without necessarily isolating traditional forms of social organisation (Johnston & Klandermans 1995: 5). The movement, thus, becomes the altar in the church of ambition where hope is laid down to be blessed. In most of these circumstances, movements were seen as the focal point of collective ambitions and desires for betterment and progress.

**Conclusion.**

In conclusion of this chapter, I find it interesting to recall the findings of William Anderson and Russell Dynes (1975) in their study of the dynamic relationship between state and movement sponsored violence in attaining social change in the May 30 1969 civil rights movement in Curaç ao. In their theoretical research, Anderson and Dynes (1975: 14) found that violence, as an aspect of movement protest repertoire, can act as a focal point of mobilisation when a movement, faced by an entrenched conservative elite, can no longer rely on constitutional modes of politicisation in attaining the desired socio-political change. It must be noted, as well, that movements tend to fail when VDA becomes the sole means of attaining their goals due to the constricting nature of political violence and the levels by which the state may utilise such cleavages to further entrench their right to use force as a means of ensuring societal stability (Tarrow 1989; della Porta 1995, 1996). Movements are agents of social change, not the focal point of the commencement of violence, as it is the state that dictates this.

Thus, it becomes imperative to study movements in their entirety as VDA is, like NVDA and party political formalisation, but an aspect of the totality of collective action that is found within an expanded protest repertoire. This is why I agree with Anderson and Dynes (1975: 14) when they say it is important to view a study of movements within the context of three dynamic relationships: the relation between movement and cleavages created in the initial mobilisation, the internal dynamics of the movement itself as it struggles to cope with the strain that comes with challenging state strategies of repression or co-option, and the successful reinvention of new expanded repertoires.

Social movements are but socio-political representatives of increasingly heterogeneous societies that are searching for more
complex forms of political representation, as traditional forms of political mobilisation may no longer suffice. It is, hence, within societal problems, within the social and cultural conflicts, that these movements must adopt new strategies in order to either work with, or combat against, the monolith of the state. For it is the state which dictates the terms of the debate through arbitrary laws and constitutional reforms, as much as it is up to the movement to fight for their own inclusion in the processes of state reinvention through political agitation.
CHAPTER FOUR: The Nation as a Social Movement Response

From a theoretical point of view this chapter will deal with the expansion of social movement activism into the realms of national movement mobilisation. In addition, it will deal with the solidification of the movement as the core of peripheral political organisation in systems whereby overt centralism, or sectarian ethno-national predominance, dictate the nature of political exclusion of competing forms of ideational movement against the state. It is here where my theory of ‘mimicking’, that of the movement being a child of the state’s push for centralisation through repeating the nature of the state’s response to peripheral demands, will be fully explored.

The reasoning behind choosing national movements rather than other movements, is the permanency that national exclusion-inclusion and autonomy possess within the European political sphere. The ability of national movement elites to claim space within the mythology of protest and rebellion (Tilly 1975c, 1993b; Kertzer 1988), plus the ethnic nature of many centralist elites’ makeup (Hechter 1975, 1978; Higley & Gunther 1992), has placed national movement mobilisation in an advantageous position of providing an oppositional statist alternative of some historicity and permanence that ‘New Social Movements’ and other movements could not have (Hechter & Friedman 1984). In this chapter what I intend to demonstrate is how the dynamic nature of state expansion, and the corresponding oppositional mobilisation of the periphery, shapes the nature of protest activism within a given state.

Through exploring how the ‘Nation-Building’ paradigm has failed to fully predict the emergence of peripheral national movements to political significance, it will be shown how the over concentration of the literature on defining nations in terms of the consolidation of nineteenth century and post-Versailles nation-states has wrongfully negated the role of national mobilisation in contemporary times. I believe this is due to the static, rather than the dynamic, way we have perceived the nationalist doctrine vis-à-vis the state. This has been solidified in the work of Deutsch (1979, 1980) who has ignored the reasoning behind much of the rebellion throughout
Europe since the 1960s. Especially, in the case of the Catholic Republicans of Northern Ireland and Basques of Spain, and the plethora of revolutionary national movements that have emerged in the wake of the end of the Cold War in 1989 throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The defining of the nation in terms of the state has left little room for the exploration of the power of national movement mobilisation as a means to social revolution in an environment dictated by supposedly fixed nation-states. By taking my theory of peripheral ‘mimicking’ I intend to show how the formation of competing national communities is conducive to the theory of protest cycles, and hence integral to the development of permanent oppositional forces to the ever expanding and reshaping state centres. As explored in the previous chapter, I believe that the theories of protest cycles, and the subsequent expansion of movement repertoire, is integral to the rise of state engendered peripheral reaction, and in the case of national movements, the rise of national alternatives to the centralist integrationists.

Tilly’s (1993b, 1994b) theory that the nation, and as such the mobilised national movement, should be seen in terms of a societal revolutionary movement, will be the base of my initial argument. Within this context, the expansion of repertoire to counter initial state integration, and eventually as a strategy in itself to be employed to access political opportunity structures found within the struggle and perpetuation of the cycle of protest-reform-protest, or action-reaction-action, will be an integral part of this study. When talking of ‘protest-reform-protest’ I am referring to Maguire’s (1996b) application of Tarrow’s cyclical paradigm in ‘normal’ societies to ‘abnormal’ socio-political communities in perpetual conflict.

This chapter will, thus, show why a movement chooses to revolt against the centre in the form of a national movement, and how national mobilisation serves to polarise society into a permanent cleavage between centre and periphery, to the advantage of the movement, through solidifying the differences to a position of irreconcilability. I will attempt to show that the periphery has little say in the initiation of the cycle of protest-reform-protest. The role of state centre expansion, the creation of elite inspired societal polarisation, and the expression of reactive ethnicity, all play a part in creating the necessary preconditions for national movements achieving their goal of either enfranchisement, or autonomy. This, thus enhances the role of the state as mobiliser of the periphery and target of the action, via providing the reason behind the mobilisation of discontent. As well as providing the structural
environment in which the perpetual cycle of protest-reform-protest forms necessary political opportunity structures for the redress of centre-peripheral ills. Without the state there would be little to ‘mimic’ and little to be discontented with in a structural sense.

The Working Definition and Problems with the Literature on Nationalism and National Movement Development.

Traditionally the literature has been divided between two streams of thought that have tended to concentrate too much upon the role of the classic nation-state in the development, concentration, and centralisation of wealth during the Industrial Revolution. The Marxist tradition of ‘internationalism’ through worker solidarity, and the liberal tradition that espouses moderate ‘patriotism’, have tended to view nationalism as a state sponsored extension of cultural imperialism (Brennan 1994: 45). Nationalism is an elitist doctrine, and hence any move by peripheralised communities to embrace it as an agent to socio-political emancipation through national movements, has been viewed as atavistic retrogradism (Deutsch 1969b; Bienen 1995; Billig 1995). The national movement is designed to empower a previously oppressed elite, through the formation of new political organisational structures that gloss over class conflicts at the core of social cleavages engendered by state formation. Thus, nationalism has been labeled as an ideological construct designed to ensure hegemony (During 1994: 139). This, in itself, ignores nationalism’s agency as a movement of emancipation for marginalised groups denied access to political opportunity structures because of their ethnicity (Tilly 1993b, 1994b).

This ideological division within the literature has led to a scenario whereby Benedict Anderson (1996: 1) feels the attempt to create a coherent anthology about the re-emergence of the significance of national movements, is akin to “mapping the terrain” of nationalism that “finds the authors more often with their backs to one another, staring out at different, obscure horizons, than engaged in orderly hand-to-hand combat.” The protagonists who stood behind the doctrines of modernisation, supranational integration, and economic globalisation only served to heighten the polarisation within a literature already convinced of the diminished value of national sentiment to political mobilisation (Lijphart 1977: 48-55).

Amongst liberal theorists the continued tendency to regard the
nation-state as a ‘necessary evil’ on the road to political development has led to an ignoring of the significance of nation formation to contemporary peripheralised communities (Nodia 1994: 13). Marx and Engels (1981), Engels (1981), Lenin (1977) and Stalin (1975) have not failed to discuss the significance of national movement development on the road to modernity. Yet, this has been done more as a study of its transient nature rather than its relevance as a means to social emancipation and full political enfranchisement (Deutsch 1979: 2). One of the major problems of Marxism was the dictum that it could create a society that would lack any form of organisation which was regulated through self-adjustment, as well as a society that would negate the historical significance of sub-categorical human groupings in contemporary political development (Gellner 1994b: 7). Whether or not ethnicity was a superimposed transient cultural entity that reinforced class distinctiveness and difference is not the issue. The issue in question is that in contemporary European society national movement activism is still viewed as a viable political option in the organisation of a viable political opposition and societal alternative.

It is the very agency of the movement, as opposed to the nominal significance of what is a nation and whether it is invented or not, that Tilly (1993b: 30-31) feels is where the study of nationalism becomes more salient in understanding the need for movements to adopt nationalist ideology as the centre piece of their ideological mobilisation. The circumstances of contemporary Europe show that it is in the nation, rather than other means of movement formation, that many disenfranchised communities have sought to redress important social, economic and political issues (Banac 1995; Breton & Breton 1995; Brubaker 1996). This may lie in the fact that the national movement, more than any other form of political oppositional formation, best offers a homogeneity of purpose, community and shared experience (Mugny & Perez 1991; Druckman 1994; Kecmanovic 1996). It is the ability to achieve change that is at the heart of the re-emergence of national movements as vehicles to political mobilisation, change and collective action. As Tilly (1993b: 31) rightly states one should ask, how did ideas of national self-determination become connected to those of sovereignty, community interests and individual freedom rather than what is a nation?

In my opinion, the answer lies in the state and its own willingness to departmentalise society through stratifying ethnos as the main determinant of social classification and societal division. This is the method by which movements seek to oppose the centralist state’s official doctrine of nationhood. As Jason Jenson (1995: 107)
recognises there is little difference between a nation and a
movement when assessing the repertoire employed in identifying
their targets and modes of socio-political mobilisation.

Still, much of the literature views national movements as transient,
and nationalist ideology as a doctrine of change placed upon more
static ethnic communities (Deutsch 1963a: 3). This places the
movement within a mechanistic paradigm and the feeling of
communal belonging in a more organic framework (Hroch 1996).
Perhaps this is why Tilly (1993a: 265) has suggested that we should
forget about viewing national movements in terms of attaining a
definition of the nation. Rather, we should see them as coalitions of
social forces who utilise the national link as the best way of
attaining social cohesion, through identification with social
movements as an extension of communal development. It was
Deutsch (1963b: 33) who pointed out that the problems with
concentrating on the ideas of organic theorists such as Burke,
Mueller, List and Spengler was that they stressed:

the interdependence of all parts of a system in their
structures and functions, but they excluded all
possibilities of major internal reorganisation, and of
any evolution beyond a final goal of maturity.

I agree with Deutsch that it would be a mistake to ignore the
mechanistic nature of national movements, but not in the same way
he does. The importance of the mechanistic nature I feel lies in the
dynamic relation between the at once expanding-consolidating state
and the polarising, opposing peripheral elites. A ‘mimicking’ of the
political shape of the opponent. It is, consequently, a mistake to
view national formation solely in terms of state-building. Rather
the very completion of the process of centralisation leads to a
‘mimicking’ from the periphery that now sees the formation of a
national movement as an alternative to the established means of
political organisation. The literature seems to ignore this
‘mimicking’ effect, as it does the significance of state actions and
movement reactions to the usage of nationalism as the core
ideology for peripheral movement mobilisation.

The Inadequacies of the Nation-Building
Paradigm as the Apex of National Development:
The Central Role of the State in the Development
of the Dynamic Nature between Official and
Peripheral Nationalism.
The state hence becomes central to any study of the development of nationalism.\textsuperscript{2} This concentration on the state, as the raison d’être behind the formation of national movements, rather than the shaper of the modes of activism undertaken by the national movement, has led to defining national mobilisation on principles of ethnos, language, religion and customs, rather than the movement itself as a means of consistent protest activism (Connor 1977: 40).

Nationalism has, I believe, become wrongly viewed as a functionalist doctrine designed to aid the nation-building process (Connor 1994: 91). This is symptomatic with what Gellner (1983b: 43) recognised as, the interpretation of nationalism by many academics with the formation of eighteenth century state building.

Nationalism has been defined, in effect, as the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that (1983b: 43).

A culturo-political hegemonisation that is ensconced within the Western European origins of the state and nationalism’s parallel development. One that has led many students of the phenomenon to concentrate on the established nation-states as the ideological, political and empirical examples that best describe its emergence. In essence, the processes of modernisation are viewed as the cause of nation-state development and hence should be studied more fully than any other reason for the re-emergence of the phenomenon (Wallerstein 1974, 1980; Lijphart 1981; Markovits & Oliver 1985).

The turning point in the 1960s was the realisation that the processes of nation-building were a front for the construction of national institutions by state elites that were designed for greater integration, and eventual assimilation, of all ethnic minorities living within the confines of a modern nation state (Smith 1992a: 1).

The reason behind this has been the equating of national movement development with the centralisation of the state (Breuilly 1982; Balme 1995). This has unwillingly diminished more peripheral national identities into sub-categories under the names of sub-national groupings or regionalism (Krejci 1978; Rokkan 1981; Arrighi 1985; Wallerstein 1985). In turn, nationalism has become equated with the doctrine of great state centralisation, inherently tying it to the outdated models of the French Revolution and Manzinian national movements (Rudé 1964; Said 1993). Which, though supplying an historical precedent of state attainment and ideological formation, nevertheless fails to relate to the dynamic relation of the contemporary parallel development of state centre and periphery.

Perhaps this was the reason why so many social scientists in the
West, such as Lerner (1993) and Kedourie (1960) have failed to recognise the significance of nationalism as a tool for social change and political organisation because their own cultural experiences were achieved long before the ideology had surfaced in its contemporary movement form (Smith 1991: 123-125). This has led to a subsequent negating of those experiences that run contrary to the established international order. Thus at once legitimising and consolidating the role of the ‘Great Nation-States’ as the model of socio-political organisation (Deutsch 1969a, 1969b: 21, 1979: 2).

The greatest criticism of nationalism and national movements has been directed at this exclusive ‘Greater Nation-State’ nature (Ronen 1986; Greenfeld 1993a; van Evera 1995). Fukuyama (1994: 24), for example, had been able to ignore the resilience of national movements as a staid ideology of political transformation, due to its tendency to distinguish and divide people along collective lines that minimise the individual within the political processes of representation. Perhaps this is why Fukuyama could declare an “end to history” as he felt that no doctrine could so fully satiate the individual’s right to representation and action as liberal democracy. The problem here is that, as Tilly (1975c: 602) points out, national movements themselves more often than not tend to form around the rhetoric of personal representation through collective security; rather than ask important questions of what causes the contemporary relevance of a doctrine promulgated in the eighteenth century, and how it became equated with notions of equality through the extension of civil and human rights (ibid.).

The Significance of the Ideology as a Cause of Contemporary Peripheral Mobilisation in a Global Environment Dominated by Modernist Theories.

The tendency of internationalists to ignore the validity of the value system proffered by nationalists as hegemonic and narrow in scope, fails to see that as an agent of social change, internationalist inspired movements, such as market force globalisation, capitalism, and communism, are equally hegemonic (Brennan 1994: 46; Saul 1997: 21). This has tended to minimise the importance of emerging national movements in a contemporary global environment (Connor. 1994g). The problem with the literature is that it has failed to recognise the significant differences in the patterns of social development between imperialist established nation-states and contestant movements on the periphery (During 1994: 138).
Nairn (1993: 157-158) feels this is due to the inability to distinguish between internationalism and internationality; the former is an ideal, the latter a doctrine, imperialistic in nature, that is designed to create a capitalist based monoculture. As such Nairn (ibid.) views nationalism in itself as a resistance to centralist state induced monoculturalism.

I believe much of this has occurred due to the over concentration upon studying nation-building processes, rather than dealing with the peripheral agency of it as a doctrine of political mobilisation for minority communities. Lijphart (1977: 56) felt that there was no adequate theoretical grounds for expecting a decline in ethnic mobilisation suggesting that, opposite to much of the contemporary theory proffered by Deutsch (1979), ‘if modernisation leads to rapidly increasing social transactions and contacts among diverse groups, strain and conflict are more likely to ensue than greater mutual understanding.”

A scenario that would lead to an increase of state activity which, by chance, would increase the possibility of unequal treatment through processes of state discerned inclusion and exclusion along ethnic lines (Gellner 1994b: 63). In such circumstances, the failure of states to recognise the emergence of national movements as political expressions of popular social discontent has cost centralist elites dearly (Dofny & Akiwovo 1980; O’Dowd 1990; Prazauskas 1991; Connor 1994f).

Theorists such as Deutsch (1969b), Lerner (?), Friedrich (1963) and Gellner (1986) have viewed that once integration has been achieved and respective economic, civil and human rights attained then the role of nationalism as a means to state consolidation is complete (Breuilly 1982: 279). The problem with political science is that nationalism is more often than not brushed off as a by-product of modernity which in turn rids it of its contemporary importance as a doctrine of social revolution (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985a: 57). This places nationalism within a monist paradigm that denies the role of parallel, yet alternate, movement development towards political modernity that many national movements fulfil. This fact Tiryakian and Nevitte (ibid.) attributed to the tendency of theorists to:

\[
\text{treat the terms “nation,” and “state,” and “society”} \\
\text{interchangeably reflects a serious conceptual problem} \\
\text{which still plagues the conventional literature.}
\]

One that serves only to further enhance the definitional incongruence between the “state” and the “nation” (Findlay 1995: 279).
Modernisation theories tend to ignore the fact that national sentiment is not solely defined in relation to industrialisation, capitalism and secularisation. The literature tends to ignore that the more potent influence on the development of national movements is the dynamic relations between state and peripheral communities, which in turn tends to diminish the wider spectrum in which movement activism occurs (Deutsch 1963a; Seton-Watson 1977; See 1980; Rokkan & Urwin 1983). As a doctrine, nationalism is both reformist and revolutionary (Smith 1983: 81). It is as a doctrine, and an agent of change, that Tarrow (1995) feels nationalism should be studied. Nationalism is itself not a one sided doctrine, it is multifaceted. Hence the tendency of the literature to explain its emergence from one perspective is false (Smith 1983: 86).

One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that, like other big realities, nationalism is multidimensional, and it is difficult to ascertain which of these dimensions are fundamental and permanent and which are accidental and transitory (Tarrow 1995: 98).

Nationalism is a narrative designed for a specific goal of placing a movement within an historic paradigm of social development and historical representative political continuum, thus legitimising it as a facilitator of power consolidation (Bhabha 1994a: 303-304). Evoking the Weberian concept of “myth of common descent”, Connor (1994c: 145) believes that the literature has failed to deal specifically with the benefits and costs, supplied by political opportunity structures formed within cleavages found between competing elites, that are weighed by participants within national movements in a rationalist manner. This trend to narrate in terms of an elite created doctrine ignores much of the contemporary aspirations of movements that emerge between controlling elites and their constituencies. When they re-emerge they do so as movements that are designed to meet the demands of a particular community rather than an elite, as it is an active political phenomenon which lays dormant for some time giving it both a ‘passive’ and ‘latent’ dimension (Banton 1986; Breton et al. 1995). It is hence responsive to the dictates of the state, and as such mutable in the way it seeks to engage the state, as most movements are.

**Peripheral National Movements as a Rational Response to Centralist Hegemonisation of**
Official State Centralist National Doctrine.

National movements are therefore movements rooted in rational choice that may be transitional, yet this transitional nature should not deny its relevance. For Ronald Rogowski (1985: 87) the problem with current social theory is that the two great schools of thought, liberalism, that views the primordial organisational formation of nationalism as irrational, and Marxism, that sees it as all too rational, perceive it solely in atavistic terms. For many political scientists the re-emergence in the 1960s throughout Europe of nationalist inspired movements, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), ETA and Croat nationalism, created a paradox (Nairn 1977; Tilly 1993b; Alter 1994; Cushman 1996). Especially, considering that many were proving much larger in scope, in terms of social and political issues addressed, than classic national movements of the nineteenth century (Levi & Hechter 1985: 128).

I believe this has led to a misreading of the post-1960s national movement environment as a revival of ethno-nationalism. Hroch (1996: 38) feels that the movements of today are similar to those of the nineteenth century due to the fact that their demands are located within independence paradigms. They have a strong cultural component and their social demands of economic parity and policy reform concerning redistribution of wealth mirrors the attitudes of those they fought against during the industrialisation era. Contemporary post Cold War Europe shows us that nationalism is but a reaction, since nationalist political parties have failed to regain power in nations where the national goal has been attained. Schöpflin (1995: 38) saw this new push to define this re-emergence of ethnic reawakening only served to negate the protest movement aspect of these mobilised communities, as well as the ever present nature of national sentiment. Even in communities that have seemingly resolved such conflicts:

in reality, under the surface of events and indeed not merely under the surface, ethnicity and nationhood not only remained in being, but they contributed significantly to the pattern of politics, though it was seldom understood in this way (Schöpflin 1995: 38).

Where contemporary theorists in the literature differ from classic nation-building theorists is in recognising that the mobilisation of national sentiment presupposes the actual existence of the nation in terms of the traditional nation state (Brubaker 1996: 14; see also Nairn 1993; Said 1993; Kupchan 1996; Patterson 1996). This places the movement itself, vis-à-vis the movement’s relationship with the state, at the centre of the study, as the national movement
is but an extension of a wider peripheral movement, designed to change the structure of power through a redefinition of the community within. Accordingly the nation, in terms of oppositional movement, must not be viewed in terms of ‘substance but as institutionalised form; not as collectivity but as practical category; not as an entity but as contingent event’ (Brubaker 1996: 16).

This marginalisation of national movements through categorising them as sub-units of the established international political order, concurs with what Tilly (1993b: 30) identifies as the common mistake held by most theorists that concern themselves with the nationalist problem in terms of what makes up a nation. Rather than concentrating on how the national community, once mobilised, acts as an agent of, or against, the state in providing a cognitive frame for the mobilisation of popular discontent, and the eventual movement action that ensues from it, they concentrate too much on outmoded ‘Nation-Building’ paradigms. If one was to instead take Tilly’s viewpoint one could discern that the mobilised nation is induced by the political environment from which it emerges and hence is a response to pre-existing social relations within the state.

State Expansion and Centralisation: The Role of Nationalism in Polarising the Centre and Periphery.

Since the times of the rise of Absolutism, the nature of elite and minority relations have been built upon structures of power whereby demarcated boundaries of state were to be the defining realms of power (Rokkan 1981; Rokkan & Urwin 1983; Anderson 1988; Balakrishnan 1996). This allows for all political consolidation and opposition to be dictated by processes of state integration, consolidation, and isolation (Deutsch 1962, 1963, 1979; Breuilly 1982; Balme 1995). The state as an entity was chosen by these elites as the central form of political organisation (Weitzer 1990; Higley & Gunther 1992). A state could dictate more effectively the peripheralisation of outer groups, and give elites the organisational freedom to concentrate on economic development knowing full well that absolute compliance to laws and hierarchical structures were enacted at all times. At the centre of this was what Deutsch (1962: 75) saw as the ability of the elite to isolate their ‘own’ from the other, whilst maintaining the interconnectedness to ensure the growth of the state.

The emergence of nationalism as a doctrine of revolution, of
change, emerged in this era, as the shifts demanded by societal restructuring were to forever change the social order through increased isolation of the periphery from the centre (Renan 1994: 11). A circumstance that would, in my opinion, lead the periphery to ‘mimic’ the political formations of the very entity that had marginalised them as a community. The process of state integration was, according to Deutsch (1969b: 16), that which would lead to a tension between institutionalised and non-institutionalised organisational bases within society. Deutsch (1963a: 6) takes national integration, and the dynamic processes of social mobilisation and cultural assimilation that it engenders, to be innately destructive. However, I believe for the marginalised community it provides necessary political opportunity structures that allow them to reclaim the political centre through opting for revolutionary mobilisation.

This elite nature of state formation has played a significant role in the legitimisation of the nation as a means to social mobilisation and political action. Nationalism as a concept has succeeded in locating itself within the boundaries of the people, yet without the consolidation gained through state experience, there is doubt to whether it could have succeeded as a doctrine of social change so readily (Deutsch 1979: 14-15). It is here that Tilly (1975b: 6) believed that it was more important to understand the nature of state formation than nation building as a raison d’être for the mobilisation of peripheral communities to political action. A point that Tarrow (1993b: 84) was to support:

As the activities of national states expanded and they increasingly attempted to penetrate society, the targets of collective action against other groups shifted from the private and local actors they were aimed at the national centres of policy making. The national state was not only target for resistance and proaction; it became a fulcrum in which forms of collective action could be employed to gain the state’s intervention against opponents.

The notion of nationalism as a political response is due to the concurrent development of the state and political cultural community; one that would innately politicise all forms of societal discontent (Schöpflin 1995: 49). Yet, it seems to be in the cleavages that develop through processes of integration that political opportunity structures arise for discontent to be transferred into political action via the dynamic relationship that develops between consolidating elites and the rest of the population. Deutsch (1979: 15) exemplified this in his definition of the nation being a result of
the transformation of a people, or of several ethnic elements, in the process of social mobilisation.” For it was, according to Tarrow (1993b: 85), “in the shadow of the national state that social movements developed their characteristic modular forms of collective action.”

It is, I believe, this dynamic nature of elite consolidation and peripheral response to the processes of integration which determines the structural necessity of many movements’ adoption of an alternate nationalist response to increased centralisation. Greenfeld (1993b: 48) felt that nationalism rose before industrialisation and the state’s need to structuralise profit and economic development. As such nationalism is more a functional response to state consolidation, rather than a functional requirement of industrialisation. The religious paradigm (O’Brien 1988, 1994), that of nationalism as a substitute for a decline in the significance of religious doctrine in communal organisation, similarly fails to offer a solution. As the rise of national states emerged as compliments to fledgling state entities such as in the Lutheran Reformation in Germany and the Protestant schism in England. The social dynamics of the development of nationalism tend to point towards what Gellner (1994b: 182) calls ‘national striving.’ That is the desire for the creation of a geographical political unit designed to achieve hegemony for a class of people, ethnically defined, that had previously been excluded. It is in this desire for enfranchisement, or in the movement towards empowerment, that Gellner (ibid.) believed nationalism emerged as a goal that symbolises control over the state.

Enfranchisement was often delivered with the condition of cultural conversion that could develop into an ethnic-class divide quite unwittingly, as the identity of the periphery would take on larger political significance (Horowitz 1985; Chatterjee 1986; Prazauskas 1991). Yet, as Gallagher (1996: 202) points out, the notion of nationalism alleviating class problems may not occur if the form of ethno-nationalist consolidation that emerges is built around one ethnic elite consolidating their own ethnic dominance. It is in the post-Versailles Yugoslav example whereby Gallagher (ibid.) feels such a situation manifests autocratic rule over another. This only emerges as a consequence of the loyalty that the state demands in order to increase its fluidity through expanding into all economic, political and cultural sectors of society (Strayer 1963: 24). Yet, such loyalty could never be guaranteed unless a sense communal principle could be found. Tilly (1975a: 390) felt that this sense of continuity is needed in order to grant a movement historicity.

Deutsch (1988: 77) saw communicative control as the key to the
expansion of the state into the realm of the cultural and traditional. Yet, I feel it is also a catalyst of further exclusion of already culturally marginalised communities who must now await the right shift in policy in order to exploit their discontent. This seems to meld with Said’s (1993: 199) belief that it is the state that determines the nature of liberty granted to the individual, and hence the collective. A viewpoint that tends to increase the significance of the structure of rule, especially if it is based on ethnic superiority, upon an oppressed group’s rebellion.

A major problem with elite engendered state identity is that it tends to co-opt those similar bourgeois strata from the periphery whilst ignoring concerns of the lower strata as inconsequential (Smith 1991). It is when the state sponsored identity correspondingly validates the ‘official’ national ideology of the centre that the periphery tends to revert to the antithesis of the moral value system held by the centre elite (Smith 1987: 223). This in effect ‘mimics’ the state’s centralisation via providing competing ideological claims of sovereignty that is riposted within the state structure. If this happens to be ethnic in origin then what emerges is what Conversi (1997: 231), following on from Wilson (1991), calls an ‘ethnogensis’ of competing national ideologies between centre and periphery embodied in the dynamic development between state and movement.

Nineteenth century Basque nationalism exemplifies how the nature of state integration may serve to further isolate the periphery from the centre (Payne 1971; Díez-Medrano 1994). Originally middle-class sponsored, the failure of the Basque elite during the Second Carlist War of 1876 to co-opt the workers’ communities would lead to the eventual shift of Basque politics to the Left during the Civil War of 1936 to 1939; to a more radical form of political mobilisation that would centre its opposition to the Rightist Centralist Government in Madrid in a Leftist national movement (Breuilly 1982: 290-291; see also Eisenwein & Shubert 1995). At the centre of this shift was the recognition by these peripheral movements of the necessity of the state, in terms of the nature of the state integration and consolidation processes, as the cause of initial movement identification. One that allowed for a dialectic homogenisation of a movement during a period of strategic repertoire expansion.

Greenfeld (1993a: 3) felt that nationalism’s fundamental attractiveness lay in its homogeneous structure which allowed it to impose a unity of purpose that more superficial, and transient, forms of societal structure like class, status and locality could not. For members of marginalised nationalist communities the issues of
political unity and territorial demarcation are but responses to the encroachment of state expansion into the social field. This was further expanded by Avineri (1994: 29) who felt that that which was perceived as a ‘primordial or irrational residue of traditional society’ was in fact still a powerful product of modernity, and as such, a significant political force. The problem is many elites may perceive national awakening as a problem of modernity, as opposed to a child of modernity that offers an alternate form of political opposition to the structured nature of the state offered through oppositional mobilisation. As Connor (1994: 110):

Increased communications and transportation within a state thus have one impact among members of the same national or potential nation, but have quite another among members of separate nations. The error of referring to nationalism has thus led authorities to assume that the variations in identity with which they are dealing will disappear with modernisation. But the body of actual evidence points in the opposite direction.

Nationalism is essentially a form of alternate alignment that is shaped as a counter movement to the established state order; a counter movement that views nationalism as a strategy that responds in a territorial and political manner to processes of state expansion (Johnston et al. 1988a: 8). Hence the ideal of the nation in development was that of raising the people to a position of the elite (Greenfeld 1993b: 49). According to Dov Ronen (1986: 6) what had occurred in the 1960s was an extension of this factor. The re-emergence of ethnicity as a means to social mobilisation was a shift in peripheral strategies as the national doctrine became viewed as a revamped means of utilising established organisational tools (Safran 1987; Hechter Friedman & Appelbaum 1992; Tilly 1993b; Connor 1994b). The adoption of nationalist strategies was a mobilisation of political discontent in periods of perceived exclusion from the structures of power. In the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe per se, Horowitz (1994: 40) felt that exclusion has often been the means by which many communities have become politicised. Leaving their own consolidation of power embodied in the rhetoric of defending their own. In such circumstances the embrace of nationalist politics by a peripheral movement can be viewed as, according to Ronen (1986: 8), an element of administrative decentralisation. As Greenfeld (1993a: 487) states:

Ultimately, nationalism can be traced to the structural
contradictions of the society of orders. It was a response of individuals personally affected by these contradictions to the sense of disorder they created.

I believe, as in the cases of Yugoslavia and Spain, this exclusion brought around a radical rethink of the position of each group, as well as their own policies, on matters of self-determination that would be repeatedly played out throughout the rest of these states. In such circumstances the ability of an elite to create the national movement through introspection becomes as important as the influence of external factors such as the state; yet the state and its influence is as ever not so far away (Sharp 1996: 10). Deutsch (1979: 140) felt that the national community held five basic principles that could grant a movement a less transient structure that more traditional forms of social movement organisation could never grant: independence from external control; cohesiveness of traditional modes of communication, expression and co-operation; multi-generational political organisation; autonomy of government leading to the ability of creating one’s own societal rules; and self-perpetuating internal legitimacy.

Ethnos as a Means to Social Class Separation through the Exploitation of Social Cleavages.

The very elite engendered nature of the state has led to the development of political community within structures of state, as well as within cleavages produced between consolidating elites and resisting peripheries (Deutsch 1963b; Greenfeld 1993b; Hobsbawm 1993). Political opportunity structure, or rather the ability to access political opportunity structures, were to play an integral role in the willingness of elites to move towards the state’s centre (Tilly 1994b). The stratification of power relations through class and ethnic division was to lead to a responsive relationship between centre and periphery that has not quite ended in the establishment of a system based on parallel reciprocity (Tarrow 1977: 35). The notion of a political community, according to Deutsch (1962: 15), is best viewed as a system of relations that are built on social differentiation.

This disparous political formalisation of state power relations is, I believe, necessary to forming an effective inner structure, an effective inner past within the group, as well as to the ability of implementing a centralist rule from within the state. Correspondingly, it is the ability of the elite to enfranchise, through the granting of privileges previously denied as a reward for loyalty
to the centre, that may determine the level of movement opposition arising on the periphery. As Tarrow (1977: 35) stated:

Clearly, the bias of national policy toward the periphery depends heavily upon the closeness of the links between the national administrative elite and the economically dominant national class.

These attempts by centralised governments to incorporate peripheries into national state structures were akin to how nineteenth century governments tried to enfranchise emerging movements into the governing body so as to neutralise any potential future opposition (Thomis & Holt 1977; Tilly 1994b, 1995, 1997). In fact, Tarrow (ibid.: 37) recognised that the greater the economic cleavage, the more likely that permanent ethno-class division would arise between centralist elites and minorities on the periphery.

Privilege would soon become related to the right of access to resources that would become central to individual empowerment such as property, education, position, and freedom of movement. The problem is that the nation-state, or societies that are stratified by nationality, also tend to be as such socially stratified, thus it is very difficult to gain any form of vertical mobility (Deutsch 1969b: 52). An occurrence that James Anderson (1988: 34) noted emerged due to the lack of shared culture between these developing classes; whilst Krejci (1978: 124) felt that ethno-nationalist identity becomes a major player in social disillusionment when the disparity between classes is clearly definable along communal lines. This seems to occur when the class status of the peripheral community is significantly different from the centre (Hechter 1975, 1978, 1985).

The Basques are an example where the bourgeoisie are remnants of the feudal ruling class who integrated into the dominant culture of the national state during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Basurto Larrañaga 1983). Yet their nationalist doctrine has consistently shifted from the Left, to the Right, to the Left according to the perceived needs of the movement at the time (Elorza 1978). The fact that it is the nationalist ideology which has not been replaced suggests the significance of it as an optimum form of popular mobilisation (James Anderson 1988: 34).

Party political organisations reflect and affect the political system in which they operate. Hence, when a group or class choose to mobilise along nationalist lines, they are in fact ‘mimicking’ the nature of social cleavages within the system they find themselves in. Horowitz (1985: 294), in fact, found that the emergence of
ethno-nationalist political and social organisation arose from two sources within pre-existing cleavages of society in “the internal imperatives of the ethnic group as a community and the external imperatives of the ethnic group, in relation to others, as the incipient whole community.”

From a class perspective the blatant policies of ethnic preference creates an automatic polarisation of society along ethno-national lines that, I feel, can only be redressed from outside the established political system. In such circumstances, conflict automatically defines the other in terms of opposition and competition, a situation that is further enhanced through the stratification of societal positions along ethnic lines (Wilson 1991). Cleavages, according to Rokkan (1981: 92), be they ethnic or class oriented, were natural consequences of political centralisation. From the formation of the Absolutist state, the concept of granting specific linguistic and ethnic groups privilege lay in the desire of the Monarch to implement advantage in order to create a compact, yet loyal, cadre under the direct control of the state (Gellner 1986: 22). As an act of political administration, this automatically precludes a significant part of the population who may in future choose to mobilise against the elite in order to attain privileges that had previously been denied them. Gellner (1979: 273) felt that it was within great economic cleavages, due to the dislocation caused within society through modernisation, that ethnic cleavages arose. An aspect of centre-periphery development backed up by Seton-Watson (1977: 10):

Where political and social power are concentrated in a group who differ in both religion and language from the majority of the population among whom they dwell, and an educated elite is emerging from that population, then the optimum conditions are given for the rapid growth of a nationalist movement.

It is within this rhetoric of equality and egalitarianism whereby Gellner (1988: 211) feels the nation-state may in fact encourage those denied these privileges to seek them in a similar form of political organisation. The fact of modernity is that the contemporary citizen is heavily dependent upon the ability of the citizen to partake in all the advantages that high culture grants them such as “his employability, his cultural participation, his moral citizenship, his capacity to deal with the all-pervasive bureaucracy” (Gellner 1994a: 41). If enfranchised correctly this may also allow for the ascendancy of one ethnicity over another in the guise of state consolidation of privilege.
The advantages of creating highly defined cleavages between elites and the ruled are many. Deutsch (1979: 53) felt that in dividing wealth and profits unevenly, hence creating social disparity, an elite may increase the ability to control and subjugate a perceived political threat within their own boundaries. In this sense I feel Deutsch is correct, though, I believe it can also be used to create a mystique around the governing elite, as the Serbs have become personified as the ‘conscience’ of the Yugoslav state (Cohen 1996b), and the Protestants, likewise, as the spiritual and physical essence of Ulster state political distinctiveness from the rest of Ireland (Clayton 1996).

In my opinion, such a theory is exemplified in the emergence of the Protestant Ascendancy in Northern Ireland and the subsequent designed marginalisation of the Republican Catholic community. If an employer in ordinary times denies a Catholic skilled positions, they may cheapen the Catholic labour market, in doing so the minority inadvertently, or advertantly, is denied steady cash flow and the security gained via financial empowerment. Hence, those on the periphery become dependent on the state (perhaps via social welfare), crippling any ability to act independently of the political system. It is here that the political dominance of an ethnic elite through economic monopolisation emerges.

Though Greenfeld (1993a: 488-490) recognised that the socio-political origins of nationalism as a means to political mobilisation are attributed to political opportunity structures found within the development of the state, she never fully explores how it is the nature of the rule in formulating cleavages that determines the nature of the nationalist response. Similarly, Deutsch (1979: 50) believed this mobilisation to occur as a consequence of external pressures once a community feels under threat of total political, cultural and economic subjugation. I feel though that mobilisation can occur even once political, cultural, and economic subjugation are no longer issues due to the perpetuity of the cycle of protest between the ever shaping and reshaping peripheral ethnic elites and the state.

This is perhaps why so many fledgling national movements spread throughout Europe today construct the notion of national community out of class differentiation (Johnston et al. 1988a: 13; see also Hechter 1985). Their marginalisation is viewed as an extension of the notion of Hechter’s (1975) ‘internal colonialism,’ a consequence itself of the development of the ‘cultural division of labour.’ The problem however with Hechter’s theory of a solely class based version of an arisen national consciousness, is that in the cases of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Croatia, economic
disadvantage cannot be relied upon as a cause for national mobilisation (Higley & Gunther 1992; Linz & Stepan 1992). In these countries, the nationalist doctrine has emerged in spite of relative economic wealth in comparison to the economic status of the ethnic group at the centre (Hechter 1985; Zirakzadeh 1989). As Gellner (1979: 274) sees it:

The ‘classes’ that really matter are those which are produced by uneven development; and they attain ‘consciousness’ through ethnicity. If ‘ethnic’ differentials are lacking, they fail to reach ‘consciousness’.

If we cannot fully concentrate our argument solely on economic reasons behind the rise of such movement activism, since many of the reasons behind the adoption of the nationalist doctrine into a movement’s ideational constructs are seemingly socio-psychological and political, then I believe the functionalism of the doctrine vis-à-vis the state must be explored. Movements underpinned by the nationalist doctrine see nationalism as an ideological tool towards liberation that ‘mimics’ the state centre. Especially, since it may be as a response to the state’s attempts at recentralisation in order to ensure the privileged status of the centralist elites.

A campaign built on principles of democracy, enfranchisement and civil rights are but means of attaining the desired liberation. The campaign built around the national question is one designed to resolve the question of communal succession, in order to guarantee that prior principles fought for are consolidated through political formalisation, so as to ensure hegemony for the emerging ‘ethnic’ class (Laitin & Lustick 1989; Lustick 1990; Weitzer 1990). Yet, always at the centre of this movement towards enfranchisement is the state, and the ability of emerging elites to hold influence over the centre, even through an attempt to shift the centre back to the periphery (Weitzer 1995). What determines a change in movement repertoire is the ability to explore the limits in organisational knowledge and resources made available for mobilisation within the confines of ‘enduring cultural expectations that resist transformation” (Tarrow 1993b: 70). Thus the reason why a movement chooses to adopt national causes as a focal point of movement mobilisation is that they ‘mimic’ the predominant form of political organisation dictated by the state they are challenging. If consolidation takes the form of national integration then the same limitations would be transferred upon the movement undertaking the collective action, through the very absorption of the ethno-nationalist repertoire, into their overall protest repertoire.
The Role of Ethnic Repression and Reactive Ethnicity in Developing Centre-Periphery Struggle.

The processes of state consolidation through integration, vernacularisation, social stratification, and centralisation of communicative channels between elites and peripheries were to play a major part in creating social preconditions for the polarisation of political society between varying ethno-national groups (Deutsch 1962, 1963b; Bhabha 1994a, 1994b). Much of this relates to the inability, or unwillingness, of expanding state centres to accommodate the needs, wishes, and pressures of newly mobilised social strata or regions (Gellner 1980; Diamond & Plattner 1994; Calleo 1995). This in turn may cause a greater identification with the communal/regional identity founded upon the periphery, than would have perhaps been granted if their political needs had been met (Deutsch 1979: 193). To understand the rise of such peripheries to political action one must look at specific conditions for the radicalisation of minority groups (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985a: 70). In this case I would suggest it is found in the role of the state dictating the terms of engagement by which movements must act.

Socio-politically this is important, for it defines why individual choices are made in favour of a dominant nation (Levi & Hechter 1985; Polèse 1985; Coleman 1995). Tarrow (1977: 47) saw that the problem between centre and periphery was inherent due to three “fundamental flaws” of modern nation-state development: the inability to convince peripheries to forgo their autonomous status; the failure to recognise the strength of peripheral cultures; and the inability to transform “grassroots public support into participatory roles” within the new structures of power sharing. All are symbolic of the problems of integration, and the failure to fully enfranchise the entire periphery into the state.

It is important to realise that the expectancy of a centre for the periphery to assimilate, causes some of the greatest fault lines within the expected outcomes of social cohesion (Lijphart 1977; Nairn 1977, 1993; Hobsbawm 1993). Once centralist governments attempt to overtake the means of social mobilisation in order to assimilate populations, then problems of competing identities arise. Polarisation of the political system is often the consequence, as traditional means of state initiated forms of conflict and interest resolution lose legitimacy amongst alienated communities, who
tend to incorporate what Levi and Hechter (1985: 130) call “reactive ethnicity.” Reactive ethnicity is the choice of extra-parliamentary activity or political action outside the state, which seeks to utilise the syncretic nature of contemporary ethno-national mobilisation; that of combining pre-existing political, cultural, economic and social structural disparity within political opportunity structures created through social movement activism. Within these cleavages the nature of centre-periphery relations is defined. For Deutsch (1962: 21) this has allowed for the institutionalisation of cultural differentiation which has its effects upon the politicisation of communities based on a dynamic model of competing, yet self-perpetuating, national movement ideologies.

The very establishment of a political differentiation between those who are part of the high culture, and those part of the low culture go a long way in explaining how those who are disenfranchised have come to see ethnicity not only as a bulwark to upward mobility, but also as a means of establishing one’s own hegemony (Gellner 1994b: 40). The subsequent deeming of one culture above another did much to establish permanent exclusivity of the periphery, that, once institutionalised takes the form of ethnic repression (Lijphart 1977; Polè se 1985; Tilly 1997). Herein lies the crux of centre-periphery power sharing problems, especially concerning centralised nations or national identifiable units. The stratification of cultural identity is a tool of political formalisation, which in the act of denying the other, may in fact consolidate one’s own power. It is here that elites must weigh the ability to openly court peripheries determined to resist full incorporation, with the necessity of creating a coherent cultural political structure:

Governments can modify communities, and they can make communities in rare and favourable situations; but on the whole it is the communities which make governments, or rather, it is the distribution of communities at any one time which both offers and limits opportunities for governments to consolidate or extend their power (Gellner 1994b: 52-53).

One of the problems I find with traditional theorists of nation-building such as Deutsch (1969) and Strayer (1963) is the acceptance that once “assimilation stays ahead of mobilisation or keeps abreast of it, the government is likely to remain stable, and eventually everybody will be integrated into one people” (Deutsch 1969: 27). This places too much emphasis on the ability of economic enfranchisement to appease issues of political, social and cultural disparity. National movements are vehicles for the attainment of specific collective goals that are mobilised in times
when the crisis in the state’s, the centre’s, ability to solve specific social issues on the periphery are accentuated. The example of the extensive centralist campaign at the assimilation of the Basque people into the greater Spanish whole, failed even though the three Basque provinces are the wealthiest in the Spanish economy (Greenwood 1977; Beer 1980: 60-71 & 75-86; Grugel 1990). Foltz (1981: 27), in critiquing Deutsch’s emphasis on the economic nature of the rise of social mobilisation amongst the periphery, noted that where numbers may increase mobilisation is in how a rise in overall community wealth may increase access to education and means to communication, that cannot be achieved in times of poverty.

Central to this is the development of social distinction which further consolidates power relations within a given system. Deutsch (1988: 77) notes that this distinctiveness is further emphasised when a given minority at the centre of the power structure tend to identify with the centralist state. It is in these structures of centre-building networks, that power becomes equated with national hegemony and the eventual exclusion of the ‘other’. Within the cleavages that form between parallel, yet ideological opposing, modes to modernisation there develops a rift between competing communities that is defined by the nature of the relationship between state and periphery (Conversi 1994; Weitzer 1995). The state once again may act as a barometer of the nature for institutionalisation of power relations along ethno-nationalist lines, and the level to which a community may mobilise to fight against perceived injustices.

Hobsbawm (1993: 151-152) feels the Palestinian national movement exemplifies this, noting that Palestinian nationalism was in fact created in response to the settlement of the ‘other’. A ‘mimicking’ of the ‘other’ which is the basis of my arguments throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation. If it were not for the coming of Zionism, and Zionist settlement, it is doubtful whether Palestinian national identity would have taken an overtly nationalist form outside the structures of pure Islam, as had occurred in other parts of the Arab world. Thus, it was the nature of oppression, and the nature of the ethnically polarised non-inclusive Israeli state, that ultimately shaped the essence of the Palestinian national movement and their subsequent modes of resistance. As it was the nature of Protestant Ulsterism, Francoist Spain and Serb unitarism that defined the shape and relevance of Catholic Republican, Basque radical and Croat peripheral nationalism.

It was the access of groups to states that activated, according to Tilly (1994b: 142), the formation, mobilisation and claim making
process of ethnic groups. The threats of assimilation and coercion were to further isolate minorities from the centre as elites who had previously held brokerage positions between liege and region were now being cut off from centralist decision making processes (Deutsch 1969b; Gellner 1977, 1983b; Polè se 1985). Accordingly, Yugoslavia had been able to survive for so long by offering spaces for ethnic mobility via the reinstitutionalisation of the centre through decentralisation. Yet, in most political systems this may go against the aims of consolidated elites at the centre of the structure of state. The Croats and Slovenes were only able to achieve independence by:

> giving preference in the administrations to those who could successfully claim to represent the presumably coherent populations within them. State and party relied heavily on ethnically-identified regional bosses who (in echoes of old imperial systems of rule) enjoyed considerable autonomy so long as they delivered goods and compliance to the centre (Tilly 1994b: 143).

What many political centres tended to ignore was that new loyalties grow on the periphery based on a codification of law, via the reinvention of peripheral culture, literature, and politics, in direct opposition to that proffered by the newly centralised elites (Brennan 1994: 45; see also Kellner 1992; Kiberd 1995). The problem with the idea of centre-periphery reciprocity within modern society, according to Gellner (1988: 206), was that those in control of the state expected the same level of loyalty from the periphery to the centre as had been attained under previous Imperial systems of the seventeenth and eighteenth century.

The state’s ability to deal with politically diverse claims lies in the fact that the state in itself is a product of modernisation, and can be seen as the political centre with the sole right to the legitimate monopolisation of violence, self-determination, and the right to define the nature of socio-political organisation. Naturally, any expression of self-will or self-determination from the periphery is immediately viewed as a questioning of the legitimacy of the state to exist in the first place. In most circumstances the right to policing and political-juridical organisation was forfeited to the centre during the Middle Ages (Gellner 1980: 238), and once the centres modernised and expanded they came into direct conflict with elites who saw no reason why the relations should be defined other than in social economic and political terms (Smith 1991: 60-61).
In mixed regions the ascendency to power by one specific ethnic
group over another tended to occur at the expense of one group
through the minimisation of political opportunity structures granted
by the state (Watts 1981: 9). The subsequent isolation and
alienation would tend to radicalise many a group to seek other
In this way nationalism can be viewed as a monist reaction by a
group seeking a solution by returning to an imagined past status to
be utilised as a base for future mobilisation and resistance (Gellner
1974b: 13; see also Purvis 1996). When a people see themselves
disenfranchised or excluded from the centre, more often than not
(especially if the perceived treatment is seen to be based on ethnic
lines) a consolidation of purpose that is diametrically opposed to
the centre is formed on the periphery. This fosters an environment
of elite competition. Yet, in most cases the periphery lacks the
legitimacy of a continuum of entrenched social cohesion afforded
the centre by the apparatus of state. In many cases the existing state
may in itself be viewed by the periphery as the enemy which allows
for the facilitation of power by another ethnic elite.

Giddens (1981: 190) saw that the reason nationalism was able to
adopt such a significantly symbolic role, was due as much to its
ability to offer an alternative to class ridden, social boundaries
created in the guise of the state. In such cases an ideal is what the
people choose to identify with, be it in a state or a cultural
structure. Yet, in order to legitimise an ideal, a consensus must be
formed. The nation is then seen, and here I concur with Brennan
(1994: 46-47), as an extension of what Foucault (1972: 5, 1988:
151-154) calls a ‘discursive formation’, which is aimed at
concentrating the efforts of the marginalised into creating an
alternate that challenges the predominant state system through
redrawing the lines of political participation. Even whilst forming
the concept of the national community, within the activities of the
movement or individual’s act of defiance. This creates a scenario
whereby each makes the other possible through at once providing a
bulwark, as in the state, or providing an alternative, as in the
movement. It is here in the constructed movement of a
marginalised community that the nation acts as a social agent of
change.

It is nationalism’s agency that acts as the guiding principle for the
desire to mobilise all disparate members and interests of a given
community into a centralised force, that is symmetrically opposed
to the existing state order (Hutchinson 1992: 104). An agency that
allows a movement to reclaim political space within a given state
system that is otherwise closed to political organisational
alternatives. Repression, hence, acts as a catalyst whereby the marginalised, ‘mimics’ the empowered, in order to create the possibility for the inclusion of its demands by likewise challenging the established political order of state. The national movement is but an ideological response to the state’s official ideology of integration. A strategic use of ideology to expand movement repertoire which shall be discussed in the following chapter.

From this perspective Tilly (1975a: 385-388) tends to see movements cast in the role of a response to state hegemonisation as significant in gauging the popularity and legitimacy of the centre’s control in the perpetual dynamic relationship between centre and periphery. National movements, hence, are ideological alternatives formulated in periods of state engendered crisis in order to establish or dismantle existing power relations. As such they are an extension of peripheral discontent, and their success lies in their ability to portray the necessity of their existence within an historic continuum defined in the reciprocal, yet parallel, development of competing ethnic and ideological movements of state. A path to state development that is steeped in a tradition of ethnic and social polarisation as being the key to the formation of the dynamic dialectic mobilisation between centre and periphery, and its subsequent role in creating the necessary environment for a spiralling out of competitive demands that are the raison d’être for a justification of state transition.

Conclusion.

Hobsbawm (1993: 167), hence, is correct in pointing to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia as an example whereby polarisation of competing elites were far from being the cause of the collapse of the Federation, but were rather utilised as a facilitator of popular discontent against the perceived exclusiveness of an ethnically defined centralist system. In such circumstances, the national movement acts not just as a defender of a community’s position within a clearly ethno-nationally designed political system, but also as social guarantee of continuance in the face of rapid sociological changes (ibid.: 173). Central to the success of decentralists are their demands for greater autonomy which tend to be heavily influenced by the nature of the state oppression in the first place (Thompson & Rudolph: 42).

If the precondition for enfranchisement is the belonging to the state engendered notion of nationhood, the logical step is to formulate a new national ideal within the movement that is proffered as a
political alternative (Brennan 1994: 58). When looking at the value of nationalism to peripheralised communities, the formalisation of a nationalist underpinned movement tends to grant a sense of autonomy of political choice that could not be gained through absorption into the centralist state. Yet this is still dependent upon political opportunity structures granted by the centre to the periphery. In Spain the two centralist parties never fully sought support for their policies in the Basque Country. This, in turn, left space for regionalist movements to open alliances with centralist parties granting an overall perception that the centre could accept autonomy of political organisation within certain limitations (Przeworski 1995: 24).

Nevertheless, the previous polarisation tends to bring great doubt amongst the two competing elites in the ability of the state in its contemporary form to satiate their demands. It is this doubt that will provide the initiative to reformulate centre-periphery relations, as well allow for the national movement to create space for itself within the cleavages that develop as a result of this emerging ideological conflict. In my opinion, the national movement grants the opportunity to proffer an ideological alternative to social organisation that may similarly effect individual and collective identity alike. At the core is the empowerment of the marginalised as a direct result of an intensification of the significance of the national movement in the day to day existence of the community.

The national movement, through the willingness to accept non-formalised participation, tends to increase the sense of the empowerment of the individual, which in turn, leads to a greater sense of collective democracy. One that nationalism as an ideological movement, is well positioned to exploit to the advantage of the disenfranchised community it represents. In expanding its repertoire to incorporate nationalism in challenging the state’s own ideology the social movement achieves a level of permanence within the overall cycle of protest, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, that is unattainable to single issue movements. Nationalism is hence a reactive doctrine, but without the state either as the raison d’être or target for collective mobilisation it loses its saliency. After all, nationalism is but another rational choice for a movement seeking greater permanency from political opportunity structures created by the perennial struggle between reforming centres and mobilising peripheries.

GO TO CHAPTER 5
CHAPTER FIVE:
The National Movement, Popularism, and the Ascendancy of Ethno-National Elites

Following on from the work of the past chapters, which traced the development of social movements from a transitory expression of social discontent to ideational movements of greater permanence, there is a need, I believe, to discern why nationalism as a doctrine of social change proves so attractive to certain movements in particular political environments, defined by the ascendancy of one community over another. Central to my premise is how nationalism, through national movements mobilisation, has become associated with concepts of communal sovereignty, peripheral representation and oppositional mobilisation. The key I believe lies in its ability to manifest as a responsive doctrine of social revolution that ‘mimics’ the intent of the state’s integration of cultural peripheries to the centre.

My intention in this chapter is not to show the necessity of nationalism as a precondition for social mobilisation. Rather, how, in specific culturo-political environments, nationalism is the sole doctrine that can achieve social reform that places the communal entity in a position that ensures their cultural specific path to political modernity. I believe that when a political system is reforming, the only way by which peripheries may utilise political opportunity structures offered them is through countering, or ‘mimicking’, the official state doctrine with a viable consensual alternative. Hence, nationalism will be shown here as an ideological response designed to usurp the processes of reform commenced by shifting centre elites.

What will be explored is how national movements have come to be seen as democratising agents within polarised systems, and how they enable marginalised elites to exploit repression as a means to anti-state mobilisation. This will be demonstrated by following the development of national movements, within the cycle of reform-protest-reform. The key to this anti-state mobilisation lies in how national movements have utilised political opportunity structures found within the struggle between reforming centre and mobilising peripheries to harness collective discontent as a tool of political mobilisation within repressive state structures. Hence, the expansion of the ideational movement to include nationalism will be seen as an expansion of protest repertoire within itself as it
creates a sense of historicity and place that more traditional social movements would struggle to attain.

It is thus necessary to explore the reasoning why nationalism, from a cultural, identity, and ideological base, became integral to the existence of regional movements seeking greater permanence within the state. By examining these movements in the forthcoming chapters, I intend to show the significance of the rise of national movements as eternal oppositional forces within specific European nation-states. In the examples of the Irish Republican, Basque and Croat national movements, nationalism can be defined as providing an ideational alternative to the official unitarist state doctrine, and as a movement, an opposing form of socio-political organisation. But first, the reason why it is seen as an effective doctrine of social revolutionary agency against the established state entity will be explored; as will its significance to peripheral movement mobilisation to rebellion within the overall cycle of protest.

**Nation as the Exemplification of Popular Sovereignty: The Role of Nationalism in Attaining Sovereignty for the Periphery in Mobilisation.**

The crux of the emergence of the notion of sovereignty being placed within the form of the nation has its roots in the French Revolution (Connor 1977: 25). The realisation that disenfranchised classes could place their personal destinies into a movement that was “dependent on the existence of the nation” as a vehicle of power consolidation and goal attainment, was to play a significant role in shaping oppositional movements towards modernity (Greenfeld 1993a: 184). The French Revolution had taught the masses of Europe the value of popular mobilisation, as well as, more importantly, that alien rule was abhorrent and only a regime consecrated by the attainment of ‘popular legitimacy’ could be considered just (Smith 1983: xxi-xxii).

This was a period whereby, in the manner of Herder (Berlin 1976; Barnard 1995), the doctrine of nationalism was to inherently link itself with the notion of civil and human rights in the minds of Europe’s disenfranchised peripheral communities, through expansionist policies of the post-Revolutionary Napoleonic elites (Smith 1992c: 60; Calleo 1995: 18). Prior to 1789, Europeans from the times of the Moorish invasion and colonisation of Iberia through to the conflicts with the Ottomans and the internal

It was from this dynamic process of power consolidation and peripheral integration that communal sovereignty was to continually align itself with the concept of physical space as a means of communal defence. Smith (1983: 13-14) felt that the *reconquista* was to signify this rise of defensive communal organisation as a means to independent continuous communal development. A commencement of the notion of rising against the oppressors, which would become embedded within the collective framework of the European psyche that was parallel to the notion of controlling space as a means of religious sovereignty. Yet it was not until the development of revolutionary movements did these notions leave the limitations of their elitist and religious socio-political organisation (Smith 1991: 96).

Tilly (1975b: 35) noted one of the main reasons for the rise of national movements over the past two hundred years has been the need to base political organisation within the framework of coherent socio-cultural groups, based on the incorporation of elites through progressive enfranchisement. It was in this era that the catch cry of self-determination became fully equated with citizenry participation (Tilly 1994b: 133). This imperialist period was to further the legacy, according to Said (1993: 193), of a cultural hierarchy that placed the centre at the top of the ratings of civilisation. In doing so the right to rule and the right of sovereignty began to indicate the stature of a given culture within the imperial hierarchy of established states. Thus implicitly suggesting that only through the attainment of a similar level of cultural organisation, through the attainment of the nation-state, can one guarantee the right of a new collective to participate within the given international order.

The Popularisation of Nationalism as a Doctrine of Mobilisation.

The development of the English (Greenfeld. 1993a), Dutch (Deutsch 1979: 266) and American Revolutions (Weilenmann 1963: 55), and the refinement of the concept of the nation as a means to political mobilisation against reactionary conservative forces, was to produce a school of thought that placed the nation at the centre of oppositional political mobilisation. Forged by the ideas of Bosanquet in the English speaking world (Calleo 1995: 20)
the nature of state centralism was to allow for the spread of the
document throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century as not just
the guarantor of legitimacy but also as a doctrine of liberation to be
utilised by fledgling movements on the ethnic peripheries of
Europe (Schöpflin 1995: 38). A point of reference further enhanced
by the linking of ethnic sovereignty to the attainment of statehood
in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points on the redrawing of the
European state systems at Versailles, towards the end of World
War One (Radan 1996: 1).

This is tied to the works of Hegel (1975) and the idea of the
‘dialectic of the spirit of peoples’, espousing that the highest form
of collectivity manifests itself in the formation of statehoods;
placing the path to heightened political formation for minorities
within the attainment of the nation-state. The ratification of the
right of all peoples to the “principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples” in the United Nations Charter Article
1 (2) and 55 was to further solidify this, equating sovereignty with
the control of the nation-state within the international order (ibid.: 2).
When the conditions of participation within the international
order are added to the nature of state centralism there emerges a
counter trend from the periphery to ‘mimic’, by example, the elitist
state paradigm in order to secure their own continuity. The state
hence becomes equated with power attainment and consolidation,
whilst the nation grants the periphery within the historic continuum
of state development; a cultural permanency that the average social
movement lacks. Thus, the nation becomes the focal point of power
attainment and culturo-political enfranchisement.

In reality, these movements were looking primarily for
access to power within the confines of the existing
state frameworks. Accordingly, they tended to limit
their demands to local, cultural, or regional issues,
which could be solved through devolution or better
provisions for minority languages (Schöpflin 1995:
46).

The base of the popularity as a doctrine of movement mobilisation
lay in its very populist makeup as well as its ability to enfranchise
the previously marginalised. Greenfeld and Chirot (1994: 80) noted
that originally the nation symbolised inclusion within an elite for
marginalised communities which would allow for the reinvention
of peoples in direct opposition to the repressive centralist structures
that had previously threatened their autonomous existence.
Nationalism as a means to collective sovereignty, according to
James Anderson (1988: 25), ‘can therefore be seen to offer
‘something for everyone,’ enabling it to draw support from very
different sections or classes in the nation.” In my opinion, this popularisation of the nation enabled the nation to become a focal point of oppositional movements for the politicisation of disparate communities. The placing of sovereignty of the people at the foot of the nation would lead movements such as the IRA and ETA to view the attainment of national sovereignty as the means to democratisation for ethnic classes, previously denied access by centralist elites to political opportunity structures of state.

The popularity of the nation as a means to oppositional mobilisation lies inside its fabricated defining structures that facilitate a counter movement of great societal flexibility and permeability. According to Benedict Anderson (1993: 7) it is the very culturally elastic, as well as geographically finite, structures that contain its specified identity that has enabled nationalism to arise in the shadows of the autocratic state. It is here, in its oppositional status, that nationalism has become associated with pluralism through its resistance to state centralism, and the enfranchisement of the marginalised into the established order (ibid.). A position that allows the periphery to develop an alternative socio-political structure that is equally flexible as the state it is ‘mimicking’.

Nations are not static, but rather dynamic entities created in response to state fostered ideals of national social organisation through continuous processes of mobilisation, politicisation, territorialism and autarchy of human society (Dofny 1980; Foltz 1981; Anderson 1988). Hence, as keepers of sovereignty they mutate according to the needs of their constituent population, and levels of mobilised discontent, within the political environment created by the state in transition. At all stages they are responsive to the level of centralisation emanating from the core elites of state, and hence are a reactionary ideological movement that emerges within the cleavages engendered from the processes of state consolidation and periphery counter mobilisation.

Essentially, in a political environment dictated by the supremacy of established nation-states in a post-colonial world, the only political entity that could guarantee unhindered continuous cultural development was that of the state (Kecmanovic 1996: 8). The concept of the nation-state proved popular because it would, through its very definition, place the cultural nation at the core of the state’s existence, providing a bulwark to further encroachment by ever expanding core centres. This is what Kecmanovic (1996: 9) calls the ‘bastion mentality’, creating a polity built around the attempts to ensure individual civil rights of the community, as well as inner demands of ethnic solidarity. What has kept this political
entity solvent has been the ability of people to identify their own aspirations with that of the group (Levi & Hechter 1985: 134). A synthesis of varying demands into one alternate social movement that achieves the stability considered necessary to formulate a collective polity provides a continuous cyclical mobilisation against the shaping and reshaping state centre.

The Convergence of the Notions of National Sovereignty and Democracy as Ideational Factors in National Movement Mobilisation.

It is this ability to portray popular mobilisation as a means of influencing elite policy formation, by directly challenging the legitimacy of the centre to rule over the periphery, which has led certain communities to see nationalism as a true exemplar of popular democracy (Horowitz 1994; Nodia 1994; Shlomo 1994). Add to this the fact that all basic needs, from political, economic and educational to medical and sanitational, are now brokered by political institutions within the structures of the contemporary nation-state set apart from, and in some cases above, traditional communal life (Jenson 1995). As Deutsch (ibid.: 171-172) states:

only the nation-states can administer the broadening scope of politics and public services. Only the nation-states- at best- have the governmental responsiveness to the needs and wishes of the governed that people now demand. Only the nation-states can get the broad popular support that governments need to endure in our time.

As Deutsch (1969b: 24) notes one finds that nearly every social interaction may have a political outcome dictated by the ability of the nation-state to alleviate these and other societal pressures. An environment is hence fostered whereby national interdependence becomes a safety valve for continued social and political cohesion. A scenario that forces many a movement to consolidate their gains in similar organisational structures to the state they oppose. In many ways national movements realise that the only way to prevent the centre from retracting their hard fought for previous victories is by consolidating their gains within a structure that negates the role of the centre in future decision making processes by in turn excluding the centre from further means of participation on the periphery (Bugajski 1994, 1995).

This interestingly points to the “neutrality” of the state, as well as its
central importance as the target for oppositional movements, due in part to its openness to mobility and the innate competition it fosters amongst competing elites (Markovits & Oliver 1981: 174). The state in such a paradigm may play the role of target, or creator of political opposition, depending on the way it is utilised by the elite at the centre. Most nationalisms are political, and are hence centred around placing sovereignty in the hands of the people, rather than concentrating on cultural retrogradism (Kamenka 1975a; Gellner 1980; Jenson 1995). This placing the role of activism within the ‘people’, according to Greenfeld and Chirot (1994: 78), allows the movement to be the target of the primary loyalty and founding base of collective solidarity.

The nation of an individual was the community within whose bounds he could realise his liberty and the right of participation, the community whose interests were fully one’s own interests since one could influence them, and in which one had true membership. The inability to fulfil one’s rights of citizenship within a particular geo-political sphere justified exit (Greenfeld.1993: 420).

This is especially the case in Northern Ireland with the reinvention of contemporary Irish nationalism since 1968 from a movement seeking electoral enfranchisement to one of national liberation, and eventually communal consolidation (Maguire 1996a). It is difficult for a minority group to bypass the jurisdiction of the existing state whilst the national movement seeks change via the utilising of political opportunity structures granted by the state (Johnston et al. 1988a: 2). In Northern Ireland since 1968 nationalism has been able to bridge this gap by at once providing an ideology of resistance and one of unity. At the core of this convergence of sovereignty and participatory democracy is the notion of the people being an organic extension of communal sovereignty (Smith 1992b: 61).

The state in such circumstances plays a dual role of target and fulcrum of protest, whilst the national movement embodies the democracy of the alternate counter organisation (Rosenthal & Schwartz 1990). It is within this movement alternative that nationalisms voluntaristic nature emerges as a means to populist mobilisation. To maintain popular legitimacy the nation must act as facilitator to social mobilisation and political change in times of state reform, as it is as an active agent that the nation provides an effective challenge to the state unwilling to absorb certain groups.

A state, though, need not necessarily be founded on national principles, but it also does not necessarily preclude the classic
nation-state from remaining a significant goal of the national movement. In fact, being the predominant presence in the international system, Nodia (1994: 3-4) notes that the Western experience of nationalism throughout the 20th century has highlighted the parallel development of democratic structures and the consolidation of national state centres. Yet, the perpetuation of a struggle defined in nationalist rhetoric also risks solidifying the state’s own identity creating a reciprocal national movement mobilisation at the centre of the state. This can, through the control of policing structures, lead to a radicalisation of the state’s own identity and criminilisation of the periphery’s mobilised activism (Hanle 1989: 208). This subsequently has led to peripheral national movement mobilisation to becoming viewed as reactionary, populist and anti-democratic threats to the consensus democracies found within the established European nation-states of modernity (Przeworski 1985 & Przeworski et al. 1986).

I believe it is the Western perception of nationalism as emotional, or reactionary, that has led nationalism to be viewed as irrational, and hence undemocratic. Popular sovereignty is as universal a subject as is the concept of justice or right, leaving it open to many interpretations. Nodia (1994: 6) points out it would be wrong to presuppose that liberalism should be the sole precursor for democracy to occur. What if the ‘people’ should choose an alternate form of democratic political organisation that they may feel is more fluid and responsive to the needs of the masses? In fact, the act of union or secession are the manifestations of the will of people to create their own physical polity, as the precursor state had failed to eliminate fears of demagogy from the minds of newly politicised peripheral communities (Connor 1994a: 96-97). What has made political movements so potent, especially nationalist movements, has been their ability to feed off the instincts of the masses (Mosse 1975: 39).

Doctrinally the attraction of nationalism to movements, as opposed to theoretical Marxism or capitalist inspired state centralism, is that it does not furnish a complete theory of social or political change, due to its ability to grant a greater flexibility to those who see the advantage in holding to it as an effective doctrine of social change (Bugajski 1994: 102-105; Ferrero 1995; Gellner 1995: 1-19; Ramet 1995: 112). This subsequently, allows for the incorporation of a broader protest repertoire that can successfully ‘mimic’ the state according to the centres own shifts in strategy. Its literature and polemic is riddled with notions of: ‘Identity, purity, regeneration, the ‘enemy’, historical roots, self-emancipation, building the ‘new man’ and the ‘community’, collective sovereignty and
participation” (Smith 1983: 23). In essence it is symbolically inclusive, from the view of the marginalised community seeking parity, but not necessarily for those classified as the ‘enemy’. It is the fusion of the three ideals of self-determination, mass expression and distinctiveness which gives it a wider scope of appeal than more theoretical and scientific doctrines (ibid.).

Thus, for movements holding a nationalist doctrine they can, not only challenge the state’s legitimacy, but also attempt to rectify the failure of policy development by promising to recreate the polity in order to include disassociated minorities in future political development. The key notion here is that of sovereignty as opposed to any politicisation of ethnos that places the movement within an historical paradigm that could grant it legitimacy. Giddens (1981: 192) thought that the fusing of notions of nationhood and democracy emerged from the bourgeois stress of placing popular sovereignty within the people during the period that saw the rise of European liberalism. For many members of minority communities, this is a true example of the implementation of their democratic right to enfranchisement in action; or what Rosenthal and Schwartz (1990) believe to be an example of democracy within the social movement, and pluralism within the expression of discontent through action.

The traditional means of defining national movements solely in terms of protecting claims to linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences do not hold (Deutsch 1962; Connor 1994d: 70; Gellner 1994b: 38-46). What has developed is an ideological reciprocity between the movement and the state. This is because of how the processes of democratisation became synonymous with the ideals of national self-determination (Przeworski & Laitin 1995: 12). Whilst the national ideal places the movement in a continuous historical paradigm (Greenwood 1977; Horowitz 1985; Druckman 1994; Ramet 1994), the movement grants the organisational impetus for the ethnos that is seeking enfranchisement and political acceptance through providing alternative, yet interdependent, options of socio-political organisation (Gellner 1994d: 81-84; Popovic 1994). Smith (1987: 168) felt that the ethnic group grants inclusion no matter what class one belongs to, and in doing so grants a quasi-recognition of the extension of the bonds of citizenship that the marginalised individual has been seeking from the centre. It is here that national aspirations of minority groups become linked to more democratic aspirations such as collective enfranchisement (Anderson,1988: 22).

Nationalism is a mass phenomenon that is totally irrelevant, until it takes on mass proportions. This is why so many national
movements tend to see the necessity of transcending their classic social movement form for a party political organisation (Bugajski 1994: 105-115; see Ramet 1995; Aughey 1996). An expansion of repertoire, and hence agency, which is all encompassing. Central to this need for permanent agency and democratic fluidity is the realisation that any attempt at attaining consistent mobilisation once the set national goals have been achieved is limited by the populist nature of the original response (Marcet 1987; Arthur 1996).

This is where movements cannot consolidate themselves unless they transform themselves into constituent states because the legitimacy they achieve through the mobilisation of popular will is at a level that should not be continued without incorporating other interests that may fall outside the realm of nationalism; such as housing, employment, welfare distribution, or small business expansion. Thus, at once expanding the relevance of the national movement’s agency to the continued social and economic development of the community, whilst increasing the dependence of the community upon the national movement as their representative within state structures.

**National Mobilisation as an Agent of Social-Political Change During Periods of State Transition.**

The role of the nation as a means to social agency lies in the latent political awareness of a shared history, grievance, and clandestine mode of communication, and its subsequent ability to mobilise a given ethnic core into a viable oppositional political entity. Tilly (1994b: 134) himself recognised that the continued denial of public grievance leads to revolutionary activity and the spread of ‘universalistic’ movements of ‘national liberation’. This form of mobilisation depends heavily on the ability, according to Smith (1991: 64-65), of the national mobilisation to mobilise against the state. Hence, the state once again plays an integral role as provider of the environment that allows for separate, yet parallel, development between centre and periphery. This is what Connor (1994g: 31) has called the emergence of the interrelationship between state nationalism and peripheral social mobilisation. The importance of nationalism’s agency is found within its ability to forge a viable political will amongst a dispossessed community that can create the necessary political constituency to enforce social mobility denied those previously disenfranchised (Greenfeld 1993: 48-50).
The mobilisation of state-claiming ethnic identities is less the product of the intensification of nationalistic sentiments than of the development of external conditions that allow preexisting sentiments to be acted upon. These conditions include the breakdown of traditional patterns of authority, a shift in the military balance, or other developments that empower an ethnic group that previously felt incapable of challenging the status quo (Kupchan 1995a: 9).

By appealing to mass consciousness and historic memory, such leaders tend to mythicise politics in order to avoid the harsh realities of contemporary social disorder caused by economic mismanagement (Kimmel 1989). The problems of oppositional mobilisation were exemplified in Eastern Europe where civic and social movements in the post 1989 environment utilised nationalism in the same manner as nineteenth century national movements did (Stokes 1993; Ramet 1995). That is as an “agent of liberation” from communist dictatorship in a way that nineteenth century national movements liberated themselves from ethnically based hegemonic monarchist elites (Fukuyama 1994: 23). The fact that many of these movements lay dormant for some seventy years is not important, as Sharp (1994: 17) points out, any political movement is dependent upon the political environment that is dictated from the state centre.

From the period of Mazzini (Smith 1992b: 61), nationalism has been able to cast itself as an historicist response to contemporary social problems akin to Breuilly’s (1982) idea of it being a formalisation of a ‘cultural mode of opposition’. Yet, its status as a vector that assisted in political and social liberation stems from the role it played in the decolonisation processes after Versailles and World War Two in ousting foreign rule, and repossessing centralist power away from colonial/settler elites distributing it to an autochthonous elite (Hobsbawm 1993: 169; Dunn & Fraser 1996). Eventually, this would lead to the consolidation and recognition of such rule within the international state’s system order.

The formation of such movements are a manifestation of a method of protest that gives the movement greater scope of options in choosing whether to aim at reforming the state, or, becoming the point of societal restructuring in the form of separatist mobilisation. This was the advantage of nationalism as a social agent as it placed the people’s will at the heart of referencing the movement which made it at once pragmatic and volatile (Smith 1991: 12). A position that Breuilly (1982: 295) noted, may be used by a sophisticated
elite as an instrumental doctrine to be utilised as an implied threat, since it always carries the possibility of alternate political organisation outside the structures of state from which it emerged. In this sense the concept of the nation takes on a more direct role as a vector of social change that frames itself within a larger picture, than one that traditionally deals solely with the limited aspirations of cultural and ethnic relativism (Kecmanovic 1996: 6-7). For Tilly (1994b: 134) it was in its ability to create potentially revolutionary scenarios out of political opportunity structures, made available in shifting elite relations within states in transition, where its agency was most potent. These were exemplified in three key elements:

1. the appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders advancing exclusive competing claims to control of the state, or some segment of it;

2. commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the citizenry;

3. incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the alternative coalition and/ or commitments to its claims (Tilly 1994b: 134).

As one can see, if one takes the dynamic relation between national movement and state polarisation, and eventual enfranchisement, as essential to the ability of the national movement to act as a social vector of change, then one can see how its power lies in its portrayal of itself as having the ability to transfer power from a demagogic elite to the people. This is because of its polyvalent nature, which allows the nation to satisfy the urge for conquest, defence, and social identity whilst focusing the thrust of a movement towards the attainment of civic justice at a collective level (Kecmanovic 1996: 97). The national movement hence serves as an all purpose forging of political unity based on traditional sociological means of community control in times of societal shift (Deutsch 1979: 308-309).

National Movement Mobilisation as a Means of Ascendancy for Political Marginalised Ethno-National Peripheries.

In this way a movement can foster not just upward mobility and the consolidation of the newly acquired status but also create the conditions that impinges the values of the movement upon the society it is purporting to represent. This, consequently, increases the community’s dependence upon the success of the movement.
Talking of the Henrician aristocracy, that could be seen as major source of contemporary English nationalism, Greenfeld (1993b: 49) noted that they were nothing more than:

Upwardly mobile commoners who reached the top of the social ladder, they found unacceptable the traditional image of society in which social mobility was an anomaly, and substituted a new image for it, that of a nation as it came to be understood in modern times.

The national movement, unlike the ethnic group in pre-mobilised form or fixed capitalist based centralist state structures, offers a mobile class structure, increased communication between elite and the people, whilst placing the people within a given historical context (Gellner 1983b: 33-34). As such, it is more than a mere agent of change aimed at replacing one elite with another, but it also acts as a responsive ideological core that allows for a supposedly porous relationship between the vanguard and the populace it represents (Horowitz 1985; Kimmel 1989; Wilson 1991). This is taking the notion of Ur-nazion of the works of Fichte, Herder, Novalis and Schleiermacher and combining them with idea of classic social agitators and protest interest group agency found in post-industrial times (Tilly 1975b: 10-12). The nation, and hence the national movement, could be viewed from this perspective as a “multi-dimensional project” designed for a radical review of the entire political system which the minority feels has failed them (Szporluk 1988: 159). In this way the national movement is viewed as an agent of opposition that is determined to redraw the entire nature of political, class and ethnic relations within a given state entity. Nationalist movements by definition have their own solution for the crises of identity and legitimacy: They propose to establish a new state that corresponds to the nation for which they claim to speak. But their agenda is much broader; they have preferences about how their state should be governed (participation, penetration) and they usually take a stand on major economic and social questions (distribution) (Szporluk 1988: 158).

The roots, for example, of the Croatian national movement and its successful equating of social restructuring with national independence can be ascribed to an expansion of such mobilisation to incorporate class driven reasons (Radic 1936: 83-88; Krizman 1989: 13-25; Macan 1992:317). Hence, social autonomy became equated with with national self-determination. It was, moreover, Benedict Anderson (1996: 3-4) that noted if it was not for the placing of the national question at the centre of Otto Bauer’s (1996: 39-77) notions of socialism as the facilitator of oppressed people
within Habsburg Austro-Hungary to political revolution, in his proposal for a federated Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Österreich (Unified States of Great Austria) in his Die Nationalitä tenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (The National Question and Social Democracy) one would doubt the validity of continually equating civil rights with national-class empowerment. This is further exemplification, I believe, of how the state in creating classes on ethnic bases leaves little option but for those disenfranchised to view the national movement as the sole agent of socio-political mobility.

It is interesting to see how Anderson (1996) links the revolutionary social doctrine of socialism, come East European state communism, with that of the national movement. When I mention national movement I mean the striving and eventual attainment of the national state. It is in this construct that the nation as an imagined community seems more reliable as a form of social agency due to its ability to posture itself as a continuance of pre-existing ethnic based social orders, and as such a traditional based counter movement to that of the state. This brings us naturally to the question of the validity of ethnic mobilisation over civic mobilisation as a less transient and more fluid, in terms of scope, forms of political organisation?


The greatest divisions within the literature have emerged between those that take the civic (Deutsch 1962, 1963a, 1969; Kamenka 1975a; Seton-Watson 1977; Merritt & Russett 1981), and those that develop the ethnic path to national mobilisation (Hechter Friedman & Appelbaum 1982; Horowitz 1985; Smith 1987). Much of the difference that lies between civic and ethnic bases to nationalist mobilisation is in the former being viewed as voluntaristic, and the latter as inherent (Greenfeld 1993a: 11). Essentially, what was emerging was the need for a more continuous form of movement opposition that, though shaped by state response, would not necessarily become heavily reliant on the state at the level of mobilisation, except as the raison d’être. Ethnicity may be viewed as a type of cultural segmentation that was able to intersect other classes and territorial divides (Thompson & Rudolph 1986: 32). In fact the re-emergence of ethnic definitions of nationalism lay in it being a “destabilising, potentially revolutionary force that
threatened to disintegrate state or at least to disrupt their smooth functioning” (Ronen 1986: 4). The dynamic nature of ethnic social interaction has led correspondingly to ethnicity being more prone to movement mobilisation. This is due to the increased fluidity of communication between varying classes in a political organisation system based on kinship (Smith 1991: 12).

The transferring of allegiance to more peripheral modes of social organisation also allows for the replacing of older forms of political organisation that predate the state into positions of organisational significance. For identity to be perceived as organic, it must somehow be linked to social units that, one way or another, predate the formation of the state they are opposing. Such a linking of identity and social organisation is enhanced by the historicity of a specific cycle of protest, and state-centre periphery development, that grants the national movement a permanent position in direct opposition to the state’s own ideological solution (van den Berghe 1978: 401-409; Giner 1984). Connor (1994e: 212) in fact shows that:

Common Britishness, Belgianess, or Yugoslavness does not involve the ultimate sense of blood affiliation; the sense of having evolved from common ancestors does not extend beyond the Welsh, Fleming, or Croatian nation. In such a circumstance ethnic alignments persist due to ethnic divisions being “maintained by the efforts of their members as part of a pattern of social interaction” enabling them to bargain with the majority at the centre (Banton. 1986: 11).

Ethnicity grants this sense of permanency that most social movements seek. Yet, once linked to the nationalist doctrine it provides, as well, an organisational base for future peripheral elites to exploit. For the classic oppositional movement geared at reacting to the state’s rhythm, the advantages of ethno-national mobilisation over more civic means are that the individual may obtain maximum net advantage through the utilisation of physical and cultural differences in a process of inclusion and exclusion. That in turn, solidifies the group on the periphery into a cohesive political unit ready to organise outside the realms of state control. Once these societal cleavages are set, and the fixed shape of the community becomes solidified, the community based movement becomes less readily shaken. It is a development that hinges greatly upon the relationship between the state and the communities it is attempting to control. In such circumstances the national movement is but a reaction to a political order defined on ethnic predominance (Connor 1977: 22).
In divided societies, the sense of an ethnic group as a community and its competition with others to constitute the whole community create a strong impetus toward party organisation along ethnic lines (Horowitz 1994: 49).

It must not be forgotten that all nations bear the imprint of ethnic and territorial aspects of national formation (Smith 1991: 37-42; Gellner 1995: 29). This in itself defines the relationship between centre and periphery because more often than not it is this battle for common rights and inclusive citizenry that leads many national movements to undertake a politic that is wider than the usual definition given to national movements (Hechter & Appelbaum 1982; Hechter 1985). Hence, social and cultural matters are considered as equally important as the fulfilment of nationalist and irredentist rhetoric (Smith 1987: 149). Yet, there remains an understanding that national rights could never be satisfied without corresponding guarantees for civil rights. It is here that Deutsch (1969a: 101) believes that national movements correspond with other movements; be it in the organisational set up and employment of popular symbols of collective identity, or, the utilisation of popular legitimacy within legislative frameworks.

The two are not mutually exclusive, and for most national movements this is recognised within their rhetoric (Bhabha 1994a; During 1994). It is after all, as Smith (1987: 165) recognises, the question of common legal citizenship that is the main reason behind the rise in political awareness on the periphery. For as Gellner (1983b: 1) acknowledges, nationalism is but a principle that takes the form of national sentiment when this principle of social organisation has been seemingly violated; it becomes a movement once this has been acted upon. This violation is subsequently determined in terms of the ability of the state to create the necessary environment in which to resolve such crises of legitimacy whilst placating the demands of the periphery (Rokkan 1983; Arrighi 1985). If this is formulated along ethnic lines then the movement has little choice but to proffer their own ‘ethnic solution’ (Wilson & Tyrrell 1996). In this way the state plays a major role in defining the preconditions for the remobilisation of supposedly ‘atavistic’ ethno-nationalist sentiment:

The mobilisation of state-claiming ethnic identities is less the product of the intensification of nationalistic sentiments than the development of external conditions that allow preexisting sentiments to be acted upon (Kupchan 1995a: 9).

As such ethnos enables these elites to formulate a body polity that
may ensure the continuation of the cultural development of one
group in the face of the territorial aspirations of another (Conversi
1994). It is what Connor (1994: 44) calls an “ethnopsychological
phenomena” that leaves a space within the collective psyche that
creates a bordered security in the face of rapid social change.

Concepts of suppression, liberation and ascendancy remain terms
that are ensconced in civic notions gained from previous battles
with state centralist elites. The prevalent philosophical thought,
according to Smith (1991: 9), is that of the ‘Western Civil Model’,
which is perpetuated through the legitimation of the territorial
administrative centres, that dictates the nature of the national ideal.
The field is hence defined in terms of the legal-political and
civic-legal (Carty 1996). In such circumstances full
enfranchisement can never be truly granted unless these issues of
civil rights are achieved. The embrace by Sinn Féin of
feminist, sexual, and gender issues highlights the need for many
national movements to embrace a wider scope of social issues
traditionally founded within civil rights movements in order to
become truly representative of their community.4

Schöpflin (1995: 55) points out that the community defined on
ethnos has outlived feudalism, imperialism, post-imperialism and
communism to create a sense of societal order built on lines similar
to clanal structure in times of extreme societal stress. This occurs
when institutions of political mediation fail and people have to rely
on less stable, yet more fluid, lines of negotiation and
communication (Smith 1991: 24), that are espoused through the
client patron relationship so common in clanal based societies
(Gellner 1977). These networks can guarantee direct access to
leaders that established civic political democracies may not. As
Schöpflin (1995: 61) states:

The feebleness of the civic sphere means, at the same
time, that reference to nationhood can be used to
legitimate propositions or to delegitimate opponents-
indeed, in this connection they become “enemies,”
“traitors to the nation,” rather than political opponents
who share the same basic commitment to the state as
citizens.

In the end, the reinvention of such ethno-filial ties is but a latter day
response to similar mobilisations that occurred at the centre
centuries before. The difference was that the state’s own
consolidation was derivative of an internal recognition for the need
of a restructuring of government. The contemporary emergence of
nationalist discontent are the parallel response of such state
Conclusion

The adoption of ethno-nationalist means to mobilisation lay in the rational desire to find a continuum within the established order that could survive at the demise of the state that was seen as the target (Smith 1991: 28-34, 1992a). This seemingly is in contrast with the notion of ethnicity being a replacement ideology developed within cleavages that had emerged as a by-product of industrialisation (Deutsch 1963a). Ethno-nationalist mobilisation is a response, not one developed in spite of the processes of modernisation but rather in reaction to forms of bureaucratic centralism which have not been inclusive enough (Esman 1977: 12; Connor 1994c: 145-147). It is interesting to note that even in 1883 Ernest Renan recognised in his seminal work What is a Nation? that exclusivity breeds the desire for the marginalised to withdraw. The danger though would be viewing the adoption of the nation as the focal point for movement mobilisation as being the desire to create a civil religion to replace the beliefs displaced by the processes of modernisation.

Renan’s theories of entwining nationalism with religion, be it in a civic form, was to influence Deutsch (1962, 1963a), Gellner (1974b, 1983b, 1986) and Hechter (1993a) in formulating concepts of national development that were to concentrate upon the link between shifting societal values and the development of the Industrial Revolution and the Imperialist State. Yet few have, with the exception of Greenfeld (1993a), Smith (1987) and Banton (1986), concentrated on the movement based on state influenced anti-elitist ideological nature of ethno-nationalist mobilisation. The nation as a response to the established nation-state identity based around state centralism has held little weight within the literature that concentrates on the ‘Great Nation State’ (Kupchan 1995: 4-5). This could allow for a theoretical discussion on how the current emergence of ethno/religious nationalism, especially in Northern Ireland, challenges the notion of the attainment of full participation for minorities within the current conglomerate international nation-state system. Civil religion, in fact, has served only to further enhance the status of the lieties and further peripheralise minorities by entrenching them within class divisions defined along the lines of the ‘other’.

Civic unity on its own was deemed ineffective as a guaranteed loyalty for states undergoing massive socio-economic change (O’Brien 1968, 1969). In Britain this was symbolised in the
religious interdependence of the developing Protestant Royal elite of the sixteenth century (Greenfeld 1993a: 49-51). Yet contemporary examples points to ethnos, in the nineteenth century Mazzinian sense, as becoming a major frame for socio-political organisation (Schöpflin 1995: 41). Greece 1829; the abortive revolutions of 1848 in Germany, Hungary and Italy; Rumania and Serbia 1878; Norway 1905; Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Yugoslavia in 1918, are examples of this legitimisation of the ethno-nationalist form of resolving ethnic based socio-political cleavages (Connor 1977: 26). Correspondingly, these new identities emerge when pre-existing state structures fail to offer sufficient political opportunity structures to incorporate these fledgling peripheral identities (Greenfeld & Chirot 1994: 84).

On an organisational basis the ability of the national, or sub-national group, to provide a level of distinctiveness, autonomy and alternate political mobilisation has allowed for the ethno-nationalist path to provide a site for organisation and protest to occur (Kupchan 1995: 5-6). Yet, if one was to look at the development of national movement organisation since the 1960s, within the European perspective, there seems to be more correlation between the development of initial civic inspired social mobilisation and the rise of ethno-national questions than previously thought (Connor 1977; Nairn 1993; Hroch 1996b). The aspect of clearly demarcated boundaries between nationalist and civic questions is waning, and studies by Tilly (1975b, 1975c, 1994b) and Tarrow (1996) suggests that perhaps they were never there.

When one looks at the development of the Nationalist Republican movement in Northern Ireland from 1963 (Kiberd 1996: 573-579), the Basque movement in Spain from 1959 (Conversi 1997), and Croatian decentralists from 1971 onwards (Denitch 1994), one can see a pattern emerging of initial social disparity being transferred into political disenchantment and eventual mobilisation against the centre. At the core is a realisation that at some point there occurs an entwining of civic and national causes that seem to the participants, indivisible. Whether or not the nationalist doctrine becomes a new civil religion is insignificant to the greater question which should be asked, ie, why is the national doctrine viewed as the cure all for problems of mobilisation, goal attainment and consolidation by marginalised communities?
CHAPTER SIX:
Reasons for National Movement Mobilisation

The 1960s was to be a watershed decade for the re-emergence of ethnicity as a means to oppositional movement mobilisation throughout Europe. States that had become associated with external elites implementing foreign value systems and doctrines in Britain, Spain and Yugoslavia, due to the predominance of a certain ethnic group at the centre and the clearly demarcated geographical regions on the periphery, were now facing movements that were clearly utilising cultural symbols as means of expressing their discontent with, and opposition to, what the state stood for (Boal & Douglas 1982; Curtin et al. 1984; Chaffer 1988; Watson 1996). The creation of new narratives to suit the times, and the subsequent joining of them with narratives of past mobilisations was to place collective memory and shared cultural experience at the centre of much of the political focus (Smith 1983: x). Culture was to become a reference point in response to increased centralisation and act as a means of communication directed at the centre (Deutsch 1963b). The manifestation of a socio-cultural alternative to state defined cultural norms would be seen by Irish, Basque and Croat nationalists as a form of symbolic resistance to the perceived cultural hegemonisation of state.

Greenfeld (1993a: 18) felt that the development of national identity was contingent on cultural specific reasons of pre-modern political development. A point that Markovits and Oliver (1981: 168-169) believe is due to the importance of culture as a tool of political mobilisation outside the paradigm of state repression of the periphery. Culture here plays mainly a motivational role by formulating a focal point for movement activity. The relation between cultural development of a people and formalisation of the nationalist paradigm is dynamic in that both are responsive to pressures placed upon them by the state, and hence change their strategies accordingly.

It is within this fluid relationship that the national movement as a narrative, that of a cultural self-manifestation of a community’s history, comes to the fore (Bhabha 1994a, During 1994). The telling and the retelling of a community’s place within the order of societal development becomes a self-generative process that can act as a catalyst to political mobilisation. The nation here acts as a sign of discontent that emerges in times of crisis only to submerge until needed again (Tilly 1993b, 1994b). In this way Bhabha (1994b: 1) feels that much of the literature, except perhaps for Anderson (1993), has ignored the “cultural temporality” of the nation as a movement that utilises cultural circumstances and differences as a means to coherent political mobilisation.

It is in the context, of acting as a cultural manifestation of peripheral discontent against overtly centralist policies, that cultural movements have become equated with the liberation of the people they represent (During 1994: 139). For many minority groups absorbed within large nation-states the borders of political subjugation were not necessarily defined along geo-political lines. They were rather cultural markers that symbolised enfranchisement into the predominant ethnic culture of the centralist elite (Calleo 1995: 19). Culture was thus to take a significant role as both a line of demarcation in terms of class access into the power structures of state, and as a focal point for the raison d’être for a group’s exclusion and subsequent peripheralisation; what Smith (1987: 3) calls a “mobilisation of sentiment.” Communities semi-permanently denied access due to their unwillingness to change began to see their cultural distinctiveness not as a bane to further socio-political development, but as a reason for the development of autonomous structures outside the direct control of the state.

The lessons learnt by disenfranchised ethnic groups through periods of centralisation and industrialisation were geared around the recognition that to survive the processes of modernisation these peripheralised communities must adapt to the conditions that surrounded them (Smith 1991: 70). They were able to realise that for the community to survive modernity, the formation of a coherent political unity based on communal solidarity of purpose and necessity would have to be forged from cultural networks that pervaded society. A homogeneity of purpose then becomes important for a movement seeking restructuring of the state as higher levels of cooperation, communicatively speaking, is needed internally to ensure a heightened state of mobilisation (Gellner 1986: 15; Anderson 1988: 21).

So at the very same time that men become fully and nervously aware of their culture and its crucial relevance for their vital
interests, they also lose much of the capacity to revere their society through the mystical symbolism of a religion. So there is both a push and pull towards revering a shared culture directly, unmediated in its own terms: culture is now clearly visible, and access to it has become man’s most precious asset (Gellner 1983a: 176).

The cultural manifestation of the oppositional national alternative is communicative in essence. Designed to allow for the growth of cultural awareness, through placing great significance on the rites of passage embodied in the cultural iconicism of the ritualisation of protest, belief and value systems, so as to achieve more coherency within the movement, it becomes an effective tool of oppositional protest (Kecmanovic 1996: 3). The very fact that culturally distinctive organic entities, like language, exist only serve to heighten the legitimacy of these movements as true representatives of the cultural, social, and political needs of these marginalised communities (Deutsch 1979: 33-37). More importantly, in terms of movement repertoire, cultural distinctiveness produces a sense of exclusiveness which can instigate pride within the marginalised community (Greenfeld. 1993a), or the political polarisation considered a necessity for radical mobilisation to occur (Gellner 1983a: 175). Especially, if one accepts that the successful movement is the one that can portray the struggle, and hence the ‘enemy’, as significant to the continued cultural development of the population they represent. This cannot be achieved if the object of disdain, in this case the state, is working with great fluidity.

These submerged cultural networks become a communicative political response to the opposing ideology of state (Melucci 1985). For Hutchinson (1992: 111), this was an exemplification of the fact that cultural nationalism is but a transient force that usually gives way to political nationalism, but never truly fades from the scene. It submerges and then re-emerges usually in response to a deep seated crisis of identity that occurs when centralist state bureaucracies persist with cultural modernisation at the expense of minority identity (Gellner 1974b; Cairns 1994). The development of the Irish national movement from a secular to a joint Protestant-Catholic enfranchisement movement, in the early parts of the eighteenth century, into a Catholic-Gaelic clerical movement, and the eventual transformation into a civil rights movement, reflects the movement ‘mimicking’ the state’s integrative processes, suggesting:

that cultural nationalism is a recurring and, at times, a formative force, capable of channelling the energies of aspiring social groups, “blocked” by established statist
patterns, into new political directions. Indeed, the
different visions of the Gaelic heritage presented by
the three revivals indicate that it may remain a
potential matrix of Irish identity, should there be a
revulsion against the currents of Europeanisation now
washing over Ireland (Hutchinson 1992: 116).

Submerged ethnic roots, hence, can play an important
socio-psychological role in reawakening collective consciousness
in a long suppressed community. Smith (1987: 2), in discussing the
role of submerged ethnicity waiting readily for the catalyst to
mobilisation to occur, noted that mythology, memory, destiny, and
belonging tend to allow for the development of a mobilised entity
known as nationalism which is nothing more than the political
mobilisation of organisational cultures. The role of this
oppositional cultural mobilisation is significant in defining the
parameters of who is ‘we’ and who is the ‘other’. Deutsch (1979:
203) says that for many the words ‘independence’ and ‘security’
symbolise “the freedom and protection of the self from the
non-self,” suggesting that the cultural identification with the
oppositional movement is a message sent to the centre from the
periphery that their needs are not being met. It is also a veiled
threat that if sufficient political opportunity structures are not
created then new repertoires will be employed to deal with this
continued marginalisation.

This reference to the ‘heroic legends of primitive peoples’ lies at
the very heart of the inner world of nationalism. To overlook it is to
miss one of the mainsprings of a nationalist upsurge since the
French Revolution, namely the way in which recent dilemmas and
crises are partly resolved through the quest for a lost or submerged
past, whose ideal images and exemplars act as prototypes and
models for social and cultural innovation (Smith 1983: x).

Culture is utilised as an almost pre-political formalisation,
ritualisation and structurisation of the past, into a coherent form of
contemporary activism (Gellner 1986; McLaughlin 1993). Thus,
culture is more than a physical bond. It is a psychological link that
ties individuals into a unified community possessing the necessary
symbols for social and political mobilisation (Deutsch 1969b: 15).
For Connor (1994: 11) this occurs when there is a rapid
transformation of society that incurs a weakening of established
social patterns of state sponsored politicisation and when there is a
perceived need on behalf of the political community for this void to
be filled. The significance, thus, of possessing one’s own flag,
language, or narrative as a symbol of independence lies in its
signification of intent. As such culture can at once polarise society

In times of social, economic and political disparity the national community, or the national movement, becomes the pater familias in which we subsume our ego into the superego in return for the promise of deliverance (Kecmanovic 1996: 114; Tarrow 1977: 122). In doing so it gives the participant, involved in direct social action controlled by the national movement within the cycle of protest, the perception of choice and influence in the day to day running of the movement. Greenfeld (1993a) notes that it is here where the national community, ie, movement, out laps the structurised centralist state. Nationalism requires only for the individual to be actively nationalistic, to openly portray pride in the nation daily, for them to have a perception of importance through deed. Thus, for an Irish Catholic Republican Nationalist, daily experiencing the realities of economic disenfranchisement at the hands of a Protestant state elite, the once yearly participation in a public march not only places them at the centre of the activism for a moment but also provides a sense of self-worth through ritualised self-assertion. This provides a place for all in an often alienating society. A Greenfeld (1993a) points out:

Transcending oblivion through posterity; the restoration of collective dignity through an appeal to a golden age; the realisation of fraternity through symbols, rites and ceremonies, which bind the living to the dead and fallen of the community; these are the underlying functions of national identity and nationalism in the modern world, and the basic reasons why the latter have proved so durable, protean and resilient through all vicissitudes.

This ritualisation of self-assertion is dependent on the state’s ability to provide structures for rebellion within the conflict between centre and periphery. As movements are at once dynamic and reactive, they tend to perpetuate according to the relative state repression that emerges with each renewal of peripheral demands (Smith 1991: 163). The state, hence, provides the forum for the ‘ethno-genesis’ of the other (Wilson 1991; Nikolas 1996; Conversi 1997). This may take the form of the periphery ‘mimicking’ the
state ideologically, culturally and strategically. Yet, this ‘mimicking’ is far from complimentary, rather it is a parodying of the state. That is a cyclical reinterpretation of the state’s identity which is eventually assessed, processed and acted upon by the peripheral movement in order to create an autonomous space for the national movement to counter the centre’s own ideational development.

Nationalism, moreover, fulfils a psychological need to know one’s ‘culturo-historical inheritance’ amongst social actors desiring a similar charge of state centre-periphery relations (Smith 1991: 163). The ability to share this displacement with others who possess a similar form of social communication, cultural patterns, personality structures, and social habits, tends to provide a security of purpose; in this sense nationalism can be viewed as ‘one peculiar response to this double challenge of opportunity and insecurity, of loneliness and power’ (Deutsch 1979: 25). It is this ability to recognise the commonality of traits that provide the raison d’être for potential future political mobilisation of the periphery in the form of a counter-movement to the state (Weilenmann 1963: 33-34).

Social movements and nationalism per se, once combined, can access political opportunity structures found in the cleavages that emerge between the parallel development of state and periphery. Ideologically this provides space for competing ideologies to continually shape and reshape their communities’ identities within the cycle of reform-protest-reform. Repertoires, of both the state and oppositional movement, expand accordingly. Each strategic intensification of the conflict further entrenches the role of the national doctrine in representing the demands of both communities (Gellner 1988: 208). This leads to a dynamic relationship which defines the centre and periphery’s movements according to each new action frame found within this cyclical perpetuation of each other’s mobilised identity (Brubaker 1996: 20-21) Thus, the core of the radicalisation of ETA’s nationalist ideology can be traced to the three major shifts in the state’s perception of what is Spanish nationalism. For the movement is but a reaction, an affectation of the nature of the state’s perception of it’s own ideological relevance to the continued development of the centralist state doctrine.

Here identification is an extension of action frames designed to, if not replicate, then modulate its manifestation according to the actions of the state that has peripheralised the movement in the first place. Whether or not civil, human, or communal rights are the issue, the validity of having a ready made reference frame for future mobilisation in times of unseen state engendered cleavage is
endorsed by movements facing periods of lull in the cycle of protest. In Croatia this is shown in the way communities who had previously sought integration, rallied behind the nationalist banner in order to assert a desired change in direction on political, social and civil issues (Drakulic 1993: 20).

National Movement Expression of the Collective Popular Will and the Nation as a Resource Frame for Future Anti-State Mobilisation.

National identity provides for the consolidation of a united political will. A notion that is perpetuated by the will of the people in order to consolidate their cultural specific path to political and social development. Yet, it is one that is responsive to the integrative processes of the state. It is in this union that a dynamic relationship develops between the expression of identity and the assertion of an identity as a means of collective demonstration (Brubaker 1996: 22). National movements tend to realise this and include this identification factor of nationalism with their own perception of community; an important fact in the ritualisation of protest within the psyche of potential activists through rebellion, uprisings and revolutions (Weilenmann 1963: 46.) As such a nation, I find, is merely the conscious moulding of a people into a physical expression against an extended order. It is a mental/intellectual union of collective minds, along a culturo-specific line, in order to more easily protect the rights, law and common will chosen by the people.

Nations, hence, are collections of individuals who unite into a political unit according to their needs, it is the historic re-emergence of the cycle of protest in the collective psyche of the marginalised community that I believe creates a space for the development of the cultural significance of the nation. Thus, each expansion of repertoire is but a response to the sophistication of the centre’s response to peripheral rebellion. Nationalism allows for an increase in repertoire creating a larger scope in which the movement can interact in the battle against the competing state identity (Schöpflin 1995; Kupchan 1995).

In this sense the national identity becomes an embodiment of living protest, as the formalisation of an oppositional identity that competes directly with that proffered by the state (Kecmanovic 1996: 14). National identity provides the movement with a new codification and structurisation outside the less fluid societal
definitions that emerged as a by-product of ‘Great Nation-State’ consolidation that enables the peripheral move to ‘mimic’ action for action, frame for frame, the state with the aim of wresting the control of state instigated reform away from the centre (Smith 1983: xxi).

National consciousness, hence, acts as a cohesive agent for movements who otherwise would struggle to justify continued existence after the initial goals of the movement had been achieved (O’Brien & Vanech 1969; Druckman 1994). The sense of societal continuance gained through equating the struggle with the historic experience of the community, places the movement’s existence at the centre of the political mobilisation potential of the community. If the necessity of the movement is proven for the continuance of the community, then a condition of reciprocity based on the ability of the movement to provide the political opportunity structure that the state has failed to, becomes integral to future identity mobilisation; even if within the structure of state engendered conflict. Simultaneously, the national consciousness provides the movement public legitimacy that is wider than the cause of their initial mobilisation within the established cycle of state reformation and peripheral development.

Central to nationalism’s ability to be viewed as a strong cohesive force within a movement, is in how it is perceived as both voluntaristic and dynamic, whilst still granting a sense of continued development of revolutionary ideological processes geared to change according to the state’s reaction (Tiryakian & Nevitte 1985a: 58-61). Rogowski (1985: 87) felt that the success of nationalism lay in the harsh rationality of its joint exclusive and inclusive nature through its ability to produce value-maximising behaviour when faced with the self-interest of competing elites and increased state-engendered social division. The contemporaneous nature of the doctrine is derivative of the link between the perception of a mode to individual self-determination, through enfranchisement and the revolutionary nature of its demands of creating shifts within society, through pressuring the centre to create more access points for marginalised communities on the basis of the perceived rights of collectivities (Kamenka 1975a: 7-10). This effectively created a doctrine that placed sovereignty at once both within the individual and the collective.

Doctrinal nationalism, hence, purports to oppose elitist concepts of ideological rule from the centre through supporting the dissolution of power upon the periphery and the re-legitimisation of new power centres (Nairn 1993: 160). It is disruptive, and as such, enacts the role of dynamic agent of societal change whilst reconsolidating the
position of the movement employing it ideologically as an inviable right. The subsequent exclusion of the movement does not necessarily mean acceptance amongst the elite that had been previously opposed. Especially, considering that the rivalry between the two groups may be so intense that there is honour in ignoring the enemy by both sides. This means that the potential advantages that may be gained in initially breaking the mould, may be outweighed by overall costs of state initiated repression (Kecmanovic 1996: 45; van der Wusten 1988). For fledgling movements, bent on reforming repressive state systems, who rely on significant popular support under such heavy policing, this can prove enticing when initial costs may outweigh immediate gains. Specifically, during lulls in the cycle of protest in periods of centralist appeasement of initial protest demands.

The movement by itself is the progenitor of national consciousness but it is the states reaction to this ideological mobilisation that transforms this innate awareness into political agency. State ideology acts as the trigger in this process, but in itself, this state ideology may be but a response to external ideological pressures that emerge as a by-product of state centralisation (Tilly 1975b, 1975c, 1994b, 1997). One that forces the mobilising movement to seek a similar ideological justification for their oppositional organisation through ‘mimicking’ the state itself. Herein lies the dynamic relationship between the ruling elite and the peripheral elite. As a legitimising agent, nationalism provides the necessary link between the old order and the justification for the required change.

Ideology, namely, legitimises both the authority and its competency range by linking them to the goals and needs of the overall society. People’s willingness to comply with nationally authorised instructions, and particularly their understanding that they do so by choice, largely comes from this ideological legitimisation of the area covered by the particular authority (Kecmanovic 1996: 129).

In the former Yugoslavia, this occurred through the continuous equating of ethnic allegiance with the organic political community (Bohman 1969; Calhoun 1993; Popovic 1994). This was a by-product of viewing the official communist ideology of state as an extension of foreign rule (Schöpflin 1995: 52). In such circumstances, the nationalist ideology provides an umbrella for marginalised groups who are seeking an ideological filler in times of state and elite transition, in order to re-establish a continuum between one’s historic place within society and the reason behind oppositional mobilisation (Sharp 1996: 12). This ensures that ideology becomes a new pillar of social organisation and a
stabiliser for transcending societies (Havel 1985: 34-35; Misztal & Jenkins 1995: 328). Accordingly, in such circumstances, nationalist ideology becomes an example of “temporal dissonance” and resistance to an elite instigated ideational regime (Avineri 1994: 30).

National movement mobilisation provides a framework for complaints and grievances, whilst the state official ideology supplies a fulcrum of contention (Tarrow 1995: 192). Thus, in a world political system defined in the legitimacy granted through the attainment of the nation-state, the predominant ideology of liberation, consolidation and implementation becomes nationalism. The Serb national movement of 1878 (Dragnich 1994), and the Irish national movement of 1922 (Curran 1981), had succeeded where others had not through the legitimacy gained in the attainment of statehood (Sharp 1996: 17).

Anthony Smith (1991: 91) noted that the one movement that had originally framed its existence in terms of an ‘anti-colonial’ movement may transcend into an integrationalist movement once the original goal had been achieved. The nation-state becomes the focal point and justification for all political activity. This allows for an elite to shift from key moral and ethical issues based around actions geared initially for the betterment of the national community to a movement that is ideologically juxtaposed to that of the state; even if it goes against the principles they originally fought for. Nationalism can thus be an instrumental and incremental doctrine that is shaped according to the needs of the community that it represents in response to the nature of the cycle of reform determined by the shifting state centre.

As a coordinator of political action, it can dictate the level of protest activism undertaken by justifying it through equating the action to the necessary survival of the community (O’Brien 1969; Levi & Hechter 1985; Prazauskas 1991). Thus strategies of VDA, terrorism, or open warfare that may often be contrary to the original value system of the movement can be implemented with greater justification as the failure of the social movement could be equated to the purposeful repression of the people. The key to its successful utilisation lies in what Tilly (1993b: 30-31) recognises as its innate functionalist methods, but not in terms of a ‘Nation Building’ paradigm rather as a means to facilitate continuous rebellion against a state elite deemed perennially the enemy. A circumstance that places the peripheral nation at the centre of continuous mobilisation, but also subsequently dependent on an escalation of the crisis to justify a permanent state of heightened movement mobilisation. It is but a response to opening or closing political
opportunity structures and as such an ideology of change and cohesion.

Conclusion

Movements that adopt the nationalist doctrine do so when there is a lack of congruence between state and national community (Krejci 1978; Anderson 1993; Connor 1994a). The fact that nationalist ideology delineates the pre-political equivalent of state infrastructure for people who have yet to attain statehood is also a reason why it is viewed as a potential facilitator to ideational mobilisation (Smith 1991: 17). Symbolism and popular sentiment become its lure, mobilisation its potential power. In essence it is a movement of popular discontent that mobilises itself on ethno-cultural lines in order to provide peripheral communities with an alternate option to political organisation than the one offered by the centralist state (Mosse 1975; Gellner 1979; Rokkan & Urwin 1983; Jenson 1995). Smith (1991: 73) saw nationalism as:

\[\text{an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’}^{2}\]

It is within this context, of being a unifying force within mobilising social movements, that nationalism will be explored as an extension of the ideological repertoire for peripheral movements in the following six empirical chapters of this dissertation. For elites seeking avenues to mobilise entire communities to a cause such as civil rights, or full enfranchisement, the nationalist ideology provides the link to the collective memory and historic narrative of a given community. As a form of political mobilisation, ethnic awareness is potent due to the fact that it does predate more contemporary social constructs used to deal with post-industrial socio-political cleavages.\(^3\) This is due to the collective nature of ethno-national identification, which once utilised as an ideology, may act as a facilitator of collective behaviour within a movement seeking a central ideology (Smith 1987: 50, 1992). It may under certain circumstances provide the bond considered necessary to unite disparate parts of the community.

Indeed, in addition to posing the primacy of the ethnonational bond, over all internal cleavages, ethnonationalism also maintains that the ethnonational bond is stronger than any ties that transcend the national group. The case of Northern Ireland is instinctive on
The national movement, moreover, utilises the doctrine of nationalism in order to acquire a measure of effective control over the behaviour and political will of its members (Deutsch 1962: 79). Nationalism’s advantage over other doctrines is its role as a consciousness moulding agent that provides a mental link between the ideals of the elite with that of the needs of the masses through interlocking the two (Weilenmann 1963: 46). By threatening the legitimacy of the state created ethnic identity, through mobilising along culturo-ethnic lines, the national movement goes one step further than more traditional movements as it threatens the very identity of the elites and their place within the organic structure of society (Havel 1985: 82). Nationalism as a doctrine, hence, allows for the thread between moments of rise and fall in protest movement activity to be ever present within the latent cleavages of society. This, gives the “cause” a sense of organic and historical continuity and relevance to the perceived repressed community (Tarrow 1996: 51). One that exploits lasting cleavages as Tarrow (1995: 198) states:

The violence and intolerance of the 1990s constitute a truly alarming trend. But this is not the first great wave of movement in history, nor will it be the last. If its dynamics come to resemble the social movements that we have encountered in this book, then its power will at first be ferocious, uncontrolled and widely diffused, but later ephemeral. If so, then like previous waves of movement, it will ultimately disperse ‘like a flood tide which loosens up much of the soil but leaves alluvial deposits in its wake.

Thus, it follows, that as an ideology it will not be separated from the ideational movements that adopt its doctrine in the rest of this study. What will be henceforth explored in the coming empirical chapters is its role as societal polariser by both state and periphery, and its ability to achieve the desired goals of socio-political independence or autonomy, depending on political opportunity structures created by reforming elites within the cycle of protest-reform-protest. Imperative to this is the role of national expression in the state’s centralisation campaigns and hence the subsequent ‘mimicking’ of ‘official’ nationalism by peripheral elites. It is here, within the cycles of protest-reform-protest, where I believe the ability for the movement to dictate the pace of action-reaction-action lies. In this way, if the movement cannot ‘mimic’ the state strategically, ideologically, and politically, then they will fail to maximise political opportunity structures created
within the perennial struggle between shifting centres and responsive peripheries. The role of the national movement is to subsequently exploit these fixed cleavages so as to attain maximum gain in political systems that would otherwise prefer to consolidate their power within the state without much care for ‘peripheral’ concerns.

Go To Chapter VII
CHAPTER SEVEN:
From Civil Rights to Civilisation

The Northern Irish case study is one that provides an interesting scenario for my thesis. The goal of the following chapters is to test my theory, that it is in the reactionary stages of the cycle of protest that marginalised, and peripheral, national movements can utilise the shifting state centre to their advantage so as to escalate the crisis. Whilst these movements themselves are not initiators of centralist expansion and colonisation of peripheral communities in a social, cultural, and political sense, they nevertheless may use the same processes in order to dictate the pace of state reforms. The idea being that in controlling the speed of the cycle they force the state to react in ways that may open opportunities within the perpetual development between centre and periphery. To the extent whereby the struggle itself becomes a defining point of not only the state’s, but, the movement’s identity. Nationalism becomes the key as it provides a sense of continuity and historicity that contemporary movements find difficult to achieve. Thus, in ‘mimicking’ the state, the movement, through exploiting tensions within the cycle of action-reaction-action as a strategy of repertoire expansion, can either ensure that the movement gains full enfranchisement, or, polarises society, so as to heighten awareness of the state’s inability in its current form to placate variant demands of the periphery and national movement itself.

This study will be progressive in so much as the Northern Ireland case will be the founding base for a study of three national movements and their varying paths towards national autonomy. The Northern Irish, Basque and Croat case studies will progressively show how an overall strategy of attacking the state monolith controlled by a competing elite, achieves the initial polarisation which tends to consolidate the crisis itself within the continuous cycle of state and peripheral parallel, yet separate, development. One that cannot be resolved until the periphery attains a nation state. In this way the successful national movement is the one that ‘mimics’ the centre throughout the struggle to create its own autonomous political space via opportunities made available by the reformist state through the struggle itself.

In the Northern Irish example the development of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in the post Civil Rights era can be viewed not just as an extension of the failure of British policy formation towards the province, but, also as a child of this perennial struggle between centre and periphery. Thus, I intend to show how the IRA is but a reaction of the overall national movement that gains legitimacy, not just through the success of its strategy of engaging the state, but through the nature of the state’s continual denial of full enfranchisement to the minority Catholic Republican community of Northern Ireland. The movement is hence a reflection of the state, though the Irish national identity would doubtlessly remain, irrespective of whether or not the Ulster state and its elite remained in power. The movement itself exists as long as it can portray its relevance to the overall political solution of the ‘Troubles’. As such it is highly responsive to the needs of its community as well as to the weaknesses of the state.

The significance of this, strategically, lies in the ability to marry the benefits of NVDA and electoral formalisation with VDA. I desire to show how the progression in tactics is dependent on the state reaction, with its success lying in the ability of the movement to escalate the crisis in times when the state is seeking to negate such escalation through minimally appeasing the initial demands of the original movement. Protest is hence a strategy that is inclusive of all aspects of the national community’s demands, and provides a unity of purpose that utilises all extremes to challenge the state monolith that is otherwise able to diffuse tensions when faced by a singular movement strategy. In the early days the success of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in portraying the Catholic community as marginalised was essential in mobilising the national consciousness. Yet, without the the expansion of the repertoire to include more formal roads embodied in the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin, it is doubtful that the demands of the NICRA would have ever developed past the classic civil rights campaigns.

It is the riding of these waves, and the escalation of cycles of action-reaction-action, which has been at the core of the politicisation, and hence mobilisation, of the national movement. It is by engaging the state that the desired polarisation can be achieved, in turn creating the necessary environment for continued development of the struggle to a position where both centre and periphery can utilise it to their advantage. Without a reforming centre, the need for the periphery to reformulate would be at a minimum. In the end, the expansion of the repertoire to meet the demands of the cycle of protest becomes in itself the key tool in achieving the desired communal autonomy from the ever shifting
The First Signs of National Movement Shaping to the Political Opportunity Structures Offered by the State in Transition.

In the eyes of many Nationalists the problem with the northern statelet lay in the inability of the Protestant political leadership to provide any sense of identity that could be considered inclusive (Taylor 1984: 69; Gallagher 1991: 18-38). Rather, sectarianism was practised as a means of maintaining the ascendancy of one cultural group over the other (Hennessey 1993: 15). For Catholics frustrated with the lack of civil liberties guaranteed them under British constitutionalism, the very conservative tactics of the southern government in representing their cause, failed to fully equate to the political reality of their immediate political marginalisation (Boyce 1991: 365). High unemployment, a lack of political opportunity structures within the statelet’s bureaucracy and poor housing had created the ingredient for social unrest as the regime was moving towards inclusion at a slower rate than what was demanded by the minority community (Birrel 1978: 23). Out of this environment a mix of nationalism and social awareness was to create a potent political force that was to manifest in the social movement activism of the 1960s; especially with the formation of the NICRA in February 1967 (Boyce 1991: 366). A movement that developed into what Hull (1976: 3-13) would define as the ‘Dublin perspective’; meaning the congruence of all wings of the national movement (the IRA, the NICRA and the EIRE 2 Government) under one nationalist umbrella that would utilise varying means of protest repertoire to attain specific goals whilst challenging the singular Ulster state’s identity and, hence, legitimacy.

The main target would be the 1946 Elections and Franchise Act (Northern Ireland) which allowed for six votes per person according to the value of their business property, a law that placed the Protestant business community at a considered advantage over the under represented Catholics (Arthur 1987: 101-102). This ensured that the national question remained a significant undercurrent in the Northern Irish polity as well as a definer of social relations (Hennessey 1995:9). In many ways the NICRA was more politically astute than the old Nationalists because they were able to recognise the true constitutional position of Northern Ireland within Britain, and attempted to recreate the sphere of political activity rather than reluctantly accept the dictated order established by the Protestant elite (Alcock 1994: 55). This signified a generational change fuelled by the frustrations of a young elite,
with the inability of an antiquated regime to create sufficient political space that would placate Catholic demands (Rose 1976: 23; Osborne 1982: 151; Miller 1990: 231). O’Brien (1994: 156-157) felt this to be the natural consequence of a movement built by a generation that were better fed and educated, due to the success of the British Welfare State, and as such felt no desire to accept their second class status.

The NICRA saw that only through bringing civil rights issues to the fore, through protest activism, could they question the legitimacy of the Ulster state (Dunn & Morgan 1994: 9). Yet the main defining force within the Catholic polity was, according to Rumpf and Hepburn (1977: 184), between those who supported constitutional modes of political formation, and those who supported outright rebellion. This split would define the diversity of protest repertoire that was to be used by the Nationalist community as a whole in their battle with the state. For it was the state’s, and the nature of the elite’s dominant settler society’s, consolidation that demanded loyalty of all its subjects to the ‘metropole’, which could be viewed as responsible for the form of contemporary Irish nationalism (O’Brien 1988: 39; Boyce 1990: 39; Weitzer 1990: 29):

Irish nationalism, therefore, was not peculiarly ‘Irish’; on the contrary, its many paradoxes and self-contradictions arise from the close and permanent relationship between Ireland and her neighbour. And Ireland’s dominant political tradition, like most aspects of her life, bears the ineradicable influence of England (Boyce 1991: 389).

More importantly these events were to occur in a period of self-examination by the Protestant elite (Banton 1986: 61). Unionism was undergoing fundamental changes under the Premiership of Terrence O’Neill that was designed to produce a more flexible and responsive leadership that could guarantee the continuity of their rule (Boulton 1993: 23-26). At the heart of this was a re-evaluation of the continued repression of the minority Catholic community and how to incorporate them into the body polity of the North, without jeopardising the state of the Union (Farrell 1976: 229). Several factors would aid this shift in centre attitudes including the lack of Catholic support for the IRA Border Campaigns from 1956 to 1962, an Irish Catholic in the White House, the return of the Wilson Labour Government, and diplomatic rapprochement with Dublin. This allowed a justification for a change in strategy as a new era of tolerance seemed to be emerging towards the Catholic community (Arthur 1987: 90-91).
The reality, however, of Catholic under representation in the structures of government remained evident. In 1964, 3 out of 33 members of the Youth Employment Board, 2 out of 22 members of the Hospitals Authority and 2 out of 24 General Health Services Board were Catholic (Farrell 1976: 242). The slow pace of reform, and the continued lack of political opportunity structure offered Catholics, was to prove a great difficulty for the reform based O’Neill Government. In fact, several studies conducted into the relationship between violence and social disadvantage have pointed to a correlation between high levels of unemployment and an increase in the cycle of protest (McCullogh 1984: 122; Gallagher 1991: 6; Murray 1995: 220). What was emerging were cleavages that were a by-product of parallel, yet interdependent, centre-periphery political development that Tarrow (1977, 1993a) and della Porta (1993) would consider a necessary pre-condition for the mobilisation of the periphery into a consistent state of rebellion.

The inability of the Nationalist leadership in the post World War Two era to achieve desired reform through parliamentary participation was to lead to an upsurge in extra-parliamentary activism that would leave the leader of the Nationalist Party, Eddie McAteer, out of the new processes of nationalist expression (Rumpf & Hepburn 1977: 192). The sectarian nature of the state further emphasised the futility of participatory democracy and ineptitude of Joe Devlin’s participationist doctrine in achieving political reform (Patterson 1996: 42). The inadequacy of the Nationalist Party (NP), Northern Irish Labour Party (NILP) and Socialist Republican Party (SRP) in assessing the shifting ideological and social needs of the population was to lead to their decline as representatives of contemporary Catholic interests (Lee 1995: 436). Simultaneously, the NICRA openly commenced addressing issues that political parties had feared to undertake so as not to further marginalise their constituencies. Not even the signing of the Joint Memorandum on Citizen’s Rights between the Northern Irish Council and NILP could redress the sectarian polarisation that was emerging in Northern Irish politics (O’Connor 1996: 53).

The first signs of popular discontent with the standing electoral processes emerged in February 1965 when the Campaign for Democracy (CD) commenced holding mass rallies; a campaign aimed directly at influencing Republican Labour Members of Parliament in their future policy direction in the run up to the 1966 general election (Arthur 1987: 92). What is interesting is that somewhere between the initial unemployment rallies of 1961 and the formation of the NICRA, under the tutelage of Billy McMillen,
the core value of protest activism had shifted from purely social issues to one steeped in nationalist rhetoric and ideology (Rooney 1984: 81). A shift in ideology that was to bring about a corresponding counter mobilisation of Protestant sentiment that subsequently led to the initial polarisation of these competing communities over the ideological nature of state-periphery development.

The NICRA came into existence in 1967 through the assistance of the Wolfe Tone Societies and the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ), formed in 1964, which was to lead to the formation of the movement along the lines of the National Council for Civil Liberties in Britain (Harkness 1983: 145). Yet, the success of post-war national movements in attaining independence throughout the British and French colonies was to place new impetus on nationalist ideology as a vehicle for communal liberation and civil action (Farren & Mulvihill 1995: 3). As Eamonn McCann, leader of the Dugannon Housing protests of 1961 noted, that though the initial marches were designed to break the Nationalist stranglehold that enveloped the Catholic community it soon became clear that the alluring nature of nationalism itself was too good to ignore as people were:

almost relieved gradually to discover that the guilty discarded tradition on which the community was founded was, after all, meaningful and immediately relevant (Wright 1990: 208).

Nationalism was emerging as a doctrine of mobilisation, especially since 1968, in an environment defined by the sectarian nature of centre periphery relations (Lustick 1985). A factor that the fledgling social movement would have been foolish to ignore. Central to this nationalist reawakening was the Republican community’s realisation that the very nature of their marginalisation was steeped in the core values of Protestant ascendancy and the protection of the Union which would automatically seek to negate state alternatives that were more inclusive. The crisis faced was hence political in nature and structure, and was a byproduct of the inadequacy of the Ulster state to deal with counter claims.

The emergence of the People’s Democracy (PD) under a younger generation led by Catholic peace activists, such as the student Bernadette Devlin, were representative of a generation of urban disassociated Catholic youth whose main concern was not the consolidation of a position within a power structure that would never fully incorporate their demands, but rather an option that
would demand social, political and economic equality at all costs (Rumpf & Hepburn 1977: 193). As Denis Haughey of the SDLP told me about the reasons behind a move away from outright rebellion:

After some years of agitating with relatively little progress being made, I came to the conclusion that many of us came to, which was the problem of Northern Ireland was fundamentally a political problem and needed to be dealt with in a political way. And a number of us conceived the idea what we needed to do was form a new political party because the old Irish National Party was completely ineffectual.3

Protest was seen as a means for demonstrating publicly the discrepancies of state relations between the rival communities (Arthur 1969; Murray 1995: 217). This was what was behind John Hume’s, who would become the future leader of the SDLP, “Positivist Agenda” as protest action was seen as a way of creating space outside cumbersome institutional structures of state via challenging the legitimacy of Stormont to exist in the first place (Patterson 1996: 43). This “Positivist Agenda” was a doctrine that would seek to utilise the very institutions of state that had previously been viewed as the repressive arm of the Protestant elite to simultaneously, through extra-parliamentary activism, symbolically reconstruct the inadequacies of the state in resolving Nationalist demands. In the main, through antagonising and challenging the state to bring around law and order whilst utilising the constitutional law of the repressor to consolidate movement gains. The idea was to utilise movement agitation to actively challenge the state, ie, London, to become actively involved. A point explained by Séan Farren of the SDLP:

I mean they’re the ones who have to make decisions as how the negative fallout from the situation will be dealt with in security terms in particular over the last twenty five years they’ve been the ones who had to increase expenditure on the army, on the police and they had to introduce laws to deal with the situation and so they carry that responsibility as governments for what has gone wrong.4

Many activists clearly saw the state as directly responsible for the spiral into disorder. What Arthur (1987: 93) points out, is that the new politics of the 1960s had accepted the significance and validity of symbolism as a mode of political demonstration and once this
occurred, this allowed for the rise of cyclical protest action. Yet without a target the ability to mobilise a population to protest would be limited. As a means to mobilisation, the ritualisation of cultural and social protest in the annual cycle of sectarian parades, designed to keep alive historical memories of varied and shared political experiences, was integral in heightening public awareness to the nationalist nature of repression within the Northern Irish political milieu (Moss 1972: 97; MacStiofáin 1975: 91-92; Doherty & Poole 1995: 21). It is a tool used by both sides of politics.

For the IRA, disillusioned by the failures of the 1956 to 1962 military Border Campaigns, marching was to take on great significance as a means to galvanising a divided Republican community through recognising their shared condition of oppression and the necessity of concentrating the community into one political force through culturo-political socialisation (Bowyer-Bell 1972: 366-397; Rose 1976: 21). Desired social parity became equated with national liberation, a conjunction of strategy and ideology that emerged with the realisation by the civil rights leadership of the validity of employing nationalist ideology in mobilising popular Nationalist support into an overall struggle with the state (Arthur 1987: 92). The Unionists groups for this reason also saw fit, between 1968 and 1970, to organise some 700 events celebrating the founding of the history of their ascendancy (Moss 1972: 98). In fact the utilisation of Calvinist like evangelical beratings of the Catholic community from the pulpit by Paisley granted much of this activism an almost organic spontaneity. The state was playing its hand, as movement was countered by movement, the nature of centre response reached a new level (Miller 1978: 153-157; Taylor 1984: 63).

What was emerging was a reciprocal development of nationalist ideology as two competing identities fought for limited space within the state (MacLaughlin 1993: 97). Loyalists, themselves, found it difficult to disequate Catholic protest from radical activism (Taylor 1984: 62), as this community, now mobilising in the name of civil rights and justice, only six years prior had logistically supported the IRA ‘Border Campaigns’. In this sense, the predominantly Protestant Security Forces, were schooled in the rhetoric of reactionary state nationalism forged in the defence against rebellion (Hennessey 1993: 35; Ignatieff 1993: 183). An underlying reactionism that seemingly manifested in times of state instigated reforms; as shown with the 1966 reformation of the UVF a year after the Catholic NP became the official opposition in Stormont (Boulton 1973).

A pattern developed whereby each reformist push by the O’Neill
Government was being met by a subsequent conservative backlash by radical Loyalists to each Catholic response (Kelly 1972: vi-ix). New opportunities for heightened mobilisation were emerging that were to place the IRA in a conundrum. Civil protest by the CD in 1965 had brought the NP to a place within Stormont (Buckland 1981: 109); it also brought the UVF back into the political equation (Lee 1995: 416). What emerged was a recentralisation of state identity within the hands of a given elite that della Porta and Rucht (1995) considered necessary for the radicalisation of policing structures so as to minimise the influence of the mobilising periphery. The rise of the NICRA had similarly created the preconditions for the establishment in October 1968 of Free Derry, yet was countered by an upswing in Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and UVF violence against the Catholic community (Coogan 1995: 160-161).

Cathal Goulding, the then IRA Chief of Staff, came to realise that in the face of government reforms, protest activism would be more likely to gain enfranchisement than physically challenging a highly mobilised state (Bishop & Mallie 1987: 70). This was the birth of IRA collusion with the higher ranks of the NICRA. The collusion was first pointed out in Paragraph 214 of the 1969 Cameron Report on the “strictures on the extremists [and] the dreadful affair at Burntollet” which questioned the nature of past strategies of engaging the state and the validity of open rebellion as a tool of mobilisation by the Republican community. Goulding’s new found anti-sectarian Marxist rhetoric was seemingly asking the IRA to embrace the new reforms and downplaying the nationalist card; a tactical blunder that was exploited by the Provisional IRA that split from the Official IRA on ideological grounds.

This error was due to the inability of the reforming elite within the IRA to recognise that much of their popular support came from their willingness to maintain armed insurrection as a valid strategy of protest (Murray 1982: 311). Amongst Catholics, the IRA’s role was clearly defined as such, leaving many to question the validity for their continued existence if they so chose to concentrate solely on NVDA (Coogan 1995: 66). Especially, considering that up until 1972 this role of civil protest group had been clearly filled by the NICRA. O’Neill desired reforms, whilst the rest of the Protestant community, however, seemed unwilling to likewise relinquish their hegemonic control of state (Rooney 1984: 83).

There was an overall realisation that waiting for the state to commence reform was politically naive. The Catholic community was facing a state elite determined to use the state’s security apparatus to maintain their national ascendancy (Moss 1972: 100;
Miller 1978; Banton 1986). For change to occur, it was realised that what was needed was a new structure of resistance aimed at engaging and challenging the state in strategies in the same manner that the state challenged the periphery (MacStiofán 1975: 143). The IRA had already provided a hierarchy of military defence that was to be exploited in the protest activism of NICRA, and later by the SDLP, in reconstructing a sense of unity through action which created space outside the restrictiveness of official state channels for future mobilisation (MacLaughlin 1993: 98). Protest and rallies became a means to self assertion that would provide space within the cleavages found in, what Maguire (1996a: 8) terms, the cycle of reform-protest-reform for a community purposefully marginalised on the periphery of the Ulster state entity (Hamilton & Trimble 1995: 4). New strategies of engaging the state were needed, and eventually found.

By 1968 the strategists of the NICRA pointed to the death of Che Guevara, the collapse of the officially sponsored Prague Spring, and the rise of student protest activism throughout France, Italy, Mexico, Spain, the USA and West Germany, as a justification for the need to exploit the human rights angle in appealing to the general British populace to influence their government (Arthur 1987: 103). A point that Brian Faulkner, who succeeded Major James Chichester Clark as Prime Minister in March 1971, summed up in retrospect:

It sounded, to a world attuned to such protests, a positive humanitarian cry from an oppressed people. It also seemed to involve a very basic right... many well-meaning but ill-informed people, even in Britain, were under the impression that the ‘evil Unionist government’ had made it illegal for Catholics to vote in elections (ibid.: 104).

The fact that this statement was made by Prime Minister Faulkner, the last Prime Minister of Stormont, and a man long associated with the right of the UUP who once he came to power sought to appease Catholic demands without necessarily isolating the Protestant-Ulster elite, suggests that the elites were aware of the ploy of playing on the marginalisation of the community in order to court media favour (Bruce 1992: 79). The success of such tactics would be played out in the escalation of reactionary violence from the Protestant community which only served to further isolate them from public opinion on the mainland (White 1983: 187-188). A point that was further enhanced by Prime Minister Wilson’s denunciation of extreme-Loyalists as ‘quasi-fascist’ in the wake of William Craig, the predecessor of Faulkner, evoking the Special Powers Act to ban Republican Clubs in March 1967 (Farrell 1976:
Strategically the NICRA was prepared to continue utilising much of the strategies of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the confrontational tactics of non-violent engagement of the state, that were tried in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Alabama and the rest of the Deep South (Wright 1990: 164). The attractiveness of such a strategy lay in the nature of exclusion and disenfranchisement in politically polarising the combatant communities. Yet, there was also the realisation that, due to cultural polarisation, the Blacks would always be defined in minority terms without any true chance at self-determination (McAdam 1982). The advantage held by the Catholics was that their Nationalist Republican ideological tradition could allow the civil rights movement to transcend such limitations once most of the initial demands concerning civil rights had been addressed. Irish nationalism had previously forged a state in 1922, in a way Black Americans could never achieve in the parameters of the US state system (Wright 1990: 165).

The move towards open nationalist confrontation became more evident with the CSJ’s decision, with the tacit approval of the NICRA, to escalate the campaign in August of 1968 via marching through RUC lines during the Coalisland to Dungannon march (Budge & O’Leary 1973: 94-95; Heskin 1980: 107-108; Lee 1995: 420). The highlighting of the overt influence of Loyalist radicals, through Paisley’s successful appeal of employing an RUC road block to halt the rally, was a clear infringement on the right to gather. What was needed was a larger stage and the decision to march on Derry, the largest Catholic city in the North on October 5, with some 2 000 protesters was to bring the nationalist aspect of the repression into focus (Moody 1974: 26-34; McCann 1993: 83). Soon Catholics saw the validity of continuing NVDA throughout the North. On October 9, 1 000 students marched on City Hall, Belfast, to set up the PD which the NICRA leadership would come to view as a direct threat by extremists on the left to any restructuring of the pre-existing political system (Farrell 1976: 247). As Henry Patterson (1997: 183) noted:

The coming in from the cold of republicanism referred in Adam’s case to emerging common ground- in analysis at least- with the main ideologists of the student-based People’s Democracy organisation, who saw in the civil rights campaign a way of hastening a crisis of the Northern Ireland state with a potentially revolutionary outcome.
When they were joined by the future leader of the SDLP John Hume, Ivan Cooper of the ‘moderate’ Citizens’ Action Committee and some 15,000 demonstrators (Lee 1995: 420), in response to Craig’s banning of marches on November 16, O’Neill responded, after pressure from British Prime minister Harold Wilson, by proposing a new reform package that would include the dismantling of the Derry Corporation (Farrell 1976: 248; Coogan 1995: 73).

For the NICRA this came too late and the decision was made to confront the statelet on all issues including the national one as previous protests had proven successful. The PD hence opted to march from Belfast to Derry, led by Michael Farrell, in a four day track that would commence on January 1 1969 (Wright 1990: 194; Taylor 1997: 43). Eighty set out but by the time they had reached Burntollet Bridge, they numbered some several hundred. More significantly, the direct threat to the state was exemplified in the response of the RUC and off-duty B-specials who ransacked Catholic businesses and stores (Farrell 1976: 250-251; Weitzer 1995: 60; Clayton 1996: 158). This was a publicity coup for a movement determined to demonstrate the disparity of the state security apparatus and bigotry of the Loyalist elite:

In any case all Unionists were becoming increasingly embedded against the other community and the British government as the whole thrust of the civil rights campaign was to portray Catholics as innocent victims, badly treated by Protestants and who had finally reacted against injustice. Unionists saw that the strategy involved instilling feelings of guilt in the British public, and to present the minority community as free from guilt and hence able to occupy a position of moral superiority in hence eyes of the British opinion (Alcock 1994: 59).

The response in Derry was swift and was to mark the turning point of the NICRA transitions from a purely non-nationalist movement, into a nationalist based one, as outraged residents barricaded the Bogside of Derry City in response to the B-Specials running amok and establishing Free Derry (McCann 1993). This was an assertion of the right to self-determination and the open delegitimation of the right of the state to use force on a specific community (Farrell 1976: 251). When the subsequent Cameron Commission of 1969 blamed the rioting not on the tactics of the RUC, but rather on their lack of numbers to control the rioters, the Catholics soon began to realise the futility of reforming a system that was bent on justifying violent means of population control (Weitzer 1995: 60).

The popular discontent was demonstrated in the February 24
Stormont elections where eight candidates were run on a militant leftist and civil rights platform. Hume would win Derry from McAteer, a clear generational victory, whilst Protestant civil rights activist Cooper would win mid-Derry along with the PD’s winning South Armagh (Coogan 1995: 83). The proof that Catholics began to see more value in utilising extra-political means of political and social mobilisation than in participating in more formalised electoral means was shown by the NILP’s sole candidate Paddy Devlin’s ability to keep his seat. He was able to win the Falls partly due to his own civil rights activism (Farrell 1976: 254). The NICRA responded in turn with the ascension of a more radical executive (Boyce 1991: 365-366).

The weight of expectation paid off, and on April 22 1969, ‘one man, one vote’ was ceded to Northern Ireland, and significantly on the following day Terrence O’Neill resigned (Doherty & Poole 1995: 40). The UVF showed their disapproval by exploding two bombs in water pipelines, in order to demonstrate to the Catholics that the Protestant community was not as willing to accept reform of the state (Farrell 1976: 256). It was a declaration of intent. One that would lead to many within the IRA to question the reasoning behind a cessation of arms. More importantly it forewarned a polarisation of the conflict through a radicalisation of the state’s response, which ran the risk of the conflict becoming the definer of both movement and state.

With the ascension to the Premiership on May 1 of Major Chichester-Clark by one casting vote from his cousin O’Neill over Faulkner, the NICRA called a halt to all protest action (Harkness 1983: 156). The subsequent arrest of some 37 PD demonstrators on July 26, would lead to the death in custody of the Catholic Patrick Corry. Derry and West Belfast were to rise again between August 12 and 15 which would leave six dead: five Catholics and one Protestant (O’Brien 1972: 178-180; Darby 1976: 43-45). NVDA had shaped a violent response by the state and the subsequent fleeing of over 1 820 families, of whom 82.7% were Catholic, from their Belfast homes between July and September, would lead to the radicalisation of the movement away from the civic option, to a more co-ordinated militancy designed to utilise the perceived benefits of VDA augmenting the strategies of NVDA (Farrell 1976: 267). On August 15, with the coming of the British Army, IRA units were put on alert.

Nevertheless, it must be recognised that the initial cycle of NVDA did bring about significant change within the development of self-dependency of the local boroughs and councils (Dunn 1993: 23; Doherty & Poole 1995). The most significant was the 1969
Governmental White Paper, which was an extension of the original 1966 Governmental White Paper, that ceded direct responsibility for education, personal social services, local heating services and roads and planning to districts councils (Birrel 1978: 23). More significantly however, was the 1969 inquiry by two British police officers, Robert Mark and Douglas Osmond, which found the RUC to be highly ‘inoperative, outdated, sectarian centred, IRA obsessed and extremist in nature’. This would, in turn, lead to the 1969 Hunt Committee findings that recommended the disbanding of the USC, a repeal of the Special Powers Act, and a reconstitution of the RUC along non-sectarian lines to be overseen by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in London (Weitzer 1995: 62-63).

In 1969, however, the Stormont Parliament would rescind these hard fought for gains through the establishment of four new organisational frameworks aimed at further centralisation of the statelet, consisting of: Centralised Boards, Area Boards, Governmental Departments and District Councils (Birrel 1978: 25). Patterson however argued that this was less an attempt to undermine reform by Stormont than a bid to destabilise the building of the power base of local councils which had played a substantial role in implementing discriminatory policies through controlling the allocation of public housing and local government employment. Thus, within the cycle of action-reaction-action there emerges a new pattern, that Maguire (1996a: 6), in invoking the cyclical paradigm of Tarrow’s and applying it to ‘abnormal’ societies, has defined as ‘reformist-rebel-reformist’. One that the NVDA initiated, suggesting that within the cycle there is a tinge of counter action as the cause of rebellion on the parts of the activists, just as much as a pre-planned push for inclusion on the political agenda of state would be a cause.

The Problems with Non Violent Direct Action as a Single Issue Strategy and the Emergence of the Protestant State Sponsored Counter Movement.

The problem with the pacifist oriented protest activity of the NICRA was that it was viewed by Loyalists as the embodiment of anti-state activity and the irredentist policies of Dublin (Coogan 196: 67). The NICRA social platform had failed to recognise that the roots of the “Troubles” lay in the innate competition between conflicting national identities and mythologies (Hillyard and Boyle 1982: 17; O’Brien 1988: 35; see also Seton-Watson 1977; Lustick 1995). Campaigns were based on opening up access to state
institutions, which Rose (1976: 1) claims was built on the premise of how the state should be governed rather than who will govern it. In turn, this negated the core of Catholic nationalism that was built on the premise of national sovereignty as the primary solution for all social, economic and political disparity (Hechter 1985: 19-20; Boyce 1990: 39).

The rise of the periphery would be seen by the centre as innately nationalist as the state was formed on the premise of exclusion of the other (Wallerstein 1974: 281, 1980: 265-266; Ignatieff 1993: 183). In terms of the Unionist perspective, the question could never be solely addressed along human rights lines, but rather on the ascension of a nation subjugated by the state they were trying to reform (Roberts 1986: 18). This in itself may explain certain aspects of Protestant militancy as Protestant groups, especially those lead by Paisley, began to fear that the goal of political change through civil unrest would not be satiated until more irredentist goals were sated (Hennessey 1995: 8).

The irony of the NICRA campaigns for social justice and political enfranchisement was that it had created a uniquely Protestant Irish counter movement that had recentralisation, if only for a little while, as the centre piece of their demands (Mason 1985). In fact it signalled a point of strategy convergence that would lead to the state itself to formulate a movement that would define its existence in opposition to the periphery. This ‘mimicking’ by the centre follows on from Kitson’s 6 (1960) counter insurgency strategical study of “the other” in replicating a cyclical development of group identity in formulating fluent, responsive communities within the process of struggle. Stratifying both Protestants and Catholics in direct conflict. This left the British Army and state in the middle as claims and counter claims isolated both communities from the rule of law. In fact, it came close to even criminalising Protestant mobilisation as militant.

By the end of 1969 this left the British and Protestant elite facing a unique scenario of Security Forces protecting a retrogradist and antiquated social class, whilst oppressing a people who were no longer necessarily ‘disloyal’ (Clayton 1996: 125). Opening up access points within the state to absorb the minority community would, according to Tarrow’s (1992, 1995) notion of creating a consistent dimension within a given political environment, run the risk of encouraging or disencouraging collective action. At the same time, with the national question being at the core of the problems, it could not guarantee fully that the extension of state created opportunity structures would be enough.
The Ulster Protestant elite were not afraid to use violent policing strategies to achieve their own goals (Farrell 1983; Aughey & Mcilheney 1984; Ryder 1990). Thus, the overemphasis on NVDA would place an unnecessary restriction on the civil rights movement capacity to fully protect, not just the legal and political rights of their constituency, but also the physical well-being at the hands of overzealous, and ideologically committed Security Forces. The impotency of the NICRA was demonstrated in the arrest, beating, and sentencing for six months, the ex-chair of the NICRA, Frank Gogarty on July 31, only a few days after a local youth Danny O'Hagan was shot dead by the British Army (Farrell 1976: 274). It was almost as if the British Army and the RUC were inviting the IRA to respond. The futility of utilising civil protest action without the corresponding support of VDA, when the state utilised CS gas and plastic bullets to hold back the hordes (Maguire 1996a: 4), heightened the sense of the Republican community’s ineffectiveness to achieve reform without engaging the state directly.

It was the Bodenstown Wolfe Tone commemoration meeting in June 1968 that was to prove to be the watershed in the strategic shift towards the readoption of VDA as a major tactic in the Nationalists’ protest repertoire (Rooney 1984: 81). According to Guelke (1995: 114), what the NICRA had taught the Provisional IRA was that only through violence could the Protestant ascendancy be truly challenged. The State Security Forces had developed into a defined Protestant mechanism of control. Yet, it was the ability of the majority Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) to equate Protestant distinctive cultural survival with that of the Ulster state, that was to prove of great significance in forging a new Ulster state identity. Central to this new ‘Loyalism’ was to be the protection of the essence of Ulsterism within a responsive state.

What was occurring was a counter movement developing at the centre of the state which I believe to be a natural consequence of a ritualisation of mobilised identity within the cyclical parallel development of the state centre and periphery. This reciprocal development of antagonistic centre and periphery identity was to cause quiet resignation amongst many Republican activists as the goals of communal enfranchisement and state reform were now being overtaken by the struggle of two competing mutually exclusive ideologies of state. Such events would force a strategic rethink on both sides, as Denis Haughey of the SDLP told me:

on the other hand Unionists have taken the view that they were a distinct [people] and were entitled to a state to themselves which they could control. 7
Significantly, with the arrival of the British Army, on August 15 1969, as an extension of state security procedures, the IRA were given the historic justification for the expansion of their repertoire to include the initiation of VDA as a tool of protest activism (Murray 1982: 311). The problem was that the increased protesting would escalate into full scale rioting once the Security Forces were deployed to counter the activists. Amongst Protestants, such activity would soon become equated with more radical elements within the Nationalist community that saw itself as insubordinate to the established law and order (Coogan 1996: 67). At the same time, Catholics would see this as an extension of Protestant military predominance, thus reassuring them of their ‘colonial’ status (Osborne 1982: 154). The British Army, hence, became a significant ingredient in the overall justification by the IRA for an upswing in the cycle of action-reaction-action. The British Army as such would become a defining element of future expansions of repertoire as the symbolic representative of the omnipotence of the Northern Irish state centre.

**Upswing, Downswing: The Search for a New Strategy in Challenging the Centre.**

The strategic placing of terrorism at the centre of collective action was a response not only to the military occupation of the Province, but also strategic utilisation of Ulster state policing as a form of community subjugation. The leanings of MacStiofáin, the leader of the Provisionals, to VDA can be traced to his stint in prison where he was daily in contact with the leaders of the Cyprian anti-colonial movement, EOKA, who in turn were greatly influenced by the FLN’s fight with the French in Algeria from 1956 to 1962 (MacStiofáin 1975: 74-79). This was an expansion of movement protest repertoire to incorporate both ‘home grown’ and ‘imported’ methods of VDA (Coogan 1996: 122). Be it the Young Ireland and Fenian rebellions of the past century, or the nail bombs, 'knee capping' and booby trap explosives of the modern “Troubles” (Maguire 1996: 1), I feel they are inherently tied to Tilly’s expansion of repertoire in order to respond to the reactive repression of shifting elites through the defensive action of counter-action. A strategy that seemingly runs correspondingly to the inability of either the reforms proffered by Westminster to resolve disputes, or the unwillingness of the state to fully review the demands of national movements.

In Northern Ireland, the four Rs of rebellion, reform, reaction and
repression are tactics in continuous use rather than the outcome of particular conflicts. Cycles of protest are not followed by cycles of reform nor, indeed, by all-out rebellion. Instead, Nationalist protest has led to occasional attempts at reform, but the result is usually a massive wave of Unionist counterprotest. The subsequent weakening or abandonment of reforms - which is the typical result of this process - radicalises the minority community and provokes further rounds of violence (Maguire 1996b: 8).

Much of the reasoning behind the split within IRA ranks lay with the frustrations felt by MacStiofáin, with the inability of the Official IRA to defend the Catholic community throughout August 1969 in Derry (MacStiofáin 1975: 143; Bishop & Mallie 1987: 122). The collusion between the state and the Orange Orders, in what became known as the Battle of the Bogside, in allowing for the Apprentice Boys rally to go ahead, as well as the subsequent use of ‘due force’ to breakup Catholic demonstrators, convinced MacStiofáin, David O’Connell and Seamus Twomey of the need to challenge Goulding (Cronin 1980: 184-191). In October 1969 a meeting was held to ask questions of the Official IRA concerning their inability to defend Catholics in the face of increased state intervention (Bowyer-Bell 1972: 430; Coogan 1995: 365-371).

In August the IRA had suffered a significant decline in reputation amongst beleaguered Catholics who had been saved by the British Army (Taylor 1997: 67). Fraternisation between the British Army and Republicans had risen to the extent whereby even the Loyalists became concerned as to whose side the British Army was on (Evelegh 1978: 5). The regime had successfully placated the initial fears of the rival community which led to a marginalisation of the IRA within their own community (Lee 1995: 429-430). MacStiofáin reacted by leading a walkout on January 11 1970, to form the Provisional IRA, loyal to the Provisional Constitution of the Republic that recognised all 32 provinces, and the need for a new aggressiveness in order to reclaim lost ground (Taylor 1997: 67). An escalation was sought as the regime became more complacent towards demands that they felt had been met. The IRA did not have to wait long as the cycle of action-reaction-action would bring around the desired intensification of the struggle, when on June 27 1970, Loyalist mobs rioted through the Catholic Short Strand in Belfast.

The inability of the Official IRA and NICRA to withhold these concerted attacks upon the Catholic community would question the ability of the overall national movement to reform a system determined to maintain the political status quo via the implementation of Draconian policing measures (Coogan 1995:
464; O’Connor 1996: 55). Militancy grew as the cycle dictated a radicalisation of both the state and its challenger’s demands. This was why many turned to the Provisional IRA as the sole means of defence against further state organised political attacks. The Provos were to offer a programme, Eire Nua, based on the formation of a democratic, socialist republic with a federal system of parliament, the latter being dropped in 1982, which was designed on ‘Third World’ political ideology based on notions of movement response towards colonialism (Laqueur 1987: 209). This I feel is significant because it places the movement not merely in the context as an alternative reaction to the state, but one willing to become an autonomous solution to the state engendered disequilibrium between rival communities.

The use of terrorism was a signal of an expansion in protest repertoire used to attain political concessions through playing on Protestant fears and prejudices about the Catholic community. Simultaneously, it provided a link between the contemporary struggle to past cycles of protest action, which granted the military campaign a sense of historic continuity. This was a declaration of intent that sought to intensify the conflict as a means of stratifying the struggle with a hope of polarising the political system beyond reform (Guelke 1995: 15).

1969 had taught the Provisionals that spontaneous mob violence could be relied upon to intensify Army strategies of policing, shepherding and law enforcement upon peaceful Catholic protesters, that would lead to the further disillusionment of the Catholic community towards the Security Forces (Adams 1982; Dunn 1993: 23; O’Neill 1994). The idea was to play on social and economic disenchantment of the Catholic community with the failure of the British Welfare state, and convert this disenchantment into a rejection of all things British, especially the British Government (Moss 1972: 103). The point was to make the Catholic community aware that what they faced was modern day colonialism, and in spite of all British rhetoric about the need for faith in all de jure structures of liberal democracy, they were de facto colonised (Osborne 1982: 154; Boyce 1990: 39). The secondary aim was to demoralise the validity of the Security Forces and portray them as intent on maintaining the political status quo that was at the heart of the “Troubles” (Taylor 1984: 60). Thus making the Army accomplices to the facts.

The Army’s direct collusion with Stormont was highlighted in the aftermath of the Protestant march on the Strand in Belfast (Taylor 1997: 75-78). On June 27 1970 some, 6000 Catholics cordoned off on the Short Strand of East Belfast whilst Belfast commander Billy
McKee ambushed four Protestants, killing two and wounding two (Farrell 1976: 273; Bell 1993: 176). This brought a swift response from the Security Forces when on July 3 some 3000 soldiers, in a mist of CS gas, ransacked the houses of Catholics on the Lower Falls Road of Belfast (Winchester 1974: 68-69). Five Catholics during the thirty six hour curfew were shot dead by the Army (Taylor 1997: 78-79). Northern Irish society was polarised, and the Nationalist community had their enemy. The curfew was to prove a watershed, as original demands for the fall of Stormont were now augmented by the nationalist rhetoric of old. As a tool of movement mobilisation, the IRA’s intent of escalating the crisis to highlight the innate bias of state would gain significant ground with each heavy handed response by the state. A fact bourn out by Joe Austin of Sinn Féin who pointed to this time as instrumental in his own mobilisation into the movement:

Well I think that I am like many of our own party members of the same age were rather than educated into the party we were hypnotised by events that took place in Belfast particularly in August 1969. Where we had an explosion of piped up anger, a demand for equal and civil liberties and we also mimicked certain events that had taken place at that point in time in America, in North America, where we had the rise of the Black Civil Rights Movement. 8

A clear equating of ethno-national repression and the need to counter it through movement mobilisation was emerging which distinguished the de facto use of the state as a means of population control, from the de jure equality of the elite’s rhetoric. By the end of 1970, 153 bombs exploded (BBCTV 1997). Directed mainly at Protestant businesses, the Provisionals were on the offensive. The aim of the strategy was to engage the state so as to increase their reaction. Talks and marches had provided little except for a consolidation of the Ulster elite’s power base, it was now realised bombs must be used to force the Nationalist question onto the agenda (Patterson 1996: 44). The IRA tactic of provoking was proving successful. Yet, the SDLP was still making headway, as Protestant reformists were seeking to resolve the question at the conference table (Coogan 1995: 356-361).

The Army had acted on orders from Stormont, this new centralist restructuration of security was to create a solidification of the struggle that would force the IRA’s hand (Taylor 1997: 78). ‘One man, one vote’ had been achieved on April 22 1969. The young civil rights activist, Bernadette Devlin, had been elected to
Westminster in the Mid Ulster by-election on April 22 1969 (Farrell 1976: 255) Yet Stormont, and the Protestant parliamentary majority it symbolised, still existed. Little had been resolved, and as such a new strategy was used that would shift the responsibility of equality back on the very institution that the NICRA had opposed, the state (Lee 1995: 431). By August 1970, the cycle of violence instigated by the state in August 1969 was now proving too effective in mobilising nationalist opposition (Patterson 1997: 150-156). With the completion of each cycle of protest, the state’s power base steeped in harsh state security application and electoral gerrymandering, would become even more entrenched. It was here that the first move towards electoral participation was sought so as to exploit the political opportunity structures that the state was now offering, in order to delegitimise the militant nationalists (Hedges 1988: 104).

It was on 21 August 1970 that the six opposition Members of Parliament united to form a new political alliance on the strength of their reputations gained during the civil rights era. Gerry Fitt was a leader of the Republican Labour Party, Austin Currie a Nationalist and Paddy Devlin from the NILP; whilst John Hume, Ivan Cooper and Paddy O’Hanlon were prominent Independents (Farrell 1976: 275). This was a prime example of how many varying political interests can come together in an almost social movement manner and unite behind what was extensively a nationalist goal of self-preservation in numbers. It was those years of civil rights campaigning that formulated their new desire to formalise the hard won gains of the movement. As such, they had no intention of losing their movement status as they saw themselves merely as formalised structures of the demands established during the civil rights campaigns (Farren 1995: 1-2).

The community was politicised by its militancy, and the move towards formal channels ran the risk, nevertheless, of limiting the repertoire of the national movement, as well as granting the centre the right to negotiate and appease the periphery without fully addressing the national question. Yet, the power of London’s control over the province proved too strong. One by one, many NICRA activists realised that to ignore the state would be to the detriment of the Republican community.

Political power is greater in London and so you can only seek vindication of your political rights from those who hold political power and that’s where we had to go to get it and the civil rights movement was directed against the institutions here that denied civil rights which were supported.9
Nevertheless, Catholics remained skeptical about the utilisation of formalised political options in protecting rights won during the civil rights campaigns (Hamilton & Trimble 1995: 42). Especially if they still lacked the influence within state policing, security and public policy formation within the wider context of state engendered societal cleavages, as exemplified in the wake of ‘Bloody Sunday’ (Dillon 1995). As Roberts (1986: 18) points out from the Protestant perspective, schooled in the strategic battles with more militant wings of the Irish national movement, ‘constitutional’ nationalism is still nationalism.

With each move by the SDLP that demonstrated a willingness to partake in the political system, as with the acceptance of a venue at the July 7 1971 all party talks (Kelly 1972: 43-47), the Provisionals would counter these peace initiatives by hitting politically sensitive military targets (Farrell 1976: 280-281). The over reaction of the authorities in raiding some 342 Republican houses with 2500 troops and auxiliary staff on August 9 1971 with the implementation of internment, was to demonstrate the colonial nature of much of the security aspects of British rule (Boyce et al. 1975: 58; Bew et al. 1979: 183). A response that would lead to the IRA commencing a bombing campaign that would leave 35 dead after 100 explosions by the end of August (Taylor 1997: 93), yet would also give greater legitimacy to the IRA’s claim as being the army and the protector of the movement:

A subtle political change had taken place as well. Up to this point, mass support in the Northern Catholic population had been for civil rights and for reform within the Northern state, with Irish unity following gradually. Now most Northern Catholics felt that the Northern state was unreformable, and that they would only get civil rights in a united Ireland. Their objective was no longer to reform Northern Ireland but destroy it. (Farrell 1976: 284)

The necessity of organising the movement along clandestine lines for security purposes also led to an increased isolation of the political cadre from the people they represented (Boyce 1990: 42). A strategy of increased social agitation and visibility was necessary in order to increase the level of legitimacy for the IRA amongst the population at large. The problem was that it exposed many members of the civil wing to retribution at the hands of the security forces and Protestant terrorist organisations, though the leadership themselves would see this as an advantage in exposing the innate bias of the state (Rooney 1984: 80-81).

More significantly for the IRA, the resultant reaffirmation of radical Loyalism through the reintroduction of internment was to
force the moderate SDLP to leave the official political arena (Tomlinson 1980: 185; McCann 1993: 88-91). The SDLP could not be seen to continually support a system that now implemented the full force of the law against one specific community. When over 300 Catholics were arrested and not one Protestant was, the pro-Unionist bias of the judiciary, RUC, and Army was clear (Lee 1995: 437). This, in my opinion, accentuates how significant is the role of the state, as well as the way an elite formulates its official ideology of state formation, in defining the nature of a movement. The development is perpetual. Without the continuous recentralisation of the Security Forces towards arch conservative Loyalism, then the need for the SDLP to embrace nationalism would have been minimal. As it was, if the SDLP did not leave, then they would have been in the same situation as the Official IRA in 1969. SDLP legitimacy, as the voice for a marginalised community, would be questioned by the very community they represented.

The IRA in the meantime had little doubt of the significance state engendered integration and repression would play in structuring their own movement identity (Coogan 1995, 1996; Patterson 1997). The state was more than a fulcrum of popular discontent, it was the creator of the struggle in which a new Ulster national identity could be re-formed. An identity forged within the very militant ideological construct of the Ulster state that would leave many Catholics believing that the state did not even view them as an underclass as much as what Conversi (1994, 1995; see also Wilson 1991) calls the integral ‘other’. That is the ethnic and ideological juxtaposition to that of the state centre elite’s own vision of self. This left the Ulster elite to be viewed as exclusive and innately prejudicial. As Joe Austin of Sinn Féin intimated to me in explaining why the IRA may have embraced an ‘exclusive’ nationalist doctrines of state:

I think that there is a racial attitude that underlies that level of English society and I think that it applies right across the board in Ireland. It applies obviously to Sinn Féin, but it applies to the Irish in general and I think if that you look and reflect the treatment of, for instance of John Bruton, who’s the Prime Minister of the South of Ireland, if you reflect how he has been treated by John Major I think that racist element is at play there.10

The Ulster state was now viewed as not just exclusive, but also chauvinistic in the methods chosen to exclude the periphery. In response the IRA felt the necessity to ‘mimic’ the state likewise, by providing a similar ideological push for excluding the other in the hope of dismantling the state. The significance of co-ordinating
VDA with nationalist rhetoric of the events as a means of publicity generation was noted by the British War Office as far back as 1922, when reports declared Sinn Féin as possessing a publicity wing that was unrivalled in its ability of being “energetic, subtle and exceptionally skilful in mixing truth, falsehood and exaggeration...” (Laqueur 1987: 122). At the core was the desire of the IRA to take the role as the militant wing of the overall national movement, designed to take on the state at the slightest hint of increased state repression or a decrease in the reform processes (Hull 1976: 40).

Through continuing the cycle of protest-reform-protest, via taking the initiative over the state, the IRA had brought a reaction from a state seeking a cessation of the conflict (Boyce 1990: 42). The formation of the UDA, in the early summer of 1971, was a precursor to a new counter insurgency (Aughey & McIlheney 1984; McKeown 1989). Originally an Ulster vigilante organisation, the UDA would soon become the embodiment of anti-IRA state terrorism, until its outlawing in 1993 (Bruce 1992: 49-50). In fact Coogan (1996: 125) would call the UDA a ‘mirror’ movement of the IRA. The conflict was now militarising Protestant movement identity as a counter-point to IRA backed anti-state activism (Bruce 1989). This general polarisation would entrench the Ulster state more so than political union with Britain at the centre of Ulster national identity and moral authority (O'Dowd 1980: 1). A scenario the IRA was able to exploit in demonstrating the insolubility of the conflict within a Northern Irish state paradigm.

When paratroopers were called in from Belfast to quash Free Derry on January 30 1972, the role of the military had considerably changed (Osborne 1982: 154; Dillon: 106; Hamilton et al. 1995: 42). In the space of half an hour, 180 rounds of ammunition had been fired and 13 Catholic civilians lay dead (BBCTV). The Security Forces had responded and the Catholics were forced into action as reports emerged that the Army acted on the orders of Stormont and the British Government (Taylor 1997: 113). The IRA took this as an example of the duality of law within the statelet. A scenario that della Porta (1996) would see as integral in exposing the illegitimacy of the state’s monopoly on violence. In turn this itself contributes to an intensification of the reform process as elites scramble to absorb reemerging cyclical discontent. The dual implementation of law and order along ethno-national lines in divided communities leads to a scenario, as Weitzer (1995: 4) points out, whereby the state’s policing and security arms are viewed as the protectors of privilege of one community over another:
Policing in divided societies is organised first and foremost, then for the defence of a sectarian regime and the maintenance of a social order based on institutionalised inequality between dominant and subordinate communal groups (ibid.: 5).

In such circumstances what initially develops amongst marginalised communities as a strategy of protest tends to also develop into an act of political self-expression that leaves an indelible mark in the collective psyche of the community of activists as it gives the action a place within the continuum of past rebellions (Townshend 1987: 179; Bairner 1996: 159; see also Purdie 1990; Murray 1995). A continuum that places the state at the centre of the reactionary nature of the movement. The patterns of action-reaction-action were the same as those that were employed by Catholics in the 1840s and 1850s in the wake of the failures of the United Irishmen (Seton-Watson 1977: 40; Doherty & Poole 1995: 21). The upsurge of violence, be it from the state or against it, I believe symbolises the decline in the legitimacy of the state. The events surrounding the January 30 killing of 13 Catholic protesters that became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’ would mobilise a new generation to rebellion. A generation that with the completion of each cycle would become ever more sophisticated in reading the direction of the state’s future reforms and model their repertoire accordingly.

To Absorb, or to Exclude? The Reformulation of State Political Opportunity Structures and the Radicalisation of the Centre.

The introduction of non-jury courts and the modifications of the rules of evidence for ‘scheduled offences’ after the Diplock Report into the nature of the Northern Irish judicial system, and the lack of response from the mainland, was to convince many IRA activists that civil rights could only be guaranteed if the repressive regime was militarily defeated (Tomlinson 1980: 191). Terrorism would be important to both strategies, especially since ‘Bloody Sunday’, with the aim of bringing into question the British Army’s image of neutrality (McCann 1993: 107). This led to a radicalisation of the movement’s extremes in the face of widespread ‘P checks,’ SAS ‘Cracksquads’ and intelligence gathering exercises in Catholic neighbourhoods, leaving the Security Forces, according to Tomlinson (1980: 192), with a Janusian quality. One that at once would be seen as protector of the state and punisher of those on the state’s periphery.
The state had opted for the joint strategy of reconciliation and stringent policing (Coogan 1987: 209). The act of appeasement to the Catholics was to be the suspension of Stormont on March 22, 1972 (Boyd 1972: 68; Kelly 1972: 130; Dunn & Morgan 1994: 9). The IRA had succeeded where the NICRA had failed. Yet, this new direct rule was tainted by an increase in state security. With a people’s sense of identification ignored by the state, this reinforcement of ‘British’ justice through the ‘right of might’ left little option but to identify their own personal struggle with that of the national movement (O’Connell 1993: 37; Coogan 1996: 171). A position solidified by the reactionary state centre:

The point is that the extent to which people are prepared to resort to violence as a possible solution to conflict is largely determined by the strength of commitment and identity with respective, and presumably conflicting, aspirations. For some people in Northern Ireland, and identity with either or a united Ireland is the single most important fact of their lives. Indeed, for some it is almost a sine qua non. It should not be surprising therefore that they will go to any lengths to protect and promote their respective identities both for themselves and for their children (Murray 1995: 226).

This was the basis of Republican discontent with the state which the Provisionals were willing to exploit. As Maguire (1996: 4) has shown CS gas and plastic bullets radicalises activists, whilst heightening the futility of peaceful demonstration against the contemporary weaponry of the state. Ideologically, the Provisionals began to seek a new method of engaging the state so as to retake possession of the pace of reform. The rescinding of Stormont was seen as a tactical move by the British Government designed to de-escalate the crisis (Harkness 1983: 170). Yet, the fundamental issue of what to do with the new radical nationalism, born of struggle, was left unresolved.

The first sign of a new offensive emerged after William Whitelaw had been named the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. A new bombing campaign commenced to assure the authorities that the radical national movement would not be satisfied with the suspension of Stormont (MacStiofáin 1975: 242; Lee 1995: 441). A total review of Britain’s role in Northern Ireland was demanded. By June 13 the commencement of an all out attack on the state monolith would lead to MacStiofáin, McGuinness, O’Connell and Twomey calling a halt to action for seven days (Coogan 1996:...
The state responded with opposition leader Wilson being sent to Belfast to negotiate (Coogan 1995: 392). On the 15th, the four IRA representatives, plus Adams, were flown to Chelsea, London, for talks with Whitelaw (Whitelaw 1989: 100). The state was to listen. Yet both sides were so polarised that peace was unattainable as two competing national identities, shaped by the same cycles of reform-protest-reform, ‘mimicked’ each other to a stand still (White 1984: 128-130).

The suspension of habeas corpus through the implementation of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act would prove a catalyst for the IRA seeking to prove the bias of British rule (Wilkinson 1976: 16). The state had upped the pressure and was itself radicalising according to the nature of peripheral response to increased state centralisation. At the core of this was the introduction of ‘counter insurgency’ theory into direct policing and security maintenance within the British state (Rolston & Tomlinson 1982: 23). One that would force the IRA to ‘mimic’ the changes within the state policing environment in their own strategy of selected VDA implementation.

The development of the strategy of “counter insurgency” by Lieutenant General Sir Frank Kitson as a tactical response to anti-colonial movements in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Oman, and the subsequent implementation in Northern Ireland was to demonstrate, not only the attitude, but also the belief of the peripheral nature of the national movement’s claim within British political society (Rolston & Tomlinson 1982: 28; Dillon 1991: 28). Kitson, the veteran of the Cyprian Campaign against EOKA, was to play a major role in training the Security Forces at the Camberly Staff College, and with the commandeering of the Third Battalion Royal Green Jackets in West Belfast in 1972 and 1973, the British Government was clearly sending the message that the state was prepared to declare a clandestine war against the IRA rather than listen to the demands of the radical wing of the Irish Nationalist community (Rolston & Tomlinson 1982: 28; Dorril & Ramsay 1991: 212). The state sought to justify its extreme extra-parliamentary modus operandii through over playing the significance of the opposite movement to the survival of the state and the de-escalation of the militancy within the cycle of protest:

Security systems actively seek to maximise their autonomy from civil society- by exaggerating the seriousness of threats to the nation and stressing their “ultra-sensitive” position, “dangerous” work, and the need for absolute secrecy in decision making (Weitzer 1990: 6).
Yet, it would also be a mistake to believe that the state is somehow the ‘blackbox’, ‘unproblematically registering and punitively responding to social stimuli’ without movements fully having control of their own action (Weitzer 1990: 7). The reality of Northern Ireland is that the state in many ways has been the progenitor of the crisis. A militarisation and criminalisation of the crisis in which the state has actively sought to place the Irish Republican movement’s goals outside the state’s agenda. The IRA more often than not would ‘mimic’ the state so to place its demands at the centre’s attention, whilst forcing the state to themselves openly engage in the struggle to highlight its collusion with militant Protestant goals (Patterson 1997: 153). This was adeptly done via timing upswings in the instigation of VDA with the exact moment when the state centre was lulled into a false sense of security concerning their successful de-escalation of the crisis. Kitson’s role was to combine de-escalation and attrition in order to slow IRA responses (Dillon 1994: 98).

Not only had it placed the Northern Irish question on the centre of the political agenda, it also demonstrated to the Irish community that in times of great extremes they were to be considered as hostile aliens by the British state. A status that would not be afforded to their co-citizens of the Protestant faith, nor the large Catholic community on the mainland. This was the advantage of VDA, it was an apt tool of polarisation in times of overall political apathy and movement lethargy. Civil rights of the Irish were considered inconsequential to the overall needs of British state security (Dillon 1991: 170). If this could be significantly demonstrated then the cause could no longer be mistakenly negated.

Thus, it became more evident that organised Irish oppositional activism was viewed by the British media, police, army and the parliamentarians as anti-British, and as such, the IRA’s demands for a resolution of the Northern Irish question within an ‘All-Ireland’ framework became less plausible (Curtis 1984). The end effect of the bombing campaigns was not just successful mobilisation that came directly after the suspension of habeas corpus, but also as a measure of the legitimacy of the British state authority in the province which was at the heart of the state’s inability to attract wider Catholic support (Wilkinson 1976: 16). The highest point of violence was reached in the ‘Troubles’ in 1972 when 467 people were killed, which included 103 Army officers and soldiers. By 1973 the killings had decreased to 250, and 216 in 1974 (Laqueur 1987: 10-11). What this shows contrary to Laqueur's own theory, is that in times of heightened conciliation, the amount of deaths dropped, as during the Sunningdale period.
This escalation in times of crisis, and the de-escalation in times of truce, highlight the strategic nature of employed violence, and how it was used as a tool by the IRA to convince the authorities of the seriousness of their claims.

It will be argued by some that without paramilitarism, the possibility of new and lasting constitutional arrangements for Northern Ireland would never have come about. Conversely, many may feel that without the paramilitaries, new arrangements would have been unnecessary (Bairner 1996: 167).

The problem facing the SDLP was that much of the legitimacy they had gained in the disbandment of Stormont and the attainment of full enfranchisement by 1973 was lost amongst the militants who felt that the adoption of parliamentary means was a betrayal of the values of the movement (Lee 1995: 442-443). Throughout the formation of Fitt and Devlin’s Towards a New Ireland policy, that sought a constitutional transition to join Dublin and London rule, such concerns were becoming evident (Patterson 1996: 45). More importantly, this meant a legitimation of the role of British participation as a congruent for Unionist political opinion, as well as a guarantee of their right to continued existence. This was a stance that the IRA would find difficult to uphold as it was a signal of a shift away from the traditional strategies of Republican protest into the uncharted waters of British electoral politics (Ibid.: 46).

Sunningdale and Direct Rule: The Recentralisation of State and the Emergence of a New British State Paradigm.

The IRA had to face the political reality that any move towards formalisation would have to be countered by an awareness of the inaffordability of relinquishing the militant strategy. Terrorism had become a significant tool in forcing the centre to review past strategies of control and policing (Murray 1982; Lee 1995). Yet, it had failed to shake the resolve of the security forces in confronting the resistance. The movement needed a responsive arm that would ‘mimic’ the intent of the state, and ensure their capability of dictating the pace of the state’s response. The period, up to the Sunningdale era, had taught the Nationalist community that a broad based strategy was needed and the time for reconciliation between centre and periphery was still far off.

With the decline of the Stormont Protestant monolith, both London and Dublin thought that the solution of direct rule would for now
placate the interests of the Republican minority (Boyd 1972: 68; Lee 1995: 461). A point seemingly acceptable to the Dublin parliament with its recognition in Paragraph Five of the Sunningdale Communique which recognised the constitutional status of the Northern Irish statelet. This was to lead to the strange scenario of the pro-Nationalist SDLP being portrayed in Britain as being pro-system and the ultra-Loyalists as anti-system (Coogan 1995: 351-352). In turn, this placed the Catholic community in the unusual position of being the lynchpin for the reform process of the very system they had actively campaigned against during the times of the civil rights movement of the 1960s (Arthur 1988: 70). A position hard to justify to a constituency schooled in anti-state rhetoric.

Dublin was looking for closure, and London an end to terror (Carty 1996: 158). This placed a great importance on the success of Sunningdale, one that in many ways would fail to see the impossibility of resolving legally the crisis instigated and run by dissident movements who demanded inclusion but never fully expected to receive it (Hadden & Boyle 1989: 26). Full enfranchisement and the introduction of proportional representation in 1973, as a consequence of the British Government’s White Paper on Constitutional Proposals, could not nevertheless influence the political environment when the heart of social policy in a non-devolved parliamentary setting lay under the centralised auspices of the Northern Ireland Office (Birrel 1978: 34-36). This signified a substantial loss to the Unionist Party as its monopoly over governance of the province was significantly eroded as Direct Rule would create more political opportunity structures for Catholics to exploit within the overall cycle of ‘reform-protest-reform’.

It was however in the March 20 1973 White Paper that the government recognised that no full representation could occur without the full exception of the sectarian nature of Northern Irish politics, and recommendation for the formation of a 78 seat unicarmel assembly elected by the single transferable vote method of proportional representation (Rumpf & Hepburn 1977: 208-209). In many ways, this was admitting defeat for class based political platforms, as it recognised that the ‘Troubles’ could solely be defined in nationalist terms. The police, justice, security, elections and all matters concerning enfranchisement, would be directly administered from Westminster. The fact that the vast majority of first preference votes for the June 28 Northern Ireland Assembly elections went to parties whose platforms were clearly defined as Catholic or Protestant further entrenched the sectarian cleavages
within Northern Irish electoral politics (Osborne 1982: 156-161; Lee 1995: 442-443). The SDLP were able to establish the acceptance of such constitutional means of addressing the national question through winning some 19 seats, as this was seen as a rejection of IRA policies steeped in redressing issues through awakening nationalist consciousness via increasing the cycle of violence-repression-violence (Rumpf & Hepburn 1977: 210).

The anti-violence platform had enabled Fitt, the SDLP’s founding president, to reach the position of Deputy Chief Executive of the Executive. This was a reward for their adoption of constitutional strategies and essentially gave them the de facto title of official ‘Republican’ opposition (Faulkner 1978: 247). Cashing in on this overwhelming popular will, the SDLP pushed their weight behind supporting the Northern Irish state on issues of constitutional violence and repression (Dunn & Morgan 1994: 9). This was risky, as the state had mobilised a campaign of internment that was aimed at the heart of militant Republican resistance. On the positive side however, the SDLP were convinced that they were single handedly successful in bringing about an ‘Irish dimension’ to the reformed constitutional arrangements of Northern Irish government (Fitzgerald 1973: 140-141).

It became clear to many Nationalists that this unexpected poll would challenge their electoral legitimacy, as it would the Loyalist camp, to a process of political reform which had too often looked elitist in makeup (Dunn & Morgan 1994: 8-10). The fact that it was two months after the Executive was formed also allowed the anti-Sunningdale Protestants to run on the undemocratic nature of its implementation (Fisk 1975: 45-48). They formed the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) to run a campaign of one candidate in each constituency, winning 52% of the vote as well as 11 of the 12 contested seats (Flackes & Elliot 1989: 319-322). Yet, the May 14 Ulster Worker’s Council (UWC) strike was to play havoc with these strategies for a while to come (Rumpf & Hepburn 1977: 212). It was a mirroring of earlier Catholic inspired movement action, and proved just as effective on the side of the state elite (O’Connor 1996: 48). As the former Minister of Home Affairs William Craig (1974: 737-738) stated about the intent of much of the radical unionists in opposing the power sharing arrangement between both communities:

...we must not prop up the undemocratic form of administration that now exists in Northern Ireland; there is not the necessary consent for the present constitutional formula.
The problem for Nationalists was that the Premiership of Merlyn Rees in the Northern Ireland Office would, through the canvassing of devolution in the wake of the failure of Sunningdale, lead to a return to civil strife as the direct result of the reassertion of the Protestant ascendancy (Roberts 1986: 10). An ascendancy fostered by the insistence of the Secretary of State in opening lines with the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) over strategy of protests (Coogan 1996: 202).

Eventually, after two years, the Whitelaw policy was in disarray. The fact that the SDLP only operated seriously as a power within its own constituency had much to do with their inability to halt the collapse of Sunningdale. Most of its energies were concentrated on undermining the electoral capacity of the extremist wing of the Republican Movement (Hammil 1985: 144-145). This closed the doors to full Irish participation within the reform process, and at once strengthening the power of the Protestant centre (Farren & Mulvihill 1995: 4). In fact this was to undermine its stance within its own community, which during the initial failures of the Sunningdale Agreement’s reform process had risen significantly (Arthur 1996a: 71).

Rightly or wrongly, many moderate Nationalists viewed the SDLP’s seeming lack of interest in internment issues and its participation in what was viewed as a government of occupation as signs of its betrayal of the national cause (Rumpf & Hepburn 1977: 214). This was to manifest itself in the loss of two seats in the following election (ibid.). Though, the respectability gained from years of successful movement activism perhaps saved them from a more humiliating fate. Especially, considering their public humiliation in the face of Sunningdale’s collapse, which had been the centre piece of their platform for constitutional reform (Downey 1983: 134).

It is doubtful that the Sunningdale Agreement’s joint power sharing arrangement would have emerged if it were not for the polarisation of the electoral system as a result of the increased tensions between centre and periphery (Arthur 1974, 1987; Aughey 1996). Yet, it would also never have reached a point of potential consolidation were it not for the efforts of the SDLP in speaking for the ‘moderate’ voice of the Republican community. O’Dowd (1980: 21) notes that the strategy of attempting to resolve the crisis through the adoption of parliamentary means placed the movement at a disadvantage due to the ‘compartimentalisation’ of the movement into legal and illegal subsections. In this sense, I believe that this only served to diminish the fluidity of options available to a movement willing to juggle NVDA, VDA and more formalised
routes of mobilisation. The state, as shown in della Porta and Tarrow’s (1986) study into the Italian state’s creation of political opportunity structures to counter leftist terrorism, gains ascendancy over the movement by dangling carrots in order to include moderates, whilst waving a baton over the militants. Thus, diminishing a social movement’s options and increasing the state’s role as adjudicator. At once granting legitimacy it could never attain in a cycle successfully manipulated by the peripheral movement.

For the IRA, a new era had emerged to exploit, as it now became clear in the wake of the UWC strike action and the subsequent collapse of Sunningdale that no state reform was possible without destroying the Loyalist monopolistic demographic base (Bruce 1993: 95). The solution was a radicalisation of the ‘Troubles’ and the realisation that only through an irredentist policy could this demographic discrepancy be addressed. Yet, this did not fully disrupt their slow move towards embracing more formal links with the established political system of state. For now any form of established electoral participation was viewed as pro-Ulster rhetoric and hence could not address the Nationalist question if it was not innately predisposed to the Nationalist community (McKinley 1987: 190). In fact, it was not till 1979 that one could see the move towards an embracement of electoral politics as violence was proving too strong a polariser (Coogan 1995: 502-512). The corresponding reorientation of both Sinn Féin, and Herri Batasuna in the Basque Country, suggests that the links forged between the Basque Revolutionary Party (EIA) and the Provisionals provided more than simply moral links. They were to be strategic and logistic as well (McKinley 1987: 190).

The Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Response of the Provisional IRA to the Reassertion of Protestant Loyalism.

The promulgation of the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act, the subsequent increase in legal surveillance, and the emergence of the SAS as a policing tool, would be viewed by the moderate SDLP as an attempt to halt civic development which would have led to a greater liberalisation of the democratic structures of state (Taylor 1997: 174). The IRA however saw this as a clear negating of the ‘Irish’ community from the political equation. Their response was to take the campaign onto the mainland. Amongst the British Government, this intensification of the conflict, after the
Birmingham bombings, was used as an excuse to reorientate official British policy to the protection of the Union rather than an ensurer of peace (Weitzer 1990: 217):

This is why the struggle in the North is founded in the contradiction between popular notions of justice and the application of the ‘rule of law’. It also explains why the struggle has come to be waged military and through embryonic and temporary forums of popular democracy constructed around attempts to resist state power (Rolston & Tomlinson 1982: 42).

Something was stirring, strategically speaking, amongst the radical sector of the national movement and the December 8 1974 break from the Official IRA of Seamus Costello, and Bernadette McAliskey,12 to form the Irish Republican Socialist Party after his dismissal from the Ard Comhairle (Executive Council) accentuated the change (Holland & McDonald 1994; Bairner 1996: 162). It became clear that for the IRA, shared Government was not an option, and only through engaging the state, or more likely threatening the state, could the national question be resolved. Both communities were caught within a permanent stratification of the struggle, which led to one feeding off the radicalism of the other, as Boyle and Hadden (1994: 56) state:

In this sense the correct description of the nature of the communities in Northern Ireland is dependent on the actions and policies of others, the paramilitaries, the leaders of the main political parties and the British and Irish Governments.

This perpetual shaping and reshaping of doctrine in accordance to shifting state structures of inclusion and exclusion would only highlight the role of the centre’s Security Forces in consolidating the crisis as a means to resolving the now extremist peripheral demands. For the IRA to exist it must ensure the continuation of the cycle of action-reaction-action, and correspondingly increase its repertoire to assist this (Murray 1995: 226). What the SDLP and the NICRA activist core politicians failed to recognise, and the IRA did, was that formalisation, or more correctly, the conduits placed on participation and eventual inclusion in the political processes, would do little to address the core problem of conflict. That is the inability of the Protestant ascendancy to share power with an emerging elite and competing ideological movement (van der Wusten 1988: 193). It was with this in mind that I feel that the IRA leadership sought an escalation of the cycle in order to reclaim lost ground as they became more aware that as things stood the radical
Ulsterism were gaining the ascendancy.13

What was to be the rallying card for much of the radicalisation of the movement came with the implementation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, as a tool of policing in 1975 after the slow phasing out of internment, due to the recommendation of Rees’ White Paper on the issue, between from July 4 1974 to its end in December 1975 (Coogan 1980: 52; Hillyard & Boyle 1982: 1). This was seen as the final implementation of the Diplock Committee report’s findings that tended to be more concerned with law and order rather than resolving the national question; the decision to trial without jury seemed to support this (Hadden & Boyle 1988: 55). The basis of these courts was to extend the role of the military powers to include arrest and prosecution (Hillyard & Boyle 1982: 1). This consolidated the Army’s position as moral authority of state. The IRA now could reshape itself as the militant protector of the entire movement as well as Republican civil order. Significantly, the cycle had come full circle. Like MacStiofáin in the early 1960s, Adams was incarcerated for 18 months on October 15 1974, taking the opportunity to write a weekly column for the Republican News that would become the IRA’s ideological and strategic platform for the next twenty years (Taylor 1997: 200).

The statistics spoke for themselves, between 1969 and 1977, although Catholics were 37% of the population they constituted 47% of all the victims of the violence, 65% of murdered civilians and 88% of those shot by the Security Forces (Murray 1982: 313). There seemed to be a relation between peak years of violent activity and years that symbolise the greatest rise in political discontent with the implementation of governmental security policies (Bairner 1996: 159-161). I believe this suggests how an increase in policing by the state has in fact moulded the nature of the response by the IRA, with VDA being used as the preferred strategy when ‘overt’ policing strategies and the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act had been implemented.

According to Gunther (1992) and Tilly (1984b, 1985) this is a natural response in periods of elite initiated state shifts in power, either through democratisation, or elite transference processes, when the state is vulnerable. This occurs when the state utilises coercive institutions as a reaction to a threat to their predominance, be it pacifist, or violent in nature (Weitzer 1990: 1-2). Yet such tendency to brand the IRA as an internal enemy would not be accepted by a community that had come to view VDA as far from mindless brutes but as somewhat strategic actors in the overall defence of the national movement:
The violence is often presented in terms of amoral ‘godfathers’ seducing young people into criminal acts. If this was the case, then solutions would be much easier to achieve (Murray 1995: 225).

Yet, at the 1977 Army Council, the now declining Official IRA would put an end to their members adoption of VDA as a legitimate means of political protest (Rooney 1984: 87). The Provisionals did not follow suit. The reality on the ground dictated the fact that the IRA had to remain responsive to an increase in ‘overt’ policing if they were to retain relevance. In the view of the Provisionals, the new core problem of the “Troubles” was no longer found amongst the established Protestant elite’s ascendancy per se, but rather in the alliance this elite had formed politically and militarily with the British Army (Dunn & Hennessey 1996: 179). The IRA was now coming to realise that the state, in its role of elite bastion, had given birth to a counter nationalism that would become equally legitimate as that proffered by the periphery, one that had to be given equal weight to that of the Republican community’s identity. As Joe Austin suggested:

I think that what we have to acknowledge is that the Loyalist community are not an ethnic mistake, they are not something that is just created, that the Loyalist community has fears that are real fears and they are genuine fears. I think that we have to facilitate those fears and that it is our responsibilities with others to alleviate those fears.14

If these fears were not alleviated then there was a risk of IRA action creating an environment that could readily minimise the opportunity for future reconciliation. The state was now taking the initiative, and as such, realising that an increase in violence could in fact enhance their status as the keepers of peace in an intercine conflict. With this in mind the Ulster elite did not seek resolution, as their earlier fears of the radical Fenian was being proven correct, all be it with the aid of an intensification of state policing (Gallagher 1995: 33).

In such circumstances, the role of the state is not designed to form consensus, but rather to maintain social division (Enloe 1980). Thus, the cycle of protest was being ridden by the Protestants to ensure their ascendancy; where VDA had thrown the cat amongst the pigeons was that this could only work as long as the discord, and hence the targets, were dictated by the centre not the periphery. In one move, the British had not only entrenched the authoritative nature of their military presence, but innately tied the security of
the North to the Union thus negating much of the demands of the IRA from the political process. What the crisis was doing was legitimising the role of the British state as mediator between the two competing ideologies. A position the SDLP was willing to play as Alex Atwood stated:

Now there are elements within the British Government and the British Parliament that are not inclined to go down that road because they see that that is a redefinition of the British Union, they see that that is somehow conceding to terrorists.15

The political space that national movements themselves give the nationalist cause is that they alone can provide the infrastructure needed to balance the politically variant ideologies of Right and Left in the guise of a loosely associated national front. It is here that I disagree with Rumpf and Hepburn’s (1977: 219) conclusions that movements are solely concerned with social progress rather than the full attainment of statehood. An argument that runs contrary to the thoughts of Tilly (1993b) who shows how the movement’s main concern is with the way nationalism is seen as the vehicle to social revolution, and even what I would call social reformation. I would suggest that their argument shows how economic masters became national, as well as class, enemies. Northern Ireland proves the fact that nationalism can in fact unite varying social classes with varying concerns into a formidable political force that sees social change as an embodiment of the national right to sovereignty. Thus, placing sovereignty outside of the centre, as the main objective of movements seeking equality of opportunity that the state denies them. This follows on from what Maguire (1996b: 4) has attributed to the adaptability of nationalism as an ideology of movement mobilisation:

Nationalism has not so much created a single ‘routine of contention’ but has created a multitude of such routines which cause internal dissent but also enormous explosions of activity which catches its enemies, and even its so-called leaders, off guard at times.

This means that the need for a movement does not decline after the initial gains of the first wave of protest. In fact it may act as an adjunct to the formalisation of movements into political parties as the electoral option in itself is but merely an extension of protest repertoire into more legalistic and parliamentary fields, as shown in Brand’s (1978: 29) study into Scottish nationalism in the wake of the re-emergence of the ‘Troubles’ in the 1970s. This demonstrated
the success of both the SDLP and IRA, in the British context, of attaining a voice in the established political system through accepting party political formalisation in formal as a means of accessing a state controlled by a definable competing national elite (Hamilton et al. 1995: 75). A new tactic was sought that would place moderates in a position to at once challenge the state whilst formulating a viable nationalist agenda that could be accepted by both sides.

The consequences of moving towards a constitutional solution, concurrent to an increased role for the Army in policing, was to place a constraint on the liberalisation of the RUC (Weitzer 1995: 16). In fact, the establishment of the Police Complaints Board in 1977 never fully satiated the IRA, due to the fact that it dealt solely with internal complaints. What was not addressed were important civil rights issues, as the rescinding of the Emergency Provisions and Prevention of Terrorism Acts (Tomlinson 1980: 188). The subsequent protest held on the behalf of police doctors, the UDA, the Police Authority, the NICRA and the SDLP were of little effect. The findings of the 1979 Bennett Report stated that police strategies in fact hampered rather than defeated the fight against terrorism, suggesting that the Ulster elite had little intention of employing non-confrontational strategies of policing (Coogan 1980: 137; Tomlinson 1980: 188).

Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, had been de facto isolated from the political system, due to the continued militancy of the IRA. The space needed to accommodate them throughout the 1970s was simply not there, which heightened the perceptions of the electoral system being inept in resolving a conflict built on the loss of confidence with the state (Boyce 1991: 369). Peace without IRA consent is superfluous, for it is denying the right of enfranchisement of a significant proportion of the Republican community. Yet, from a structural perspective the IRA itself would lose much of its weight within the movement if it was to move away from its position of strength, that of its ability to strike at the heart of the British state through VDA. This only serves to show how the British-Unionist Axis of this period was by nature exclusive; and the statelet of Ulster once again became their fiefdom independent of main land norms in public policy formation.

Successful national movements hence turn the strategy of oppression back onto the state, engaging the state similarly in order to spread its resources. A national movement based solely on NVDA is easily restricted through concentrated policing. One however that is diverse in strategy, spreading the state’s resources
as the state can never be sure from whence the next attack will emerge. It is here, in spreading the state troops off in many directions, that the IRA, in its Green Book, was able to manipulate the cycle that the state had instigated via challenging the state’s ability to concentrate its energies into one point of access (Coogan 1975: 205, 1996: 245-251). In terms of the overall movement they also enabled the creation of strategic space within the perpetual structure of state and periphery development in, following on from Tarrow (1996: 45), as much as new options created were able to form new opportunities for the expansion of movement repertoire and future activism against the state.

The problem with terrorism was that by itself it could not bring around the desired political solution (della Porta 1983, 1992a; della Porta & Tarrow 1986). Terrorism was an extension of the movement’s strategy, as acknowledged by Adams (Shamrock & Devenport 1997: 238-239), designed to cause maximum confusion (Wilkinson 1976: 3). Its role was to highlight the plight of an aggrieved minority at the expense of the state by utilising implied threat as a signal, as della Porta and Rucht (1995) seem to suggest, that if conditions are not taken seriously within governmental structures, then the movement will have little recourse but to react outside the official channels of state conflict resolution. The problem is that the restructuration of identity has created a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ scenario (Miller 1978: 153-157; Boyce 1991: 364; Ignatieff 1993: 21; Dunn & Hennessey 1996: 179). What Tilly (1985) saw only served to solidify the relationship between state and periphery in perpetual conflict leaving the cycle of protest to continue on its way (Hechter 1985: 19-20; Lustick 1985). A situation that would lead to the criminalisation of the conflict (Rolston & Tomlinson 1982: 29).

It is also interesting how Boyle and Hadden (1994: 66) have noted that it is in times of increased paramilitary violence that a counter-tendency emerges, due in part to fear for personal safety, whereby people feel obliged to align themselves with a specific party in order to express their sentiments electorally. This, from an IRA perspective, can be viewed as both a mobilisation of popular discontent for the wrong cause, that of the legitimisation of the preexisting system as the best means to conflict resolution that the movement is ideologically opposed to (Lustick 1985: 8-9; MacLaughlin 1993: 97), and the justification for the continued existence of this system as the sole means of conflict resolution defeats much of the purpose of the original action (Hennessey 1993: 35).
Preparing The Next Wave: The Expansion of IRA Repertoire as a Cyclical Response to the State’s criminalisation of the Movement.

It was the Hunger Strikes that were to symbolise the power of protest in a period when effective harm of the self, rather than direct harm of the other was to grant the IRA, as a movement, the rarefied position of martyrdom (Beresford 1987). A position they could never fully claim on the British mainland schooled in the dialectic of the bomb and anti-British rhetoric. In such an environment, NVDA would have to undertake a more dramatic nature capable of capturing the attention of a population fearing an escalation of the crisis in their own backyard. The Ulster state and British constitutionalism remained the enemy. Thus, to play at reconciliation in an environment that still negated the national question, would only serve to isolate the Republican movement from its community.

Many Protestant Unionists had come to view the successful civil action that saw the downfall of Stormont as a defeat of a system of government that was representative of the majority of the population in the name of a vocal, innately anti-Ulster, minority (Hennessey 1995: 8). In the aftermath of ‘Bloody Sunday’ much of the NVDA was seen as sectarian insurrection and would, as such, be dealt with accordingly by the security forces. The next battle would have to deal directly with the issues of those who had been caught up in the cycle of action-reaction-action. From a civil rights perspective the most worrying factor was the importance placed upon interrogation at the centre of attaining convictions. This led to an increase in the number of suspects held without charge on suspicion of crimes against the Anti-Terrorist Acts. In comparison with the rest of Britain the rates of arrest without charge were substantially higher: some 65% of those arrested in Northern Ireland were held without charge compared to 15% in England and Wales, of which 94% were convicted compared to 82% in England and Wales; this seemed somewhat prejudicial (Hillyard & Boyle 1982: 5-6). It was also in direct contradiction to Article 15 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Yet it was not until the Maze Prison riots of 1976 that imprisonment, let alone civil justice, was to take on a highly politicised form (Rolston & Tomlinson 1982: 27).

It was at once an acknowledgement of the innate polarisation between the state and the minority Nationalist community, as well as a declaration that for the state the main issue was not the national
question, but, rather a security issue as now the Catholic question would be equated to that of state security (Boyce 1990: 39-43). It is here that Weitzer (1990: 4) feels that the Army and the RUC fall into the a pattern of response common amongst most settler societies who view security forces as ‘designed to perpetuate racial, ethnic, or religious domination through the suppression of threats from the subordinate population.’ As an anonymous British Army Major stated in the Guardian on November 1980:

some people believe in selective internment. I believe in selective assassination (Rolston & Tomlinson 1982: 29).

The unifying nature of the ‘Hunger Strikes,’ and their value as a tool for movement mobilisation was proven in the involvement of the GAA, in an official capacity, in fund raising for the families of the Hunger Strikers (Sugden & Harvie 1995: 13). An action that controversially saw, for the first time, the support of a Provisionals initiated action by a conservative movement traditionally more inclined to concentrate solely on cultural, rather than socio-political, issues of national importance. By the late 1970s the base for this new method of popular mobilisation was to become an effective tool in mobilising a Republican community publicly disgruntled with the political processes of the day. The relevance of the 1916 heritage to contemporary Belfast and Derry was few and far between (Moxon-Browne 1982: 95-98; Lee 1995: 369). The community needed a contemporary symbol and contemporary martyrs that had lived through internment and British policing the way they had. The October 28 1980- October 3 1981 Hunger Strikes which claimed ten lives, and especially the fasting to death on May 5 1981 of Bobby Sands was to provide the ritualised spectacle required to complete the cycle and usher in an era of new ‘martyrs’. Each death was significant, since it provided the necessary open demonstration that had not been seen since the fall of Stormont (Beresford 1987; Campbell 1994: 178).

The funerals decorated with paraphernalia and symbols of resistance, such as the tricolours, rosary beads and crucifixes draped on the coffins of young martyrs, ‘redeemed from a life of violence”through their ultimate personal sacrifice, was an evocative scene that challenged past glories such as the 1969 Belfast-Derry march and the August 1969 Free-Derry riots (Taylor 1997: 298). Granting a sense of continuity, allowing this ‘time the ghost of 1916 not merely walking, as in 1966, but being reinforced by new volunteers- ghosts, week after week’ (O’Brien 1994: 171). The line between peace activist and men of violence were thinly drawn and the fluidity of the two allowed for a commonality to
emerge between the two extremes of the national movement in the cause of the people.

In Ireland, as well as in Britain, the general longing for an end to political violence has become the IRA’s greatest asset. Partly, this is a mechanical and general phenomenon. The more you crave for peace, the more you may come to be dependent on the men of violence, who alone can supply you with that which you crave (O’Brien. 1994: 172).

The greatest success of the Hunger Strikes was the embarrassment caused to the British Government as their own record on prison and human rights abuses was shown up by this most extreme of actions and sacrifices. Both Farren and Mulvihill (1995: 4-5) note this effectiveness lay in their ability of throwing government strategies into disarray as it became clearer that the proposed talks between Haughey and Thatcher were quite exclusive in nature; even leading to the tacit recognition at the December 1980 Haughey-Thatcher summit that further IRA exclusion would prove futile.

What was now sought was a complete redress of the nature of Protestant predominance within the established political system. It was only through placing the periphery at the centre, through proffering an ‘All-Ireland’ solution, would the issue of separate state centre-periphery development be addressed. It was with this in mind that the IRA were to enter the 1980s ever more sure that the key to survival as a movement lay in the polarisation of society. In order to ensure the significance of the national movement within the continuum of the cycle of protest, and parallel state-centre/peripheral movement development.

GO TO CHAPTER VIII
Strategically, the greatest shift for the Nationalist movement was the resignation of Gerry Fitt from the leadership of the SDLP in 1979. The emergence of John Hume as the new leader, with the high esteem that he was held in from his civil rights days, was to shift formalised Republican politics back to the larger issues, rather than concentrating on internal settlement between the two communities. Hume’s role was clear. He was to engage the state at all levels, legally, and attempt to internationalise the ‘Troubles’ so as to force a review of official British policy that sought to portray the ‘Troubles’ in terms of intercine tribal rivalry. At the core of this was the push to increase the role of both London and Dublin in further rapprochement between the state and Republican community which was to become the lynchpin of the formation of the Forum of New Ireland on May 30 1983 (Aughey 1996: 79-80).

What Hume was attempting was more importantly a rapprochement with Sinn Féin and the IRA. Relations had been strained over issues of party participation, the Hunger Strikes, and the open fight for the Catholic vote since the decline of the NICRA as a political factor (Aughey 1996: 80). The plan was to form one Republican block, with the SDLP as the moderate voice at its head, which would clearly mark the divide politically between the pre-NICRA and post-NICRA political landscape (Arthur 1996: 67). The problem was that the IRA itself viewed this as a negating of their political influence through denying them the one tool that gave them significant power: that of their ability to strike at the state through direct military means on behalf of the militant Republican community. Yet, the successful formation of a Nationalist block would have the effect of squeezing the Unionist out of the equation. Already the SDLP’s candidate’s withdrawal from the April 9 1981 Fermanagh-South by-election had allowed Bobby Sand’s, Hunger Striker, to win a seat in Parliament (Adams 1996: 292; Bairner 1996: 163; Taylor 1997: 240).
Ideology?

Adams by 1981 had realised the importance of forming broad united fronts to ensure the demands made by the Hunger Strikers were met (van der Wusten 1988: 193). Central to this was ensuring that the movement would be less elitist and enter the political arena along the lines of the NICRA’s elite’s transition into the SDLP (Hedges 1988: 110). The shift in strategy towards a more conciliatory platform would emerge concurrently with the processes that would lead to the Anglo-Irish Agreement’s re-emphasis of the significance of communal rights to any future resolution of the crisis and power sharing arrangements (Dunn & Morgan 1994: 9; Farren 1995: 4). This was a redefinition of relations between Sinn Féin and the SDLP, as the UDA and RUC were themselves forging a new axis with the British Army.

Adams and McGuinness seemingly recognised that Sinn Féin had won even more electoral support from peace talks than they ever did in times of increased terrorist action (Boyce 1991: 369). For Sinn Féin, electoral participation gave them an avenue to test their public legitimacy in the wake of the ‘Hunger Strike’ campaigns of 1980-81 (Coogan 1996: 282-283; Taylor 1997: 382-383), in order to ensure that the SDLP’s moderate line would not dominate fully the Republican movement’s formalised political platform (Aughey 1996: 78). Especially, considering that much of the split in the NICRA between the SDLP and Sinn Féin occurred over the abstentionist debate (Hedges 1988: 104). Yet, it would also be a mistake to believe that lines of communication between the two groups were non-existent. They were after all, united in their desire to dismantle Ulster.

Whenever Fitzgerald and Hume denounce the IRA, this is the most consumate humbug, but it is politically necessary humbug and the IRA understands this political necessity and does not get upset about it (Roberts 1986: 26).

The legitimation of the Irish national angle, in terms of the 1985 endorsement by 473 to 47 votes in the House of Commons of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, through the acceptance of the central role of Dublin in any future negotiation was to grant significant approval to this new strategy (Roberts 1986: 12). Hume had successfully placed the national agenda at the centre of any future resolution between the movement and the state, thus giving an olive branch of sorts to Sinn Féin:

...with the Anglo-Irish Agreement under his belt, Mr Hume was talking about the need to ‘transcend’ that
Agreement. The Agreement itself has been rejected (formally) by Sinn Féin, but an attempt to “transcend” it, by further movement down the nationalist agenda, might be the basis for a common front of all nationalists (O’Brien 1994: 177).

Once again the debate in the Republican camp was to be over direction and strategy. The 1980s were to be a watershed which was to see a re-emergence of the debate between constitutionalism, which even Sinn Féin contemplated, and the role of nationalism in movement mobilisation for a newly almost completely formalised electoral entity as the SDLP proffered (Banton 1986: 18). The IRA themselves were realising that in some sections of the movement the strategy of VDA was now becoming equated with the very identity of the movement itself (Dunn & Hennessey 1996: 183). In turn, marginalising the IRA when issues of social, cultural and formalised political concern were being debated. Strategically, the need for a broader based national movement similar to the ANC of South Africa was becoming evident if the IRA wished to continue to compete successfully with the SDLP for the nationalist community’s sympathies (Coogan 1995: xix). As Paddy Molloy of Sinn Féin explained to Hedges (1988: 110):

there is still an element of people who want a unified Ireland and that’s it, so we have to say to ourselves the Republican movement is a broad-based movement and it will have to take in, by necessity, as many people as possible... like the ANC in South Africa.

From 1981 onward, the nature of the violence was changing. VDA as a strategy of protest became ever more calculated, and succinctly correlated with electoral platforms and periods of intrinsic negotiation between both Republican competitors and Loyalist foes (Patterson 1997: 209-220). The IRA High Command soon realised that the electoral success of the campaign of violence could be enhanced through the participation in elections of Sinn Féin, the movement’s political wing (Guelke 1995: 124). The progressive move towards formalisation was still counter weighed by the IRA’s military capabilities and their ability to tune in on Republican discontent with the lack of will of the SDLP to engage the state in any way outside official channels (Lee 1995: 454-457).

Sinn Féin was able to consolidate their vote from 10.1% of first preference votes in the October 1982 Northern Irish Assembly elections, to 13.4% at the June 1983 UK general election, during the SDLP’s initial negotiations with London that eventually became the impetus behind the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Coogan 1995: xix).
The SDLP’s great problem was its inability to confront the reality of those ghettoised communities for whom constitutionalism resolved little when the Security Forces were still willing to resort to extra-parliamentary and unconstitutional methods in their fight against terrorism. A point, according to Maguire (1996b: 12), Sinn Féin has fully recognised:

Sinn Féin has not become a reformist party because the British state has not taken up the risk of engaging it directly in a process that would lead it into the parliamentary arena. This also makes it difficult for Sinn Féin to enter the politics of electoralism as it always encounters difficult political opportunity for advancing its cause.

The very fact that Section 14 of the Prevention of Terrorist Act, whereby the Security Forces were reserved the right to detain any person without a warrant, on suspicion of belonging to an illegal organisation or movement, was applied solely when dealing with Northern Irish security issues, was a major civil rights issue. This led the Republican community to view such policing as being designed to oppress Irish nationalism specifically, as well as to reassure the Protestant of the maintenance of their hegemony (Coogan 1995: 517). Especially, when Welsh arsonists, Scottish nationalists, and animal rights activists did not come under this act (Dickson 1995: 66-67).

The more recent attempts to defeat terrorism by relying on uncorroborated evidence from a series of ‘supergrasses’, and by an apparent ‘shoot-to-kill’ strategy on the past of undercover police and Army units, have likewise achieved only short-term successes and caused further damage to communal confidence in the administration of justice (Hadden & Boyle 1988: 56).

What was developing could be interpreted as a tacit recognition by the British Government that a reassessment of the nature of nationalist elite exclusion of the Ulster state was needed. The fact that Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and the Irish Labour Party were now ready to recognise the right of the Ulster community to exist in their own terms, also signified the realisation that civil and human rights could not be addressed until communal and national rights were secured for all sides (Hussey 1994: 193). A point emphasised throughout the 1984 Report of the New Ireland Forum on the New Ireland Forum. At this stage the IRA were not fully convinced of the validity of power sharing with a community that had overwhelmingly rejected it back in 1975.
The decision, hence, at the November 1984 Chequers Summit between Thatcher and Taoiseach Dr Fitzgerald, to recognise the role of national sovereignty was seen more as a change in tactics from a London Government sick of the high costs of maintaining troops in Northern Ireland rather than a redress of the Ulster elite’s inherent right to rule (Hadden & Boyle 1988: 62-63; Fitzgerald 1991: 566). Northern Ireland was heading to a federal solution. Yet, the subsequent street marches and civic disobedience, led by the Protestant Loyalist community, and supported eventually by the IRA, on the anniversary of the Hillsborough Agreement, would show that the resolution through the established political process was not always acceptable to communities schooled in venting their discontent via other methods (Arthur 1988: 73; Coogan 1996: 217).

Hillsborough and the Formalisation of Republican Demands within an Official British Framework.

The Hillsborough Agreement of 15 November 1985 was the 6th Summit in the Anglo-Irish process that began in May 1980, and much of the problems in its implementation was seen to be in the policy makers definitions of the protagonists (Arthur 1988: 66). Both sides had tended to talk from non-negotiable fixed positions. Correspondingly, the parallel development of competing identities would create space outside the system, similar to Melucci’s (1992b) notion of conflict creating alternative spaces within pre-existing social cleavages, whereby new strategies would be implemented according to the pace of reform being instigated from the centre. The IRA had to now face the facts that the nature of their own response to state hegemonisation had created an opposite state ‘mimicking’ of the movement that would forge an equally stoic national movement entity at the centre of the state they opposed (Adams 1995: 193-197). What Hillsborough had achieved was a recognition of the right of Ulster to exist as territorial representation of Protestant concerns (Taylor 1997: 285).

In fact, the problem with the constitutional nationalist path, embodied in the Hillsborough Agreement of 1985, was its contradictory nature, since it recognised the right of the state not merely to dictate the terms of engagement, but also the pace of reform (Boyce 1990: 44). Tilly’s (1993b) example of the national movement being but a response to such state dictates is further bourn out here, as the SDLP realised that violence was in fact entrenching the cycle and leading further away from any resolution.
This was due to the inability of the state to deal with violence as a means of expressing peripheral discontent. It was an oversimplification of policy that would negate the role of more moderate alternatives, thus entrenching anti-state feelings amongst many Republicans:

I mean there were two ways of dealing with the violence either it was suppressed by force if you like, by the strength of security measures or the people who were using the violence were persuaded to stop using it. The force didn’t work and didn’t seem to be working. The second has worked, people didn’t believe that it would when it was embarked upon but it did and so I think that party’s role stems from its decision to try and end the violence by direct engagement with those who are using violence on the Nationalist side in particular.

From a Protestant perspective, this curtailing of their power to formulate policy directly, through being directly represented by London, has shifted the political centre which in turn has led to a new peripheralisation (Dunn & Morgan 1994: 11). This has commonly become known as ‘Protestant alienation’ and has been dealt with quite succinctly in the literature by Clayton (1996), Morrow (1995), Dunn and Morgan (1994). More importantly, it allows for the legitimation of Protestant extremism (Hadden & Boyle 1989: 18). Due to the fact that if the Protestants can be portrayed as alienated, then the Ulster state can be seen as equally anti-Protestant. This is difficult to accept for many Nationalists who have yet to be convinced that Protestant paramilitaries are autonomous of the British Security Forces.

The IRA now realised that within the very cycles of protest that had defined the intensification of the ‘Troubles’, the British Government was also using their inability to curtail Protestant extremism to justify their maintenance of all security issues (Adams 1986: 64; Clayton 1996: 96). The British Government wanted resolution, but as things stood it would come at the expense of an ‘All-Ireland’ solution. The state had successfully, through the political opportunity structures formed in the Anglo-Irish process, enfranchised the moderate Nationalists and all Unionists, whilst excluding the Provisional IRA (Fitzgerald 1991: 492; Hussey 1994: 193). This would force the Provisionals into action.

This was a period of centre-periphery reformulation that would benefit the SDLP greatly, as the SDLP would also directly benefit from both VDA and NVDA initiated by the IRA, thus enhancing
the SDLP’s position as the middle ground between state and movement (Mallie & McKittrick 1997: 37-43). It was during the ‘Hunger Strikes’ that the SDLP had gained 17.5% of the vote, and progressively up to 17.8% during the formalisation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 (Arthur 1996). Their highest results, with peaks of 21% and 22% in 1989 and 1993 respectively, were posted when cycles of protest and IRA activity were in decline (Coogan 1996: 506).

It was Sinn Féin that, seemingly, realised that much of the social cleavages felt in the province were the result of elite ethnic pressures, rather than external class pressures. In such circumstances, the class driven rhetoric of the SDLP was irrelevant. Socialism was viewed as an anti-rural doctrine, but socialism driven by the nationalist goal was a form of revolutionary strategy that the rural periphery could comprehend. Thus, when Seamus Mallon, the SDLP candidate won traditionally nationalist Fermanagh, on a platform of aggressive nationalism, both Sinn Féin and SDLP strategists alike realised the necessity of finding a middle ground that was less revolutionary, yet, strongly nationalist in principle (Hedges 1988: 107).

Whatever the environmental conditions placed upon groups such as the IRA, they operated as representatives of a nationalist movement, unified in an ideology based on nationalist resistance to a perceived imperialist state entity; in this way the strategy is a ‘mimicking’ of state institutions of repression designed to counter the state’s own strategies of elite consolidation. The problem faced by the IRA was how to hold together a nationalist tradition and contemporary social conditions, without alienating those who find the national issue confronting. Sinn Féin in realising this, published in May 1987 a discussion paper entitled A Scenario for Peace which was to redefine the role of the Provisional IRA. They nevertheless maintained a right of reply to any increase in overt policing against their constituency by the Security Forces (Guelke 1995: 125). VDA was seen as a right of reply for a community that held little redress within the established legal system.

In fact, the IRA were to call upon the need for the establishment of communal policing, as a major buffer to the vociferous policing strategies of the British Security Forces (Mallie & McKittrick 1997: 81-82). This is similar to what ETA was doing in the mid-1980s when the democratisation processes in Spain were complete. Yet, the IRA had still fallen into the greatest trap offered by the cycle of action-reaction-action, that which della Porta and Rucht (1995) note as the identification of the movement with their action, rather than their core ideology. This is embodied in the
stratification of the conflict which I believe occurs with the failure of the movement to gain control over the protest cycle through ‘mimicking’ the state (Murray 1995: 226).

Social protest was interlinked to terrorism, as a response to state oppression with nationalist aspiration and the social liberation, as shown in Tilly’s (1975 1993b) paradigm of the dynamic nature of movement-state cyclical inter-development. This fostered an environment of acceptance of both the need for VDA, as a last resort, as well as legitimisation of the SDLP’s move towards opening channels with London through democratisation of the movement, as well as the Northern Irish state (Dunn & Morgan 1994). More importantly, it forced Hume to recognise the legitimacy of Sinn Féin’s claim of being a significant voice within the Republican movement, and perhaps tacitly recognising the role of VDA in bringing the British to the table (Sinn Féin in 1988: 197-198, 1994b). In fact there is even a hint that the IRA have intimated to the SDLP their willingness to embrace, a political solution as long as they are given a position of prominence within the entire peace process:

Since the Hume-Adams talks that hostility has declined and there is now I think a disposition within both parties to try to examine ways in which we might cooperate and at least to reduce the bitterness of the hostility between us.5

In a bid to achieve a pan-Irish political unity, the SDLP was forced to embrace more overtly nationalist causes. This would prevent the SDLP from being further isolated from the radical urban Catholic vote (Guelke 1995: 130). Yet, it is still their ability to utilise these state sponsored political opportunity structures within the electoral system that allows the SDLP to exploit a decline in public sympathy with the gunmen (Weitzer 1988:230). The IRA though had to renege on armed insurrection as a means to negotiation (Coogan 1996: 396). If this was to occur, it would bring into question the one physical strategy of protest that could guarantee them autonomy of action and defence against state reactionism (Sinn Féin in 1994a). A position that would bring about a similar defencelessness as occurred at Sunningdale’s decline in 1975 (Kyle 1995). The merging from the mid-1970s of an anti-imperialist struggle with the military and political wings of IRA revolutionary socialism, was to further alienate a war weary Nationalist community that were beginning to question issues of abstentionism and outright rebellion (Hedges 1988: 110).

Weitzer (1988: 230) notes that there is a decline in the percentage of the Republican vote that Sinn Féin has accrued between 1983
and 1987 from 43% to 35% due to the dissatisfaction with their strategies of engaging the state in VDA. Yet, I would disagree with Weitzer’s analysis that the decline was due to the Republican community’s general frustration with the inability of the IRA’s VDA to achieve reform. What I believe has occurred, in periods of electoral decline, has been the correlation between a decline in effective activity and corresponding declines in IRA support. For many in the community the IRA’s role is specific, and if they are not seen to fulfil this then they are negated from the equation.

By the late 1980s the social disadvantage of being Catholic within Northern Irish society and government was still a prominent enough an issue as in the mid-1960s for activists frustrated with the rate of reform to exclude any notion of joint rule (McCullogh 1984: 122; Gallagher 1995: 7-46; Knox & Hughes 1995: 51; Smith 1995: 177). Within the local councils some 66.2% of employees were Protestant and 33.8% Catholic; with 75.1% of managers Protestant and 24.9% Catholic; whilst, more importantly, in the middle bureaucracy 81.6% was Protestant and 18.4% Catholic (Knox & Hughes 1995: 51).

Facing a political reality of inherent disadvantage, the SDLP recognised that community empowerment cannot occur from above but must occur through grassroots activism. This has allowed the SDLP to seek reconciliation with Sinn Féin at the council level in order to redress issues of social welfare and inner urban decay (Knox & Hughes 1995: 51). Whether this is a sign of a general move towards the formalisation of a national front is hard to tell. I feel this is due to an overall strategic move towards pooling of common resources, ie, national sentiment, in a bid to unite the national movement into a more fluid coalition of interests that could justify the expansion of repertoire in times of political lull in the cycle. After all even members of the SDLP are not adverse in expressing their mistrust in the ability of the British state structure to absorb the competing demands of two diametrically opposed ideological movements.

Every time there has been a big breakthrough whether it is the Downing Street Declaration, the Framework Agreement or the Communique the British Government has always tactically up to that moment said ‘no deal, big problems to overcome’ and then very often at the last tactical moment they say ‘right, we got agreement’. So times to decode the British whether it is a tactical matter or whether it is actually a policy matter is very difficult.6

The SDLP recognised that they had failed to gain support from the arch conservative rural communities with the IRA still receiving
the majority of their mobilisational base from Fermanagh, Tyrone and Armagh, whilst holding significant influence in Derry and West Belfast (Hedges 1988: 105). It was the nationalist doctrine that enabled the IRA to focus on the nation-state as the end political goal. Suggesting that the way to liberate the Nationalists from the Ulster state was through the attainment of statehood by the movement. As Eugene Kelly, a SDLP member for Fermanagh stated on the move back to nationalism in Hedges (1988: 106), it was:

a reactionary political choice... the reaction of people living in the rural areas is that it’s the only way we show our opposition to Unionism... and the dominance Unionism had in a county where there was always a nationalist majority.

This suggests that the state still remains significant, not just as a fulcrum to mobilisation, but also as the predeterminer of the nature of movement formation. For both the IRA and SDLP, each reaction of the state remained to be ‘mimicked’, and only through parodying the state could they reassert their position that was constantly changing according to the new political opportunity structures offered the periphery. The cycle seemed endless, and the nature of the conflict had solidified Protestant extremism (Banton 1986: 21; Morrow 1995: 161). Each move by Thatcher would lead to an extension of the violence to the effect that by the late 1980s, the processes that were derivative of the Hillsborough process could be said to have identified a place for the legitimation of radical Loyalist claims (Ignatieff 1993: 166). The IRA as an alternative ideological movement of state had increased the role of the state as mediator with each new targeting of it during lulls in the protest cycle.

Hamilton, Moore and Trimble (1995: 57) note that this occurred through the way VDA was able to create a place for the IRA within more formalised structures of state as a symbol of resistance. Just by openly belonging to the movement is, in itself, a sign of political opposition to the force that the movement is sworn to dismantle, which is the state (Cairns 1994: 5; Cairns & Cairns 1995: 105). This is why the mythology of the significance of the Roman Catholic Church to Irish nationalism is simply that, a myth. The contemporary nature of the ‘Troubles’ has brought a more sophisticated community which sees more pageantry and effective protest in the secular (Murray 1982; Doherty & Poole 1995). This is why the slogan ‘Beware a Risen People’ in West Belfast is so thought provoking, as well as powerful a tool of social mobilisation, as it relates more to thoughts of every day life than...
notions and rituals of the Church (Hamilton 1995: 95).

Ideologically, religion is important only in its ability to define socio-economic class as there is evidence, as purported by Morrow (1995: 151), that most terrorists do not place religious doctrine central to their political aims and strategies of protest. Nationalism hence, has become the doctrine of movement consolidation. As such state nationalism is the mobilisation raison d’être as it not only defines the anti-Ulster activist into a definable collective whole. It offers, rather, a solution that can outride cycles of increased and decreased political activism to eventually claim political autonomy. Nationalism, doctrinally speaking, relies on this agency to act as a point of departure for future anti-centralist activism. As Joe Austin points out:

I think that nationalism in its definition and certainly in the Irish sense is not an aggressive force by and large, and there are exceptions to this, but by in large its been a progressive force and nationalism from a Sinn Féin point of view, nationalism or socialism I think are the two sides of the one coin it doesn’t really matter if you got national independence and behaved in the same way as we behave now it would have no effect but if you had national sovereignty and use it in a productive fashion I think it certainly can bring about a better way of life and a change of life.7

The IRA, however, has fallen into the trap of slipping into a permanent militancy that only further justifies the centre’s intransigence towards including these radicals into the state run processes of conflict resolution. What sustained Sinn Féin throughout the lean periods of the 1980s was the responsiveness of the Republican community to each step by Sinn Féin in at embracing varying tactics that were non-violent in origin, the threat of the British Government to alienate them from any of the peace initiatives also helped (Coogan 1995: 609). The peak support attained by Sinn Féin in came with their initial foray into the electoral system during the ‘Hunger Strikes’ when they accrued 10% of the total vote (Taylor 1997: 282).

Yet, with each push towards reconciliation, the Republican voters tended to show solidarity with the militant wing of the national movement. After the February 1996 Dockland Bombings were to signal an end of the cease fire, when anti-IRA feeling was most prominent in Britain some 15.47% of electors voting for Sinn Féin in during the May 1996 round table talks (Coogan 1996: 505; Arthur 1996: 72; Mallie & McKitrick 1997: 402). This suggested that Catholic Republicans could not tolerate any solution that espoused the continued existence of an Ulster state because the cycles of
continuous centre-periphery inter-dependent development had ensured the formation of a movement identity in exact opposition to that of the centre’s identity. This would lead to a stratification of the conflict that is bourn out in the successful election results (Mallie & McKittrick 1997: 402-403). A high was eventually reached of 17% at the May 1 1997 general elections, during New Labour’s landslide victory, which significantly saw Martin McGuinness, for the first time in thirty years, wrest Mid-Ulster away from the DUP (Taylor 1997: 313).

The Mid-Ulster vote was a significant success for the IRA’s policy of a continued use of VDA as a last resort. Though predominantly Catholic, this electorate had remained significantly in the hands of the extremist DUP since Stornmont’s collapse due to the inability of the the SDLP and Sinn Fé in to concur on the nature of the resistance (Coogan 1996: 505). This had allowed for the DUP to hold the seat through exploiting the disunity amongst the Nationalist community. In fact, since Denis Haughey, John Hume’s European Assistant and prominent NICRA activist, was the main Republican candidate, it was presumed in an environment whereby the majority of the Catholic community seemingly desired resolution that the old peace activists would win out. To the surprise of SDLP strategists, and the Unionist Electoral Council, Martin McGuinness would win (Adams 1997).

This was a stinging rebuke for the SDLP’s appeasement of Unionist concerns, as McGuinness has been commonly acknowledged as the link between the IRA and Sinn Fé in, and for three years had been integral as the direct representative of the Army Council in private talks with the Major Government and Sir Patrick Mayhew the Secretary for Northern Ireland (Taylor 1997: 329-333). It was a sign that the national question was far from resolved and the IRA far from a spent social movement force in the eyes of the community they represented (Sinn Fé in 1994a: 22-25).

Where the movement activities of the SDLP and Sinn Fé in were most effective were in their ability to highlight the discrepancies between the written law and human rights abuse within the Northern Irish state; and how that could be looked upon as the catalyst of the modern ‘Troubles’. As a result, the Opsahl Commission (1993) was set up by the British, Irish and US Governments, under the chair of a leading Norwegian human rights activist Professor Torkel Opsahl. By June 1993, after reviewing some 500 submissions, he concluded that if Unionists refused to accept direct executive rule from Dublin then they should allow the Catholic community an equal voice in legislating laws and policies, as well as a veto on the ratification of administrative structures.
(Opsahl 1993: 40; Boyle & Hadden 1994: 127). This placed the onus back on the state. One that would counter the British Government’s attempts to portray the Protestant Community as equally aggrieved within the post Stormont Ulster state structure (Clayton 1996).

For the first time since 1922, the place of Ulster within the Union had been questioned by the British themselves within the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Dunn & Morgan 1988: 72). The very acceptance of a role for the Irish in the future development of the statelet, was a signal that the extremism of the Ulster Unionist doctrine of Britishness was one that was not on par with modern mainland Britain (Mallie & McKittrick 1997: 139). The settler society notion of identification with the metropole, through positioning themselves as the last bastion of Crown and Empire, was antiquated in a society heading for greater European integration.

It would, however, be wrong to believe the notion of Protestant Loyalism is no longer a part of the discourse. What has changed is that this Loyalism is now conditional on the ability of the state to maintain Protestant hegemony (Clayton 1996: 129; Hennessey 1995). In the long term, this can only recreate the cycle of action-reaction-action as it points to the need of the state to use the same populist strategies of the peripheral movement in order to re-legitimise the centre’s role in the continued existence of the state (Taylor 1984: 64). Central to this new Ulster identity is the ability to portray the state as an anti-thesis to the radical Irish Republican alternative. This has led to reciprocal ‘mimicking’ by the IRA of each intensification of Protestant militantism.

The fact that some 75 people have been killed by on-duty members of the Security Forces between 1982 and 1992, whilst only four soldiers have been convicted for murder, suggest that the state does much to cover up ‘extreme’ policing as a natural consequence of the protection of state security (Dickson 1995: 67). Correspondingly, the UUP, as the one elite that holds control over a majority of local boroughs and councils, has been able to portray itself before the British Government as the mediator between two radical competing ideological movements. The result has been the re-emergence of the Ulster state as integral to any future resolution of the conflict as the entity that can best guarantee Protestant rights in any future All-Ireland framework, in which the current elite would become a minority.

The Republican community, as a result of twenty five years of direct confrontation with the centre, were now even further away
from the state ideologically than they were at the commencement of the cycle (O’Malley 1983; McKeown 1989; Mallie & McKittrick 1997). The paradox of this type of movement activism was that it hinged upon the backing of a given community, thus excluding the other (McLaughlin 1993: 97). No matter what direction taken, any reform of the Ulster state still held Protestant hegemonism and Catholic exclusion as its doctrine (O’Brien 1988; Dillon 1995). For the IRA, the message was clear: any Ulster solution was no solution, just a continuation of centre-periphery relations of the past. In such an environment all activism must be ensconced in the symbol of resistance to the state, and its continued denial of communal peripheral rights, ie, nationalism (Dunn 1993: 24).

It is significant that during each reform period, the exclusion of the IRA from direct negotiation processes would see the rise in their support base, as in the times of the 1993 Joint Declaration and the 1995 Frameworks for the Future (Farren & Mulvihill 1995: 1). Clearly what has developed is a strategy of insurrection in order to create opportunity structures. The conservative reaction of the centre to ignore this only serves to isolate the centre from access to the more radical Nationalist community, resulting in short term polarisation. Denying the IRA access to political opportunity structures offered in the negotiation process serves only to heighten the perceived exclusive nature of the Ulster elite’s centralist strategies.

The Irish Nationalists were rewarded for their willingness to review their protest strategy in contemplating a cessation of the armed struggle. What the Humes-Adams talks of 1993 were able to achieve, was the formulation of a de facto national movement front in terms of a convergence of perceptions, if not strategies. One that could be representative of both militant and formal wings of the national movement, via recognising the necessity of placing joint demands before the state (Mallie & McKittrick 1997: 271-275). Central to this evolution of the disparate wings of the Republican movement towards a more unified stance vis-à-vis the state, has been moulding and remolding of the movement through the perceived need to compliment the shifting nature of the state’s own re-consolidation process. As one SDLP councillor recognised:

There is a legacy between our parties there but we equally recognise that they have evolved fundamentally since the Hunger Strikes in terms of policy and practice and that we think that they should evolve further. 8

The Joint (Downing Street) Declaration of Major and Reynolds on
December 15 1993 was a direct response to the Hume-Adams initiative designed to convince the IRA to halt its military campaign so as to encourage Sinn Féin to join the normal political process (Boyle & Hadden 1994: 131; Coogan 1996: 436-446). This was the continuation of the processes of 1973 that were unceremoniously dumped in the wake of strong Protestant civil action that culminated in the Ulster Workers’ Union strikes of 1974 (Fisk 1975: 48). Through subtle persuasion, and the reopening access points within the state, the Security Forces came to the realisation that any further political crackdown would only lead to a further radicalisation of the action-reaction-action cycle. The IRA could rightly claim this a success of their strategy, as in the long run, it did bring a highly peripheralised and illegal movement into the centre of policy formulation (Taylor 1987: 343).

Amongst the Protestant community, this has led to a situation whereby the British state is viewed as more responsive to Republican calls due to the ability of Hume to network within the political opportunity structures offered it (Morrow 1995; Clayton 1996). Thus, bringing the Republican cause to the centre of the political agenda of state (Dunn & Morgan 1994: 16-17). In my opinion, the reasons why the ceasefire lasted for 17 months lay in the positive publicity that the IRA were able to accrue from the British media for their unilateral decision back in 1994. It was interesting that when they felt that Major was stalling and backtracking on the original agreement (Taylor 1997: 465), that was clandestinely formulated with the Security Forces by Martin McGuinness over a three year period prior to the commencement of the cease fire (Taylor 1997: 465), the IRA chose to strike at the geographic heart of London, at the Docklands in February of 1996. This suggests that the IRA will not walk away from past strategies if they feel the centre is using negotiations as a tactic to buy time for the re-consolidation of their own Security Forces predominance within the province.

The greatest success gained from the The Joint Frameworks Document of 1995 was three pronged: it created space for the movement in the power-sharing executive for the province, it would allow for a strategic shift in methods of governance, and would allow the Republic of Ireland to act as a political guarantor for the Republican community in much the same way that the British Government had for Unionists (Kyle 1995: 5). These documents have forced the IRA and SDLP to adopt more formalised political structures, as new principles of conflict resolution have been built on democratic consent (Farren & Mulvihill 1995: 6). For the state, this places the significance of its
survival as the sole mediator between competing ideological movements at the centre of any conclusion. Perpetuating its existence through using the co-operation of these movements to further legitimise its position. A fact that the overall Republican Movement has long accepted:

There are certain ground rules that are established but the British Government’s role is central in that it is the sovereign authority in Northern Ireland and its responsibility therefore is to create the political process and structures through which we can engage in dialogue and negotiation about the future. 9

The lessons of the 1970s had taught the centre that direct engagement in overzealous policing by the state only leads to an upswing of protest activism. Gallagher (1995: 33) suggests that the rising electoral fortunes of Sinn Féin as well as the realisation that overt military intervention by the state would only increase the cycle of violence rather than stem it. In this way, the British Government has tacitly recognised the role they have played in the upswing of protest action and the diversification of the repertoire of extra-parliamentary protest. Hence, the move to negotiate rather than confront, signals the desire for a re legitimisation of the constitutional path as the sole path to political reform of the state (ibid.: 7). Yet it may also question the validity of possessing a revolutionary national movement doctrine at the core of mobilisation, as it serves only to distance further the IRA from not only the centre, but much of the war weary nationalist community as well.

The Good Friday Agreement: Movement Sacrifice? Or National Resurrection?

The Good Friday Agreement of April 10 1998 was significant for the eventualisation of the Republican movement’s political goal of national reunification with the Republic of Ireland and the withdrawal of the British state military and political presence from the province. A great fear in Nationalist ranks lay in the willingness of Dublin to bring the SDLP into All-Party talks without leaving equal space for Sinn Féin’s agenda to be represented. Added to this was Sinn Féin’s fear of a renewal of ‘Stormont’ whose abolition in 1972 was considered a Republican strategic success. Sinn Féin came to realise that they faced the possibility of being isolated from the peace process by the very reforming state centre they had opposed, and in doing so leaving much of their own Republican
constituency without representation in the future make up of the state (Patterson 1997: 229). Thus, Adams, McLaughlin and McGuinness main task became securing a place for Sinn Féin in at Stormont without decommissioning IRA weapons or negating the role of a republican solution to the ‘Troubles’. Yet to legitimate Republican demands the IRA Army Council would have to be convinced of the benefits of alleviating Protestant fears of alienation from Britain. This was done by emphasising the language of ‘joint-sovereignty’ found within the December 1993 Downing Street Declaration and the February 1995 Joint Framework Document as a base for negotiation and legitimation of both Catholic and Protestant interests (ibid.: 249-251).

The release of a British and Irish joint communiqué on February 28 1996 that All-Party Talks were to go ahead on June 10, even after the February 9 Canary Wharf bombing heralding the end of the August 31 1994 IRA ceasefire, signified that the centre was willing to reform in order to resolve the conflict it was instrumental in initiating (ibid.: 288-289). Yet the refusal of the Major Government by November 1996 to allow Sinn Féin into the All-Party Talks until the IRA promised a decommissioning of weapons and a ‘convincing unequivocal’ ceasefire was a stumbling block to resolution of the ‘Troubles’. All this could achieve was to convince the Republican radicals that the Northern Irish state was irrefordable as long as the British state refused to deal with the IRA. The mood would change with the victory of Tony Blair in the May 1997 UK General Election and the fact that Sinn Féin in would win a 45% share of the Nationalist vote at the May 22 local government election (ibid.: 293). Still they were moving towards a ‘Sunningdale Mark II’ in this power sharing arrangement that would see the cycle come full circle (Bew et al 1997: 3-4).

Interestingly, though, Republicans intimated that an All-Ireland framework for peace would have to be achieved within ten to fifteen years or they may return to the policy of the gun (Patterson 1997: 296).

A new path was forged when after the July 21 1997 ceasefire declaration, Blair moved to include Sinn Féin in in All Party Talks. This heralded a new state culture of ‘consent’ which would grant the Ulster state legitimacy (as Catholics would have to respect the Protestant numerical majority within the new Stormont) in return for active Protestant acceptance of some six cross-border institutions and ten ministries with executive powers. Moderate Protestant Ulstermen would cede control over arts, cultural, national parks and estuaries’ policies to the very state that they perceived as responsible for supporting Catholic mobilisation since
the 1960s. What was emerging was a tacit recognition by prominent Unionists John Taylor, Sir James Molyneaux and, his successor, David Trimble that any continuation of the crisis would lead to a stratification of the conflict and an eventual paralysis of the state that was the symbol of the historic continuity of Ulster state development to modernity (Bew et al 1997: 210-211). In turn, Republicans, through the radicalisation of the movement, may have successfully placed their demands on the table through VDA, yet any further continuance of VDA could run the risk of isolating them from the All-Party Talks. Already both Dublin and London have made it clear that talks would go ahead with or without Sinn Féin (Duignan 1995: 147). Yet it would be a mistake to believe that the gun has been permanently taken out of the debate as one in four of the Northern Irish electorate voted for party political organisations heavily linked to para-military organisations at the May UK General and Northern Irish Local government elections (Bew et al 1997: 213).

The All-Party talks, an integral precursor to the Good Friday Agreement’s revamped ‘Stormont’ Assembly, was radically reshaping the atmosphere in which negotiations could commence for the formation of joint institutions of governance that would include an ‘Irish Dimension’. In doing so Protestant fears of alienation from Britain through the enforced acceptance of Sinn Féin participation were alleviated by the realisation that any formal recognition by the Republicans of the necessity for a ‘joint’ resolution would in itself be a tacit legitimation of the central role of both the Ulster state and British Government in the future completion of the peace process (McIntyre 1995: 115). In essence, for the first time in Republican movement history, the Republicans would recognise Ulster political claims, aspirations and traditions as a legitimate force within the overall history of the island, and not simply as an implanted colonial ideological construct.

The push for peace was now shaping the outlooks of the parties. On May 22 1998 a referendum was held in both the North and in the Republic on the acceptability of the Good Friday Agreement. 71% of the North and 94% of the Republic’s populations voted in support of the Agreement (Henning 1998: 1). Sinn Féin would eventually win 18 seats in the June 26 Northern Ireland Assembly vote out of 108 contested seats (Henning 1998: 9) and Adams, with the May 11 Dublin Sinn Féin in Conference decision to pursue a united Ireland through political means behind him, would seek to appease the IRA by placing Republican movement issues at the centre of the new state assembly’s agenda (Fletcher 1998: 11). Equally significant was the appointment of Seamus Mallon of the
SDLP, a Nationalist, to the position of Deputy Minister to Ulster Unionists First Minister, David Trimble (Henning 1998: 9).

I believe this signifies a drastic change in Northern Irish politics, but one that would not have been achieved without the IRA/Sinn Féin strategy of the “armalite and the ballot box” developed throughout the 1980s. The national movement’s reliance on VDA in times of a down swing in the cycle of protest enabled the periphery to remain a threat whilst the centre remained unresponsive to their demands. This is what marks the significant difference of ‘Suningdale Mark II’ from its 1974 predecessor, in that the years of violent protest strategy and movement repertoire expansion awakened the Ulster Unionist to the possible intractability of the crisis. A situation that would leave little space for the state elite to be able to absorb its discontented minority, and hence bring into question the continued ideological justification of the existence of democratic perspectives amongst the Ulster elite. Thus, the IRA, like it or not, had assisted moderate Nationalists to achieve their goal of equal representation, even if more irredentist policies may perhaps still be abandoned. Though I feel this is quite an unlikely scenario, as the communities have been too significantly polarised through VDA for them to so readily forgo their initial goals. Nevertheless, the gains at this stage significantly outweigh the losses.

The gains were a significant change in the Unionist willingness to accept Catholic political aspirations as essential to any internal resolution of the conflict; a restructuring of the RUC; a reevaluation of the nature of British state military and political involvement in the province, and the legitimation of an ‘Irish dimension’ to any future restructuring of the Northern Irish state’s power sharing relations. The losses were equally significant. The IRA and Sinn Féin would now have to accept the existence of a state that had to be the central target of their activism. Whilst greater civil rights and full enfranchisement may have been attained the state centre had successfully recreated itself as an arena of conflict resolution that could in the future ensure its existence in either a developed British umbrella framework or a federated Ireland. In terms of the continued existence of the movement this failure to dismantle the state, or the repromulgation of Stormont, all be it a heavily neutered version, has left many grass roots activists with a feeling of betrayal and mystification of what the past thirty years of struggle has been for. This feeling is best summed up by prominent Republican activist and ex-political prisoner Anthony McIntyre’s comments, as quoted by Patterson (1997: 278):

We went to jail, our people hunger striked, we
suffered in protest, we died, and we killed an awful, awful lot of people in the process- we killed British soldiers, we killed an awful lot of RUC, we lost an awful lot of our own lives, as we blew up London, we blew up Belfast, we wrecked the place. Now we’re back to where we started.

A return to the past which begs the question of the Republican movement’s ability to reform itself amongst a constituency sick of conflict and the intransigence of both sides to find a lasting solution. Hope lies in the April 10 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Nevertheless, it is a political solution that exemplifies my thesis in that only through protracted conflict and the inability of the centre to reform can the national movement significantly polarise both sides in the conflict so as to have no other choice but to secede. The Ulster centre, having recognised the benefits of change, has created space for its own ideal, that of the continuity of a distinct Ulster state development, to survive. Though lasting peace may be the result, the much sought after Republican goal of a 32 county All-Irish Republic has failed to arise.

Conclusion: The Formalisation of the Cycle and the Perpetuation of the Conflict.

As demonstrated in this chapter the ability of the national movement to engage the state through multi-dimensional strategies of protest has been the key to placing the national dimension at the centre of the political agenda. Otherwise, it is doubtful whether or not the initial protest activism undertaken in the 1960s by the NICRA could have developed past the short term goals of radical student protests. At the same time, due to the lack of will by both sides to compromise, the subsequent polarisation of society between two competing national ideologies has led to a corresponding state of inertia in the process of conflict resolution and a further perpetual development of the crisis. Under such circumstances it seems difficult to view the possibility of resolution without the state placating the demands of both the periphery and newly radicalised centre alike.

The ability of the national movement to thus control the nature of the struggle, through ‘mimicking’ the reactions of the state, has led to a failure of the state, in its current form, to provide any solution to the crisis. In this way, the manipulation of a cycle of reform that the movement did not fully initiate, so as to provide the necessary political opportunity structure within the perpetual struggle
between centre and periphery, has allowed for the nationalist doctrine to develop a legitimacy within its own constituency. There seems to be little left for the national movement to do but recreate its own space within the perpetual struggle between reforming state and reshaping periphery. The position the IRA holds as the minority movement is one that limits its options once the conflict is resolved, thus questioning the raison d'être for the continuation of the movement itself.

In the subsequent chapters I will demonstrate how this in fact has limited the Irish nationalist movement in ways that it could never have with the Basque and Croat nationalist movements. Peripheral movements that had similarly manipulated cycles of protest in times of shifting state centres and reforms due to their positioning as majority communities within the geographic boundaries they represented. Under such circumstances there is little choice for the militants of the Republican community but to continue the struggle, for within the struggle there is a sense of design and purpose for the future development of the national community.

In Northern Ireland the deification of protest and the cultural claiming of mythology in activism has led to the development of more than a counter movement. Rather it is a communal national movement that is at once hindered and assisted by its tradition of resistance. It is hard to see whether or not this sense of national community can survive without the state that defines it in opposition. The cycle of repression provides, according to past studies that similarly deal with radical peripheral communities conducted by della Porta and Mattina (1985), a communal purpose. A reinterpretation of communal repression, that through its own a polarisation of civil society threatens to create a new movement, or consciousness, steeped in the state’s own tradition of repression of the periphery.

This Protestant Ulsterism, which in itself will find it difficult to submerge its identity into that which is defined by the Southern state has arisen as a state backed counter ideology that can only solidify with each step of the IRA to intensify the crisis. Consequently, the results of the Irish movement’s protest activism’s successful dismantling of the Protestant governmental majority of Stormont has been outweighed by what Wilson (1991) and Conversi (1994, 1995) call the ‘ethno-gensis’ of a militant ‘other’. A militant counter-movement that itself is defined solely in terms of its ability to justify its existence in the face of the continued mobilisation of radical Republicanism.

The wave of Loyalist Volunteer Force killings from January to
March 1998,10 in response to the Maze Prison assassination of their leader Billy Wright by the IRA splinter movement, the Irish National Liberation Army, is an example of how the Republican intensification of violence simply continues the cycle (Breen 1998: 16; S.M.H. 19.I.1998: 6). A continuation of reciprocal strategy ‘mimicking’ in ‘tit for tat’ killing that simply isolates the radicals from future negotiations. Thus, allowing the current Blair New Labour Government to portray the IRA’s demands as far from suitable in bringing around a solution to the ‘Troubles’ (Cowley 1998: 14; Harnden & Jones 1998: 9). A stratification of the cycle that has created an ideological impasse. One that has now set in place the irreconcilability of two ideological movements that have become identifiable with the movements’ place within the conflict, as opposed to the cyclical reciprocal development of both national movements to modernity.

This intransigent polarisation of conflict has created the seeds for a new conflict that may lead to a shrinking of the geographic boundaries of the North to four of the six counties, but may also lead to the counter formation of a new elite that will be schooled in the same anti-state insurgency of the radical Catholic community. I feel, this is derivative of the nature of the actual cycle of action-reform-reaction-repression in the Northern Irish case study and the inability of the national movement to convince the Protestant elite, as opposed to the British Government, of the necessity of a full opening of political opportunity structures of state and access to this elite.

An overall control of state has nevertheless remained the goal of the IRA. This is because for the IRA the goals of the NICRA were puerile so long as enfranchisement remained the main issue. The IRA desired nationhood, and as such the nation-state remained its main goal of mobilisation. Protest, demonstration and collective activism within the overall cycle of state reform-protest-reform was to supply an historic link to past protest movements. A ritualisation of competing demands that would lead to a radicalisation of the movement, and eventually the state it opposed.

The problem with the cycle of Northern Ireland is that both elites have manipulated it to consolidate their national aspirations, coming to identify their advantage in terms of the conflict, and this in itself will lead to problems of transition if a solution emerges from the Prime Minister Blair backed extension of the Downing Street Declaration ‘All Party Peace Talks’ and the April 10 1998 Good Friday Agreement. This is due to the fact that the very national movements that once merely represented the communities have become the backbone of the politicisation of these
In many ways, the responses that the cycle action-reaction-action has attained from the state, and their utilisation in the consolidation of national movement gains, has led to a solidification of the crisis to the extent that they are no longer symbolic of popular discontent, but have come to embody and define both communities. In this way the expansion of repertoire to include VDA as an augmentation of more formalised, and more NVDA, oriented strategies as a tool of movement mobilisation, in an environment defined by competing nationalist aspirations, has led to the intractability of the ‘Troubles’; and more importantly a redefinition of both communities and movements in opposing the ‘other’.

GO TO CHAPTER IX
CHAPTER NINE:
Spanish State Expansion as Catalyst to Peripheral Movement Mobilisation

Except for two differences, the emergence of contemporary Basque nationalism was in many ways to follow similar lines of development to that of Northern Ireland. Firstly, while the Basques faced a similar predicament to the Irish in terms of the state being the bastion of a culturally definable elite unwilling to relinquish their ascendancy, they nevertheless possessed the decided advantage, in terms of polarisation, of living under a dictatorship lacking, until 1977, a democratic structure (Kelly et al. 1982; Taylor 1984). Secondly, the ability of the centralist elite to be independent of other structures of government enabled the Basque polity to have a clearly definable enemy that could be defined in terms of the state. The fact that the Irish could have democratic recourse after the fall of Stormont in the British electoral system would dilute the saliency of a national movement built on the need for secession as a guarantor of the continuation of civil rights (Aughey 1996). This meant that the Irish national movement would have great difficulty in redefining their goals at the completion of each protest-reform-protest cycle. As each attempt by London to enfranchise the minority Catholic community would question the need for continuous mobilisation. In addition it would legitimise the metropole’s role as ‘protector’ of the minority from the centralist push of the Protestant elite.

At the completion of each cycle, and with the expansion of repertoire, the monolith of state proved pliable enough to bend to specific demands of the Irish national movement, without necessarily dismantling the processes of British rule in the province. This meant that for polarisation to remain, the movement had to remain militant. The effect was to lead to the legitimisation of VDA as the final recourse to national movement mobilisation, as without it, the occupation forces would have been well placed to absorb all cleavages and demands within the processes of democratic bargaining. The Basque situation was different, as I will show in the following two chapters.
The Preconditions for the Variance between the Basque and Northern Irish Examples.

When looking at the Basque scenario, one can readily see a political situation more conducive to social movement revolt and the eventual appeasement of the national movement’s demands due to the nature of the dictatorship from 1939 to 1977 (Kaplan 1980; Cazorla 1993). Faced with the monolith of state that was the Movimiento, Franco’s governmental movement, the preconditions for societal polarisation along ethnic lines were already there. A predominant Castilian elite, like the Ulstermen of Northern Ireland, ruled. Yet, unlike Ulster, Franco’s Spain had no democratic recourse to the overt centralist campaigns of integration and centralisation of the state (Preston 1976). This placed the Basque movement in the advantage, up until the attainment of autonomy in 1979, of not necessarily needing their movement strategy to fully polarise society, in order to attain the necessary cleavage that could manifest itself in communal discontent, and eventually, collective action. Lacking the necessary opportunities for democratic participation that the Irish could claim in Westminster, the Basques could afford to engage the state from the beginning with the knowledge that under the Falangist option, the unitarist fascist state could provide no answer for the Basque question, as long as it saw integration as the ultimate goals of the Spanish state entity.

It is from this angle that I will attempt to expand on my argument that for national movements to successfully utilise the expansion of protest repertoire in order to shape the cycle of protest-reform-protest, the national movement needs to ‘mimic’ the conditions of rule as dictated by the centralist elite. The Basque argument will be used to show how the core of peripheral mobilisation against the state is dependent on the nature of the state’s governance over these marginalised communities, and the ability of these movements to utilise cycles of protest to attain their ultimate goal of independence. Thus, it will be shown how the ability of a national movement to attain independence is dependent on strengthening pre-existing cleavages between centre and periphery, without necessarily forcing the state’s hand to create all inclusive political opportunity structures that could satiate the demands of the movement within the overall structure of state democracy. If this could not be achieved, whilst the state reforms, then what occurs is the consolidation of the cycle, as opposed to the attainment and consolidation of the goals of the movement as has occurred in Northern Ireland.

The first period that will be studied will be from the emergence of
ETA in 1959 through to the death of Franco in 1975. This will entail a look at the development of strategy of the movement in its initial stages, and the development of a revolutionary ideology that would become the lynchpin of the future direction of all Basque movements. I will attempt to demonstrate how the move to more radical forms of collective action was a direct result of the state’s inability to fully enfranchise the minority community, and how within this radicalisation, the Basques were able to create a space within Spanish political society so as to force their agenda on the state. Like the Irish, this reactionism would expand the ability of the minority community to claim vital space within the state. Unlike the Irish, the continued intransigence of the centre to reform on specifically nationalist issues, would provide the opportunities for the radical nationalist movement to continue in periods where otherwise its saliency would be questioned, as in the case of the democratisation process.

Thus, the perpetual dynamic relation of the ever developing state and peripheral movement will assist in showing the necessity of the two competing identities in continuing the development of not only the state, but, the periphery as well. This will lead to the second period to be researched in the next two chapters that will deal with the waking of the state centre and the realisation that the legitimacy of the national movement is secure, in so much as the state is willing to react to the provocation from the periphery. The longer clientelism, corruption, and ethnic ascendancy continue, the more justified become the peripheral movement’s struggle. If, however, the cycle of protest can be broken, then the issues will no longer be the same, and social discontent would have to emerge in a different form than the national one that lies at the core of the struggle between state centre and periphery.

The Rise of Peripheral Nationalism as a Counter to the Movement of State.

Realising the strength of regional movement development, in 1937 Franco formed his own movement that could socialise the populace towards a deeper centralised national state consciousness (Carr & Fusi 1993: 25). The Movimiento, by May 17 1958 and the formation of Franco’s Sixth Government, would become the sole official state party, and as such an integral aspect of Greater Spanish state identification that was determined to alleviate all political, regional and social cleavages through an extensive campaign of culturo-political homogenisation (Arbos & Puigsec
1980; Giner 1984). A process that I will call a ‘Castilianisation’ of Spanish ideological state development. Unitarist in origin, by the time of the Sixth Government’s end, it had established an extensive repressive system of state that had courted the churches and quietened the Leftist opposition (Pérez-Agote 1986; Lanson 1987; Carr & Fusi 1993: 28-31). Unitarism at all costs was to be the motto of state (Gregory & Fry 1983: 22). This led to a social stratification based on the three main tensions within Spanish society: church versus state, centre versus periphery, and owner versus labourer (Lipset & Rokkan 1967).

In Spain we find a cross cutting cleavage whereby a group of people amassed along one line - the region - may also be grouped together under another - class (Gunther 1980). This produces a potentially explosive environment when at the cross section one group may be hermetically sealed from another; as in the case of the Basques, as well as the Catalans and Galicians. This has led to the formation of distinctly regional institutions and polities that can be ruled independent from the centre, such as in the Basque Country where compact political units are formed amongst a homogeneic core community (Gregory & Fry 1983: 27). Due to the nature of Franco’s Movimiento, however, these political communities could only organise outside of the competitive multiparty context, leading to the importance of social movements to establish control over oppositional politics (Watson 1996: 31). This would lead to the marginalisation of regional national identities onto the periphery of Spanish political society, in direct opposition to the fledgling state national identity being forged within the parameters of the state monolith (Eisenwein & Shubert 1985: 266).

Gregory and Fry (1983: 27) noted this was why the Basque National Party (PNV) chose to organise along social movement lines, as well as re-adapt the nationalist doctrine as the centre of all future mobilisation. This notion of augmenting movement activism with more formalised avenues of oppositional activity, was similar to the way the NICRA, in the wake of Bloody Sunday (McCann 1992), realised the only way to justify the maintenance of a movement was to provide a mobilisational doctrine that could challenge the established order.

The Madrid Government considered peripheral nationalism to be a direct threat to their legitimacy. The Falangist state was all-encompassing, hence any other form of political mobilisation would be viewed as sedition (Laqueur 1993: 386). Yet, the continued activism of the PNV from a cultural and linguistic aspect
had convinced many Basques that no civil and humanitarian issues could be fully addressed without first addressing the national question (Clark 1981). The subsequent promulgation of the Organic Law of 1966, which was to divide the executive powers of state between the head of state and Parliament (of whom one sixth were to be elected by the people), was to push the state in the direction of reform that would have democratisation of the state as an inevitability (Laqueur 1993: 386) For the oppositional Left, the Organic Laws and the Labour Charter resolved many issues, yet, for ETA and the PNV democratisation was a long way off resolving issues that were at the heart of their repression, ie, their autonomous national development (Cazorla 1993: 74; Padró -Solanet 1996).

The position of the PNV as being the sole claimant of the title of Basque Government in the shade, as it held since 1939, was slowly dissipating throughout the late 1950s (Farrel 1976: 34). By 1959 a generational split was to emerge with the rise of younger elites coming through the PNV youth wing (Euzko Gaztedi).4 EGI, formed in 1952 in Bilbao, questioning the validity of having an over-arching governmental structure of the National Assembly dictating policy from France when the fundamental socio-political failings were being felt under Francoist rule in Spain (Farrel 1976: 35; Clark 1979: 110). EGI, originally designed to teach literacy, soon established underground political colleges as new strategies were sought to engage the state monolith that favoured a redefinition of power relations through movement activism (Giner 1976: 190-191). Eventually, they would be responsible for training many future activists of ETA, the Maoist ORT, and the Trotskyist LKI 5 (Zirakzedah 1991: 42).

The advantage that the Basque nationalists had over the Irish lay in that in the early stages, civil rights were to be linked to national sovereignty, hence, making the issue of national autonomy non-negotiable. A position that the NICRA failed to get across to a centre that believed all would be resolved with the fall of Stormont. What was developing was the placing of the nation as a movement construct at the centre of opposition to the state. As a PNV councillor, Jose Maria Etxebarria, told me in retrospect:

> We had to construct our nation to persuade our people, our culture, our economy to strengthen our consciousness, of belonging to one collectivity in one country. 6

The Francoist state elite, however, would view this as a direct threat to their own ideological construct of state and acted
accordingly. Madrid would instigate waves of repression instigated from Madrid upon the region which saw Franco declare, from 1956 to 1975, ten states of emergency in the Basque Country, compared to once throughout the rest of Spain (Conversi 1997: 258). The outlawing of the teaching and speaking of the Basque language was to lead to a criminalisation of any form of cultural participation (Carr 1980: 170). This would place great emphasis on the ritualisation of cultural expression, as each act of expression was viewed as an act of defiance to the centralist state’s right to dictate the nature of state ideological development (Clark 1986a: 287; Uría 1988; Watson 1996: 17). What had emerged was a codification of alternate peripheral expression that Melucci (1992a, 1996) would consider important in providing the necessary cultural stratification needed to supply the polarisation for separate, yet parallel, state and peripheral movement development. One that could exploit the existing cleavages to expand the movement’s challenge on the state.

For the PNV this meant a redefinition of their internal organisation so as to incorporate strategies of passive resistance which was found in a base of 5000 core activists (Clark 1979: 113). The PNV’s organisation was hierarchical, leaving little room for an expansion of protest repertoire away from more formalised modes of collective action (Conversi 1997: 160). The state as a movement itself would engross all aspects of the state security and information apparatus, and as such would perceive itself as the monolithic symbol of populist rule (Cazorla 1993; Eisenwein 1995). This gave the Basques a clearly definable singular state target that the Irish could not enjoy when attempting, up until 1972, to work out if London and Stormont should be seen as one or not. As the HB political activist ‘Patxi’ told me:

It was clear to us, always, that it was the Spanish state, not the people, the state, that was our enemy, and we had to destroy it.

Cazorla (1993: 72) felt the one enduring legacy the nationalist opposition had was this residue of authoritarian franquismo; Francoism that had sedimented into the national mentality of Spain. This legacy would become the centre piece of the national apathy to political mobilisation that would pervade contemporary Basque and Spanish oppositional participation, as well as affect the modes of action through which movement participation would occur (Carr 1982: 718). The notion of forming the national polity along specific lines of a movement was to grant the state greater flexibility in dealing with unofficial opposition outside more traditional realms of parliamentary resolution. At the core of this was the placing of
the security and policing apparatus at the centre of the resolution of political disputation (Jáuregui 1981: 205). This was to ensure that, through the implementation of the 1958 Law of the Principles of the Movement and the 1966 Organic Law, the state could achieve the necessary economic liberalisation without diminishing the government’s authoritarian nature (Carr 1982: 726). A circumstance that the Basque national movement had to combat through increased engagement with the state.

This unsatisfied discontent manifested into general apathy which was to force a change of strategy, so as to polarise the community into action, through exploiting the opening of opportunity structures that emerged in periods of state reform (Zirakzedah 1991: 43). Union halls, church groups, neighbourhood organisations and football were to provide meeting places for clandestine education centres that recruited future activists, training them tactically in the methodology of social movement protest (Ramírez Goicoechea 1991: 289-297). The PNV realised that the way to combat Franco’s policy of politics of evasion’, that pervaded the general apathy of Basque, as well as Spanish, society, was through direct confrontation and forming alternative social networks (Morán 1982: 268; Carr & Fusi 1993: 118-123).

What was emerging was an ‘ethno-gensis’ of peripheral identity whereby through the perceived need of acting against the state, a new competing movement was being formed through the ritualisation of protest (Conversi 1997: 231). This identification through action would become intrinsic to the corresponding development of Basque and Greater Spanish identity (Reinares 1987: 122). The cyclical reproduction of the nation in movement would become dependent upon the action of the state, in its ability to incorporate or exclude peripheral demands through the extension of political opportunity structures. With each extension of the state upon the periphery, there was a corresponding ‘mimicking’ of the state by a movement seeking to break the cycle of continuous repression. As Carr and Fusi (1993: 160) stated:

The governments of Franco reacted to its activities by an indiscriminate campaign of repression which ended by completely alienating Basque opinion, including, that originally hostile or indifferent to ETA. Unable to distinguish a political problem from one of public order, the regime pursued the one political solution that most benefited ETA; it could not ever make a relatively harmless gesture of goodwill such as the concession of some form of economic autonomy proposed by Basques loyal to Franco.
The only social movement activity of note that the PNV was involved in was with the nationalist-Catholic trade union Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (ELA-STV), founded in 1911 (ibid.). The insistence of founding all political participation through the Basque Government’s Consultative Council was to lead to the neglecting of social issues that would be better addressed from the grassroots level (Jáuregui 1981: 75; Morán 1982: 268).

The mass influx of migrants to Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa throughout the 1950s and 1970s was to significantly change the notion of viable political protest as trade unionism began to emerge as a means to political mobilisation (Zirakzedah 1991: 37-40). The traditionally middle-class elite now had a new population of migrant workers, as well as the rise of a Basque industrial class, that saw the need to mobilise protest as a means of increasing living standards and achieving an awareness of civil liberties. ELA-STV began a strategy of protest that was designed to at once confront the state on issues of labour representation, whilst providing a support base for nationalist protest activism (Kaplan 1980: 106). Under the umbrella organisation of Alianza Sindical de Euzkadi (ASE), the PNV was able to co-ordinate protest activism, as in the general strike of 1947, so as to ensure that strategically and ideologically it would not clash with the official doctrine emerging from Paris (Giacopucci 1992: 14). More importantly, they proved to be an integral point of contact with the Castilian migrant communities, especially in assimilating them politically, socially and culturally into the Basque national community (Clark 1979: 251). An aspect of cross communal communication of strategies that the Irish Catholic community could not achieve with its minority position vis-à-vis the Protestant majority community.

Yet slowly, the readiness of the average Spaniard to embrace foreign trends was to lead students, for example, hungrily turning towards the ‘social’ poets, novelists, dramatists, bards and musicians of the West for inspiration, in organising counter cultural points of reference and movement action to the official one offered by the state (Carr 1980: 163). In fact, militancy in itself could be interpreted as a form of opposition to a state that encouraged the worker to eat, sleep and watch football (Zirakzedah 1991: 44).

But why was the labour movement so important to the nationalist causes? Especially considering that outside the student unions in Northern Ireland, trade unions in the province remained an important bulwark to Catholic working class progression through the labour movement ranks. In the main, it was due to the nature of the regime. The very fact that out of all of Spain, over 30% of
labour protest was initiated in the Basque Country, suggesting that trade unions were a ready made source of organised political resistance to Madrid (Clark 1979: 256).

Between 1963 and 1974, the most crucial period of unrest as it would convince the regime to reform, some 37% of all industrial unrest manifested itself in the Basque Country (ibid.). Considering that in 1967 alone, up to 39% of all strike action was initiated to protest political and social rather than economic issues, then the political potency of labour movements in the general nationalist scheme of things was quite significant (ibid.). This is a further example of my theory that movements, ‘mimic’ the state. In a system defined along Rightist protection of economic and class interests, the parallel development of Leftist activism was a natural response to a state that viewed ideological challenges as “acts of sedition” (Zirakzedah 1991: 35-37).

Conversely, the rise in Basque nationalism could be viewed as the adoption of a statist paradigm that would signify to the centre the unwillingness of a minority to subsume their collective identity to the state’s (Watson 1996: 31). In doing so, they challenged the state via ‘mimicking’ the state’s intent. The fact that each protest was followed by heavy repression at the hands of Guardia Civil led to the belief commonly forming in the Basque Country that the nature of economic oppression was colonial in origin and that the military were the occupying army protecting the colonialist power’s profits at the expense of the indigenous population (Pérez-Agote 1984; Zulaika 1988).

Thus, strike action was a peripheral rejection, utilising mobilised protest marches, of the encroachment of the state on Basque civil society, granting a continuum between past rebellions and current protest actions (Giacopucci 1992: 16). This was similar to Northern Ireland, whereby the NICRA activists saw that to gain a continuum in protest action one had to link the repression to an established historical precedent that would give reason for the exploitation of cycles of protest (Townshend 1987: 179). In this way, the peripheral movement gains control over aspects of the struggle between state and national movement.

The state was slowly becoming a symbol of an elite in ascendancy that was highly unrepresentative of the community it was meant to control (Calamai 1978; Cazorla 1993). This fear of the re-emergence of direct police control over the region, and the rise of a non-Basque political constituency, not surprisingly, ran correspondingly to a period when economic inspired strikes would soon change into rallies for solidarity that would combine leftist
social goals with an overtly nationalist political platform (Clark 1979: 259). This was to create a diversification of movement repertoire that would last to this day that accordingly influenced the ideological direction in reaction to the consistent policy shifts emerging from the centre.

When Franco came here this country was a very Catholic one and the Vatican thought that as a party we would go with Franco because they couldn’t. But we refused Franco we went to the left wing and that is quite strange with a national movement that is why we are more than a 100 years old but we are Christian Democratic and Social Democratic.10

Integral to the mobilisation of protest activism was the emergence of a new generation of activists, who could not remember the atrocities of the Civil War and hence feared little, the direct consequence of open confrontation with the state (Giner 1976: 192-194). The Francoist state was continuously reshaping its political environment without necessarily incorporating the very disenfranchised who would prove the greatest threat to the state’s integrative process. The Falangist’s complete control over the judiciary, police, education and media would create a totalitarian environment ripe for the exploitation of cleavages produced within the polarised national polity (Giner 1984: 89). The lack of access points made available to differing societal aspirants would force the Basque periphery, as the major nationalist ideological challenger to the state, to undertake a reciprocal perpetuation of the crisis of state as a means to societal change (Kaplan; Reinares 1989; Laqueur 1993). It was here that ETA would emerge as the progenitor of this crisis, and the catalyst for the spiral into the reciprocal development of competing nationalist identities of the state centre and Basque periphery (Hollyman 1976: 216).

In such a climate, ETA had to expand its repertoire in order to incorporate new protest strategies so as to create a voice that could be present when the promised democratisation arrived. Working out of churches and private homes this expansion would commence with the re-education of the population towards permanent anti-state activism, and the radicalisation of the National community in direct opposition to the state (Hollyman 1976: 216).

The Emergence of ETA and the Commencement of New Strategies of Engaging the State.

The basis for the usage of terrorism against the Francoist regime
was founded in arguments pointing to the violent nature of regime formation and consolidation. It was a response to state engendered repression that sought to challenge the centre in the same way that the centre had challenged the periphery (Reinares 1987: 122). In this way, Fusi (1985: 123) believes that ETA was born directly from the PNV’s perceived passivity. For José MariáLeizaola, frustrated with the inability of the Lenda-kari in exile, the formation of ETA on July 31 1959 by Basque law students returning from Paris, under the leadership of José Echevarrieta Ortiz, was to signify a move away from NVDA to a militant stance towards the government (Janke 1980: 4; see also Baeza 1995).

The PNV had seemingly lost its ability to provide opportunities within their own organisation to absorb a new generation of activists discontent with the perception of past inaction (Linz 1985: 223). Critical of EGI’s liaison officer, Mikel Isasi’s, toeing the PNV party line, the ETA group were to utilise the radical Ekin magazine to devalue the part political organisation action that EGI were pushing. Leading to seven out of twelve original members of Ekin, headed by José Luis Emparanza ‘Txillardegi’, leaving to establish the military campaign in the formation of ETA (Sullivan 1988: 29). Here Ekin, in breaking with EGI, fell into the classic disillusionment paradigm that della Porta (1995) feels is integral to the embracement of VDA as the main strategy of mobilisation and oppositional formation to the regime.

ETA was able to create space for itself within the wider national movement by becoming the symbol of physical resistance to the innately violent way in which the Francoist regime had gone about its state centralisation (Grugel 1990: 100; Watson 1996: 31). They were ‘mimicking’ the state. The fact that the state refused to repeal extreme methods of law enforcement only served to legitimise this new strategy of escalating conflict in order to control the nature of state-peripheral polarisation (Kaplan 1980: 109-110). In such circumstances ETA, like the IRA and the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (CRB), sought to engage this at a pace at which the centre was not ready, in order to exploit the cycle and gain maximum advantage for the movement.

Slowly, with the expulsion of del Valle (a founding member of Ekin) from the PNV, and the pressure of the Spanish Security Forces to remove potentially militant activists from the Spanish territory. ETA began viewing their plight in terms of colonial oppression and occupation (Sullivan 1988: 32). In turn, this would lead to the marginalisation of the fledgling movement onto the periphery of internal Spanish political relations (Ibarzábal 1978: 78). What was clear was that for many ETA activists the PNV was
now viewed as a cultural movement, as opposed to a fully committed political movement (Sullivan 1988: 33). The absence of the PNV Government also granted significant space for ETA to mobilise popular support through engaging the Security Forces and forcing them to increase state repression (Farrel 1976: 34).

ETA’s first priority was to organise resistance to the Francoist regime at a militant level without exposing their activists to the response of the Security Forces; as the desired engagement was preferred to be enacted on the general population so as to more easily mobilise the people against the state (Laqueur 1993: 497). For this reason, it was in the traditional social groupings, called caudrillas, that the cell nature of the movement was to take shape:

With the creation of a tighter organisation composed of young men with a fervent commitment to create an independent Euskadi, ETA’s members discovered that the ideas which they had taken from the PNV and from Ekin were a poor guide to developing a strategy in an industrialised society in the 1960s (Sullivan 1988: 38).

Since its formation in 1959, ETA had formulated a five prong attack upon the state through publishing periodicals and journals such as Zutik (Stand Up) and Berriak (News), the dissemination of propaganda, and providing courses in social movement strategy; the Basque language and culture, as well as legal considerations (Janke 1980: 8). What was developing was a tacit recognition amongst ETA activists for the need to influence the pace of reform (ibid.). ETA was a responsive movement that itself accepted the necessity to ‘mimic’ the state in order to achieve maximum gains. The fact that the date of ETA’s formation was some nine days after the introduction by Franco of his stabilisation plan showed the unwillingness of the agitators to accept any further consolidation of the Falangist state (Carr & Fusi 1993: 53-54). At this stage though, the repression was culturally based, and as such ETA’s own activism would concentrate on undermining the cultural predominance of the Movimiento (Pérez-Agote 1984: 91). It would not be long, however, until this proffering of a peripheral alternate mode to societal organisation would bring the ire of the centre.

The arrest and the sentencing to twenty years imprisonment of the ETA elite along with the new more conservative EGI elite, on seditious acts against the state, demonstrated that not even moderate Basque protest activism would be tolerated (Hollyman 1976: 217-218). The natural consequence was a further exploitation of the way in which basic civil rights, such as the suspension of
habeas corpus, was to re-occur continuously as a tool of government repression in times of increased tension (López Garrido 1982).

ETA responded, and on July 18 1961 they were to launch a symbolic attack on the state that would greatly effect the nature of Falangist and Basque relations for another nine years (Clark 1984: 35; Preston 1986: 22). A bomb was exploded during a veterans day train ride that was to be the catalyst for a massive government crackdown that would see 110 ETA activists arrested and the suspension of habeas corpus throughout the region (Ibarz 1981: 95). Basque civil society was polarised and the state commenced a counter-offensive that would allow ETA to create a space for itself as the physical opposition to the state that would emerge from the formation of the First Assembly of ETA in 1962 (Garmendía 1979: 18-20). The Basque peripheral movement had radicalised with the state acting as cause for this new militancy and the movement as catalyst.

The Movement and the Cycle: The Strategic and Ideological Radicalisation of ETA and the First Engagement of the Spanish State.

Throughout 1963 and 1964, after the March 1963 Bayonne Second Assembly, papers began to be published that openly talked of the climate of national exclusivity created by other Basque groups that were forcing militant ETA activists to respond from a position of marginality (Conversi 1997: 96). Especially, considering the internal peripheralisation that had occurred within the PNV after the 1961 crackdown at the hands of the Guardia Civil (Sullivan 1988: 38). ETA, however, pulled off a major coup with the return of Antonin Etxebarrieta, the former PNV-EGI militant, from revolutionary Cuba and his defection to the militant wing of the national movement (Giacopucci 1992: 21). This would pave the way for the emergence of a syncretic strategy that would absorb colonial liberationist with indigenous tactics.

In the lead up to the 1964 Third Assembly, the move by Zabilde, a major ETA strategist, to utilise VDA as a catalyst in polarising the community behind the ETA movement was coming into focus (Sullivan 1988: 44). Like the IRA, ETA’s usage of VDA was to be responsive to the state’s repression so as to dictate the pace of change (Reinares 1987: 122; Thompson 1989). Unlike the IRA, where nationalism ruled as the main tool of movement
mobilisation, VDA was to become the core strategy of mobilisation and engagement as it now sought to recruit only those who saw the total dismantling of the state through complete armed insurrection, rather than it augmenting nationalism, as the main mode of mobilisation (MacClancy 1988; Zulaika 1988; Waldmann 1989).

The publication of José Luis Zabilde’s La insurrección en Euskadi in 1964 was to become the ideological base for strategic militantism that viewed terrorism per se as a rational political choice in a political environment that was non-conducive to more pacifist options of oppositional expression (Reinares 1987: 122). ETA’s Ortiz, in turn, had been greatly influenced by the works of Mao Tse-tung and saw the debate that emerged from the Second Assembly of 1963 as an opportunity to break from the PNV through the re-evaluation of past protest strategies (Janke 1980: 4). The key was to formulate a movement that would initiate and then, through responsive action, perpetuate cycles of action-repression-action in order to create space in a political system dictated by opposing national elites. As such, this was a tactic of protest, as opposed to open military conflict, designed to place the Basque question at the centre of Spanish national political debate.

The nature of the debate was one that was to encompass the complete spectrum of social movement strategic analysis. More importantly the ideological link was provided by Federico Krutwig’s Vasconia, published in Buenos Aires in 1963, between Third World liberation strategies of revolution and traditional militant Basque nationalism proposed by Txillardegi (Conversi 1993). It would also clearly define the tension between the PNV and ETA (Núñez Astrain 1995: 60). The PNV responded, in their paper Alderdi, to persistent government accusations of compliance to terrorist activity by denying that they would ever resort to such anti-Spanish state activity (ibid.). Not only was ETA attempting to polarise Spanish society in general, but the Basque political community as well. As Sullivan (1988: 42) noted:

Krutwig’s enduring contribution to ETA’s strategy was his theory of the cycle of action/repression/action, which held that, where popular protest against injustice met with oppression, the revolutionary forces should act to punish the oppressors.

Clark (1986: 123) feels that since the adoption of the action-repression-action theory at the Brussel’s Fourth Assembly in 1965, ETA showed their willingness to adopt violence as an integral part of their overall strategy of widening the scope of
protest repertoire; something that would set them apart from other movements. It provided a strategy which would create a “suitable reality of the Basque circumstance” for the movement (Giacopucci 1992: 21). A notion akin to leading Irish nationalist polemicist John Mitchell’s argument in the United Irishman in 1848 that ‘Ireland’s opportunity would come when England was in difficulty” that was to become a mainstay of Irish Nationalist doctrine (Coogan 1995: 16). Following strategies formulated by the Black French sociologist, Frantz Fanon, Zabilde and ETA were to produce the paper A Letter to the Intellectuals that would seek to forge alliances with the broader Spanish and European Left through its ability to act as the militant wing of both the nationalist and leftist movement (Garmendia 1979: 287-303; see also Ortzi 1975, Conversi 1993). Overall, it was a sign that the state as target and reason for mobilisation, had not lost its power.

The Fifth Assembly of 1966 and 1967 was to be a watershed as the new leadership elected by the Fourth Assembly attempted to incorporate a Trotskyist agenda, in a similar way that INLA would a decade later in Northern Ireland (Conversi 1997: 97-98). One which would place the national agenda as a secondary goal to that of the achievement of a socialist society. This subverting of the nationalist doctrine in favour of a Marxist ideology, in the same way that the Official IRA chose, was not attractive to the emerging grassroots nationalist bourgeois elites who preferred nationalism itself, to nationalism as a means of organisational structuration to combat the fascist state (Hollyman 1976: 222). Quite opposite to how the broad Left viewed the situation.

Such ideological variations have in common the insistence on the Basque homeland and freedom first, as a consequence of which class freedom is envisaged as developing within its newly gained democratic boundaries (ibid.).

This is dependent on the attitude that Basques themselves may have as individuals to the validity of VDA as a response to state aggression (Jáuregui 1981; Zulaika 1988; Wilson 1991: 40). Moral support is one thing, but active support is another. ETA realised that Krutwig’s cycle of action-repression-action had to be implemented immediately so as to bring around a rapid response from the state that would ensure a continuous state of mobilisation (Kaplan 1980: 110; Reinares 1987: 123). The old guard, under Txillardegi, Beltza, del Valle and Madariaga, pushed a nationalist line that was able to halt a general shift to the Left as it was feared that if a greater co-operation with the Spanish Leftist opposition occurred then a corresponding movement towards a socio-political Castilianisation would emerge amongst the Basque population
The ETA leadership after all realised that it was the nature of the state resistance that could forge the essence of peripheral counter-movement social identification.

ETA had to decide between the PNV methodology which concentrated on legalistic and institutional constitutional change, or, that of a revolutionary Left, which in itself was hostile to national movements which they perceived had roots in a bourgeois misreading of history (Padró-Solanet 1996: 452-453). Thus the Fifth Assembly proclaimed ETA a Basque socialist movement of national liberation under the belief that ETA would create a ‘Basque Workers’ Society’ under the leadership of the twenty year old Txabi Etxebarrieta (Farrel 1976: 36; Hollyman 1976: 223). For the young Etxebarrieta, VDA was seen as a response to the regime, and this led him into direct conflict with the older elites, headed by Patxu Iturrioz and José Luis Zalbide, who saw this tactic as a consequence of an expansion in the movement’s ability to engage the state through direct confrontation (Giacopucci 1992: 25).

This new notion was founded by the ‘Political Front’, one of the four fronts in which ETA was divided (Conversi 1997: 90). The other fronts held varying responsibilities so that the organisation’s diverse strategies would more readily attack the complex monolith that was the Francoist state (Sullivan 1988: 42-43). It was a maximisation of opportunity structures created in the cycles of protest under the guise of one over riding dogma that promised social liberation: through a perpetual struggle with the state (Carr 1982: 730). The ‘Workers’ Front’, modelled along the Vietnamese Troung Chin, was charged with welding the working class interests into a formidable national movement; the ‘Cultural Front’ against linguistic and cultural Castilianisation of Basque society; and the ‘Military Front’ was the militaristic response to state oppression (Giacopucci 1992: 25). The expelled group became known as Komunistak after a brief existence under the nomme de guerre ETA-Berri (New ETA). This de-emphasis of the bourgeois nationalist struggle would lead to a drop in their support amongst a people who desired to control their wealth, not necessarily share it around (Hollyman 1976: 223-224).

VDA would become the centre of ETA’s activity as its usage was timed to correspond to cycles of protest decline when the government would need to commence reforms that would increase political participatory structures for marginalised communities (Krutwig 1963; Jáuregui 1981: 417). For now the state and the Security Forces were clearly defined as the prime enemy of the movement, enabling ETA to create, what Carr (1982: 734) calls, a
policy of ‘magnicide’ designed specifically to force a reaction from the far-Right in order to create a basis for a mobilisation of popular discontent. Noting that without such radicalisation of the periphery it is doubtful whether or not the final reshaping of the state’s political system would have occurred. ETA realised this, and utilised VDA as a means of getting the state to listen:

All over the world the negotiation is the only solution and here what they call terrorism. The ETA has a great or a quite important support in the population so if you don’t change the situation it is very difficult to finish with the result you want.¹⁴

The aim of engaging the state through VDA had emerged at the same time as the emergence of the Organic Laws. This was no coincidence, as ETA and the PNV had come to realise that this new division of power between Parliament and Prime Minister was preparing Spain for political changes steeped in unitarist traditions (Rokkan & Urwin 1983: 176). Already, the PNV was proving inactive as the Movimiento was increasing pressure upon the periphery in a bid to crush extra-parliamentarian opposition (Núñez Astrain 1995: 60). ETA responded with an act that was designed to inflame the divisions between the Security Forces and the Basque community (Bruni 1993). On June 7 1968, the police commissioner for Bilbao, Melitó n Manzanas, was to make an error that would not only cost him his life but send Spain into a spiral of reciprocal violence that would last to this day (Sullivan 1988: 92-112; Conversi 1997: 99).

After an incident in which two Civil Guards were shot at a road block, Txabi Etxebarrieta was himself pulled out of a car and shot dead in retaliation. The Basque Country rose in dismay (Clark 1984: 49). This was a flagrant political targeting that equally disgusted the PNV as it did ETA. Up till this time ETA had not purposefully killed government officials (ibid.). Mass demonstrations ensued and Txabi’s funeral became a symbol of nationalist resistance (Aretxaga 1988). Yet, more significantly, ETA’s response, in assassinating Manzanas in front of his home, signalled that governmental physical force would be met in kind.

This was in direct opposition to the political conservatism of the PNV, which to be fair was hampered by limitations of its party organisational structure (Clark 1979: 44; see also Brezzi 1979; Heiberg 1979). ETA, though, had achieved the desired response. By the end of 1968 hundreds of Basques, ETA activists or not, had been incarcerated, tortured, and intimidated. Mass demonstrations and nationalist strikes commenced that would directly question the
legitimacy of the state (Conversi 1997: 99). The regime had not expected such public displays of support for the Basques, which led to an upswing in mobilised discontent that created new opportunities for protest throughout the rest of Spain. On January 24 1969 a state of emergency was declared throughout Spain which lasted until March 25 (Carr & Fusi 1993: 148). The cycle of reform-protest-reform had begun.

The perennial restructuring of protest cycles due to the nature of the combat with the government, led ETA into a shaky period of fragmentation by 1970 (Ortzi 1975; Clark 1984: 44). Those who would support the Sixth Assembly of 1970 would see the benefits of uniting with the wider Spanish Left into a Socialist Front against the regime (Jáuregui 1981: 417; Heiberg 1989: 107). The fact that the majority of the Fifth Assembly elite was incarcerated allowed for those youths schooled in the activism of 1968 to expel ETA-V from ETA-VI (Conversi 1997: 104). A new Marxist ideology was to replace nationalism (Ortzi 1975). Yet as ETA-VI would soon find out, this would only isolate them from a population base that had acquired a new national revolutionary identity in direct opposition to the Greater Spanish identity of state (Conversi 1997: 103). This corresponded to the breakup of the IRA between the Officials and Provisionals along similar strategic differences.

The state had declared war on a national identity and the nation would respond in kind. The protest activism of a region had been ritualised into an ideological counter-movement to the state with nationalism at its core (Preston 1986: 22). The cycle of reform-protest-reform had created a polarisation of society, yet more significantly, the reciprocal development of two competing and exclusive national ideologies of state (Kaplan 1980: 124). Matters came to a head during the September 18 1970 jai-alai, sporting championships, Joseba Eló segi, the commander of the Basque military unit present during the bombing of Guernica in 1937, set himself alight in front of Franco, offering himself up to the flames of nationalist intent (Preston 1986: 27). The symbolism of the sacrifice of a war hero, perhaps the sole member of the resistance left within Basque public life, before the dictator was as effective as Jan Palacka’s similar sacrifice before the Soviet tanks in 1968 in mobilising popular opinion against the futility of the state’s repression when the collective soul was at question. The fact that it was done in the name of the activists accused of killing Manzanas highlighted that repression would only strengthen the need for the perpetuation of the national movement.
The response of Carrero Blanco and Franco was to make an example of 16 ETA terrorists, that Elósegui had protested about, in a show trial (Halimi 1976). This only served to mobilise anti-Francoist forces into demonstrations of mass rallies, protests and marches throughout the Basque Country (Preston 1986: 28). Amongst the activists who would become known as the Burgos detainees were two Basque priests which allowed for Monsignor Cirarda Lachiondo to intercede on the behalf of the Vatican to force the government to hold the trials in public (Sullivan 1988: 30).

This was a tactical defeat for the Francoist regime that knew a public trial of priests, from the very religious order from which they claimed their moral authority, would not show the regime in good light (Pérez-Agote 1986). Not only did this lead to the final rift between the once allied Church and state, but, it also focused the attentions of the Spanish community upon the inadequacies of the judicial system (Hermet 1986: 458). Finally, on November 22, 1970 Monsignor Cirarda and Bishop Argaya Goicoechea of San Sebastian proclaimed a joint pastoral letter which condemned the processes of the trial and the validity of the application of the recently reintroduced Law of Banditry and Terrorism (Preston 1986: 30). Church disapproval forced many conservatives to re-evaluate the validity of such harsh systems of repression as means to establishing a stringent social order (ibid.).

The significance of the Burgos trials lay in the symbolic representation of the trial through the mass media (see Sartre's "Introduction" to Halimi 1976). O'Brien (1969: 217) noted that the trial as a drama is a transmittance of a regime's symbolic power to dictate moral rights and wrongs of society, and as such the power of the state over the masses. Yet, it is within this very symbolic reinforcement of power relations that the peripheralised movement can shape popular opinion in their favour (Tarrow 1983, 1993a; della Porta 1995, 1996). This occurs through manipulating the circumstance to heighten public awareness to the nature of the repressive apparatus of state. The movement under trial is granted the public forum that could only have been previously achieved through NVDA or VDA (Heiberg 1989: 107). In addition, it attains to a greater legitimacy due to the fact that the state has viewed them a sufficient enough threat to have prosecuted them (ibid.).

In the case of the Burgos trials, the ability of the defendants to stipulate how in fact their values were indeed separate from those of the state was to be a propaganda coup in exemplifying the two
competing national movements’ relationship vis-à-vis the Spanish state (Sullivan 1988: 110-112). The continuing cycles of reform-protest-reform had produced a polarisation of two opponent communities, that forged new identities on the threads of past rebellions and state consolidations due to the nature of state reformulation in times of conflict. At the core of this reciprocal development was the state. ETA was a response to the state as much as it was a child of the cleavages produced by the state (Núñez Astrain 1977; Reinares 1987). With each upsurge in repression or reform, the periphery would counter likewise.

Where ETA differed from the PNV was that as a movement it was more responsive to these periods of state consolidation and reform, as it held no responsibility to the state except as a fulcrum of popular discontent. The Burgos trials and the January-March 1969 state of emergency would create space for a new radical nationalist doctrine to emerge that would be embodied in the fall of ETA-VI by 1972, and the rise of an ETA-VI/EGI realignment that would place the onus of mobilisation back on the Castilian dominated state (Zulaika 1988: 61; see also Ortzi 1975). Yet, the state itself had forged an equally sustainable national identity built on institutional violence which became the core of state nationalism.

The cross Spanish support for the Basque activists surprised the regime, especially as they had offered themselves as the guardians of a pan-Iberian identity (Ortzi 1975). One hundred lawyers held a sit-in at the Palace of Justice in Madrid and 3 000 students clashed with armed police in Barcelona (Carr & Fusi 1993: 156; Conversi 1997: 101). More importantly was the galvanisation of support for the movement in the Basque Country with over 180 000 workers going out on strike in Euskadi (Carr & Fusi 1993: 156). ETA chose this moment to kidnap, on December 1, the West German Honorary Consul Eugen Beihl in San Sebastián (Preston 1986: 31). This was done by the more nationalist oriented ETA-Fifth Assembly as opposed to ETA-Sixth Assembly whose members were in the Burgos trials. Nevertheless, it was a sign that by ‘mimicking’ the state centre the periphery could take advantage of openings made by a state in transition.

The German Government began to exert pressure on the regime to grant clemency; as they were Spain’s second largest foreign supplier and customer, plus third largest investor, Franco had to listen (Conversi 1997: 101). Once again the value of coordinating VDA with NVDA was proving to be an invaluable tool in the ETA’s attempt at forcing the state’s hand. When Beihl escaped and local villagers recaptured him and gave him to ETA-V, the public support that Carrero Blanco and the Castilian media had claimed...
was proven to be somewhat premature (Preston 1986: 32). ETA had now come of age as a major oppositional movement force within the Spanish political scene.

The trials went ahead on December 3 whilst the government implemented a policy of house to house searches, unrestricted detention, exile and complete censorship of all mail. To the surprise of the regime, Colonel Manuel Ordovas allowed the first defendant Jesús Abrisqueta Corta to recall how he had been tortured by the police with evidence being provided by the next three accused (Sullivan 1988: 110-112). The trial was adjourned until December 9, due to the regime’s embarrassment about the nature of the torture (ibid.). In fact, when Omaindíá Nachionda jumped up and sang the hymn of the Basque Warrior, Eusko Gudariak, with the other 15 accused and much of the audience joined in, the publicity coup was complete (Preston 1986: 32). Support from all over the country followed quickly (ibid.). The Parliament was besieged by the civil guard, whilst police clashed with the people in Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and Oviedo (Pérez-Agote 1984: 116). On December 28 when three of the accused were given double death sentences the ETA tactics of action-repression-action were proving successful, as the more subtler methods of the PNV were inadequate in speeding up the state’s response to popular pressure (Preston 1986: 32). The price, though, proved high. Of the sixteen trialled, nine were sentenced to death, whilst the rest were sentenced to a combined period of 518 years imprisonment (Sullivan 1988: 112).

In the wake of the Burgos trials many young activists, such as Eustakio Mendizábal Benito, saw that reform could only occur through physically dismantling the state (Janke 1980: 8). The centre was now forced to review its stringent strategies of population control as the periphery was now in a continuous state of mobilisation. According to Carr (1980: 171) however, the response of the Government, as in the immediate aftermath of the Burgos trials, was to ‘jump into the bunker.’ With the eventual assassination of Mendizábal Benito by the Security Forces, ETA had proof of the willingness of the government to partake in extra judiciary methods of controlling the periphery (Arango 1985: 180; Ammann 1995: 27-29). Spain was irrevocably polarised and only through a re-examination of the nature of state unitarism could the nationalist cleavages be resolved.

The Ideological Schism over the Nature of the Enemy: The Re-evaluation of the Nature of
Violence within the Cycle of Periphery
Movement Development.

ETA-VI, until 1972 was still the majority group due to ETA-VI’s staunchly Marxist-Leninist approach of addressing the national question in the overall structure of a global revolution (Ortzi 1975: 390-391; Preston 1984: 44). This new adaptation of revolutionary doctrine was to allow ETA, similar to the Provisional IRA, the chance to redefine their continued existence in terms of any future state centre led reactionism. The success of the ETA-V lay in its support base amongst the common people. This served them well in battles with the intellectual elite over the issue of revolutionary legitimacy within the Basque community (Hollyman 1976: 228).

An internal conflict emerged when a group of ETA activists supporting the Marxist doctrine of the Sixth Assembly, published a new manifesto in the internal magazine Kemen that called for:

i. the overthrow of the state by popular armed councils;

ii. the unification of the Basque Country under a populist government;

iii. the socialisation of wealth; the liberation of all political parties and trade unions; and

iv. the equality of Basque and Castilian languages.

Nationalism had been usurped by an internationalist revolutionary doctrine that was to deny access to all classes that did not fall within this proletarian paradigm. Thus, alienating the PNV from the more radical nationalist Left (Conversi 1997: 105). The desired polarisation was now dividing the Basque national movement as it did the Irish in Northern Ireland. The PNV, like the SDLP in Northern Ireland, had portrayed themselves as the middle ground (Llera Ramo 1985). Yet, without direct contact with the radicals of ETA, they would be unable to negotiate with the centre, since a radicalisation of the crisis would only further stratify the conflict between the state and movement (Hipsher 1996: 292). The subsequent hunger strikes failed to amass popular support as it led to sixty days solitary confinement for the detainees (ibid.). The result was a swing back to ETA-V and a re-evaluation of the worth of NVDA without VDA augmenting it (Hollyman 1976: 230).

ETA activists became disheartened with what they felt was the negation of the nationalist question in favour of a pan-Iberian Marxist revolutionary front (Sullivan 1988: 28-31). Txillardegi and Benito de Valle were frustrated with this humanist Marxist line that placed a greater emphasis on underground movement alliances rather than direct confrontation with the state (Jáuregui 1981: 308;...
Zulaika 1988: 55), similar to the split between the Official and Provisional IRA. Yet, the split was not to fully occur until the formalisation of the democratic centralist ideological doctrine by a young activist, Eduardo Moreno Bergareche, at the 1973 Hasparren Assembly in France (Janke 1980: 6). ETA would be further divided between traditional nationalists of ETA’s main wing (ETA-m), founded on the principles of the Fifth Assembly and those who sought to reformulate themselves along democratic-centralist lines (ETA-pm) (MacClancy 1988). ETA-pm viewed itself as a political entity along the lines that, like Sinn Féin in the early 1980s, would become the electoral representatives of the wider national movement (Núñez Astrain 1995: 66). A division that was to be solidified with the formation of ETA-pm in 1974 (Grugel 1990: 110).

The strategy was to create space for public debate on issues that had been perceived as resolved through manipulating the media’s hunger for sensationalism (Clark 1986b; Chaffee 1988: 545-572). This strategy hinged upon humiliating the state, through showing its inability to confront direct challenges to its authority. This was similar to the belief held by the Provisional IRA High Command in 1974 that by launching a bombing campaign they could force the British to the table (Coogan 1995: 385-391). Both strategies failed as what emerged was a simultaneous criminalisation of the movement and a reinforcement of the state’s right to implement counter-insurgency as a defence of its position.

When looking at ETA, the nature of terrorist activity can been seen to be one that is designed to accommodate state reactionism. Thus, suggesting that the act of violence is more than an expression of collective frustration, but, rather a move to widen the field of communication, whilst expanding the repertoire of the movement, with the target, ie, the state. The leaving behind of 9-mm ‘Parabellum’ case shells as a calling card of ETA, after machine gun attacks, is a sign that ETA acknowledges the worth of terrorism as a communicative device, through manipulating media coverage, to the centre (Clark 1986b: 124). Even the traditional call to the Basque papers Deia of Bilbao and Egin of San Sebastián before an event occurs shows not just the staged manner of the attack, but also the desire of the group to foster sympathetic relations with certain sectors of the nationalist community, whilst condemning the Madrid dailies as lacking independence from the centre’s control (ibid.).

ETA’s muse was the state. Every repression was ‘mimicked’, every reform intensely followed (Laqueur 1987: 224-225). When the state relaxed, ETA would increase its strikes. When the state attacked,
ETA responded (Reinares 1987). Each action between centre and periphery was a message that would shape the future of state development and peripheral counter-movement mobilisation (Díez-Medrano 1994). With this in mind, ETA would see the June 8 1973 appointment of Carrero Blanco, the sole figure of continuismo, to the Premiership as a sign that the Basque people’s demand for autonomy would be considered an anathema to the state’s official Francoist/Falangist identity (Cotarelo 1993: 34).

This would provide a conundrum to the Spanish Left determined to avoid a revolutionary scenario (Boggs & Plotke 1980; Maravall & Santamaria 1993: 195-196). For ETA, the movement that was born of Falangist repression, the solution was not so ideologically challenging (Preston 1990). Knowing full well the consequences, on December 20 1973, six months after his ascension to power, Blanco was assassinated (Forest 1975). ETA had provided the Leftist opposition an opportunity that would test the ability of the Spanish state to incorporate future competing nationalist agendas and ideological movements.

For this reason, the Bordeaux press conference called by six ETA terrorists in the house of a Basque engineer, in front of nine posters of ETA activists killed in gunfights with police in the wake of the Carrero Blanco assassination on December 20 1973, played a major role in convincing middle-class Basque nationalists of the benefits of terrorism in removing major obstacles to reform that the PNV had failed to do (Janke 1980: 3). Here were six “freedom fighters,” placed almost religiously before an altar to past martyrs of the struggle, explaining how they had removed the chosen successor of their main protagonist, and the head of the unitarists within the Spanish state (ibid.). A position ETA was able to exploit amongst the broad Spanish and Basque Left to justify their assassination of Carrero Blanco as the official ETA press communiqué stated:

Luis Carrero Blanco, a hard man, violent in his repressive attitudes, was the key which guaranteed the continuity and stability of the Francoist system. It is certain that, without him, the tensions between the different tendencies loyal to General Franco’s fascist regime- Opus Dei, Falanga, etc.- will be dangerously sharpened. We therefore consider our action against the president of the Spanish government to be indisputably an advance of the most fundamental kind in the struggle against national oppression and for the cause of socialism in Euskadi and for the freedom of all those who are exploited and oppressed within the
Spanish state (Preston 1986: 49).

More significantly for ETA, the removal of Carrero Blanco was to grant them greater legitimacy amongst the Spanish Left as a major political player (Kaplan 1980; Rodríguez-Ibañez 1980). It also sent the message to the rest of Spain that ETA was the organisation that best suited the title of revolutionary vanguard against the state (Hollyman 1976: 214). As the smoke cleared, the influence of ETA intensified with each close-up camera angle of the remains of the Dictator’s Deputy, on a second floor balcony, opposite the church where he had just received confession in fortress Madrid. The image of the utter futility of repression was borne into millions of living rooms throughout Spain. As Jean Grugel (1990: 104) stated:

ETA was responsible for the single most audacious blow to the authorisation state in December 1973, when Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco was assassinated in Madrid. This event, more than any other single act, became the symbol of resistance to the dictatorship.

ETA demonstrated that, though the state had created the cleavage between centre and periphery, the national movement could, through VDA, change the shape of the struggle so as to assert greater control over the rate of state response. The appointment of Arias Navarro to the Premiership on December 29 1973 showed that any hope for continuismo was defeated (Carr & Fusi 1993: 195-196). The Spanish state, and hence national ideology, would change (Ló Pezrodó 1977). The question now was, in what way? Whatever the nature of this redefinition of state continuity, one thing was clear, it would equally change the nature of Basque political identification as the state was the raison d’être for its continuous mobilisation.

The Death of Franco and the Reinvention of the State.

The advantages of social movement organisation were seen as a deepening of the processes of democratisation since they allowed for profound political, social and economic activity to occur outside the realm of the state (Linz 1972; Linz & Stepan 1992). Yet, the great problem with movement activism mobilised along strategies of NVDA was that it lent itself more readily to the processes of electoral formalisation in response to the shifts in political opportunity structures of state that emerged in the wake of Franco’s
decline (Pérez Calvo 1977; Fusi 1984; Silver 1987). A demobilisation of extra-parliamentary collective action that the state calculated would legitimise its own reform process, and hence negate the extreme demands of the Basque periphery:

Movement demobilisation and institutionalisation were strategic, norm based responses to changes in political opportunities over time and in attitudes regarding the desirability of democracy (Hipsher 1996: 274).

The very push for demobilisation of illegal protest activism in favour of more traditional means of conflict resolution via the parliamentary system was to signal a change in state strategies (Pérez-Agote 1987). ETA, lacking the electoral traditions of the PNV, would have to face this shift with much chagrin. A situation that the PNV were to exploit, as the SDLP had done in Northern Ireland, to their maximum advantage. This enabled past elites to continue in positions of influence without necessarily being accountable for past injustices (Linz & Stepan 1992). More importantly, it allowed these once isolated elites to influence reform even when they renounced the previous power sharing agreements. Thus, bringing into question who was controlling these cycles of action-reaction-action (Gunther et al. 1986; Gunther 1992; Higley & Gunther 1992). In fact, the increase of assassinations between 1968 and 1975, some 34, during a period of state restructuring, heightened the significance of the Basque national question to the process of governmental succession (Calamai 1978: 58; Laqueur 1987: 224-225).

This suggests that the action itself was more often than not employed so as to create polarity between the reforming state and alienated national community. One that, Laqueur (1993: 442) felt, was aimed at highlighting the palpable differences between the state’s doctrine of unity and reality of life on the periphery. More significantly, this points to the fact that for the majority of ETA activists any process of democratic reform that negated the national question, was no resolution to cleavages within Spanish society. Cleavages that ETA felt were so clearly defined along national lines. The fact that they were a people questioning the right of other Spaniards to co-exist in regions that they called their own, brought doubts over the very nature of oneness in cultural and social identity between the regions, and begged the question of whether or not the Spanish state was a legitimate ethno-political entity?

The revenge killings during the 1970s are more descriptive of a movement in conflict rather than one out of control. A situation
proven, according to Clark (1984: 124), in that up until the early 1970s not one attack was unplanned. Rather, they were systematic in their application as tools of socio-political mobilisation. One designed to taunt the state into responding with suitable force. Thus, the promulgation of the August 1975 Anti-Terrorist Law, which saw the death penalty being applied to five ETA and FRAP militant activists, including ‘Txiki’ and ‘Otaegi’, in September 1975 by the Arias transitional Government, was criticised by many moderate Basques as the government falling into ETA’s hands (Conversi 1997: 106). Carrero Blanco’s assassination proved that extreme protest action could force the government to react in ways that would further mobilise the people against the regime, through escalating the crisis during low ebbs of the reform process (Carr 1982: 736).

The February 12 1974 announcement by the Arias Navarro Government of an official policy of “opening” up the system, only two months after Carrero Blanco’s death would catch ETA by surprise (Arias Navarro 1976; Llorca 1986; Tezanos 1993: 36). ETA was defined in terms of its resistance to an immobile state monolith; if this monolith could reshape, then the only way ETA could justify its continuous existence would be in an institutionalisation of the conflict. In doing so ETA would perennially be defined in terms of its action, instead of its nationalist ideology; and with autonomy and freedom of association on the table, any redefinition of state would effect the Basque movement greatly.

From an electoral perspective groups amongst the nationalist Right, such as the PNV, tended to always view NVDA as a limited means for attaining exposure of their plight, and as such, a tool that would have to be utilised less with the removal of Franco from the political scene (Clark 1979: 381). For ETA, the realisation that democratisation of the system would satiate much of their demands, hence diminishing the reasons for continuing their extra-legal activism, would cause a major strategic rethink of the role of the state in providing a target for activism (Zirakzedah 1991: 97). There was a risk of the movement dissipating unless it could prove that the original cleavages between competing identities still existed, and Spanish society was not as fluid as commonly thought (Hills 1980; Tamayo 1988). VDA and an upswing in the cycle would change this. Hence, eleven days after Franco ceded power to Juan Carlos, ETA exploded a bomb at Café Redondo in Madrid killing twelve people (Conversi 1997: 106). It was frequented by off duty soldiers.

Spanish society had been defined for nearly four decades, from
1939 to 1976, between victors and the defeated of the Spanish Civil War (Fraser 1986). This allowed for a virtual criminalisation of the opposition that threatened to polarise society as had occurred in 1936 (Preston 1986: 4). Not only did this bring about a lack of legitimacy for the government, but also a radicalisation of those placed upon the periphery. In essence these groups felt that Spain was governed as one would govern a conquered territory (Linz 1986; Reinares 1994). Hence, they designed their counter-strategies upon this premise. This was due to the fact that Franco had turned the army into an institution whose prime concern was social control rather than national defence (Castells Arteche 1978; Preston 1985).

Central to Franco’s rule was the institutionalisation of the Nationalists’ victory in the Civil War over that of the Republic, and as such all opposing viewpoints were considered treason as well as anti-statist (Fraser 1986: 189-209). A situation whereby state controlled violence could act as a catalyst for the expression of political frustrations that occur through predesigned marginalisation of a given community. Thus, within the Spanish context terrorism, and broader VDA, were not necessarily the sole property of a national movement in the immediate period prior to democratisation and its early periods of restructuring (Moa Rodríguez 1985; Piñuel 1986).

The era of Arias Navarro’s continuismo (continualism) was to bring about further repression and the ignoring of civil rights. The government now implemented a policy of intimidation through harassment and internment of wives and girlfriends of suspected terrorists (Preston 1986: 73). A forerunner to GAL, under the names of Antiterrorism-ETA and the Basque-Spanish Battalion, these squads also machine gunned bars where prominent nationalists were known to have frequented (Alvaro Baeza & Forte 1983). More often than not this tactic backfired as funerals of innocent bystanders were utilised as popular demonstrations of public solidarity against the harshness of the regime (Aretxaga 1988). This only serves to highlight the ability of movements to adapt to given social and political environments formed by reactionary states when faced with governmental impasses and a crisis in the effectiveness of more traditional protest repertoire (Calamai 1978: 59).

As far as the democratic opposition is concerned there were no doubts: behind these unprecedented facts were the forces of reaction, working at re-establishing the terrorism-repression spiral, in an extreme attempt to obstruct Suárez’ reforming plans and the struggles of the workers movement (ibid.: 60).
The sentencing to death of ETA activists ‘Txiki’ Jon Paredes Manot, José Garmendía Artola and Angel Otaegi Etxeberría, and the subsequent blanket repression of the region, saw general strikes paralyse the region on August 29 and September 11-12. In the interim, the Government introduced their draconian Anti-Terrorist Law (Preston 1986: 73). ‘Txiki’ Paredes and Angel Otaegi were executed along with three FRAP members on September 27 1975 (ibid.: 73-74). For the first time since the announcement of the intended reform of the state monolith, the government left the door ajar enough for ETA to exploit.

Creating a New Enemy: ETA’s Search for a New Movement Ideology and Strategy.

ETA was not going to relinquish the one strategy of their repertoire that enabled them to directly threaten the state, ie, terrorism. The emergence of Roberto Lertxundi, a radical young physician, suggested that the next generation, like those in 1959, would feel that VDA still held strong political relevance (Rodriguez-Ibañ ez 1980: 89). Central to this was the ratification of the Koordinatara Abertzale Socialista, KAS, in October 1975, as the strategic and ideological basis for a broad nationalist revolutionary movement front (Grugel 1990: 110). One that would cast itself as guarantor of the nationalist struggle in a period when new post-democratic elites were determined to minimise the importance of peripheral nationalism within the new Spain. The six points of KAS being:

i. a complete amnesty for all political prisoners;

ii. the expulsion from Euskadi of all Spanish police and security forces;

iii. an improvement in the standard of living for all the ‘popular’ classes of Euskadi, especially the working class;

iv. the reunification of Navarre with the other provinces of Euskadi;

v. recognition of the right of Euskadi to form an independent state;

vi. the control by the Basque government of the armed forces which are stationed in Euskadi (ibid.: 110).

The new strategy would again be revolutionary. Yet, this time it would move into incorporating a wider social platform that could be mobilised into electoral support in times of crisis along the old Gramscian line of creating a popular hegemonic “bloc” (Rodriguez-Ibañ ez 1980: 94). A point ratified by the Ninth
Congress of ETA. The shift came as ETA arrived at a decision that the PCE, with the dismantling of FRAP, were more interested in integration than logistically supporting a nationalist revolution (Story 1979: 168).

The great problem with the usage of VDA is that once it commences it cannot be restricted by enforced moral limitations. VDA also legitimises the state’s utilisation of violent policing as a means to self-defence (Calamai 1978: 61). Thus, the overt use of violence as the main tactical strategy serves to militarise the situation to the point whereby solely political actors fail to create significant space for their ideals within their own militancy; as they have now become associated with anti-state activism. Thereby, creating a polarisation of society whilst limiting opportunities for moderates within the movement to gain representative legitimacy.

This was to emerge as the main reason behind the split between ETA-m and ETA-pm in 1975, as ETA-m felt the opening up of institutional opportunity structures would serve only to diminish the strength of the armed-wing of the national movement (Arango 1985: 181; Reinares 1987: 125). A situation that in Northern Ireland would lead to the mobilisation of counter movements amongst working class Protestants that would see such activism directly threaten the institution that defined their distinct version of Irishness, ie, the Ulster state and the Union with the Crown (Clayton 1996; Dunn & Hennessey 1996). In Spain, as in Ireland, this would lead to the political intractability of the crisis and perpetuation of the struggle in the reciprocal nature by which one defines the other, that is, state repression is needed to define the movement militant.

From a peripheral perspective, the Franco years were ones of overt homogenisation that only served to radicalise the majority of the population. The assassination of Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco was a signal to the centre that democratisation without restructuring the entity of the Spanish state would be flawed by a lack of legitimacy. ETA’s continued strikes were a demonstration of this point, yet the inability of the centre to respond had much to do with successful de-politicisation processes implemented by Franco (Cazorla 1993: 84). The Second Arias Navarro Government of December 1975 to June 1976 symbolised this neo-conservatism (Carr & Fusi 1993: 209). Yet, it was in Arias’ premiership that the opposition was to push for ruptura democrática in the formation of large based coordinating councils that began to collaborate clandestinely in the guise of popular fronts (Gunther 1992: 47).

Mass demonstrations calling for an amnesty for all political
prisoners occurred throughout March 1976 with up to 80% of the Basque work force going out on strike (Clark. 1979: 269-271 & Conversi 1997: 143). In the Basque Country, the policy of mass demonstration in combination with strike action was proving a useful tool in uniting the Left and the nationalist into a workable social movement. ETA militants, though, continued their campaign of VDA which so infuriated the Arias Government that it pushed the Minister for the Interior, Manuel Fraga, to declare war on ETA on April 8 1976 (Preston 1986: 82). Just as the regime seemed to move more towards compromise on the issue of democratisation, it became quite obvious that if ETA could not prove itself adept enough to embrace a more traditional form of electoral political participation, then the PNV would attain the majority moderate vote amongst the Basque body politic. A position that ETA had come to recognise as a means of dividing the periphery, and hence the legitimacy of their national movement to act in unison against state. As ‘Patxi’ an HB activist told me:

The bringing of democracy was meant to divide us. It legitimised the Spanish state without letting us organise separately. So we did not support it.16

In July 1976 hundreds of political prisoners were pardoned, the Movimiento itself was eventually disbanded, whilst political parties were legalised. The elections were scheduled for June 1977 (Gunther 1992: 48). The announcement by Adolfo Suárez, with his ascension to power on July 3 1976 that “sovereignty resides with people” was to lead to an ideological shift amongst the Left as they realised that any future support of extreme nationalists, like ETA, would be an electoral liability (Story 1979: 176; Balcells 1992: 203). Even the PCE realised that it would be futile to isolate fully the Basque vote (de Blas Guerrero 1993a: 591). The response of ETA-pm, after the July assassination of Pertur, the first major ETA activist to push for a review of exclusive VDA strategies, was to move towards a scenario whereby ETA could formalise their demands through a renunciation of violence, but held the right to return to arms if the Government back-tracked on Autonomy. By the end of 1976 the Basque Revolutionary Party (EIA) was formed in order to enfranchise the demands of the militants within the national movement’s electoral front to the state’s reforms (Zirakzedah 1991: 192).

Suárez himself understood little of the Basques and the motives behind their actions. His main concern was to balance precariously the demands of the Falangists with those of the Left. The desire for a revolutionary break from the state was one that he could not come to terms with. His mistake, I feel, was regarding the Basque
problem as one of public order. The killing of demonstrators by the Security Forces throughout 1976 eventually forced ETA out of their self-imposed ceasefire when on October 4 1976 they assassinated the president of the Guipúzcoa Provincial Council Juan María Araluce Villar and his four guards (Preston 1986: 105). Fraga’s the then Minister for the Interior, major mistake in the lead up to the first full elections was in increasing the military presence in the Basque Country. As Gilmour (1985: 219) stated:

If the Basques had to choose between ETA and a government in which the Franco/Fraga ‘reasoning’ predominated, it clearly was going to side with ETA.

Tactically the Suárez Government was not prepared for an escalation of the crisis. This was to allow ETA to threaten the very process of democratisation if they were kept out of government-opposition negotiation. The PCE, in following the Italian Communist Party leader’s, Berlinguer’s, Eurocommunist line, and the PSOE, in seeking reconciliation, failed to deal with the realities of overt repressive policing in the Basque Country (Bell 1979: 21). Especially considering that the new Special Power Acts in April 1975, and the Prevention of Terrorism Law in August 1975, had been used to subjugate all wings of the national movement (ibid.). For the average Basque, this proved that the state again was determined to marginalise them due to their national identity. Terrorism, once again, was viewed as the tactic most likely to remonstrate to the centre the discontent of the periphery (Reinares 1987: 126). As Laqueur (1987: 6) points out, it is no coincidence that terrorism increased in the Basque Country whilst declining through the rest of Spain throughout the democratisation process.

King Juan Carlos responded to this crisis by granting Adolfo Suárez to formulate a Government of renewal before the elections (Morán 1979; Figuero 1981; Melià 1981). A Minister for the Movimiento (de Blas Guerrero 1993b: 50), he nevertheless persuaded the Falangist dominated Parliament to commit political suicide by approving the Law of Political Reform in October 1976 (Maravall & Santamaria 1993: 200-201). At the heart was the promulgation of the Law of Fundamental Reform on December 15 1976 (ibid.: 201-202). Constituting a bicarmel parliament to replace the Francoist Cortes, consisting of a lower house of which the Chamber of Deputies of 350 members proportionally elected in four year terms, a Senate with 248 members of which four would come from the majority vote, seven from the Spanish islands and North African enclaves, 41 to be appointed by the King and only 50 from the provinces (Fry & Gregory 1983: 41). By the end of 1976 ETA
had killed 60 policemen, whilst losing 20 of their own; a further 150 activists were gaoled (Carr & Fusi 1993: 156). ETA signalled that the further negation of their role would lead to a continued usage of VDA against the state. The cycle would continue and this time it would define the movement, as the state had done before, and would continue to do so as the ideological opponent of ETA (Burton et al. 1992: 23).

The Centre’s Democratisation Process: A New Opportunity for Peripheral Rebellion.

The sense that a time for change had emerged on the periphery, along with similar pushes for a decentralisation of state emerging from Catalonia and Galicia (Rokkan & Unwin 1983: 154). These movements were in fact just as diversified in their objective goal as the Basque national movement. Herein lies the main dilemma for the centre. If the territorial objectives of autonomy are to preserve cultural, linguistic, social and political integrity, how can the centre accommodate conflicting demands of one group without necessarily isolating other communities? The solution, that the Spanish Government in transition sought, was the absorption of regionalist movements into the party political system in order to negate much of the extreme demands (Linz & Stepan 1992: 124). This had the reverse effect of pushing extremists onto the periphery, and away from the centre, which would force them to take more extreme means of redressing their grievances. Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 171), following on from Lipset and Rokkan (1967), felt that this is a prime example of how the state can assist in further radicalising a movement, hence, politically homogenising a given national community, through placing exclusive preconditions on participation.

From the perspective of the Basque national movement, the democratisation process was to launch a two prong attack on the monolithic Francoist state. The first, was to establish a parliamentary democracy; and the second, was to dismantle the state centralism in favour of regional autonomy (de Antonio 1991: 153). The advantage to ETA was the Suárez Government’s inability to interpret the significance of the national question amongst the Basque community (Gilmour 1985: 219).

It was these divisions that were to highlight, in the eyes of groups such as ETA and the PNV, the fundamental differences between the broad democratic oppositional movements and the national movement. The leader of the Republic in 1936, Santiago Carrillo,
was formulating a broad movement called Junta Democrática, the ‘Democratic Government’ project, that sought alliances between some socialists and various liberal monarchists, whilst the PSOE would proffer a wider leftist platform called the ‘Democratic Programme’ (Fry & Gregory 1983: 30-31). What held these groups together, and eventually allowed Felipe González to unite these two splinters under ‘Co-ordination Democracy’, was the ideological negation of the need for devolution to outright independence, as well as terrorism, as platforms for resolving the national question (ibid).

The main argument was that where there was still ethnic tension then the processes of democratic consolidation were incomplete (Burton et al. 1992: 4). Linz and Stepan (1992: 124) felt this was a purposeful formation of a new national identity, within the wider ideological centralist government, away from statist paternalism towards state liberalisation. Suárez, schooled in Falangist politics, knew that the shape of the state’s ideology would shape the peripheries (Morán 1979).

ETA-pm were just equally as interested in expanding their base over ETA-m, as much as they desired to seek new means of dictating change to the state (Conversi 1997: 148-149). Thus, their forcing of the union of EIA with the Movimiento Comunista de España a under the name Basque Left (EE) was a sign that the militants of the movement sought to broaden their popular base into a new consolidated national electoral front prior to the 1977 elections (Preston 1986: 125; Zirakzedah 1991: 194 Reinares 1993: 619). The goal was to break the cycle of action-repression-action in order to entice the moderates back towards the nationalist Left’s cause, through a strategy of democratic mass mobilisation (Hipsher 1996: 274). Yet, this could not be achieved whilst the state still refused to deal directly with the issue of devolution, and its role in the overall liberalisation of Spanish society.

Franco’s intransigent centralism and its heavy-handed application to the Basque Country were at the heart of ETA terrorism and the considerable popular backing it enjoyed, at least up to 1978 (Preston 1986: 4).

What the democrat forces had failed to recognise was the multi-nationalist nature of the polarisation of Spanish society. In this regard I agree with Preston (ibid.) that it was in this misreading of the significance of the national question in the process of movement formalisation, and the subsequent slow rate of state democratisation, that the chance for a permanent cessation of hostilities was lost. Especially as ETA took this as a sign of the
unwillingness of the state to entertain the notion of Basque sovereignty, preferring rather a state about democratic unitarism (Clark 1986a).

Yet, even when ex-ETA members, such as Pertur, sought to reconcile the movement towards more peaceful means, he was murdered in the summer of 1976. Evidently, by Miguel Angel ‘Apala’ (Preston 1986: 144). Apala, who had broken with Pertur’s ETA-pm would seek escalation of the crisis through a redefinition of the role of violence as a means to the institutionalisation of the state engendered cycle of repression-action-repression (Ross 1993; Conversi 1997: 106). The state saw this as a chance of portraying ETA as an anti-democratic force. The fact that José María Portell, a loyal ‘abertzale’ journalist, was also killed before the June 15 1977 elections, when he made it known that he intended publishing a book that would implicate ETA-m in the assassination suggests that ETA was not ready to rid its repertoire of VDA (Preston 1986: 144; Tezanos et al. 1993: 888). Nor did they desire to reopen channels with the government at a time when the June elections, that would be opposed from the outset, were designed to simply redefine the state in a bid to survive pressures coming from the political periphery. The Government failed to take note of both deaths, in particular the second one’s proximity to that of the elections.

The PSOE had similarly miscalculated the significance of the national question as the PNV would win 7 out of 26 seats reserved for delegates of the regions (Mujal-León 1979: 101). The 1977 vote had convinced Carrillo that allies must be found amongst national movements in order to be a voice within the Basque Country (Story 1979: 183). This would lead Suárez to include nationalist parties in the December 25-27 1977 Pact of Moncloa on one condition: ETA’s exclusion (Ekin 1992: 65). In return, the Basques would receive a pre-Autonomy Council on December 30 1977 (Story 1979: 101). Out of this the PNV were to re-emerge as the moderate electoral voice of the national movement (Janke 1980: 10; EAJ-PNV 1995).

More and more the Basque Government in exile was coming to the fore. Made up in the main of PNV and PSOE members it began negotiations with Suárez and the leader of his Basque section of his party (Mujal-León 1979: 101). The PNV was represented by Juan de Ajuriaguerra, José María Benegas of the Basque branch of the PSOE, and the Union of Christian Democrats’ (UCD) Juan de Echeverría (Núñez Astrain 1995: 97). They created a body called the Basque General Council that would be responsible for negotiations concerning Basque autonomy (Janke 1980: 10). The
UCD’s push to block a nationalist candidate as head led to their backing of the PSOE’s Ramón Rubial over the PNV’s de Ajuriaguerra (Preston 1986: 135). Rubial, and his usage of the Pacts of Moncloa as the state’s guarantee for liberalisation of all aspects of Spanish civil society, would not prove a popular choice (Calamai 1978: 60; Laqueur 1987: 225). ETA would benefit from this miscalculation.

More and more, ETA came to be viewed as a radical representation of youth frustration, as even children of immigrants adopted the ideology of ‘cyclical revolution’ (Preston 1986: 126). The xenophobic policies were viewed with disdain as many felt ETA no longer had the right to exist when the main cause for its formation, state Francoism, had been defeated. Yet the bombing of the ‘Basque revolutionary’ weekly Punto y Hora (Place and Time) on October 5 by a fascist organisation called the Alliance of Apostolic Anti-Communists (AAA) released a new wave of violence by ETA-m which culminated with assassination of Pamplona’s Police Chief Major Joaquín Imaz Martínez in late November (Calamai 1978: 60; Burton et al. 1992).

The subsequent police crackdown, and the mutiny of a Bilbao division of the Civil Guard, had its desired effect as mass protest demonstrations were often interrupted by chants of ‘Long live ETA! ETA the people are with you!’ (Preston 1986: 127-128). Protest and terrorist action were merged and a new enemy found (Jáuregui 1981: 233; Pérez-Agote 1984: 16). Utilising the KAS document ETA, ‘mimicking’ again the state’s response, would in November 1977 form their own social movement pact, to counter the Pact of Moncloa, in Herri Batasuna (HB) (EH 1994: 1-2). ETA was responding to the state in the only way it knew how, through ‘mimicking’ it so as to create new opportunity structures within the cleavages shaped by the state’s own policy. ETA knew that as long as independence was not addressed, then democratisation held little legitimacy amongst the Basque population.

Since the Spanish state was still perceived as the main enemy, the whole democratic process was seen merely as a façade disguising the perennial Spanish attempt to eliminate Basque identity (Conversi 1997: 149).

The Suárez Government’s efforts to placate nationalist demands with welfare and social security reform, in the same way as the British Government had done in Northern Ireland in the wake of the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement, failed (Gunther 1992: 55). The revolutionary movement refused to dissipate.
The Statutes of Autonomy as a Means of Absorbing Centre-Periphery Tensions.

The ridding of the nationalist rhetoric and mythology for the PNV, EA, EE or ETA-m would have been suicidal since nationalist symbolism, and nationalism per se, had been an integral tool in the overall politicisation of the Basque national polity. What had emerged, according to Watson (1996. p29), was a sense of ‘being’ for the average Basque within protest cycles and individual activism that was found in the active and mobilised movement. Strategically, the cultural struggle had metamorphised into a political one creating unofficial channels that could be exploited when the national Left and Right sought joint action (Jáuregui 1981: 233; Sullivan 1988: 48). Where there was room for shift was in the hegemonic nature of much of the ideology of the overall movement that was still based on ethnic, cultural, and social issues.

What was clear was that both the PNV and ETA had no desire to become a bargaining chip of the Spanish Democratic Opposition. This is where I believe Tilly (1993a) has misinterpreted the significance of revolutionary nationalism over the movement itself as the raison d’être for continued popular mobilisation. This was shown by the general population’s tendency in the post-autonomy era to vote for the limited national option of the PNV, as opposed to the wider platform of mass movement organised social doctrine proffered by the Euskadiko Ezkerra and Herri Batasuna,18 that included aspects of nationalism as a major doctrine of change (Arango 1985: 182; Shubert 1990: 248).

The fact that the PNV, through negotiations with the UCD and PSOE, would leave negotiations for autonomy in the hands of the Catalans on the night of May 22, 1978, whilst ETA was banned, would push ETA even more to not recognise this settling of the “Basque” issue by Catalans and Castilians (Clark 1979: 349). The PNV would eventually abstain from the process with a walkout instigated by the EE’s Letamendía before the ratification of the constitution (Hills 1980; Tamayo 1988). The boycott called by most members of the combined national movement’s fledgling political party organisations, under the lead of the PNV, for the December 1978 referendum was mostly heeded, with 56% of the population abstaining from voting (de Pablo 1994: 24). Of those voting, 68.8% ratified the Constitution compared to an average of 20%, more throughout the rest of the Spanish regions and Madrid (Carr & Fusi 1993: 245-252). The Catalan vote of 90.4% was
viewed as a betrayal (Balcells 1992: 204). The response across the nationalist spectrum was clear. Xabier Arzaballus stated in a rally held prior to the December 1978 referendum:

Ancient Basques lived within an ensemble of kingdoms that were later called Spain... and as a guarantee that its way of life would be represented, the right of secession was always reserved. We also reserve [that right], be it or not in the constitution (Gunther 1992: 62).

A response that was reiterated by more radical nationalists of EE, when Letamendía stated:

The right to self-determination is a fundamental democratisation right, without which the constitution has no meaning for us. If the Basque people, someday, were to face this alternative, you can be sure that Euskadiko Ezkerra would vote for independence... Euskadi is not a region but, rather, a nation divided into two halves (Gunther 1992: 62-63).

The fact that the vast majority of the Basque people, and their political representatives, either did not see fit to vote for the reforms or rejected it outright, could be seen as a sign that autonomy was no substitute for independence to a people who lost faith in the state that they had competed with for so long (Coleman 1995: 5). As one Basque activist told me:

The Basque Parliament is limited also because of the unfinished parts of the constitutional charter. The problem with the Basque Parliament is it is limited by the centre. 19

ETA responded by rejecting the Pact of Moncloa as illegal, instigating the worst cycle of violence experienced in Spain, from October to December 1978 (Arango 1985: 182). The revolutionary wing was now seeking legitimation through the electoral system. ETA-m, through the formation of a political wing called Herri Batasuna (HB),20 would partake in the 1979 elections after viewing the success of EE during the 1977 elections (Janke 1980: 14). It followed the rise of Sinn Féin as a viable formalised political alternative in the wake of the 1981 Hunger Strikes. Engagement of the state was one thing, but getting the state to listen was another. Soon the strategists came to realise that if no formal channels were sought, then the possibility of the cycle merely continuing the responsive development of state centre and periphery without a resolution was a reality (Burton et al. 1992: 23).
All Basque parties and movements refused to recognise the legitimacy of a plebiscite whereby only 44% of the population participated (Conversi 1997: 145). The fact that Article 2 of the New Constitution talked of the “indivisible unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards;” whilst acknowledging “the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which form it” seemed somewhat contradictory. Especially, when Article 145 insisted that: “No federation between autonomous communities will be permitted under any circumstances.” For the PNV these were fundamental non-negotiable demands. The resultant victory of the PNV in the elections re-emphasised this point Mujal-Lé on 1979: 101). Carlos Garaikoetxea, a committed anti-Francoist nationalist, was appointed the new head of the Council (Llera 1993: 171). The state’s intransigence was once again shaping the demands of the Basque community.

The failure of the 1979 Basque Autonomy Statute, as well as the 1978 Constitution, to fully placate a substantial proportion of the Basque community, including the failure to explicitly mention the three historical nationalities by name, was to be a resource for future mobilisation (Burton et al. 1992: 21). This would ensure a perpetuation of the cycle of conflict as the exclusion of ETA from the political process would exclude a sizable amount of Basques from full political participation. ETA, in turn, realised the potential of transforming states attempting to establish a new order, a new political centre, in sustaining cycles of mass action and state repression that served to fuel the radicalisation of the periphery (Eisenwein & Shubert 1995: 271). A situation that Burton, Gunther and Higley (1992: 23) call a “dialectic of rocks, clubs, and tear gas.” One that would inadvertently burn the bridges of reconciliation as in the Northern Irish context. As one Basque activist told me it was the ‘dialectic of CS gas and democracy’ that convinced her that the new Constitution and promised autonomy was both carrot and baton:

As a teenager it left an indelible impression. Each time we marched they, police, attacked. It soon became clear that they would deny us independence no matter how we voted.21

The problem was that the Security Forces had been fed on a doctrine of repression, and they had come to see any form of public disturbance, protest, demonstration or flagwaving as sedition, and anti-state activism (Carr 1980: 175). ETA during this period took the opportunity to reorganise, so as to create space themselves within the emerging cleavages that the new democracy had
provided, in a bid to broaden its support base (Clark 1984: 204-218). The most important change in strategy was to be ETA’s entering the fight for prisoners’ rights, along the same road as the IRA had been doing since 1975. Evoking the KAS document in March 1979, HB sought a collaboration with EE when they called for a ‘national day of struggle’ in support for demands for a general amnesty of all political prisoners as a sign of goodwill before the vote for autonomy (Janke 1980: 15).

Similar to the events occurring in Northern Ireland, ETA was now searching for a new defining point that would allow the movement to remain relevant as they realised most Basques now preferred a negotiated settlement to outright rebellion. HB, like Sinn Féin, was to emerge as a focal point for future protest strategy as a new cause was needed to grasp the Basque community’s attention (Jáuregui 1981: 310). The re-promulgation of the Anti-Terrorist Law, and its implementation solely in the Basque Country, was to provide the necessary cause for future mobilisation. The state upped the cycle of action leading to the arrest of 652 persons between December 4 1978 and December 5 1979, and a further 329 by June 1980 (Clark 1986a: 285). ETA was waiting for this response, and acted accordingly in order to regain lost ground.

**Conclusion.**

With the implementation of the democratisation process upon the Basque nation, the Basque national movement was forced to live within a unique political situation. The years of acting as the oppositional Left’s militant vanguard had paid off in as far as they had forced the Basque issue of independence onto the table of the state centre’s political agenda. Yet, at the same time this very process of state initiated reform was to place ETA in the same boat as the IRA, and the more moderate PNV as the SDLP. The desired address of democratic enfranchisement had led to many social demands of the national movement being resolved. This not only gave a great advantage to the moderates, by isolating the support base of the radicals, but also brought into question the necessity of the periphery to secede from a state that was now taking the issues of cultural differentiation seriously. Justifying militancy in periods of overt repression was one thing, in times of rapprochement it was another.

A dilemma emerged amongst the Basques as they realised that what the state was offering was more than appeasement. They were political opportunity structures that would ensure the end of the
perpetual continuation of the cycle of repression-protest-repression between state and periphery. This dilemma would mean that accepting the olive branch would lead to the abandonment of the goal of full national independence. Yet, it would also lead to the recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of the Basque national polity. For the moderates this was negotiable. ETA however, would see this as a sign of the centre attempting to diminish their main support by placating the moderates. The only way they could conceivably redefine themselves in a period of state consolidation was to, subsequently, challenge the state directly in a new protest cycle of action-reaction-action. A new upswing in violent protest that the state would not be ready for; as ETA had no desire to forgo their revolutionary doctrine for the moderates to claim the benefits.

ETA had learnt from the IRA’s previous cessations of arms, that though accepting political opportunity structures placed before the movement by the state may have brought peace. Yet, the initial issues of national self-determination were far from resolved if the raison d’être for mobilisation, the state, still existed. National sovereignty as such, due to the ritualisation of protest within the collective frame of movement identification, had now become entrenched in the new doctrine of the movement.

Go To Chapter X
CHAPTER TEN:
The Vote for Autonomy and the Beginning of the Fracturing of the National Movement

The vote on autonomy was designed to placate the centralists whilst granting certain privileges to the nationalist core on the periphery. It did not attempt to debate the nature of independence as the completion of the democratisation process, under the platform of “coffee for all,” was always meant to be the main goal (de Antonio 1991: 153). The first major signs of discontent were to emerge with the formalisation of a nationalist electoral front, HB, under the KAS Alternative statement. It consisted of former cultural militants, ETA-m, the radicals of the Basque neighbourhood associations, Basque Communists and the PNV (Zirakzedah 1991: 197). Due to the diversity and the lessons of the past they did not owe allegiance to a specific power bloc, but, rather to their constituted set of demands called the KAS Alternative. A document that demanded the full withdrawal of the Spanish police and military forces from the Basque Country, the release of prisoners of war and the political independence of all four Basque provinces. The PNV and the PSOE moved into damage control mode and quickly sought to place autonomy at the centre of their political platforms in order to counter the ground made by the entering of ETA, under the guise of HB, into the political arena (Kaplan 1980: 126).

HB insistence on campaigning on the base of the radical KAS statement was justified as they recorded a remarkable 15% of the total vote in the 1979 elections (Shubert 1990: 248). The fact that they received three deputies and one senator, compared to the EE’s one deputy in 1977, suggested that the Basque people were still far from adverse towards adopting a revolutionary stance (Mujal-Lé on 1979: 101). It also lead to the death knell of the reformed constitutionalism of the EE, as the Basque people found it hard to come to terms with the EE’s new role outside their traditional field of terrorist action (Gilmour 1985: 223).

The PNV was losing ground with the younger generation of disassociated youth, as the negotiation process over autonomy dragged on. In a last minute attempt of placating nationalist demands, the PNV withdrew from the Cortes so as to speed up devolution (Janke 1980: 15). In July 1979 this act in itself would break the impasse with the centre devolving powers to Bilbao,
through Suárez renegotiating concessions to the Basques in return for the PNV granting legitimacy to the democratisation process (Gilmour 1985: 220). The move to form connections with the centrist UCD and the conservative successor of the Falangist bureaucracy, Alianza Popular (the Popular Alliance) was viewed as collusion with the very unitarist forces that the movement had for so long defined as the enemy (Zirakzedah 1991: 142). As an ex-ETA activist assured me:

It was hard for us to accept the good will of the UCD, PSOE and Alianza Popular when they remained loyal to Spain first. We are Basque first. So they are the enemy.1

The 1979 election results highlighted this with over 77% of all Basque natives and 66% of all Basque speakers supporting the regionalist/nationalist line according to public opinion research conducted by Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1986: 352). The fact that of the immigrants who supported regionalist parties, up to 59% belonged to leftist revolutionary groups, suggests that the link of individual social justice and national parity were strong enough for them to vote with a joint leftist and nationalist ticket (ibid.). This suggests to me the revolutionary nature in which nationalism was perceived as a doctrine of change by all aspects of Basque society. Even amongst non-traditional spheres of support nationalism was strong enough to fall into Tilly’s (1993b) perception of national movements being the mode to communal social liberation. This led to the emergence of the belief amongst Euskara speaking Basques, that the Basque national parties were the legitimate voice of the Basque people as long as they remained loyal to the integral values held by the overall national movement:

The Basque party system stood out from the other regional party systems, both because of the far greater strength of micronationalist parties and because of its greater degree of polarisation and fragmentation. A dynamic of polarisation over centre-periphery issues existed not only between statewide parties and the more strident nationalist forces of Euskadi, but also among Basque groups themselves. Indeed, the nationalist bloc encapsulated within itself all other salient societal cleavages- left- right, class, clerical-secular, and generational, in addition to divisions over the regional question.”But the problem with this lay in the fact that this made it virtually impossible for them to create a census over Basque autonomy (ibid.: 387).
The failure of the Basque representatives to pass the Amnesty Bill by 296 votes to 2, with 18 abstentions in the Congress of Deputies, and 196 to 0 with 6 abstentions in the Senate in the wake of an upswing of state policing in the North suggests that the Basque population were far from convinced that the Autonomy Statute would resolve the nationalist question (Clark 1984: 251). On June 29 1978, the PNV Parliamentary Spokesperson José Angel Cuerda had correctly warned in Parliament, that it would be unwise to neglect the nationalist aspirations of much of the movement as there were signs in Bilbao that the reintroduction of the Law for the Prevention of Terrorism was being interpreted as a move by the centre towards a recentralisation of the state (ibid.; Grugel & Rees 1997: 184-185). In fact, a new cycle of violence in reaction to harsh policing would suit certain elements of the national movement. Throughout October and December of 1978 ETA’s attacks on the military and Guardia Civil increased substantially (Clark 1984: 248). The goal was to utilise the new state repression as the raison d’être for a further radicalisation of the conflict.

Spain was falling into the classic example of a state polarised by its own attempts to ideologically counter radical peripheral mobilisation through what della Porta and Tarrow (1986) recognise as a heightened responsiveness to threats on their own legitimacy. This, in my opinion, is derivative of the periphery’s ability to successfully ‘mimic’ the state to a stand still. A situation whereby the centre is at a loss of how to react outside a further radicalisation of its own counter-insurgency. Unless of course the state could co-opt certain militants, in order to weaken the support base of Basque extremists (López Garrido 1982). This new redefinition of Spanish political participation seemed to be working by 1979 (Clark 1984; della Porta & Mattina 1985).

Mario Onaindía, a principle theoretician of EIA and a former ‘Burgos 16” defendant, said that both ETA-m and ETA-pm’s support for violence was in fact counter-revolutionary given the precarious nature of the democratisation process (Reinares 1993: 614; Núñez Astrain 1995: 85). This would be the first of the state centre’s attempts to demilitarise certain wings of the militant movement in order to weaken the justification by ETA-m for the continuation of VDA against the state within their repertoire (Llera 1993: 172). The cycle of violence-repression-action was to play its role in the exhaustion of ETA-pm which eventually dissolved by the mid-1980s taking opportunities offered by the government in the amnesties (Reinares 1987: 121-129; Zirakzedah 1991: 200). ETA, that is the 1972 coalition of ETA-V and EGI, however, would survive.
This new upswing of VDA was a calculated strategy of protest repertoire expansion in periods of closed door negotiation between the centre and non-ETA representatives of the national movement (Calamai 1978). Each killing of a politician was aimed at obstructionist figures within the Basque community (Conversi 1997: 248-249). The assassination of the mayors of Galdacano and Olaberria in February 1979, and the ex-Mayors of Echarri-Aranaz in January 1979 and Bedia in September 1979, were messages to the rest of the community that any public commitment to the reform process and the Statute of Autonomy, whilst ETA was excluded, would be considered national treason (Clark 1984: 138). ETA wanted inclusion as the legitimate army of the Basque people. Any continued refusals of the centre to recognise them as such, would suggest that they were to remain a marginalised and criminal movement on the fringe of Spanish society (Núñez Astrain 1995: 92-98). ETA had calculated correctly:

The intrinsic confrontational character of Basque mobilisations, a partial fulfilment of the ‘action/repression/action theory’ envisaged by ETA’s first theorists, has in some way handicapped any peaceful solution of the conflict. Since repression was needed to hold such an eclectic movement together, ETA was also needed as a continuous trigger of both ‘state violence’ and ‘nationalist counter-violence’- and as a bonding agent for the nationalist movement (Conversi 1997: 158).

An anonymous PNV leader interviewed by Gunther (1992: 65-66) in 1979 made it clear that the ideological, if not physical, closeness between ETA and the more moderate wings existed concerning the issue of state repression, only seemed to highlight ETA’s reliance as a response to Spanish statist militarisation of the crisis. As well as the legitimate role in which ETA fulfilled in an overall national movement:

I perfectly remember French patriots who fought against Pétain. Then, they were called terrorists. Well, the Vichy government called them terrorists of ETA, but I would never speak of ETA terrorism (ibid.).

Though the PNV had steered the boat to autonomy, for the average ETA activist, this was insignificant; so long as Basque national freedom was still defined within a Spanish state context (Heiberg 1984: 110). The social revolutionary struggle was, hence, still defined in opposition to that offered by the state’s ideology of
ubiquitous inclusion of all (Eisenwein 1995: 266). In this context, an increase in VDA within the repertoire of ETA can been seen as an attempt to redraw the parameters of the conflict away from the state, after the state had taken the initiative of reforming the system of popular representation, through a calculated usage of counter-insurgency (Zirakzedah 1991: 11). The fact that Suárez could not win one province on March 1 1979 from where violent oppositional action emerged, suggests that the people were willing to incorporate VDA as a signal to the government (Preston 1986: 150). The problem with ETA was that, though the vast majority of non-Basques and a significant number of Basques condoned VDA as a strategy of protest during the Francoist era, they found it hard to justify when the monolith itself sought reform (Laqueur 1993: 497).

Terrorists, in a dictatorship, can claim to represent a suppressed general will; in a democratic system terrorism is the claim of a self-appointed moral and political élite to override the general will, expressed by the vote (Carr 1980: 177).

Basques were also beginning to question a movement that also placed its ideological line before the exact will of the people. With the increase of the cycle of violence between 1978 and 1979, there were parallel mass demonstrations for peace and settlement organised by the PNV and the PSOE (Kaplan 1980: 126). A new consciousness was emerging, built around state liberalisation being the guarantor of civic freedom which asked the question of ETA: liberation from whom?

Laqueur (1987: 121), rightly I feel, appraises terrorism as a tool of political activism that is designed as a campaign of “propaganda through deed” which is greatly dependent on the amount of publicity it receives. Yet, without the subsequent repression of old, ETA would rapidly lose popular support (Clark 1986b; Jáuregui 1986; Watson 1996). It was a crisis point that ETA never fully expected to meet (della Porta & Mattina 1985). Their once allies in the Left had now circumvented their participation, placing ETA out of the political process that was successfully re-socialising not just the state, but the notion of what it was to be Spanish (Kaplan 1980: 124; Aranzadi 1981; Padró -Solanet 1996: 452). Unexpectedly, ETA would find its saviour within the state they detested, with Suárez’s refusal by the end of 1978 to meet Basque and Catalan demands.

ETA greatly feared the negation of the national question once the democratisation reforms had been well under way. The new democratic centre was content to negate the national question once
in power, but ETA had every intention of keeping them to their word (Jáuregui 1982: 205). At first the numbers of political killings were kept to a minimum, in comparative terms, immediately prior to the first democratic elections of 1977, with some 17 people assassinated in 1976 and a further 9 in 1977 (Reinares 1993: 617). The constitutional crisis of 1978 would provide ETA with the catalyst needed for an upswing in violent anti-state activism. In 1978 when the government was faltering on their promises the killings rose to 67, with a further 72 killed in 1979 in the period leading up to the July Agreement between Goekoetxea and Suárez (Clark 1984: 133). The cycle of killings would peak at 88 in 1980 during the lead up to the referendum. A third of those killed and a quarter wounded were from the Guardia Civil, whilst 23.7% of those killed and 15.3% wounded were the national police. The message was clear. The Autonomous Statute was no substitute for outright independence, and the Security Forces were still viewed as an occupationary force (ibid.: 136).

Suárez’s Last Throw of the Die: Re-Centralisation or Perish?

Throughout this period of the ‘Democratic Consolidation’ between 1977 & 1982, Clark (1986b: 127) noted that patterns of violence held a distinct structure that points to a systematic and calculated strategy of media manipulation throughout Spain. Traditionally, it is aimed not at individuals, but at whole societies (Reinares 1993: 617). This is best demonstrated in the targets chosen. They tended to target military, policing, and judicial figures during major negotiation processes between government and peripheries (Douglas & Zulaika 1990; Carr & Fusi 1993: 245; Conversi 1997: 249-250). The machine gun killing of two police officers, and the wounding of 11, whilst playing football in a field adjacent to their barracks in Basauri (Vizcaya) on November 20 1978; the machine gun wounding of eight police and three construction workers in a San Sebastián café on October 8 1979; and the killing of one lieutenant of the Guardia Civil and the wounding of 34 troops through a planted explosive in a convoy in Logroño on July 22 1980, are all examples of the psychological nature of attacks designed to send the message that one is not safe anywhere (Clark 1986b: 127-128).

The fact that some 52.2% of those killed, and 77.2% of those wounded, occurred in public places also gave a message of omnipotence to the scope of their activities; a sense that one could
be killed anywhere (ibid.: 129). ETA were also not afraid of accidentally eliminating innocents; thus, heightening an awareness of the desperation of their struggle against the state. Some 13.2% of those killed and 20.3% wounded were in public bars, café’s and hotels; 19.5% and 35.1% were on city streets, parks, airports and train stations; 5.6% and 6.5% at one’s workplace; and 19.5% and 21.8% in an automobile or bus, whilst only 1.7% and 5.2% occurred at military installations (Reinares 1993: 615-642).

The goal of ETA was to force themselves into the political equation via pushing Suárez into direct negotiations with the movement (Carr & Fusi 1993: 252). ETA definitely did not want to portray themselves in front of the Basque people as incapable, or, defeatable. The fact that some 68% of all those killed and 40.5% of those wounded were part of the Security Forces, whilst 25.1% and 59.5% were civilians suggested that ETA clearly had, what I call, an ideological target (Clark 1986b: 136).

The threat of ETA to the maintenance of public order in the Basque country has risen in almost perfect correlation with the granting of more autonomy to the Basques. As regional autonomy has been extended to the Basques, the pace of ETA assassinations has risen accordingly. Finally, ETA’s attacks have been directed primarily against the agents of the Spanish military, paramilitary, and law enforcement apparatus in the Basque provinces, only secondarily against civilians, and to an even lesser extent against representatives of industrial capitalism (ibid.: 141).

It is within this context that the Spanish state, in its entirety, was seen as the bulwark to the establishment of a new Basque political order (Clark 1987; Díez-Medrano 1995). Perhaps this is the reason why the PNV refused, until the late 1980s, to condemn their political rival for their usage of terrorism as a strategy of protest and defence (Gunther 1992: 65; de Blas Guerrero 1993a: 603-606). After all the purposeful refusal, until 1988, to ridicule ETA suggested it was still viewed, in many people’s eyes, as the military wing of the one national movement (Gunther 1992: 65). That of the Basque people militant against the centre.

A new era had emerged, nevertheless, as Garaikoetxea became, in April 1980, the first Lenda-kari to rule the government in Bilbao since 1936 (de Pablo 1995: 27). Leizaola, Aguirre’s successor, had returned home on December 15 1979, and the new PNV Government set about establishing channels with the Madrid Government. 89% of the 61% Basques who had voted at the October 1979 autonomy referendum upheld the Statute (Vaca de Osma 1995: 268; Conversi 1997: 145). The state, however, was not
placated by this vote and soon new pushes for recentralisation would find a voice in the form of González’s PSOE reformist government at the 1982 general election.

The Ascendancy of Garaikoetza.

With the death of the Juan Ajuriaguerra, the long established Basque President, a generational shift would emerge within the PNV leadership between the radicals, called the Sabinianos, who were opposed to constitutional negotiations, and the Rightists who feared any break from the constitutional path would entice a pro-Soviet ETA to undertake a full confrontational revolutionary strategy (Gilmour 1985: 222). With the emergent battle between Garaikoetxea, now the leader of the PNV, and the conservative Xabier Arzallus, who would replace him, the question of strategy would become as important as political demands for autonomy (Ekin 1992: 78).

Garaikoetxea could not move fully away from the nationalist issue as independence had for a long time been central to his political doctrine. His moves to create a wider front for the Cortes by attempting to open up channels with the EE, which had by 1980 undergone a leadership change, saw the political rehabilitation of Mario Onaindía and the ex-ETA soldier Roberto Lertxundi, two Burgos Trials’ dependents whose death sentences had been commuted (Gilmour 1985: 223). The EE responded by giving tacit approval of Garaikoetxea’s desires for re-examining the national question with Suárez (Preston 1986: 125).

ETA reacted by implementing a new bombing campaign in the period preceding the spring 1980 elections and referenda (Reinares 1987: 126, 1993: 617). These were aimed at increasing awareness amongst the population that the military wing did not consider the battle over (Arango 1985: 182). It was also designed to show that any solution that would not be solely resolved within the Basque national polity would only be viewed as a legitimization of the unitarism that is inherent within the Spanish state (Morata 1995: 118). This heralded a period whereby the targets of reprisal would no longer be limited to non-Basques, but, also Basque industrialists, who were perceived as perpetuators of centralist policies expressed through economic reform (Heiberg 1989: 110). The method chosen to determine the loyalty of the new middle classes was their compliance to the impuesto revolucionario, the new “revolutionary tax” (Arango 1985: 182).
This new initiative of ETA was rapidly met with the re-implementation of the repressive Law for the Prevention of Terrorism, on December 1984 (Clark 1984: 253; Ekin 1992: 94). Contrary to government claims, the remnants of the radical Basque movement were still convinced that they were isolated from the process of political negotiation over the future of the Basque Country (Clark 1984: 253). The government saw this new ETA campaign as a chance to pressure the periphery through again criminalising association with ETA activists. The government was attempting to complete the cycle through ‘mimicking’ ETA (EH 1994: 27-28, 1995: 3-6). Soon clandestine pro-government organisations were being formed such as the Guerrillas of the Christ-King (GCK), Basque Spanish Battalion (BSB), Anti-Terrorist ETA (ATE), the Anti-ETA Group and Apostolic Association of Anti-Communists (Korn 1989; Miralles & Arques 1990; Alvaro Baeza 1995b). Their directive was to increase the pressure on ETA until either they were arrested or collapsed from within, as Clark (Clark 1984: 253) suggests:

Vigorous antiterrorist legislation provided the juridical framework for strengthening police and paramilitary operations aimed at total suppression of ETA.

Garaikoetxea now began to become more independent of the centrists and increasingly more interventionist, almost “socialist,” in his policies (Zirakzedah 1991: 142). The nature of the centralist culturo-political repression in creating a radicalism steeped in anti-statist activism in the Basque Country, was an aspect of the movement’s development that Garaikoetxea had to accept as legitimate (Corcuera 1984: 37-54). This was symbolised in the PNV’s refusal to form a democratic front against terrorism in early 1980, after intensive lobbying by the Basque Socialists (Zirakzedah 1991: 142). As pointed out to me by former PNV activist and EA representative Arruti Begoña:

They refused to sign the anti-terrorist pact in Madrid, because they believe that they had to achieve a fundamental base between all the nationalist movements in the Basque Country so they could go to Madrid not only with that, but with a lot of other questions. They [Madrid] are against terrorism, but we believe terrorism is but a political route to the attainment of independence.3

In response, the Basque Council decided to form a coalition with the socially conservative Popular Coalition and the Union of the Navarrese People (Ekin 1992: 69). Yet, the Basque nationalists in
Navarre refused to accept the new pro-Spanish line. They were already isolated from the new political provinces, and as such a move away from VDA would leave them as marginalised a political community as the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, since Navarre held a slight Castilian-Navarrese majority. The PNV realised that the violent push for independence went a long way in forcing the Government to accept autonomy as a compromise in the face of continued ETA insurgency (Vaca de Osma 1995: 269). Secessionism was used as a bargaining chip by the broad-Left in order to ensure the development of autonomy as a gesture of peace to the radical wings of the Basque movement (Linz & Stepan 1992: 126). However, even if one accepts the UCD’s premise of varying fixed results between regional and nationwide elections, one would be wrong to perceive the success of cross national electoral parties as having any bearing on the cultural specific machinations of the Basque political environment.

Garaikoetxea had to face not only pressures from the radicals within, but more significantly, the creation of two opposing Spanish state identities. One was steeped in the culture of the Falangist (Eisenwein 1995: 226). The other, equally unitarist in nature, in the processes of Spanish democratisation and Leftist oppositional assertion (Padró-Solanet 1996: 453). It was the former that would prove the more difficult to succumb. The reintroduction of the counter-terrorist groups signalled that even the centre maintained much of the Army’s ideological frameworks and views to the nature of state identity: Rightist, clerical and culturo-politically Castilian (Calamai 1978: 61; Kaplan 1980: 105). Integration, however, was no longer their main strategy. The total defeat of ETA was to replace it. ETA now found themselves responsible for the militarisation of the state’s ideology (Kaplan 1980: 105). At once, polarising the conflict, rather than the competing communities. In the face of a radicalisation of the centre Garaikoetxea chose to appease Suárez. Though it was later recognised by the PNV that this was a tactical error:

The scandal of the Security Forces of Spain helped the HB because they can say to the people Spain is not a democracy, the Spanish Security Forces have been killing us. In the end that can only help HB and ETA.4

Suárez sought control, yet it proved increasingly difficult for his UCD’s pan-Iberian nationalism to attract Basques. The UCD’s ending of the Pact of Moncloa in December 1978, in response to neo-fascist organised mass rallies and demonstrations against the ratification of the democratic constitution, was seen by Basques as retrogradist (Carr & Fusi 1993: 248-249). Popular opinion held that
Suárez himself was virulently anti-Basque, as his disdain for going to the region to negotiate became more obvious. Time after time, this was shown by Suárez’s refusal to acknowledge the ETA crisis was in fact a problem of the state’s perceived illegitimacy amongst the periphery (ibid.). The most prominent occasion was when in October 1980 no media commentary was made by Suárez after an accident in Ortuella, Vizcaya, when 50 schoolchildren were killed in a road accident, when even the Queen had visited the region to give her condolences (Gilmour 1985: 228). In fact, the first time he visited the Basque Country was a month before he lost power. In response to Suárez’s visit ETA killed two prominent Guipúzcoans in the UCD, but Suárez did not attend the funeral suggesting to many Basques an absolute disdain for the region (ibid.: 228).

The greatest mistake I feel that the centre had made was, and here I concur with Padró-Solanet (1996: 452-453), that they believed the Basque region, as well as Catalonia, voted Left due to civic principles, and as such, a solution would be found within the formation of a Leftist Government, perhaps led by the PSOE, rather than nationalism. What they did not realise was that the people voted Left because in the Basque Country the national movements tended to place their rhetoric on a leftist platform.

The core value of the movement was the nationalist aspirations of statehood and never simply enfranchisement within a Spanish context. This is borne out in the insistence of all contemporary moderate and radical parties alike of keeping the attainment of independent statehood as central to their movement’s strategies (EA 1987: 7-8, 1990: 11-13; EAJ/PNV 1995a: 45-46, 1995b: 4-10). Like Irish Republicanism, socialism and democracy were seen as ideological tools of protest repertoire expansion, that were to be a shaper of the movement’s direction in engaging the state, rather than a core political value. Under such circumstances they ‘mimic’ the social conditions that the centralist rule created. The state as oppressor was the raison d’être for initial, and continued, movement mobilisation. Radical movement nationalism was, hence, the collective symbol of resistance to the political reality as dictated by the centre from a cultural, political, and social perspective. One whereby the nature of the cultural interpretation of protest was integral to the essence of Basque political identity.

The allocation of legal rights to the Basque region does not merely result from a legally regulated cascade of rights from central government to local government, but reflects the status of that conflict. The conflict is one between two kinds of power, the control of extensive resources including armed forces (held primarily by the Spanish central government) and the power to
mobilise large numbers of people willing to act collectively (held primarily by the Basque activists) (Coleman 1995: 5).

However, new problems emerged. The nature of the conflict began to influence the movement’s identity. ETA under the leadership of Miguel Angel Apalategui, came to realise that the cycles of protest had indeed polarised the movement’s identity within the dynamic relationship between centre and periphery (Gilmour 1985: 225). It also ran the risk of becoming antiquated, due to its employment of rhetoric best suited for Francoist times (Gilmour 1985: 225). The Basque political panorama was rich with a variety of divergent colours including pacifist, militant, labour, literary and cultural movements (Hooper 1995: 399). For ETA to survive it had to reshape itself according to these new societal pressures (Conversi 1997: 150-155). Taking this into account, between 1982 and 1986 approximately 250 ETA activists accepted a government amnesty (Zirakzedah 1991: 181).

What was to emerge was a new era of self-evaluation. ETA could no longer rely on the innate militancy of the Basque nation when the state now openly courted their demands (Rüdig 1990: 137-139; Núñez Astrain 1995: 85-87). ETA had survived two variations of the one unitarist ideology. VDA had influenced strategy as well as reform. More significantly, however, was the way conflict had polarised, and thus created, two competing statist paradigms in direct conflict with each other (Hooper 1995: 399-403). At the core of this development was the perpetual shaping and reshaping of state and movement, as the movement to ‘mimic’, action for action, frame for frame, each move by the state to co-opt or reject peripheral demands. It was within the cleavages created in the cycle of protest that ETA was able to create space in order to proffer a statist alternative. Yet, at the core of this mobilisation was always the state.

This is akin to how both Melucci (1992a, 1992b) and Giddens (1979, 1994) tend to view the more successful oppositional movements as those that adopt the structures of state placed before them as a means of creating a counter-point to state identity. A scenario that exemplifies Tarrow (1995) and Tilly’s (1993b, 1994b) belief that the state is more than a fulcrum of popular discontent, rather it supplies the raison d’être for initial and continuous movement mobilisation.

ETA realised the significance of the state, and as such ‘mimicked’ it accordingly (Krutwig 1963; Zabilde 1963, 1964, 1968). This is why Zabilde’s cycle of action-reaction was imperative, not just strategically for ETA, but in also defining the essence of Basque
protest activism and movement oppositional identity. ETA radicalism, hence, was a by-product of the cycle of state reformation. The 1960s integration campaigns brought a rise in VDA; the Burgos trials a similar radicalisation of the periphery (Clark 1986b; Ercegovac 1996: 15-16). Each reform process, would be followed by an increase in ETA activity. More significantly, each process that excluded ETA from the negotiation stages, such as the 1977 elections, the 1978 ratification of the constitution, and the 1979 Suárez-Garaikoetxea talks over autonomy, saw an even greater increase in militantism (Reinares 1993: 615-616). In my opinion, this was symbolic of how the state, through selective inclusion and exclusion, sought to redevelop the nature of centre-periphery relations to their advantage.

It is, thus, the state, not the political opportunity structures of state, but the state as the historic catalyst of societal formation, which is at the core of the need to rebel. What the statist ‘cycles of protest’ paradigm grants the study of such movement activism is an historicity that is unattainable to those movements studied from a ‘Resource Mobilisation’ or ‘New Social Movement’ paradigm. Be it the July 1981 Laws for the Harmonisation of the Autonomous Process (Hanum 1990: 263-279), or the failed February 1981 coup (Busquets 1981; Cid Cañaver al 1981; Morales 1981), the centre’s role in defining the essence of Basque radicalism and protest, and hence Basque identity vis-à-vis the state, was to act as the controller of the pace of cyclical change through processes of coopting some and excluding others (Preston 1990).

It was this problem, of placating certain peripheral demands and ignoring others, that was to be the core of the state’s attempt to reshape the political opportunity structures offered the periphery in order to further isolate the periphery (Rokkan & Urwin 1993: 166). The cycle of action-reaction-action had not only peripheralised ETA’s identity but solidified the notion of the necessity for a conflictory state engendered Spanish identity in direct opposition to the perennial conflict on the periphery of state (Calamai 1978; Cazorla 1993: 72-84; Eisenwein 1995). ETA, by 1982, would now have to face a similar crisis of identity when confronting what I call the second Spanish state ideology. One of seemingly greater tolerance, and even more determined to absorb national cleavages through an extension of democracy. For ETA the decline of one nationalism, the Falangist unitarist variety, would soon be countered by its replacement in the form of the national ideology of Gonzalez’s PSOE Government (Hipsher 1995).
The Second Spanish State Ideology and ETA’s Spiral into Continuous Revolution.

By 1982 both HB and EE came to realise that the revolutionary stance would not be accepted in a political environment that would see the emergence of Spain within the European Economic Community and the sudden move of the majority of the population away from poverty (Linz 1985: 234). In October 1982, the electoral victory of the PSOE was viewed with positivity throughout Spain, though the Basque Country was still wary of committing itself to an all-Spanish solution. Especially, considering the PSOE’s inability to create the desired autonomy sought in 1978 (Shubert 1990: 248; Montero 1993: 143). The nature of oppositional and elite coalitions were to leave a mark on the collective psyche of a community which was still fighting many civil rights issues; including the right of Basque political activists to be interred within the Basque Country, education reform and the demilitarisation of the local and national police strategies in the Basque Country.

What had developed in Spain was a variance in the perceptions of democracy and the form it should take, and hence two interpretations of the form that Spanish state development should be formalised (Coleman 1995: 5). This is a concept that not only falls within a nationalist paradigm, but, one that also embraces the varying class and social allegiances that permeates all societies, not just the Spanish ones (Linz & Stepan 1992; Ost 1994; Przeworski et al.: 1995). Democracy may be considered as merely a guarantee against any return to an authoritarian regime, or the perceived right to keep the government accountable, either through direct lines made available by party political organisations themselves or through the electoral lobby (Przeworski 1985). In the Basque country, it is equated with the right to separate political development towards modernity (Laqueur 1987: 6). As Montero (1993: 159) states:

The quality of democracy thus depends not only on the support that citizens to the rules of the democratic game, but also to the closeness-of-fit between citizens’ understanding of these rules and their perceptions of the political world to which they apply.

The advantage that the Franco era had given the fledgling democracy was an inherited tradition of ‘visible’ protest which leads to a highly visible and symbolic usage of democratic processes in order for elites to achieve legitimacy (Gunther et al. 1986; Gunther 1992). Yet the two main streams of ‘visible’ democracy that have developed have been those of ‘participatory’
democracy and “social” democracy (Montero 1993: 159). This has meant that the term political liberty has more often than not been equated with democracy. Consequently, leaving communities such as the Basques not feeling that liberty, and hence democracy, since it is the current system they oppose that does not recognise the inordinate right of the Basque national state to exist separate from the Spanish whole (Arango 1985: 136). González Spain was a social-democratic European Spanish state, but, to Basque nationalists a unitarist Spanish state nonetheless.

The Spanish state elite’s mistake was that they wrongly perceived, when HB had lost one seat in the 1982 elections, the issues of the limited autonomy granted in Article 151 were now superseded by the notion of greater European integration and the modernisation of Basque economic, social and cultural life within a Spanish framework (Shubert 1990: 247). This was important to ETA, as many conservative commentators had wrongly believed that they would fail to attack the state after the October 1982 PSOE electoral victory (Fusi 1985: 125). This was not to be the case as ETA would now use a twin campaign of VDA augmenting electoral action. What had not changed, from a Spanish integrationist perception, was the determination of the PSOE to use extra-parliamentary means to deal with terrorism (Díaz Herrera & Durán 1996: 171-210; Esteban 1996: 71-113). The alliance between the PSOE and PNV would lead to a radicalisation of state response, in order to placate a dishonoured Spanish military (Ekin 1992: 95; Conversi 1997: 147). In 1983 the González Government set up the state run Liberation Anti-Terrorist Groups (GAL)5 to work as a counter intelligence and terrorist organisation that would act extra-constitutionally through increasing civil restrictions on known ETA activists (Llera 1993: 173-174).

From 1982 to 1984 this upswing in aggressive policing had the effect of pushing the government towards viewing ETA as an anathema to state consolidation (Reinares 1993: 638). The centre had come to realise that the only way to withdraw from the cycle of action-repression-action was by indeed ceding the rights of enforcement to the Basque police, in a bid to neutralise the radical Basque movement through playing the old colonial doctrine of divide and rule (Fusi 1985: 123). It would be a mistake to believe that ETA were not revising much of their strategies on VDA, especially concerning viable targets. In a vain attempt to show their contemporaneous nature, ETA also began targeting ‘environmental colonialists’, starting with the assassination of José Maria Ryan, the chief engineer of the local nuclear power plant (Rüdig 1990: 212-213). The fact that this was condemned even by EE is not as
important here as the fact that even in their attempts to embrace contemporary issues such as environmentalism, feminism, and minority rights, ETA still justified all their actions with nationalist rhetoric.

The IRA similarly attempted this coalition of social movements, yet the reliance on VDA would nevertheless separate them from more moderate nationalists. Gonzalez would introduce a new strategy of “coffee for all”, that encouraged the PNV to be a major symbol in the ‘New Spain’, in order to utilise the cycle of action-reaction-action to isolate ETA from the very Basque community it supported (de Antonio 1991: 153). Just as Major and Thatcher had attempted to isolate the IRA during the 1980s by lifting the profile of Hume, and the SDLP, as the “true” representatives of the Nationalist community throughout the Anglo-Irish Agreement’s negotiation process (Sharrock & Devenport 1997: 231-257).

ETA facing the impossibility of inciting revolution against a state that had seemingly co-opted a significant number of Basque nationalists had to again show their relevance in conciliatory times (Chaffee 1988: 565). Public rallies and demonstrations would be the new choice in strategy (Preston 1986: 125). Yet, whilst the PSOE was seemingly tolerant, it was simultaneously waging a clandestine war against the radicals; as shown when in 1984, the body of the ETA soldier José Arregui was found mutilated after intense torture by the Spanish police (Gilmour 1985: 227). The next day a wave of strike action and protest swept the Basque Country in support of ETA, and demands for self-determination echoed through the streets. ETA’s tactic of attacking, then waiting for the public outcry to die down, comfortable in the knowledge that the state had over-reacted, worked. Even Federico Krutwig, the ETA theorist behind the strategy of action-repression-action, in 1984 admitted that González had missed the opportunity of breaking the cycle, as popular opinion held ETA now as no better than gangsters (Gilmour 1985: 228).

The November 1984 killing of the ETA member Santiago Brouard by GAL was a sign that the government would not back down (Fusi 1985: 124). Garaikoetxea, was also coming under consistent attack in the Basque National Council throughout the autumn of 1984 for his staunch nationalism. Garaikoetxea eventually won a slim majority and proceeded to negotiate with the PSOE on December 4 1984. The PNV rebelled and asked for his resignation, to which he angrily complied (Zirakzedah 1991: 143; Hooper 1995: 403). Within two years Garaikoetxea formed a new political party with the disenchanted Aranaists, nationalists from Navarra and
Guipúzcoa, lawyers and business groups, called Basque Solidarity (EA)6 (EA 1987: 1-10). These events demonstrated that the greatest problem in formulating effective nationalist oppositional movements lay in unifying strategy when confronted with movements grounded in nationalist traditions that offered divergent paths in engaging the state.

The 1986 schism would push ETA further onto the periphery. The nature of elite convergence, and the trap of democratic bargaining, would allow little room for radical movement options. ETA was no longer the sole movement that dealt with nationalism. EA, due to Garaikoetxea could now portray themselves as the middle road between the radicals of ETA and the conservatives of the PNV (Conversi 1997: 152).

Many nationalists now rejected ETA’s revolutionary ideology feeling that they had become entrenched within the very cycle of action-reaction-action they so believed in (Ammann 1995: 28). Yet, the movement by the González Government to negotiate with the PNV that produced a conditional loyalty of the PNV to the Spanish state, was seen as an embracement of an all-Spanish political framework (Hooper 1995: 403). This was to further isolate the PNV from the nexus of the nationalist core since the PSOE demanded that the PNV sign a legislative pact that would abandon any notion of ‘semi-loyalty’ to the Spanish democratic regime (Gunther 1992: 41-42; Ekin 1994: 3). This led to an opening of channels between Bilbao and Madrid, and to the forming of a new pact against ETA. For the fledgling EA, and ETA as well, this was a tacit recognition that any hope for a Basque nation-state was lost (EA 1987: 10-13). The PNV had presumed that nationalism as a cultural doctrine could not survive as a political ideology without overt centralism acting as a catalyst to rebellion (PNV 1992: 5-23). The PNV leadership had followed Tilly’s (1993b) premise that it was a movement to liberation rather than an end point of rebellion. The November 29 1986 Basque parliamentary elections would provide the showdown.

The Final Cycle, or a Continuation of the Same?
The Stratification of ETA’s Conflict and the Re-Consolidation of the Centre as the Means to Conflict Resolution.

1986 would prove a watershed year. Not only was HB legalised in June, but an important split was to emerge along similar
generational lines towards the events of 1959 between the ETA-m elite, now called los Históricos, and a younger generation of activists (Núñez Astrain 1995: 98-109). At the centre again was the role of the state as the initiators of the cycle of reform-protest-reform. The old guard, led by Txomin, sought to regroup along cultural lines. Yet, by the summer of 1986 they were sent into exile (Conversi 1997: 250-251). A new generation of radical activists, schooled in the rhetoric of revolution, and frustrated by the failures of autonomy to grant independence, now sought redress in the inability of the PNV to gain more from its new pact with the PSOE. A general discontent with the downplaying of the issue of independence that one ex-PNV activist, but current ETA exile, related to me:

Autonomy, has not given us anything substantial. What we needed was a war, as in Croatia, that could mobilise us and finally end the Spanish problem.7

Simultaneously, popular opinion had swung behind the nationalist middle ground of EA as Garaikoetxea had been able to win 14 seats in the Basque parliamentary elections of November 1986, equal in number to the seats won by the PNV (EAJ/PNV 1992: 12; Ekin 1992: 81). The message was simple, nationalism as an alternate ideology to the centre’s was still viable. Onaindia’s recognition that ETA existed in a normalised political environment, without overt centralism, would spark a new wave of attacks that would seek to engage a state not willing to ‘openly’ fight the periphery (Núñez de Lara 1995: 85). HB would form a new social movement that embraced punk, gay, trade union and artistic groups that felt limited by the nature of post-democratisation socialisation (Blasco 1987: 12-30; Rüdig 1990; Lahusen 1993; Morata 1995). When HB unexpectedly won 40 000 votes to become the largest listed party not represented in the June 1986 Catalan elections (Conversi 1997: 151), the symbol of ETA as a resistance to state encroachment upon peripheral civil society, even amongst non-Basques, was complete. The cycle had turned full circle.

In 1987 the last great spectacle of Basque unity was to occur in a final action of protest against the concept of Spanish unitarism at the funeral of the last legend of the Basque resistance during the Civil War, Telesforo Monzón. A former minister in the Basque Government of 1936, and respected widely for his break from the PNV in the 1960s on the nationalist principle, Monzón had the rare quality of being able to appeal to all Basque citizens across class, religious and political lines. Being anti-communist and anti-capitalist, he once told a Spanish jury that he could not recognise it because the only courts he could answer to were those
of “God and the Basque Country” (Tuñon de Lara 1992: 390). As his coffin was lowered, the scene of part of the crowd crossing themselves, the other section raising their clenched-fisted hands in a revolutionary salute, was to evoke powerful imagery of a final signal from a bygone era (Grugel 1990: 107). An era whereby, the state could unify these people in symbolic opposition. It also could divide, as the desired reforms were bringing around new structures that could absorb these dissident movements in ways that the exclusive monolithic Francoist state could never achieve (Maravall 1985).

The symbolic unity shown throughout the funeral procession of Telesforo Monzón was to prove to be a significant final stand of a national movement, that hence forth, fractured into strategically irreconcilable sections over the role of the Spanish state in appeasing the nationalist goals of the movement (Aretxaga 1988). The state had seemingly won, due to its ability to be equally flexible in repertoire as the movement (Grugel 1990: 107).

Yet, the political environment had changed. The state monolith was no more, and ETA, that had formulated its repertoire in order to combat a state centre that was organised along the lines of populist movement itself, had to now confront an ever more sophisticated democratic state system that possessed a formalised political system of national and regional institutional redress (Tezanos 1993: 433-489; EH 1994: 1-6). The development of civil courts had changed the environment significantly enough for a re-evaluation of the practicality of VDA as an adjunct to more formalised political actions to occur. Processes of negotiation and devolution had created a greater fluidity between centre and periphery (Aja et al. 1986; Embid 1987; Hernández & Mercadé 1987); whilst the separation of powers had ensured a justification for the need for a unified Spanish state as a bulwark against Falangist retrogradist reactionism (Ortega 1993: 694-700).

The more the PNV moved towards the centre, the more HB was able to convince the periphery that the PNV had lost its core nationalist ideology (Grugel 1990: 107). This policy was to bear fruit when HB won four seats, a doubling of their last results, during the 1986 general elections; whilst in the regional parliament they had gained a further two seats from the PNV to have a total of 13.15% of the vote (Shubert 1990: 248). Much of this success occurred due to its willingness to adopt feminist, anti-nuclear, and environmental rhetoric mixed with a nationalist consciousness that appealed to younger generations searching for newer, more socially relevant, nationalist representatives (Ekin 1992: 78-84; EH 1994: 23-24 Hooper 1995). A point borne out in a study of polls
conducted by Grugel (1990: 110), that demonstrated 77% of Basques rejected the belief that either ETA or HB were a law and order problem.

Nationalism as an expression of anti-state peripheral movement formation was still viable. The EA felt that even if they controlled the autonomous parliament in Vitoria, this would not bring enough reform if the price of political inclusion was a compromise on the issue of independence (Grugel 1990: 108). The EA would become an electoral party based on the ideals of movement activism against cultural Castilianisation that emerged throughout the 1970s (Watson 1996: 31). Yet ETA, saw this as a sign of submission, as it did with every Basque who took up the political opportunity structures placed before them (Pérez-Agote 1990; see also Ortzi 1991). ETA’s new wave of attacks, instigated by the new elite under the control of twenty four year old Juan Carlos Yoldi, would shock the state into retaliation (Núñez Astrain 1995: 86-87). Hence, creating new political opportunity structures for ETA to redefine the notion of nationalist revolution within the inability of the PSOE state to deal with a competing ideology foreign to their own centralist leftist state paradigm (Esteban 1996: 107-111). The solution would be a period of further consolidation of democracy.

PSOE democratic consolidation was to be an alliance of leftist social movements defined in terms of placing Spanish pluralism at the core of the new state identity (Hooper 1995: 428-432). It was felt that the nationalist question had been sufficiently resolved enough to shift the emphasis of state ideology towards incorporating peripheral notions of Spanish state restructuration (Ammann 1995: 28). Thus the Pacto de Ajuria-Enea was promulgated between the PNV, PSOE, EA, EE, Partido Popular (PP) in order to create a new ‘politic of consensus’ that would ostracise those who took military action (Grugel 1990: 174). HB refused to sign. In Guipúzcoa the EE-EA coalition held power and in Alava, as well as Vizcaya, PNV-PSOE coalitions were formed (Barandiarán 1994: 10). The Alava election results in 1990 even showed the emergence of a pro-provincialist party in Unity of the Alavesas, suggesting the frustration that many provincialised Basques felt for the cities’ inability to come to terms with their own expectations (Conversi 1997: 152).

The PSOE had used its parliamentary majority in the first seven years of its rule to pass bills without going through normal parliamentary processes with the only recourse being an appeal to the Constitutional Court (Ormazabal 1994: 12). The result was that this created in excess of 800 court cases (Morata 1995: 118). From 1986 to 1989 the majority of cases would come down in favour of
the centre, as there was no provincial representation in the Constitutional Court. Even the Senate had only 20% of its representatives selected from the provinces (Morata 1995: 118). ETA though was shifting in its stance on parliamentary participation, and in 1989 HB declared it would partake in parliamentary debate if elected (Gunther 1992: 64). This gave the PNV the green light to finally condemn ETA, as HB itself now recognised that to ignore the state as a structure of potential conflict resolution rather than just a target of mobilised discontent was an error:

Negotiations are not between a party and other parties, but between all of the state, and all the forces of the state. In the Spanish case the military is a very important force because it is the same army that had been with Franco for many years and it is really very strong in influencing the Spanish state.8

It was not until two months after the January 1990 pledge of respect to the constitution, that the PNV, for the first time, publicly proclaimed disdain for ETA initiated violence. This hints at Gunther’s (1992: 67) theory that the reason why the Basque goals were more successful now than in the 1930s was due to the fact that there no longer were 20 varying parties; rather three significant ones at the most who could more readily mobilise their energies in unison, without needing to compete for the popular vote to attain minimum participation rates. This would lead to a crisis in the creation of political identity formation as the one goal, Basque nationalism, would over ride the multifaceted schisms of old such as Left versus Right, Monarchist versus Republican, and church versus state. A matter borne out in the formation of an electoral coalition between the PNV, EA and EE after the 1990 elections (Llera 1993: 175). The ideological tensions, however, between the PNV and ETA remain tense with the PNV reluctant to deal with an organisation they believe is determined to maintain the conflict as a means of achieving their goal of independent statehood (Garaikoetzea 1994: 10). As a PNV activist assured me:

Herri Batasuna is a kind of party which is subordinated to ETA. Herri Batasuna is not independent. Herri Batasuna acts as a function of ETA, and that's the biggest problem Herri Batasuna, they are not a party to the democracy they don’t respect what people have said here within the elections.9

This has created a polarised pluralism that has left a politically
fragmented ideological landscape, with the state ever more entrenched and the periphery ever more radicalised, even if somewhat more disjointed (Ercegovac 1997: 24). The Spanish state could be seen as a successful example of how to ride the cycle of reform-protest-reform through incorporating some, and marginalising others. The death of Franco had provided it with such an opportunity, forcing ETA to define itself in terms of the struggle against the state, rather than within its own community.

Conclusion.

In my opinion, the Spanish and Irish national movement’s, ETA and the IRA, failed because both had taken the risk of attempting to engage the state in a cycle of action-reaction-action that would eventually lead, through the exploitation of societal cleavages and discontent, to the formation of a separate political entity. Where both failed was in their inability to utilise the cycle’s up and down swings as rapidly as the state’s changing of strategic approaches via combining NVDA, VDA and PPO formalisation. Though both had successfully engaged the state and their communities in terms of polarising society, they had failed to gain full control of the cycle so as to prevent the very consolidation of the cycle itself. What occurred was the ratification of the struggle and perpetuation of the state’s legitimacy through allowing for the formation of counter-movements and through granting legitimacy via electoral participation.

The initial goal of the expansion of protest movement repertoire had been designed to challenge the state monolith. Yet, the diversification of protest action had successfully challenged the state to some extent, through creating space within the struggle and from the state itself. It also allowed for the state centre to reform in order to appease the minorities without necessarily isolating the old elites. It had, in a nutshell, allowed for the state to redefine itself so as to make itself more relevant in a changing world, thus, contemnorising its own ideological reason for existence, and expanding its own support base. As long as the Basques were faced with an intransigent unitarist state entity, their ability to exploit cycles of reform would be beneficial and would achieve maximum results.

Once, however, the elites saw the benefits of democratisation, and opening of access points to the centre, then the initial polarisation needed, for the push to independence, would fail to arise. ETA, HB, the PNV and EA were then in the same situation as the IRA,
Sinn Féin, and the SDLP; stuck in a perpetual dynamic relation between centre and periphery that polarised the conflict rather than the community. The democratic infrastructure of both states successfully had cut the raison d’être for the continuation of the struggle of the peripheral movement. Even if this enfranchisement was only on paper it still existed, if solely in the eyes of the centre.

Nevertheless, the engagement of the state had perpetually redefined the notion of the national movement militant through creating a space for it within the cycle of protest. The success of terrorism cast doubt in the minority community’s belief in the genuineness of the state’s efforts of reform. It is true that the Basque’s greatest chance for independence lay in the repressive nature of the Falangist state. Yet the reforms do not preclude a conservative swing back to repressive means of population control which might provide the catalyst for future national movement mobilisation and rebellion. In the North of Ireland the refusal of the Protestant community to deal directly with Sinn Féin has given much hope to those within the IRA leadership who are reluctant to forgo the armed struggle. Though a minority within the movement, their dissatisfaction has been a catalyst in the formation of the breakaway movement calling themselves the Continuity IRA. As such, the mid-November 1997 walkout of some 30 members of the IRA head command, including Michael McKevitt the Quartermaster General, suggests that whilst there is centralist intransigence there is justification for the continuation of the movement’s more militant strategies. Even if only as a backup in case the Blair-Adams talks should fail.

The recent arrest on December 3 1997 of the entire twenty-three person membership of the HB Executive throughout the Basque Country (BBC Radio News Day 4.12.1997), and the subsequent execution on a busy freeway of the body guard of the PP politician behind the arrest and instigation of court proceedings against the HB Executive, shows that in Aznar’s redefined neo-Rightist PP government, the possibility of a return to more repressive means of dealing with the national movement is a reality. What becomes clear is that the national movement must remain relevant, and only through engaging the state directly in times of state initiated pressure can the necessary polarisation of Spanish society re-emerge in order to justify future utilisation of radical paths to political activism by ETA.

As I will show in the following chapters that deal with the successful attainment of statehood by the Croat national movement, it is only through ensuring continued polarisation between centre and periphery, that marginalised national movements can
successfully ‘mimic’ the state via manipulating the cycles of action-reaction-action to ensure that no other situation can arise from the regime but repression. If the state successfully incorporates any part of the periphery, through liberalisation of the political system, then the polarisation of society required for a radicalisation of the community towards independence may fail to emerge. The result, in my opinion, would be a simultaneous stratification of the conflict and a withdrawal of the demands for independence as the periphery seeks the political opportunity structures granted by an ever more flexible centre. For movements like the IRA and ETA, defined by the nature of the conflict, this leads to a further peripheralisation, and hence minimisation of their demands. They had ‘mimicked’ the state, but failed to see how the state had similarly parodied them in order to diminish the movement’s authority as an agent to socio-political reform within an overtly ideological centralist state structure.

Go To Chapter XI
CHAPTER ELEVEN:
From Spring to Silence

As seen in the previous four empirical chapters dealing with the Irish Republican and Basque national movements, it is the ability of movements to create a continuous state of mobilisation between state centre and periphery, and the subsequent polarisation that such a situation entails, that may aid them in the attainment of their goal of independence. The incorporation of NVDA, VDA and electoral formalisation must be measured so as to avoid a simultaneous consolidation of the struggle and state structural reform. The successful movement, as I will attempt to demonstrate, is the one which so polarises the system in the face of state engendered reform, that it forces the state to exclude the minority allowing for ethnic cleavages to emerge that will ensure a breakdown of the political system. Thus, it must be the movement, rather than the state, that completes the cycle. For this to occur it must force the state’s hand by ensuring that it expands far enough to provide political alternatives to that of the centre’s. It must ‘mimic’ the state’s actions and reactions to the extent of even ‘mimicking’ its own formation. It is the aim of these final chapters to demonstrate that the Croat movement was able to employ similar strategies as the Irish and Basque movements, but was able to achieve its goals via utilising lulls in the cycle to consolidate its position before acting. Hence, only by engaging the state in a full confrontational way at the very end of the collection of cycles could it achieve independence.

This chapter will chart the rise of the Croat movement, under the gaze of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC), from the end of World War II until the death of Tito. Thus, this chapter will be divided into two sections. The first will deal with the emergence of the first wave of protest that manifested itself in the Croatian Spring movement of 1971 as a direct consequence of generational changes that emerged from the state centre’s own debate over the nature in which Yugoslav nation-state development should be addressed. I will examine how the separate development of competing movements was to manifest in the form of the Serbian unitarist oriented national movement at the centre, and the Croat decentralists on the periphery, of the Yugoslav Federation. This will commence with a look at the rise of the liberalist wing led by
the LCC and Slovenian League of Communists (SLC), under the party wartime dialectician Edvard Kardelj. As well as the counter-movement it engendered led by the League of Communist Serbia’s Aleksandar Rankovic (Ribicic 1983: 3-4, 1989: 212; Banac 1990: 153). I will map the emergence and eventual decimation of the Croat periphery and its eventual decimation as a precursor of future continuations of the cycle of protest.

The second period will deal with the consolidation of the state centre in the aftermath of the Croatian Spring Movement’s collapse and the eventual restructuring of social movement strategy that was to become the backbone of future peripheral mobilisation (Bilic 1990; Tripalo 1990). It must be noted that the advantage that the Croat movement had over the Irish, and the Basques up until 1979, was that if possessed a constituent entity within the Yugoslav Federation that was ruled by a nationalist communist elite organised along the lines of a left wing ideational movement. This, unlike the Basques who faced a similar movement at the centre of state, enabled access to the halls of power. Thus, what I will search for here is an explanation of how the Croat movement was able to redefine itself continuously in the face of repression, and the role that the expansion of repertoire played in achieving independence, considering that VDA had not played a significant role until just before independence was attained. The answer, I believe, is found in the ability of the movement elite to take the initiative in the reform process; ensuring that reform would be viewed as detrimental to the centre. This subsequently would create such a polarisation of society at the end of consecutive cycles of protest that structures made available for reform of the political system would be minimal; leaving little option but for a complete break from a system that could not provide democratic options for future interest integration.

The Rise of Peripheral Discontent and the Relegitimation of Nationalism as a Doctrine of Revolutionary Reform.

The most significant move back towards the “politics of the masses” was to occur with the shift away from centralism by the head of the Slovenian League of Communists (SLC), and the official party dialectician, Edvard Kardelj (Dedijer 1953: 426; Johnson 1972: 41). The significance of Kardelj was that he would become the ideological lynchpin of the decentralist block consisting of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovinia that would be diametrically
opposed to the Unitarists led by Serbia and Montenegro (Horowitz 1994: 36). Between 1945 and 1991 it was this divide between Yugoslav integrationists, Serbia, and federalists, Croatia, that was to define the dynamic nature of the state centre and periphery’s separate republican development that was at the core of competing, yet separate, paths to national state development (Seroka 1992: 251). Kardelj believed, as exemplified in his ‘Self-management’ laws, that the only way to avoid a return to the dogmatic doctrine of overt Serbian centralism, was through a liberalisation of the economic system. One that would allow for a devolution of economic power away from the centre, towards the factory and sub-republican levels (Friedman 1996: 152).

Kardelj’s plan was to attain economic decentralisation of the lower levels of management by redirecting economic responsibility of management to the factory floor (Ramet 1992b: 50-53). Away from the party organisation, the subsequent independence from bureaucratic centralism would foster an independence of thought in decision making processes throughout society, based on autonomy of action at the sub-federal republican level of political organisation (Lampe 1996: 279-281). The aim was to de-ethnicise the political structure of the centralist elite through advocating the development of the periphery (Bose 1995: 103). Yet, true reforms at the republican level would not fully appear until the official move away from Yugoslav integralism. In the 1963 constitutional reforms the path to political modernity was set out, and would be implemented through a restructuration of the state to accommodate a truly federalist structure (Shoop 1968: 205-213; Rusinow 1977: 62-64). Yugoslav integralism would become the ideological core of Serb bureaucratisation as espoused by Rankovic, the head of the Serb LC and Yugoslav state security, as well as the promulgator of post-war Serb unitarist doctrines of state (Banac 1990: 153).

What World War Two had taught both political elites was that a system without the legitimacy of a popular front, without a movement from below, would fail due to the innate fear of dictatorial policies and governments (Johnson 1972: 28). This was a result of the bitter experiences of foreign occupation and rule under the Habsburgs, for the Croats (Banac 1995: 108-112; Necak 1995: 22), and under the Ottomans and Nazis, in the case of the Serbs (Banac 1995: 108-113; Kitromilides 1996). In Serbia, whose capital Belgrade would become the administrative and military centre of Southern Slavic post-colonial state development, what developed was the politics of unitarism that saw a strong Serbian centre as the sole guarantee against future foreign encroachment on the fledgling southern Slavic state (Necak 1995: 23; Vojnic 1995:
Croatia, due to the more liberal nature of Habsburg occupation in comparison to Ottoman rule, had developed a nationalist ideology steeped in traditions of parliamentary decentralism as the guarantor of national autonomy (Lerotic 1989: 199; Anderson 1996: 3-4).

In Croatia, with its tradition of peripheral based oppositional mobilisation of the National Anti-Fascist Liberation front against Nazi Occupation founded by the Croat Tito (Lane 1996: 38), any move towards centralism was seen as an attempt by a Serb dominated state at minimising the significance of Croat nationalism within the greater context of Yugoslav state development. For most Croat political activists, Yugoslavia was a ‘security community’ whereby they could continue their distinct culturo-social path to political modernity without fearing foreign claims to their territory (Necak 1995: 15). Unitarism was, in their eyes, synonymous with Serbian culturo-political assimilation and state homogenisation (Banac 1990: 147). As such, it would be virulently fought against so as not to subvert Croatian national aspirations for the formation of a nation-state, be it within or without, the Yugoslav national paradigm (Cigar 1996: 53).

At its beginning, Communist Yugoslavia seemed to have found a solution to the national question through constitutional federalism. It soon became clear that the party ideologues and dialecticians mistakenly perceived the class principle as more central to the state doctrine than the national one; hoping that the competing national platforms would find a solution within the Federal Parliament (Banac 1990: 150; Malcolm 1994: 203). This federal solution was to prove to the periphery that Serb expansion into the realms of state was far from satisfied, and the only recourse left to the peripheries would be the mobilisation of the League of Communists (LC) backed mass movements against the centre as a method of expressing popular legitimacy for certain aspects of state reform (Johnson 1972: 74; Clissold 1983: 119). A movement away from class to nationalist rhetoric that Vlado Gotovac, a prominent Spring Movement activist claimed was planned:

It was realised that the communist working class was no longer a means to mobilisation. What engaged people was the desire for national freedom and individual freedom.1

The period between the end of the war and the 1963 constitutional reforms, that saw the constitutional ratification of Kardelj’s self-management reforms, brought a slow mobilisation of forces in preparation for the main engagement with the state (Lampe 1996: 3-4).
This would commence with the rise of the Croat Spring Movement from 1967 to 1971, and the subsequent realignment of Republican elites behind anti-unitarist populist movements (Kesar et al. 1990; Tripalo 1990; Ercegovac 1992).

These shifts were to manifest themselves with the dismissal of Rankovic from power in 1966, and the implementation of radical economic reforms that would threaten the monolithic power of the centralist LCY (Höpken 1994: 233; Dimitrijevic 1995: 50). Rankovic was seen as a key target, as he symbolised an era of neo-conservative bureaucratisation of the Serbian led Yugoslav state centre (Banac 1990: 152). What was shaping the battle between centre and periphery in Yugoslavia was the same political force that shaped a similar crisis in Spain. As in Spain, the peripheral movement faced the monolith of a unitarist state entity ruled by an ethnic elite maintaining a strict official centralist state doctrine based on the elite’s perception of how national integralism and national state formation should develop. A policy that would be seen by many Croatian activists as a threat to fledgling national elites on the periphery of the Yugoslav state (Ramet 1994: 118).

The subsequent interdependent development of the Croat Spring movement from the LCC was to be a sign not just of the continued significance of populism in Yugoslav state politics, but the importance of the national question in the attainment of full communal enfranchisement of peripheral national communities, and access to political structures offered by the state (Gagnon 1994: 119). For the state, what officially became know as the maspok (mass movement), as opposed to the Spring Movement favoured by the non-elite activists, the idea of utilising populist activism to influence cycles of reform by the state centre became important in engaging the centre (Bose 1995: 103; Vojnic 1995: 108). This was an accreditation of the agency of nationalism as a means to social transformation in times of cyclical change:

In Croatia it was shown, as it had already been uncovered in Czechoslovakia, and later it was unravelled in all other east European countries, that the only historical force that was still active, which could engage the entire community was in fact nationalism.²

The goal was to attempt to convince Belgrade of the necessity of placing regional, that is national, concerns to the centre of the federal political agenda in the same way the PNV attempted, throughout the 1960s, of challenging the Movimiento of Madrid (Bennett 1995: 73). Centred around the coalition of LCC and the
Matica Hrvatska cultural organisation, these intellectuals sought to create a revised version of Titoist Yugoslav federalism that could guarantee greater access for Croats to state institutions of policy formation.

The immediate goals of these Croats was to further decentralise both the LCY and the rest of society through a greater devolution of power away from the central government and a relaxation of the principle of democratic centralism, according to which minority opinions were less readily acceptable. Greater participation by mobilised citizens in the distribution of enterprise earning and in direct and competitive elections would be encouraged, accompanied by a purge of the older and more resistant Communists (Friedman 1996: 157-158).

The removal of Rankovic was to create wider political space for liberal reforms and open debate as Rankovic was the main bulwark to autonomous peripheral political development (Plestina 1992: 72-83). The cultural freedom that was to emerge was to develop along populist anti-establishmentarian lines similar to the development of alternate youth cultures throughout the rest of Europe and North America during this period (Ramet 1992a, 1995: 219-276; Lalic 1993: 85-91). Where they differed was in the organised nature of this manipulation of structures created in the struggle between shifting centres and mobilising peripheries, by the LCC and academic elites who were organised along nationalist lines. Manifested in the Declaration on the Status of the Croatian Language (HR 1967: 15-18), this declaration of intent would soon become the focus of a campaign of cultural liberalisation that would form the base of extra-parliamentary oppositional mobilisation against the state centre (Singleton 1985: 256).

Signed by 140 intellectuals, what became known simply as the Declaration, was a doctrine that demanded the protection of the autonomous status of the Croatian language and the move away from the centre’s official push for the cultural homogenisation of Yugoslav culturo-political identity (Bennett 1995: 73). The LCC, which had been instrumental in ideologically debasing the Yugoslav integralists of Rankovic, with the assistance of the old guard of the non-Serb LCY elite of Bakaric, General Gosnjak and Tito of Croatia, as well as Kardelj of Slovenia, were now searching for a means of legitimising the decentralisation of state power to their advantage (Rusinow 1977: 255-268). Nationalism, and the release of peripheral movement activism in a bid to foster the development of a culturally distinctive civil society from the centre, as in the Northern Irish and Basque examples, were seen as the answer. As Puhovski (1995: 129) notes:
In order to legitimise their new circumstances, the republican parties gradually embraced the nationalist ideologies of the majority nation in their respective republics.

I believe that the Yugoslav federal system constitutionally allowed for this situation to arise. Realising their opportunity, the young elite of former Partisans had been searching for ways to separate themselves from the consolidationary tendencies of their older colleagues, and placed themselves at the centre of this activism (Seroka 1992: 153). Much in the same way Arias Navarro had attempted to separate himself from the ghost of Carrero Blanco in Spain. This new generational elite became known as the ‘Triumvirate’, due to the central role played by the three main figures of the LCC. The President of the Croatian Republic, Dr Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, secretary of the LCC, Miko Tripalo, and the former head of the youth wing, Dr Pero Pirker, were to be key actors in the orchestration of civil disobedience, mass demonstrations and strike action (Lampe 1996: 301). As the frustrations with the failure of the centre to observe their demands through parliamentary means grew, movement activism was seen as the sole means to prove to the Serbian dominated bureaucracy the significance that greater Yugoslav decentralisation held for the survival of the state (Banac 1995: 119). This point was emphasised by Tripalo in the spring of 1966 when he stated (Lendvai 1969: 140-141):

As to nationalism, the only solution is that our multinational Yugoslavia must be based on the full equality of each nation and not on some being more equal than others, on socialist self-government and not on bureaucratic centralism.

In Croatia much of the discontent with the misuse of funds stemmed from the launch of the 1957 ‘Five Year Plan’ which ignored LCC suggestions of improving port and rail facilities for the enlargement of the unused port of Bar (Petricevic 1967: 379-381; Ercegovac 1992: 38). The fact that the whole project was running at a loss by 1966, and that the sole beneficiaries would be the Serb and Montenegrin workers employed in its construction, went far in convincing the North3 that they were funding projects that were not for the economic betterment of the whole Federation (Petricevic 1968: 379-381). They were rather projects designed to increase communication, transport links, and industrialisation within Serbia (Lendvai 1969: 145-146). In short, they were supplying Serbia vital infrastructure separate from the needs of the rest of the nation.
The resultant reshuffle in April 1967 of the political structure to appease the periphery, would lead for the first time to the decentralisation of the political system in favour of the periphery (Ignatieff 1993: 16). The Yugoslav Government would now consist of the Federal Executive Council composed of a President and two Vice-Presidents, with a further 27 members within this top administrative team (Lendvai 1969: 166). The two Presidium members within the government were the Premier Mika Spiljak and his Deputy Premier, Rudi Kolak, both Croats, though Kolak was from Bosnia-Herzegovinia (ibid.). The new Secretary was Mijalko Todorovic, a Serb, whilst the President of the Federal Parliament was to be Veljko Vlahovic, a Montenegrin (ibid.). Tito in one quick move declared his hand, recognising the inability of contemporary state structures to fully eliminate nationalist tensions through accepting a compromise that would see the two most powerful nations balance each other’s ambitions through creating power sharing structures (Tripalo 1990: 269-294; Ridley 1994: 393).

This act by Tito was to create a similar polarisation as in Northern Ireland, of two communities behind two exclusive and competing ideologies of state. Yet, as in the Sunningdale Agreement, this was to only further antagonise the state centre who saw it their right to hold a predominant position within the structures of state being threatened. Thus, solidifying one behind the state, as in the case of the Serbs and Protestants, and the other permanently on the periphery with no other option but to find recourse in alternative extra-parliamentary forms of political mobilisation, as in the case of the Irish Catholics.

The inability to solve problems that were symbols of national pride were seen as extensions of economic disempowerment happening at the centre (Petricevic 1968). For the average Croat citizen annoyed by the amount spent on visibly unprofitable ventures in the south, whilst the National Theatre in Zagreb, for example, was closed for months at a time because there was no money available to repair the concert hall, the nature of government spending on political and economic white elephants proved difficult to justify (Petricevic 1967: 379-381; Lydell 1984: 82-88). In 1965 Croatia and Slovenia, 30% of the population provided 40.4% of capital assets and 46.3% industrial input, but received only 30% of government inventory funds (YCIS 1968: 630; Cicin-Sain & Nikic 1969: 20; YBSI 1972).

A time for change had emerged, as had the time for political action outside official political structures of state, as the Croat elite came to realise that only through engaging the state in times of reform...
could change be forced. This would either further isolate them from the state, or, force the state to open political opportunity structures. Either way, the desired polarisation of the two communities would force the general population to make a choice one way or the other.

The Rise of Matica Hrvatska to Prominence and the Escalation of Movement Mobilisation as a Means of Accruing a Reaction from the State.

If a doctrinal difference had to be found in order to justify a varying path to socialism, then independent institutions of political society that could guarantee this variance would have to be the backbone of the new ideology (Supek 1992: 247). For Yugoslav theoreticians the official alternative would be embodied in the return of political control to the “people” through programs of decentralisation (Jelavich 1996: 386). This held great significance in a state whereby the centralist elite, as well as peripheral ones, had justified much of the reasoning for its existence within the context of being the political manifestation of a populist ideology that emerged from the victorious autochthonous resistance movement during World War Two (Muzic 1969: 255-262; Clissold 1983: 119; West 1984: 125). It would also provide the necessary environment for political elites to engage in the dialectic of state consolidation versus popular legitimacy, without destabilising the process of integrating competing national ideologies that were at the heart of the escalation of the crisis between Croatia and Serbia during World War Two (Bose 1995: 107). The Federation of Nations was seen as the solution to the national question, whilst the formalisation of communist resistance movement was the raison d’être for the continuation of Yugoslav state legitimacy.

For existing elites, this meant that popular mobilisation would be considered a necessity in attaining political and ideological legitimacy as theoretically the power would move from the centre to the collective (Clissold 1983: 118-119; Banac 1990: 152). It gave these rising elites the justification they needed to politicise their population base behind the goals of their own republican elites rather than those of the centre (Puhovski 1995: 122-123). Yet, for this to occur an organisation that was officially autonomous from the LCC, but de facto under its direct control, was needed to counter any criticism that the readaptation of the nationalist doctrine would engender.

In Zagreb in 1964 a new openness was to emerge with the birth of
Praxis, a twice monthly journal which allowed orthodox Marxists to critique social conditions of the state (Conversi 1996: 254). This tepid attempt at liberalisation would not supply the vehicle for mass oppositional mobilisation in a political climate whereby Marxist ideology was given as the raison d’être of state, and national identification the sole visible means of deciphering various political communities from one another (Jelavich 1996: 394). Instead, it opened structures for debate that would openly question the need for a unitarist state. Matica Hrvatska (Croatian Queen Bee- from here on to be referred to as Matica) a cultural relic from the 1840s, was to prove to be the ideological backbone that the LCC was searching for (Ramet 1992b: 88-135). Matica, which was concerned specifically with the maintenance of separate Croat cultural identity, was to play a major role in ideologically countering centralist state integration as Matica’s board of directors saw this as an attempt at Serb hegemonisation (Lampe 1996: 299; Tanner 1997: 190). As such it threw its weight behind the Declaration (Tripalo 1990: 92-94). As Vlatko Pavletic, a director at Matica, told me:

The Declaration was the only place we could fight for Croatian autonomy. The economics was a no go zone.
So we saw it as the first step in a wider movement towards independence.4

The rise of membership in Matica Hrvatska, which would come to rival that of the LCC, was seen by many centralists as proof of the nationalist orientation of the majority of Croatian oppositional political organisations (Djilas 1996: 90). Yet, more importantly it was a signal to the LCC, that popular opinion in Croatia now sought a more activist approach in engaging the state centre to react. This was similar to the choice by EGI in the Basque Country to utilise popular mobilisation as a means to challenging the state. The streets seemed more attractive than parliament, and the LCC began revising the populist nature of Yugoslav national ideology by questioning the benefits of silence when, as proven between 1941 and 1945, change could only emerge from peripheral movement and activism, not centralist consolidation (Bilic 1990: 61).

The Problems of Croat Nationalism as the Corner Stone of Reforming the Centre.

The dialectic of the Croatian resistance and the incorporation of the Croatian national idea into a revolutionary struggle was a problem that the leadership of the LCC would have to deal with. Especially
considering the bitter memories of Ustasha rule held by many Serbian centralists (Clissold 1983:118). For this reason it was important to solidify national mythology behind a fledgling, but active, political movement. In fact, the merging of often bitter enemies such as the Croat Left and Right would prove difficult to achieve (Almond 1994: 25). This was proven in the explosive Parliamentary debate in 1967 that emerged, questioning the validity of such a strategy shift, considering that the last time overt Croatism was used in national mobilisation, the result was a reactionary fascist movement supported by the Axis powers (Covic 1975: 125-130). Especially as the Partisan elite feared greatly a convergence of the Left and Right into a consolidated movement on the periphery of state (Djilas 1996: 91).

Within the Yugoslav movement there was a realisation that the Croatian nationalist social movement of 1971’s power came from this convergence. It allowed the antagonism [between left and right] to be settled.5

Controversy was also sparked when Bakaric, the leader of the LCC and the last of the old Partisan generation, refused to fully comment on reports that the late Secretary of the LCC, Dr Andrija Hebrang, who had been executed under orders from Rankovic in 1948, had said under interrogation during World War Two to the leader of the Ustasha, Dr Ante Pavelic:

You are Fascist; I am a Communist. But I am no less a Croat patriot than you are. The difference between us is that you want a Fascist Croatia whilst I am fighting for a Communist Croat state (Pavlowitch 1994: 205).

This brought the ire of the centre when it was rehashed as moral justification for converging all wings of the national movement into a more fluid, republican controlled movement (Pavolwitch 1994: 205). It also signalled that, if Yugoslav communism was revolutionary in nature, then secondary ideologies of state, ie, the need for national assertion, could be considered as equally as revolutionary in terms of popular mobilisation. The insensitivity of the LCC, to the facts that most Serbs would view Croat revanchism as a primordial push was outweighed by the LCC’s own equating of socialism with nationalism as a tool to facilitating oppressed people to rebellion (Anderson 1996: 3-4). Up until then, many at the centre viewed the attainment of the federal structure as the end point of national consolidation of all Yugoslav peoples’ national aspirations (Necak 1995: 25).

The Croats, however, viewed the Yugoslav state not as an end point
of history but as a means of providing political structures that would create the right environment for further national development (Vucic 1991: 60-76). Based on Otto Bauer’s (1996) dream of controlling national intent within a federal state to be used as a force for social development in times when populist mobilisation was a necessity, the LCC were always to see federal relations as dynamic (Brook-Shepherd 1996: 89-90 & 172). Croatian nationalism and socialism were not incompatible. In fact, historically speaking, they had converged from the times of Mazzinian national development, through Habsburg parliamentarianism, to the oppositional nature in Radic’s Croatian Peasant Party (HSS)6 throughout the Monarchist era (Boban 1974). The problem for the LCS was that the long term memory of this political marriage was superseded by the short time memory of Croat-Nazi collaboration.

Tito did not react, as he had himself come to view the Croat nationalist ideology as a bulwark to the Yugoslav unitarism that the LCY’s centre was preparing to offer as an antidote (Pavlowitch 1994: 207). It seems Tito desired the communist individual, but, was willing to play the nationalist card in a bid to counter the growing power of the Belgrade bureaucracy and LCY apparatchiks (Banac 1990: 207; Cigar 1996: 54); just as Franco, a Galician, was willing to develop economic autonomy in the Basque Country whilst negating any moves to decentralise politically (Carr & Fusi 1993: 15-16). As Tripalo told me:

Though Tito was politically and, by nationality, a Yugoslav, he was still an ethnic Croat who could not allow the Yugoslav goal to be superseded by Serbian goals of hegemony. 7

The LCC, under the “Triumvirate”, sought to exploit this confusion in times of state transformation in order to ride cycles of action-reform-action (Bose 1995: 106). They knew that once the dynamic nature of Yugoslav state development ceased, the reason for their autonomous republican stature would be no more. The need for a new debate on the right for republican, ie: national, control over finances was to be the platform for a polarisation of the political system between centre and periphery (Prazauskas 1991: 581-183). “Stop the plunder of Croatia” and “Economic autonomy” were to become catch phrases of the new nationalist rhetoric of Kucar, Pirker and Tripalo’s decentralist campaign (Bose 1995: 105). Even Tito was willing to give tacit support to such nationalist outpourings, within limits, as his wartime experiences had taught him the importance of nationalism in mass mobilisation...
to rebellion could also be used by clever elites to destabilise consolidated state entities (Seroka 1992: 153).

The culmination of the doctrine would emerge with the promulgation of a proposed Croatian constitution in the nationalist newspaper, edited by the future leader of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) Dr Franjo Tudjman, Hrvatski Tjednik (Croatian Weekly). A declaration that demanded the formation of a territorial army, the right to secession, tax collection and a seat at the UN (Stokes 1993: 227). This document would become the base for the formation of the HDZ movement some nineteen years later. The seeds were being sown for the intensification of the national debate and the future exploitation of the cycle of protest. As in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, the Croat political leadership came to realise that national feeling was central to a continuity of protest that other mobilised forms of action could not assure.

The Isolation of the Extremists and the Attempt to Create New Space for their Participation via the Implementation of a More Sophisticated Ideology behind VDA.

Abroad, the Croatian diaspora, with the decline of the Right after the death of Ante Pavelic in 1959, the leader of the Nazi-puppet Government (NDH) and the Ustasha movement, was to signify a re-evaluation of strategies of open rebellion and terrorism (Almond 1994: 143). The main ideological push away from the doctrine of overt fascism was led by Dr Branko Jelic, who had been the chief representative of the NDH to Nazi Germany until his capture by the British during World War Two, after returning from a recruiting campaign in Latin America (Clissold 1979: 6). Theoretically uncompromised concerning wartime atrocities, due to his wartime detention at the hands of the British, Jelic’s main concern was to steer the militant side of the movement away from any association with Nazism in order to provide a base for a constructive reassessment of the Croat situation within Yugoslavia. The realities in Croatia dictated that any escalation of VDA, as with the IRA or ETA, would provide a backlash as much of the Croat population recognised the legitimacy of the Yugoslav People’s Army’s (JNA) claim of being an autochthonous movement that sprung from a deeply resented foreign occupation (Novak 1970; Irvine 1993). As such, a new response was needed that would ‘mimic’ the legitimacy of the Federation as well as its strategies.

Jelic’s main rival was General Max Luburic, chief commandant of the concentration camps, who formed the Croat People’s Resistance (HNO) in Spain (Covic 1975: 320). Operating throughout
Germany during the 1960s, and well after his assassination by the Yugoslav Internal Security Service (UDB) in 1969 (Covic et al.: 1969; Nikolic 1969) until it was outlawed by the German Federal Republic in 1976 (Clissold 1979: 6). Its spearhead was the Drina operational group that was designed to cause public awareness to the Croat cause through attacking prominent figures within the Yugoslav diplomatic community (Clissold 1979: 6). The LCC, in attempting to avoid direct conflict with the JNA, feared being equated with the descendants of the very Right wing movements they themselves resisted.

The continued success of Yugoslav authorities in infiltrating these movements caused new strategies to be formulated that would concentrate more upon propaganda, and an increased lobbying of Western powers, than VDA (Milivojevic 1988; 1992: 204-207). The problem with the new platform was that it utilised old nationalist rhetoric which was tinged with notions of cultural superiority, racial difference, and a negation of the role of the Croat Right in the occupational forces. For the West, that had been victors over a power that had used similar rhetoric, this was considered too close to the ideology of the defeated Axis powers, and only served to further associate Croat nationalist aspirations with the antiquated ideology of pre-war Germany (Jelic-Butic 1977; Krizman 1977). The fact that much of this push came from the revolutionary Right based in Rightist Argentina did not assist their cause.

Formed in 1956 under the name of the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP), the revolutionary Right headed by former Ustasha ideologues such as Dr Stjepan Hefer, from Pavelic’s death until to 1976, and eventually the writer Ante Bonifacic after 1976 (Covic 1975: 40). The movement was too close to the Peronist regime to have been considered a base for a classic human and civil rights campaign. The LCC knew this, and often portrayed its own aspirations for national autonomy as a moderate voice to those of the extreme (Perovic 1975: 647-658; Vukelic 1975: 122). This slow move to the Left was also a realisation of the need to court Moscow through attempting to reform post-war contacts between the Ustasha insurgents and pre-World War Two communists in an anti-Titoist coalition (Clissold 1979: 6).

Creating a programme based on the original united front formed at the death of King Alexander in 1934, that had placed the division of the country at the heart of fermenting popular revolt against the Monarchy, this new movement now openly courted a Moscow frustrated with their inability to rein in Tito (Kovacic 1972). The
removal and death of Andrija Hebrang in prison, in 1948, for
Croatism highlighted to the Left that there were still significant
numbers of members of the LCC that held to the nationalist
objective of increased economic, social and political autonomy
within a confederal framework (Clissold 1979: 6). The link was Dr
Branko Jelic, who through his German published journal Hrvatska
Drzava (Croatian State), was able to foster dialogue on the need to
create allies within the communist world (Perovic 1972; Eterovic
1975: 360).

The main plan was for the ‘Findlandisation’ of Croatia by the
Soviet Union in return for the use of Adriatic naval bases in Pula
and the Gulf of Kotor, as well as unlimited access to the Mostar air
base (Lampe 1996: 302). The problem with this proposal was that it
was interpreted by the LCS and LCY as an act of open aggression,
as the Gulf of Kotor had been a part of Montenegro since 1943,
whilst Mostar was the unofficial capital of the Herzegovinian
region of the Bosnian Republic (Clissold 1979: 7). There is little
doubt however, that this co-operation did a lot to convince Tito that
if the Spring Movement was left untouched in its attempts to co-opt
foreign assistance for its liberalisation campaign, then the Serbs
would fully utilise the anti-Yugoslav Jelic connection in attempts at
militarising the conflict (Djilas 1996: 90). A situation that could
spiral out of control.

Human and civil rights had now, through the fostering of
republican elites, become associated with a move towards more
republican autonomy. In this way HOP and the fledgling Croatian
Revolutionary Brotherhood (CRB) felt they could shape a space for
themselves as protectors of the Spring Movement (West 1994:
291). This would be vehemently opposed by the activists grouped
around the student unions and Matica in the same way that the
SDLP sought to circumvent the IRA from Sunningdale (Sharrock
& Devenport 1997: 285). The problem was that they failed
continuously to gain support from the Spring Movement activists,
whilst the LCC still viewed them as dangerous fanatics and
political enemies (Clissold 1979: 7). What the LCC was seeking
was a decentralisation of the state’s law enforcement, security and
policy institutions so as to limit the state’s ability to respond to
peripheral pressures, not war (Covic 1975: 383-385). As such they
specifically passed on information of these radicals to the very
UDB they themselves so feared (Nikolic 1969).

Any intensification of the cycle away from NVDA to VDA was
seen as beneficial only to the unitarists in the Army. Thus, the
Croats preferred to ‘mimic’ the state at a level in which they knew
they could compete equally. In many ways, unlike Northern Ireland
and the Basque Country, this enabled the LCC to survive in periods of mass repression as the LCY could never fully say that they were adversely anti-Yugoslav, as the Basques were anti-Spanish or the Irish anti-British. This enabled Croatia always to have representatives within Government that could in future be well placed to exploit further policy shifts to the advantage of the nation. Though the immediate reaction of the state was to dismantle any links between the LCC and autonomous popular disturbances through progressive reform (Ridley 1994: 377).

The Centre’s Response and the Solidification of the Divide between the State and the Croatian National Polity.

Soon riots were occurring at football matches and many papers openly questioned the loyalty of the Croatian population to the Federation. In fact, a study by Drazen Lalic (1993: 25) on football hooliganism has shown that in periods of upswing in the cycle of protest, football fans had utilised matches to organise preplanned political rallies as an expression of support for specific politicians and reforms vis-à-vis the centre. The Army did not intervene however until the student leaders Drazen Budisa and Ante Paradzik decided to call a strike that sought, among other things, the formation of a separate currency (Bennett 1995: 73). What most scared the centre was that these mobilisations that had started as expressions of student, trade unionist and public discontent with centralist policies, had manifested into a vibrant nationalist movement that began to employ anti-Yugoslav rhetoric (Djilas 1996: 90). Similar to the way that the NICRA was, by 1968, becoming an organisational base for nationalist mobilisation against not just Stormont, but British rule as well.

In 1971 Mihailo Djuric, a major theorist in the ratification of the pro-Centralist doctrine, questioned the validity of a movement that would directly threaten, through its exclusivist demands, a significant number of the Serbian body polity (Stokes 1993: 223). The ability of such a movement to be representative of all Yugoslav communities was questioned due to the fact that much of its popular rhetoric was built around fledgling nationalist demands (Seroka 1992: 155). Dabcevic-Kucar realised this was a forewarning of future events, when she hinted that what she greatly feared was the usage of economic centralism as an ideological strategy to implement an ethnic state hegemony (Stokes 1993: 227).
By October 1971, under the leadership of Drazen Budisa, the students would lead a nation-wide strike action that would spread to the workers’ trade unions and factory floors (Tanner 1997: 198). The centre was simply not ready for such public demonstrations of peripheral defiance. In November the ideological war began as it became clear Dabcevic-Kucar would not backdown (Tripalo 1990: 161). The surviving Rankovic and unitarist conservative LCY elites, would view this as an attempt by the periphery to offer a competing nationalist ideology that would minimise Serb influence (Djilas 1996: 90). Fears that were apparently correct as the then student leader Budisa recounted:

> We did not say we wanted an independent Croat state. But we did want it. The old regime was right in accusing us of what they did. We were always for independence.¹³

On December 1 the ‘Triumvirate’ were each individually called to Belgrade for talks with Tito (Ridley 1994: 397). The message was clear: the dynamics of Yugoslav parallel national movement development could not afford to be broken without a corresponding collapse of the Federation (Wilson 1979: 206). The ‘Triumvirate’ had ridden the wave of movement populism in order to engage the state and enforce reform from the periphery, but they had failed. The regime which, until now had respected the demands, felt the need to end the crisis through unleashing the Army (Milivojevic 1989: 22). Dabcevic-Kucar realising her predicament had little choice but to continue with her demands. If she relinquished them, then the faith of the population with the leadership would be lost. What was important was that the example of movement mobilisation was there for a future generation to exploit. The ‘Triumvirate’ had utilised the cycle to the maximum, to provide the opportunity structures for nationalist mobilisation within the cleavages that formed between the reciprocal development of state centre and periphery. They had paved the way for the next cycle which hopefully could be more readily exploited by the next nationalist oriented LCC elite. On December 11, Tito sent the Army in, and for now, the LCS was appeased (Lampe 1996: 304).

**The Immediate Aftermath to the Spring’s Repression and the Initial Decline in Protest Activism.**

What had developed in the decade preceding the formulation of the
February 21 1974 Constitution was a generational shift that was to see the Partisan elite further isolated from an emergent younger elite based on republican lines throughout the Party (Dimitrijevic 1995:50). The resultant purge was to leave a dent in the makeup of both elites in 1972, yet it would be especially felt by the Croats who would have over 6 000 people dismissed from state run political, business, media, educational and cultural institutions (Djilas 1996: 90; Tanner 1997: 201-202). The core of the Spring Movement had been weeded out, yet, the ideological reasoning behind the initial mobilisation would not die so readily. As Ivan Aralica emphasised to me in our discussion over the cyclical nature of state repression and movement counter-mobilisation:

That year 1971 was nothing more than one chain in the whole relationship between Serbs and Croats from the beginning of the century till today.14

The core difficulties of Yugoslav state development were far from resolved. At the centre of the dispute between centre and periphery there still remained an ideological conflict over the future direction of Yugoslav state development. The subsequent centralist crackdown seemed to only enhance the separate development of Croatian and and Serbian national polities, as the Croats withdrew into themselves and the Serbs began to fear the power of movement populism on the periphery. In fact this mobilisation against the centre was derivative of the nature of state ideological development in the first place. What Djilas (1996: 91) noted was that much of the success of the initial mobilisation, and thus the reason why the state took it so seriously, lay in the innate analytical and objective histiographical nature of Yugoslav Marxist doctrine and the way it formed space for populist revision of the existing social order:

Tito judged that he could accommodate many nationalist demands because he believed that nationalist and communist authoritarianism were compatible. He was much more afraid of liberal reforms than of nationalism, since reforms directly challenged the communist monopoly of power and his personal rule. Indeed, nationalism, if supervised and channelled by the party, could even be an ally. Its mass appeal increased popular support multiplying offices (each republic, for example, had its own foreign office).

The government had to somehow demonstrate that they were not anti-Croat as much as they were anti-populist. Thus, a period of reintegration would occur which would punish the leadership of the
Spring Movement, whilst addressing the demands for equality which were fundamental to Yugoslav federalism. Slowly though, the LCC would become viewed as the Trojan horse within the party (Brunner 1994: 205). This was the reason behind the extensive push of placing ‘ethnic’ Serbs into positions of power within the LCC after the systematic purges of December 1971 and January 1972 (Bennett 1995: 78). Nonetheless, this increased the resentment of many liberals towards the centre as many, according to Cicak, now began to equate the original suppression of the movement with Serbian political aspirations and, hence, unitarism with greater Serbian nationalism. Especially, considering that within Serbia the liberals were not as harshly dealt with (ibid.: 78-79). Thus the, attempt of limiting the role of LCC backed popular mobilisation was seen as a direct attempt to curtail the effectiveness of the Croatian national movement at attacking the state through more diverse political strategies (Debeljak 1994: 5).

A New Federation, or Croatia’s Sunningdale? The Centre’s Bid to Appease the Croat National Movement and the Isolation of the Serb Elite.

One of the key objects of the repromulgation of the 1974 Constitution was the dilution of Greater Serbian state nationalism through establishing greater autonomy for the six Constituent Republics (Ferrero 1995: 227-228). Rights were to be linked to territorial autonomy, whilst the consolidation of republican status was to guarantee national minorities a virtually unhindered path to social and cultural development (Brunner 1994: 193). What the protest movements of the late 1960s had taught peripheral communities was that nationalism, or rather national movements as a vehicle to social liberation, had been a ticket to political participation within Yugoslav political institutions similar to the post-Stormont Sunningdale period in Northern Ireland and the democratisation processes in Spain (ibid.: 203; see also Linz & Stepan 1992). The difference was that the Croat movement still had the LCC placed strategically within a limited position of power so as to exploit future political opportunity structures for an upswing of protest cycles.

The promulgation of the 1974 Constitution was designed to placate peripheral demands whilst securing the LCY’s predominant role at the centre of state security (Dimitrijevic 1995: 50). It also allowed the LCC access to legislative arms within their own Republic, separate from the centre (ibid.). In this way the LCC had a codified
means of reacting, of ‘mimicking’, the centres policy shifts so as to
instigate any future upswing in the cycle of protest. Prazauskas
(1991: 581-583) believes it is the framework of multi-ethnic states
that give individual ethnic communities a high potentiality for
political mobilisation. Democratic multi-national states survive
through a series of political bargaining and compromise, whilst
authoritarian states survive through eliminating the possibility for
mobilisation, through coercion.

When the process of democratisation sets in, the subsequent
disintegration of coercive systems give way, as does the complexed
system of checks and balances, leaving a vacuum to be filled by an
elite, competitive enough to outplay the opposition (Lerotic 1989).
This allows for the formation of a characteristically rigid and
permanent fragmentation of the political system that was put in
place to balance varying and competing peripheral nationalist
aspirations (Dodan 1991: 253). The advantage that the Croats had
over the Irish and the Basques up until the granting of autonomy in
1979, was that they never faced a flexible elite willing to use
democracy as a means of enfranchising disparate ideological claims
to state formalisation (Linz & Stepan 1992). This suggests that the
Basques now at least have similar structures placed before them to
achieve this necessary change. Perhaps the only way the Irish could
resolve this problem is by similarly ‘mimicking’ the other and form
their own autonomous councils within the framework made
available in the Frameworks Documents joint rule
recommendation.

Naturally, the notion of sharing power, especially after the Spring
Movement had been suppressed, was difficult for many leading
Serb intellectuals to accept (Stokes 1993: 222), as it had proved
equally difficult for Protestant elites during the Sunningdale period
(Fisk 1973). This was due to their ability to identify themselves
within the ideological continuum of Yugoslav centralism (Seroka
1992; Necak 1995; Vojnic 1995). In Serbia, such discontent was to
mobilise in the form of literary criticism and an ideological debate
that was to circle around Dragoslav Markovic’s Blue Book, which
suggested that Serbia’s role was that of forming a unitarist polity,
that was to have a wide distribution amongst the elite of the LCS
(Stokes 1993: 222). In Croatia, this solution was seen as an attempt
from without of creating a homogeneous political will and
imposing it on the periphery, in order to limit any future expression
of national will autonomous from that of the centre’s (Alter 1994:
79).

The state was to be the battle ground for two competing national
goals, and two differing perspectives of the role of the state. The
new constitution that would place the Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations Act as the official ideology of state would exemplify these differences (Jelavich 1996: 386). Tito was a Croat and Kardelj a Slovene. Many Serbs felt that any relinquishing of their predominant place within the state would lead to a diminishment of Serbian control (Bose 1995: 106). This was seemingly justified when the 1974 reforms saw the granting of federal status to Serbia’s two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. It was seen as a direct attack on Serbian plans for a unitarist state (Cviic 1995: 61-62). At the core was the interpretation of what form of ideological role the Yugoslav state would take. In the immediate post Spring environment, it was a debate that would polarise both communities over the vexed nature of state integration:

It is, then, apparent that the powerful ideology of the nation-state, even if related to the concept of the political nation, can only temporarily contain internal social fissures that result partly from historical coincidence and the deliberate, forcible integration which characterised the birth of that state (Alter 1994: 81-82).

Initially, the decentralisation of decision making processes was to buy time for the centre to reorganise, whilst appeasing the periphery sufficiently enough so as not to effectively pressure the population towards more popular revolts (Jelavich 1996: 386). In effect, Croats had more power within their parliamentary system before the change then they did after it. Yet, the new freedoms of autonomous republican governmental policy formation stated in the constitution gave Croatia wider recourse, legally speaking, within the new constitution (Vojnic 1995: 100).

There would now be three tiers of government with the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, and the Assemblies of the Communes representing the lower tiers and the Federal Executive the very pinnacle of power. The Chamber of Republics and Provinces, as the second tier, consisted of 12 delegates per republic and 8 per province; whilst the Assemblies of Communes were allowed 30 delegates from each Republic and 20 from each province (Lampe 1996: 306-307). The Executive would attain their members from the Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslav Assembly (Singleton 1985: 263). More importantly the JNA would gain, at the all important 1974 Tenth Congress of the LCY, 15 seats in the new 166 member Central Committee (ibid.: 265).

The prohibition of doctrinal factionalism in the old system was to
lead the regional elites down the path to localised reform that was answerable to no one except their own bodies, so long as they would not infringe upon the economic and political development in neighbouring Republics (Kardelj 1980: 121). As Denitch (1994 55) points out, even before 1974, the nature of republican structures had allowed for the elite to utilise national sentiment to leverage change from the centre. The ratification of the right of secession in Article 3 of the 1974 Constitution would legitimise the threat of national awakening as a viable movement for addressing political disparity between the competing Republics (Dimitrijevic 1996: 57):

The principle message was that, in spite of class rhetoric, the federal state was based on a national arrangement where even nations originally considered to be the “titular nations” of Yugoslavia came to play a full role.

Article 327, in conjunction with the Rules of Procedure of the Presidency of 1975, was to further recognise that the greatest question yet to be resolved was the national one. The solution to the succession of Tito lay in the creation of a revolving Presidency that would ensure the balance of power was to be held by all competing constituent national republican entities (Dimitrijevic 1995: 64). This new national policy was based on Lenin’s theory of nationalities, later developed by Stalin, that would see the right to self-determination, territorial autonomy and national equality become the essential gauge of the success of the centre in appeasing peripheral demands (Friedman 1996: 146). The essence of Act 327 was an attempt to diminish the periphery’s need to mobilise whilst reconstituting the legitimacy of the centre’s unitarists ideological movement.

The reintroduction of Kardelj’s self-management reforms to education, health, social welfare, childcare, employment, sport and information sectors would also redraw the nature of movement activism up until Tito’s death which would see the national movement respond in kind to the centre’s attempts at liberalisation by concentrating on social issues for the majority of their activism (Ribicic 1989: 212-218; Tomac 1989: 127-129; Ramet 1992: 9). The national movement was now facing a redefinition of strategic positions they held amongst their constituent communities. The LCC had already sought to ‘mimic’ the centre in terms of parliamentarism. Yet, this also weakened their ability to respond in times of crisis as they now, more than ever, lacked the responsiveness of a social movement.

What was to emerge was the political incorporation of the Croat
and Slovene peripheries’ national aspirations into a viable decentralist bloc that would link reforms with a bid to use social action to dilute Serbian elite control of the political centre (Dimitrov 1988: 15; Jelavich 1996: 386). I concur with Hardin (1995: 29) who felt that it was this radicalisation of regional politics that was to lead to the equating of co-ordinated civil disobedience and republican aspirations with public fear of external exploitation. Where I differ is in my belief that this was done in order to ride the waves of mobilised popular discontent, ie, mass movement activism, through a widening of protest repertoire. One that would incorporate the rhetoric of the Spring Movement’s constitutional goals with the ideological movement shift within a reconstituting government movement. The key was to resolve the fissures through appeasing basic demands so as to avoid a return to the mass movement demonstrations embodied in the mobilisation of the Spring Movement between 1965 and 1971.

The First Signs of the Convergence of Civic Social Movements with the National Ideology.

The problem was that too much of civic society had been organised essentially from clerical circles, who had embodied bourgeois conservative values within Croat society (Alexander 1979; Sklevicky 1987; Pavlowitch 1994: 205). The direct result was that non-nationalist mobilisation in many ways was considered of inconsequential importance, as the national question was deemed the way to independence (Ramet 1995: 233). It was from here that a convergence of political platforms between social and national issues occurred. Like the Basques, the Croats, never rejected the validity of the national question, since they were sponsored financially, since 1974, from Zagreb (Dodan 1990: 103; Crawford 1996: 133). This perhaps explained their rise in media and protest terms to levels of popular representation that the overall national movement in the Basque Country could never achieve.

What the LCC was able to offer was an avenue for the public expression of discontent in an otherwise controlled civic environment. Ost (1993: 456) found that this was where national movements were able to go one step further in providing the necessary communal base that could, once mobilised, provide structures that the state would fail to produce in the very action of taking on the state. The peripheral national identity was more than an alternative to the system, it was a movement through which the system could be taken on. This fits in nicely with Clissold’s
argument (1979: 1) that much of contemporary Croat nationalism was formulated in response to the slow emergence of Serbian unitarist ideas into political ascendancy. In fact, many Croat activists began to view the Serbian centre in terms of a national class that utilised communist class ideology as a means to ethnic national ascendancy:

The structure of all civil servants from ambassadors to state servants to police were 70% Serbs and Montenegrins that were placed there to exploit the other Republics for the advantage of their own. The rise from World war Two to now was a classic Marxist example of a class ascendancy and that is how they survived everything.16

As such this upward mobility could only be countered by a similar mobilisation from the periphery. Thus questioning any notion of Yugoslav unity. The Croats were utilising the down swing in the cycle of action-reaction-action to not only polarise Yugoslav political society, but also ‘mimic’ the state by providing an alternative to formalised state inspired social organisation within the activism of the underground movement. The role of the LCC would confuse this issue. In Croatia and Slovenia, this meant that national movements had the double role of playing at being the voice of the people’s movement as well as the legitimiser of the very state structure that the people disapproved of via entering into opportunities offered them through the threatened state elite’s constitutional reforms of 1974 (Dodan 1990: 104-105; Tanner 1997: 204). In both scenarios, however, that of Ost’s (1993) study of the “Velvet Revolution” and Ercegovac (1996) on the democratisation of the LCY, the movements had to transform themselves into electoral parties that could contest elections so as to ascertain the true popularity of their policies. A position of institutional frameworking that was denied the Irish in the wake of the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement.

This process of compromise would in fact threaten the integrity and what these organisations in transition stood for, that is the consolidation of this movement in permanent opposition to the state (Bugajski 1987: 17; see also Giddens 1994; Melucci 1996). Of course, this perception would change as emerging elites would soon realise that without control over the processes of reform, through parliamentary participation, no guarantee could be attained that conservatives would not again assume control of the state. It is more than coincidental that the Basque movement consolidated their position as a constituent nation when they similarly chose to engage the state, via ratifying autonomy in 1980, through electoral
participation whilst leaving social movement options open for further responses in case of a neo-conservative backlash from the centre (Ercegovac 1996: 19-20).

The Need for a Re-Invention of State Ideology in the Face of the Federation’s Failure to Address the Parallel Development.

Socialism as a doctrine of change was now under review, as it was felt to have lost much of its potency due to the national plurality in interpreting Yugoslav communism (Burg 1983; Cohen 1989). Chauvinism and national exclusion had become a means of achieving entitlement in a system that was built on excluding those who dissented from the centre by claiming they possessed anti-social behaviour (Sher 1977; Ramet 1992b; Denitch 1994). This was the same type of state exclusion that was embedded within Loyalism and Francoism of Northern Ireland and Spain respectively. This is where, I feel, that the Croatian movement differed from the Irish and Basque movements in that the convergence between state ideology and national identification reached its peak in the Spring Movement’s successful reform of the political system, which was the means by which independence would be attained in the very next cycle of reform.

What both the LCS and LCC realised was that this convergence would subsequently place the notions of justice and citizenship into the same communal paradigm, whilst allowing for nationalist expression to be the key gauge of organised political intent of the mobilised movement (Supek 1992: 218). Something that the Irish could not ratify until the Downing Street Declaration; and which was negated by the Spanish centre with the enforced ratification of the Autonomy Bill, in an effort to take the initiative away from the floundering Basque National Movement between 1976 and 1977. It is not coincidental that this emerged in a time of a downswing in ETA activism. I agree with Denitch (1994: 81) who sees the nation’s emergence as a tool for the expression of social discontent, within the Yugoslav scenario, as a natural consequence of the search by movements in action for new means of engaging the ever shifting state.

Once again, with the diminished role of elite sponsored state protest, it was the dialectic of letters that would again provide the arena for the testing of future strategies of protest (Beker 1981; Valentic 1991; Grdesic 1996). For many neo-communist
intellectuals, publications such as Praxis would become an integral focal point in expressing the ideological nature of the Federation and the direction which state development should head (Sher 1977: 239). The problem for many Croat political dissidents was that the publication’s insistence of reviewing the debate from a classic Yugoslav Marxist paradigm seemingly downplayed any solution that would address the Croat national question in the interests of a more “user friendly” unitarist option (Tanner 1997: 203-204). A perception of anti-Croat pro-centralist bias that was widely felt within the Croat opposition:

Praxis no matter what anyone says held the Stalinist and Greater Serbian line. They were the ideological link of the Bolshevik Serbian centralist state.17

This was borne out by 1985 when one of the founders, Mihailo Markovic, would become a prominent architect of the Serbian Memorandum (Conversi 1996: 254). Croatian political dissidents pointed to the fact that the failure to suppress Praxis, especially in the wake of the crushing of Matica Hrvatska in 1972, could have been taken as a sign of the predisposition of the state centre to more readily accept the Serb view of unitarism as a necessary precursor to future state development (Jelavich 1996: 395). As such it was feared, as I have shown in the Basque example, that with the intensive push by the centre to force the Autonomy Bill upon the periphery, even in the face of nationalist opposition, that the centre was utilising the decline in the cycle of protest of the movement to take the initiative in an attempt to redefine the nature of any future engagement of state and periphery. The reason the communist doctrine proved so appealing to the state elite, was its ability to negate any democratic expression of nationalist intent in a country where political plurality was feared (Cigar 1996: 53).

The whole point of Communist repression had been to prevent the ties of minimal social solidarity and mutual confidence from developing, for those ties foster democratic opposition (Denitch 1994: 87).

The necessity of incorporating nationalist rhetoric in the media debate was seen as imperative for the ideological mobilisation of people who had to take on the state that was hindered by the very nature of its federal structure (Grdesic 1996: 407; Letica 1996a). Nationalist debate was traditionally embraced by professional and amateur linguists, historians and ethnographers who sought a revitalisation of Yugoslav political history in order to foster a more open environment for non-communist dominated doctrinal polemics (Babic 1990; Horvat 1991: 181-284; Denitch.1994: 106).
However, from an elite perspective, the placing of national aspirations at the centre of state ideological reform was seen as the means of defining republican aspirations with the organic will of the people (Clissold 1983: 119). The fact that it could be placed within the doctrine of Yugoslav national communism was seen as a bonus for peripheries, and greeted with great trepidation from a centre not fully steeped in democratic legitimacy (Jelavich 1996: 387).

Yet, within Serbia itself, there were signs of the acknowledgement of the failures of the Federation in resolving questions of national equality; though they came from a decidedly different arena (Cigar 1996: 54; Djilas 1996: 90). Discontent with the monist approach of the state monolith would emerge in Vojislav Kostunica and Kosta Cavoski’s Party Pluralism and Monism (1985: 41-131). Based around a collection of intellectuals, the Belgrade Institute for Social Studies this group questioned the validity of the party’s claim to being an extension of the original movement that aimed at liberalising the national question through the advent of state democracy (Singleton 1985: 280). But the People’s Front held little legitimacy when the definition of who the people were, and for whom the state was created, still permeated much of the political debate in the country (Singleton 1985: 280).

What was feared was a united front that would opt for the unthinkable, direct confrontation, which up till now had been cleverly skirted by the LCC. Except for the ‘Triumvirate’s’ demand in 1971 for separate territorial defence forces from the JNA (Wilson 1979: 216-219). The incorporation of VDA would have led to a Belfast situation which the Croat, without the benefits of a territory outside the Federation that the Irish had in Southern Ireland and the Basques in France, could have hardly controlled. The LCC had long ago acknowledged the necessity of ‘mimicking’ the centre in all avenues but one, the military (Ridley 1994: 393).

The Shift from Reactionary Violent Direct Action towards Non-Violent Direct Action in the Wake of the Collapse of the Spring Movement & Constitutional Reform.

The eventual crackdown and the relaxation of freedom of movement laws was to lead to a massive exodus of Yugoslav workers, with 640 000 employed in Germany alone (Clissold 1979: 8). The vast majority were Croats which was to exert a lasting
effect in five ways: it increased the size of the diaspora; it increased the number of competing secessionist groups; increased the fluidity of movement of propaganda between Croatia and abroad; increased the counter-insurgency strategies of UDB, the internal security forces, which led to a further radicalisation of the Croat community abroad; and finally, this led to increased protest activity that served only to further highlight the illegitimacy of the regime for a sizable number of the Croat population (Bilic 1990; Tripalo 1990: 237-251; Djilas 1996). If they thought this was a way of ridding the region of resistance, then they were wrong, as the decimation of the demographic heart of the opposition would only allow for the emergence of more sophisticated resistance that was now to be found within the structures of state itself.

Amongst the original post-World War Two diaspora, as well as the pro-Spring Movement diaspora, the immediate reaction to the dismantling of the Spring Movement was one that tended to embrace more violent revolutionary response (West 1994: 302). Ever responsive to the nature of state repression, it was in the CRB where one could see, even more so than in the Basque Country and Northern Ireland, the nature of state repression being specifically geared to the ridding of the presence of the periphery from the entire political spectrum (Perovic 1972; Krizman 1977, 1986). In the Basque Country the reformist Falangists and the oppositional Left alike never sought isolation from the PNV, just ETA. Similarly the British Government, if not the UUP, always attempted to allow for the development of the SDLP as the moderate alternative to the IRA. This led to a controlled de-escalation of movement activism in both countries which in the long run led to the consolidation of the centre’s role in any future resolution of the crises. Ironically, in Croatia it would lead to what I call a ‘polarisation of intent’ that would ‘mimic’ the state’s exclusiveness, and some twenty years later lead to the exclusion of Serbia’s role in any resolution of the Croatian crisis (Banac 1990: 147). When the centre listened, they remained silent. When the centre reacted, they went into action.

In June 1972 there was an attempt at armed incursion from abroad when 19 guerrillas from the CRB commandeered a truck at the Austrian border and penetrated into Bugojno in Bosnia-Herzegovinia (Coxsedge et al. 1982). After six weeks of fighting 15 CRB activists were killed outright, whilst another 3 were executed at a later stage, the fourth received 20 years imprisonment due to his youth (Clissold 1979: 10-11). It was later recognised by a Czechoslovak Major-General Jan Sejna that it had been part of the Soviet Polarka plan that was designed for ‘loyal’
Yugoslavs to call upon Soviet assistance (ibid.). The Bugojno insurrection was reactionary, as activists sought the use of VDA as a direct reaction to the enforced emigration of some 10 000 political activists and the execution of several members of the university elite. Yet, what was more interesting was how Tito would respond to such action by his compatriots by initiating reforms, as he knew popular support for this action could spur on further street demonstrations, thus challenging the legitimacy of the 1974 constitutional reform process as a way to reconciliation (Bennett 1995: 74). As Tripalo intimated:

Tito realised at Bugojno that the last thing he could afford was open rebellion, as the Serbs would demand a unitarist solution. So he pushed a liberal constitution to simultaneously halt mass discontent and weaken Belgrade. That is why the Army was sent in.

For LCC, the role of the JNA neutrality was called into question as it became more and more associated with being the military wing of an ever centralising LCY that was moving against the constitutional decentralisation of the state (Gow 1992: 95-111). Tito had to balance this ever politicised Army with the demands of the periphery for greater social, economic and political liberalisation. Thus, the reformulation of the Security Forces into five regional military districts that would place an entire Army corpus in Zagreb, in order to control the North, was seen as pointing towards who were the internal enemies and friends of the centralist state (Bennett 1995: 76). Much the same way that the British Army consolidated behind the RUC and UDA. As Singleton (1985: 262) stated:

The coming together of the army and the LCY reflects a realisation, born of the experiences of 1971, that, in the event of a crisis threatening the stability of the country, these two centralising agencies, with an all-Yugoslav rather than a republican character, provide a strong defence against separatist tendencies.

Between 1975 and 1976 the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior reported some 17 attacks on public figures, with the most popular tactic being the installation of time-bombs on transportation vehicles (Clissold 1979: 10). The culmination of the campaign came in a series of attacks on the Yugoslav Military Mission, Trade Mission and Consulates throughout Germany in 1975, which ended with the death of Vice-Consul Zdovc in Frankfurt (ibid.). This scared the Yugoslav Government into taking new initiatives when in 1978 they clandestinely exchanged four German terrorists in
Zagreb for eight from Germany, six of whom were prominent Croat emigres (ibid.). The German Courts refused extradition for all but one, Stjepan Bilandzic. The LCS was slowly regaining lost ground, as they commenced putting the disappointment of the 1974 constitutional reforms behind them. The LCC was still weak, and as such their national ideology was in no way ready to challenge the state’s own ideology; yet the radicals were still proving a nuisance.

The ability of the terrorists to intensify state responses to their actions, lead to increased repression on the nationalist community in Croatia itself, as well as abroad. The increased diplomatic pressure, surveillance of the diaspora and local communities, and counter intelligence operations, served its purpose of highlighting to Croats within the Federation that even when they were not personally involved in such anti-state activity, they were to be viewed by the organs of state as potential enemies within. In short, it allowed for Croats to realise that under such conditions their national aspirations could never fully be realised within the existing Yugoslav framework (Clissold 1979: 12). More significantly for the survival of the national movement, the upswing of state repression would force the LCC to reevaluate the nature of LCS perceptions about the future course of Yugoslav state integration.

The arrest and sentencing to 12 years of the renowned chemist Dr Nikola Novakovic for visiting the former pre-war Vice-Premier and HSS President Dr Krnjevic on a trip to London in 1978 only served to highlight this point. Under Article 143 Croats were not permitted to visit declared anti-state activists at home or abroad. The stringent interpretation of this law by the UDB was a signal that aggression would be met by like cause (Ridley 1994: 414; Tanner 1997: 314). When the journalist Branko Busic was murdered in Paris in October 1978 by the UDB, then it became clear that the Yugoslav government equated even non-violent oppositional emigre political thinkers as anti-statist activists equal to terrorists.

Yugoslavia was shaping up like Spain, and this is perhaps a reason why in 1991 the HDZ, was able to more readily mobilise the population behind the resistance campaign compared to the IRA, who nevertheless, was more obvious in the choice of target and their desire to taunt the state to respond in a similar manner. This was not the case with the LCC, and the fledgling Croat underground by 1978. The elimination in Johannesburg in December 1977 of CRB committee member Joso Orec was one thing, the callous elimination of public intellectuals was another. (Clissold 1979: 13). More importantly, the fanaticism in branding all Croat activism as anti-Yugoslav did much in diminishing the
legitimacy of the Security Forces, UDB and SUP, in Croatia as a whole.

This however does not deny the fact that the CRB existed. They seemed to be under the direct control of the HOP’s military branch who mainly concentrated their recruitment and training as a support base in case of the emergence of a popular rebellion from within the Republic. Each seemed to be based within a specific country wherever the diaspora found themselves. In Germany they congregated under the United Croats of West Germany, with a speciality in targeting diplomatic staff. In Australia the CRB seemed to train for insurgency and providing support for rebellion within Yugoslavia. When this failed to eventuate, it became clearer to most political activists that the only way to survive would be through a realignment with the LCC and the cessation of arms until the achievement of statehood had been attained. The extremist diaspora quietened, and the scene was set for the formation of a movement that once again would be coordinated by the LCC.

Conclusion.

Croatia was now placed in a position whereby they could successfully exploit the cleavages left by Tito’s legacy. The difference between the centralist elites of Northern Ireland and Spain, from Yugoslavia, was that the core of the Serbian state centre had come to identify their continued existence exclusively in terms of Yugoslav state unitarism. In Northern Ireland the very concept of Union with the Crown had created an elite that for a long while would follow the British example; thus, placing Ulsterism, until recently, in a secondary position. By the time this had changed the British government itself had initiated a process of change that would dramatically curtail the influence of the Ulster Protestant elite and redefine the role of Catholic participation in the existing political order. In Spain democratisation, as full enfranchisement had done to a lesser extent in Northern Ireland, subtly changed the centre’s stance whereby its desired ideology of state unitarism would exist correspondingly to the autonomous organisation of the periphery. This ceding of power effectively created a greater room for state consolidation as now the newly defined Spanish parliamentary state centre would become the repository of democratic sentiment and hence a filter of peripheral demands.

The mistake of the Yugoslav elite was the desire to punish. This would fuel future generations, as the national question would never
be fully resolved. The subsequent consolidation of the Serb aspirations behind the state centre would destroy any hope of reconciliation within the structures of the federation. In the long run, the historic lack of convergence between the centralist Serb and peripheral Croat national movements was to polarise both entities in direct opposition to one another, without reforming the state suitability in order to bring them together, at least on paper. The refusal of the Serbs to relinquish any trace of power would lead in the 1980s to a showdown that was to be neatly exploited by opposing national movements in a bid to ride the cycle of collective activism one more time.
CHAPTER TWELVE:
State Centralism, Peripheral Nationalism- From Serbian Memorandum to Croatian Independence

The death of Tito was to provide the catalyst for a shift in the political centre’s addressing of the cumbersome nature of national power relations within the Yugoslav state. Though the sum total of the Titoist era would see the emergence of a revived centre and weakened political periphery, the legacy of past cycles of nationalist oriented protest activism had shown that the periphery, though marginalised, would be more than ever acutely aware of the nature of the state sovereignty. In this chapter I will chart the rise of the final cycle of activism that would inherit the knowledge of past campaigns and utilise them into a coordinated attack that would ‘mimic’, frame by frame, the reactivation of the centre’s counter-movement. Until there would be no other choice for the LCC, but exclusion from a Serb dominated political structure, ie, independence.

In this way, I have no intention of saying that Yugoslavia could not have been reformed like Spain, or kept in limbo like Northern Ireland, through the successful circumvention of the cycle of protest. Rather, I wish to show how the path to populism chosen by the Serb elite left the Croats with little choice but to seek the radical option of state independence. Thus, I desire to demonstrate how the Croat movement, under the guidance of the LCC, purposefully ‘mimicked’ the actions of Belgrade with the full intention of exploiting the cycle of action-reaction-action initiated by Milosevic to ensure the polarisation of Yugoslav political society. A polarisation that would prove to be the catalyst for a decline in communal relations and the impetus needed for the reemerging national movements. Hence, without the state centre’s intransigence, without their willingness to consolidate their power at all costs, there was no way that the cycle of protest-reform-protest could have emerged by which the peripheral Croat movement could have so readily exploited to their advantage.

The trigger was the expansion of repertoire in coordination with...
similar centre expansion, so as to never directly threaten the state through the implementation of VDA, as occurred in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. Thus, ensuring that the institutions would be put in place through consolidating national formalisation, via electoral participation that would provide a state organisation alternative in direct opposition to the ideological option proffered by the state centre.

Revolving Presidency and Spiralling National Claims: The Death of Tito and the Immediate Aftermath for the Resolution of the National Question.

The core political changes that occurred after the death of Tito in Yugoslavia were derivative of a fundamental shift in political organisation that had its base in the grass roots movements of the 1970s that were steeped in anti-state cultural movement activism (Ramet 1992: 7). VDA had become inconsequential, yet alternative means to social mobilisation seemed to provide necessary cultural structures that could be utilised to create space within cleavages that emerged from the dynamic inter-relationship between consolidating state centre and mobilising periphery. Much of this was a response to the refusal of the LCY to move away from a narrow perspective of state power, through excluding the adaptation of any pluralist notion that would threaten their monopoly of power (Stokes 1993: 228). The cleavage in political society that emerged was between elite and masses, centre and periphery, and the ability to create a larger scope for structures of communal and individual advancement through the very struggle between Serbia and Croatia for predominant, and autonomous, political development respectively (Bose 1995).

The revolving Presidency that emerged in the wake of Tito’s death failed to provide a sufficient bulwark to the increasing demands coming from the Council of Nations (Dimitrijevic 1995: 64). With the ascension to power of a new President every year there emerged a scenario whereby each republican elite would place their own demands at the centre of the political agenda each time they held office; subsequently negating the aims of the previous competing Presidency. Thus, according to Janjic (1995. p35), what emerged on the periphery of Yugoslav society were “autonomous political spheres.” This led to a rise in the occurrence of popular movements, protest actions, political gatherings and popular demonstrations in response to the increased polarisation of the Presidency.
The very populist nature of the movements was highlighted by the lack of resistance to such reform from the very institutions of the Yugoslav state that were designed to relieve ethnic competition (Prazauskas 1991: 581-583; Malcolm 1994: 203). This could be attributed to the communist regime identification with the state, leading the periphery to view the state as an extension of the ethnic rule of one core elite over another (Banac 1990: 147). The regime, and hence the state in the eyes of the populace, became associated with the growing disparities in economic development and power sharing throughout the Federation, so nothing but the complete dismantling of its constitutional base would suffice for the majority of the population on both sides (Dodan 1991: 253). Kecmanovic (1996: 94) feels that with the death of Tito a new environment emerged whereby this new doctrinal push would be the institutional key to how the state effected protest awareness of peripheral activism as a means of seeking political redress. One in which strategically placed movement elites could exploit the cycle of action-reaction-action emerging from centralist elites in order to gain maximum advantage. The problem was that with each move to engage the state to react, and with each expansion of protest repertoire, there would be a similar rise in state sponsored counter-movements.

The Formation of Counter Social Movements as Ideological Challengers to the Innate Pro-Serbian Line of State development.

The nature of the state monopoly was to lead to the formation of nationalist elites on the periphery that were innately anti-Serb, but not yet anti-Yugoslav (Denitch 1994: 36-40; Malcolm 1994: 211). There was still a belief that if the centre could be wrested away from the LCS, then a decentralised Federation could placate the national demands of the periphery (Silber & Little 1995: 50; Lampe 1996: 347-349). The 1980s would become a period of redefinition of strategy as the period of national movement inactivity in Croatia would slowly dissipate, which came to be called the ‘Great Silence’ (Bilandzic 1990: 20). The key was that of the LCC, which would, through political opportunity structures offered by the Federation in transition, take on the trappings of Croatism as an ideological principle of counter movement to the intensive centralism that was emerging from Belgrade (Banac 1992: 157).

The 1981 Kosovo Uprising, and the 1981 to 1982 Vojvodinian autonomist rallies, were all significant in their ability to mobilise
non-Serbian populations of the provinces through utilising Yugoslav nationalist ideals and rhetoric (Horvat 1989: 18; Banac 1992: 149; Ramet 1995: 201-203). Yet, the nature of state repression was to leave little doubt in the eyes of most activists that Yugoslavia as a unitarist state was constructed to the advantage of the Serbian population (Bilandzic 1986: 73-74; Stokes 1993: 231). More importantly, it was to place the attainment of the nation-state at the centre of all future nationalist demands, as the fight for titular republican status was seen by many Kosovars and Vojvodinians as the sole guarantor of national political development (Pupovac 1995: 142). Nationalism was the vehicle set within the Yugoslav power sharing framework that guaranteed a community its continued separate development (Stokes 1993: 232).

Per capita, Albanian Kosovars and Croats were the most arrested political activists in the Federation (Horvat 1989: 189; Bennett 1995: 78). What the Croatians feared most was the further isolation of their political elite, that was slowly reconsolidating much of the ground that they had lost in the wake of the collapse of the Spring Movement. With the peripheral nature of movement activism, it soon became plausible to establish that these anti-centalist forces were truly anti-Serb, for otherwise why would they be so blatantly trying to wrest power away from Belgrade (Banac 1992: 149)? The fact that the unitarists had failed at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982 to restructure the state away from republican self-determination had signalled to the Belgrade elite that for Yugoslavia to survive, a strong hand was needed (Lytle 1995: 240).

What the Kosovo uprising had taught the LCC was, no matter the rhetoric of national unity and the Federation as the guarantor of the continuance of historic national movements, the LCS would prove to be the agent of centralist mobilisation and state expansion into the public and cultural sphere (Horvat 1989: 18). Vesna Pesic (1994b: 9) believed that this would “influence the first wave of nationalism in Croatia” as the political arena was being defined by Serbia within a cyclical reemergence of national identity to suit the popularisation of centralist doctrine. Yugoslavia was dividing along conservative and liberal nationalist lines, as it had done in 1966. With the formation of the collective Presidency on May 15, 1984, a new period of debate arose as Milka Planinc was re-elected for a further two years as Prime Minister (Lampe 1996: 320). A politician who had relinked the LCY with the LCC in the wake of the collapse of the Spring Movement, she had gained her reputation in ousting nationalist elements within the LCC (Tanner 1997: 200-201). Her statements made in support of the political status quo were in fact dated, and belied the true nature of the disenchantment...
that the nation was feeling with the established political order. More significantly, it was a sign that the LCC was willing again to play with the concept of mass movements as moral justification for elite inspired change in the name of further decentralisation (Singleton 1985: 283).

This move towards mass movements was to come fully to the fore by the mid-1980s as the LCY was moving towards a unitarist stance through the development of separate political platforms between the various Republics (Ramet 1992: 8). The strength of the decentralist argument lay in the expansion of Serbian influence, not only within the political sphere, but also the economic field (Dodan 1990, 1991). The ability to harness the crisis of class, and national and urban-rural identity, that emerged with the death of Tito, would create political undercurrents as issues of social discontent, economic poverty and ideological rigidity would become associated with the centre’s inability to deal with peripheral demands (Kecmanovic 1996: 163). The restructuring, that commenced under Stambolic, but was completed by Milosevic, saw the rate of contribution to the Fund for Economic Development of Impoverished Regions between 1985 and 1989, which was coincidentally under Serbian bureaucratic auspices, increase in Croatia and Slovenia from 25.28% to 26.42% and 14.72% to 23.77% respectively; correspondingly in Serbia it would drop from 38.16% to 27.42% (Vojnic 1995: 102).

The October 1984 plan, for further recentralisation of state funds and judicial legislation by the LCS, with the tacit backing of the LCY, was to mobilise the LCC into a strong anti-centralist stance at the 14th Central Committee Plenum (Ramet 1992: 15). Serbia’s response to the claims, by the Slovene delegate Andrej Marinc, that the centre was playing with nationalism in order to reconstitute the state was summed up in Milosevic’s reply:

We have been threatened with a political crisis if we continue to discuss these problems. All right, let us enter that political crisis. This is going to produce a great uproar about the question of unity or separatism. In such a crisis, separatism will not prevail, because the people have accepted unity. Those leaders incapable of seeing this will lose the public’s confidence. If separatism is not opposed, our country will have no prospects for the future. It can only disintegrate (Ramet 1992: 16).

This is a tacit recognition, on Milosevic’s behalf, that a crisis would only lead to the success of the centre, and as such should have been
taken for the threat it was. Yet, he neglected to read the signals that suggested that without the figurehead of Yugoslavism, Tito, any justification for a stronger centre would only serve to provide a reason for anti-centralist popular mobilisation that a marginalised Croat elite was searching for. The fact that the Vlaskalic Commission, that was convened to prepare the Party ideological line for the 13th Party Congress held from June 25 to 28, 1986, was to demand the defeat of decentralists and the serious consideration of the role of Yugoslav national identity, with the role of the LCS in achieving this, highlighted the state’s role as oppressor (Ramet 1992: 17-18). It was here when Stambolic was overthrown by Milosevic that the liberals within the central state apparatus were to dissipate (Letica: 1996b 177).

The ascendance of the Bosnian Croat leader Branko Mikulic to the Premiership in the wake of the 13th Party Congress was to be viewed by the centralists in Belgrade as an example of how Croat heritage would innately be related to the push for decentralisation (McFarlane 1988: 61-65; Malcom 1994: 210). His 1987 admittance of the misuse of borrowed funds by the Presidency for use in regional development was perceived as an attack on the centre’s desire to dictate economic development (Bennett 1995: 69; Woodward 1995: 253-259). The legitimation process was soon to take the form of pandering to Serbian mass popular opinion, as well as the role of the Serbian state as the guarantor of constitutional unitarism. The ascendency of Ante Markovic to power in March 1989 was to be the last opportunity to save the Federation (Stokes 1993: 239).

The state was to respond by a total misreading of the situation. At the core was the Markovic ‘Long Term Stabilisation Programme’ of 1983 (Crawford 1996: 71). The aim of this programme was to alleviate social division of development through the introduction of a more equitable long term economic programme (Malcolm 1994: 210; Lampe 1996: 347-348). Yet, in a country fed up with ‘five-year plans’, any solution that did not redress the national question could not be fully acceptable (Cviic 1995: 55). Milosevic read this as such, and rightly saw that what the Croat Spring had taught the Yugoslav populist was that national sentiment was a tiger to be ridden, and any state willing to embrace their nationalist constituency would have a loyal cadre ready to break the restrictions of the federal cage (Denitch 1994: 105). Lane (1996: 41) would classify these tactics by Milosevic as the classic strategy of an ideological policy of ‘counter offensive’. In many ways, he sought to dance with the extremists in the same manner that Major courted Paisley (Sharrock & Devenport 1997: 387-389). Unlike
Major, however, he had no minority coalitions within the Serbian Republic to deal with. This provided an advantage for the Croat movement that the Irish and Basques never had. That of a clear message that the centre would never negotiate.

I fully concur with Lytle (1995: 239), who felt that where the LCY had failed was in that it refused to recognise that it was viewed as a transitory government in the greater national development of both the Serb and Croat national movements. Markovic’s attempts to formulate a strategy based on the 1958 unitarist doctrine of Jedinstvo (Unity), that was created by Rankovic the father of contemporary Serbian state unitarism, was bound to be exploited by the centre searching for new means, outside outright military intervention as in 1971, of diminishing the power base of the fledgling movements on the periphery (Lane 1996: 41). This very federalist structure had indeed fostered an environment balanced by competing ethnic ideologies which would lead to the eventual downfall of reforms designed to bring all Republics into line (Djilas 1995: 85). The heart of the demands from the periphery concentrated on complete autonomy from the centre, as it was realised that centralism advantaged Serbia more than any one else, a point annunciated further by Pupovac (1995: 142):

The process of democratisation within the political framework of the former Yugoslavia was led by nationalist movements with the primary objective of establishing nation-state.

The new direction that the LCS was to follow would arise simultaneously with the political ascension of Slobodan Milosevic. Even when succeeding Ivan Stambolic to the top of the Belgrade LC in 1984, Milosevic was at worst considered a consummate apparatchik (Bennett 1995: 83-85). Yet, it was through his ascendancy within the financial and industrial core of the Yugoslav bureaucracy that he was to see the advantage of formulating an alliance between the state bureaucracy and the Serbian nationalists outside the Party, through the push for a state sanctioned nationalist platform (Lampe 1996: 338-341).

This possibility aroused deep concern among many Serbs who saw a potential loss of status and privilege on an individual and communal basis. However, it also offered an opportunity. New elites could attempt to use this tension to carve out a greater role for themselves in the shifting structure of power within society, as existing forms of political legitimacy frayed and anxieties escalated (Cigar 1995: 20).
By associating national identity with strong centralism, Milosevic was able to bypass the liberals of the LCY through exploring the benefits of mass populism as a means of pressing his political claims (Sekelj 1993: 198-205).

In a sense, Milosevic is more an exceptionally malignant symptom or manifestation of the terminal crisis of the superstructure of the Titoist state in relation to the infrastructure of Yugoslav society (or perhaps societies) rather than its cause (Bose 1995: 109).

Greenfeld (1996: 306) felt that the ease in which Milosevic and the Serbian unitarists were able to shed the Marxist doctrine for the nationalist one lay in the similarities between both ideologies. Though Marxism is an internationalist doctrine, I agree with Greenfeld (ibid.: 307) when she points out that in the Yugoslav case, Marxism slimly camouflaged national aspirations of Republican elites behind a doctrine of mass legitimation through movement mobilisation of organic political sentiment. It was a doctrine that could be manipulated without having to be necessarily responsive to the periphery once it was consolidated in the form of the state. Of course, on the periphery perceptions were different, and lent much to equating the development of national movement activism with freedom of political expression (Simms 1996: 254).

The traps that the Basque and Irish movements had to face once they achieved full enfranchisement was, unlike the Croats, their centre had the foresight to provide semi-acceptable structures for peripheral advancement in their new democracies. The advantage for the Croat political elite seeking re-engagement was that the Serb centre gratefully supplied, unwittingly, the necessary polarisation that the Irish and Basque peripheries could only supply through VDA. An option that also tends to consolidate the peripheral community rather than stratify the conflict.

The willingness of the state to embrace populist nationalism in order to check the periphery would come to the fore in the Summer of 1987 (Almond 1994: 202; Ramet 1995: 211). On April 24, 1987 some 60 000 Serbs of Kosovo signed a petition orchestrated by the Party against the ‘genocide’ of the Serbian population that would be presented to the Council of Nationalities and the Federal Executive (Bennett 1995: 92-93). Frustrated with the inability, or unwillingness, of Mikulic to deal with the unitarists, both the LCC and SLC attempted to bring around a no confidence vote in his Premiership (Lampe 1996: 341). An action that was backed by the trade unions as 5 000 workers from Vukovar and Borovo were to picket the Federal Parliament building in Belgrade at the beginning of July, to be eventually joined by tractor factory workers in Rijeka.
For Milosevic official state nationalism provided the necessary ideological control of the state apparatus that excluded those individuals and communities that opposed his reshaping of the state in times of socio-political transformation (Pupovac 1995: 142; Greenfeld 1996: 309). For the LCC this provided the mobilisation that would be more difficult to achieve in more stable times. One that could utilise mass politics in order to influence the media and other areas of information dissemination to the benefit of the bureaucratic state elite (Kupchan 1995a). In this respect, Milosevic’s rhetoric was designed to polarise Yugoslav society along ethno-nationalist lines which left little choice but for republican elites to respond in similar means (Simms 1996: 67). The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) manifesto, The Proposed Serbian Church National Programme, that would be published correspondingly on the 28th of June 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo would clearly place the onus for the protection of the Serbian nationalist aspirations on the shoulders of Milosevic (Popovic 1994: 327; Cohen 1996: 41). Such rhetoric was exemplified in his speech at the commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo:

I want to tell you that you should stay here. Here is your land, here are your houses, your fields and gardens, your memories... [By leaving] you would betray your ancestors and disappoint your descendants. But I do not propose that in staying you continue to endure a situation with which you are not satisfied. On the contrary. We have to change it... Don’t tell me that you can’t do it alone. Of course you can’t do it alone. We will change it together, we in Serbia and everyone in Yugoslavia. No one will ever beat a Serb again... No one has the right to beat the people! (Stokes 1993: 233).

The prime example of Milosevic’s willingness to embrace nationalist populism emerged at this mass rally when in 1989 he granted permission for the bones of Prince Lazar to be exhumed and placed on display at the monastery at Gracanica. After having been transported by train throughout ethnic Serb territories, mass demonstrations of faith were evoked that had not been seen since similar exhibitions of popular expression of sorrow for the funeral cortege of Tito (Sells 1996: 24). Under the Chetnik Movements pro-monarchist slogan of ‘Only Unity Saves the Serbs,’ the LCS would declare its role as protectors not just of Yugoslav unitarism,
but Serbian national predominance of the state (Kecmanovic 1996: 35). More significantly, the subsequent campaign that surrounded the festivities, including an icon poster for sale that included Jesus Christ, Prince Lazar and Milosevic together, left no doubt of whom the LCS considered was to be representative (Malcolm 1994: 213). Milosevic had arrived.

The Serbian Memorandum as a State Response to Peripheral Liberalisation: A Declaration of Serbian National Intent or an Attempt to Dictate the Pace of reforms?

The LCS had become the last bastion of conservative bureaucrats, with Milosevic at its head, who saw the predominance of reformists within the LCY as a direct threat to their privileges (Gagnon 1994: 120). 1985 would prove to be a year of much structural reform which would see the state seeking to align itself with popular undercurrents within Serbian society. Especially, with the disenchanted nationalist intelligentsia, so as to provide the necessary popular base that could challenge the populist movement emerging on the periphery. Kosovo, and the imagery of its history within the collective psyche of the Serbian people, would become a key to this (Schöpflin 1995: 56-57).

The alignment between the Serbian Association of Writers and Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was to produce a state programme that was to be placed in an historic continuum of the development of the Yugoslav state as the protector of Serbian political predominance (Crnobrnja 1994: 97-100; Mestrovic 1994: 45; Cohen 1996: 40). This new, essentially literary oriented, movement was to play an integral role in defining the state’s reaction to the push from the periphery for greater liberalisation (Sells 1996: 32). The death of Tito had enabled the desire for Serb sponsored unitarism, that had been repressed since the dismissal of Rankovic in 1965, to gain political legitimacy amongst the state bureaucracy searching for new means of controlling the ever dissident peripheries (Conversi 1996: 254).

The academics Dobrica Cosic, Ljubomir Tadic and Mihailo Markovic, who were to play a major role in unifying the Serbian polity behind the state, produced the Serbian Memorandum (Conversi 1996: 254; see also Pavkovic 1994). First drafted in 1985, by 1986 it would provide the moral justification that most centralists were searching for (Bennett 1995: 81; Alter 1994: 110).
What was more fearsome for the Croat elite was that much of the work was penned by Cubrilovic and Cosic, who both had written a similar Government memorandum in 1937 (Simms 1996: 67). The 1937 document had been similarly utilised by a unitarist Serbian Government to assimilate Albanians within the Monarchy immediately prior to the commencement of World War Two (Cohen 1996: 40).

These first moves to embrace the rhetoric of the historical national movement of Serbia, by placing state unitarism at the core of state, through development referring to the images of the loss of independence on the Field of Blackbirds in 1389, the desecration of Orthodoxy under the Ottomans and the decimation of the Monarchy by the Partisan forces with a Croat at its head, Tito, were an open dance with the ghosts of unfulfilled populism (Sells 1996: 24). It also questioned, how far the Federation could accept the notion of popular movement as the base for its legitimacy. Considering that the state now would proffer an ideological movement in direct conflict of the periphery’s. Milosevic desired to create out of the Kosovo issue what Sells (1996: 31) called the ‘Serb Jerusalem’. What the Memorandum had granted the centralist LCS, was intellectual legitimacy for the new centralist doctrine (Höpken 1994: 235; Cigar 1996: 58).

The greater mythification of the national cause was aided by the rehabilitation of nineteenth century Serbian and Montenegrin romantic literature in works like Bishop Petar II Njegos’ The Mountain Wreath, where the Moslem Slav is further vilified as the traitor within, who will always oppose the right of the Serb ascendancy until they are disposed of (Banac 1992: 150; Ramet 1992a: 28-29; Sells 1996). Similar to the mythology of the Siege of Derry and the defence by the Apprentice Boys becoming integral to the ideological justification for a homogeneous Ulster state (Ignatieff 1993: 169). Though, as one Croat activist ironically told me ‘this was somewhat similar to the way we perceived Serbia. We are more alike than we like to admit.’ Nonetheless, the rhetoric of national betrayal and the concept of the metropole as the bastion of the continuance of an historical movement would become integral in Milosevic’s attempts at mobilising the nation behind the state (Banac 1992: 150). A passage from the Memorandum (1986), seems to highlight such objectives of maintaining the centralist state’s pro-Serbian development:

The economic reform of 1965 was in essence a change in the basic strategic direction of social development: the project political democratisation was substituted for a project of economic liberalisation. The idea of
self-management, whose essence is the disalienation of politics, was substituted for the idea of decentralisation, which brought about the establishment of regional centres of alienated power. The ethics of solidarity and social justice were substituted for the spirit of possessive individualism and apology of group interest. Political voluntarism, which was daring and dynamic in the first post war decades, when it could count on the mass support of the people, now became static and determined in the defence of the system, even when it became evident that the system is inconsistent and ineffective.

This ideology required for the recentralisation of state was in fact supplied through the Serbian Memorandum (1986). Essentially, it was designed to shape the intellectual atmosphere considered necessary for the emergence of populist political action as a means to facilitating systematic change (Pesic 1994a: 132-133). This change in values was seen as important as many of the values espoused by the new doctrine would normally be viewed as contrary to the development of equality within a given system. In fact, Ivan Stambolic stated in an address to the student body at Belgrade University on October 30 1986, as quoted in Cigar (1995: 24), that such a doctrine was atavistic and revanchist in ideology and would be far from acceptable in any normal developing social order:

The so-called Memorandum is not new. It is the old chauvinist concern for the fate of the Serbian cause with the well-known formula that the Serbs win the wars but lose the peace... In short, the so-called Memorandum, more precisely and with an easy conscience, could be entitled ‘In Memorandum’ for Yugoslavia, Serbia, Socialism, self-management, equality, brotherhood, and unity... Essentially, it is diametrically opposed to the interests of the Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.

The strategic core came from the father of the Greater Serbian ideology, Ilija Garasanin’s 1844 publication Nacertanije (1991). Constrained on the theory that places the security of the Southern Slavic people within a unitarist state dominated by Serbia, Milosevic sought to align dissident historical, ideological and national movements to the state’s centralisation platform in a bid to counter the emergence of oppositional movements that were determined to liberalise the state at all costs (Simms 1996: 65-66).
By aligning Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic’s 1836 theory ‘Serbs all and everywhere’ (1991) with Rankovic’s concept of Jugoslovenstvo, Yugoslavism, Milosevic was able to produce an official doctrine of state placing Serbia in the position of guarantor for the continuous development of Southern nations into one ethno-national state core. An aspect of ethno-specific national development that Greenfeld (1996: 306) felt was integral to contemporary Serbian state national development.

More disturbing for the LCC and the fledgling oppositional movement was the call by the Orthodox Metropolitan of Zagreb-Ljubljana, Jovan Pavlovic, who was a major contributor to the Memorandum, for the placing of the reevaluation of the status of Serbia’s position within the Federation vis-à-vis its relation with Croatia at the centre of a recentralisation of the state. If this occurred then one movement would be placed against the other, simultaneously defining the struggle in terms of one national movement ‘mimicking’ the other, and further entrenching the centre-periphery nature of the debate.

At the core of this development had been the reciprocal development of state and periphery as separate, yet, competing national identities that perpetuate one another in their constant battle for political recognition. I agree fully with the cyclical analysis of Pinson (1993: xi), which demonstrated that the forging of national identity in the Balkans was a result of a perpetual mobilisation of competing peripheries within cycles of state centralisation and peripheral rebellion. Pinson (ibid.) noted that one of the peculiarities of national development in the Balkans is that the movement seeking national consolidation, through political mobilisation against the other, must possess “sufficient identity in the eyes of its neighbours and rulers to be perceived to be separate and to be discriminated against.” The raison d’être behind the Memorandum was the realisation that the centre itself could not fully define who it was, and hence justify the reason for it being in a perpetual stage of mobilisation, without separating itself from the periphery (Crnobrnja 1994: 97-100; Ramet 1995: 403). Thus, even the state centre ‘mimics’ the action of the peripheral movement. A situation of the action of one vilifying that of the other.

The feebleness of the civic sphere means, at the same time, that reference to nationhood can be used to legitimate propositions or to delegitimate opponents- indeed, in this connection they become “enemies,”“traitors to the nation,” rather than political opponents who share the same basic commitment to the state as citizens (Schöpflin 1995: 61).
This places the national movement on the periphery leaving them little choice but to fully challenge the right of the state to hold sovereignty over them. Especially, if they are now cast as the “enemy of state.” In Northern Ireland, this took the form of the vilification of Catholics by the Ulster Protestants once Catholicism was equated to radical Republicanism (Clayton 1996). Similarly, in Spain the criminalisation of the Basque cultural expression throughout the 1950s and 1960s would lead to the radicalisation of ETA ( Jáuregui 1981, 1986). A situation, according to Horowitz (1994: 35), whereby the state responds by implementing policies that ensure a further marginalisation of the periphery due to their ethnicity, in a mobilised sense, being ideologically incompatible to the continued development of state. I agree with Kupchan’s argument (1995b: 182) that the core of this lies in the perceived need by one ethnic elite to exercise control over another as an extension of identifying their national aspirations with the state as opposed to being an extension of nation-building processes per sé.

In Yugoslavia, the questioning of the role of national guilt in the compliance with war-time occupation, and who was the true torch bearer for the Yugoslav ideal, was seen as such an attempt to equate any re-emergence of the Croatian national ideal in the guise of a social movement with fascism and, hence, retrogradism (van Evera 1995: 147-151; Cigar 1996: 53-57). Much in the same way MI5 attempted to portray the IRA as Nazi sympathisers (Taylor 1997), and Franco the Basques as anti-Falangist. The reality of the Croat national movement, according to Cushman (1996: 189), was that the republic itself had been absorbed into the Yugoslav polity as a direct result of political hegemonisation of the state. Yet such an ideological marginalisation was sufficient enough for many Croats to feel that the whole apparatus of state was designed to repress them:

Because Croatia was pressured by Serbian hegemonisation, naturally they were the first people who wanted reforms because they could see them as a resource that could guarantee them their national situation and cultural autonomy. It was not just separatism but it was a symbol of a crisis of the totalitarian state.7

Correspondingly, the formation of alternative movements within Croatian urban centres, through the amalgamation of the punk movement and national symbolism, could be viewed as attempts to formulate a cultural identity juxtaposed to that of the official state centre’s (Ramet 1995: 250-254). Especially when, through internal migration and years of state repression of folk identity, the organic
traditional ways had been lost. The state, thus, defines the rift between centre and periphery along cultural ideological terms, whilst the structure of the Federation had done so along national lines. These movements were anti-statist, hence, if the state would define itself in terms of a specific national community, true rebellion would further be enhanced through the re-embracing of the national identity that most symbolised the oppositional core of the official state’s ideology. An ideology that was defined and consolidated in the state reactionary stage of the cycle of action-reaction-action.

**The Reemergence of Croatian Nationalist Doctrine as the Raison d’être for Social Movement Mobilisation against the Predominant Unitarist Ideology of State.**

For the emerging Croat movement this emphasised the importance of portraying a civic face, as well as a protest strategy designed to show how only via the granting of their national aspirations could human equality and civil rights be guaranteed (Cushman 1996: 186). This was a repeat of the “politics of the people” of the late 1960s, which ensured that political legitimacy could only be attained through the expression of popular will in a country bereft of a democratically elected parliament (Banac 1992: 153). The LCC, soon realised the only way to counter Milosevic’s populist rhetoric was to counter it frame for frame.

It was through this ‘punk nationalism,’” as Friedman (1996: 196) calls it, that civil protest groups in Slovenia such as ‘New Slovenian Art” (NSK), and the fledgling Croat underground, under the guidance of the “New European Order” (NEP) movement in the 1980s, that new spaces were created in order to proffer an alternative solution to state centre forms of ideological organisation (Ramet 1987, 1992a). These groups were independent, yet without the sanction of the LCC and SLC they could provide only an intellectual bulwark to the Memorandum (Ramet 1995: 307). Yet, these were not the classic ‘New Social Movement’ proffered by Habermas (1981, 1982) and Touraine (1995). Even though they proffered an alternative to the state, they never sought to minimise the role of the state as the core of ideological mobilisation. In fact, in the manner of Melucci (1992a, 1996) and Giddens (1981, 1994), they themselves desired a redefinition of state ideology in their favour, as Budisa explained:
My main political goal was to create an independent Croatian state. We did not have an idea about creating a pluralistic system, we wanted to change a Stalinist system. But the movement itself was innately pluralistic in nature. What we wanted was a radicalisation of the problem, but we were against militantism.10

In Croatia, the original social movement activism was careful not to flirt openly with the nationalist question. In 1986 at the Philosophy Faculty of Zagreb University, an independent ecology association was established that would be followed quite rapidly by a citizens action initiative within the Zagreb-Trnje district conference at the Socialist Youth League of Croatia which was to deal with ecological, pacifist and feminist issues (Sklevicky 1987). Eventually, with governmental tolerance of the initial debates, action was expanded to include movements set up to deal with human, artistic freedom and gay rights issues throughout Zagreb, Ljubljana and Belgrade (Ramet 1995: 42).

The problem with movements like NEP was that its intellectual base was to give an almost aloof status to a movement that struggled to create space for itself in an environment that was frequently being reshaped within the battle between the competing nationalist aspirations of the centre and periphery (Ramet 1995: 226). The LCC realised that peripheral movements could only succeed if they sought to prove their arguments within the historic continuum of the cyclical, yet parallel development between Serb centre and Croat periphery.

It is Gagnon (1994: 118) who I feel comes closest in understanding the ideological movement nature of the centre’s push to embrace integrationist nationalism as a means to popular mobilisation when he points out that the slide to war was orchestrated by a minority elite within the LCS who realised that they could not benefit from liberal and democratic reform. Hence, hatred and fear was as much a construct as was the perceived inorganic nature of the Yugoslav state. The embracement of the Serbian Memorandum was a state response to the upswing in peripheral activism which was seemingly ensconced in a more organic ideology, vis-à-vis the national movement’s elite, and the relevance of its platform to its constituent population. Yet, the state would remain the target, be it as a goal of attainment or the fulcrum of popular discontent due to what Prazauskas (1991: 581-583) views as the innate polarising agency of federative structures.

The initial reasons for constructing Communist Yugoslavia in the
wake of the Second World War had not been resolved some forty years later (Banac 1990: 150; Dodan 1991: 253). What the Serb centralist had refused to realise was that Croat nationalist aspirations had as equal an amount of justification, constitutionally, as their own. No matter what the role of the extreme-Right Ustasa movement played, from 1941 to 1945, in dismantling the old Monarchist regime. The automatic absorption of the quisling state of the NDH into the Communist Federation had failed to provide the sufficient self-analysis needed to question the role of mobilised Croat nationalism in anti-Yugoslav activism (Cigar 1996: 53).

Cushman (1996: 190), I believe, is correct when recognising that the Ustase ideology itself was largely a foreign doctrine, Italian in origin, whilst communist federalism was seen by most Croat activists throughout the 1980s as a solution best utilised for the Soviet Union for whom it was initially designed. The LCC’s strategy, of legitimacy through mass movement mobilisation, grew from the autochthonous nature of the resistance movement throughout World War Two which brought anti-fascist liberation (Ramet 1995: 28-30). Thus, what emerged in the mid-1980s was seen as a direct response to the hawkish nationalism emerging from the centre. As Sosic, a founding member of Matica, told me:

Croatians were not allowed to be Croats in Croatia, we were not allowed full rights and what occurred was a ghettoisation of the Croatian nation and they acted accordingly.11

In this way Croat nationalism was viewed as autochthonous and, hence, a legitimate means to societal self-determination outside the direct control of a state elite searching for unitarist solutions (Ost 1993: 463; Vojnic 1995: 98-99; Djilas 1996). A position that the Irish could not, nor the Basques until 1979, hold due to the lack of constitutional recognition of their right to sovereignty. The LCC could exploit this from the Yugoslav Federal structure. In my opinion, this suggests that the contemporary form of Croat nationalism that emerged in the late 1980s had more to do with the state’s push for greater centralisation than a spontaneous outburst of national aspiration:

While the resurgent Croatian nationalism of the late 1980s certainly had deep historical roots, and in many respects could be seen as reenacting (though going beyond) the Croatian nationalist movement of 1967-71, it was in crucial part a response to the destabilising Serbian bid for hegemony within Yugoslavia (Brubaker 1996: 70).
National liberation, hence, became equated with freedom of expression and democratisation of the political system. In Serbia, this was seen as the re-emergence of Croat reactionism and a movement designed to dismantle a state rather than fully become enfranchised within the centre (van Evera 1995: 147). But the Croats themselves felt that the key to the re-emergence of national movements lay in the push for further state unitarism which threatened the gains made throughout Tito’s thirty-five year tenure of power in Yugoslavia (Lane 1996: 44). For the competing elites this forced a re-evaluation of previous strategies of linking governmental reform with mass populism in order to find new methods of mobilising popular opinion (Mestrovic 1994: 76).

Yet, the spectre of Ustasa Right-wing radicalism still hung over the heads of the activists who desired to take up the state’s challenge of utilising the nationalist debate as the corner stone of the transition (Magas 1993: 241; Denitch 1994: 107; Almond 1994: 216). So much so that much of the LCC elite still desired to embellish their nationalist aspirations in pro-Yugoslav rhetoric. The fact that, of the 100,070 combatants in the Anti-Fascist Front, some 60,703, 60.66%, were Croat seemed to matter little, as Belgrade still symbolised the centre of Yugoslav ideology (Banac 1992: 154). What the Yugoslav state failed to recognise, however, was that this expression of national discontent was an extension of their own inability to solve ‘the central problem of legitimation’ (Ramet 1995: 4). Only through popular and mass mobilisation to political activism could the LCY achieve this, at least within the Serbian community.

The re-emergence of cultural symbols of autonomy such as the grb (the Croatian checkerboard coat of arms), the language, and cultural organisations in their political roles such as traditional Matica Hrvatska were seen as attempts by the established LCC elite to embrace nationalist popular sentiment in order to achieve the necessary grass roots movement base that was required to legitimise a reformist doctrine (Cushman 1996: 191-192; Cushman & Mestrovic 1996: 14). It is Mestrovic (1994: 61) who points out that the Communists themselves had already provided, and utilised, symbols, be it in the cult of the Red Star or the paternal leader, for the mobilisation of sentiment in the past. Thus, it is little wonder that the emerging national movement elite sought to use a form of social conditioning that already existed as a pretext for future political development and mass mobilisation. More importantly, it provided a counterpoint of ideological, communal and movement reference to the state’s ever encroaching centralist doctrine.
The rehabilitation of the imprisoned Spring elite in the late 1980s, especially Budisa, Gotovac, Veselica and Tudjman, was a sign that Suvar, the head of the LCC, was willing to foster a nationalist block of sorts if the Markovic reform package was to fail (Banac 1992: 158). From the perspective of the LCC themselves, it was after Milosevic had labeled Ivica Racan, the LCC’s representative to the Federal Presidency, “Ustasha” that the LCC fully realized that the time had come to play the nationalist card as mass mobilisations in Belgrade pointed to a radicalisation of the centre’s own populist agenda (Malcolm 1994: 214). The decision to engage the state through “mimicking” their action, so as to control the nature of reform and its rate of implementation, was a direct response to these state initiated populist pressures.

The Media Campaign by the State and the Croat National Movement’s Alternative Media Agenda in the Mobilisation of the People to Rebellion.

The most important tool to popular mobilisation proved to be media engendered propaganda that came to the fore with two created events. The first was the Martinovic affair which involved the claims by Serbian ultra-nationalists that on May 1 1985, a group of Albanians had anally penetrated a Serbian farmer, Mr Martinovic, with a bottle that subsequently broke (Almond 1994: 203-204). The resultant media campaign slandered the Albanian minority, as well as those who supported their decentralist tendencies such as the LCC (Letica 1996b: 95).

The tactic was to vilify the Albanian community and all their supporters in order to paint the LCS as the moral authority overall state doctrine. It was later revealed that Martinovic’s injuries were self inflicted, yet, the aim was to invoke historical analogies of Ottoman impaling of innocent Serb peasant folk and the Islamic threat, rather than the truth (Letica 1996b: 95). This auto-eroticism, with a sadistic bent, was a key in vilifying the Albanian and recreating the “Turk.” Thus, opening up space for the second campaign that by late 1989 would utilise images of the Croat fascist to recreate the “Ustasha”, in order to mobilise Serbian popular opinion as a counter movement to those of the periphery (van Evera 1995: 147-151). A powerful image for Serbs who still held painful memories of the Ustasha regime, and who had learnt of the harshness of Ottoman rule on the laps of their grandparents. As Cvijic (1996) stated:
Milosevic encouraged the mass media in Serbia—particularly Belgrade Television— to step up the dissemination of allegations about Albanian ‘terror’ with the aim of radicalising Serb opinion and building a new and aggressive populist movement.

The media initiated campaign of demonising Muslims in general, through the hostile stereotyping of Muslims in Vuk Draskovic’s Noz (Knife) in 1982, was to play a major role in vilifying opponents of centralists as enemies not just of the Serbian people but the continued historic development of the Southern Slavic state.12

Overall, Muslims, as well as Croatians, were depicted routinely as virtually non-people, essentially being labeled— with little historical basis— as Serbs who converted to Islam or to Catholicism, but who were lacking consciousness of their very roots and identity (Cigar 1995: 26).

Letica (1996b: 96) feels that the majority of the Croatian intellectual elite failed to respond well enough to this campaign. Analysis was negated because it was seen as being complicit to the dreaded ‘national silence’ that had existed in Croatia throughout the 1980s (ibid.). Janjic (1995: 29) noted that out of this environment the Croat nationalist opposition began to align with the decentralist aspirations of the titular Republic. The Republican run state mass media was utilised, along with other means of manipulation, to create an environment that espoused nationalism and national sovereignty as the doctrines of state fulfilment of popular political aspirations (Ramet 1995: 214). In republics such as Croatia, the transition was achieved even more smoothly due to pacts between the old regime and fledgling oppositional forces (Janjic 1995: 38). At the core was a new wave of investigative journalism that seemed more content on exposing national wrongs committed by opposing elites than to review the innate corruption of the federal system (Tanner 1997: 209). As Mladen Maloca the editor of Danas confided:

> Our goal was not to bring down Yugoslavia, but expose the dangers of the nationalist divide in the LCY. It just opened a pandora’s box though.13

The rise of discontent and the desire to establish a stable civil society eventually would gain a public voice in the youth publications of Mladina (Youth) in Ljubljana, Katedra (Chair) in Maribor and Studentski List (Student Paper) in Zagreb. It is not clear when the LCC and SLC decided to join forces with the...
dissidents, but the April 1986 LCY of Slovenia 12th Congress, held in Krsko was to prove instrumental in commencing an attack on the nature of the LCS's use of Serbian nationalist rhetoric in justifying its centralist policies (Ramet 1995: 42). The Congress ended with the following recommendations:

1. that no one organisation had a monopoly on what the truth was;
2. a call for direct election of officials to higher levels of government;
3. greater autonomy for the press;
4. the formation of an all native civilian national force for conscientious objectors; and
5. the abolition of legal constructs that would guarantee wider privatisation.

Ramet (1992: 11) noted a link between this upsurge in press freedom and the desires of the LCC to formalise behind a campaign of ensuring regional autonomy as the prime most political activity. At the centre, the LCS, would commence similar campaigns through the centralist state controlled media in order to provide an ideological bulwark to national movement activism that was constantly being relayed through the non-centralist media (Denitch 1990: 82-83; Lampe 1996: 340-341; Letica 1996a: 103).

The Rise of Mladina and the NSK Scandal and Re-Awakening of the North.

What was developing in the North was a LCC and SLC inspired national movement media campaign that sought new means to popular mobilisation through the advancement of technology, especially in concepts of multi-media and televised demonstration of protest activism (Thompson 1992: 43-47). A point of constructed mobilisation to national consciousness that Letica (1996a: 100) feels would not have arisen without the media campaign orchestrated in Start, Danas (Today), and Studentski List (Student Paper). Bennett (1995: 101) was to call this the ‘golden age’ of culturo-political activism, as both Croatia and Slovenia would manipulate communist ideology to express the bankruptcy of the Marxist-Leninist ideology as a solution to the fledgling movements on the periphery. Slovenia, more so than Croatia, was renowned as being pro-Yugoslav, and began to develop a civic movement that was frequently using anti-unitarist and anti-Serbian rhetoric (Almond 1994: 25).
Illegal polls were increasingly becoming a popular gauge of national discontent. A prime example of this occurred in 1985 in Split, a city renowned for being the capital of pro-Yugoslav and anti-fascist Dalmatia, where 750 Split high school students were surveyed about famous personalities, and the results showed that a Catholic nun, Mother Teresa, polled the largest vote, the Pope third and Lenin last out of 24 personalities (Danas 28.I.1986: 22-25). For the LCC, the fact that conservative religious, and potentially nationalist personalities, were making a come back in the most radical of provinces suggested that there was a fundamental change in attitude over the relevance of the Federation and unitarism in the day to day existence of the average Croat (Ramet 1995: 270).

This was to scare the centre even more than any campaign of mass demonstrations could achieve. The obvious wit and creativity of this new generation of intellectuals could be broadcast safely into the homes of the middle-classes and apparatchiks, which had proven nigh on impossible during the Spring Movement some fifteen years earlier (Denitch 1994: 180-181). Once again the media, or more correctly, the manipulation of the media’s coverage of events, was to become an integral tool of expressing peripheral discontent with archaic solutions from the state centre (Robinson 1992; Thompson 1994; Kuzmanovic 1995). Unlike in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, however, it was not VDA that was to prove the main part of the protest repertoire. Rather, it was the opening of the national debate through presenting nationalism as an extension of the right to communal and free communication, via visual art, music and the playing with propaganda imaging, that would highlight the ridiculousness of ‘double speak’ emanating from Belgrade (Bennett 1995: 104).

Yugoslavia did not possess the democratic structures in which VDA could be absorbed, whilst moderates, or a non-nationalist middle class, could campaign peacefully for the people (Linz & Stepan 1992: 131). This placed the Irish and Basques at a distinct disadvantage whereby, even in the wake of an escalation in campaigns of VDA, as the means had been pre-established that would ensure that the state, due to its democratic principles, could not fully repress the periphery without losing substantial legitimacy as an agent of democratic enfranchisement (Bunce 1992; Bunce & Csanadi 1993; Ost 1993). This lack of democracy in Yugoslavia served to further polarise the Croat national movement, to the extent that the state was deemed irreformable (Bugajski 1995; Plestina 1995). A position that would allow the LCC to manipulate cycles, as it did throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and expand repertoires with the knowledge that there could only ever be one
solution without fear of compromise (Bose 1995: 103; Vojnic 1995: 108). It was a tradition of ‘patronage’ that enabled the cyclical development of the Croat national movement to rebellion.

Practically, we had to ensure that every centimetre gained had to be done slowly so we would not give the opposition the chance, the excuse to stop everything. We had to give it an evolutionary feel that was spontaneous without being repressed... No one could be anti-Yugoslav because we would have been suppressed immediately. Thus we had to elongate the complete process of change. 14

The most influential anti-centralist peripheral movement, NSK, emanated from Slovenia, not Croatia (Thompson 1992: 43). Formed by Slovenian artists, NSK was designed to parody not only Yugoslav society, but, the very Marxist-Leninist brand of Titoism which they blamed for the Yugoslav nation becoming a collectivist nation of sheep (Silber & Little 1995: 49). NSK was headed by the rock band Laibach, who would intermittently release doctrinal statements during ad hoc concerts, whilst wearing military uniforms and spouting dictatorial philosophy (Tomc 1989: 113-134). Soon, the NSK, became the mouthpiece for dissident liberals throughout the former Habsburg provinces.

In May 1986, matters came to a head during the ‘Day of Youth’ celebrations when the LCY belatedly realised that they had given permission for the Youth organisation of the SLC to release a flier that turned out to be the exact replica of a Nazi youth poster from the 1930s (Bennett. 1995. p104). It was here that the Youth Organisation had become the focal point for the opposition (Thompson 1992: 44). Much of its popular support was being gained through the increased readership of its weekly magazine Mladina amongst young intellectuals throughout Yugoslavia (Silber & Little 1995: 51-57). In fact, they succeeded in forcing the early resignation of the Minister of Defence Branko Mamula (Gow 1992: 78-80). This was attributed to the publication of a series of articles that demonstrated how Mamula had used JNA novices to build himself a villa in Opatija in Croatia, as well as how he had been instrumental in smuggling arms to the oppressive Ethiopian and Libyan Governments (Stokes 1993: 236). On May 31, 1988 the LCY, and the JNA, reacted by arresting the Mladina journalist, Janez Jansa,15 who exposed the scandal on charges of stealing military secrets and treason (Bennett 1995: 105). Though, they did not publish the relevant documents (Denitch 1994: 110).

The SLC, with Croat assistance, would revolt through mobilising reformists in a concerted effort to prove the nationalist nature of the
curtailment of freedom of speech. Many of these motions were to gain popular support amongst the intellectuals, with the renowned Yugoslav oriented member of the LCC, Branko Horvat, urging for the legalisation of private enterprise throughout the entire Federation (Ramet 1995: 44). The subsequent trial in 1988 of the editorial board of Mladina was to have a significant role in the revolt of the media in Croatia as the trial was in essence convened over an event that occurred in Croatia (Gagnon 1994: 122). I feel this did much in breaking the long ‘Croat Silence’, as the broadcasting of the television imagery of mass street protests in the most conservative of Republics, Slovenia, was to question the Croats appeasement of Serbia. The SLC’s mustering some 50 000 protesters out of a population of 300 000 outside the Ljubljana courthouse questioned the validity of outright constitutional modes of action and constitutional strategies that had been hereunto proffered by the LCC (Bennett 1995: 105). NEP would lead the civic campaign as the LCC would search for means of extracting concessions from the centre.

Once again, the issue of press and cultural freedom was leading to a polarisation of Yugoslav political society (Denitch 1994: 110). Yet, unlike twenty years before, the LCS no longer hid their desire for a reconstitution of the state behind pro-Yugoslav rhetoric (Ramet 1995: 307). After the internal coup that toppled Stambolic at the LCS’s Eighth Party plenum, Milosevic was free to implement his new strategy for state integralism (Letic 1996a: 103). By 1989, all wings of the Serbian media were under his control. His subsequently ability to mobilise up to 100 000 citizens for each rally he led, from Vojvodina in 1988 to Kosovo in 1989, would allow his populist doctrine to be portrayed as the choice of the Serbian people (Malcolm 1994: 211-212; Letic 1996a: 103). What emerged here was a new ideology of state that clearly desired no compromise, and more significantly, offered no structures of enfranchisement for differing ideologies within the proffered new statist paradigm.

The awaited showdown emerged in Kosovo but would soon, with the aid of the media, send a message to Croatia that any dissent would be dealt with swiftly (Lampe 1996: 345). The staged for television repression of the civil action undertaken by some 1 300 Kosovar miners on February 29 1989, and the usurpation of the regional government under the newly proclaimed ‘counter revolutionaries’, Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari, provided powerful images for thought (Tanner 1997: 217-218). What was more chilling was Milosevic’s playing of the nationalist card at the 600th anniversary of the the fall of the Kingdom of Serbia on June
29, 1989. Named the “Third Serb Uprising” by the government press, the call to arms at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, which saw some one million Serbs rally behind Milosevic, was the first time that the LCS would fully attempt to usurp popular historical culture as a means of mobilising the Serbian masses behind the centre (Blitz 1996: 195; Letica 1996a: 104). A reaction that the LCC would manipulate to their advantage (Simms 1996: 142; Tanner 1997: 217), in a way that the Irish and Basques could not, because their political leaders never fully appreciated the implications of complete exclusion for these minorities from processes of policing and control when engaging in the reactionary end of the cycle of action-reaction-action.

Significantly, the utilisation of religious media outlets throughout Serbia by the LCS, such as Glas Crkve (Voice of the Church) and Pravoslavije (Orthodoxy), was to align the state to the reactionary core of the Serbian national movement, thus, polarising the communities on non-negotiable ethno-religious lines (Popovic 1994: 327; Cigar 1995: 32). In Northern Ireland there was a complete division between church elites, whilst the Basques faced the political reality of sharing the same faith with their oppressor. The move to embrace distinctively separate cultural symbols was one that would ensure that the state was in itself becoming more than the target of the cycle, but the symbol of the continuation of one national movement’s development over the other. As Blitz (1996: 195) pointed out:

Government-sponsored disinformation proved to be an effective means of mobilising the Serbian public behind an exclusive nationalist ideology.

The LCC responded by allowing for a series of articles to be published in a magazine called Start,16 that questioned the nature of the oppression in Kosovo; the utilisation of Serb nationalism as a tool of Party mobilisation, and the consequences of such populist mobilisation for the development of an autonomous Croat civil society (Tanner 1997: 208). The cycle was now open for exploitation, and the media was to play an integral role in the mobilisation that would last well into the attainment of independence. An aspect of ideological mobilisation that was denied the Basque and Irish due to the de-monopolisation of media outlets that occurred as a by-product of full-enfranchisement.
The Rejection of the Yugoslav State and the Move towards Opening up the Political Opportunity Structures of State: The Cycle as Catalyst.

The Yugoslav elites began to polarise behind their retrospective national goals as the Serbs, as the predominant nation, clearly defined themselves in terms of the necessity to “save” Yugoslavia (Puhovski. 1995. p131). It would, though, be incorrect to believe that the Serbs were totally against the democratisation of the LCY. They did not question the need for the expression of democratic will. What they were against was the call for republican elections before the federal election; as this was seen as an attempt to derail the development of the state towards a more unitarist line (ibid.). The LCS realised as much as the other republican elites, that if a general election was called first, then the Serbian majority with their client states could be called upon to justify the continued existence of an overtly centralist Yugoslav state (Lampe 1996: 325). The LCS were trying to reformulate the Spanish model to their own needs (Linz & Stepan 1992).

This was to become a key aspect in the breakdown of the Federation, as the populist card was to become ever more associated with the notion of nationalist legitimacy (Janjic 1995: 36). Realising the potential, the LCC and SLC moved fast to hold elections so that at the federal level they could effectively claim to be representative of the national interests of the majority of their constituencies (Magas 1993: 3-76; Cigar 1996: 52; Puhovski 1996: 133). At this level, no other doctrine but nationalism could suffice, as a true shift to the development of a civil society would weaken the level of collective reform available at the republican level.

The weakened LCY, too, had virtually abdicated power to the republic parties- the real locus of influence- and became more a forum for those parties. In effect, then, Yugoslavia came to have a multiparty political system with the elite of each republic vying for influence and resources for their own party structure (Friedman 1996: 188).

The political opportunity structures offered by the state came through the pre-existing communist elites (Necak 1995: 25). The question was not how one could achieve enfranchisement through political reform, but, how was one able to gain access for one’s group so as to create a block that could defend the gains recently attained? Thus, competition between national elites became synonymous with the pre-existing order (Bose 1995: 107).
The last valiant attempt to resuscitate the Federal structures riddled with aspirations of competing state and counter-state nationalisms was the ascendancy of Ante Markovic to the Premiership in March 1989 (Malcolm 1994: 210). The main strategy of his reform plan was to outflank both conservative centre and republics alike through minimising the negotiating process, by heading straight to the legislature, thus diminishing the status of republican elites whilst ignoring their separate right to economic development (Esterin & Takla 1992: 266-270). At the core was the establishment of a meritocratic order that would bypass traditional party boundaries (Lampe 1996: 347-349). By December 1989 he had placed suitable cadre into the ministerships under his direct control, so as to successfully push through his legislative redraft of the role of the Parliament in economic development.

A market oriented communist, and a Croat, Markovic stressed deregulation, privatisation of small business, and the creation of capital markets (Esterin & Takla 1992: 266-277). Like Balcerowicz in Poland and Klaus in the Czech Republic, he believed that through controlling inflation one could gain control of the macroeconomic situation. Through the process of writing off all contaminated debts (Lampe 1996: 348), produced from worthless promissory notes exchanged between companies, the push for control over money supply had begun (OECD 1990: 46-48). Markovic introduced a new ‘heavy’ dinar that was convertible at seven to the Deutschmark, balanced the budget, brought in restrictive monetary policies and froze wages for six months whilst freeing all prices except for 20% of all retail and 25% of all industrial (Stokes 1993: 239). The results were to prove amazing. Inflation fell to practically zero after a few months, whilst foreign exchange reserves rose dramatically leading to a decline in foreign debt (OECD 1990: 48-49). Between 1990 and the first few months of 1991 nearly 3000 foreign corporations signed agreements worth up to $1.2 billion for the entire country (ibid.). However, inside Yugoslavia he was unpopular as almost all communities saw him as the only man standing in the way of their national aspirations (Lampe 1996: 345-346).

What Markovic failed to comprehend was that he would gain little support in Serbia due to being portrayed by the centralist sponsored media as a Croat, rather than a Yugoslav politician (Gagnon 1994: 123). The Markovic Government had failed to realise that though they had succeeded in tackling the 250% inflation rate in 1988, all political sides had already legitimised their respective stances, vis-à-vis the state, behind competing nationalist doctrines (Stokes 1993: 240; Malcolm 1994: 210). In Croatia, where the LCC were
funding Serbia’s economic development, hard fiscal realities held little political currency when the Federal Parliament was clearly distinguishing elites along ethnic lines (Lampe 1996: 344-345).

The movements that emerged in Croatia, in the wake of the state’s dance with extremist Serbian nationalist rhetoric, tended to be reactionary and spontaneous expressions of cultural opposition to the order of things as dictated by the state (Vojnic 1995: 99; Simms 1996: 68). The subcultures that were to merge into a unified political undercurrent from rock music, football and church groups in Zagreb, Split, and Istria, were to be united by this common feeling of not belonging to the closed definitions of what Serbian unitarism meant (Debeljak 1994: 6-7; Letica 1996a: 100). The more the state attempted to suppress peripheral pressures, the more they would increase the perceived public discontent with the centre.

Slovenia had rebelled with President Kucan ensuring that the SLC would follow the coalition DEMOS17 nationalist bloc’s push for de-monopolisation of official state ideology (Bugajski 1994: 112). The Belgrade based LCY would see 54 amendments pushed through the Republican Parliament between September 1989 and the Fourteenth Congress of the LCY in January 1990 (Bennett 1995: 110). The lines had been drawn, and for the peripheral republican elites that had relied on mobilised populism to counter the centre’s own populist push, Markovic’s reforms would have to be rejected in order to keep their place within society (Puhovski 1995: 129). Yugoslavia was polarised, and this was further exemplified when the Slovene delegates walked out of the Fourteenth Congress of the LCY between January 20 and 22, 1990. They were soon followed by the Croat delegates (Djilas 1995: 91).

Milan Kucan, the first democratically elected President of Slovenia and the head of the reformed SLC, would not have long to wait for support from Croatia. Suvar’s LCC, though predisposed to the Kucan decentralist line, could not act without popular consensus (Lampe 1996: 345). Realising that the only way to counter the centre’s move towards populism was by likewise utilising nationalist populism, the LCC called for republican elections in order to circumvent the moves by the LCY and LCS to instigate Federal elections that would ensure a pro-Serb majority vote within the Federal Parliament (Puhovski 1995: 131).

Yugoslav society was polarised, and only through ‘mimicking’ each step of the centre’s embrace of populism with a peripheral counter-populism could the LCC form alternate structures that would utilise the cycle of reform-protest-reform to their own advantage (Pupovac 1995: 142; Riesman 1996: 351).
What followed was a reciprocal development of state and movement strategies that would spiral both competing communities, both competing ideologies, down the track to either the complete integration of the periphery into the centre, or the development of separate political entities (Tanner 1997: 239). As the leader of the Croat Peasant Party Ivan Zvonimir Cicak pointed out:

Ninety nine per cent of the Croat response can be traced to the ideology of Milosevic, it was a response to his politics. Milosevic created what subsequently occurred in Croatia.18

Following this pattern of social development, Ramet (1995: 4) feels that there is a ‘reciprocal’ and ‘organic’ relationship between political, social and economic factors which enable disturbances in one field to effect change or reaction in another. Following on from Tarrow’s (1995: 153-169) belief that it is the movements that are able to transcend each cycle of protest through an expansion of repertoires and exploitation of state opportunity structures found within the conflict between state and periphery, I believe that structural change arises from an acute manipulation of the struggle within society by elites willing to use the other as a fulcrum for continued mobilisation. Each action though, is dependent on a series of phasal developments that provide political opportunity structures needed for rebellion. From the fundamental discontent that arises in the first stage, to the failing of governmental policy that heightens the ineffectiveness of the regime, to those of the minority grouping, none of this can be achieved without a structure set up in opposition to the solutions proffered by the regime. Thus, it is the state’s inability to deal with peripheral demands without engaging in reactionist policies that goes a long way to explain how the battle between state and periphery shapes the way in which the national movement chooses to engage the state in reform or rebellion. Thus, in the Yugoslav context:

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was a result of many failures and missed opportunities. However, in the end the inherent contradiction between Slovene and Croat aspirations for autonomy and Serbia’s desire to regain its inter war hegemonic position failed the Yugoslav union (Friedman 1996: 205).

The advantage that the Croats had over the Irish and Basques, was that their political push could be consolidated behind a titular republican elite that could, constitutionally, instigate reform. Even if only to merely challenge the state knowing full well it could be
militarily opposed. Yet, without the LCS’s desire to embrace populist nationalism as a defining point of state, it is doubtful that the environment would have been created for the rise of the Croat nationalist alternative.

‘Mimicking’ the State, or Riding the Cycle? The Consolidation of the Movement through the Electoral Path.

Movements have to gear themselves to absorb all opinion so as to truly support democratic remodelling of the system (Ost 1994). For the national movement, it becomes important to adopt the necessary pluralism that will ensure the division of power at the commencement of a cycle of protest (Bugajski 1987: 3; Kaminski 1992). For many movements though, the need to consolidate their political gains via participation within the system, be it in an advisory capacity to the government or the formalisation into political parties, means running the risk of excluding the more eclectic elements of the movement (Bunce & Csanadi 1993: 272; Puhovski 1995: 136). It is a balance between the necessity to effect change, and the will to be true to the will of the constituency, which places the future political development into a precarious balancing act (Bugajski 1987: 3). The LCS never fully understood this, and as such, isolated the centre in the eyes of the Croat periphery, as the centre would be viewed as reactionary. In Croatia, however, the failure of the centre to provide Federal before Republicans elections allowed nationalism to become centralised within the movement’s ideology. An opportunity that the Spanish and British centres never allowed their peripheral movements to exploit.

Ideologically, the LCC saw the adoption of nationalist rhetoric as an expansion of protest repertoire, in reaction to the LCY’s response to peripheral demands for state restructuration (Letica 1996a: 100). Thus, allowing for a perpetuation and expansion of the cycle of reform-protest-reform according to the nature of LCY’s support of LCS radicalisation. Already, the ability of the LCC to act in the interest of the Croatian population was called into question by the fact that though ethnic Serbs in 1987 numbered 11.6% of the population, they made up 19.4% of LCC members (Cviic 1996: 69). An environment had emerged whereby any expression of Croatian national identity was equated immediately by the centre and their supporters within the LCC and JNA as anti-Yugoslav (Gow 1992: 78-84; Lampe 1996: 325). This situation subsequently led to a decline in the LCC’s ability to portray itself
as a movement for the expression of Croatian national intent.

In my opinion, this came about with the fact that in Croatia the idea of democratisation, and pluralism, had become assimilated into the collective consciousness simultaneously with national liberation from the centre. Something not quite achieved in Northern Ireland during the crucial NICRA campaigns, or in the Basque Country with the rise of the broad-Spanish Left as consolidators of democratisation (Ercegovac 1996: 17-20). In the Basque case, the channels between competing communities were never in reality broken, due to Franco’s equal repression of the Castilian Left (Conversi 1997: 101). The collective experience of Serbian repression assisted the LCC’s realisation that democracy itself could only be pushed on the back of a populist movement that would counter that of the state’s official expansionist ideology (Seroka 1992: 151; Puhovski 1995: 129).

This growing Serb-Croat rift, set against the background of increasing Croat rejection of Yugoslavia, was one of the main reasons why there was no joint Croat-Serb struggle for democracy and civil rights in Yugoslavia (Cviic 1996: 70).

Transition or no transition, for a society to remain free of a return to authoritarianism, the society produced by these fledgling elites must be strong in its pluralist values. Even stronger than the capacity of the elite they face to consolidate power through means of overt non-democratic institutional consolidation. A balance that must realise that a recipe of weak government and strong society is equally as explosive, as it leaves the system vulnerable to the mood swings of populist political aspirations, as has happened in Serbia (Ramet 1995: 20; see also Offe 1991). The insistence of the LCS to dictate the ideological development of the Yugoslav state only served to polarise the LCC in direct opposition to state unitarism. A position that the Irish, and to a lesser extent the Basques, could not find themselves in due to the democratic structures offered by the centre to absorb many of their related social demands.

In fact, the collapse of the government to the forces of Milosevic’s inspired nationalist posturing can be attributed to the incapacity of the government to achieve consensus; the lack of conviction of the elite in its right to govern, and its failure to achieve popular legitimacy. As Miko Tripalo told Ramet (1992: 28) in 1989, the LCC was happy to seek reform within structures of state, yet, the more and more Milosevic manipulated national sentiment, the more other non-nationalist solutions could not be sought:

Croatia can, at this point, be satisfied with its position
in the federation. But it is gravely threatened by Milosevic, who is trying to bring about a totalitarian revolution and achieve Greater Serbian hegemony. This threatens not only Croatia but the other republics as well. It is critical, in these circumstances, to defend Tito, he is the symbol of everything that has been achieved.

The 1989 declaration of unilateral democratisation can be interpreted as a realisation by Racan and Suvar that no matter what the strength of decentralist ideologues in Croatian and Slovenia no reforms could occur without the ideological support of the Croat people. The nationalist nature of the centre’s justification for not joining the other Republics was shown in the fact that it would only be Croatia and Slovenia who would fully adopt such reforms as an integral part of their overall oppositional movement strategy (Puhovski 1995: 136). Milosevic’s dance with state sponsored nationalist populism had ensured that the centre would reform no longer.

Clearly strategies had to change once Milosevic had decided to take politics to the streets. What he had miscalculated was the nature of similar grievances that the Croats held against the Serbs, due to the way Yugoslavia was originally founded through the systematic delegitimisation of many symbols of Croatian cultural autonomy at the end of World War Two (Silber & Little 1995: 87-89). The subsequent public humiliation of the Catholic Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (Alexander 1979; Seroka 1992: 154), and the Spring Movement’s cultural and political elite (Tripalo 1990: 207; Almond 1994: 161-162; Tanner 1997: 201), only strengthened Croat fears of Serb unitarism. Milosevic was now reshaping the centre in order to curtail all peripheral pretensions to reform the state (Ramet 1992: 40-42). A conflict with the LCC was still needed in order to create the pre-conditions for the spiral into the abyss. Civil unrest was becoming apparent, even if it was not as yet widespread (Denitch 1994: 153 & 189; Mesic 1994: 17; Ramet 1995: 421; Silber & Little 1995: 96).

The emergence, in the spring of 1989, of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) and HDZ seemed to prove that the national question would be the core for any future restructuring of the state (Banac 1992: 165). This occurred due to the popular belief held by the recently rehabilitated Spring elite that Croatia could only achieve its maximum socio-economic potential through creating a sovereign state (Dodan 1991: 258). Those movements that were
able to achieve greater legitimacy were to be those who could claim
greater social movement legitimacy (Basta-Posavec et al. 1993: 3).
As Pajic (1995: 152) noted, it seems the fate of Yugoslav ideologi
cal shifts had always lain in the hands of movements as moral
justifiers of radical oppositional, and state engendered
movement mobilisation.

On the 17th of February 1990, the Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) was founded to represent ethnic Serbian interests as the
LCC in transcending its movement structure into a political party
had failed to represent ethnic Serbs within Croatia (Glenny 1993:
16; Silber & Little 1995: 101). Yet the autonomy of strategy and
action would not last long. The replacement of Dr Jovan Raskovic
in September 1990 by Belgrade backed non-elected bureaucrats in
Milan Martic was a sign that all actions would first have to be
ratified from Belgrade as Milosevic could not risk dissension from
the state centre’s official plan of action in reimplementing unitarism
at all costs (Bennett 1995: 127). This confirmed, in the eyes of the
HDZ, that:

The SDS were to be the representatives of the Serbian
hegemonic national interests. They were to be
Milosevic’s police and army, they were to be the
controllers of this country [Croatia].

The survivors of the Spring Movement would take this as a direct
threat to the separate development of Croatian political society
(Letica 1996b: 172). The obvious goal of the LCC was to
reconstitute the political environment in a way in which they could
continue to exist. Hence, the merging of the continuity of the
national struggle with a broad based movement attack on the
monolith of state was viewed as the best way to achieve the desired
redefinition of the political environment that Milosevic had created.

The dialectical interaction of rigid, single-party unitarism and
decentralisation to ethnically defined regional party elites is crucial
to understanding both the fact and the form of the disintegration of
Titoist Yugoslavia. This dialectic ensured that the question for the
Yugoslav citizen ultimately proved an illusory one (Bose 1995:
107).

Accordingly, the LCC realised that the only way to play the mass
politics of the centre was to provide a counter movement that
would manipulate the very ‘cyclical’ nature of national movement
development of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the state (Seroka 1992:
151-152). The periphery was shaping according to the nature of the
centre’s own definition of the nature of the conflict.
Amongst the emerging electoral party identities, the continuation of the Spring Movement’s activism was to become the ideological focus point of Dabcevic-Kucar and Tripalo’s Coalition of National Understanding (KNS), Budisa’s HSLS and Tudjman’s HDZ (Seroka 1992: 157; Lytle 1995: 243). Nationalism was to be the key to the ideological makeup of these movements come parties (Janjic 1995: 39). The advantage that the HDZ held was in their ability to garner support from the isolated diaspora, which had throughout the bleak years of the 1970s provided much of the national movement’s media and military wings, whilst balancing demands of the bureaucracy due to the fact that Tudjman as a general in the JNA had played an integral role in the initial formation of the post-World War Two centralist state (Brubaker 1996: 71).

The ideologue of the Spring Movement’s nationalist section, Tudjman envisioned the movement as a forum whereby the manifestation of a collective Croatian political will could be successfully achieved (Bugajski 1995: 58). Much of his own social movement strategy that influenced the wider range of the HDZ’s repertoire as a national movement could be traced to the time he spent as Director of the Institute for the History of Working Class Movements in Zagreb during the 1950s (Bennett 1995: 129). The very fact that the HDZ was organised into a centralist nationalist bloc suggests that they viewed themselves as the sole repository of the national question within the Croatian body polity (Ignatieff 1993: 23; Brubaker 1996: 71). Much of Tudjman’s (1962, 1965) work dealt with the notion of national movement theory, and the significance of social movements in the liberation of peoples, and the full development of oppositional elites within authoritarian regimes.

The theme of mass movements ran strong throughout much of his work career with much of the strategies that he was himself to employ in the HDZ emerging from his intense studies of the successes and failures of past social movement and revolutionary activism. Tudjman’s work on the de-Stalinisation of the workers movement (1962) which deals with the handling of social movement activity in the wake of transitory authoritarian state entities, as well as his doctoral thesis entitled The Causes of the Yugoslav Monarchy’s Crisis: From Unification in 1918 to the Collapse in 1941 (1965), concentrated on the social undercurrents that engineered changes in movements and regime’s vis-à-vis the relationship between state indoctrination and repression, and social revolt.
It was here that Suvar and the LCC leadership was to completely lose control of the reform process (Basta-Posavec 1993: 3). The moral authority held by the political prisoners of the Spring Movement gave the HDZ great legitimacy in the eyes of much of the population (Tanner 1996: 222). The HDZ’s elite incarceration on seditious acts against the state in the wake of the collapse of the Spring Movement, meant that those civil rights activists that were imprisoned became equated with anti-Yugoslav activism (Letica 1996b: 175). An ideological rift that was reemerging in 1989.

Little had changed from past cycles of reform-protest-reform that saw that the Croat version of Yugoslavism was based on the right to difference, as opposed to the official Serbian sanctioned view that difference was divisive. Wrongly presuming that they could act as moderator between militant national movement and more moderate political parties, Ratan & Suvar accepted that the implementation of a new electoral system would guarantee the LCC a chance of direct rule in a last bid to ensure a plurality of polity (Tanner 1996: 221-222). The fledgling oppositional movement was unified in rhetoric only (Stokes 1993: 242). Realising this, Zdravko Tomac, the leader of the Party of Democratic Change (SDP), the reformed LCC, pushed for a Federal solution, as 2.2 million Serbs and 1.1 million Croats lived outside their constituent republics (ibid.: 243). Tudjman had succeeded in circumventing the old Spring leadership of Dabcevic-Kucar and Tripalo’s ownership of the ideology of the Spring Movement by cleverly associating all reforms, to the necessity of creating and maintaining a movement that was to be representative of all disparate sections of Croat civil society (Bennett 1995: 123). A doctrine that became known as the movement to national synthesis (Ignatieff 1993: 23; Bugajski 1994: 113).

The fact that Dabcevic-Kucar and Tripalo’s party was named the Coalition of National Understanding (KNS) did little to endear them to a Croat polity that had realised that their marginalisation within the structures of the LCY had occurred as a direct result of an orchestrated campaign against them due to their national identity (Lytle 1995: 244). Understanding between nations was not as salient as mobilising and protecting the very identity threatened by further bureaucratic disenfranchisement (Brubaker 1996: 70-73). An equating of national movement mobilisation with the attainment of peripheral liberation from centralist integration that Tilly (1993b) believed would be imperative in instigating initial mobilisation to rebellion.

With the election of 356 seats in the tricarmel legislature on April
22, 1990, the significance of the national question to fledgling parties was settled when the constitutional right to national self-determination was to become the main platform for the dissolution of the Chambers of Nationalities. The structure of alliances were to be demarcated along ideological lines but most held to a decentralist platform (Crawford 1996: 122-124). In the end the HDZ won 206 seats, taking 41.5% of the vote and 69% of the seats due to the non-proportional electoral system (Almond 1994: 186). Thus, the President of the HDZ was able to be elected to the office of President of state (Bugajski 1995: 48; Djilas 1995: 92).

This enabled the HDZ to infiltrate the state apparatus before the state could react, so as to be ready to fill the ideological void left by the fall of the communist doctrine (Bugajski 1995: 58). The advantage it held over others was the contacts it had forged with many ex-Partisans, communists and security personnel during the Spring Movement’s ascendancy (Ramet 1995: 310). Consequently, a doctrine of state emerged containing a heady mix of militant nationalism, a perennial state of siege mentality concerning the Serb threat, and the cult of personality that was growing around Tudjman, in a similar way de Valera had successfully claimed such status in the Irish Free State (Brubaker 1996: 71-72). The key would be the utilisation of the other, ie, Milosevic, as a means of radicalising HDZ mobilisation and legitimising it as a response to an exclusive state structure (Bosse 1995: 109; see also Ignatieff 1993: 15-16).

The shock waves had reached Belgrade, and continuancy plans were introduced to curtail rise of the periphery. Tudjman, according to Ignatieff (1993: 4-5), was placed in a position whereby without the consolidating national movement demands, there would be little guarantee of the continuance of reform. This was a lesson learnt in the failure of the Spring Movement to fully co-ordinate its cycle of protest activity with the development of state reforms. Tudjman was now determined to create his own political space so as to ensure the emergence of the nationalist underclass into political maturity (Basta-Posavec et al. 1993; Pusic 1994: 9). A space that no movement could fully achieve without stepping outside of the established cycle of action-reaction-action through formulating their own alternative entity that ‘mimicked’ the state they have challenged (Tarrow 1993a: 281-301; see also della Porta 1992b).

Serbia would react by sponsoring similar movements for autonomy amongst their communities in Croatia (Tanner 1997: 224-227). Milosevic would use Cosic’s contact, the SDS President in Krajina Dr Jovan Raskovic, and his own man Police Chief Milan Martic to
declare on July 1 1990 the Krajina region under the direct control of the SDS, not the HDZ (ibid.: 231). By dividing the democratic forces in Croatia along old ethnic lines, Milosevic had hoped that Tudjman’s nationalist rhetoric would do the rest in furthering the Manichean divide that emerged between the non-Serb and Serb elites (Cigar 1995: 72-74). As Djilas (1995: 93) argues:

Although Milosevic publicly condemned Croatia’s policies toward its Serbs, he privately welcomed them because they allowed him to disguise his expansionist ambitions as aid for his persecuted brethren in Croatia.

Milosevic’s argument, that unitarism would allow the Serbs to become a primary entity within Yugoslavia, and as such possessed a unitary right to transcend the political and geographic divisions of the state, proved powerful for many rural Serbs (Malcolm 1994: 207). The fact that the Serbs in the Krajina would call for a referendum on the 19th of August and the 2nd of September 1990 on the issue of secession suggested that Milosevic’s tacit approval of the activity would force the HDZ’s hand and declare independence so as to bring a rapid response from the centre (Bennett 1995: 130).

The December 1990 Constitution ensured in Articles 3 and 15 that all constituent nationalities were granted equal rights of citizenship. Article 14 guaranteed that all citizens irrespective of “race, colour, language, sex, religion, political opinion, national or social origin” would be granted equal rights; whilst Article 5 provided for the recognition of cultural autonomy of all members of all nations. Problems arose over concerns that the Serbian community was not given a specific mention at all (Glenny 1993: 12-13). The Declaration of Independence for the Krajina in early 1991, and the rejection by the centre of the joint Slovene-Croat proposal for confederalisation (Silber & Little 1995: 12-13), suggested that the state could not appease any form of Croat national mobilisation any longer without considering it a direct threat to the continued existence of the Yugoslav state.

In reality, the nature of the national movement alliance was what greatly limited the choice of direction (Matic 1994: 44; Brubaker 1996: 71). The HDZ did emerge as a movement only to formalise into a political party once they were granted full enfranchisement and the opportunity to rule. As such, they were able to formulate a politics of consensus that could only negotiate to the extent of devolution of the system (Bugajski 1994: 113). Anything else would have been interpreted as bending to the ambitions of Serbian predominance of the expansitory state centre. The HDZ went even
as far as to demand a seat at the United Nations in the same manner that the Spring Movement had demanded some twenty years prior (Stokes 1993: 228).

Milosevic had polarised Yugoslavia through implementing a strategy of reform-protest-reform that would bring the nature of separate nationalist ideological development to a head (Djukic 1992; Ramet 1995: 209-213; Lampe 1996: 338-341). The goal was an identification of the ‘other’ so as to produce a reasoning for a further radicalisation of the state’s integrative processes. Yet, what had developed was the reciprocal development of an alternative statist paradigm as a counter-movement to the state’s own ideology. Milosevic had failed due to his inability to see that the movement activism of the past was far from resolved, as the nature of centre-periphery development was perpetual (Bugajski 1995: 48).

The manner in which outgoing communist elites had attempted to deconstruct the perceived official ideology of the state’s history, and that of the war as well, enabled nationalist rhetoric to take hold as the official language of politics (Ost 1993: 463; Debeljak 1994: 6-7). This also enabled the Serb authorities to exploit seemingly minor issues, such as the removal of Cyrillic from public signs, in order to facilitate greater internal cohesion as a direct threat to the right to autonomous social, political and cultural development within the Republic of Croatia (Thompson 1992: 260; Tanner 1997: 230-231). The response of the Serb leadership was to demand autonomy (Glenny 1993: 17-19). A move that Tudjman had to proceed cautiously on so as not to inflame the extremists within his movement who saw themselves classically as the militant/military wing of the nationalist sphere of politics (Bennett 1995: 49).

The Irish could never fully achieve this, as the strategy to engage the state at different levels would divide the national movement to the extent, whereby, the entering of Sinn Féin into the electoral system was done as much as a protest against the SDLP’s diminishment of the national question as it was a challenge to the state hegemony. A unity of purpose for Northern Ireland had changed during the Hunger Strikes, and the best that the SDLP and Sinn Féin could do was keep channels open. This was similar to the rift that occurred between ETA and the PNV by the time of the autonomy vote. These national movements had taken on the state and failed, due in part to the ability of the state to read potential rifts in the movement and play on them by offering political opportunity structures to some, and none to others. This favouritism privileged a few, via granting them state recognition as the legitimate voice of their community, but also diluted the impact of their diversifying repertoire, through cutting these channels. Where
the Croats succeeded, where others could not, was that all their action was aimed at the one target, the state. Both the LCC and HDZ never lost sight that the greatest enemy was the state that they sought to challenge.

**Conclusion: The Militarisation of the Crisis and the Belated Attempt of the Centre’s Reign in the Periphery.**

For the state, the military option was always to be a last resort but with its implementation, it became clear that Yugoslav pluralism would be seen as anathema to the historical continuity of the Serb dominated state (Puhovski 1995: 136). It was a message by Milosevic to the periphery that any constitutional moves away from the Federation would be deemed as anti-state activity and would be dealt with accordingly (Stokes 1993: 246). The role of the JNA was made clear: it had to engage the peripheries in direct confrontation so as to facilitate a spiral into a strategy of action-reaction-action so as to justify state military intervention (Puhovski 1995: 132). It was in this period that the nickname that the JNA had gained with the attainment of political representation in the 1974 constitutional reforms, that of the ‘Seventh Republic,” would come to the fore (Cviic 1996: 79).

Between the fall of 1989 and May 1990 the JNA had succeeded in disarming the Croatian Territorial Defence Force (CTDF) whilst simultaneously arming local Serb militias (Almond 1994: 28; Silber & Little 1995: 113). In what could be described as the ascendance of “Serbia’s warrior class”, Cohen (1996: 35) sees that the initial impasse between regional councils and the HDZ was in fact preplanned in order to escalate the cycle of violence as the JNA would calculate that the HDZ was ill prepared for war. This led to a military advance, outside any official declaration of war, that would lay claim to 35% of the Republic’s territory (ibid.). This had two effects. Firstly, it placed Serbia in a position of overwhelming military power that could only be countered by full scale war that would ensure a heavy defeat for the fledgling Croatian state (Gow 1992a: 78-80; Ramet 1992a: 48-51). Secondly, and more significantly, in Milosevic’s attempt to ratify centralist power over the Federation that was legally under the Premiership and Presidency of Croats, was an attempted usurpation of the Federal Presidency by centralist/unitarist forces through a Serbian and Montenegrin alliance (Cigar 1993; Almond 1994: 7).
Once and for all, this left the HDZ representative to the Presidency, and the current federal President, Stipe Mesic, with no other option but to take up his May 15 1991 role as President (Tanner 1997: 247). This would force a showdown with the centralists. When the Macedonian, Bosnian, Slovenian and Croat vote was nullified by Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina, the nature of Yugoslav state development was made clear to the entire population of the Federation (Silber & Little 1995: 166). Yugoslavia could only accept a non-Serb President if she/he was a member of the LCY (Mesic 1994: x). On May 18 the HDZ responded now by calling a snap referendum on independence (Tanner 1997: 298). Yugoslavia was an ethno-nationally defined state. The legitimacy of the LCS and Milosevic outside the centre was lost, as was the notion of the JNA’s neutrality.

Yugoslavia had splintered, and the nature of separate, yet parallel national movement development became evident. The fact that the centre refused to recognise the legitimate President of the very state structure they had created meant that for the first time, the centre itself had rejected the state (Almond 1994: 29). Parallels could be drawn with the Ulster Loyalists rejection of Sunningdale, but the difference was that the LCS had never allowed a radical movement to develop and implement VDA on the periphery to justify a further wave of repression.

The LCS, also had not initiated a controlled devolution as the CDU had in Spain, in the formation of the Pact of Moncloa (Denitch 1992, 1994: 66-69). Thus, they never could regain control of the cycle of reform-protest-reform that would have now fully separated the periphery from the centre. The LCS’s dogmatism, and lack of willingness to truly incorporate a Croat voice at the centre of a President independent of the state security apparatus and JNA would push the Croats to independence (Almond 1994: 19; Zunec 1994: 46-64). The British and Spanish state’s were successful where Yugoslavia was not, via incorporating aspects of the national movement into the institutions of conflict resolution, ie, democratic enfranchisement, they were able to redefine the nature of centralist nationalist identity to survive each successive wave of peripheral demands instigated in the processes of state development. The LCC-HDZ block succeeded where the IRA-SDLP and ETA-PNV could not by never letting the actual struggle, the cycle of protest, define the identity of the mobilised nation itself. The LCC-HDZ block saw that the movement was a reflection of the state; once divided, or radicalised, it could only be defined in terms of the cycle of action-reaction-action.

This could not prevent the rift that was occurring between the
conservative Titoist wing of the JNA, who caste themselves as protectors of Yugoslav unity outside ‘Greater Serbian’ dogmatism, and the emerging Milosevic backed Serbian nationalist elite (Cviic 1996: 80; Lampe 1996: 325). The cycle was no longer fully under his control. At the core was the further homogenisation of Army units with an influx of a predominantly Serbian and Montenegrin cadre (Gow 1992: 95-111; Malcolm 1994: 217). The HDZ took the upswing of the JNA’s increased military pressure to fully consolidate their power and entrench their elite into the new governmental bureaucracy in the name of national security (Stokes 1993: 246).

What had emerged instead was a coinciding of strategies due to the nature of the state’s increase in confrontational militantism as there was a realisation that the strong unitaristic push would only serve to consolidate the isolated peripheral elites (Denitch 1994: 123-124). As the JNA would provide strategies based on the ability of the militias to compromise the communities, in the same way the French Resistance and Viet Cong had done (Malcolm 1994: 217). The Croatian Defence Council, Ministry for Internal Affairs and Armed Forces would similarly utilise such tactics in order to co-ordinate a response that would further polarise the anti-centralist communities behind the HDZ’s campaign for full separation (Gow 1992; Malcolm 1994: 217). War was an option left to the last, as with the re-incorporation of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, eastern Slovenia, Knin and most of the occupied Adriatic into the First (Belgrade) Army Corps, the centralist had made its intentions clear that Croatia could not leave the Federation without paying a territorial price (Letica 1996a: 105).

The mistake Milosevic made was in creating heightened levels of polarisation without intending to create space for the incorporation of some aspects of Croat civil society (Puhovski 1996: 133). By exclusively adopting a non-inclusive Serbian line a new environment was forged in which all opposition was to be defined in terms of national movement opposition. The fact that not all Yugoslav framework was paralleled to absorb these cleavages also left the Croatian national movement little option but to secede. It was in this way that they avoided a stratification of the cycle as occurred in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country.

The HDZ was now able to form a war cabinet in November, 1991, that would unite Right and Left on the periphery until the commencement of the Croat-Bosnian War in June 1992 (Tomac 1994: 35-50). This new tenuous, and short lived, alliance of prominent HSLS figure, Budisa and reformed LCC/SDP leader, Tomac, would never have occurred without the rise of overt
centralism. The state, ie, the national elite behind the centre, had created a polarising of society that could not be reversed. Croatia had succeeded where the Irish and Basques had not, due to their ability to ride the historical continuum of protests cycles, whilst simultaneously utilising the shifts from the state centre to ‘mimic’ action by action the state’s own restructuration. Never, though, did the LCC or HDZ over extend their repertoire to include VDA in times when they were in no position to exploit escalation of the conflict prior to their attaining government. When there were signs of militancy in the CRB, the periphery quickly withdrew responsibility. Even to the extent of voluntarily disarming of the CTDF in 1989 (Letica & Nobilo 1991: 63).

This would give the state little justification in directly engaging Croat society, the way the LCY had done in the wake of the Spring Movement’s collapse in 1971 as the LCS had engaged the ethnic-Albanian Kosovars in 1981, as there was seemingly no need for crisis escalation. As the JNA and LCS treaded warily, the LCC by the late 1980s had been able to utilise non-violent confrontational mobilisation to create a crisis of legitimacy within the cleavages of the competing nationalist ideologies that could solely be defined in terms of a parliamentary struggle. The Croat periphery had polarised the system rather than the cyclical struggle itself, as occurred in Northern Ireland and Spain. By the time the centre had realised this, the periphery could finally instigate their military campaign with the full knowledge that they had the full resources of the new state behind them. Thus, independence was attained with the assistance from the ‘other’.

Go To Conclusion
CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to examine the impact of the state in the reciprocal development between mobilising centralist elites and marginalised national movement peripheries. What has been examined has been the development of reciprocal centre-periphery mobilisation with the state playing a significant role in providing the raison d'être for initial movement mobilisation. Central to this thesis has been the role the state has played in forging peripheral identity, as well as its role in assisting the genesis of competing ideological frames in which resistance to further integration is based. The study of the role of the ‘cycle of protest’ and nationalism as a doctrine/repertoire of social movement action has been important in deciphering the reasoning and methods chosen by communities opting for the national movement path to mobilisation. This thesis has argued that at the core of all peripheral mobilisation is the nature of the political environment created by the state, and the subsequent cleavages that emerge from shifting state centres in the process of reform. The nature of elite control over the state has meant that peripheral movements have had to shape their own counter mobilisation according to the nature of the regime’s repression of the periphery. In effect, this thesis has provided an examination into the nature of these peripheral movements that have ‘mimicked’ the state according to the ideological premise of state formation placed before them.

Within the development of ‘Social Movement’ theory, fundamental differences have emerged between those social scientists who seek to explain oppositional movement mobilisation in terms of political opportunity structures created by enfranchising state centre’s and ‘life style’ choices that focus on a movement’s rejection of institutional means for social movement redress. Divided between the ‘Resource Mobilisation’ and ‘New Social Movement’ paradigms, both schools of thought have tended to be somewhat exclusive of the other. Whilst the former has ignored the ideational reasons behind oppositional mobilisation, the latter has ignored the significance of the state as anything but an object of derision by movements seeking a societal alternative to pre-existing state structures.

This lack of synthesis within the field has led to the minimisation of what I believe to be a significant aspect of peripheral movement mobilisation that is the role of the state in the cyclical development of elite core centres and rebellious peripheries. As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the inability of social movement theorists to
provide a syncretic analysis has led to the ignoring of the state as the shaper of all political events, both legal and illegal, within the arena of its auspices. Both political opportunity structures and the desire for a societal alternative to the state’s encroachment play an equal role in determining the nature of resistance. Yet, not one is more influential than the other. This is due to the nature of elite consolidation and peripheral rebellion which I believe to be highly reciprocal and responsive. This has led to a parallel, yet interdependent, development between state centres and peripheries due to the dynamic nature of state expansion and consolidation.

The state is far from a static entity. Thus, the tendency of social movement theorists to view state enfranchisement and consolidation as set ignores the fluid and porous nature of centre-periphery relations. As argued in chapter 3 I believe it is the very dynamic nature of state formation that is at the core of the active agency of movement mobilisation against the centre. The movement is but a response. A response to the inability or unwillingness of the state’s governing elite to incorporate certain segments of society into the overall national polity. Central to this dynamic of movement counter mobilisation is the ability of the aggrieved community to formulate an ideological construct within a given historic continuum of protest in which the periphery may frame their contestant demands. This is found within the ‘cycle of protest’ that is derivative of the state’s own process development.

Each action creates an opposite action, each frame is met by a challenging frame. What the ‘cycle of protest’ paradigm grants the social scientist is a mechanism by which movement development can be charted. It is here that I believe that the dynamic nature of centre-periphery mobilisation is shown to be a continuation of an historical process of state formation. At the core is what I call the movement’s ability to ‘mimic’ the state in order to create an opposing ideational structure of societal organisation juxtaposed to that of the official doctrine of state. This ‘mimicking’ recognises simultaneously the necessity of the state as a precursor to movement mobilisation and the fact that the oppositional movement is but a child of the state’s own movement to modernity. Hence, if the state chooses to repress the periphery in the form of capital and labour, the peripheralised community will organise in terms of workers’ movements. If the nature of the suppression is sectarian in nature, the periphery will supply a movement alternative steeped in culturo-religious symbolism. Subsequently, it follows that if the state chooses to differentiate in terms of national identity then the periphery has little choice but to challenge the state on its own terms. It is for this reason I chose to explore in
National movement mobilisation in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country and Croatia from the 1960s onwards are examples of this ‘mimicking’. Each movement has been defined by the nature of the perceived repression at the hands of their state elites. Whether or not this suppression existed, is not as important as the fact that it is felt as such. As explored in chapter 4, there has been a tendency within the discipline to ignore the dynamic nature of national movement development. The theoretical debate surrounding the successful consolidation of the modern nation-state system, in the ‘Nation-Building’ paradigm, has negated the role of so-called ‘sub-nationalities’ as means to modern movement mobilisation against the centre. This is why I believe Charles Tilly (1993b) to be correct in recognising that this has led to the subsequent failure of both national and social movement theorists to foresee the emergence of contestant nationalist ideologies throughout the ‘First’ and ‘Second’ world since the 1960s. They have wrongly presumed that the process of modern state development was complete, thus minimising the role of nationalism as an agent of social change.

Nationalism, as explored in chapters 5 & 6, has become the most effective means to mobilisation for what I have described as historic protest communities. The reasons lie in the ability of the peripheralised nation, once mobilised, to provide an historic continuum and a place within the overall development between state centre and periphery. Through exploring the ‘cyclical’ paradigm there emerges a pattern of state engendered repression-protest-repression that becomes integral in forcing the marginalised community into reaction. Yet without a strong state alternative the national movement would lack legitimacy within its own constituency. I believe this is because the state, as the creator of the conflict and fulcrum of public discontent, is necessary in defining the political ‘other’, ie, the enemy.

What develops is a reciprocal ideological movement found within the cleavages of the conflict. Two contestant ideologies that feed off each other, that would find it difficult to formulate a frame of contention without the perceived threat of the alternative. This has led to a parallel development of competing ideologies that become more exclusive with the completion of each cycle of repression-protest-repression. For a protest community seeking longevity this allows for a ritualisation of contention that allows the movement to be in a state of heightened mobilisation for as long as
the state refuses to meet their goals. Thus, the movement becomes dependent on the state to provide a target of discontent that, in not enfranchising their demands, at once allowing the movement to become important in the day to day life of the community.

The problem with this cyclical development is that if the state is not willing to grant significant political opportunity structures then there is the chance that the conflict between centre and periphery may itself become stratified. This stratification I believe is derivative of the inability of both centre and contestant movement to successfully compromise on issues of sovereignty and self-determination. Though, I believe that for the survival of the state this could be to its advantage. It is the Northern Irish example that I feel best exemplifies this stratification of the crisis that leads to little resolution, or advantage, for an entrenched elite who themselves are seeking a lasting identity. Even if it be defined in opposition to the periphery.

In adopting what I called in chapter 6 a “consecutive study” for the forthcoming six empirical chapters on the Irish Republican, Basque separatist and Croatian national movements I desired to show the machinations of this stratification of crisis vis-à-vis the reciprocal development of state centre and periphery ideological movements of state. The premise I put forward was that for a movement to be successful it had to successfully mobilise their community against the state within the cleavages that emerge from state expansion and consolidation. Central to this development is the ability of the movement to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the state, in its current form, in providing any framework for the resolution of the community’s demands. This may be achieved by challenging the state directly, through utilising cyclical processes of reform to equate current discontent with those of the past. A scenario that grants the periphery an historic continuity of their own defined in the nature of state repression against them, which in turn plants the seed for future rebellion. Once this is achieved there emerges a polarisation of society in which the minority, now continuing the desire for protecting their cultural separateness from the ‘other’, can no longer look to the centre for resolution.

Societal polarisation hence provides the leverage for continuous action. Yet, if the state remains in control of the reform process then little opportunity may be created for the active involvement in policy formation of the alternate movement. The solution is to engage the state at the same level they have in the past engaged the periphery. The state must be ‘mimicked’, rather than mirrored as mirroring implies reflective passivity. In the process of ‘mimicking’ the movement attempts to copy each action of the
state in order to escalate their contention, yet simultaneously parodies the state in a bid to attain a sense of autonomy. Whilst recognising the impossibility of the movement initiating reform, the movement nonetheless recognises the necessity of influencing the processes of reform through placing continuous pressure upon the state in periods of lull in the overall cycle of reform-protest-reform. This may be achieved by escalating the crisis, yet not the conflict itself.

National movement mobilisation, hence, becomes an agent of opposition that not only challenges the state’s inability to enfranchise peripheral demands, but also provides an ideological alternative. In this sense the concept of the nation itself is an extension of the state’s expansion of repertoire to incorporate cultural, social and political integration. Yet, it is when the movement commences to ‘mimic’ the state’s own repressive arm that I believe the desired polarisation of society may run the risk of isolating the militant wing of the national movement from the political opportunity structures of state. If the state elite, in turn, opts to enfranchise certain aspects of the rebel community and isolate other sections, there emerges the opportunity of the centre to divide the militants from its support base, as the periphery now view the reforms themselves as sufficient in dealing with the initial demands.

Consequently, this leads to the intractability of the conflict, in which the state itself gains greater legitimacy as the keeper of public order, as counter-movements define themselves, in terms of the conflict, as perpetual challengers to the centre. This is a reciprocation of identity formation that continues the historic enmities rather than resolves them. However, it may be enough to minimise the support base of the extremists, and thus, placing the state at the centre of any future conflict resolution as the legitimate voice of one of the competing communities. Thus, for secession to occur the national movement must polarise the communities and somehow avoid challenging the state to the extent where the centre sees benefits for itself in partaking in an overall process of reform.

Chapters 7 and 8 provide an insight into how the state may seek to reshape itself without necessarily threatening its own identity. The IRA are a response to the innately chauvinistic methods in which the Protestant state elite chose to put down competing ideas of statehood. Yet it has been the ability of the Ulster elite to at once slowly enfranchise variant Catholic groups such as the SDLP, as well as foster a Protestant militancy in response to IRA attacks on the UDA, that has enabled them to force upon the peripheral Catholics the notion that Protestant/Ulster state identity is as
legitimate as that of the Republic of Ireland. Nevertheless, the nature of the state’s insistence on countering terrorism with counter-insurgency served to radicalise much of the Catholic community against any compromise. Thus, any positives gained by the Ulster state in acceding to the demands of the NICRA have been nullified by their desire to eliminate the IRA from the political process. This has led to the parallel development of two mutually exclusive ideologies of state that could only be resolved through the attainment of joint rule on the side of the Ulster elite and the recognition of the right of the Protestants to have a statelet independent of the south or the incorporation of the majority Protestant north into a restructured Republic of Ireland. Both solutions seem unlikely as such a solution would still not cover those Catholics living in predominantly Protestant areas and vice versa.

Hence, the mistakes of 1922, 1969 and 1975 would be repeated, as both communities have clearly defined themselves in terms of the ‘Troubles’ rather than within their movements themselves. What has developed has been the identification of the movement with its actions rather than its own sense of community. Out of this a permanent militancy emerges by which the IRA cannot be satiated within the preexisting state and hence the ‘Troubles’, in my opinion, will continue to spiral out of control as long as the IRA sees little change occurring to the Union between the province and the mainland. The fact is, due to memories forged in previous cycles of reform-protest-reform, the majority of Catholics have failed to see the Ulster and British states as a viable solution to their demands. As such they will continue to rebel. Yet, unlike the past there is now a prominent Protestant counter identity that is Irish, not British, that has emerged from the crisis. One that would itself continue the cycle of violence if an ‘All-Ireland’ solution is proffered.

A similar stratification of the crisis has occurred within the Spanish state. State repression created peripheral response. Yet, the level of violent reciprocity between the state and ETA has been outweighed by the ability of the Spanish state to enfranchise a reluctant Basque community through the realisation of the Francoist elite that only through democratisation of government could a full scale confrontation be avoided. This has by the 1990s led to the alienation of ETA from much of its popular support base. Consecutive UCD and PSOE Governments have realised the necessity of granting autonomy within a general Spanish framework in order to placate the moderate nationalist community. In general this has worked. Though, in my opinion, the state lost
the opportunity for lasting peace through the insistence of the PSOE and Spanish Security Forces of waging a clandestine war against ETA activists throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

This intensification of centralist pressure on ETA has raised much doubt within the Basque community of the willingness of the state to accept Basque opinion if it should ever contradict the centre’s view of how the Spanish state should be ideologically and politically structured. The state, in its insistence of eliminating one wing of the overall Basque movement, is opening a window of opportunity for ETA to sow the seeds of future rebellion. ETA, schooled in the strategy of action-reaction-action, may yet be able to survive. Relevance for its militancy is after all dependent on its ability, through deed of action, to portray the state as intolerant to any formation of Basque dissidence. The emergence of the Parti di Popular and its new campaign of arresting HB activists can only prolong ETA’s existence. Yet no matter what the circumstance, the Spanish state in general has successfully redefined its own identity to become a more pluralistic and inclusive ideology. This, in my mind demonstrates the significance of the state as the definer of the socio-political environment in which conflict occurs. The very fact that the state recognised the need to absorb these cleavages, rather than isolate peripheral demands, has led it to survive its social movement challenge. Suggesting that for the peripheral nation militant to survive there is a need for a repressive regime to justify a continuance state of mobilisation that the national movement demands.

State repression hence is at the core of peripheral militancy. Without state encroachment there is little justification for peripheral mobilisation. When the state chooses to absorb the disparate groups and demands, it lessens the justification for oppositional mobilisation. Yet, as I have shown in chapters 11 and 12 on Yugoslavia, if the state remains intransigent, and unwilling to hear counter demands then there is little option left for the periphery but to ride the cycles of reform until the goal of independence is attained. Herein lies the reasons for the successful attainment of statehood by the Croatian political periphery. That is, without the exclusive nationalism of Milosevic there is little doubt that the move to autonomy by the LCC and the HDZ would not have been achieved. Milosevic and the LCS failed in not providing a rhetoric that could include disparate Croats. The last chance of reform was in the hands of the Markovic Government.

Yet, with the move of the centre to counter peripheral discontent with the fostering of a new ethno-centric centralist state ideological movement, the periphery would be forced to ‘mimic’ the centre in
order to proffer an alternate movement for the survival of their own community. Where the Croats were able to succeed where the Irish and Basque could not, had more to do with the lack of any political opportunity structure created by the centre than anything to do with their own initiative. Though, it must be recognised that the choice early on in 1967 not to engage in open militancy allowed for Croatian voices to be represented within the structures of power well after past movement activism had been suppressed. This placed the Croatians in a position to be able to exploit any future opportunities that emerged from future redefinition of centre-periphery relations. The ability to ‘mimic’ the centre without necessarily physically challenging the state enabled the periphery to formulate an alternate society that had already created the infrastructure necessary to secede. A point bourn out in the rapidity in which the HDZ consolidated the national movement within the new Croatian state after the first Republican elections of 1990. By the time the centre reacted it was too late, as the means to absorbing the periphery could no longer be found in a new Yugoslav state ideology steeped in anti-pluralistic rhetoric.

The development of successful national movement mobilisation is hence dependent on the very state structure that it opposes in the first place. It is the state through the way it chooses to expand and consolidate which provides the reasoning behind oppositional mobilisation. Movements are responsive entities of collective demands that maintain agency through remaining relevant as focal points of peripheral discontent with the overarching structures of state rule. When the state is repressive, the movement responds likewise; when it opens opportunity structures, the periphery tends to explore the path to enfranchisement. As such national movements are responses to preconditions of state enfranchisement based on one’s own national identity. It is within this very continuum of dynamic reciprocal centre-periphery development that cycles develop two competing, mutually exclusive ideological movements. Their saliency within the modern world however, lies in their ability to grant protest communities a sense of longevity unattainable to more conventional forms of social movement organisation. The national movement is hence an ideological construct that provides a point of opposition to the state centre’s own notion of societal development towards modernity.

While this dissertation does not claim to proffer a more complete theoretical solution to the reasons behind national movement mobilisation, it has nevertheless, heightened the need for a more syncretic solution that would include a convergence of ‘Social Movement’ and ‘Nation-Building’ theories. The solution to this
need for a convergence of political opportunity structures and social alternatives needs to be found within a more dynamic paradigm. A dynamic solution which can be found in the cyclical development of state centre and periphery relations, as parallel, yet interdependent, movements to political organisation. One cannot survive without the other, as each movement by the state is countered by the periphery. A countering of strategy that allows the national movement to ‘mimic’ the state to the point of proffering a new state alternative, ideologically juxtaposed to the original state structure. Hence, the ‘other’, ie, the ideological opposition, plays a significant role in the perpetual development of state, and as such the state as the raison d’être and target of social movement mobilisation should never be diminished. For in ignoring the significance of a strong state centre in formulating peripheral counter-mobilisation, one runs the risk of negating the cause of the rise of many a national movement in contemporary Europe.

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Competing National Ideologies

—End notes—

Introduction

1) Basque Land and Freedom.

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2) From here on in the state, within the context of this thesis, will be defined as the overarching political structure of institutions of governance controlled by a numerically dominant parliamentary or governing elite. Thus, the state is the space in which both the centre and periphery seek to redress their claims and counter-claims.

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3) The reason I have chosen the term ‘mimicking’ as opposed to ‘mirroring’ implies a passive reflection of another’s movement. Hence suggesting the movement is but a secondary image of the state. ‘Mimicking’ suggests less passivity and greater interpretive free will, as it is an act of repeating the action of the ‘other with the added weight of implementing one’s own interpretation of the initial action. It is thus both an interpretive and critical action. For deciphering the inapplicability of the ‘mirroring’ analogy to a study of dynamic organisations such as nationalist social movements, sue to its innate passivity, I am indebted to my supervisor Dr Diarmuid Maguire of the University of Sydney Department of Government and Public Administration.

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4) Throughout this thesis the Movimiento Nacional will be referred to as the Movimiento.

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5) Author’s italics.

Back to Chapter

6) Author’s italics.

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7) Author’s italics.
8) The Basque Nationalist Party is the English translation of Partido Nacionalista Vasco, hence the abbreviation PNV.

9) This was due to age of many of those involved rather than the consequences of war. Though as the period of the Croat-Bosnian War of the summer 1993 would prove, war would be the reason for my inability to gain interviews past this date.

10) Meaning ‘Popular Unity’ would become the political wing of ETA.

11) ‘Basque Solidarity’.

Chapter I

1) When talking of political opportunity structures I am referring to Tarrow’s (1996: 54) definition of political opportunity structures being the “consistent- but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national- signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movement.”

2) The ‘Long May’ is the term given to the continuous anti-statist social movement activism that emerged throughout Italy in May 1968 that would not end until moves were made to incorporate the Broad Italian Left into the government by the end of 1971 (see Lumley 1990; della Porta 1995; della Porta and Rucht 1995).

3) Which will be the subject of Chapters Four, Five and Six of this Dissertation.
Chapter II

1) This will be discussed more fully in chapters 4 and 5 of this Dissertation, on the development of nationalist movement protest opposition to dynamic state-centre and movement-periphery development.

Chapter III

No end notes in this chapter.

Chapter IV

1) Though, in the Balkan context, Gramsci (1989: 105) recognised this side of national movements, claiming that the problem with the post-Versailles Yugoslav state was its inorganic structures attempting to withhold the development of communal peripheries that were organic in structure.

2) Though, as Greenfeld (1993b: 49) has pointed out, the concept of the nation in some cases may indeed preclude the formation of the nation state as in the case of the Henrician aristocratic elite’s ascension to power after the battle of Bosforth Field. Whereby, a sense of Englishness, emerged, before the foundation of an administratively definitive English state entity.

3) The prime example of this shift away from nationalist rhetoric once the goal of statehood has been attained has occurred with the election victories in Poland in 1996 and Lithuania in 1994, of party political organisations that are defined along class, rather than national, specific platforms. This, in my opinion, suggests that Tilly (1993b) is correct in pointing to the significance of nationalism’s agency as a movement to societal liberation, rather than a doctrine of established Great Nation-states.
Chapter V

1) The reconquista was the name given to the Catholic revolt against Moorish-Islamic rule and reincorporation of the Iberian Peninsula into Christendom. Populist in nature, the reconquista commenced with the victory of the Christian forces at the Battle of Tours in 732 and was completed with the absorption of the Emirate of Grenada into the Dual Crown of Castile and Aragon. It was to prove an effective tool of mobilisation against the foreign oppressor that would be utilised both against the Ottomans, as well as against the Absolutist integrative state by peripheral national communities of Western Europe (see Wallerstein et al. 1979; Arango 1985: 137).

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2) Ur-nazion is a phrase that emerged from the Romantic period within nineteenth century German philosophy. Taking the German prefix Ur, meaning the ‘first’ or ‘prime’, and adding it to the noun die Nazion ‘nation’, it alludes to the notion of the primordial nation. When used by Hegel and Fichte it was often utilised to define those nations that held they were ‘historic’ forebears to the contemporary ‘Great Nation States’ such as the yet to be unified Germans, French and Italians (Tilly 1975b: 10-12).

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3) Bauer’s Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Österreich and Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemocratie would be highly influential on Edvard Kardelj, the League of Communist of Yugoslavia official party dialetician, and Tito’s restructuring of the Yugoslav state through implementing a Socialist Federal Republic based on the equality of all constituent nationalities within their republican borders (Brooke-Shepherd 1997: 172).

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4) Interview, no.3.

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Chapter VI

1) A marriage of revolutionary doctrinism and political enfranchisement that stems from the rise of anti-centralist movements in America from 1775 to 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789.

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2) Author’s italics.

3) See, Anthony Smith (1987: 51) on the Uruk rebellion in Sumer against the Zagros mountain tribes in the Third Millennium BC; and Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1969b: 7) on thirteenth and fourteenth centuries European Mediaeval ethnic mobilisation as examples of the innateness of ethnic political mobilisation between centre and periphery in pre-industrial times.

Chapter VII

1) Throughout the rest of this thesis I will utilise the term the ‘Troubles’ to describe the militarisation conflict within Northern Ireland between the Republican Catholic community and the Protestant state elite that has emerged since 1969. Though, colloquial in origin it has become a standard term used to describe the conflict within the literature and amongst the participants themselves as demonstrated in Coogan (1996).

2) The Republic of Ireland.

3) Interview, no. 2.

4) Interview, no. 4.

5) I am indebted to Professor Henry Patterson of the University of Ulster for pointing this out to me in his original examinor’s report of this thesis.

6) This work by a young Captain Frank Kitson would become somewhat prescient as by 1973 the tactics espoused within this work gained from his experiences in fighting for the state against the colonial liberationist rebellion of the Mau Mau would be implemented in Northern Ireland. Kitson’s counter-insurgency would play a key role in radicalising protestant paramilitary’s and escalating the active involvement of the British Army in...
confronting the IRA directly. His thesis (1960) stated that for a settler society to survive the transitory stages of decolonisation they would have to control the overall cycle of reform-repression-reform through eradicating the periphery’s ability to respond to increased pressures emanating from the centre.

7) Interview, no. 2.

8) Interview, no.3.

9) Interview, no.4.

10) Interview, no. 3.

11) In fact Tim Pat Coogan (1996: 125) would come to call the UDA a ‘mirror’ movement of the IRA, which augments my argument that often the very identity of the state elite is as much formed within the cyclical reciprocity of parallel centre and periphery development. Even, as in the case of the UDA this may be for purely strategic defence reasons.

12) The then member for Wickham.

13) Interview, no. 3.

14) Interview, no. 3.

15) Interview, no. 1.

16) The Green Book (1971) was to become known as the Provisional IRA’s Bible. The Green Book was to play a similar role to Krutwig’s (1963) Vasconia and Zabilde’s (1963) Insurrección en
Euskadi in the formulation of the strategy of cyclical engagement of the state. The direct confrontation strategy was to be replaced by that of clandestine urban insurrection steeped in the traditions of combing anti-colonial and urban resistance into a nationalist front defined in direct opposition to the state.

Chapter VIII

1) A shift in strategy to create greater dialogue that Sean Farren, the SDLP’s Justice Spokesperson, intimated to me was the only way that Hume could convince the British of the necessity to include the IRA in any future negotiations. The difficulties Hume faced lay in the unwillingness of the British Army to accept the fluidity of support that exists between the moderates and extremists of the Republican movement. Hume had realised that any ignoring of the IRA would be viewed too simplistic for the cause of the “Troubles” still lay in the ability of the Catholics to trust an Ulster elite that they perceived were ultimately colonialistic in nature (Interview, no. 4).

2) Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland.

3) Interview, no. 4.

4) Interview, no. 3.

5) Interview, no. 2.

6) Interview, no. 1.

7) Interview, no. 3.

8) Interview, no. 1.
9) Interview, no.2.

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10) The period when this thesis was completed.

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Chapter IX

1) ETA is the abbreviation for the term Euskadi `ta Askatasuna (Basque Land and Freedom).

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2) Castilianisation is to be taken as the historic development of Spanish state centralisation based around the formalisation of the legal codes of the Cortes of Castile and León throughout the Middle Ages during the reconquista. It refers to the cultural, legal, social, economic and political standardisation and consolidation of the monarchist state based around its epicentre at predominantly Castilian Madrid. A socio-political process of integration that would become the core of Spanish state development until the transition to democracy and the Pact of Moncloa on June 15 and October 25 1977 respectively. A Process that David T. Gies (1999: 31) calls an “emergence and evolution of nationalist histiography in Spain.” In no way is it to be associated with the ‘racist’ doctrine established Sabino Arana Goiri at the head of the Basque national movement at the end of the 19th century (called Aranism) in his 1892 publication Bizcaya por su independencia. In fact, ETA as movement has long shed any links with the Basque Right and has adopted a Marxist ideological stance towards radical Basque national revolution. So much so that I propose that contemporary radical Basque Nationalist ideology is a ‘mimic’ of this Castilian centred histiography of Spanish national movement ideology of state.

Back to Chapter

3) The Basque National Party translates into Spanish as Partido Nacionalista Vasco, hence the abbreviation PNV.

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4) Within the Basque Country Euzko Gaztedi has been abbreviated to EGI. This abbreviation is used throughout the Basque Country specifically for the youth wing of the PNV based within the Spanish state, as opposed to those in exile, throughout the Francoist era. It is derivative of the full name of the organisation Euzko
Gaztedi del Interior (Basque youth from the interior).

5) Both the ORT and LKI were to form the core of pro-Spanish Leftist terrorist movements that grew out of the discontent with the racial and extreme nationalist rhetoric of the PNV and ETA.

6) Interview, no. 5.

7) Franquismo, is the term given to the bureaucratic nature of Franco’s rule, which became the strategic core of the ideological expansion of bureaucratic centralism upon the Spanish periphery under the direct influence of the cult of Franco’s personality.

8) Solidarity of Basque Workers.

9) Alliance of Syndicates of the Basque Country.

10) Interview, no. 5.

11) Lenda-kari is the official title of the President of the Basque Government.

12) Krutwig published Vasconia under the pseudonym Sarrailh de Ihartza, for security reasons.

13) By 1970 Kominstak (Communist) would shed its Basque nationalist identity to become a pan-Iberian communist revolutionary movement under the name of the Communist Movement of Spain. Due to the traditional strong working class support of the Spanish Communist and Socialist Parties they failed to attract much support outside of the Basque Country. The ridding of their nationalist ideology would also see a sharp decline in their support amongst the Basque population that was schooled in a state
repression steeped in nationalist chauvinism, hence the new anti-nationalist rhetoric of ETA-Berri was considered irrelevant to the cause of their collective repression.

14) Interview, no.6.

15) Continuismo, is the term given to the desire of the Falangists and other Rightist parties to continue with the development of franquismo as the central ideology of state once Franco died. The aim was a minimum restructuring of the political system that would incorporate sections of the periphery on the proviso that centralisation and Castilianisation would remain at the heart of the state’s development.

16) Interview, no.9.

17) EE is the abbreviation for the term Euskadiko Ezkerra, that translates as the Basque Left.

18) Both movements were children of the radical ETA movement and hence embodied two varying strategies of the same militantism. The rise of both movements will be dealt with later in this chapter.

19) Interview, no. 7.

20) Herri Batasuna is the Basque phrase for ‘Basque unity’ and is symbolic of the goals of ETA that are steeped in nationalist and socialist rhetoric, as well as the desire creating a homogeneous national movement in strategy and ideology.

21) Interview, no. 8.
Chapter X

1) Interview, no. 9.

2) The impuesto revolucionario was a tax of 15% placed upon the business class of the Basque Country by ETA. The goal was to create a financial resource that could rival that of the states whilst simultaneously implicating much of the business community to the revolutionary struggle that most opposed.

3) Interview, no. 7.

4) Interview, no. 5.

5) The Liberation Anti-Terrorist Groups is the translation of Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, hence the abbreviation GAL.

6) Basque Solidarity is a translation of the term Euzko Alkartasuna-Solidaridad Vasca, hence the abbreviation EA.

7) Interview, no. 10.

8) Interview, no. 6.

9) Interview, no.5.

Chapter XI

1) Interview, no. 11.

2) Interview, no. 11.
3) The North is the term often given to the predominately Catholic, former Habsburg provinces, of Croatia and Slovenia. In terms of Yugoslav economic development, it is also used as a sarcastic reference to the economic inequality between the wealthier northern Republics and economically deprived southern Republics; as in the ‘Global North’, ie, the First World, and the ‘Global South’ the Second World.

4) Interview, no. 16.

5) Interview, no. 13.

6) Croatian Peasant Party is the translation for Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka, hence the abbreviation HSS.

7) Interview, no. 18.

8) The Croatian Democratic Community is a translation of Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, hence the abbreviation HDZ.

9) The Yugoslav Peoples Army is a translation of Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, hence the abbreviation JNA.

10) The Croat People’s Resistance is the translation for Hrvatski Narodni Otpor, hence the abbreviation HNO.

11) The Yugoslav Internal Security Services is the common English translation for the Croatian and Serbian term Uprava drzavne bezbednosti, hence the abbreviation UDB.

12) The Croatian Liberation Movement is the translation for Hrvatski Oslobilacki Pokret, hence the abbreviation HOP.
13) Interview, no. 14.

14) Interview, no. 13.

15) Interview, no. 19.

16) Interview, no. 17.

17) Interview, no. 17.

18) This information was confided in me by Miko Tripalo during our interview.

19) Interview, no. 18.

Chapter XII

1) The protegé of Ivan Stambolic, whom he met at University, Milosevic followed his mentor from position to position until his own ascendancy to power in 1987. Originally director at ‘Tehnogas’ Petroleum Company and ‘Beobanka’, the central bank of Belgrade, Milosevic would soon become the architect of the new state unitarism that was to emerge from Belgrade in response to the demands for greater liberalisation of the state centre. However, his role as a Serbian nationalist did not truly come to the fore until 1987 (see Djukic 1992; Letica 1996a: 103).

2) From the commencement of his manipulation of the Kosovo myth Milosevic directed much of his energies to ensuring that the rallies were controlled expressions of political discontent, tied to his own ambitions of restructuring the state. The key of controlling the rise of state engendered movement mobilisation was the ‘professional protesters’ employed for these rallies. Consisting, in
the main, of the unemployed, Milosevic would pay them in food for attending each rally (Glenny 1992: 34).

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3) The utilisation of such blatantly Monarchist symbols was to cause great controversy. In Croatia, the Serbian alliteration of this phrase in the form of four Cyrillic esses placed within a cross was considered a sign of ultra-nationalism. The fears of Serbian hegemonism were further highlighted that the cross and four esses were often placed in the middle of flags carried by Chetnik forces throughout World War Two in areas captured from Croatian Ustasha and Partisan forces. It was a sign that federal equality was far from the minds of the architects of the proposed new Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1994: 213).

Back to Chapter

4) Interview, no. 19.

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5) Garasanin has been recognised as the political father of the ‘Greater Serbian “ state ideology. A Minister for the Interior between 1843 to 1852, during the reign of Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic, Garasanin’s work Nacertanije would provide much of the reasoning behind the expansionist policies of the post World War One Monarchist elite and the World War Two Chetnik movement. It’s main theme was the recognition for the necessity of forming a unitarist state to ensure the continued protected development of all historical Southern Slav national ideological movements into one state entity. At the core was placing Serbian population in the position of cultural, political and social predominance within this new centralist state (see MacKenzie 1985, 1982).

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6) Renowned as the philological standardiser of the Serbian language in 1820, Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, would become recognised as the cultural founder of the ‘Greater Serbian” ideology. Serbs All and Everywhere significance arose from its claim that all Southern Slavonic linguist groups that were similar to contemporary Serbian were derivative of the same people who had come under varying influences after a millennium of foreign occupation. This would be manipulated by successive centralist governments as the cultural justification for the minimisation of the rights of the Croats and other communities to the right of separate
national development (see Wilson 1970; Lampe 1996: 61).

7) Interview, no. 11.

8) New Slovenian Art, or Neue Slowenische Kunst, adopted the German phrasing in an attempt to demonstrate their direct opposition to the expansive LCS policies. Amongst the Croats and Slovenes this German phrasing was alluding to the Habsburg origins of the North. The idea was to associate any social and movement activism with the continuous tradition of independent Central European civil societal development. Thus placing peripheral movement development into an historic continuum.

9) New European Order, or Novi Evropski Poredak, would become the Croatian coalition of activists that would employ the similar Central European origins of Croat civil society.

10) Interview, no. 14.

11) Interview, no. 15.

12) Vuk Draskovic was to become the leader of the Serbian Movement for National Renewal which flagrantly utilised Chetnik Movement symbols throughout their public rallies. By the winter of 1996 and 1997 Draskovic would become the democratic hope of Serbia with his involvement in the protest activism that was geared towards removing the Milosevic government in the wake of electoral tampering during the November council elections for Belgrade (see Ramet 1995: 421; Lampe 1996: 340; Tanner 1997: 270).

13) Interview, no. 19.

14) Interview, no. 11.
15) In June 1991 Janez Jansa, as Slovenia’s first post-communist Minister for Defence, would become the strategic architect of the Slovenian Government’s military campaign against the JNA. Interestingly, he noted that it was his time in prison that convinced him of the necessity of preparing for a military campaign; due to the nature of the repressiveness of the regime. As such, he spent the majority of his time in prison researching books on military strategy published by the JNA (Tanner 1997: 239).

16) Start a soft porn magazine/periodical renowned as a medium for expressing the “unofficial” views of the LCC.

17) DEMOS is the common acromyn used by the nationalist democratic movement grouped under the title of the Slovenian Democratic Alliance.

18) Interview, no. 17.

19) The Croatian Social Liberal Party is a translation of Hrvatska Socijalno Liberalna Stranka, hence the abbreviation HSLS.

20) The Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative is a translation of Udruga Jugoslavenske Demokratske Inicijative, hence the abbreviation UJDI.

21) The Serbian Democratic Party is a translation of Srpska Demokratska Stranka, hence the abbreviation SDS.

22) Interview, no. 13.

23) The Coalition of National Understanding is the translation of Koalicija Narodnog Sporazuma, hence the abbreviation KNS.
24) The fact that the JNA also provided access to much needed education and employment for people from the underdeveloped regions of the Krajina, Montenegro and Southern Serbia, also provided a reason for many ethnic Serbs to view the JNA as a protector of the privileges that come with adhering to the unitarist doctrine (Remington 1978: 181-199; Denitch 1994: 40-41).

25) In fact much the newly reformed Serbian Socialist Party of Slobodan Milosevic was more successful in engaging the Kosovo Liberation Army militants under the leadership of Jakup Krasniqi to openly engage in terrorist activity on Yugoslav soil in the summer of 1996, prior to the commencement of all out war in 1998 (Malcolm 1998: 355).

Conclusion

No end notes in this chapter.
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The references are divided into two lists. The first list consists of published material, including books, biographies; academic journal, newspaper and magazine articles; unpublished theses, conference papers and documentary video titles. The second consists of archival material that includes movement and party political policy statements, magazines, research papers; government treaties, statutes and constitutions.

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Appendix 1: INTERVIEWS

Interviews
(Interview number for referencing throughout the text, name or pseudonym where relevant, date of interview, position at time of interview, and previous positions relevant to thesis topic).

Northern Ireland
Taped interviews:

1. Atwood, Alex 5.12.1995 SDLP Councillor for the Upper Falls Road, Representative to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation.


**Basque Country**

**Taped interviews:**

5. Etxebarria, Jose Maria 22.12.1995 PNV Councillor for Bilbao, Head of Department for Human Resources.

6. Rodriguez, Carlos 27.12.1995 Deputy Head of Herri Batasuna and Member of Executive, Economics Director.


**Annotated interviews:**


**Croatia**

**Taped interviews:**

11. Gotovac, Vlado 3.1.1992 President of Matica Hrvatska and Vice President HSLS, Member Matica Hrvatska and Hrvatski Tjednik (Croatian Weekly) Editorial Board.


14. Budisa, Drazen 10.1.1992 President of HSLS, President of Student Union of Croatia during Spring Movement.


17. Cicak, Ivan Zvonimir 17.1.1992 President of the HSS,

Annotated interviews:

18. Tripalo, Miko 9.1.1992 President of KNS and HNS, Party Secretary of the LCC and President of the Croatian Republic.