TREATING IDENTITY AS A VARIABLE:
MEASURING THE CONTENT, INTENSITY, AND CONTESTATION
OF IDENTITY

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1. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY

The concept of identity seems to be all the rage now in the social sciences. A critical focus of "process-oriented" scholarship concerns why and how the social groups to which we belong — whether ethnic, national, or transnational — influence the knowledge, interpretations, beliefs, preferences, and strategies, that underlie both our individual and collective behavior. In addition, it appears that scholars have come to recognize that much discourse by actors is, broadly speaking, identity discourse; that is, actors use particular adjectives that describe the self and others in order to achieve goals, and these articulated self descriptions also serve as motivations for behavior.

It is accurate to say, however, that there is not much consensus on how to define identity; nor is there consistency in the procedures used for determining the content and scope of identity; nor is there agreement on where to look for evidence that identity indeed affects knowledge, interpretations, beliefs, preferences, and strategies; nor is there agreement on how identity affects these components of action. At its simplest, the problem is that in social science there is no consensus on how to treat identity as a variable. Not that we should fetishize consensus — but its absence reflects the dearth of work on some basic questions about how to conceptualize and study identity. We prefer to put the problem this way: If identity is a key independent variable explaining political, economic, and social behavior, how does it vary, why does it vary, and how would one know variation if one saw it?

This paper outlines our initial thoughts on treating identity as a variable. It is part of a longer-term project to develop conceptualizations of identity and, more importantly, to develop technologies for observing identity and identity change that will have wide application in the social sciences. Heretofore the usual techniques for analyzing identity have consisted of non-replicable discourse analysis or lengthy individual interviews, at one extreme, or the use of large-N surveys at the other. Yet, much social science research relies on historical and contemporaneous texts. Specifically we hope to develop computer-aided quantitative and qualitative methods for analyzing a large number of textual sources in order to determine the content, intensity, and contestation of individual and collective identities at any particular point in time and space. These methods will allow researchers to use identity in a more rigorous and replicable way as an independent (and dependent) variable in a wide variety of research projects. They will also allow more rigorous testing among identity-based hypotheses — such as those drawing on social identity theory, role theory, or cognitive theories — along with other variables in explaining behavior. Researchers may also be able to develop early warning indicators that might be used to track growing intensity of out-group differentiation, a development which makes subjected groups more susceptible to identity-based mobilization for conflict. Perhaps most important, scholars will, using these methods, be able to observe more systematically the contestation and construction of identity over time.

This paper is mainly a 'brush clearing' exercise where we try to systematize the problems in the ways identity has heretofore been studied, and sketch out a range of plausible solutions. We begin with an outline of the potential value of identity as a variable and its growing popularity in social science research. We then move to a discussion of two analytical problems in the treatment of identity — definition, and theories of action that inhere in different definitions of identity. The paper then looks at the methodological options for the more rigorous treatment of identity. Here we define the dimensions along which identities can vary and offer examples of four techniques for observing these dimensions: discourse analysis, cognitive mapping, surveys, and quantitative content analysis.

2. THE GROWTH OF IDENTITY RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

2.1 Issues in Social Science that Identity Can Address

Fundamental to this project is the claim that the concept of identity is critical to understanding many of the important issues of our time. In addressing the building blocks of social, political, and economic life, our thanks to Erin Jenne for excellent research assistance.

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identity has been used to explain individual behavior as well as collective action. Moreover, identity has been used to account for discrete outcomes, at both macro and micro levels, and it has also figured prominently in studies of longer term processes of institutional development.

Some current or potential applications of identity analysis include:

- accounting for the unexpected empirical frequency of collective action. According to identity-based hypotheses, collective behavior is motivated by the self-esteem derived from acting in ways consistent with one's self-identity or by the desire to maximize status markers from an identity group. Moreover, knowledge of the distribution of identity-intensity may allow researchers to predict when social movements will reach a take-off or tipping point and when they may fizzle out.

- accounting for variation in the revolutionary potential among classes in a society, as part of an explanation for macro-historical change. In explaining the degree of class conflict in a society, for example, historians increasingly emphasize the values inherent in the moral community of the working class, such as accepted notions of dignity and honor, and the degree to which these conflict with prevailing elite values and behavior.

- accounting for outcomes in "contentious politics" — including social movements and protests, studies of more violent action, including riots and ethnic conflict, as well as studies of territorial politics, including separatism and nationalism — where existing theories such as resource mobilization or rational expectations of material gain are inadequate.

- understanding how party identification and development as well as interest group formation leads to institutional development — perhaps the fundamental process of politics. Identity has also become increasingly important to understanding variation in the development of economic institutions.

- understanding how different state identities will designate as appropriate different kinds of relations between government, society and business. A "welfare state" identity implies that certain kinds of social protection are legitimate while a "developmental state" identity, premised on a different relationship between state and business, implies that they are not.

- understanding the creation of security communities or the evolution of peaceful coexistence in state dyads. In security communities the factors that prevent defection are not institutional per se, but are based on the development of shared notions of in-group identification where interaction has literally eliminated defection (war) as a possibility — where there exists the "impossibility of imagining violence."

- accounting for the creation of "insecurity communities" where realpolitik practice prevails (that is, where foreign policies among states stress danger and the competitiveness of the external world, and where violent threats and actions are considered legitimate). These can be explained as emanating from identity construction, rather than structural anarchy or human nature. Such a hypothesis is based on a basic proposition from social identity theory (SIT), namely, that the process of in-group identity creation by

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3 This is particularly true of work on the Russian Revolution. See Bonnell 1980; and Siegelbaum and Suny 1994.
4 See, for example, Stokes 1995; Rouhana 1997; Leff 1997; and Herrera 2001.
5 For classic treatments on identification with political parties, see Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; and Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1964. For an attempt to use social identity theory to measure the relationship between identity and other types of variables, see Hooper 1976, 154-164.
6 For example, in explaining economic institutional development in East-Asia, and in particular, Japanese management strategies, William Ouchi argued that consensual decision making and the promotion of social units as opposed to individuals was an expression of Japanese "groupness." See Ouchi 1982.
7 Katzenstein shows how cross-national variations in identity lead to different concepts of domestic and national security and the appropriate relationships between state coercive capacity and society. See Katzenstein 1996.
8 On security communities, see Adler and Barnett 1999. On state identities and state practices in general, including national security policies, see Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 33-75.
necessity requires, or leads to, the devaluation of out-groups. Hence the creation of in-group identity will tend to produce conflictual behavior with out-groups.

- accounting for why states chose to participate in some international institutions while refraining from others. Often these choices are framed in identity language — to which community does a state belong, and what behaviors, including institutional memberships, are appropriate for membership in that community.\(^9\)

- explaining variation in the intensity of ethnic conflict. Some argue that ethnic conflict and national identity are particularly intense where ethnic identity coincides with class, status or religious identity. On the other hand, students of communist regimes have attempted to explain the surprising lack of class hostility found in survey data by arguing that the popular dichotomy between "we" (the vast majority of the population) and "they" (the Party nomenklatura) attenuates class identity and hostility.\(^10\)

- shedding light on discrete outcomes such as voting behavior. Kaufman and Zuckermann have explained public support for economic reform in Mexico, not only by traditional "pocketbook concerns" but also by socio-tropic evaluations including "subjective perceptions of well being" and expectations and retrospective judgments, as well as by "group loyalties and political cues."\(^11\)

- furthering our understanding of the relationship between "political culture" and democratic outcomes. For example, in explaining the "democratic peace," identity-based theories posit that actors in democracies "know" that actors in other democracies are the type who prefer negotiation and mediation to conflict. Thus, democratic actors reason that actors in other democracies are "like us." Hence, one can expect security dilemmas not to exist (or to weakly exist) among democracies, with all the behavioral implications this entails.\(^12\)

- understanding how governments interpret economic activity within self and other. Basic identification of another government as friend or enemy will affect how economic interdependence is valorized. Historical memory and the prevailing construction of national identity will affect how one government interprets the acts of another on the social purposes of economic policy.\(^13\)

- accounting for cross-national variation in the business practices of firms. Identity may influence the time horizons of political and economic actors. It is widely recognized that Japanese firms have sought market share more than profitability in markets outside of Japan during Japan's rise to economic prominence after World War II.

- understanding how corporate culture and the identity of firms leads to different commercial strategies for firms operating under similar economic incentive structures.\(^14\) Firms have histories and cultures; they have visions of the roles which they are to play in the market. These elements of identity are subject to processes of social contestation, and can vary as corporate leadership varies.

### 2.2 The Growing Use of Identity as a Variable

The examples above suggest that the concept of identity, particularly as a key independent variable, has come into broad use in social science scholarship. And, indeed, the widespread use of identity in the 1990s

\(^9\) This is explored in Johnston, forthcoming.

\(^10\) Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Inkeles and Bauer 1961; Davies 1997; and Fitzpatrick 1993, 745-770.


\(^12\) For example, Braumoeller shows that those in Russia who categorize themselves as liberals AND perceive another state as a democracy have reduced perceptions of hostility from that state. See Braumoeller 1997, 375-402.

\(^13\) On national identities and governments' interpretations of economic interdependence, see Abdelal 2001.

\(^14\) See, for example, Brickson 2000a, 147-148; Brickson 2000b, 82-101; Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton 2000, 13-17; Ashforth and Mael 1996, 19-64; Hogg and Terry, forthcoming; and Whetten and Godfrey 1998.
is also evident from a frequency count we conducted of the number of articles in which the term identity appears in either the title or abstract in the social science citation index from 1988-1999.\textsuperscript{15}

Figure 1 shows an obvious exponential increase in the attention to identity in the social sciences in general. The figure shows the cumulative sum of "identity" articles taken from all journals listed in the SSCI. As a control, Figure 2 indicates that identity articles as a portion of all articles has shown a steady increase across time (the ratio of non-identity to identity articles has dropped markedly).

These trends are also found in political science, a discipline traditionally less concerned with identity than other social science disciplines. Figure 3 shows the cumulative sum for identity articles taken from a selection of international relations and comparative politics journals.\textsuperscript{16} As a control, in order to show the relative increase in the use of identity vis-à-vis standard international relations variables, Figure 4 shows the ratio of articles that use traditional concepts of war and power and articles in their titles and abstracts to the number of "identity" articles in the study of international relations (IR). This ratio has dropped dramatically over the last decade.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Fig. 1 Cumulative Sum of "Identity" Articles in social science journals, 1988-1999}
\textbf{SOURCE: Social Science Citation Index}

\textsuperscript{15} We were inspired by Jim Fearon's initial count of the changing frequency of dissertations in which "identity" appears in the abstracts from 1981-1995. He found that the number of dissertations mentioning identity grew at about 12\% per year from 1985-1996 while the total number of dissertations only grew 4.4\% per year. See Fearon 1999, 1.


\textsuperscript{17} One caveat, however, is that in comparative politics, although the underlying concept of identity may be at work, the term itself may appear less frequently than expected because in comparison with scholars in international relations, comparativists (and Americanists) who study concepts close to what is meant by identity in international relations, may refer to their research as semiotics, hermeneutics, thick rationality, or the study of epistemic communities, ethnicity, gender, race, or political culture. And, rather than the term identity as an independent variable, comparativists may use terms such as shared understandings, beliefs, heuristics, frames, schemas, hegemony, socio-tropic evaluations, or even attitudes. This point speaks to the findings in Figures 3 and 4, but it also suggests that by considering similar concepts under different labels comparativists may not be reaping the full benefits of a shared research paradigm.
Fig. 2 Ratio of all social science articles to "identity" articles, 1988-1999
SOURCE: Social Science Citation Index

Fig. 3 Cumulative sum of "identity" articles in IR and comparative politics journals, 1988-1999
Source: Social Science Citation Index
3. THE PROBLEM: IDENTITY IS "UNDISCIPLINED"

3.1 The Many Definitions of Identity

The proliferation of identity-based research has generated lots of interest, but also many different ways of studying identity, including a variety of definitions of the concept and a wide array of research methodologies. The result is a lack of precision about what "identity" actually means.

The following is a sampling from political science and sociology.

- Alexander Wendt argues that "Social identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is as social object ... being at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine 'who I am/we are' in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations." He argues elsewhere that: identities are "relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self ... identities are the basis of interest."

- Jutte Weldes et al. (citing William Connolly) argues that an identity is "established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not exist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity."

- Erik Olin-Wright considers class identity. He argues that "Class identity refers to the ways in which people consider themselves 'members' of different classes. As such, it constitutes one of the many ways in which people define what is salient about their lives and what differentiates them from others. 'Identity' has both a cognitive and affective component. Cognitively, identity simply defines the ways people place...

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18 Fearon provides fourteen examples of definitions from across the social sciences in general. See Fearon 1999, 4-5.
21 Weldes et al., in Weldes et al. 1999, 11.
themselves into different systems of formal classification. Affectively, identity refers to the kinds of classifications that are subjectively salient in a person's system of meanings.\(^\text{22}\)

- In considering ethnic identity in particular, Donald Horowitz, quoting Enid Schildkrout, writes, "The minimal definition of an ethnic unit … is the idea of common provenance, recruitment primarily through kinship, and a notion of distinctiveness whether or not this consists of a unique inventory of cultural traits.' This is close to Max Weber's conception of a 'subjective belief' in 'common descent … whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.' To this I would add a minimal scale requirement, so that ethnic membership transcends the range of face-to-face interactions, as recognized kinship need not. So conceived, ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers 'tribes,' 'races,' 'nationalities,' and castes.\(^\text{23}\)

- In perhaps the broadest definition, Harrison White argues that identity is actually a function of contingencies and for him it serves as a "catch-all" variable. He writes, "identity is any source of action not explicable from biophysical regularities, and to which observers can attribute meaning."\(^\text{24}\)

Note the vast range of conceptualizations here. Identity can be anything from cognitive schemas about one's role in a group to a commonly held sense of "provenance" to any source of action that is given meaning by a group.

Despite this seeming definitional anarchy, Fearon does find that both popular and scholarly usage of the term identity converge on two core definitions: 1) "social identity" "refers simply to a social category, a set of persons marked by a label and distinguished by rules deciding membership and (alleged) characteristic features or attributes; 2) "personal identity", "a set of attributes, beliefs, desires, or principles of action that a person thinks distinguish her in socially relevant ways and that (a) the person takes a special pride in; (b) the person takes no special pride in, but which so orient her behavior that she would be at a loss about how to act and what to do without them; or (c) the person feels she could not change even if she wanted to."\(^\text{25}\)

The vast majority of social science research has focussed on Fearon's "social identities", and in particular what he calls "type" (class, gender, race, ethnic, estate, religious, etc.) as opposed to "role" (father, lawyer, etc.) identities. We propose to focus primarily on such large-scale social identities, and focus on personal identities only to the extent that they involve identification with such large-scale social categories.

One possible analytical reaction to this undisciplined diversity of views is to reject the entire concept of identity as hopelessly vague. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper offer exactly this critique.\(^\text{26}\) Brubaker and Cooper seek to replace the concept of identity with three alternatives that capture some of the theoretical work that identity is supposed to perform. These are: identification/categorization; individual self-understanding; and commonality/connectedness/groupness. These alternatives suggest that Brubaker and Cooper are dissatisfied with the use of individuals' identities to explain individuals' behaviors and practices. The central problem with these alternatives, however, is that they ignore the most theoretically significant and empirically useful conceptualization of identity, namely, group self-understanding. In other words, to the extent that Brubaker and Cooper deal with collective identities, they propose to analyze them as the "degree" of groupness of groups, rather than what and who groups think they are.

Alternatively, we propose that the degree of groupness is only one way to conceptualize the variability of collective identities. There is much more at stake than how much the constituent individuals of a group identify with the group. As we argue below, scholars have evaluated, and should continue to assess, the content or meaning of group identity (the group's groupness), the purposes associated with the group, the group's constitutive norms, and the ways in which they are contested. Thus, we argue that this definitional diversity can be organized systematically, and that the concept of identity, with a little more analytical rigor and methodological precision, can be useful for understanding a great number of empirical puzzles in the social sciences. Indeed, an appropriate conceptualization of collective identity can avoid all of the

\(^{22}\) Olin-Wright 1997, 495.
\(^{23}\) Horowitz 1985, 53.
\(^{24}\) White 1992, 6.
\(^{25}\) Fearon, 2, 11.
\(^{26}\) Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 1-47.
weaknesses that Brubaker and Cooper find fatal for much of the work on identity. Thus, we argue it is premature to abandon the concept.

3.2 The Relationship Between Identity and Action

This brings us to the second major problem in the use of identity-based arguments. Much of the research on identity is unclear as to how identities are supposed to affect the behavior of actors. That is, how does having an identity lead to action? It turns out that the definition of identity affects predictions about action. We have identified at least three different ways in which identity could affect behavior and we believe there has been insufficient attention to these differences in the literature.27

The first is indirect and, in some ways, is the most acceptable for a wide range of methods and research programs. Here identity allows actors to interpret the external world. In considering Erik Olin-Wright's definition of class identity, rather than implying an alternative theory of action, there is an implied theory of interpretation. In this case identity affects the way actors understand the world, and therefore the material or social incentives for particular action will take on different values according to one's identity. Thus, action still flows from material or social incentives, but identity affects the valuation of incentives.

The second corresponds to social identity theory's theory of action. Here the central causal process in behavior derives from in-group and out-group differentiation, not the roles or identity traits per se that are attributed to in-groups and out-groups. In this case, action is in some sense a reaction to, and conditioned by the existence of, those who are different. Some relationships (with the group that is socially recognized as similar) will be more cooperative than others (with the group that is socially recognized as different) even if the same issue is at stake (territory, power, status). Similarly, SIT-based arguments predict conflict with out-groups regardless of the content of the identity; i.e. we're peace-loving, but you're not; indeed you threaten our peace-lovingness, and therefore anything goes in dealing with your disposition to threaten us. This type of theory predicts belligerence, and conflict with the "other."

The third corresponds roughly to what is sometimes referred to as "identity theory" or "role theory." Here the central causal process in behavior is the performance of roles. The behavior of actors (or attempts to act) is more or less consistent with actors' role expectations flowing from their identities — thus, if we are peace-loving, we should act in peace-loving fashion. Identity provides socially appropriate roles that actors perform, and that are "taken for granted." In this conceptualization, the reasons to act in a particular way are found in a decision to perform a role, not in a decision to choose between optimizing paths to some preferred outcome. This is the "logics of appropriateness" claim.

In dealing with the action implications of identity, the literature (in politics at least) tends to favor this last claim of logics of appropriateness: "taken for grantedness," "normative," "role expectations," etc. are common phrases. However, if identity traits provide norms of appropriate behavior, we know there are a number of reasons for people to follow norms, not all of which involve logics of appropriateness.28 There are at least three other logics by which an identity norm might be followed: 1) mimicking, whereby an actor, under conditions of uncertainty, ascertains that it is at least safe to copy what others do until a "better" mode of behavior appears; 2) social incentives, whereby an actor values the status markers that a social audience bestows on norm conforming behavior; 3) material incentives, whereby conformity maximizes reputation for cooperation and/or material rewards. Thus to make this "logics of appropriateness" claim, one has to show that other reasons for conforming to the norms of an identity were not just ruled out (or heavily discounted) but basically not present in the decision process.

Thus to use identity as a variable one has a very tough empirical task at hand. One has to show, in essence, that certain behavioral options were a priori non-existent (ideally while also showing that an actor with a different identity, but operating in similar "structural" conditions, selected these options). Of course it is possible that effects of identity can be multiple (e.g. I act a particular way for role reasons and I devalue

27 For an analysis of these differences (and an effort to bridge them) see Stets and Burke 1998.
28 See Fearon for this caveat.
those who don't act the same way for social identity reasons). But in general, scholars working with identity still must address the very different theories about precisely how having an identity leads one to act.

The type of techniques for determining the nature of identity may differ depending on the theory of action one adopts. If one proceeds from SIT-derived arguments, then one wants information about the distance between in-groups and out-groups and degrees of concentration or proto-typicality of an in-group (e.g. how different from the out-group and how homogeneous is the in-group.) The content of these differences is less relevant. Maximizing the sameness of the in-group and maximizing difference with the out-group should predict the maximum amount of conflict. If one subscribes to role theory based arguments, then one wants techniques that extract the content of the identity; i.e., the traits and role expectations associated with particular contents. Finally, if one adopts an interpretivist notion of identity, one would require techniques which distinguish different understandings of information according to differences in identity.

4. METHODOLOGICAL OPTIONS: A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT WAYS OF MEASURING AND USING IDENTITY AS A VARIABLE

4.1 The Parameters of Identity

Given the problems in the conceptualization of identity as an explanatory concept in social science, it is worth going back to "first principles." What does it mean to treat identity as a variable? At its simplest it means to conceive of identity as a characteristic of individuals or groups that varies along some metric or value in such a way that it has a systematic, independent, positive or negative effect on some other variable.

In principle there are three types of variation:

- dichotomous (present or absent);
- categorical (different types, mutually exclusive, exhaustive);
- interval (numerical, continuous valuation along some metric).

It may make little sense to treat identity as a dichotomous variable — present or absent. Since a group exists by definition through having an identity, some kind of identity can never really be absent (though in historical studies, the emergence of previously non-existent social identities, in particular national identities, is one of the most studied issues). Thus, in terms of categories and intervals, identity can vary in three fundamental ways: content, intensity, and contestation.

4.1.1 The Content of Identity

When content varies, we can think of identity X (with traits X1...n) at time t changing into identity Y (with traits or attributes Y1...n) at time t+1. For example, over the past couple of decades, Chinese leaders' designated identity for China has shifted from that of "revolutionary major power" to "responsible major power." Behaviorally, this may mean a shift from subverting international institutions to joining and upholding them. The analytical problem then is how to typologize identities, and how to determine how actors themselves typologize.

Since identity is a categorization of the self, it provides people with a set of types or categories (e.g. if there are responsible major powers, then there are irresponsible minor powers and irresponsible major powers and responsible minor powers, logically). And, as noted in the above discussion, how state elites categorize identities, therefore, is critical for explaining their behavior. For example, following SIT, other responsible major powers will be perceived to share more traits, and therefore be considered less different; hence there would be less basis for conflict than if the other is perceived to be an "irresponsible" major power.
However, it is unclear whether these categories can be imposed by the observer deductively or drawn out from the actor inductively. Weldes, for instance, imposes a typology. On the basis of the language used in a couple of Kennedy speeches, she uses a very simple dimension to describe the identity that underlies US policy towards communist states: "aggressively macho." Presumably the other end is "extremely feminine." She argues that it is this masculinized identity that drove US concerns about credibility of commitments threats and promises. But this identity dimension, constructed by the scholar, to be analytically useful means that one should be able to look at other speeches by others in the US or other countries and then determine where on this dimension other state identities can be categorized. However, if identity is an inter-subjective and subjective phenomenon, we cannot assume that externally imposed categories are similar to the ones the actors themselves use to typologize the world.

Thus, an alternative is to typologize identities inductively. The problem with inductive typologizing, however, is that actor's typologies usually violate the rules of typologizing — that categories be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. For example, "rogue," "open economies," "responsible members of international community," "democracies," etc., are all US categories and do not as a whole fit the criteria for a typology.

Scholars observing and measuring the content of identity, therefore, will have to be clear about how precisely the attributes of an identity are typologized — inductively or deductively.

In principle it is possible to distinguish among three kinds of content of collective identities, which also imply three separate theories of action. The content of a collective identity can be *purposive*, in the sense that the group attaches specific meanings and goals to its identity. This purposive conception of content is analytically similar to the commonsense notion, explicit in recent constructivist scholarship, that what groups want depends on who they think they are. Thus, identities can lead actors to endow practices with group purposes and to interpret the world through cultural lenses defined in part by those purposes. Using Fearon's distinction between role and type identities, purposive content is more often associated with type, or sui generis, identities. The content of a collective identity can also be *causal*, along the lines of strategic culture, schema theory, and social representation theory. The causal content of a collective identity implies explanations of how the world works, specific cause-effect relationships. Third, content can be *normative*, influenced by dominant conceptions of propriety, as is the case in role theory (normative content therefore refers primarily to Fearon's analysis of role identities). In this case the content of an identity is given by a broader set of social norms defined by agreement among multiple centers of authority. In this sense the normative content of an identity is constitutive. That is, the specific practices of actors can cause others to recognize a particular identity.

### 4.1.2 The Intensity of Identity

A second dimension on which identity may vary is intensity. In this case, identity X (with traits 1...n) at time t changes to X' (with traits 1...n) at time t+1. This shift entails an increase in the degree of caring, desire, or urgency to fulfill roles or devalue the out-group, and therefore also entails changes in tradeoffs and risk acceptance when facing obstacles to acting consistently with one's identity. For example, a shift from "responsible major power" to "very responsible major power" may mean moving from a position of joining and upholding to one of creating, leading, expanding, and proselytizing such change in others, and devaluing those who do not change. The analytical problem here is how to measure changes in intensity of identification with particular social categories and their associated traits.

### 4.1.3 The contestation of identity

Given the ways in which identity can vary, we want to underscore that, while we are well aware that all methods embody ontological and epistemological assumptions which are to some degree contestable, we do not assume that identities are fixed or stable or uncontested. Precisely because some of the major battles in and between social groups are over identity we believe it is important to be able to have techniques that can take relatively rapid and easily developed snapshots of identities as these evolve, as they are challenged, and as they are (re)constructed. Because identities are contested at times, identity language can be used strategically. We are well aware of this possibility. However, if it is used strategically it will only

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29 Weldes, in Weldes et al. 1999.
be effective if at least some important portion of the population has internalized the identity cues and responds to their use. That is, the instrumentality and authenticity of identity are two sides of the same coin. Thus there is still a need to develop techniques for determining how authentic, or how internalized, these cues are for them to have a mobilizing effect.

4.1.4. Measurable dimensions of identity

Content, intensity and contestation provide ways of thinking about parameters of identity, but not actual dimensions of identity that one could actually operationalize and measure. Ideally, one would like to develop a series of dimensions of group identity that apply across identity varieties and identity types. In practice, it would seem that only Social Identity Theory has attempted to develop such dimensions. The following is a list of eight potential dimensions. All will address contestation, since this is a question of internal unanimity on any given dimension. Some will address content, others intensity.

i. Recognition (or Prevalence of Recognition). One could measure the degree to which a group accepts a particular social identity; the degree to which outsiders recognize a social identity; and the degree to which a state recognizes a social identity. For example, there is a universe of individuals who could potentially recognize themselves as Hispanic, White, Black, Asians. How many do in fact? How many are recognized by others? Measuring recognition of course would entail the researcher defining or accepting a particular definition, at least for analytic purposes, of the boundaries of the group. Recognition involves all three parameters of identity: content, intensity, and contestation.

ii. Exclusivity. Recognition is the most minimal aspect of identity. Beyond this, we could measure the degree to which a given social identity excludes the holding of another social identity. For instance, according to Mary Waters, the racial identity black in America has high exclusivity and over only a few generations crowds out the ethnic identities of Jamaican or West Indian. Hispanic, on the other hand, has a very low exclusivity. In Europe now, some individuals continue to see a national identity (French, Dutch, English) as being either incompatible with a European identity or being necessarily superior, while others see the two identities as perfectly compatible or the European as superior. Exclusivity is very much an intensity and contestation variable.

iii. Primordiality. Some identities are interpreted as being chosen and others as essential and unchangeable. This is an important aspect of identity content. Again, one can view this from the perspective of group members, out-group members, and the state. An example of the latter: The Soviet Union in 1938 changed passport regulations so that individuals could not choose nationality, but had to accept the nationality of their parents (or if in mixed marriage, choose at age 18 and not change for rest of life). This represented a massive increase in the state's primordialization of ethnic identity in the Soviet Union. Primordiality is a content measurement.

iv. Entativity. Some Social Identity Theorists have measured the degree to which groups are perceived (mostly by outsiders) as being "real", as cohering as a natural group, rather than an arbitrary one. Entativity is a contestation and content measurement.

v. Status. Is the identity seen as positive, neutral, or negative; something to be taken pride in or something to be ashamed of. Again, this can be measured from the perspective of in-group and out-group members, and the state as well. Status is a content dimension.

vi. In-Group Favoritism/Out-Group Hostility. Social Identity Theory focuses primarily on this issue, the degree to which "groupness" leads to in-group favoritism and out-group hostility. Favoritism/Hostility could be interpreted as a content or intensity dimension.

vii. Claims. One could try to measure the claims that membership in an identity group makes on an individual. For instance, one could measure the right to hold opinions different from the group on matters of fundamental interest to the group (for instance on border definitions as to who belongs in the group; or on sovereignty claims; or Affirmative Action claims), or what claims are made in terms of sacrifice of one's economic or other interests. Again, social others and the state can also make claims on the group. Social Identity Theorists often distinguish at the individual level between high and low identifiers within a group.
Faced with discrimination, low identifiers will attempt to exit the group, while high identifiers will try to contest the discrimination. *Claims are an intensity dimension.*

viii. **Goals/Purposes.** What are the primary goals/purposes of the group? For instance, does an ethnic identity imply a belief in sovereignty or other less demanding forms of recognition. **Goals/Purposes are content and contestation dimensions.**

### 4.2 Identity Regimes

As one sets out to measure identity, two major problems confront the researcher. **Identity is relational** and it is **situational.**

That a social identity is relational is tautological. One can only choose a social identity to the extent that one can get in-group and/or out-group members to recognize one’s social identity as such; and they will do so based on their notions as to what constitutes a valid social identity and who can legitimately claim that identity. Therefore, all social identities exist within a kind of framework of broadly accepted, though often unwritten, rules and assumptions (in some cases, codified by the state or other important social organizations, but in most cases reflecting generally accepted “common sense”) as to what types of identity (ethnic, religious, sexual, class, estate etc.) have social significance, what varieties of those identity types are recognized (in America, Black, White, and Hispanic are now officially recognized as racial identities, whereas Quadroon (signifying individuals who are 1/4 black) no longer appears as a census category), and what rules of membership govern those varieties. Moreover, these rules and assumptions are continually contested at various levels (globally, as to what identity types are recognized in a given society; or locally, as to whether a given group should be recognized as a valid identity variety). We can think of the environment that governs identity formation as an identity regime. Such regimes exist at different scales from the world community of states, to individual sovereign states, to regions within those states, and down to villages, individual churches, prisons, and so forth.

If, for the sake of illustration, we think of the identity regime that exists within a sovereign state, it may be thought of as having four levels:

1. **The written and unwritten rules and assumptions** that govern the recognition of identity types and varieties by the state, by society and by individuals, as well as the membership rules that help determine what individuals will be recognized as belonging to what identity varieties. Some of these will be distinct to the individual state, but many will be transnational (i.e. the illegitimacy of “estate” and “clan” identities and the valorization of “ethnic” and “national” identities was often exported or imported). They will almost always be contested. Indeed, any move to introduce a new type or variety of social identity, or a fundamental change in their status, will necessarily involve an overt or, more often, covert attempt to change the rules governing the identity regime (for instance, the gay rights movement successfully established sexual orientation as a recognized social identity type).

2. **The recognized types of social identity.** Examples would be ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, caste, estate. While individuals will have multiple social identities, they typically will have only one **variety** of each **type** of social identity: one racial, ethnic, religious, estate identity and so forth. (though there are exceptions; in America one can be racially Black and Hispanic).

3. **The recognized varieties of a given social identity type.** For instance, in America, Hispanic is a recognized racial identity, while quadroon is not. The opposite was true one hundred years ago. There is currently a movement to establish “mixed race” as a recognized racial identity variety. As these examples suggest, the state, non-group members, group members and given individuals may follow different rules.

4. **The individual members of the identity regime,** each of whom will have a multiplicity of identity varieties, but will give vastly different significance to them.

An identity regime, at the level of a sovereign state, may likewise be thought of as having **four actors:**
1. **The State.** The state is sometimes the repository of written rules concerning recognized types and varieties of social identity, though not in all (perhaps most) cases. Official state recognition is one goal of identity politics. Another goal is to affect state policies towards a given identity variety (affirmative action, neutrality, discrimination). State recognition could take different forms. For instance, the state can recognize the existence of a social identity variety (or type) by counting it in statistics such as the census, and nothing more. Or it could use the social identity variety in formal legislation (for instance, legislation forbidding discrimination against various identity groups). Third, the state could not only mention the group in legislation, but could give it benefits (affirmative action) or penalties (formal legal discrimination). The role of state recognition in identity regimes has not received a great deal of theoretical discussion, and even less work on measurement.

2. **Society (or Out-group members),** here defined from the perspective of a given social identity variety as non-members, i.e., from the perspective of blacks, society is non-blacks; from the perspective of Amish, non-Amish. In other words, society is "the other". A more complex development of this actor would recognize, however, that not all "others" are equal.

3. **The Group (or In-group members),** again defined from the perspective of a given social identity variety.

4. **Individuals,** who will in different scenarios be members of #2 or #3.

The fact that identities are relational, and that they involve recognition by different actors, makes the measurement of social identities more complex. Social Identity Theory practitioners typically measure both the in-group's identity as well as the out-group's evaluation of the in-group's identity (and sometimes, *vice versa* as well). To this, we would add the state as a third actor. Therefore, one might argue that to measure a social identity properly will require measuring the perspectives of three actors: in-group members, out-group members and the state. Another perspective would argue that the effects of state and out-group attitudes will have been internalized by the in-group members and therefore need not be measured separately.

If we take a simple yes/no measurement model to recognition of an identity variety by the state, by out-group members and in-group members, we get four ideal-types of social identity. The development of more rigorous methods of measurement could help researchers determine across a large number of cases which of these types of identity regimes predominates in space and time.

1. State-yes; Society-yes, Group-yes (that is, a social identity variety recognized by the state, social others and group members). An Officially Recognized Identity.
   Examples: currently in America, the racial identities: Black, White, Native American.

2. State-no; Society-yes; Group-yes. An Unofficial Recognized Identity
   Examples: In America: Italian-American, Irish-American, or Arab-American; in Soviet Kazakhstan, clan identities. However, the difference between #1 and #2, will depend ultimately on the definition of state recognition, which certainly changes over time.


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30 The state here is simply an example, the most common one, of a power center that can codify aspects of an identity regime. If one chooses another scale such as the international level, there may be other power centers; and, we would not exclude the possibility of course, that there are multiple power centers.

31 While there are other aspects to collective identities, we have chosen, for pragmatic reasons, to study only groups' collective identities, internally defined. Thus, the four ideal-types discussed above all assume that there is at least recognition by the group; without group self-recognition (a situation common in colonial contexts) there would be seven ideal types. The other three are:
   State-yes; Society-yes; Group-no. An Officially Imposed Social Identity
   State-no; Society-yes; Group-no. An Unofficially Imposed Social Identity
   State-yes, Society-no, Group-no. An Officially Ascribed Social Identity
Examples: rare, as ideal-types, but most typical in revolutionary regimes that recognize previously neglected social categories. For instance, "poor peasant" (bedniak) in the Soviet Union.

4. State-no; Society-no; Group-yes. **An Insurgent Social Identity**

Example: separatist movements in assimilatory states with majority support for assimilation, such as Kurds in Turkey. This example reminds us that these are ideal-types of social identity, since there is some recognition of the Kurds as an identity group by Turkish society.

In reality, of course, recognition will not involve a simple yes/no answer, but reflect a continuum.

The idea of an identity regime, then, helps address identity's relational aspect and suggests some strategies for measurement to address that aspect. It also helps locate the perhaps even more problematic situational aspect of identities, that is the fact that, as noted above, each group might have multiple identity varieties and that these identities will manifest themselves differently according to the situation a group finds itself in. Social Identity Theorists address this issue under the heading of salience. In a given situation, a certain identity (gender, race, etc.) becomes salient. Some identities are said to be chronically salient (such as the black racial identity in America), which means that the identity becomes salient in many more contexts and that it tends to dominate other competing social identities. The salience of a given identity can perhaps only be understood within the context of an identity regime, and is indeed one of the important features of such a regime.

4.3 Techniques for Measuring Identity

To date, much of the identity literature in political science, whether international relations or comparative, uses fairly simple forms of discourse analysis, looking for "identity-like" language (we are like..., they are like...). Sometimes language use is simply substituted for measures of identity but more often analysis is based on detailed, but less-than-systematic, case studies of newspapers, interviews, and other sources. However, this leaves out methods developed in other disciplines specifically for the observation of identity — such as some forms of content analysis and some survey measures. Towards improving on the measurement of identity as a variable, we propose examining four techniques: discourse analysis; cognitive mapping; quantitative survey analysis; and quantitative content analysis (see Appendix 1 for a summary of the following methods).

4.3.1 Discourse Analysis

This approach analyzes how actors talk about their identity. How do they categorize their identity and that of others? What behaviors are deemed appropriate for each category? How extreme are the perceived differences with other categories? The approach comes from the critique of traditional "attitude" analysis techniques that de-contextualize responses. Discourse analysts believe surveys are unable to capture how views are articulated in real social situations (e.g., given peer pressure, in crises, and when status is at stake, etc.).

Discourse analysis does suggest looking at certain types of identity language. One type is metaphors used to categorize an in-group (e.g., "beacon on a hill" or "country of darkness"). The assumption is that metaphors are essentially used for cognitively ordering complex amounts of incoming information.

Discourse analysis also suggests looking closely at people's "theories of others' actions." "Why do you [the informant] think they do X?" Dispositional answers will reveal an "other categorization" usually associated with devaluation, critical, or competitive identity relationships. Situational answers will usually reveal a closer degree of identification. This type of analysis works with SIT-based theories of action.

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33 See Appendix 2 for a sample of the range of methods used in organization studies and social psychology that tend to be neglected in political science.
The problem with discourse analysis, however, is that after it asks, "how do people talk about their identity" it isn't clear what you do with the answers, or how these help you understand behavior in a more generalized way. Discourse analysis assumes that talk is both strategic and normative, depending on the context; and it can be incoherent and contradictory as well. Hence identity-talk is not an especially consistent "explanation" of behavior of groups in the way role theory or SIT posits. Indeed, discourse analysis, ironically, may prevent social scientists from using identity for explanatory purposes because, pushed to its extreme, discourse analysis assumes identities are highly unstable, constantly in flux, and very, very contingent. This being the case, it is hard to argue that there is enough constancy across time and space in an agent's identity that might allow for prediction.

So one could argue that people who use discourse analysis to "observe" or uncover role expectations may be using a method that is inconsistent with the theoretical assumption that role categories are a good guide to behavior. However, assessment of the utility of discourse analysis will ultimately depend on how it is conducted and to what purpose. We do not propose ruling out discourse analysis, but the project will suggest ways of marrying the advantages of discourse analysis — its focus on the language that actors use to describe self and other — to content analysis techniques that can sample larger numbers of discourses more systematically and representatively.

4.3.2 Cognitive Mapping

One key indicator of collective identity (i.e., who is inside or outside of the group) is to see if there is an "impossibility of imagining violence" in the discourse among actors. In an anarchical environment with stark in-group/out-group differences, it should always be possible to imagine violence among groups or states. But, if there is evidence that this is impossible, then this is indicator of collective identity in a group (or state).

The problem is how to observe the impossibility of imagining violence. This "impossibility" means, for example, that in serious (but non-militarized) disputes the policy process does not even mention violence as a means (not that it is too costly, but literally it is never considered an option).

The only way we can think of doing this rigorously is by using cognitive map analysis. Cognitive mapping entails breaking down selected texts from a decision making process into all of their component cause-effect relationships. The researcher then determines whether these causal relationships are negative or positive. The technique can help uncover the deep structure of an argument — the presence or absence of certain cause-effect assumptions, and the consistencies and inconsistencies across cause-effect arguments. So, for example, in order to determine whether there was an "impossibility of violence" imagined in a relationship with another actor — a defining characteristic of a security community — one could look at cognitive maps of a decision-maker or a group of decision-makers to see whether violence was or was not imagined, or whether it did or did not appear as a cause concept negatively linked to some effect (as it would have to be if it were an option that was discarded as too costly) (see Appendix 1: Methods). THEN one would have to look at a comparative case where the content and intensity of the dispute was similar, but where the dispute was with an actor who was considered to be a member of an out-group. If "violence" was imagined in this second cognitive map, if it was a conscious cause concept leading to a particular effect, only then could one conclude that in the first dispute violence was indeed "unimagined."

This method may help tell you what role expectations are associated with particular categories in the minds of actors. It will not tell you much about the intensity of identity with a particular category, however.

Cognitive mapping is highly labor intensive when done by human coders. We propose to investigate how to build on methods for extracting cognitive maps from large numbers of texts using computer-aided content analysis techniques.35

34 See Axelrod 1976.
35 A computer-aided cognitive mapping program is being developed by Social Science Automation. See http://www.socialscience.net/toc.html.
4.3.3 Quantitative Survey Analysis

Social psychologists who do research on identity are quite familiar with the problem of measurement — determining the content and intensity of identity. Measurement is often based on surveys of groups of individuals. For example, Burke and Tully's work on gender identity involves surveys of girls and boys to determine "prototypical" traits that each believes is true of self and other. They use Osgood semantic differentials to determine the content of girl-ness and boy-ness and the degree of within-girl and within-boy difference to determine intensity.36

Osgood semantic differentials appear to be especially useful survey scales for identity research. The scales involve lists of polar attributes about some individual or group, and a respondent is asked to place himself or herself (or others) usually on a 7 point scale. Means and the spread or dispersion of responses is then used to determine differences between groups and the degree of in-group identification.37

There is no reason these scales and procedures cannot be reproduced for cross-national samples of foreign policy or other political elites, for example. But, of course, this technique requires active participation by individuals. This makes the technique problematic for studying historical topics (due to issues of memory, representation, etc.) or for studying topics where individuals are not available or willing to participate.

4.3.4 Quantitative Content Analysis

The key methodological conundrum, if one is trying to quantify identity intensity or extract trait clusters associated with a "social category," is how to do this using texts. As we suggested above, there are already — mostly in social psychology and sociology — a pretty good set of tools for measuring identity using surveys. However, in the social sciences many of our cases are historical or involve closed states and/or societies. Thus, a key problem is how to translate these survey procedures into textual analysis.38

Because definitions of identity mainly seem to focus on "statements of being." (i.e., we are something, while they are something else), methodologically one needs to isolate such statements and extract 4 components of the statements:

• the subject (e.g. self or group).
• the prototypical traits or roles associated with that group (trait).
• the term that establishes the relationship between the subject and the trait (e.g. is, was, will be, embodies, reflects etc).
• the term that indicates intensity of identification with this group and its traits.

One would then need a technology for extracting these four components "quadruplets" from texts; for example, in the sentence "China is above all a responsible major power" the subject is "China;" the prototypical trait is "responsible major power;" the term that establishes the relationship between the subject and trait is "is"; and the term that indicates intensity is "above all."

Finally, one would also have to determine what the associated behavior expectations and/or roles associated with having the trait (being a responsible major power) are.

36 Burke and Tully 1977, 881-897.
37 In addition to Osgood semantic differentials, there is another fairly common tool for determining the content and intensity of racial identification among African Americans called the multidimensional model of racial identity. In such models, Likert scales (e.g. ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree) are used to track answers to questions which tap into traits of blackness, the degree to which blacks are oppressed for being black, the degree to which being black is central to respondents' lives, and the degree of pride in being black — in other words, the questions that get at the content and intensity of "blackness." The problem with Likert scales as opposed to Osgood semantic differential scales is that, in the former, the respondents are being asked to comment on a statement, and therefore the instrument itself limits the choice of how to describe the categories of self. In Osgood semantic differential procedures the respondent is being asked to make a statement about self and other. It is a more active judgment or assessment of a wider range of possible responses, since they are being asked to place themselves (or others) on a logically inclusive range of possibilities. Osgood semantic differential scales, therefore, are more likely to tap into an internally generated concept of self than are Likert scales.
38 On some of the latest developments in computer-aided content analysis, see Roberts 1997.
In developing quantitative content analysis, there are at least three general techniques we have come across that, with modification, might be useful. One method is the "verbs in context" machine coding computer procedure.\textsuperscript{39} Here the recording unit is verb-based attributes of self and other. Presumably one could alter this to "adjectives in context," weighted by degree of conflictualness/cooperativeness with others in order to determine the intensity of difference. One could then correlate adjectives to verbs-in-context to see if certain adjectival attributes are related to certain expected actions. Basically, as far as we understand, this means drawing up different dictionaries of terms to ask the computer to search for in documents.

A second technique might involve modification of the Kansas Events Data Set (KEDS). At the moment KEDS is programmed to examine texts (Reuter's headlines, at the moment) to extract verb actions done by subject to object, classified or weighted by a range of types of actions. Presumably KEDS could be reprogrammed with adjectival dictionaries, not just verbal ones. KEDS classifies in a quite fine-tuned form (sub-national actors, etc.). Thus one could extract statements made by actors from different parts of a society quite quickly. In principle, KEDS should be able to extract both identity content (just as it extracts action content and classifies acts into a fine-tuned list) and the intensity of identity, (just as it classifies actions according to a cooperation/conflict scale, and then fine-tunes this using WEIS weights). Adjectives could be weighted by descriptors such as "very, extremely, completely, utterly" or by frequency.

A third technique would involve the application of the Osgood semantic differential scale to textual content analysis. One would have to do this with some sample of relevant elites, looking at means (weighted perhaps) and differences of means to see if there is enough congruence in the scaling to conclude there is an overarching characterization of other and self.

As is evident, the most appropriate technology would be one that could analyze the semantic and causal structure of texts. There are a range of computer-aided content analysis programs that could be adopted to these different quantitative procedures. We have read a number of sources on quantitative content analysis and visited a number of web sites showcasing various procedures.\textsuperscript{40} Some of the most promising appear to be the following:\textsuperscript{41}

- The General Inquirer III: classifies text words into content categories depending on the type of dictionary. Dictionaries can include identity-related pronouns, actions, and adjectives (i.e. ascriptive social category or affective description dictionaries).
- PC-ACE (Program for Computer Assisted Coding of Events): organizes text into actor-action-object structures and provides ways of modifying the description of these relationships.
- PLCA (Program for Linguistic Content Analysis): classifies text into subject-verb-object relations by one of four types of intentions. The techniques is used for "comparing strategies of communication in different socio-historical settings."
- CETA (Computer-Guided Evaluative Text Analysis) (for semantic differential analysis): Derives from early work by Osgood and others on assertion analysis and is used to extract implied sentences from the text, to generate semantic relationships among objects.
- MECA (Map Extraction, Comparison, and Analysis): designed to extract and display cognitive maps of individuals or groups from texts, allowing researchers to determine level of shared knowledge (cause-effect relationships) within or between social groups.

\textsuperscript{39} Cited in Walker et al. 1999.
\textsuperscript{40} For instance, Content Analysis Resources at: http://www.gsu.edu/~wwwcom/content.html; Text Analysis Resources at http://www.intext.de/TEXTANAE.HTM; Social Science Net at http://www.socialscience.net/Profiler+.html; The General Inquirer at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/.
\textsuperscript{41} Most of this information comes from Popping, in Roberts 1997, 209-221.
APPENDIX 1: METHODS

1. Discourse Analysis:
Labor intensive interviews of informants or textual analysis.
• How do informants "talk" about their identity and that of others?
• What identity categories do they use to order their "world"?
• What roles are considered appropriate to each category?
• What metaphors and analogies are used to describe these categories?

2. Cognitive Mapping
Extract all cause-effect relationships from a text to determine what behavioral options are “imaginable” and how these relate to the actor’s utility. The first map indicates that force is considered an option, but rejected for utility reasons. The second map shows that force is never even considered as an option — it is “unimaginable” conceptually.
3. Survey Analysis

3.1 Osgood semantic differential

e.g. Chinese (American) people are…..
peaceful / / / / / / / warlike

4. Content Analysis

4.1 Kansas Events Data Set (KEDS): Computer coded Reuter’s headlines. Dictionaries determine what actions are given what level of cooperative versus competitive weight. Dictionaries could be reprogrammed to code adjectival descriptions of self and other.

4.2 Verbs-in-Context System:
I (us, we) (punish)(threaten)(oppose)(support)(promise)(reward)
You (them) ) (punish)(threaten)(oppose)(support)(promise)(reward)

Could be changed to….. Adjectives-in-Context System
I am (we are) (adjectives coded from highly conflictual to highly cooperative)
You are (they are) (adjectives coded from highly conflictual to highly cooperative)

4.3 Osgood Semantic Differential techniques for Content Analysis: Would involve coding descriptions of identity (self and other) in texts along a semantic differential scale.
### Empirical Measurement of Identity in Organization Theory

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<tr>
<th>Author, Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Definition of Identity</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Brickson (2000)</strong></td>
<td>Theoretical analysis of “organizational context” (organizational, task and reward structures) and the impact it has on minority and majority responses to one another and the resulting degree of “diversity management” in an organization.</td>
<td>Following Brewer and Gardner’s tri-partite model (1996), Identity or self-concept is “multi-faceted, consisting of three fundamental loci of self-definition: the self as an individual, the self as an interpersonal being, and the self as a group member” (84).</td>
<td>A flow-chart that maps identity orientation processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ashforth and Mael (1996)</strong></td>
<td>Theoretical analysis of organizational identity and how it is enacted and expressed via firm strategy, and how it is inferred, modified or affirmed from strategy</td>
<td>“Identity refers to an organization’s central, distinctive, and enduring character, typically anchored to its mission” (19).</td>
<td>A flow-chart that maps reciprocal relationships between organizational identity and strategic choice.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ely and Meyerson (2000)</strong></td>
<td>This article reviews traditional organizational frameworks for understanding gender relations and introduces a new one to improve the gendered structure of organizations.</td>
<td>Gender identity is “a system of oppressive relations reproduced in and by social practices” (107).</td>
<td>The article presents three traditional “frames” (charts) for treating gender issues and discusses limitations of each as a foundation for organizational change. The authors then propose a new frame that conceives of gender as a complex set of social relations enacted across a range of social practices that reify and maintain gendered social order in organizations. The authors propose an intervention strategy for changing gender relations in organizations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Author, Year</td>
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<td>Tyler (1999)</td>
<td>This study investigates why people cooperate with the organizations to which they belong. The authors hypothesize that organizations play a crucial role in defining and maintaining members’ social identity, creating incentives for individuals to cooperate with their organizations.</td>
<td>Adopts the social identity theory (Hogg and Abrams 1988) notion that “people’s connections to organizations are motivated by their desire to obtain information relevant to development and maintenance of the self. Specifically, people use membership in organizations to help construct their social selves” (206).</td>
<td>This study reviews field and survey research showing that people receive favorable identity-relevant information from membership in organizations and respond by cooperating with these organizations in order to maintain their social identities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freeman (1999)</td>
<td>This paper tests a general model of organization response to loss. The author observes that organizational response to major environmental change is very similar to an individual’s response to loss. Loss constitutes a chasm between two forms of identity—structural and cognitive—that a viable entity must hold in congruence.</td>
<td>Combines Albert and Whetton’s classic definition (1985), that identity is a statement of central character based on shared understandings, with White’s structural definition (1992), that identity is a function of present relationships between an entity’s constituent parts. There must be congruence between the cognitive and structural components of identity.</td>
<td>The author uses case research of the U.S. auto industry in the late 1970s and 1980s to show how the auto industry’s response to its loss of customers and status was similar to the loss of an individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabusky and Barley (1997)</td>
<td>This study debunks the organizational theory notion that industrial scientists are torn between their professional and organizational identities. Instead of role conflict, the paper posits that technical professionals have “liminal identities.”</td>
<td>Membership in a collective (social identity) can be said to occur if, and only if, three conditions hold: (1) the individual expresses consciousness of similarity with other group members, (2) the individual expresses consciousness of difference with outsiders, and (3), members of the group perceive the individual to be one of their own.</td>
<td>The authors conduct an ethnographic study of scientists at the European Space Agency to show that scientists in ESA possess liminal identities: they identify with neither the organization nor the scientific community. Zabusky conducted numerous interviews and conversations with resident scientists at ESA in 1998-1989 about how they were seen by outsiders and how the scientists saw themselves.</td>
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### Empirical Measurement of Identity in Organization Theory. cont.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author, Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Definition of Identity</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hogg, Hains and Mason (1998)</td>
<td>This study tests the proposition that as people identify more strongly with a group, they are more likely to base their perceptions of leadership effectiveness on how well the leader is perceived to match the group prototype.</td>
<td>None—groups are assigned.</td>
<td>Experimental. Subjects were divided into groups and then asked to nominate a group leader. Experimenters then measured the participants’ perceptions of the leader relative to that of nonleaders on effectiveness, prototypicality, and so on. Experimenters also measured the subjects’ own perceived prototypicality to the group. Relationships among these factors were explored with correlations and hierarchical multiple regressions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brewer and Gardner (1996)</td>
<td>This study tests whether the increased salience of interpersonal and collective “we” can alter one’s spontaneous judgments of similarity and self-perception.</td>
<td>Introduces three levels of identity: personal, relational, and collective. “[T]he personal self is the differentiated, individuated self-concept most characteristic of studies of self in western psychology… the relational self is the self-concept derived from connections and role relationships with significant others, [and] the collective self corresponds to the concept of social identity as represented in social identity theory and self-categorization theory” (84).</td>
<td>Experimental. Participants were first primed to think in collective or non-collective terms using texts and other devices. Subjects were then tested to determine the extent to which they identified with the “collective” by being asked to agree or disagree with general statements of opinion OR by completing questionnaires.</td>
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<td>Author, Year</td>
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<td>Hortaçsu (2000)</td>
<td>This study explores the connection between inter-group relations and self-categorization (one measure of social identity).</td>
<td>None—uses self-categorization.</td>
<td>Veiled and unveiled female students in Turkey were surveyed in 1996 and again in 1998. Factor analysis was performed on survey results to explore connections between self-categorization and changing relations between the two groups.</td>
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<td>Hooper (1976)</td>
<td>This study aims to create a single instrument to measure the social identities of many different individuals. The study is designed to systematically examine relationships between social identity and other demographic characteristics.</td>
<td>Adopts Robert E. Lane’s definition, “social identity…refers to the use of attributes derived from a man’s identification with social groups to describe and define himself” (155).</td>
<td>Survey questionnaires were distributed to 146 students enrolled at Temple University. Respondents were given a range of social identities (political, racial, class, etc.) and asked to rank each identity in terms of its importance to the individual. Factor analysis was then conducted on the survey results to determine whether there are common underlying factors by which respondents can be scored.</td>
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<td>Branscombe and Wann (1994)</td>
<td>This study tests the social identity hypothesis that (1) high group identification, and (2), the reduction in group self-esteem following a threat to the group’s identity lead to outgroup derogation</td>
<td>None—uses self-categorization.</td>
<td>Experimental. Forty U.S. college students were asked to rank themselves on a scale of identification as an American. They were then randomly assigned to watch film clips of U.S.-Soviet boxers, one where U.S. wins, one where Soviets win (group threat); respondents were then asked to complete a questionnaire concerning their views of Soviets (the threatening outgroup).</td>
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<td>Brown and Smith (1989)</td>
<td>This article tests hypotheses concerning perceptions of homogeneity and competence of ingroups and outgroups in minority-majority settings.</td>
<td>None—uses self-categorization.</td>
<td>Questionnaires were sent to 37 faculty members in British university, of which females were the minority. Respondents were first asked to report their gender. They were then asked to rank the perceived degree of variance within different groups at the university as well as the general competence of these groups.</td>
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<td>Brown, Vivian and Hewstone (1999)</td>
<td>Two studies were conducted to determine whether heightened membership salience (achieved by increasing the perceived “prototypicality” of outgroup members during cooperative inter-group contact) results in the generalization of positive attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole.</td>
<td>None—ethnic identity is assumed.</td>
<td>Two experiments were performed in which 64 British students were seated opposite German partners hidden by a screen. Participants were given personality profiles completed by their German partners beforehand—some profiles were consistent with German stereotypes, others contradicted these stereotypes. Participants then performed cooperative tasks with their German partners. Afterward, participants were asked to fill out a survey concerning their beliefs about Germans as a whole (positive vs. negative).</td>
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<td>Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk (1999)</td>
<td>This study aims to show that, when examining social identification, it is important to distinguish between self-categorization, commitment to the group, and group self-esteem—specifically, self-categorization is related to relative group size, whereas group esteem is related to group status</td>
<td>Adopts Tajfel’s definition (1978), Social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (63), cited on p. 372.</td>
<td>Experimental. 119 students at the Free University of Amsterdam were divided into two different groups on the basis of “problem solving style.” One group was told it was the majority group, the other the minority. Some people were told they were in the high status group, others the low status group. Afterward, participants were tested for degree of identification with their respective group and for esteem of the group.</td>
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<td>Spears and Manstead (1997)</td>
<td>This study tests the hypothesis that the relationship between group identification and ingroup bias is mediated by group norms that prescribe or proscribe ingroup bias.</td>
<td>None—uses self-categorization.</td>
<td>Experimental. 191 psychology students at the Free University of Amsterdam participated in the study. Questionnaires were distributed that manipulated the degree of group identification. Group norms were manipulated with the statement that psychology students cared about other students. Ingroup bias was then measured by asking students how they would allocate university funds between psychology students and other students. The authors used factor analysis to determine whether belief in the “fairness” norm moderated the impact that group identification had on ingroup bias.</td>
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<td>Troop and Wright (1999)</td>
<td>This study explores the relationship between perceptions of relative deprivation and (1) the level of identification with the ingroup, and (2), the identity of the comparison group.</td>
<td>Drawing from Tajfel (1981), “both one’s awareness of group memberships and one’s emotional attachment to group are essential components of one’s social identity” (709).</td>
<td>Survey research. 176 Latinos and 126 African-American university students participated in the study. Subjects were given questionnaires that assessed their degree of ingroup identification on a seven-point composite scale. Respondents were then asked to provide demographic data as well as perceptions of relative deprivation—both generally and in relation to different outgroups. Factor analysis was performed on data to test for relationships among the variables.</td>
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<td>Kawakami and Dion (1993)</td>
<td>This study tests whether and how the salience of self-identity influences feelings of relative deprivation and subsequent action intentions.</td>
<td>Uses self-categorization theory (SCT): “…social self-perceptions can be perceived as a continuum ranging from perception of self as an individual to perception of self as an ingroup member” (526).</td>
<td>Experimental. 113 psychology students at a university were divided into two tutorial groups and randomly assigned to eight different experimental conditions: large vs. small differences within groups, large vs. small differences between groups, and high vs. low salience of group identity. Factor analysis was then used to test for relationships between beliefs concerning ingroup and outgroup characteristics and perceptions of group relative deprivation.</td>
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<td>Van Oudenhoven and Groenewoud (1996)</td>
<td>This study explores the conditions under which small-scale inter-group cooperation can bring about positive attitudes toward an outgroup as a whole.</td>
<td>None—ethnic identity is assumed.</td>
<td>Experimental. 27 pairs of Dutch high school students were randomly assigned at random to work together in triads to solve word puzzles. The triads consisted of one Turk and two Dutch students. Three experimental conditions were introduced: one where reference to the Turk’s ethnicity was made early in the interaction, one where the reference was made later on, and one where no reference was made. The Dutch students were then surveyed concerning their evaluation of Turks in general, using a 7-point valence scale.</td>
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<td>Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995)</td>
<td>This study tests the hypothesis that differences in inter-group status and the degree of group identification influence perceptions of <em>intra</em>-group variability.</td>
<td>None—groups were assigned.</td>
<td>Experimental. Two experiments were performed on a group of psychology students. First, the subjects received false feedback that their group was either more or less intelligent than business students (the outgroup). The students were then divided into two groups on the basis of high or low group identification. Finally, subjects were asked to evaluate the degree of variation <em>within</em> the psych. group and <em>between</em> the psych. and business groups.</td>
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<td>Dovidio, Validzic, and Gaertner (1998)</td>
<td>The study tests for conditions that decrease inter-group bias. Specifically, the authors explore whether beliefs of inter-group equality serve to lower inter-group bias.</td>
<td>None—groups are assigned.</td>
<td>Experimental. Two three-person laboratory groups first worked separately on a task. Before meeting, they were informed that (1) the groups were either equal or unequal in task performance, and (2), they had been working on similar or different parts of the task. Each subject was then asked to rank how much he/she liked each member of the opposite team on a 7-point scale.</td>
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<td>Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, and Hodge (1996)</td>
<td>This study tests the hypothesis that members of low-status groups are more likely to distance themselves psychologically from their group (social mobility), rate their group’s distinguishing characteristic less unfavorably, and rate other characteristics of the group <em>more</em> favorably, than do other groups.</td>
<td>None—groups are assigned.</td>
<td>Experimental. Three experiments were performed, wherein participants were divided into groups on the basis of some distinguishing characteristic. Subjects were told that this difference was either positive or negative. They were also told that this distinction was either stable or fluid (social mobility). Participants were then asked to rate their group on the basis of its distinguishing feature and on the basis of other group characteristics.</td>
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<td>Jetten, Spears, and Manstead (1996)</td>
<td>This study examines the influence that ingroup and outgroup norms of fairness have on ingroup bias in small group settings. Specifically, the authors test the theory that ingroup norms of fairness will lead to more fairness, and ingroup norms of discrimination will lead to more discrimination, toward outgroups.</td>
<td>None—groups are assigned.</td>
<td>Experimental. Two studies were performed in which participants were broken into two groups and group identification was experimentally heightened for each group. Members of each group were then informed of the general level of fairness/discrimination exhibited by other members of their group. Finally, subjects were asked to pick a strategy from among four strategies (which varied in terms of fairness and discriminatory) for allocating money between the two groups.</td>
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<td>Lalonde and Silverman (1994)</td>
<td>The authors test the social identity hypothesis that individualistic responses will be preferred to collective responses when (1) group boundaries are relatively open, and (2), when group identities are less salient.</td>
<td>None—groups are assigned.</td>
<td>Ninety research participants were given the task of moving from a low to a high-status group. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions of boundary permeability (open, token, and closed), and low or high salience of group identity. The subjects were then surveyed to see whether they wanted to work together, separately, or not at all to obtain membership in the high-status group.</td>
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References


